ML20028H375
| ML20028H375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1990 |
| From: | Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 90-18, NUDOCS 9101020157 | |
| Download: ML20028H375 (4) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY--
- ~
- CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ot
-j SB Lookout Place y
DEC 211990
.- i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
-ATTN -= Document Control Desk-
' Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:-
<In the Matter of.
)
iDocket Hos. 50-327
-Tennessee-Valley Authority
)
50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT-(SQN)._ UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328--
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79 - SPECIAL REPORT 90 FIRE JSUPPF*tSSION WATER SYSTEM-Theienclosed special report provides details-of an event where all four fire suppression, water pumps were declared inoperable for a' period of 38 minutes.-
This event was initially-reported by telephone not'ification at 1227 Eastern
_ daylight-time on December _ 14,;1990,. and confirmed by facsimile on,the same-day,in accordance.witL Limiting Condition for Operation'(LCO)l3.7.11.1,.
Action b. 1This; report'is being made in:accordance with LCO 3.7.11.1, Action b.
If.you have any questions concerning this submittal, please-telephone f
LM..A.jCooper at-(615)'843-8422.-
Very truly yours,-
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY' 3
E. G. Wallace, Manager, Nuclear-Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
).
Enclosure-cca-See page J h
^
'9101020157 901221
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I, PDR ~ -ADOCK 05000327
(
s PDR
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. An Equal Opportunity Ernployer p
DEC 211990 '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosure):
Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate II-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. J. N. Donohew, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ore White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20B52 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
,4 ENCLOSURE 14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT SPECIAL REPORT 90-18 Rngerip. tion of Event On December 13,-1990, at 1714 Eastern standard time (EST), with Unita 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the four fire suppression pumps were Se;1ared
' inoperable by being placed in manual in accordance with Work Request (WR) C010259.
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4 were entered. The placement of the four fire suppression pumps in manual was a_ result of a preplanned contingency to repair the valve stem packing leak of Flow Control Valve (FCV) 0-FCV-26-14 located in the condensate circulating waste pumping station, Elevation 670.5, east of the fire pump strainers. The WR was complete, and the four fire suppression pumps were returned to service at 1752 EST.
The event was reported to URC by telephone on December 14, 1990, at 1227 EST in accordance with Action b of LCO 3.7.11.1.
This special report is also submitted in accordance with LCO 3.7.11.2.
WR C010259 was written to repair the valve stem packing of Valve 0-FCV-26-14.
.A Physical Security Instruction (PHYSI) 13, " Fire," Attachment C,
" Procedure for Removing Fire Protection From Service," was completed. The completed
, PHYSI-13 Attachment C called for the isolation of 0-FCV-26-14 by closing Isolation Valves 2-26-550 and'-553.
It also included a preplanned contingency for the case where the isolation of 0-FCV-26-14 was not obtainable. This contingency, along with the approval of the shift operations supervisor, called for stopping and placing in manual the four fire suppression pumps (IA, IB, 2 A, and 2B).. This contingency was implemented because water continued to blow from the packing of 0-FCV-26-14 as a result of leakage past Pressure Control Valve (PCV) 26-15.
WR B215925 was initiated to repair PCV-26-15 as a result of the leakage.
Parts are on order for this valvo and are currently scheduled tc arrive on site by February 1991.
CaMAQ_al. Event The cause of this event is the bypass leakage of the isolation valvo, which resulted in the need to place the fire pumps in manual to prevent automatic actuation to allow valve repair.
Analysis of Event The fire protection system is described in Section 9.5.1 of the SQH Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The high-pressure fire protection system furnishes raw water for fixed water spray systems, preaction sprinkler systems, fire hoce racks, and fire hose connections throughout the plant.
Low-pressure carbon dioxide fire protection systems are also provided for some areas.
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=TheI-four-fire. pumps had been placed in the manual position. These pumps could
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have.been started if they_were required during the_38 minutes that-they were'-
fdeclared inoperable.
Section VI, " Subsequent Operator Action," of Abnormal Operating Instruction 30, " Plant Fires," requires-the-operator to verify two
- fire pumps-are running or, if not, to start two fireLpumps when a call is received that a~ fire, exists.. The starting of the. fire punps during the
-repacking ofl valve 0-PCV-26-14 would not have resulted in the inoperability of j
'the fire suppression system, because the removal of this valve results in the system at this point being open to the atmosphere and the reduction of flow vould not have any impact on the fire suppression system.
i Corrective Action
_The four fire pumps were restored to operable status by 1752 EST on-December 13,L1990, WR B215925 will be worked upon receipt of ordered material.
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