IR 05000338/2014005

IR 05000338/2014005, 05000339/2014005; on 10/01/2014 - 12/31/2014; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Inspection Report

ML15034A083
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	02/03/2015
From:	Steven Rose NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2014005
Download: ML15034A083 (24)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 3, 2015

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2014005 and 05000339/2014005

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On December 31, 2014, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On January 22, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. F. Mladen and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna Power Station. In accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000338, 05000339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

IR 05000338/2014005, 05000339/2014005 w/ Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 05000338/2014005 and 05000339/2014005 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: October 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014 Inspectors: G.Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector G. Skaggs Ryan, Resident Inspector P. McKenna, Surry Senior Resident Inspector D. Bacon, Senior Operations Engineer, Section 1R11.3 Approved by: Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000338/2014-005, 05000339/2014-005; 10/01/2014 - 12/31/2014; North Anna Power

Station, Units 1 and 2. Routine Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and senior operations engineers from the region. No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

One violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and operated at full power until December 22, 2014, when it was removed from service to repair a small reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leak. The unit remained off line for the rest of the reporting period to complete repairs to the reactor coolant piping.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in a planned refueling outage that began September 7, 2014.

On October 10, 2014, Unit 2 returned to full RTP following the refueling, and operated at full power for the remainder of the report period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the external flood vulnerability of the North Anna for the Unit 2 Safeguards and Quench Spray building pump cubicles. The inspectors verified the condition of the emergency flood protection dike between the service water pond, and the plant and related drainage ditches and culverts, in addition to the west side flood protection dike. The inspectors also reviewed applicable station procedures and design documents to assess proper surveillance and maintenance for external flood protection features.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed two site specific weather related inspections, listed below, due to anticipated adverse weather conditions. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee adverse weather response procedures and site preparations including work activities that could impact the overall maintenance risk assessments.

• On November 10, 2014, the inspectors reviewed the licensee response to unusually high winds in the area.

• On November 20, 2014, the inspectors reviewed the licensee response to expected frigid temperatures utilizing procedures for the emergency diesel generators and the service water equipment

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted five equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify the operability of a redundant or backup system/train or a remaining operable system/train with a high risk significance for the current plant configuration (considering out-of-service, inoperable, or degraded condition); or a risk-significant system/train that was recently realigned following an extended system outage, maintenance, modification, or testing; or a risk-significant single-train system. The inspector conducted the reviews to ensure that critical components were properly aligned, and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

• Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Terry Turbine during startup preparations for Unit 2 after refueling

• Unit 2 Motor-Driven AFW trains A and B during startup preparations for Unit 2 after refueling

• Unit 2 H and J Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) during startup preparations for Unit 2 after refueling

• Unit 2 Service Water (SW) system, A Train, during startup preparations for Unit 2 after refueling

• Unit 2 SW System, A Train, during maintenance on SW-MOV-205A and 205B

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Fire Protection Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted focused tours of the four areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Revision 10, CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Revision 6, and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Revision 5.

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to:

(1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;

(2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and,

(3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• Main Control Room

• Unit 1 Safeguards Area

• Unit 1 Quench Spray Building

• Unit 1 Containment

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a licensed operator performance on October 16, 2014, during a simulator scenario which involved a Safeguards Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) leak which led to entry into Emergency Action Level SU6.1, Notification of Unusual Event.

The scenario required classifications and notifications that were counted for NRC performance indicator input.

The inspectors observed the following elements of crew performance in terms of communications:

(1) ability to take timely and proper actions;

(2) prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms;

(3) correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures;

(4) timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and

(5) oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterly Control Room Operator Performance Observations

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted three observations of licensed reactor operators actions and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. As part of this assessment, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance:

(1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications;

(2) control board/in-plant component manipulations;

(3) use and interpretation of plant instruments, indicators and alarms;

(4) documentation of activities;

(5) management and supervision of activities; and

(6) communication between crew members.

The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance during the following events;

• On October 8, 2014, during Unit 2 startup activities from Mode 4 to Mode 3

• On October 9, 2014, during Unit 2 startup activities from Mode 3 to Mode 2

• On October 10, 2014, during Unit 2 startup activities from Mode 2 to Mode 1 and online

• On December 22, 2014, Unit 1 shutdown starting for the RCS cold loop drain valve repair

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Licensed Operator Requalification

Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results:

a. Inspection Scope

On February 7, 2014, the licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with inspection procedure (IP) 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification Examination Results, of IP71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

For the two equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 6. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• CR555478, 1-HV-P-22A Found Tripped

• CR563370, 2-SI-P-1A Mechanical Seal Leakage

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;

(2) management of risk;

(3) appropriate and necessary steps taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities upon identification of an unforeseen situation; and

(4) adequate identification and resolution of maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify that deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.

• Emergent work for Unit 2 yellow risk entering Mode 4 on October 8, 2014

• Emergent work for a 2-SW-MOV-205A/B Unit 2 SW B outage on October 22, 2014

• Emergent work for 2-SW-MOV-205A/B Unit 2 SW B outage on October 28, 2014

• Emergent work for Unit 2 A Charging Pump Unit 2 SW piping leak on November 28, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations and functionality assessments, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1)the technical adequacy of the evaluations;

(2) whether continued system operability was warranted;

(3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensatory measures;

(4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and

(5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance with the Significant Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors review included a verification that operability determinations (OD) were made as specified by procedure OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 12. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• Review of OD000597, "OD for N2C24 to Address Fuel Rod Bow

• Review of OD000598, OD for N2C24 to Address Fuel Rod Bow

• Review of OD000600, Evaluate U2 Baffle Jet Impingement

• Review of CA289368, 2-FW-MOV-250C Bonnet Support Plate Nuts are Loose

• Review of OD000604, Unit 2 Control Rod E-11 rod position indication signal stability

• Review of ETE NA-2104-0064, Assessment of Operability of 2-SW-MOV-205A/B if MOVs Left in Manual Mode

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the completed permanent plant modification design change package (DCP) DC-NA-13-01059, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement.

The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the installation, discussed the desired improvement with system engineers, and reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Review/Regulatory Screening, technical drawings, test plans and the modification package to assess the TS implications.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, listed below, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether:

(1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;

(2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;

(4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;

(5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;

(6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;

(7) test equipment was removed following testing; and

(8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Revision 14.

• Periodic test 2-PT-71.2Q, 2-FW-P-3A, A Motor-Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test, Revision 38

• Periodic test 2-PT-71.3Q, 2-FW-P-3B, B Motor Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test, Revision 40

• Periodic test 2-PT-71.1Q, 2-FW-P-2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Test, Revision 55

• Periodic test 2-PT-210.1, Valve Inservice Inspection (Service Water MOVs to RSHXs), Revision 13, and procedure 0-GOP-3.3, Valve Position Verification for ISI Valves, Revision 6

• Periodic test 2-PT-213.7B, Valve Inservice Inspection (B; Train of Recirc Spray System), Revision 13, and 2-PT-214.B, Valve Inservice Inspection (miscellaneous Valve Position Indication), Revision 10

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

.1 Unit 2 Refueling Outage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Review (OSR) and contingency plans for the Unit 2 refueling outage, which began September 7, 2014, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. The inspectors also confirmed that the licensee had mitigation/response strategies in place for any losses of key safety functions. Using NRC inspection procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, the inspectors observed portions of the refueling, and maintenance activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan and applicable TS. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.

• Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate maintenance of defense-in-depth commensurate with the OSR for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.

• Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing.

• Installation and configuration of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) instrumentation for system pressure, level, and temperature to provide accurate indication, and an accounting for instrument error.

• Implementation of licensee procedures for foreign material exclusion.

• Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that TS and outage safety plan requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities.

• Controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system.

• Reactor inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss.

• Controls over activities and structures, systems and components which could affect reactivity.

• Fatigue management in accordance with meeting the rule requirements for each process.

• Refueling activities, including fuel handling operations (inspection, sipping, reconstitution and insertion), and fuel assemblies tracking, including new fuel, from core offload through core reload.

• Controls over containment penetrations, per TS, such that containment closure could be achieved at all times.

• Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities

• Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisities, walkdown of the containment to verify that debris had not been left which could block emergency core cooling system strainers, and the review of reactor physics testing.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unit 1 Forced Outage for RCS Pressure Boundary Leak

a. Inspection Scope

Unit 1 forced outage on December 22, 2014, due to a leak in an RCS drain pipe, which continued until January 1, 2015. During the forced outage period, the inspectors used NRC inspection procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, to observe portions of the maintenance and startup activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with outage risk assessments and applicable TS. The inspectors reviewed licensee actions for the outage activities listed below.

• Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage safety plan and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.

• Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard to ensure that TS and outage safety plan requirements were met.

• Decay heat removal processes to verify proper operation and that steam generators, when relied upon, were a viable means of backup cooling.

• Containment closure activities, including a focused containment walkdown prior to startup, to verify that there was no evidence of leakage and that debris had not been left which could affect the performance of the containment sump.

• Heat up and startup activities to verify TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. RCS integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment penetrations and containment isolation valves.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the four surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

In-Service Test:

• 2-PT-61.1, Reactor Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test, Revision 25 Other Surveillance Tests:

• 2-PT-846.3, Annual Evaluation of the Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor as Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Indicator, Revision 4

• 1-PT-46.3A, Primary-to-Secondary Leak Rate Determination, Revision 14

• 2-PT-62.2.1, RSHX SW Inleakage, Revision 15

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Unit 1 and 2 PI for Safety System Functional Failures to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 data reported to the NRC for the period October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2014. Documents reviewed included applicable NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by NRC inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.

.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues but also considered the results of daily inspector corrective action program item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.1. The review included issues documented outside the normal corrective action program in system health reports, corrective maintenance work orders, component status reports, site monthly meeting reports, and maintenance rule assessments. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of July through December 2014, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted.

The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest integrated quarterly assessment report. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy. Trends noted by the inspectors were previously identified by the licensee and addressed in their corrective action program.

b. Assessment and Observations No findings were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends and has addressed the trends with their corrective action program.

.3 Review of Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions for operator workarounds (OWAs). The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the licensees OWAs and procedure OP-AA-1700, Revision 6, Operations Aggregate Impact. The inspectors reviewed the data package associated with this procedure which included an evaluation of the cumulative effects of the OWAs on the operators ability to safely operate the plant and effectively respond to abnormal and emergency plant conditions. The inspectors reviewed and monitored licensee planned and completed corrective actions to address underlying equipment issues causing the OWAs. The inspectors also evaluated OWAs against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Revision 23, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and OP-AA-100, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 27

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. In general, the inspectors verified that the licensee has identified operator workaround problems at an appropriate threshold and entered them in the corrective action program, and has proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions.

.4 Annual Sample: Review of CR555478, 1-HV-P-22A Found Tripped

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions for CR555478, 1-HV-P-22A Found Tripped, to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program, Revision 23 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. In general, the inspectors verified that the licensee had identified any issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the CAP database, and had proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions.

.5 Annual Sample: Review of CR558584, In-Mast Sipping (IMS) Identified a Failed Fuel

Assembly in Unit 2 Cycle 23 Core

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions CR558584, In-Mast Sipping (IMS) identified a failed fuel assembly in Unit 2 Cycle 23 Core, to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program, Revision 23 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Other documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. In general, the inspectors verified that the licensee had identified any issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the CAP database, and had proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions.

.6 Annual Sample: Review of CR558708, 1-LW-RM-111 not Capable of Performing

Design Function From 5/13/14 to 9/3/14

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions for CR558708, 1-LW-RM-111 not Capable of Performing Design Function From 5/13/14 to 9/3/14, to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program, Revision 23 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Other documents reviewed are listed in the to this report.

b. Findings and Observations

A licensee identified violation was identified as part of this review and is documented in Section 4OA7 of this report.

4OA3 Event Followup

.1 (Closed) LER 05000339/2014-002-00: Failed Fuel Assembly

On September 15, 2014, with Unit 2 defueled, debris that had the potential to be fuel fragments was located on the core plate directly below the B11 core location. Video inspection of the fuel assembly identified that the top springs of two fuel pins were dislodged. The direct cause of the event was due to baffle jetting, the process by which water on the outside of the core baffle plate is forced through small openings in the baffle seams and onto the fuel assemblies. During Unit 2 Cycle 23, baffle jetting caused two rods in assembly 4Z9, located in core position B11, to begin rotating and vibrating.

This resulted in rod wear and eventual mechanical failure and rod cladding separation.

Both AREVA and Westinghouse reviewed the videos and concluded the cause was baffle jetting. Other Cycle 23 fuel assemblies in other baffle locations were also inspected as a precaution.

No significant safety consequences resulted from this event because the reactor coolant system activity levels during the Unit 2 Cycle 23 were well within the requirements of the TS 3.4.16, Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity. After Cycle 24 startup, the activity remained well within requirements of TS 3.4.16, and the health and safety of the public were found not to be affected by this event. This event was reportable per 10 CFR 74.11(a) for the loss of special nuclear material, and 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii) because the seven fuel pellets contained licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C of 10 CFR 20. This issue is in the licensees CAP as CR558720, Debris Found in U2 Core Plate @ location B11, and CR558824, OD for N2C23 Fuel Rod Bow. No findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified.

.2 Unit I Forced Outage for RCS Pressure Boundary Leak

The inspectors followed up on actions taken in response to the Unit 1 forced outage due to a leak in an RCS drain pipe. Containment entries were made and it was determined that the leakage was coming from the B loop room in the piping run between the steam generator and the reactor coolant pump. A walkdown of the B loop room was performed and it was discovered that the leak was from a pipe section upstream of the isolation valve. This was a non-isolable RCS pressure boundary leak which required a shutdown of the unit. The unit was shut down on December 22, 2014. A detailed inspection found a cracked elbow in the 2 inch RCS drain line. The inspectors reviewed licensee plans to isolate and repair the RCS drain pipe, and return the unit to service.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On January 22, 2015, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. F. Mladen and other members of the staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, being dispositioned as a NCV:

• Section 5.5, Programs and Manuals, of North Anna TS stated, in part, that an offsite dose calculation manual shall be established, implemented and maintained. Section 6.2 of VPAP-2103N, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (North Anna), Revision 23, required that radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels be maintained operable with a trip setpoint which will automatically isolate the discharge line in response to a high radiation condition. Contrary to section 6.2 of VPAP-2103N, 1-LW-RM-111, the liquid radioactive effluent rad monitor was not maintained operable from May 13, 2014 to September 3, 2014. During the time period that 1-LW-RM-111 was inoperable the licensee was not aware of the situation due to inadequate procedure guidance for daily source checks required to verify operability as defined in 0-LOG-6A. This finding was identified by the licensee and entered in the licensees corrective action program as CR558708, 1-LW-RM-111 not capable of performing design function from 5/13/14 to 9/3/14,and Apparent Cause Evaluation, ACE019800, 1-LW-RM-111 not capable of performing design functions from 5/13/14 to 9/3/14. The inspectors performed a significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, Section C, dated February 12, 2008. Because the licensee was able to monitor the radioactive effluent release with downstream radiation monitors on the circulating water line which have alarm capability the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning

G. Bischof, Site Vice President

J. Daugherty, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing

B. Gaspar, Manager, Nuclear Site Services

R. Hanson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services

E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Site Engineering

J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

P. Kemp, Supervisor, Station Licensing

J. Leberstien, Technical Advisor, Licensing

F. Mladen, Plant Manager

J. Plossl, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures

J. Schleser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness

J. Slattery, Manager, Nuclear Operations

W. Standley, Manager, Nuclear Training

M. Whalen, Technical Advisor, Licensing

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

05000339/2014-002-00 LER Failed Fuel Assembly (Section 4OA3)

Discussed

None