ML19242C438

Forwards Responses to NRC Positions Identified in Section 3.3 of Draft Safety Evaluation Re Fire Protection Review. Oversized Drawings Available in Central Files Only

ML19242C438
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	08/06/1979
From:	Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7908100410
Download: ML19242C438 (57)

Text

B ALTI M O R E G AS AN D E LECTRIC CO M PANY GAS AN D ELECTRIC B UILDIN G B ALTI M O R E, M A RYLAN D 212 03 Aar u. c.tv on u..s . August 6, 1979 n........,

so-s.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors 3 ranch #4 Division of Operating Reactors

Subject:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1 & 2, Docket No. 50-317 & 50-318 Fire Protection Program, NRC Review File: 013-261-0 L-037-F

Reference:

Draft Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Pegulation, Staff / Licensee Discussions held July 11, 24 & 31, 1979 Gentlemen:

The enclosures attached are submitted in response to a request to furnish information and data, and to furnish commitments relative to staff positions identified in Section 3.3 of the Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER). Enclosure 1, entitled " Responses", addresses Section 3.3 that con-tains 47 positions. Some positions were mutually resolved during discus-sions held in July and are indicated as completed in the enclosure attached.

Enclosure 2 provides, in tcbular form, commitment dates for implementation of the various positions.

Very tr y yours,

/

n .

s .

cc: J. A. 3iddison, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Messrs. E. L. Conner, Jr. - NRC J. W. Brothers, Bechtel 7 90810o'//o . .,1 s -

\

t

6 Enclosure 1 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Review RESPONSES TO STAFF POSITIONS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 3.3 0F THE DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

. i-

._')

7 I;r \\

3.3.1 Fire Hazards Analysis (b.1, 5 3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.12, 5.15, 5.23, 5.2h, 5.28, 5.30)

We vill require the licensee to provide the results of an analysis to:

(1) identify the minimum separation betveen the redudnant cables (in trays or in conduits)/ equipment recuired for safe shutdown in each fire area, (2) identify the largest fire than can be errected in each fire area based on the fixed combustibles in the area and transient combustibles which may be introduced into or moved thrcuch the area, (3) identify the vorst damage that could result from such fire, and (L) demonstrate that such damage vill not have an adverse effect on safe shutdown or cause excessive radioactive release to the environment.

Pennonse In our April lo letter, we co=mitted to a fire hazards analysis in our resnonses to positions 8, o and 11. This analysis is underway, and vill address the Staff's concerns expressed in 3.3.1, 3. 3.32, 3. 3. 37, 3.3. 38 and 3.3.k2. The intent of the analysis is to verify safe shutdown /cooldown canabilities following any single maximum exposure fire. Where this canability is not verified by the analysis, modifications vill be trovided as necessary. These modifications nay take the form of additional barriers or fire cunpression systems , or even modifications to or additions of shutdown /cooldown equinment. Where necessary to sunnort the analysis, we vill conduct tests of equipment, cable or barriers ; for example , we vill conduct a fire test on silicone rubber insulated asbestos jacketed cable in conduit to demonstrate that it vill continue to perform its function followinc the maxinum exposure fire (see response to 3.3.32).

Our aonroach was discussed with the Staff on July 31. Using equirment in the charrinc pump rooms as an example, we defined safe shutdown equipment and cable locations and routing and proposed modifications, which in this case consisted of eurbs at doorways and automatic strinkler protection at the ceilinc; in this case, our analysis shows that these planned modifications preclude the need for additional barriers between equirment, fire doors for the room, or detection in addition to that built into the automatic sprinkler system. The corridors containing redundant cable for charcinc pu=ps vill be provided with early varning fire detection at the ceilinc and sprinklers below the trays to eliminate the transient fire hazard. Criteria for cables vill be derived from our cable secaration work (described in 3.3.32), which irill prove adequacy of our existine separation or nrovide adecuate protection where needed.

d bs \

s

3.3.2 Alar Power Supply (L.2)

'n'e vill require the licensee to verify that those fire protection alarms annunciated on the separate panel in the Centrol Roc are provided with back-up pcVer from the en-site energency pcVer syster and are derigned and installed in accordance with Article 240 of UFFA 72D.

Respense The Alar: Power Supply for the fire protection alar s annunciated cn the separate panel ICITE is frc: the 125V DC stationary battery.

The battery is backed up by Class IE prir .ry chargers which are supplied frc= Class IE buses and thereftre can be considered as a plant energency power supply.

Electrical supervision, in accordance with NFPA 72D, Article 2LO, is provided on panel IC2kE which is a Pyretronics U/L approved p anel . Panel ICITE although not U/L approved specifically for fire protection use, serves as a remote annunciator. The signal indication provided en annunciatcr panel ICITE includes the follering fire protecticn conditions: (1) fire, (2) fire extinguish-ing syster trouble, (3) electrical fire pu=p operation, (b) diesel fire pump cperation, (5) fire pu=p trouble, and (6) pressurized fire protecticn system tank trouble. Signal indication of conditions identified by (1) through (L) above is provided with electrical super-vision by panel IC2LE vhich is in the Control Rocc. Audible and visual alart and supervisien indicaticn is provided for conditions (1) and (2).

Visual alars and supervision indication is provided for the running alar for the electrical and diesel fire purps, conditions (3) and (k) identified above. Ceniitions (5) and (6) identified above are troutle signal circuits which do not require electrical supervision as detailed in Section 2h3 of Article 2LO of NFPA, Standard 72D.

v

,v

( \\

pi

3.3.3 Fire Detection in Safety-Related Areas We will require the licensee to install appropriate fire detection da"'ces in all safety-related areas which contain fire hazard.

Rt , ponse Many of the safety-related areas containing redundant divisions of safety-related cables and components are currently provided with automatic fire detection. The fire hazard analysis described in Section 3.3.1 will identify those additional areas which contain necessary cables and components for shutdown / cool down and radio-activity release controls. We will provide additional automatic fire detection in those rooms identified by the analysis. For example, we will provide automatic fire detection systems in the Charging Pump Rooms and adjacent corridors and similar areas con-taining redundant divisions of safety-related cables and components.

Aut0matic fire detection systems may consist of automatic sprinkler protection, fixed temperature, rate of rise, products of combustion or flame type detection as may be required by the Fire Hazards Analysis.

-\

i s

'{ l-s b\

3.3.4 Adequacy of Detector Installations (4.2)

We will require the licensee to provide the results of a study or tests to verify that proper consideration has been given to such factors as ceiling height and configuration, ventilation air flow rate and patecrn, location and arrangement of plant equipment and combustibles, etc., in determining the type, number and location of the existing and the pro-posed fire detector installations.

RESPONSE

BC&E will provide results of the study or test to verify that proper consideration has been given to such factors as ceiling height and configuration, ventilation air flow rate and pattern, location and arrangement of plant equipment and cembustibles, etc., in determining the type, number and location of existing fire detector installations.

For detection systems installed to meet requirements of other sections, the job specification will require the successful bidder to provide this verification.

nO9

, LL" h\\

3.3.5 Fire Water Storace (4.3.1.1)

We will require the licensee to increase the asount of water that is reserved for fire protection in the storage ta:2 to provide the amount of water required for 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> operation of the combination of the largest sprinkler system with an additional 1,0'>0 gc.llons per minute for the manual hose application.

RESPONSE

The largest sprinkler system protecting a safety related area is in the

" Solid Waste Handling Room" (R=. 418). Tnis system is designed as

" ordinary hazard" as defined in the National Fire Protection Association's "ITFPA 13, Standard for the Instn11rttion of Sprinkler Syste=s". Table 2-2.l(E) of that Standard requires a minimum water supply of 750 gpm for ordinary hazard - Group 3. ETF 9.5.1 requires an additioreJ.1,000 gpm for hose streams for a total requirements of 1,750 com. A one hundred and twenty minute duration corresponds to a total demand of 210,000 gallons.

As described in previous sub=ittals, fire water is supplied from either of two independent 500,000 gallon capacity storage tanks. Each tari has 300,000 sc.llons re::erved for fire protection.

/

e r

s L-T

\

3.3.6 Fire Water System Valves (4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.3)

We will require the licensee to electrically supervise the fire water tank discharge valves and to check the positions of all locked valves at least monthly. We will also require the licensee to keep the valve in the fire water tank interconnection locked closed except when the interconnection is necessary in case of fire.

RESPONSE

The fire water discharge valves are locked open. The fire water tank interconnection valve will be locked closed. All locked valves in the fire protection system are checked monthly to verify their position.

$\

/

i N\

VN \

v

3.3.7 Fire Water Freeze Protection (4.3.1.1)

We will require the licensee to verify that adequate measures are provided to prevent freezing in the fire water tanks.

RESPONSE

Table 6 in NFPA 22 shows a Ic;s of 1,093,000 Btus per hour from a 500,000 gallon capacity water storage .ank when an atmospheric temperature is 0 F and the water temperature is 42 F. Specification No. 6750-M24, Specifica-tion for Pretreated Worar utorage Tank Heat Exchangers and Miscellaneous Waste Processing Systen Heae Exchanger Calvert Clifts Nuclear Power Plant Units Nos. 1 & 2" calls for a heat exchanger " capable of maintaining the i

tank contents t a minimum temperature of 45 F with a tr nimum art' .;nt temperature of +5 F when sunplied with 75 gpm of 200 F plant heatint water". The specification suggests that this requires 1,500,000 Btu per hour which is well in excess of the actual heat loss. This figure is conservative as it allows no reduction due to expected plant water usage which would be made up by well water which would be introduced at 55 F.

, f' 3 L'

,s\

(

3.3.8 MISCELLANEOUS USAGE OF FIRE WATER (4.3.1.1)

We will require the licensee to discontinue usage of fire water for purposes other than fire protection or to provide the results of a detailed analysis to demonstrate that such uses will have no adverse effects on the availability of acequate fire water supply,

RESPONSE

In addition to those measures previously described in Reference 1, (P-20), BG&E will implement administrative controls to ensure that fire system usage for purposes other than fire fighting will be limited to a single (1h") hose stream at any time. These administrative contmls were discussed with and found acceptable by the staff at the July 24 meeting.

,)'{3 v

s

<\

hs\

Reference 1, Letter from Lundvali to Reid dated April 19, 1979

3.3.9 Fire Pumo Flow Test (4.3.1.2)

We will require the licensee to submit recent fire pump flow test reports which include the full range of pump output from shut-off to 150% of rated capacity.

RESPONSE

The most recent full-scale fire pump tests were made on 11/22/77. See enclosed test results. Loop tests were perf ormed satisf actorily on 5/30/78 to verify the condition of underground piping as well as pump capacity. Full scale pump tests are scheduled to be performed in August of 1979. Results of these tests will be furnished.

< ,0 l

, \ l l' '

% i

• e-m&

Rev.11-o3 N-15-H Sheet I f$:

&)) ANNUAL FIRE PUMP TEST SHEET FILE NO.2f - jl 1 RISK C C AJ P P DATE 19 M AK E ,.. f m . ',e Model or type re,o g - Serial No. W. .,, p ,o sy > u Rated Capacity M) -;,.mw ._ gpm. at rated head psi. , f n.c

t. at rated speed fy, rpm.

Net pressure at snuton jug,._ psi. Net pressure at 150% rated capacity pp.2 pst.

Brake horsepower at ratec conditions 2n, > Max. brake H. P. at rated speed at any capacity /ug.3 Horizontal, vertical, turbine j stages impeller dia. it 'g/ inches.

FUMP OPERATES: Manual, Automatic Cut in psi Cut out psi.

DRIVEN BY. Elearic motor, steam, turbine, gasoline, diesel, endne, water wheel, no clutch.

SUCTION FROM: S y h 'r , ,,, K Capacity 50z oy Gals.

Lift ft. Vertical Turbine Discharge Head to Water Level Ft.

Hud f3 ft. , psi. Vertical Turbine Lowest Impeller to Water Level Ft.

K 2 P3 JOCKEY OR MAKE-UP FUMP: Make 5,s d , .,2 ; Typea<mc p Rated Capacity 30 gpm.

Rated Head /3 n psi. , ft. Hm Cut -in ,,e psi. , Cut-out fs psi.

Centrifural or rositive Displacement Type, Relief valve Setting gfc psi.

SPECIAL COMMENTS b;} /iO Pumo Pressures j Steam V - =r3_ W h erge at Qx _ '. ser=t:exel Inlet Jets Number and A r- slip Size of Suedon Stroke at 100 Streams Discharge} Net D2te Ft. of Hose Location Pitot G.P.M. PSI. Ft. PSI. Ft. PSI.Ft. R. F. M . Volts AMPS Inso.

. .n.7 7 i

c.1, . ,. ,, , i - l -

I .-v i r I ,-c. I,-n. l l l I I I I I I I I I I

" l '3 - i % I7c.7c 'l- I Mce i faf I ,e I fog ,77 1 I I

! I I i i i I

.. Ie-r%" l e -, s - b .7 t l ac2 1 I /M i f4 I ,,e f ?' o i I l l I I i i l I I

. i.t ,%" l u,0..n ,4..t -u :1 iwu I na I fu I a. I,m. I l l  ! l I I l I i l  !

l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l I l l l l  ! I I i l l l i I l l i l l I l i i i I I  !

I I I l 1  ! I I l 1 i l  !  ! I I  ! l I i i

I I l I i l i i l I i l l l I l l l l l L_ l _ [__ l I l I _

Check engine tachemeter against insp. Speed Counter. Plot test paints on N-15-H Sheet 2

Rev.11-66 S H Sheet 1 T.i.'.u.,

s

.IJ l ']j -

gi ANNUAL FIRE PUMP TEST SHEET

LE NO. r[ 07 RISK CtfJ PP DATE 19 I

AK E - , , , . . . n , , .: . Model or type p e u 1: Se rial No. p _ _- ;. ,7 c u , r.

Ratec Capac::y ac= gpm. at rated head ac psi. , it. at ratec speed nce rpm.

Net pressure at snutofi f 57.g psi. Net pressure at 1505 rated capacity ;.c psi.

Brake horsepo'c;er a: ratec con:' : ions 2c.s Max. brake H.P. at rated speed at any capacity 277 Horizontal, vertical, turbine j stages impeller dia. /27s inches.

.'MP OPERATES: Manual, Automatic Cut in psi Cut out psi.

RIVEN BY: Electric motor, steam, turbine, gasoline, diesel, engine, water wheel, no clutch.

JCTION FROM: Su \ _i ' , f. s. 9 Capacity Eco coo Gals .,

Lift ft. Vertical Turbine Discharge Head to Water Level F t.

Heac iu W., psi. Vertical Turbine Lowest Impeller to Water Level Ft.

K-2P3

)CKEY OR MAKE-UP PUMP: Make Fairs - Type esen.e Rated Capacity s gpm.

Rated Head 133 psi. , ft. %c Cut -in psi., Cut-out er psi.

C_entrifural or rositive Displacement Type. Relief Valve Setting fue psi.

'ECIAL COMMENTS Pumo ?ressures  ! Stearn Ve * >w - V.C.:.. me

-- at G%a ' _.; r Levc-1 Inlet Jets Number and ser slip Size of Suedon Stroke at100 Streams Discharge!

2te F t. of Hose Locaden Pitot G. P. M I PSI. Ft. : PSI. Ft.j Net, PSI. Ft. l: Volts R.P.M.IAM oS ' In se.

D-W Gh w t I -

I -

I ju l I i3 I N'; I f 7 7 4' I i i i I  ! l l l 1 l l l 1 l _W 1 - A, " l ,a -N - F). I > s, t i ra u I ,2 I i3; I ,9 I i l I i I i I i i l I i

. I 4 - P/z " i m- t c . 4 -b I o ; u 1 jao I ,A 1 ff ? I,77c i I i l i I  !  ! I I I I i

.. It-,b" Iv-w w.alep,el u m i e; I ,, i F; I f x si I l I~ i l l l l I l l I I i i l  ! I l l l l l I I i  ! i l i I l l l 1 i l I I l l 4 I l l r i i l l l l l 1 I I I i l l l  ! l l d i  !

i i  ! l 1 J l i ul i I i  ! l i i l , 'l i

I I I i l I  ! hil l l 1

! l l 1 I i i l i l .

I  ! l  !  ! I i l I i -.

I i l l l 1 I i l  !

c:, ct- + :., w+. .m . n. a e - s r In s n. 5 .ced Counwr. Plot ten coints en N-15-H D:e: 2

3.3.10 Fire Water Demand (4.3.1.2)

We will require that the licensee provide the results of an analysis which demonstrates that a single fire pump is capable of meeting the combined demand (flow and pressure) for any fixed water fire suppres-sion system plus 1,000 gpm for hose streams, taking into account the pressure drop between pump discharge and the suppression system, and minimum pressures required for effective sprinkler discharge and manual hose application.

RESPONSE

The largest sprinkler system protecting a safety related area is in the " Solid Waste Handling Room" (Room 418). This system is designed as an ordinary hazard as defined by NFPA Standard 13, Table 2-2.1 (B).

This standard requires a minimum water supply of 750 gpm for " Ordinary Hazard - Group 3". BTP 9.5.1 requires an additional 1,000 gpm for hose streams. Therefore, the total requirements are 1,750 gpm at 65 psi at PIV #11.

As described in previous submittals, fire water is supplied from either of two independent 500,000 gallon capacity storage tanks by two 100 per-cent capacity fire pumps rated at 2,500 gpm at 125 psi.

,liiQ a

h.T

3.3.11 LOW WATER TANK LEVEL INTERLOCK (4.3.1.2)

Fire cumps are interlocked to shut off when the water level in both fire water tanks is 12 inches above the bottom. This is in violation of the provision of NFPA 20. We will mouire the licensee to replace the interlock with alams which sound in the control room and in the fire pump house.

RESPONSE

BG&E will rewire each fire pump controller in such a manner as to effectively remove the pretreated water storaat tank level interlock from the control logic. In addition, BC&E will provide pretreated water tank low level alams which will annunciate in both the control room and the fire pump house.

, 1. \

b

3.3.12 Sincle Isolation in Fire Water Piping System (4.3.1.3, 5.18, 5.30)

We will require the licensee to provide modifications necessary to preclude a single isolation in the fire water piping system from causing the loss of fire water supply to both fixed water suppression system and the backup hose stations in any single safety-related area.

RESPONSE

The ordinary hazard automatic sprinklers in the Diesel Generator Room No. 21 could be valved out of service simultaneously with hydrants No. 6 and 7 in the event of a break in the underground piping in the west loop.

BC&E plans to modify Calvert Cliffs Ins:ruction (CCI) No. 113 which will require a 2b" hose be preconnected to hydrant No. 5 and run to the exterior door of Diesel Generator Room No. 21 in the event of an impairment as described above. This prelaid hose will be available for manual fire fighting through the duration of the impairment. In addition, interior standpipe hose systems are designed for Class III service and are provided with both 2 " and 1%" connections. Hose Station 45-10 is located imme-diately adjacent to the overhead roll up door in the west wall of Room 419 and can be isolated from the west loop to be available for backup hose stream protection west of the structures.

,,c.

r\\

ps

3.3.13 Hose Reach Tests (4.3.1.4, 5.6, 5.12, 5.17, 5.19, 5.21, 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.28)

We will require the licensee to perform hose reach tests, and provide additional hose stations as necessary to assure that all points in safety-related areas and other plant areas which contain major fire hazards can be effectively reached by at least one hose stream.

RESPONSE

As indicated in our previous submittal on Staff Position 13, hose stretch tests have been performed. Additional lh" fire hose has been added to existing hose stations at Elevation 45'-0" and 27'-0" so as not to exceed 100 feet at each station. Eight additional hose stations are proposed for the Auxiliary Building, Elevation 69'-0",

45'-0" and 27'-0". Two additional stations are proposed for the Intake Structure, Elevation 12'-0". Hose station design and installa-tion will be as shown on Figure E-1 of the Fire Protection Program Evaluation (see the detail of Type "C" Hose Str. tion).

Preliminary engineering and design is being performed now to provide hose stream protection in those areas containing safety-related equipment and areas containing large fire hazards.

c

.)

g

\

3.3.14 Halon System Backup Power (4.3.2)

We will require the licensee to verify that the Halon suppression systems are provided with backup power from the onsite emergency power system.

RESPONSE

Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Systems are supplied with power from dedicated breakers on 120 VAC distribu: ion panels at 480 V MCC (#103 WP). These systems are electrically supervised by the fire protection control panel 1C24B located in the constantly ettended Control Room. Loss of power to the Halon 1301 control panels would be immediately alarmed visually and audibly as required by NFPA Standard 12A Section 1-8. Backup power is not provided as it is not required by NFPA Standard 12A.

'j 70 f\\ L U"

3.3.15 SMOKE REMOVAL CAPACITY (4.4.1)

We will reouire the licensee to demonstrate that the capacity of the smoke removal systems complies with the provision of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, which specifies at least 300 CFM for every 200 square feet of floor area, or is adeouate for the service in the area they are provided; especially in the cable spreading rooms.

3.3.16 VENTILATION SYSTEM POWER AND CONTROL (4.4.1)

We will require the licensee to verify that power supply and controls for those ventilation systems providing smoke removal capability are run outside the fire areas served by the system.

We will require the licensee to justify, or modify, the place-me it of any ventilation system power supply or controls in the fire area which they serve.

3.3.18 PORTABLE SMOKE EJECTORS (4.4.1)

We will require the licensee to provide three portable cmoke ejectors and associated portable ducting to aid in manual smoke removal. The ejectors should be of the explosion-proof type that are used for fire fighting and have a minimum combined capacity of 17,500 CFM.

RESPONSE

BG&E will provide three (3) explosion-proof portable smoke ejectors with a minimum combined capacity of 17,500 CFM and will provide associated oortable ducting to aid in manual smoke removal. BG&E will not demonstrate that the capacity of the smoke removal systems complies with the provisions of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, as referenced in 3.3.15. BG&E will not verify that power supply and controls for those ventilation systems prcviding smoke removal capability are run outside fire areas as rcferenced in 3.3.16. The preceeding two items (3.3.15, 3.3.16) were deleted from consideration during the July 24 meeting between staff and BG&E, since staff agreed that portable smoke removal equipment would provide a suitable equipment sub-stitute to installed ventilation hardware for the purposes of fire protection.

DO

\)

3.3.17 Ventilation Duct Penetrations (4.4.1, 4.9.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.9)

Wt will require the licensee to verify that all ventilation duct pene-trations of fire barriers are protected with 3-hour rated (or lower rating if justified by the amount of combustibles) UL or FM listed fire door dampers which will close automatically in event of a fire, and the gaps between the ducts and the barriers are sealed. Additional modifi-cations will be required as necessary.

RESPONSE

Ventilation duct penetrations through rated fire barriers are equipped with U/L or FM listed fire dampers which close automatically in the event of fire and the gaps between the ducts and barriers are sealed.

Fire ratings of fire dampers will be evaluated and appropriate modifi-cations made as a result of the Fire Hazards Analysis (3.3.1).

/90

3.3.19 Separation of Ventilation Air Intake from Exhaust (4.4.1)

We will require the licensee to provide additional information which will enable the staff to evaluate the adequacy of separation between the intake and exhaust of ventilation air.

RESPONSE

The Staff Review Team requested and under separate cover will receive BG&E Drawings 60-319-E, Sheets 1 and 2 which clearly identifies the relative locations of the smoke removal system intake and exhaust relative to the normal outside air intake for the Control and Cable Spreading Rooms H.V.A.C. system. Attention is directed to " Responses" for items 3.3.15, 3.3.16 and 3.3.18 relative to smoke removal capa-bility.

8

3.3.20 Fire Water Piping Overoressurizatior (4.3.1.3)

We will require the licensee to demonstrate that the fire water system overpressurization has not inflicted any permanent damage to the fire water piping.

RESPONSE

As indicated in the Acril 19 response, the cause of the overpressuriza-tion has been identified. This is to be corrected by installation of Q" pressure relief valves on the 13 automatic sprinkler systems which trap pressure surges. As icentified in Position No. 22, pressures trapped on the system side of the alarm check valve are now observed to be up to 275 psi. Any test to verify that no damage has been done would require hydrostatic tests to 50 psi in excess of normal operating pressure, as specified in Section 1-11.3 of NFPA Standard 13. The fact that no leakage has been observed at the 275 psi pressurization in fact proves that the system has not been damaged. During the July 31 meeting this discussion satisfied the Etaff Review Team's concern and no further action is contemplated.

j fTGi:

4 (, "

/

ry. \. \

3.3.21 Battery Room Ventilation Air Flow Monitor (4.4.4, 5.11)

We w.11 require the licensee to install a ventilation flow monitor in each battery room to alarm and annunciate in the control room the loss of ventilation air flow in any battery room.

RESPONSE

Information previously submitted April 19 in response to Position P-7 and additional clarification furnished during July discussions has satisfied the Staff Review Team's concern.

i

'3

. L

'Q \

3.3.22 Fire Water Drainace (4.5)

We will require the licensee to perform an additional study, following the completion of hose reach tests and addition of interior hose sta-tions, to verify that fire water drainage in all safety-related areas is adequate and possible fire water accumulation in any safety-related area will be acceptable.

RESPONSE

BG&E will perform an additional study to verify that fire water drainage in all safety-related areas is adequate or that any accumulation in a safety-related area is acceptable as a result of modifications requiring installation of additional standpipe or suppression systems.

i.y k

3.3.23 Backflow Protection (4.5, 5.2)

We will require the licensee to provide the results of an analysis, including drawings or sketches of the drain systems as necessary, to demonstrate that the design of existing drain systems can prevent the backflow of combustible liquids to other safety-ralated areas, or to provide additional modifications to prevent such possibilities.

RESPONSE

BC&E will perform an analysis and furnish drawings and sketches, if necessary, to demonstrate that backflow of combustible liquids is prevented from communicating fire from one safety-related area to another.

v

\

. U

. \ \

V, \

3.3.24 ECCS ROOM SUMPS (4.5, 5.1)

We will require the licensee to dermnstrate that oil drainage from a failed reactor coolant pump could only affect one ECCS roon and that concurrent fires at the reactor coolant pump area and at the affected ECCS room will not prevent safe shut-down.

RESPONSE

Two motor operated valves (nonnally shut) exist in line between the containment and ECCS Pump Room sump pioing and therefore preclude the possibility of a fire spreading to the ECCS Pump Room. In addition, containment sump drains are piped such that oil drains from a failed Reactor Coolant Pump may only drain into one ECCS Pump Room (Room 12 for Unit 1 and Room 22 for Unit 2). In the unlikely event that a fire were to spread to an ECCS Pump Room, safety equicment redundancy between each ECCS Pump Room precludes the possibility of preventing safe shutdown.

') 'I( f-nx -

3.3.25 EMERGENCY LIGHTING (4.6)

We will require that each fixed, sealed beam emergency lighting unit be provided with battery power rated at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and that they be provided in all safety-related areas and their access to facilitate fire fighting and emergency operation of equipment.

RESPONSE

BG&E will provide in sufficient quantity, enough portable light-ing of a battery power rating not less than eight hours to facilitate fire fighting and emergency operation of ecuipment for all safety-related areas. Further, as a result of the July 24 meeting, it is understood that the presently installed fixed emergency lighting is acceptable for the purposes of access to and egress from all safety-related areas during fire fighting and emergency operating conditions. The portable equipment will be of such a type that the operator is unencumbered in performing his fire fighting or emergency operating duties.

The number of portable emergency lighting units available shall match site. the(Seetotal number of emergency) accompanying literature . breathing units stored on s

. Cs 1 - 2/75

~ ~

,? e t e--, ,- ,- p.., - - - , e , ~ , - . -

1. ' '8 y

, e t e' f

a ~ .~ .rW '

L - ..k .e .

e P LIGHTS LIFE SAVING DEPENDABILITY "'%"=",'=T:

W.T'DS-F R E E USE, VEHICLE i.50 UNTED CO NVEi.'!ENCE f";'[

o , o M ECONOMICAL - RUGGED

=130 H AND LIGHT - 25.000 beam candiepower,1/4 mile bebm with 2 amp bulb, adjustable ,.

focus. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> light per charge,3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br /> battery use life. Re:harge 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for each hour of

~

use. Polished Stainless Steel construction, waterproof toggle switch and battery top, sht>ckproof [

leather handle. Carry hands f ree on a shoulder strap. Use 120 volt chargers =125, c126. or ' '. 1 '

12 volt venicie mounted chargers =5500 and c5520-mm

\

=175 SAF ETY H AND LIGHT- Simila- to =130. Approved by U.S. Bureau of Mines for methane atmosphere: U.S, Coast Guard Listing =CG293 for Class 1,-Group D use.15,000 beam candie-

, power, one amp buib,hurs iscrii per enarge, 6000 hours0.0694 days <br />1.667 hours <br />0.00992 weeks <br />0.00228 months <br /> battery use life. Recharge 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (hf

for each hour of use. Lise 120 voit chargers =1h, *126.

175 Light 3

--R--:

• 5100 or 5200 CAP LIGHT - 15,000 beam candiepowerhurs light per ch 6000 hours0.0694 days <br />1.667 hours <br />0.00992 weeks <br />0.00228 months <br /> banery use life. Rechsga 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for each hour of use. Powerhead weighs only 5% ounces, is

.c-. made of high imca:t resistant polycarbonate. Has a single Krypton filled bulb with two filaments, 4'"

t both can be easily focused to a perfect spot Ea:5 filament is designed for 275 hours0.00318 days <br />0.0764 hours <br />4.546958e-4 weeks <br />1.046375e-4 months <br /> providing i \

j 550 hours0.00637 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.093915e-4 weeks <br />2.09275e-4 months <br /> useful bulb life,15% more light than competitive products, and greater safety. A -/, { .[t single knob switches and focuses both filaments, gives positive fingertip adjustment. Headpiece  ;*

is carried on a hat, battery on a belt. Approved by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, the Canadian '

~

Bureau of Energy, Mines, and Resources: U.S. Coast Guard Listing =CG293 for Class 1, Group D use. May be used with 120 and 220 volt chargers. #

G

\ 5280 BELT LIGHT - Same powerhead, bulb, and battery as cap light. The powerhead and h- battery attach to belt freeing both hands. Belt clip gives light correct tilt r- nMnr- makes, h j[ positive attachment yet is easily removed to use as a hand held spotlighh2 hours light DC

- ,- charge, 6000 hours0.0694 days <br />1.667 hours <br />0.00992 weeks <br />0.00228 months <br /> battery use life. Cha ge 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for each hour cf use. Use uv voit enargers

~-

=125, *126, or 12 volt vehicle mounted chargers e5500 and e5520.

A _ sU ^

-* S280 betr light '-

~

~

Twtst ucwTs compty w TM 1AT3ERY - Heavy duty 4-volt;15 amp hour rechargeable lead acid battery is the ** heart" of D ;_ r~4 T P' /; --Koehler lights. They are rechargeable '500 complete cycles. The smoothly cc,ntoured battery

_J-..--~ da m *) a b a bla @js made of tough, high . impact resistant polycarbonate with belt Joops moulded into the 2 h S

.s 7, etcutATeons  ;. case,geinforced corners for extra wear. Patented spillproof traps snsure easy maintenance and

---

_s__._L

'1,e.b.K.

-.. - proof Use. ..  ;

"_'~ -

, LIFE SAVING DEPEND ABf LITY2 Koehler rechargeable portable lights are designed and built

.ng 3 _ .* -r r -- - Jto'be so dependable they are life _ saving tools. They provide long fasting, nonfading light;are e ^ 7

~ALL swoutoEn sT maps, abays ready at full power, like having a new battery for each use. Proven by years of hard use

~

BELTS ANo H ARo M ATs and abuse by miners, fire, police, Utilities, sportsmen, construClion workers industry, railroads,

/ ~-. i . , swown m attusTR Avsons . airlines, Armed Forces' Government, and others. ' 'F" W'Or * ' "

% wh'& ' * ~-

W-b- - .

ARE AVAILABLE ON AN OPTIONAL Ex7AA-easts.

.ECONOWC AL - Koehler rechargea le lights provide better maintained light at lower cost, The recharceable battery also elimina thrcost of 500 replacement batteries.

~~ - y ". ~

.: g f ;) { < . . ,

~ =f

=

., a  %; l .!!

-.pn , ~ ~

- LZ2 P [ E- D . $- ;_; M AN U FACTU A I N G C MPANY 2;, um mn-ucu msac us-us2 ,,, _ ,, c m

- . , _ . - ~ . -

I / 6 !_ -

( t t p 7 F * " " " ' ,' -

s\ -.* war_*/-

I\ r ' rs I -

' L Thoroughly proven in years of unequaled perf ormance, be placed on charge at any time. Lamp may be removed

.- oehler Automatic Chargers are the brains" of the when the charge o Jmpleted. as indicated by the meter,

---

,e h l e r system. They are simple and safe, merely plug or be lef t connected in a fully charged condition: won't in the equip?nent, low voltage charging power can be overcharge. Each lamp takes only the current needed to lef t on at all times without need for manua! adjustment keep it charged. All chargers are built for long hfe end or timing devices tamps in any stages of discharge can trouble-f ree service.

~

g l O .

NO,, b. c%

.c h

.  !' o cccc ... oooooo .Oooooo j

h

• 125 a5301 and 1 x5200 s1578and 1 sSIM s12C and 6130 loghts c530C and 6 =S200 *1515 and 6 eS100

1. 125 Sinnie Light for e130, =175, & e5280 120 VOLT *126 Six Light for 130, 2175, & e5280.

c5301 Single Light for e5200 Cap Light. 50/60 CYCLE e5306 Six Light for e5200 Cap Light.

=1578 Single Light for *5100 Cap Light. CHARGERS c1515 Six Light for *S100 Cap Light.

S; . - T '~%vC= = ~*" 2 fg _

A

\

o....

M&YN I.

y s._. b.VAQNMM'

. .......... ..... DN ... b . N b ;i

. *1

=.

.,soo .d 133 bgnt

. ,520 .,d 2130 hgha

. ,s n - d S280 bett hpht p 4

w

- ~

. . EHICLE T.',0UNTED CHARGERS e5500 and c5520 - Lighu q JyC  ; i

-A W i~ I and chargers mount on vehicle. Between uses the light is automati- "

g "pe[$g% @ ,., ,

cally recharged from the vehicle's power system, eliminating e "'

maintenance. Maximum battery drain is 1.2 amps, and tapers to -

20 milliamps. Chargers are solid state, printed circuit, fully auto-50 and 100 LAMP CHARGERS matic. Lights in any condition may be placed on charge. Charger 230 VOLT - 50/60 CYCLE automatically monitors the current necessary to recharge the bat-

1. 5400 CH ARGER tery, won't overcharge. Chargers operate on 12-14 volts. Charges + *1561 Rack for 50 wS100 Cap Lamps.

.1

130 Hand Lights and c5280 Belt Lights.

c5400 CH ARGER Charper and light holder are one compact unit,8%" tall,4% x 5", +2 #1561 Racks for 100 c5100 Cap Lamps.

double unit is 8%" x 6". Installation is easy. *5400 CH ARGER

+1 c5351 Rack for 50 e5200 Cap Lamps.

Model 5500 12 vo!t vehicle mounted single light charger unit c5400 CHARG ER Model 5520 12 volt vehicle mounted two light charger unit +2 e5351 Racks for 100 c5200 Cap Lamps.

T -; "'

• 240 Floor 7 --~ =245 Adjustable Stand Y 'T

+

4 l .):

2 - - -

,.~

Mounting Bracket r&

~~. - -

N

'g,.

m

• W56 Leathe- "f f ' ? " - M;' :-I

• MS-2 Leather Bett U

~ ~

^

@~ Shoulder Strap for for carrying battery carrying hand lights. and Belt ght ', T > [ L4M- /

f c

6

.s ;  ; '

m

-@.[L b ,0'c b %' . = L MANUFACTURING COMPANY I

Made in U.S A. M A R LBOR OUG H, M ASSA CHUSETTS 01752 Printed in U.SA

3.3.26 PORTABLE RADIO COMMUNICATION (4.7)

We will require the licensee to provide signal repeaters as necessary to ensure that all plant areas, including the contain-ment, can be reached by the portable radio communication. We will also reauire that a sufficient number of portable radios be provided to coordinate fire fighting, a worst emergency operation, and a physical security emergency, if the radios are also shared by the security force.

RESPONSE

BG&E will provide co munications equipment to facilitate communi-cations between the Control Room and all areas of the plant including the interior of containment.

, n G l'

Vi )

3.3.27 Unnrotected Doomays (4,9*, ' 5., , 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5 7> 5.18, 5.22)

" E r listed fire doors of ib' ra' s ' +he +

+e" S in fire barriers SePratin,; variout safety-rdu.e,.- areas of the plant.

RESPONSE

A commitment for installation o c #1 rotection for the above rooms has been inco rated th rego- o 3 3.-

')v !\ l

x5 D\

3.3.28 Bullet-Proof Doors (4.9.1, 5.16)

We will require the licensee to replace five bullet-proof doors without fire resistance ratings that have been installed in the co=nuter rooms, control roon and stair tower in the control roon area with UL listed 3-hour rated bunet-proof fire doors.

RESPOUSE:

As part of the Fire Hazards Analysis as required by 3.3.1, the adequacy of the bullet-proof doors to withstand fire exposure is being evaluated.

. f. . s)

\

3.3.29 Fire Door Supervision (4.9.1)

We will require the licensee to identify those fire doors which are not presently locked or electrically supervised. We will require the licensee to keep these doors locked closed or electrically supervised, or to justify the lack of locks or electric supervision.

RESPONSE

Information previously submitted April 19 in response to Position P-1 and additional clarification furnished during July discussions is being evaluated by the Staff Review Team.

n s

v SI

'. 3

3.3.30 Electrical Penetration Fire Resistance (4.9.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.9)

We will require the licensee to provide the results of those tests con-ducted to demonstrate the adequacy of fire resistance of the Calvert Cliffs electrical penetrations. Additional tests, or upgrading of the penetrations, will be required if these test results fail to establish the adequacy of the penetrations.

RESPONSE

BG&E will perform a standard ASTM E119 Fire Test to demonstrate the adequacy of the fire resistance of cable tray and conduit penetrations fire stops in rated fire barriers as defined by the Fire Hazards Analysis (3.3.1). We propose to include in this test representativi piping pene-tration fire stops consisting of pipe in sleeves with the annular space closed cy rope packing as requested in item 3.3.31. Test specifications will be developed to provide the necessary documentation for the NRC staff review.

U

3.3.31 Pipine Penetration Fire Resistance (4.9.4, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.9)

We will require the licensee to provide test results or other evidence to demonstrate that piping penetrations have fire resistance ratings commensurate with fire hazards on both sides of the barriers. If the adequacy of fire resistance for such penetrations cannot be established, upgrading of these penetrations will be required.

RESPONSE

BG&E will perform tests as identified in Item 3.3.30.

. T i

rj3 s

' .g 's v

3.3.32 C1bl a ?craz;tior (L.lt, 5.1, 5.', 5.h, 5.!, c.7, 5.B. 5.ll, 5.17, 5.21, 5.2E)

We vill recui-e t*e licensee to trovide tke results of add'itiona' tests or analyses which demonstrate that senarntion of electrien1 cables in the Calvert Cliffs f acilities is adecuate to preserve the plant 's safe shutdown carability, postulctinc a fire in any one riant area.

The size of the postulated fire in each area should be the larcest possible fire as discussed in Section h.1 of this report. These tests / analyses should also establish the effectiveness of the fire be*rier desicn or the Stee3 conduit /virevay in treventine the erread of fire dar.are if a credit vere taken for such.

If it cannot be dercrctrated that the riant's se.fe shutdovn carability can be crecerved under fire enerrency situations, additional nodification(s) vill be recuired.

Fesronse The criteria for cable separation or the arplication of protective materials to conduit and cable trays vill be established based on the results of the fire hazards analysis (3.3.1) and the results of our test and evaluation trocran, described as follows:

(1) We vill provide 'the results of tests to demot trate that silicone rubber cables which are installed in steel ec' duit are adequate to treserve the plant's safe shutdown capability.

(2) Cables other than silicone rubber which are installed in conduit vill be protected where shown to be necessary by the fire hazards analysis by raterials which have been proven by test to trovide adecuate trotection to creserve the plant's safe shutdown capability.

(3) Where shown to be necessary by the fire hazards analysis, cables which are installed in cable trays will be trotected by materials which have been troven by test to provide adecuate protection to preserve the riant's safe shutdown capability.

, s 4  %.

k p

i i

\

3.3.33 Unorotected Structural Steel (4.11, 5.23)

We vill recuire the licensee to identify those areas in which barriers are supported by unprotected structura.1 steel, and provide appropriate protection for this steel unless it can be verified that postulated fires in these areas would not adverselr affect these supports, or that failure of these sunports could not i= pair the safe shutdown or cause excessive release of radioactive mterials.

RESP 0'3E :

There are no fire valls supported by unprotected structural steel at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.

<i

') n ]

,s .

Lo b\

3.3.3L Eafetv-Felated Areas (L.1L, 5.5, 5.6, 5.20)

We vill require the licensee to provide a list identifying those plant areas which centain systers , cenpenents and structures i pertant to safety and major safety-related syster/cctponents ecntained therein.

Fesponse The attachment lists roons/ areas which contain safety-related equipment, and the major equipment in each roct. Equipment such as piping, valves ,

instruments and cable are not listed. Rocc and equipment numbers in parentheses refer te Unit 2.

~A

Roet Majer Safety-Felated Ecuirrert 100 103 10L 115(105) Charging Purps 11, 12, 13 (21, 22, 23) 117 116(102) CS Pu=p 12 (22)

EPSI Purp 13 (23)

LPSI Purp 12 (22)

West ECCS Purp Pr. Fans & Cover SDC EX 12 (22) 119(1C1) CS Furp 11 (21)

EPSI Purps 11, 12 (21, 22)

LPS! Purp 11 (21)

East ECCS Purp Pr. Fans & Cover SDC EX 11 (21) 122 200 202 207 Waste Gas Decay Tanks 206 209 210 212 216(216A) Heat Tracing Equip.

217(215) Boric Acid Tanks 11, 12 (21, 22)

Boric Acid Purps 11, 12 (21, 22) 218(21L) 220(213) 221(211) 222 d

223 h ', 1 L'

Ecce Major Safety-Felated Equipment (cent.)

22L(203) MSIV Hydraulics 11 (21) 225(20L) Aux. Feed R . Vent Fans 11, 12 (21, 22)

Ct=t. Purge Exh. Fan 11 (21)

ECCS Purp En. Fans 11, 12 (21, 22) & Filters Penetration En. Fans 11, 12 (21, 22)

Associated Filters 226(205) Service Water Pps. 11, 12, 13 (21, 22, 23)

Salt Water Air Oc p. 11, 12 (21, 22)

Service Water EX 11, 12 (21, 22) 227(206) 228(201) CCW Pp. 11, 12, 13 (21, 22, 23)

CCW EX 11, 12 (21. 22) 301(305) Eattery 30L(307) Battery 306(302) Various Centrol & Equip. Cabinets Eattery Chargers 11,12 (13, IL )

Inverters DC Control Panels 31L( 313) Spent Fuel Eacks 315(309) FSIV's 316(310) 317(311) Breakers, Switchgear 318(312) 319 320 SFP Cocling Pp. 11, 12 SFP Cocling EX 11,12 323 32L(322) 326(321) 327 328 Cable Chase 1A, 13 (2A, 23) /

b\,\ h O

Roc Majer Safety-Eelated Equirnent (cont.)

LC5 Control Roc Equipment L10 Ll6 DG 21, Air Corp., Vent Fan, FO Xfr. Pp.

L19 L21 DG 12, Air Cc=p., Vent Fan, FO Xfr. Pp.

L22 DG 11, Air Conp., Vent Fan, FO Xfr. Pp.

L23(Llk) MCC's Recentiner 12 (22) Panel L27(Lll)

L2S(LOS) MSIV Hydraulics 12 (22)

Atros Durps L29(LO9) Eecembiner 11 (21) Fanel L30(LO7) Breakers, Switchgear L39(LLO) Eefueling Wtr. Recire. Pp. 11 (21)

Refueling Wtr. EX 11 (21)

Cable Chase 1C (2C) 512 control R=. & CSE EVAC Equip.

Post-LOCI Filters 520 Fuel Fool Vent Equip.

52L(526) Svgr. R=. EVAC Equip.

525(527) CCW Head Tank 11 f;1; 529(532) MCC's 533 New Fuel Racks Horizontal Chase El 82'9" 603(605) Aux. Feed Pp. 11, 12 (21, 22)

Intake Structure Salt Water Pps.

Containments NSSS & Support Systens

/ .

/

}

iei *

7. 3.35 Padiclorical Consecuences of Fire (L.1k, 5.3, 5.7, 5.9, 5 20, 5.2h. 5.25)

We vill recuire the licensee to sunplement his fire hszards analysis with a study of radiolocical consecuences of a fire in areas containine radio-active materials (including a fire in a charcoal or a HEPA filter), or other areas where a fire could cause the release of radioactive materials.

Additional modifications vill be required in areas where a fire could cause the release of radioactive materials that could preclude the normal usare or occupancy of area surroundine the plant.

Fesnonse An analysis of the radiological consequence of fire vill be Drovided as required by the staff. Modifications will be provided if necessary to Drevent fire-caused releases that exceed our safety related criteria.

~p

')"'b 0

(-}' \\ .

3.3.36 Control Air (4.15)

We will require the licensee to:

(1) provide a detailed information which supports the statement that the operation of the charging system valves are required only f ollowing a LOCA, and (2) provide the results of an analysis which demonstrate that the transient caused by the less of control air to the saltwater valves would not have a detrimental effect on the salt water pumps, or any adverse effect on the plant safety. The analysis should take into account a possible delay in the operator's action.

RESPONSE

3G&E is currently evaluating and will provide information relative to the independent contral air systems identified in this item by August 17, 1979.

(.

i,

. \

Jl i i

3.3.37 Senarction of Pedundant Ecuirment (b.1, 5.2, 5.L , 5.5, 5.27)

'de vill require the licensee to separate, by fire barriers of approtriate fire resistance, one division of equipment (purp, valve , control, instru-mentation, etc. ) reauired for safe shutdown from its redundant counterpart (s) to treserve the functions of such systens during and following fire e=ercency situations , or trovide alternate means of performine such functions.

Systems to be so protected include but not be limited to: (1) the coNponent coolinc water system, (2) the charging system, (3) the service water system, and (L) the auxiliary feedvater systen.

Fernonse Refer to the response to 3.3.1.

?

.s a h\

3.3.33 Senaration of Flant Areas (5.L, 5.6. L.o)

L'e vill require the licensee to senarate each of the followine areas fi-or adioininc ulant areas by installine fire doors and uncradine renetrations of barriers to fire resistance ratings required of the barriers:

(1) Each of the corronent cooline nurp roors (2) Each of the pininc areas ?:os. 203 and 22h (3) The hot r.achine shon and the het instrurent shop.

"esnonse Refer to the response to 3.3.1.

\

s i .,

t i t

3.3.', Reroutine Hydrocen Pioing (5.4, 5.8, 5.9)

We will require the hydrogen piping in the referenced plant areas out of the areas and other safety-related plant areas, or provide other additional protection.

RESPONSE

BG5E is currently evaluating and will provide information relative to the hydrogen piping by August 17, 1979.

1

, l0 1

3.3.40 Addition of Curbs (5.9)

We will require the licensee to provide curbs at the doorways to the hot machine shop and the hot instrument shop to contain a possible oil / solvent spillage.

RESPONSE

E. G. & E. will provide means to curb or contain possible oil / solvent spillage to the Hot Machi:te Shop and the Hot Instrument Shop.

is i ()

b N

u

3.3.41 CONTROL OF C0 CUSTIBLES (5.9, 5.24, 5.26)

We will require the licensee to remove all combustibles that are not required for the routine operation and maintenance of the plant from all safety-related plant areas and prohibit open storage of combustible materials near or under the safety-related cables /eouipment. Storage of combustible materials necessary for the routine operation or maintenance of the plant should be limited to apprcximately one week's supply. Appropriate facilities should be provided for such storage.

RESPONSE

BG&E will remove and prohibit storage of all cortustibles not reauired for routine plant operation and maintenance from all safety-related areas. In addition, BG&E will provide metal storage cabinets removed from the vicinity of any safety-related cables / equipment for the storage of a one week's supply of combustible materials necessary for the routine operation and maintenance of the plant.

t 3 L' ei'

3.?.h? Alternate Phutdown carati!!?v (5 10, 5.13, 5.16)

We vill require the licensae to verify the existence of, or rrovide if it en_nnot be ve-ified, the canability to safely shutdown both units indenendent of cables and equirment in any one of the following rooms or chases:

(1) The control room (2) Two cable spreading roons (3) Six cabla chaces (1A, 1E, 2A, 23, U1 and U2)

Perronsa Fefer to the response to 3.3.1.

4

,h

,a

3.3.43 DEDICATED LADDERS (5.10)

We will require the licensee to provide a dedicated ladder of noncombustible construction in each cable spreading room to provide access to the areas above the battery rooms and the over-head cable chases.

RESP 0tiSE BG&E has provided fiberglass construction dedicated ladders for each cable spreading room. Fiberalass was selected so as to meet OSHA standards for electrical shock hazards in these areas.

()$3

,s v

/ \

3.3.44 Fire Suppression System in Cable Chases (5.13)

We will require the licensee to provide an automatic water suppression system in each of the six cable chases (lA, 13, 2A, 28, U1 and U2).

RESPONSE

BC&E will perform a fire hazards analysis (3.3.1) for the six cable chases identified and modifications will be provided as necessary.

'/-

3.3.45 Miscellaneous Protection for Control Room (5.16)

We will require the licensee to:

(1) provide a fog nortle for the manual hose protecting the room, (2) replace wooden furniture and shelves with those of metal, and (3) provide metal partitions to separate the adjoining panels from the computer terminal in the middle of the main panel.

RESPONSE

(1) A fog no::le is provided for the standpipe hose station protect-ing the room.

(2) All wooden furniture will be removed from the control room complex except for work benches in the Log and Test Instrument Room (hoom 435).

The metal work benches with wooden tops are required to reduce potential electric shocks from injuring technicians. This room is separated from the constantly attended Control Room by a metal bullet-proof door. The room is equipped with an early warning fire detection system.

(3) Metal partitions will be provided to separate the adjoining panels from the computer terminal in the middle of the main panel.

2, 4  %

3.3.46 RC Puma Lube Oil Collection System (5.19)

We will require the licensee to provide a description of design bases of the lube oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps, and the drawings or sketches showing its arrangement.

RESPONSE

Information previously submitted April 19 in response to Position F-5, new information, photographs, and additional clarification furnished during the July discussions is being evaluated by the Staff Review Team.

i ,

, 8 4

3.3.47 Effects of Fire on Radiation Monitors We will require the licensee to provide the results of a study to demonstrate that the radiation monitors will remain operational when exposed to smoke or heat of a potential fire.

P.ESPONSE:

We will provide the results of a study to demonstrate the capability to effectively monitor radiation levels in the plant.

(

i r t-f  %

p -

s

Enclosure 2 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Review IMPLEMENTATION DATES FOR ANALYSIS, ADDITIONAL DATA AND MODIFICATIONS

^.

' \

l \

v s

N \

(T

Implementation Table Item Analysis / Data Modification 3.3.1 Fire Hazards Analysis Nov 1979 Oct 1980 3.3.2 Alarm System Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.3 Fire Detection Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.4 Adequac' of Detector Installation Nov 1979 N/A 3.3.5 Fire Water Sto age Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.6 Fire Water System Valves Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.7 Fire Water Freeze Protection Aug 1979( } N/A 3.3.8 Mir.e.laneous Use of Fire Water Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.9 Fire Pump Flow Test Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.10 Fire Water Demand Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.11 Low Water Level Interlock Aug 1979( Nov 1979 3.3.12 Single Isolation in Fire Water Piping Aug 1979 Aug 1979 3.3.13 Hose Reach Tests Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.14 Halon System Backup Power Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.15 Smoke Removal Capacity Aug 1979 N/A 3.3.16 Ventilation System Power Aug 1979 N/A 3.3.17 Ventilation Duct Penetrations Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.18 Portable Smoke Ejectors Aug 1979( } N/A 3.3.19 Separation of Ventilation Intake and Aug 1979( N/A Exhaust 3.3.20 Fire Water overpressure Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.21 Battery Room Vent Air Flow Aug 1979(1) gfA 3.3.22 Fire Water Drainage Nov 1979 Oct 1980 3.3.23 Back Ficw Preventior. Nov 1979 Oct 1980 3.3.24 ECCS Sumps Aug 1979( } N/A 3.3.25 Emergency Lighting Aug 1979( Oct 1979 3.3.26 Fire Protection Communications Nov 1979 June 1980 3.3.27 Unprotected Doorways Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.28 Bullet-Proof Doors Nov 1979(4) Oct 1980 3.3.29 Fire Doot Supervision Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.30 Electrica'. Penetration Test Nov 1979 Feb 1980 3.3.31 Piping Peletration Test Nov 1979 Feb 1980 3.3.32 Cable Sep . '_ at i on Nov 1979 Oct 1980 3.3.33 Unprotected Steel Aug 1979(2) N/A

, ' )'

3.3.34 Safety Related Area Listing Aug 1979(2) N/A

Imolementation Table (Continued)

Item Analysis / Data Modification 3.3.35 Radiological Consequences Nov 1979 Oct 1980 3.3.36 Control Air Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.37 Separation of Redundant Equipment Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.38 Separation of Plant Areas Nov 1979 Oct 1980 3.3.39 Hydrogen Piping Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.40 Additional Curbs Nov 1979 June 1980 3.3.41 Control of Combustibles Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.42 Alternate Shutdown Capability Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.43 Dedicated Ladders Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.44 Fire Suppression in Cable Chases Nov 1979( Oct 1980 3.3.45 Miscellaneous Protection for Control Aug 1979( Oct 1980 Room 3.3.46 RCP Lube Oil Colletcion Aug 1979( N/A 3.3.47 Effects of Fire on Radiation Monitors Nov 1979 N/A

(

9ata furnished prior to this submittal.

(

Data furnished with this submittal. ,

(

Additional data to be furnished by August 17, 1979. b\

( Items common to fire hazards analysis of safe shutdown systems, Item 3.3.1.