ML20006B185

Forwards Opening Statement on Behalf of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Re Offsite Emergency Planning & Safety Issues.Adequate Emergency Planning at Facility May Not Be Feasible & License Should Not Be Issued.Svc List Encl

ML20006B185
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/19/1990
From:	Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	Cole R, Mccollom K, Smith I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#190-9745 ALAB-924, OL, NUDOCS 9002010065
Download: ML20006B185 (17)

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3 J. B R ANCH DOCKlilNG 8, $[itylc7' BRANCH January 19, 1990 '

Administra'tive Judges Ivan W. Smith, Chairman [

Dr. Richard F. Cole 1 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom '

.US NRC Washington, DC 20555 Re s . 'In the Matter of s Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al.

.(Seabrook Station, Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-443-OL[sp/p-g[ ,-

Dear Administrative Judges:

Three days ago I received the Board's Memorandum and Order of January 11, 1990, the purpose of which was "to provide to interested par cies an opportunity to advise -the. Board on how to proceed in accordance.with the directives'of ALAB-924 and how they proposed to participate in the resolution of the remanded issues." 4 g

My first. reaction was that this Order must be in jest. Surely,-

! the members of this Board could not expect SAPL to have the least ,

l interest whatsoever in any further proceedings before the Board, 1: given the fact that the Board has decided the. issue in the case by l -directing the "immediate authorization" for a full power nuclear license.

Perhaps the Board has forgotten that'SAPL intervened in this

. proceeding to oppose the issuance of a nuclear license for Seabrook. It did not intervene in this proceeding for the sake of ,

being'in the proceeding, and it has no intention of serving.as an uncompensated emergency planner for FEMA, NRC, or.the New Hampshire Emergency Management Agency.

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• Administrative Judges Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Page 2 1 January 19, 1990 In case the Board has forgotten SAPL's position in this matter, we enc 1'ose a copy of SAPL's Opening Statement. SAPL's position remains what it has been, there is no " adequate" emergency-plan for Seabrook I , adequate emergency planning at Seabrook may indeed not be feasible, and therefore no nuclear license should be issued.

Respectfully submitted, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League By its. Attorney,

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Robert A. Backus RAB:jsr Enclosure e

i a c lIf it comes to pass that these new proceedings involve licensing, SAPL will again be a participant. -

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA N0 CLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD L In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-433-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF )

NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al ) Off-site Emergency Planning

) and Safety Issues (Seabrook Station, Unit 1) )

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE Mr. Chairman, and Administrative Judges, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League has been concerned about the unfortunate siting of the:Seabrook Plant since the organization's founding 18 years ago. Prominent among those-concerns has been the issue of whether the population at risk could be_ reasonably assured of

-safety-in the event of a catastrophic accident.

Today we are here to determine this issue as to the New

' Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plans. This issue is entrusted, in the final analysis, to this agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

In this opening, I want to do three things:

First,-to set this issue in context in light of the history of:the Seabrook licensing, for SAPL has been involved throughout i,

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that history.

Second, to set forth our particular contentions, and ,

highlight the conclusions of the evidence on those contentions.

Third, to urge SAPL's position as to the ultimate issues to be considered.

D However, at the outset, I think it is important to emphasize that this issue'is, at its center, one that depends on an appreciation of the unique character of the Seabrook site. The fact is that the Seabrook site is indeed unique. No other

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commercial nuclear power plant is in sited as close proximity to a [

beach population of thousands of individuals, as close as 1.7 n I

miles to the reactor, with limited egress routes, and with the beach goers largely without the protection of even ordinary street clothing. ,

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., it has long been recognized that the Seabrook site exceeds the NRC's own siting population guidelines, as set forth in Regulatory Guide 4.7.

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In 1ight of the absolute central importance of the Seabrook site and its environs to the determination of whether an

" adequate" level of protection can be afforded to the population i

at risk, SAPL filed on June 22, 1987, a Motion for this Board to j take a view of'the Seabrook EPZ. Although this Motion was not .

opposed by any party, it was not ruled upon by this Board until denied by the Chairman during our multi-party telephone conference L

held on September 17, after the opportunity to view the summer -

conditions in the EPZ had expired. We do recognize there was a

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o j '* . 4 change of Board chairman in the meantime.

Notwithstanding Chairman Sr..ith's statement that he had, as a matter of personal interest, once visited the New Hampshire seacoast, and that the other members had familiarity with the seacoast area, SAPL believes that to understand these issues it is essential to present visually the condition of the EPZ as best we can. Therefore, at this time, SAPL would like to play a 2 1/2 minute videotape of the EPZ, narrated by our Field Director, Jane Doughty. Copies have already been provided to the adverse parties and a' copy has been t'urnished to the Board.(See attached Transcript of "Hampton Beach Area Traffic" Videotape)

This, then, is the human context forsthe issue before us.

New I want to turn to the historical context of the emergency .

planning issue, because it bears on one of the most' critical-issues in this case, and that is the credibility of the NRC's treatment of the issue.

The simple and unhappy fact - D m is that the emergency planning issue has not been responsibly handled by the NRC. Instead, denial and procrastination have been the order of I

the day on the part of the NRC, at all levels.

This is indeed ironic, for it was way back in December of l 1974, the year of this Agency's founding, and 18 months before construction at Seabrook began, that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the claimed independent body that reviews safety issues for the agency, criticized the Seabrook application, on the precise issue now before us. The ACRS said, and I quote:

"Because of the proximity of the Seabrook Station to the

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. m, beaches on the coast and because of the road networks serving the-beaches, the Applicant has given early attention to the problem of evacuation. The Committee believes, however, 6 that further attention needs to be given to evacuetion of residents and transients in the vicinity even though they may be outside.the LPZ."

Mr. Chairman, as the members of the, Board will be aware, but the public here way not, the LPZ referred to by the ACRS refers to the low populecion zone, a circle that prior to the present emergency planning requirements was drawn around nuclear reactors based on certain engineering considerations and the distance to the nearest j l so-called population center. In the case of Seabrook, the LPZ

< eventually ended up being drawn in a circle a mere one and a

- quarter miles'from the reactors, a distance which of course did s i

not include either the heavily populated beaches or any town -

I centers.

l It is indeed interesting that the ACRS noted this concern so early, because it had also been noted in contentions raised by 1

l . various intervenors in the Seabrook construction permit l A

proceeding, including the former Attorney General of New l 5

Bampshire, now Senator Warren B. Rudman. In the construction i l J L permit proceeding, Attorney General Rudman had contended that evacuation of the beaches needed to be addressed, and there was l

sharply varying testimony on the time and feasibilty of evacuating an area of five miles around the reactors.

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Later, the Seabrook Appeal Board was asked to address these 3 issues. Over ten years ago, in ALAB 422, the Appeal Board noted ,

the following:

"There is no doubt that, at peak periods there, in excess of 25,000 people'can be found in the densely populated area--in- -

deed no one disputes the claim that this area will be at times the most densely populated area in the state."

'Notwithstanding this, however, the Appeal-Board finally disposed of Attorney General Rudman's contention, by simply stating.:

"We would be left with a nagging practical question--what account is to be taken of the large number of people on the

-beach? As we have held in an earlier opinion, no plans for their evacuation are required." ,

Consequently, the Appeal Board was able to conclude: "For this reason we do not need to go into the sharply disputed issue respecting the evacuation.of the beach areas or other territory likewise not encompassed by the LPZ." (ALAB 422, Slip Opinion, pages 31, 32.and 36).

There is thus absolutely no doubt that the issue of evacuation was timely'taised in regard to Seabrook, 1cng before construction at Seabrook was started, and that this agency refused to consider it.

The reason for this refusal was simple. The NRC had catagoricA13y declared that the chances of an accident at a licensed nuclear plant were so remote that the idea of protective e <w .

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s4 ~e action outside the so-called low popule. tion zone was simply

' incredible.

This mind set largely prevailed against all challenges, including the intervenor challenges at Seabrook, until March of 1979, when an " incredible" accident in fact incurred at Three Mile-Island. That accident' eventually resulted in the August 1980 Emergency Planning Requirement that brings us here today: the requirement that there be in place emergency plans, as an

essential independent safety requirement, and that those plans provide " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."

However, even before this requirement became-final in August 1980, SAPL had moved, in May of 1979, to have the construction permit for Seabrook suspended because of the failure of the NRC to require development of an evacuation plan beyond the LPZ.

SAPL had noted that Seabrook had been designated one of the 12' problem sites by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, and indeed, pursuant to a FEMA report, FEMA Rep. 3, had the longest estimated range of evacuation times of any site in the country, an estimate ranging up to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. Not until July of 1981, more than two-years after SAPL's request, did the NRC staff L refuse to take action. The Staff Response noted that: "Indeed, for the lowest likelhood events, some serious health effects could l

be expected." The Staff held, however, that emergency planning

! was not necessarily expected to ameliorate.all health effects.

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The NRC Commissioners, in reviewing the Staff position on l

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SAPL's request, also refused to take action. However, two of the five NRC Commissioners dissented. They noted, and-I quotes  :

"Seabrook poses difficult, and perhaps unique, emergency planning problems. In light of the time and cost likely f to be involved in improving Seabrook's emergency prepared- .

ness, we should begin to seek solutions now, not scme years from now when the plant is almost ready to operate. More- i over,.at that time it will be much more difficult for the )

NRC to require remedial measures which could delay plant operation."  ;

SAPL did not stop with the Commission's refusal to review.

Believing that Seabrook indeed posed uniquely diffcult planning problems, SAPL appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 1

the District of Columbia. Before that' Court, the NRC again

- reiterated its belief that the Emergency Planning issue was not necessarily unsolvable.at Seabrook, and went on to make a solemn

- promise- to the Court, and to SAPL, that it would not allow the continuing massive investment in construction to sway its judgment on whetherethe Applicants had met the requirement that emergency plar.ning achieve anf" adequate" level of public protection. The Court, accepting the NRC's promise to ignore the utilities' investment, agreed'the inquiry could be postponed to the operating licensing-proceeding. It noted, however, f "We are'not-unsympathetic with SAPL's position in'this case.

SAPL has-presented evidence regarding the unique features of the Seabrook area and the current state of emergency pre-paredness would seem to warrant the Commission's most ,

careful exmination in evaluating the adequacy of the final l Seabrook EPS emergency plans. (690 F. 2d 1025-1033 (1982)).

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And so, the NRC has, in the 13 years since the agency was founded, first denied the existence of an emergency planning problem at Seabrook by first decreeing an accident requiring emergency protective action beyond the LPZ to be incredible,.and later, when that position became untenable, by refusing to face the issue until the eleventh hour, which is today. SAPL respectfully submits, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a pretty record.

Now, let us turn to the SAPL contentions and our evidence on those contentions. We must first note, however, that many of our concerns are not going to be addressed at this hearing, due to denials of contentions and summary dismissal rulings that have been made. Those concerns relate to contentions directed toward the capability for radiological monitoring, capability of the telephone system to handle emergency conditions, the adequacy of area medical facilities to handle contaminated and/or injured individuale, the adequacy of the ter, mile zone, and the adequacy of emergency fuel supplies in the area. All of these issues will be dealt with only in the event of an appeal ordering a remand for failure to consider these issues in this proceeding.

The issues which we do have before the Board are SAPL Contentions 7 and 33 having to do with the capability to monitor and decontaminate evacuees in the host community reception centers. .

SAPL 8 and BA, having to do with inadequate personnel to carry out the plans on a continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis.

SAPL 15, having to do with whether or not there are

9 sufficient commitments, through letters of agreement, to insure adequate response by entities having emergency plan responsibilities.

SAPL 16, having to do with the adequacy of sheltering as a s

protective response.

SAPL 18, having to do with the protection of non-auto owning persons.

SAPL 25, having to do with the protection of those whose mobility may be impaired due to institutional confinement or other factors.

SAPL 31, having to do with the adequacy of the evacuation time estimates.

SAPL 34, having to do with the accuracy of population estimates for the Seabrook EPZ.

SAPL 37, having to do with the availability of emergency vehicles and drivers.

Because of our limited resources, SAPL's direct testimony is directed to only five of those contentions, those having to do with personnel resources, SAPL 8 and BA, those having to with mobility impaired populations, SAPL 25, and those having to do with decontamination at host community reception centers, SAPL 7 and 33. Ecwever, we do support the testimony of others, particularly the Massachusetts Attorney General, on the other SAPL contentions.

The testimony, taken as a whole, will just demonstrate certain basic facts:

1. The Applicants have seriously underestimated the population at risk'. The beach population will be shown to have a l

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, . peak capacity of 93,000 persons, not the 61,000 or so persons estimated by the Applicants' consu3 tant. This means that the total EPZ population estimate should be 260,000, more than a j i

quarter of a million people.

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2. The time to evacuate is more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, a figure 93%

greater than the Applicants' estimate, and a figure which we believe will show two things:

First, that the time to evacuate is so long that evacuation is not a reasonably adequate protective measure for the population at risk, particularly in the beach area, and that in the absence of an effective sheltering alternative, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures and will be taken.

Second, that the New Hampshire radiological emergency plans do not in fact achieve dose savings over the estimates for an unplanned evacuation that were the subject of hearings before this Board in August of 1983. As I have already mentioned, the original FEMA report on the Seabrook evacuation time estimates, FEMA Rep. 3, released in February of 1981, set forth a range of

, evacuation time estimates from four to fifteen hours, and it now .

appears that, based upon the testimony offered by the Massachusetts Attorney General, the time estimate for a planned evacuation is in the upper end of that range. Therefore, it is SAPL's position that the New Hampshire radiological emergency plans for Seabrook have done nothing but demonstrate the inadequacy of the New Hampshire emergency plans in this l^

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Now let me turn to the SAPL position on the ultimate issues

! in these proceedings.  !

SAPL believes the major issue in this proceeding is the j standard that will be applied. That standard, once again, is P

whether or not these plans provide reasonable assurance that  !

adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of ,

a radiological emergency. Bat what ir " reasonable assurance"? l What is " adequate protection"? [

We all know that the NRC has steadfastly refused to set any c objective criteria for measuring either adequacy or reasonable .

assurance. The Commission' has already held that r there are no time limits in which evacuation must be carried [

' t out, and there are no minimal acceptable dose limits for either individuals or the population at large. Thus, it remains the task of the agency, and this Board in the first instance, to determine what will be the definition of adequacy and reasonable assurance i 1

in light of the findings it may make about the efficacy of these pisas.

We already know what the position of the Applicants and the utility is on this matter. This Board, and the parties, were

-furnished on June 12 with a letter from Mr. Edward Christenberry, i

Chief Hearing Counsel, to the Acting General Counsel of FEMA. In that letter Mr. Christenberry set forth the basic position that adequacy would be established if the plans in fact achieved dose reductions and represented the best effort achievable given the facility and the site in question. Under this theory, adequacy s

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, t could be found if the plans achieved some dose savings for say 500 of perhaps 50,000 people on the beach, even if the remaining 49,500 did sustain radiation injury, or even death, as the result l of a nuclear accident.  !

SAPL totally rejects the NRC utility view of the meaning of adequate protection. It is SAPL's position that even if the plan l is found to be "the best" that can be achieved given this site and the major facilities, such as roadways, that are available and l even if that plan does achieve some level of dose reduction, it is wholly inadequate in the event of an accident, in which early ,

warning is not possible and there is a major radiation release, and which results in off-site consequences which are, as set forth ,

in the Massachusetts testimony, five times greater than for J

accide'nts at other licensed nuclear facilities.

Rather, SAPL concurs with the position taken by FEMA in this case, that: ,

"It appears that thousands of people would be unable to leave during an accident at Seabrook involving a major release of radioactivity without adequate shelter for as much as the entire duration of that release. Therefore, until these issues are resolved even if all the other inadequacies and deficiencies cited in the RAC Reviews of the New Hampshire Plans, and the Review of the Exercise of these plans were to be corrected, FEAM would not be able to conclude that the New Hamsphire State and local plans to protect the public in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant are adequate to meet our regulatory standard that such plans

' adequately protect the public health and safety by provid-ing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency.'" -

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i s iv In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe SAPL's long standing position in this matter will be vindicated, and that since, at Seabrook, the people cannot be adequately protected from the risk of catastrophic accidents, the risk must be removed from the people. This must be accomplished by denial of the application for a nuclear operating license.

Thank you.

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Ivan O* Smith, Chairman Su;:nne Breicath Thomas Dign:n, E quira {

Atopic Safety and Board of Selectmen hopes & Gray .

Licensing Board - Town Hall iIDne International Place  !

U RC US NRC One Drinkwater Road Boston, MA 02110-2624  !

Wa:hington, DC 20555 Hampton Falls, NH 03844

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gJfICE OF SECRETARY Kenneth A. McCollom

' Atomic Safety and Docketing & Service Sec.

Office of the Secretary hC SAPL Li;;csics Board US NRC 5 Market Street  ;

US NRC Washington, DC 20555 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555

Offic) cf Selectmen Richard F. Cole Geoffrey Huntington 1 Esquire l Town cf Hampton Falls Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney General's Office '

Hampt:n Falls, NH 03844 Board State !!ouse Annex US NRC Concord, NH 03301 i Washington, DC 20555 i t

i Ashod N. Amirian, Esquire Joseph Flynn, Asst. Gen. Cnsl. Sandra Gavutis 145 S;uth Main Street Federal Emergency Town of Kensington I P.0,:B:x 38 Management Agency Box 1154 Bradfctd, MA 01835 500 C Street SW East Kensington, NH 03827 Washington, DC 20555 i

J1hn.'Traficonte.' Esquire Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Charles P. Graham, Esquire i As;istint Attorney General ~ Office of Exec. Legal Dr. Morphy & Graham  ;

One Ashburton Place US NRC 33 Low Street 19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Newburyport, MA 01950

~ Boston, MA- 02108-JR. Sc.ctt Hill-Whilton,'Esq. Judith H. Mizner, Esquire William S. Lord.

-79 State Street 79 State Street Office of Selectmen

-Newburyport, MA 01950 Newburyport, MA 01950 Town Hall Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Dicn3 Curran, Esquire Paul McEachern, Esquire Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Harmon, Curran & Tousley Shaines & McEachern US Senate 20001 S' Street NW . 25 Maplewood Avenue Washington, DC 20510 Suita 430 P.O. Box 360 Attn: Gordon. Mcdonald LW:,hington, DC 20009 Portsmouth, NH 03801 4

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'.Atomia Safety and Licen ing Board Panel-(.US NRC

[ W.shington, DC 20555 .

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