IR 05000338/2022010
| ML22269A310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/2022 |
| From: | James Baptist NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Stoddard D Dominion Energy Co |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML22269A310 (18) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2022010 AND 05000339/2022010
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On August 10, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at North Anna Power Station. On July 1, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Ms. Lisa Hilbert and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at North Anna Power Station.
September 26, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Br 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000338 and 05000339 License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000338 and 05000339
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000338/2022010 and 05000339/2022010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-010-0040
Licensee:
Dominion Energy
Facility:
North Anna Power Station
Location:
Mineral, VA.
Inspection Dates:
June 13, 2022 to July 01, 2022
Inspectors:
J. Bundy, Senior Operations Engineer
T. Fanelli, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Franklin, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
James B. Baptist, Chief
Engineering Br 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at North Anna Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Address Faulted Conditions for Valve Analysis Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000338/2022010-01 Open/Closed None 71111.21N.
The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III, for the licensees failure to address design basis load combinations in the analysis to determine the safety-related functional performance of 16" service water butterfly valve 1-SW-MOV-103D, Service Water Supply to "D" Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger,
Outside Containment Isolation Valve, at the North Anna Power Station (NAPS).
Failure to Verify the Effects of Overstressing the Backseat of Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000339/2022010-02 Open/Closed None 71111.21N.
The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III for the licensees failure to justify the model used for accurately representing the geometry of the disc and seat and the forces acting on the valves backseat and bonnet of 2-RC-MOV-2536, Block Valve for Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a. Determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.
Specific Guidance b. Determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions.
c. Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.
d. Evaluate maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).
(1)1-RC-MOV-1535, Block Valve for Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (2)1-SW-MOV-103D, Service Water Supply To "D" Recirc Spray Heat Exchanger, Outside Cont Isolation Valve (3)2-RC-MOV-2536, Block Valve for Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (4)1-SI-MOV-1836, High Head SI from Charging Header to RCS Cold Legs, Outside Containment Isolation Valve (5)2-CH-MOV-2115D, Charging Pump Supply Isolation Valve from Refueling Water Storage Tank (6)2-SI-MOV-2867A, Boron Injection Tank High Head SI Inlet Valve (7)2-SW-MOV-204D, Service Water Return from "D" Recirc Spray Heat Exchanger, Outside Cont Isolation Valve (8)1-RH-MOV-1720B, RHR Return Isolation To "C" Accumulator Discharge Line (9)1-RC-PCV-1456, Pressurizer Power Operated Pressure Control Valve Discharge to Pressurizer Relief Tank (10)2-MS-TV-211A, Main Steam Supply Trip Valve to Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (11)1-RC-SOV-101A, Reactor Vessel Vent Line Isolation Valve to Refueling
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Address Faulted Conditions for Valve Analysis Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000338/2022010-01 Open/Closed None 71111.21N.0 The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the licensees failure to address design basis load combinations in the analysis to determine the safety-related functional performance of 16" service water butterfly valve 1-SW-MOV-103D, Service Water Supply to "D" Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger, Outside Containment Isolation Valve, at the North Anna Power Station (NAPS).
Description:
The inspectors reviewed the calculation of record that determined the functional performance of valve 1-SW-MOV-103D. The calculation (NA-CALC-MEC-ME-0317, Service Water Motor Operated Valve Operating Torque Requirements, 59-01-SW-MOV-103D-Valve, Addendum Q, dated August 21, 2019) determined that the valve had a 3.3% margin in the open and close directions without considering additional seismic loading. However, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Appendix 3A, Compliance with Safety Guides, specified that loading combinations that included seismic loads must be addressed.
The UFSAR Appendix 3A.33, Design Limits and Loading Combinations for Seismic Class I Fluid System Components (Regulatory Guide [RG] 1.48), stated in part, that the valves were designed to function at normal operation conditions, maximum design conditions, and DBE conditions. The inspectors noted that this statement paralleled the statement in RG 1.48, regulatory position 12.a for, the primary-pressure rating Pr11 should not be exceeded when the component is subjected to either
- (3) concurrent loadings associated with the normal plant condition, the vibratory motion of the SSE, and the dynamic system loadings associated with the faulted plant condition. In addition, the RG stated, in part, to further provide a consistent basis for design of fluid system components important to safety, this guide delineates acceptable design limits and appropriate combinations of loadings associated with applicable plant conditions and specified seismic events. And that for the particular case of active pumps and valves (i.e., pumps and valves that must perform a mechanical motion during' the course of accomplishing a 'system safety function), special design limits and supplemental requirements are specified to provide assurance of operability. These special design limits and supplemental requirements are provided for active pumps and valves because the rules for construction of [ASME] Section III apply to the assurance of pressure-retaining integrity but do not assure that pumps and valves designated to perform a system safety function will operate when required. The inspectors determined that the licensee was not using the loading combinations specified by the UFSAR.
The NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) require that licensees comply with the testing provisions of the applicable ASME OM Code and must establish a program to ensure that MOVs continue to be capable of performing their design-basis safety functions. In the Federal Register (FR) notice dated September 22, 1999, the NRC discussed the licensee MOV programs in response to Generic Letters 89-10 and 96-05 in meeting this regulation. With GL 89-10 applying to MOV capability for design-basis events, GL 89-10, Supplement 1, Results of The Public Workshops, dated June 13, 1990, indicates in the response to Question 16 that the NRC staff did not expect licensees to duplicate external factors (such as seismic loads) in performing MOV tests, but considered that these loads should be addressed analytically. The inspectors determined that the seismic loads could amplify the dead and live loading of the valve and fluid and might increase the thrust required to operate 1-SW-MOV-103D as specified by the UFSAR and GL 89-10, Supplement 1. The 3.3% functional margin (19.8 ft-lb of torque) could be depleted when considering the seismic loading, and thus affecting the safety-related functional performance of the valve.
At NAPS, the failure of the licensee to address design basis loading combinations that included normal operation conditions, maximum design conditions, and DBE conditions to determine the functional performance of 1-SW-MOV-103D is a performance deficiency.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to address design basis load combinations in the analysis to determine the safety-related functional performance of 16" service water butterfly valve 1-SW-MOV-103D was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to address design basis load combinations design calculations to determine functional performance of the service water system that required to automatically support the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers on a high-high containment signal and to close if required to provide containment isolation that affects the availability, reliability, and capability of service water system.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality Cross-Cutting Aspect: None
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components.
Contrary to the above, since 08/21/2019, the licensee failed to review for suitability the parts and equipment that are essential to the safety-related functions of the service water system 1-SW-MOV-103D required to automatically support the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers on a high-high containment signal and to close if required to provide containment isolation.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Verify the Effects of Overstressing the Backseat of Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000339/2022010-02 None 71111.21N.0
Open/Closed The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III for the licensees failure to justify the model used for accurately representing the geometry of the disc and seat and the forces acting on the valves backseat and bonnet of 2-RC-MOV-2536, Block Valve for Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve.
Description:
In 2013, prior to the third and final diagnostic test stroke, block valve MOV 2-RC-MOV-2536 was manually back-seated with 12,145 lbs. of thrust or 13,120 lbs. when considering measurement uncertainties. This exceeded the backseat weak link limit per Calculation 2044498-C-056, Seismic / Weak Link Calculation for MOVs: 2-RC-MOV-2536 at North Anna Unit 2, Rev. 1. At the time, this was identified as a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) and condition report, (CR) 510969, was submitted for this loss of test control and potential over-stress of the valve backseat. The initial corrective action was to perform a visual inspection and blue check of the backseat contact surface area to determine if the backseat must be replaced. The inspectors determined from OE that similar events caused stress degradation of the valve bonnet structure.
Under CR 510969, a Corrective Action item (CA) 259171 initiated an addendum A to calculation 2044498-C-056 that evaluates the inadvertent local-manual back-seating of 59-02-RC-MOV-2536. The addendum modeled the forces on the backseat as an applied force to a 45° angle and discarded one of the constituent vectors of the applied force without sufficient justification. This inaccurately implied that only one of the force vectors contributed to the seat stress. In addition, addendum A increased the established seat to disc contact area and used the less conservative full yield (30 kips per square inch (ksi)) instead of the allowable yield limit (18.7 ksi) from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (BPV Code). As a result of this new model, the calculation determined an acceptable condition for the substrate portion of the back-seat, since the allowed thrust of 9,779 lbs. exceeds the local-manual back-seat force of 9,289 lbs. In response to inspector questions, the licensee stated, in part, that this evaluation determined no allowable limits were exceeded and recommended a visual inspection of the valve stem and bonnet back-seat regions be performed to visually inspect and assess the condition of 2-RC-MOV-2536. NAPS Engineering recommends cancelling WO#59102595243 (Valve Bonnet Back-Seat Inspection) and WO#59102714708 (Contingency Valve Back-Seat Replacement). As a result, the valve bonnet-backseat area of the valve was not inspected or replaced. The inspectors determined that the licensee model did not include sufficient justification for accurately representing the geometry of the disc and seat nor the forces acting on the valves backseat and bonnet.
The inspectors determined that the contact profile between disk and backseat had the same geometry as a globe valve. The inspectors noted that the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) had established models and equations for this contact profile to determine the disc to seat contact stresses, and what is needed to determine the effect of the backseat overstress event. In addition, the EPRI models and equations satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The EPRI model indicates that the backseat yield stress limit, 30 ksi, was most likely exceeded during the event. This was because both vector components of the applied force contribute to the disc to seat contact stress.
The licensees current position is to rely on ASME BPV Code service level D to accept the condition of the valve internals. Level D service limits are allowed in the ASME BPV Code, and permit gross general deformations with some consequent loss of dimensional stability and damage requiring repair, which may require removal of the component or support from service. Using Level D service limits to cancel the planned corrective actions of inspecting and repairing potential degradation to safety related active components (such as pumps and valves), does not meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix B requirements, especially where plastic deformation of internal parts can prevent an active component from performing its safety function. Over stressing the bonnet could result in a gross general deformation with some consequent loss of dimensional stability and damage of the backseat which, in turn, could have affected other components in the valve. Although the licensee previously obtained peer review of its calculations, the technical issues identified by the inspectors did not appear to have been considered as part of the peer review.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to justify the model used for accurately representing the geometry of the disc and seat and the forces acting on the valves backseat and bonnet for block valve 2-RC-MOV-2536, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. because a failure of the structure of the pressurizer block valve could cause undesirable consequences during accident sequences.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality Cross-Cutting Aspect: None
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, Requires, in part, that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, since April 23, 2013, the licensee failed to provide design control measures for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of alternate or simplified calculational methods to determine the actions necessary to address potential gross general deformation with some consequent loss of dimensional stability and damage of the backseat that could have degraded other components in the valve.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Ms. Lisa Hilbert and other members of the licensee staff.
On August 10, 2022, the inspectors presented the Re-Exit inspection results to Ms. Lisa Hilbert and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
14938.32-M-1
Maximum Differential Pressure High Pressure Safety
Injection and Auxiliary Feedwater Valves
Rev. 1
2044498-C-014
Seismic / Weak Link Calculation for MOVs: 1-CH-MOV-
1115B/D, 2-CH-MOV-2115B/D, 1-SI-MOV-1863A/B, 2-SI-
MOV-2863A/B
Rev. 1
2044498-C-036-
ADD-G
Seismic / Weak Link Calculation for MOVs:1-SI-MOV-
1890A, 1-SI-MOV-1890B, 1-SI-MOV-1890C & 1-SI-MOV-
1890D at North Anna Unit 1 1-RH-MOV-1720A and 1-RH-
MOV-
20B at North Anna Unit 1
Rev. 0
2044498-C-050B
SEISMIC / WEAK LINK CALCULATION for MOVs: X-RC-
MOV-X535 & 1-RC-MOV-1536 at North Anna X-RC-MOV-
X535 & X-RC-MOV-X536 at Surry
Rev. 2
2044498-C-056
SEISMIC / WEAK LINK CALCULATION for MOVs: 2-RC-
MOV-2536 at North Anna Unit 2
Rev. 1
2044498-C-056
Addendum A
Seismic - Weak Link Calculation for MOVs 2-RC-MOV-
2536
Rev. 1
59-02-PT-213.20
Valve Inservice Testing 2-MS-TV-211A and 2-MS-TV-
211B
Rev. 13
CE-1436
Seismic Qualification for PCV Valves, including 1-RC-
PCV-1456
2/18/1998
CT-CACL-MEC-
DR-2958
Design / Seismic / Weak link report for 2-SI-MOV-2867A
2/21/2012
CT-CALC-MEC-
2044498-C-050A
Seismic / Weak Link Calculation for MOVs at North Anna
& 2 and Surry 1 & 2
Rev. 3
DR-3566
Class 150 Triple Offset Butterfly Valve (Nuclear Safety
Related) Actuator Limitorque SMB-00-10/HBC-3
Rev. 0
ETE-NA-2013-
0059
North Anna Air Operated Valve (AOV) Categorization
Basis
Rev. 2
ME-0623-ADD-
00A
System Level Calculation for Category 1 Air Operated
Valves
Rev. 0
71111.21N.02
Calculations
ME-0659
Evaluation of Category 1 AOVs to Perform their Design
Rev. 0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Basis Function
ME-0659-ADD-L
Evaluation of Cat 1 AOVs to Perform their Design Basis
Function
2/18/2013
ME-0697
MOV Differential Pressure (DP) Calculation for the Valves
59-01-SI-MOV-1
Rev. 0
ME-0922
MOV Differential Pressure (DP) Calculation for the subject
valves: 1-RH-MOV-1700, 1-RH-MOV-1701, 1-RH-MOV-
20A, 1-RH-MOV-1720B, 2-RH-MOV-2700, 2-RH-MOV-
2701, 2-RH-MOV-2720A, 2-RH-MOV-2720B
Rev. 0
ME-120
Addendum 004
maximum differential pressure across valves 01-RC-MOV-
1535
Rev. 0
ME-12166
Fatigue Analysis for HBC Actuator for 1SW-MOV-103D
Rev. 0
ME-12181
NAPS Unit 1 and Unit 2 RSHX SW Supply and Return
Valve Setup Calculation and JOG Evaluation
Rev. 0
ME-12197
JOG Classification Document
Rev. 0
ME-12198
Calculation of Minimum Required Closing Thrust at CST
(C14) for Limit Switch (LS) controlled SB actuators with
leakage requirements (1-CH-MOV-1115B/D and 2-CH-
MOV-2115B/D)
Rev. 0
ME-3050
JOG Calculation of Required Thrust Settings for MOV 1-
RC-MOV-1535
Rev. 3
ME-3055
JOG Calculation of Required Thrust Settings for MOV 1-
RH-MOV-1720B
Rev. 3
ME-3064
JOG Calculation of Required Thrust Settings and margin
for 59-01-SI-MOV-1836
Rev. 2
ME-3135
JOG Calculation of Required Thrust Settings for MOV 2-
Rev. 2
ME-3182
JOG Calculation of Required Thrust Settings for MOV 2-
RC-MOV-2536
Rev. 2
NA-CALC-ASM-
6730
Design and Seismic Report of Target Rock Valves
including 1RC-SOV-101A
Rev. 1
NA-PROC59-
000-59-EZD
North Anna Units 1 and 2 Environmental Zone Description
07/18/2019
PQE-03.01-P01
Environmental Qualification for Motor Operated Valves
Rev. 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Outside Containment
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1062856,
CR1080095,
CR1080391,
CR1117567,
CR1119542,
CR1159527,
CR1179992,
CR1193543
050-0029411-
D01
Torqseal Triple-Offset Butterfly Valve
Rev. H
11715-12050-
6.43-24A
8" 150# Gate Valve R.S. B.B. Cast Stain Stl Butt Weld
Ends Stellite Trim Seal W.B. Motor Operated
Rev. D
11715-7.69-116A
Fisher Controls Co. NA-125 Steel Body Style 1
Rev. A
11715-ESK-6CY-
Elementary Diagram 480V Circuit for 01-SW-MOV-103D
Rev. 25
11715-ESK-6NR
Elementary Diagram 1-RC-PCV-1456
Rev. 20
11715-FM-078B
Service Water System Unit 1
Rev. 37
11715-FM-093B
Reactor Coolant System VOND for 1-RC-PCV-1456
Rev. 29
11715/12050-
6.43-11D
10x8x10 N
- O. S350 W DD ASA Series 1500, Welding
Ends Outside Screw & Yoke Gate Valve With Lip Seal
and SMB-2-00 Limitorque Valve Control
Rev. 5
15_NA-DWG-
000-1800084-
11715-RC-109
SH-001
Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Power Relief Valve
Rev. 0
Drawings
NA-EDWG-000-
11715_12050-
6.43-7C SH-001
Velan Engineering, Forged Bolted Bonnet MOV for ASA
1500 lb 3
Rev. 6
NA-09-0116
Upgrades to 2-CH-MOV-211B/D, 2-CH-MOV-2289A, 2-SI-
MOV-2860A/B, and 2-SI-MOV-2867C for MOV JOG
Imporvements
Rev. 0
NA-10-00126
Design Change for Replacement of 2-SI-MOV-2867A
2/07/2010
Engineering
Changes
NA-10-00152
Reactor Head Vent Equivalent SOV
10/03/2010
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NA-17-00223
Anchor Darling Gate Valves Wedge Pin and Stem
Replacement /NAPS /Unit l &2
Rev. 2
NA-18-00160
1-RH-MOV-1720A/B Control Scheme Modification
Rev. 0
NA-19-00086
2-MS-TV-211A & 2-MS-TV-211B Trim Replacement
Rev. 1
NA-20-00051
2-SW-MOV-203B/D and 2-SW-MOV-204B/D
Replacement
Rev. 2
CT-EQUAL-000-
PQE-35.04-P01
Plant Qualification Evaluation for Reactor Head Vents
Rev. 3
ETE-CME-2013-
25
Design Basis COF for Gate Valves With Stellite-Stellite
Disc/Seat Material Pairs
Rev. 0
ETE-CME-2018-
0011
MOV Rate-of-Loading (ROL) Evaluation for North Anna
and Surry Power Stations
Rev. 0
ETE-NA-2013-
0059
North Anna Air Operated Valve Categorization Basis
06/08/2016
ME-0985
Pressure Locking Analysis for GL 95-07: North Anna
Rev. 0
NA-CALC-MEC-
ME-0659
Evaluation to Perform Design Basis Function for 1-RC-
PCV-1456
2/18/2013
NA-CALC-PSS-
CE-1641
Analysis of Reactor Head Vent Line Unit 1
Engineering
Evaluations
SEWS 1-RC-
PCV-1456
Screening evaluation work sheet for 1-RC-PCV-1456
2/30/1998
59-A101-00002
Darling OS & Y Motor Operated Gate Valves
Rev. 5
59-A101-00004
Flexible Wedge Type Gate Valves
Rev. 5
59-F098-00001
Instruction Manual for Anchor Darling Double-Disc Gate
Valves Sizes 2-1/2" and above
Rev. 1
59-F264-00010
Fisher ES and EAS Easy-E Valves CL125 through CL600
Rev. 10
59-F264-00011
Series 476 Actuators
Rev. 2
59-L553-00001
SMB Series/ SB Series Installation and Maintenance
Rev. 9
59-L553-00002
Limitorque Type HBC Series
Rev. 6
CE-0110
Criteria and Approach for Seismic Qualification of Valves
09/30/1999
Miscellaneous
CT-EQUAL-000-
GQE-03.01-G02
Nuclear Power Station Qualification Type Test Report
Limitorque Valve Actuators with Type LR Motor for
Rev. 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CT-PO-000-
45323520
Certificate of Compliance for Valve Model 79AB-008BB-1
2/08/2003
ETE-CME-2013-
25
Design Basis COF for Gate Valves With Stellite-Stellite
Disc/Seat Material Pairs
Rev. 0
IOM-BFVM-02-
16a
Installation and Operation Manual Torqseal Valves
Rev. 1
SDBD-NAPS-
System Design Basis Document for Auxiliary Feedwater
System
Rev. 22
SDBD-NAPS-CH
System Design Basis Document for Chemical and Volume
Control System
Rev. 28
SDBD-NAPS-MS
System Design Basis Document for Main Steam And
Ancillary Systems
Rev. 27
SDBD-NAPS-NC
SDBD for Nuclear Control System
Rev. 14
SDBD-NAPS-RC
System Design Basis Document for Reactor Coolant
System
Rev. 31
SDBD-NAPS-RH
System Design Basis Document for Residual Heat
Removal System
Rev. 17
SDBD-NAPS-SI
System Design Basis Document for Safety Injection
System North Anna Power Station
Rev. 31
SDBD-NAPS-SW
System Design Basis Document for Service Water
System
Rev. 29
1-PT-138.3A
1-SI-MOV-1836 COMBINED CHARGING PUMP 1A
HEAD CURVE VERIFICATION AND HHSI BRANCH
FLOW VERIFICATION USING SMART TRANSMITTERS
04/15/2021
1-PT-210.12
Valve Inservice Inspection (RCS Gaseous Vent System)
04/17/2021
1-PT-212.10
Valve Inservice Inspection, 1-RC-PCV-1456
04/14/2021
1-PT-212.7
1-SI-MOV 1836 VALVE INSERVICE INSPECTION
(SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM)
04/07/2021
1-PT-214.16
Valve Inservice Inspection (Residual Heat Removal
System Remote Valve Position Indication and Digital
Points Verification)
Rev. 11
1-PT-78.4
Valve Inservice Inspection (Residual Heat Removal
System)
Rev. 14
Procedures
2-PT-212.3
Valve Inservice Inspection (Chemical and Volume Control
Rev. 26
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
System)
2-PT-213.11
Valve Inservice Inspection (Service Water)
Rev. 24
2-PT-213.20
Valve Inservice Inspection (2-MS-TV-211A AND 2-MS-
TV-211B)
Rev. 19
2-PT-214.18
Valve Inservice Inspection (Misc. Outside Containment
Isolation Valve Position Indication)
Rev. 15
2-PT-214.2
Valve Inservice Inspection (Charging System Valve
Position Indication)
Rev. 14
2-PT-215.1
Valve Inservice Inspection RWST Isolation Valves
Leakage Test
Rev. 17
2-PT-57.4
Safety Injection Operational Test
Rev. 62
2-PT-61.1
Reactor Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
Rev. 25
2-PT-61.3
Containment Type C Test
Rev. 51
2-PT-66.3
Containment Depressurization Actuation Operational Test
Rev. 51
2-PT-71.1Q
2-FW-P-2, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, And
Valve Test
Rev. 74
2-PT-71.1Q.1
2-FW-P-2, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater 1st
Comprehensive Pump and Valve Test
Rev. 27
DNES-AA-
ME/MOV-1001
Motor-Operated Valves
Rev. 8
DNES-AA-MOV-
1001
Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Test Preparation and
Evaluation
Rev. 4
Preventive Maintenance Program
Rev. 15
ER-AA-AOV-10
Air Operated Valve Program
Rev. 3
ER-AA-AOV-100
Air Operated Valve Program Categorization
Rev. 3
ER-AA-AOV-101
Design Basis Review
Rev. 4
ER-AA-AOV-102
AOV Testing and Control of Setup Parameters
Rev. 4
ER-AA-IST-10
ASME Inservice Testing Program
Rev. 7
ER-AA-IST-107
ASME IST Program - Inservice Testing of Active Motor
Operated Valves
Rev. 0
ER-AA-MOV-10
Motor-Operated Valve Program
Rev. 3
ER-AA-MOV-101
Motor-Operated Valve Program Process
Rev. 5
ER-AA-PRS-
Preventive Maintenance Task Basis and Maintenance
Rev. 15
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1010
Strategy
ER-NA-APJ-318
CFR 50 Appendix J Program (Containment Leakage)
Rev. 4
Work Orders
203386047,
59077471001,
59103128339,
203386047,
203297705,
59102632935,
59102639723,
203378993,
203287651,
203287716,
59102402552,
203288895,
203382345,
59102102277,
59103011593,
59102425464,
59102210021,
59102208906,
59102933959,
59102648690