ML19332C056

Special Rept 89-14:on 891021,four Fire Barriers Nonfunctional for Interval Greater than 7 Days.Caused by Centrifugal Charging Pump Room Coolers Leaking ERCW from Cooling Coils.Roving Fire Watch Remains in Effect

ML19332C056
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/17/1989
From:	Michael Ray TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
89-14, NUDOCS 8911220255
Download: ML19332C056 (2)

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i  : TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY t CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 i'

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NOV 171989

'U.S.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN: : Document Control Desk

-Hashington, D.C. 20555

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. Gentlemen:.

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET .

NO.' 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECI AL REPORT ~ 89-14 y'

- The enclosed.special. report provides details concerning fire barriers being Jnonfunctional for an interval. greater than seven days. This event is reported 9 Lin accordance with Action Statement (a) of Limiting Condition for i Operation 3 7.12. j .

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If-you~have,any questions concerning this. submittal. please t'elephone

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.M.~'A. Cooper at (615) 843-6651.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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ManageN, Nuclear L' censing and j Regulatory Affairs

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Enclosure cc (Enclosure): 1 Ms. S. C.-Bla'ck, Assistant Director for Projects

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TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

One White Flint, North -

i 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852  ;

Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director

-for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 t Atlanta, Georgia 30323 j NRC Resident ' Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

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,89.11220255 891117

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.gDR ADOCK:0500032 PDC An Equal opportunity Employer

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ENCLOSURE li SPECIAL REPORT 89-14 UNIT 1 Description of Event On October 21, 1989', with Un!ts 1 ar.d 2 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, ,

2,235 pounds per square inch gauge, 578 degrees Fahrenheit, four fire barriers (Fire Doors A-25, A-29, A-42, and A-46) were nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. Fire Doors A-25 and A-46 are on auxiliary building Elevation 669 serving the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) 1A-A and 2A-A rooms respectively. Fire Doors A-29 and A-42 are in the same iespective building locations serving the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) IB-B and 28-8 rooms respectively. The fire doors were breached to run temporary hose lines from leaking ~ room coolers in the CCP rooms to the floor drain in the TDAFWP rooms. As reautred by the action statement of Limiting Condition for Operation-(LCO)'3.7.12,~a roving fire watch was established, and fire detectors in the area were verified operable within one hour. On

' November 14, 1989, the temporary hoses were rerouted to motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump drains, and.the fire breaches for TDAFWP Fire Doors A-25 and A-46 were closed. This also included the rerouting of the temporary hose reported in.Special Report 89-09.

Cause of Event The floor drain in each CCP room leads to the tritiated drain collector tank.

The CCP room coolers are leaking essential raw cooling water (ERCW) from their cooling coils. . Because ERCW is simply river water, it is not prudent or cost-effective to treat it as radiological waste; i.e., the increased volume of water impacts needed radiological waste processing capabilities. Thus, the decision was made to run temporary hose lines from the CCP room coolers to alternate drains. The temporary hose lines will remain in place until the CCP room coolers are replaced.

Analysis of Event This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of Action Statement.(a) of LC0 3.7.12. A roving fire watch was established to inspect the associated rooms on an hourly basis a* required by the action statement of

- LCO 3. 7.12. The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the affected areas is operable and would actuate in the event of a fire.

Therefore, there is no danger to safety-related equipment.

Corrective Action Tie roving fire watch will remain in ef#ect until the CCP room coolers are replaced,'the. temporary hose lines removed, and the fire barriers restored to functional status including the Fire Door A-28 reported in Special Report 8h 09. SQN has developed an action plar, to coordinate the replacement of the room. cooler cooling colls. This work will be scheduled and completed as the replacement cooling coils for the room coolers are received. The scheduled arrival date for the last cooling coil is January 12, 1990.

Commitment None.

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