ML20155B973

Insp Repts 50-499/88-24 on 880405-0502.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Tagging Status of Equipment,Cable Protection,Followup on Previous Insp Findings & Followup on Licensee Reported Significant Const Deficiencies

ML20155B973
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	06/03/1988
From:	Constable G, Garrison D, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155B942	List: ML20155B938 ML20155B958 ML20155B973
References
50-499-88-24, NUDOCS 8806140038
Download: ML20155B973 (13)

See also: IR 05000499/1988024

Text

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APPENDIX B,

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. ;, . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION- .

> ' REGION IV-

NRC Inspection. Report: 50-499/88-24 Construction Permit: CPPR-129-

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Docket: 50-499 CP Expiration Date: December 1989 ,

Licensee: Houston Lightir.g & Power Company (HL&P) '

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001

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Facility Name: South Texas Project, Unit 2 (STP)

Inspection 'At: STP, Ma,tagorda County, Texas

Inspection Conducted: April 5 <throuch May 2,1988

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Inspectors: / h www

D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector, Reactor

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Project Section D, Division;of Reactor

Projects

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D. M. Hunnicott, Senior Reactor Inspector

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Reactor Project Section D, Division of

Reactor Projects

Approved: h orAnc.'

G. L. Constable, Chief, Reactor Project

d/3/87

Date '

Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

8806140038 880607

{DR ADOCK 05000499

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted April'5 through May 2,1988 (Report 50'-499/88-24)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including tagging. status of

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equipment, cable protection, followup on previous inspection findings, followup 4

on licensee reported significant construction. deficiencies, review of 10 CFR

.Part 21 reporting program, reactor vessel and internal work observation,

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reactor vessel and internal .QA review, standby diesel generator. expansion seals

replacement, and safety-related piping installation observations,-

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Results: .Within the seven areas inspected, three apparent violations were

widentified (improper tagging of equipment, paragraph 2; inadequate cab'e

protection, paragraph 3; and inadequate housekeeping, paragraph 10).

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DETAILS-

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1. Persons Contacted

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HL&P

• J. S. Phelps, Supervising Engineer, Project Compliance-

• S. M. Head, Support Licensing Engineering

• W. G. Wellborn, Supervising Project Engineer

• S. D. Phillips, P Z Engineer'

• X. M. 0'Gara, Project Compliance

• T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance Manager

• G. Ondriska, Startup Engineer

• A. R. Mikus, General Supervisor

• T. Quirk, General Supervisor, Records Management System

Bechtel

• R. D. Bryan, Field Construction Manager

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• R. H. Medina, Quality Assurance Supervisor

, Ebasco

• R. Abe'i, Quality Program Site Manager

• R. C. Sisson, Site Resident Engineer

In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with

various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor and other contractor

personnel.during this inspection.

• Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on

April 22, 1988. ,

2. Tagging Status of Equipment - Unit 2 (50071)

Numerous procedures on the site required tagging to reflect the correct

status of the items tagged. During the inspection in the "B" Isolation

Valve Cubicles (IVC), five instances were observed by the NRC inspectors

where the tagging on valves and components did not reflect the current

status of the tagged equipment. The observed incorrect tagging is listed

. below:

• One tag indicated a valve to be temporarily installed. The valve was

permanently installed. ,

• Two tags indicated parts were removed or to be removed and had been

on the equipment for three years. The required action was found to

be abandoned.

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,0ne. gate valve was found with only the body intact in the line. No

status or tagging was on or near the valve.

One secondary system hydrostatic test tag was observed which should

have been removed before the primary hydrostatic test was perfonned.

During the review of the procedures, the NRC inspector concluded that

clarification in some instances was needed for removal and change of

status. This problem could be a plant generic problem. The licensee's

failure to maintain current status tags on equipment (tags that were

invalid or did not correctly identify the status of components) is an

apparent violation (499/8824-01) of NRC requirements and licensee

commitments. ,

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3. Cable protection - Unit 2 (51065 and 51063)

During the inspection of the "B" Isolation Valve Cubicle on April 20

and 21, 1988, and previous inspections of the electrical switchgear rooms

in the electrical auxiliary buildin

there were numerous (more than instances 25) g, the of

NRC inspectors

failure observed

to install cable that

softeners over the sharp edges on some of the cable trays. The sharp edges

on cable trays were observed in the cable trays where electrical cables

were routed from one cable tray to another cable tray. Licensee procedures

are clear concerning this item. The NRC inspection results indicated that

failure to install cable softeners could be a generic plant problem. The

licensee's failure to provide cable softeners, where required, to preclude

damage -to electrical cableijacket material is an apparent violation

(499/8824-02) of NRC requirements and licensee coninitments.

4. Followup on Licensee Reported Significant Construction Deficiencies

(10 CFR 50.55(e)) (36100 and 92/00)

(Closed) Incident Review Committee (IRC) No. 398

This item involved a finding that if the standby diesel generator (SDG)

was being operated in the testing mode and a loss of offsite power (LOOP)

occurred, the electrical supply breakers to the 480 VAC load centers would

be tripped. Then, since the SDG would be running at design speed, the

breakers would be signaled to close shortly thereaf ter. The signal to

close prior to full spring recharge would cause the antipump feature on

the electrical supply breakers to the 480 VAC loads to lock out the

breakers. The breaker lockout would prevent energizing of all 480 VAC

loads connected to the affected train.

Configuration control package (CCP) 2-E-ST-833, Revision 0, dated

August 20, 1987, was issued to add an Agastat relay (6-second setting) in

the LOOP control circuit f rom the sequencer to ensure that the DG breaker

does not close until the 480 VAC circuit breaker closing springs are

,

cha rged. Site electrical discipline personnel had been reinstructed in

the proper design methods assnciated with conditions to prevent

recurrence. This item is considered closed.

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(Closed) IRC No. 400 ,

This item involved concerns related to inadequate cooling of the Unit 2

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high voltage cubicle panels for the SDG. HL&P completed and installed a

design, modification to provide additional cooling for the Unit ~2 SDG "

panels. A 100-hour test run of the SDG was completed successfully. No

recurrence of overheating conditions were observed. This item is-

considered closed.

(Closed) IRC No. 402

This item involved a finding that some motor shaft-to-pinion gear keys

sheared (failed) in Limitorque Model SMB-0-25 operators. The shearing of

the keys was apparently due to'the keys being machined from incorrect or

defective material. Twelve motor shaft-to-pinion gear keys in valve ,

operators in Unit 2 (Deficiency Evaluation Report 87-046) were replaced

with keys manufactured from AISI 1018 steel. According to the material

specifications, AISI 1018 steel is the correct material. This item is

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considered closed.

(Closed) IRC No. 403

This item involved Class 1E electrical cable splices which utilize Raychem

^ insulation material and which had been identified as nonconforming after

final QA-acceptance. Three different problem areas were identified by the

licensee. The licensee reviewed the completed cables and terminations; '

reviewed a computer resort of cables and terminations to validate previous

data; reviewed data on electrical penetration termination cards to assure

that electrical splices to electrical penetrations had been reinspected;

reviewed the transfer of data from master splice lists to the reinspection

data lists to identify any omissions; and reviewed the qualifications and

. work performed by off-project Bechtel personnel to assure that the

methodology and reviews had been performed correctly. This item is

considered closed.

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(Closed) IRC No. 408

This item involved the failure of tubes in the component cooling

water (CCW)heatexchangers. The tube failures resulted from shell side

flow induced vibrations. Design modifications to the heat exchangers were

o required to prevent further damage. In each CCW, 30 tubes were removed in

the areas above and below the impingment plate. Two hundred sixty-four

tubes were rodded with steel rods inserted to dampen vibration ar.d to

decrease the vibration level in the adjacent inboard tubes. The vacated

tube sheet holes and the rodded tubes were plugged with plugs manufactured

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from aluminum bronze material (similar to and compatible with the

tubesheet cladding and essential cooling water (ECW) piping materials).

1he ECW flow (design flow rate was 15,000 gpm) and pressure drop through

the heat exchanger tubes have been recalculated for the modified condition

of the heat exchangers. The seismic qualification and the weight increase

due to the modification of the heat exchangers have been reevaluated.

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Other safety-related heat exchangers have been evaluated to determine if

any of these heat exchangers would be susceptible to the problems observed

in the CCW heat exchangers. None of the heat exchangers evaluated were

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found to be susceptible to these identified problems. The changes that

have been made to the CCW heat exchangers to resolve the vibration induced

problems do not alter previous FSAR commitments. This item is considered

closed.

(Closed) IRC No. 410

This item involved an 8-inch pneumatic operated butterfly-valve that was

found to "fall closed" instead of "fail open" during system testing

(system flush) in Unit 2. Nonconformance Report (NCR) SN-03566 was

dispositioned to change couplings on the pneumatic operator. The

. replacement of those couplings changed the failure position from "close"

to "open." The licensee checked pneumatic operated butterfly valves of

similar design to assure that correct couplings had been installed. No

other valves have failed in an incorrect position. This item is

considered closed.

(Closed) IRC No. 411

This , item involved loose valve-shaft-to-actuator keys on motor operated

valves (M0Vs). During performance of preventive maintenance on MOVs in

the reactor containment building, the electrical maintenance division

found that keys used to key the motor actuator to the valve stem on

butterfly valves were loose or out of place on some MOVs. The licensee

identified the manufacturer of these 12- and 16-inch diameter butterfly

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valves. The licensee identified a total of 42 M0Vs to be inspected for

icose or missing keys in the keyways. The licensee replaced the loose -

keys with "snug tight" keys in the respective keyways. The licensee also

.

followed up on an NRC issued Information Notice (IEN) 85-67,

"Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below

' Horizontal Axis" and an NRC Circular (IEC), "Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key

May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis." This item is

considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. 10 CFR Part 21 Reporting (36100)

An inspection and review of site documents was initiated by the NRC

inspector to verify that the requirements included in 10 CFR Part 21 were

being adhered to and that licensee documentation and implementation of the

10 CFR Part 21 process functioned as required by NRC regulations and

licensee commitments. The licensee controls were adequate to assure that

the reporting, disposition, evaluation, and records management met NRC

requirements and licensee commitments.

The NRC inspector randomly selected 12 licensee 10 CFR Part 21 packages

for review. The packages selected are listed below. (NOTE: Those 10 CFR

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Part 21 packages identified with an "*" befora the 10 LFR Part 21

identification number had previously been reviewed by an NRC inspector.)

ID Number Title *

• 8604642 Yokogawa AB 40 Voltmeters and Ammeters

8400551 Circuit Breaker Failures During IEEE-323 Testin,g ,

(IEN 83-72)

P21-87-28 Improper Seating of Agastat GP Series Relays

,

• P21-87-29 Inadequate Instructions to-Maintain Torque Switch

Balance (IEB'85-03)

• P21-87-31 Haughto-#620 Lubricant Attacks and Degrades Aluminum

in Valves

1

P21-87-51 Erratic Behavior of Static "0" Ring Differential ,

Pressure Switches" (IEN 86-47)

.

• P21-87-53 Failure o'f Neodyn Pressure Switches Used in Valve

Operators for PORVs (main steam power operated relief

- valve actuator-hydraulic pressure switches)

P21-86-02 Pipe Support Tolerance and Installation Procedures

Improper Electrical Manhole Duct Seal Design

P2}-87-o0

P21-86-03 Defective Emergency Head Lever Supplied for Auxiliary

Feed Pump

P2!-87-16 Damaged Insulation on Valve Operator DC Motor Caused

Motor Failure (IEN 87-08)

P21-87-19 Design Defect in Valve Operators Manufactured Prior

to 1975

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Reactor Vessel and Internals Work Observation - Unit 2 (50053)

a. Observations and Evaluations

The NRC inspectors performed direct ot,servations and independent

evaluations of the licensee's work performance, work in progress, and

completed work. These observations determined that activities

related to the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor vessel head had

, been accomplished in accordance with NRC requirements and facility

SAR commitments. The licensee was in the process of completing

electrical wire installation on the reactor vessel closure head guide

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tubes and related components. The wiring in progress was being

.. perfonned in accordance with procedures and general construction

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. practices.

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b. Installed Reactor Vessel Protection

The installed reactor vessel was being protected in accordance with

approved pr_ocedures. A protective covering over the top of the

reactor vessel assured that foreign objects and debris would not fall

into the reactor vessel. Personnel access into the covered reactor

vessel was controlled. No personnel entryway into the reactor vessel

was provided through to the covering over the reactor vessel into the

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reactor vessel.

c. Installation of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Components

The NRC inspectors verified that the reactor vessel closure head

assembly disconnect devices and the instnament port columns were

installed in accordance with approved procedures and the following

drawings:

• CE E 12173-101-003, "Closure Head Assembly," Revision 3, dated

December 1973.

Westinghouse 6123E44, "Instr Port Column, Sef., Loading and

Hydrostatic Test Assembly," Revision 3, dated March 1, 1978.

- Westinghouse 1455E38 "(TG) South Texas Report No.1 Reactor

General Assy." Sheet 2 of 3, Revision 0, dated September 27,

h 1978. (NOTE: Drawing for Unit 1 is used for Unit 2.)

Westinghouse 1209E92, "Interface Feature Critical 4 XLR Reactor

Internals," Sheet 1 of 6, Revision 3, dated February 13, 1978.

d. Weld Inspection of Reactor Vent Piping

The NRC inspector performed an inspection of the 1-inch piping from

the near center of the reactor vessel head including two manual

relief gate valves and the balance of piping, including the four

Target Rock solenoid operated relief valves. The Target Rock valves

were identified by their respective serial numbers: 103, 105, 108,

and 110. The inspection determined that the weld quality and the

installed piping and valve configurations were in accordance with

design and construction requirements. No indications of damage or

inadequate installation were identified. Visual inspections of

weldin'; and general installation indicated that the welding,

components, and reactor vessel; closure head were in satisfactory

condition.

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e. Review of Data Packages

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s The NRC inspectors reviewed the data packages for the two manually

operated globe valves and for each of the four solenoid operated

globe valves. The solenoid valves were manufactured by Target Rock.

These six valves and the associated piping were designed to meet the

prinary system requirements, including design operating pressure of

2485 psig and 650 F. The results of the review of the-data packages

for the four Target Rock manufactured solenoid valves.are as follows:

Component Material Spec. No. Material

Body ASME SA 182 SS316L

Bonnet ASME CA 479 SS316

Disc ASME SA 564 SS17-4ph

Indicator ASME SA 479 SS316

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The data packages for these'six valves were complete and contained

,

the information required by ASME, Westinghouse, and the licensee to

fully document the material, testing, welding., and inspections

performed on each of these six valves. The data packages also met

the requirements stated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.88, "Collection,

Storage and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance

Records."

f. Procedure and SAR Review

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The NRC inspectors determined that the inspection, installation, and

wiring in progress were in accordance with licensee approved

procedures and the SAR (Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, and 17, including

appropriate codes and standards referenced in these SAR Chapters).

g. _ Containment Vessel Housekeeping

The licensee was adhering to the recommendations stated in RG 1.39,

"Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" in

the general area of the reactor vessel internals and reactor vessel

head laydown areas.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Reactor Vessel and Internals QA Review - Unit 2 (50051)

The NRC inspectors determined that the licensee's onsite QA

responsibilities relative to the reactor vessel and internals installation

had been established and implemented. The licensee had' established an

audit program (including plans, procedures, and schedule) covering

safety-related work and control functions related to the reactor vessel,

reactor vessel closure head, and internals. The licensee and each

contractor had an established program to assure that craft, eramination,

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and inspection personnel associated with the reactor vessel, reactor

vessel closure head, and internals had been trained and qualified to

perform the designated tasks. The licensee had developed appropriate and, '-

adequate procedures. These procedures assured that activities associated

with the reactor vessel, reactor vessel closure head, and internals were

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controlled and performed in accordance with NRC requirements and SAR

commitments-(SAR Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, and 17 and the codes and standirds

referenced in these SAR Chap;ers).

These procedures included precautions to preclude damage or mishandling of

equipment and components. The installation of the reactor vessel

internals and the reactor vessel closure head were properly addressed.

No violations or deviations,were identified.

8. Standby Diesel Generator Expansion Seals (Bellows) Replacement - Unit 2

(50073)

During the licensee's prerequisite testing (initial startup) of the "A"

SDG, leaks were discovered in cylinder liner expansion seals (bellows) on

cylinders 10R, SR, 2L, 3L, and 4L. Each of the three Unit 2 SDGs is a

V-type, 20 cylinder, Model KSV, manufactured by Cooper-Bessemer.

These bellows are designed to allow the cylinder liners to expand and

contract. The bellows are a cooling water jacket pressure boundary

secondary seal between the cylinder liners and the cylinder block. The

secondary seal prevents jacket water cooling system fluid from entering

. the diesel lube oil sump. The primary seal is the metal to metal contact

l of the liner to the engine block.

L The NRC inspectors performed 19 separate inspections during the expansion

seals (bellows) removal and replacement activities on the "A" SDG. The

NRC inspectors visually inspected all 20 of the bellows that were removed

for replacement by contractnr personnel. Visual inspection by the NRC

l

inspectors verified that the bellows removed from cylinder 10R- had a

l through wall hole about 1/4 inch in diameter and that the bellows removed

I from cylinders SR, 2L, 3L, and 4L had through wall pin holes. Replacement

l of all 20 bellows on "A" SDG and related work activities was completed by

the contractor on April 22, 1988.

,

The licensee shipped the two bellows that were removed from cylinders 10R i

! and 10L to the Bechtel Material Laboratory for analysis. The analysis

reported that both bellows exhibited evidence of Microbiological Induced

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Corrosion (MIC) and trar,sgranular stress corrosion cracking.

,

The licensee prepared a detailed report for submittal to the NRC. The

licensee's report was submitted to the NRC on May 11, 1988. This report

discussed the discovery of MIC in the jacket water cooling systems, piping

l replaced, bellows replacement, an evaluation of storage history, Unit 1

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storage history and inspection activities, and overall conclusions of

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Units 1 and 2 SDG inspection, repair, replacement, and analysis

activities.

No violations or deviations were identified. .

9. Safety-Related Piping Observations - Unit 2 (49063 and 49065)

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The NRC inspector performed an inspection of safety related piping to

assess the licensee's program for welding off-site fabricated spool pieces

into completed systems and to determine the adequacy of inspection to the

specifications,

a. Work Observation ,

The NRC inspector selected the main steam and feedwater systems for

the "B" train in the "B" bay of the Isolation Valve Cubicles (IVC).

The following portions of the completed systems were inspected:

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Main steam line from the north wall to containment penetration

M-3 which included the following:

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(1) Main steam isolation valve - FSV 7424

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(2) Main steam isolation valve bypass - FV 7422

(3) Five safety valves (PSV 7420 through PSV 7420D)

(4) Manual steam dump valve - MS-0038 ,

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(5) Remote operated steam dump valve - PV-7421

(6) Five main steam line hangers (Numbers HL-5010 through

HL-5014)

(7) Main steam manifeld and balance of piping - Feedwater line

f rom the north wall to the containment penetration

including:

a) Feedwater Check Valve - FW-0C65

b) Feedwater bypass and Valve - FV-7147

c) Feedwater Control Valve - FV-7142

d) Balance of uninsulated piping

The following isometric drawings were reviewed and compared to

installed components during the inspection of the above:

2G369 PMS 646, Sheet 7, Revision 6

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SG369 PMS 646, Sheet 2, Revision 7

• 2G3818 FW 1030, AA2, Sheet 1, Revision 2 .

2G3618 FW 1053, AA2, Sheet 1, Revision 2

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Five main steam line hangers (Numbers HL-5010 through HL-5014) were

found to oe installed in accordance with the following drawings

MS-9002-HL5010, Sheet 1, Revision 7

MS-9002-HL5011, Sheet 1, Revision 6

MS-9002-HL5012, Sheet 1, Revision.6

MS-9002-HL5013, Sheet 1, Revision 4

MS-9002-HL5014, Sheet 1, Revision 2

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The NRC inspectors visually examined the pi)ing systems for correct

length, size, and configuration. The pipe langers were inspected for

, location, configuration, welding, and hanger type. The valves were "

examined for data plate information, identification, visual damage,

installation assured flow in the proper direction, and general

condition.

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The NRC inspectors determined that the two piping systems inspected

had been installed in accordance with the procedures and drawings,

b. Record Review

The NRC inspectors reviewed the code data packages for the spool

pieces and valves in the safety-related portions of two systems (main

steam and feedwater) inspected. The following records were found to

be properly stored, retrievable, and representative of this

particular segment of the installation.

Valves

30 inch Atwood and Morrill - Main steam isolation valve - FSV-7424

4 inch WMK - Main steam isolation bypass - FV-7422

6 inch Dresser - Main steam safety - BT02199 - PSV-7420 C

8 inch Anchor Darling - Main steam dump - MS-0038 '

8 inch WMK - Main steam dump - PV-7421

18 inch Anchor Darling - Feedwater control - FV-7142

18 inch Anchor Darling - Feedwater check valve - FW-0066

2 inch Valtek - Feedwater bypass - FV-7147A

Piping

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30 inch MS-1002-GAZ

3 inch FW-1053-AAZ

No violations or deviations were identified during the inspection of

the piping systems. However, the inspection was expanded to include

construction activities in the "B" IVC, and the results of the

inspection are documented in paragraph 10 below.

10. Housekeeping - Unit 2 (50073 and 49063)

During an inpsection of the ICV's, the NRC inspectors observed excessive

amounts of construction debris, abandoned tools, and various supplies

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scattered about. Also, the inspector noted dirt in cable trays, under

grates and on beams and flanges. Tnis is an apparent violation of the '

licer3ee's Construction Site Procedure (CSP) .12. "General Instruction for

Houseneeping During Construction," RG 1.39, and American National

Standards Institute ' ANSI) N45.2.3. The licensee is committed to RG 1.39

and ANSI N45.2.3. The NRC inspectors determined that the lack of

appropriate housekeeping ac

- work being performed in an ,tivities in

inefficient this area

manner that could

could result

producein low

routine

quality results that would not be in conformance with NRC requirements and

licensee commitments. This unsatisfactory level of housekeeping was

evident.,in the IVC area only. The licensee's failure to maintain minimum

housekeeping) standards

(499/8824-03 of the in the IVC area

above requirements is an apparent violation

and commitments.

11. Exit Interview (30703) ,

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

,.

paragraph 1) on April 22, 1988, and summarized the scope and findings of

the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee

management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss

identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of

the information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection.

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