ML20043B211

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Special Rept 90-08:on 900508,portion of Fire Suppression Water Sys in Auxiliary & Control Bldgs Removed from Svc & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Leak in Fire Header.Fire Watches & Backup Fire Suppression Sys Established
ML20043B211
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1990
From: Wallace E
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-08, 90-8, NUDOCS 9005250081
Download: ML20043B211 (2)


Text

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. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401

$N 157B Lookout Place MAY 221990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk ,

Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.11.1 - SPECIAL REPORT 90 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM The enclosed special report provides details concerning the fire suppression water system being removed from service for maintenance in several areas of the auxiliary and control buildings. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statement (c) of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.11.1.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6651.

Very truly yours, t

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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E. . Hallace, anager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North l 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road l Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Mr. B. A. Hilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division // j ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NH, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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ENCLOSURE SQN SPECIAL REPORT 90-08 Description of Event On May 8, 1990, at 0632 Eastern daylight time (EDT), Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.1 was entered to comply with SQN technical specifications (TSs) for removing a portion of the fire suppression water

' system from service in the auxiliary ,nd control buildings rendering the system inoperable. A 24-hour telephone call was made to NRC stating that a portion of the fire suppression water system in the auxiliary and control buildings had been removed from service and had been declared inoperable. A facsimile on May 9, 1990, confirmed the 24-hour telephone call and provided details as reported in the telephone call.

A four-inch fire header in the auxiliary building was removed from service for a planned maintenance activity to repair a pipe leak. The removal of this fire header isolated several areas of the control and auxi M ary buildings from the normal fire suppression system. The safety-related areas isolated were (1) the charcoal filter room for the control room emergency ventilation system, (2) the spreading room in the control building, (3) the 250-volt Battery Room No. 1, and (4) the fifth vital battery room. Several other non-safety-related areas were also isolated, such as the control building kitchen and locker room.

Immediately upon entering the LCO, a backup fire suppression system was established by routing fire hoses from nearby hose stations to the affected areas, and fire watches were establisheJ commensurate with the areas affected.

Cause of the Condition A leak in the four-inch fire header required replacement of approximately 18 inches of the pipe. To accomplish replacement of the fire header, isolation and draining of the affected portion of the system had to be completed. The section of the fire header that was isolated is the only supply of automatic fire protection for several areas of the control and auxiliary buildings.

Corrective Action Work Request B26053 was initiated to accomplish the removal and replacement of the leaking pipe. Fire watches and a backup fire suppression system were established for fire protection and also to comply with the action statement of the LCO. The leaking pipe was removed and replaced. The fire suppression water system was returned to service, and the LCO was exited at 0035 EDT on May 9, 1990.

No further corrective action is necessary, i

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