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| {{#Wiki_filter:February 16, 2021 | | {{#Wiki_filter: |
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| REISSUE - PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT -
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| INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; AND 07200010/2020001
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| ==Dear Mr. Domingos:==
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| The NRC identified that the inspection report sent to Mr. S. Sharp dated July 30, 2020 (ML20213A880) inadvertently omitted two inspection samples associated with the Mitigating System Performance Indicators for heat sink and high pressure injection, from the report. As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety with the updated subject. None of these changes affected the technical content of the report.
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| On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
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| One NRC-identified Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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| No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
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| A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
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| consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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| If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
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| Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
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| Sincerely,
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| /RA/
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| Hironori Peterson, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000282; 05000306; and 07200010 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60; and SNM-2506
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| ===Enclosure:===
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| As stated
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| ==Inspection Report==
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| Docket Numbers: 05000282; 05000306; 07200010 License Numbers: DPR-42, DPR-60, SNM-2506 Report Numbers: 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; 07200010/2020001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0041 and I-2020-001-0143 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location: Welch, Minnesota Inspection Dates: April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020 Inspectors: J. Dalzell, Health Physicist R. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist N. Feliz-Adorno, Branch Chief L. Haeg, Senior Resident Inspector K. Pusateri, Resident Inspector Approved By: Hironori Peterson, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
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| =SUMMARY=
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| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115
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| ===List of Findings and Violations===
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| Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Not Applicable 60855.1 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146,
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| Design Control for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle (CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
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| ===Additional Tracking Items===
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| None.
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| =PLANT STATUS=
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| Units 1 and 2 operated at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period, with the exception of brief power reductions to perform surveillance testing or flexible power operations.
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| ==INSPECTION SCOPES==
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| Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
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| Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
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| ==REACTOR SAFETY==
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| ==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment==
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| ===Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
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| : (1) Unit 1 caustic addition system on 04/16/2020
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| : (2) 12 diesel-driven cooling water pump on 05/4/2020
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| : (3) 121 safeguards travelling screen on 05/20/2020
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| ===Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)===
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| The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the following:
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| : (1) Unit 1 control rod system on 06/19/2020
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| ==71111.05 - Fire Protection==
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| ===Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
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| : (1) Fire zone 18 relay and cable spreading room on 04/22/2020
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| : (2) Fire zone 58 Unit 1 charging pumps 11, 12, and 13 on 04/22/2020
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| : (3) Fire zone 75 plant screen house elevation 695' on 05/20/2020
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| : (4) Fire zone 74 plant screen house elevation 670' on 06/15/2020
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| ==71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures==
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| ===Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)===
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| The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
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| : (1) 695' elevation turbine building on 04/28/2020
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| ==71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
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| Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
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| (1 Sample)
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| : (1) Control room observations during a spent fuel loading campaign on 05/26/2020
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| ===Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator training in the simulator on 05/27/2020
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| ==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness==
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| ===Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
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| : (1) Component cooling water system on 04/27/2020
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| : (2) AR 501000039958; PMT unsatisfactory due to leak on 4/23/2020
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| ==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
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| ===Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
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| : (1) AR 501000039494; 23 fan coil unit damper did not re-position on 04/09/2020
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| : (2) AR 501000039466; 2A reheater drain level control failure on 04/10/2020
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| : (3) AR 501000039723; CV-31941 had dual indication on the control board on 04/16/2020
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| : (4) 22 diesel-driven cooling water jacket water hose leak availability determination on 05/12/2020
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| : (5) Maintenance risk during 12 residual heat removal pump breaker replacement on 06/23/2020
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| ==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
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| ===Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
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| : (1) 23 containment fan coil unit damper past operability review on 05/04/2020
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| : (2) 22 diesel driven cooling water jacket water hose leak past operability review on 05/06/2020
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| : (3) 22 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump bearing temperature in the alert range on 04/21/2020
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| : (4) 11 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump past operability review on 06/04/2020
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| ==71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing==
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| ===Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)===
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| The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
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| : (1) AR 501000038420; 23 containment fan coil unit damper did not re-position on 04/09/2020
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| : (2) Maintenance on 13 charging pump breaker following instantaneous trip test failure on 04/22/2020
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| : (3) AR 501000039981; PMT planning issues on 2SM-5-4 on 04/23/2020
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| : (4) D5 emergency diesel generator ventilation system testing following damper maintenance on 06/10/2020
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| : (5) 22 component cooling water heat exchanger temperature control valve failure on 06/02/2020
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| ==71111.22 - Surveillance Testing==
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| The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
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| ===Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)===
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| {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=1}}
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| : (1) SP 1856; Bus 26 undervoltage test on 4/28/20
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| ===Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) SP 1089A; RHR quarterly pump and valve test on 05/08/2020
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| ==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation==
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| Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)
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| (1 Sample)
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| : (1) Licensed operator re-qualification training with DEP Performance Indicator evaluation on 06/19/2020
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| ==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE==
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| ===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
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| MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) ===
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| {{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=2}}
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| : (1) Unit 1 MSPI high pressure injection 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/22/2020
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| : (2) Unit 2 MSPI high pressure injection 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/22/2020
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| ===MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)===
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| : (1) Unit 1 MSPI heat removal 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/23/2020
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| : (2) Unit 2 MSPI heat removal 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/23/2020
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| ==71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution==
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| ===Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)===
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| : (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program during the period of January 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020, for potential adverse trends in maintenance practices that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
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| ===Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)===
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| The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
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| : (1) RCE 501000036932; Breaker 26-16 undersized on 03/31/2020
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| ==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
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| - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
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| ===60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants ===
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| {{IP sample|IP=IP 60855|count=1}}
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| : (1) Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, the inspectors remotely evaluated the licensees Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask loading through use of the licensee's in-plant camera system on May 26 - May 29, 2020. To complete this inspection, the inspectors intend to visit the Prairie Island ISFSI before the end of 2020 to evaluate the material and radiological conditions of the site. This site visit is pending further reductions in risk associated with travel during the public health emergency. During the remote portion of the inspection, the inspectors observed the following activities:
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| * Fuel selection and fuel loading for the third and final cask in the campaign, cask number 47
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| * Heavy load movement of the cask out of the spent fuel pool to the cask processing area, and movement of the cask in preparation for transport to the ISFSI
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| * Drying and backfill evolutions
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| * Closure operations
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| * Cask transport evolutions
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| * Radiological field surveys The inspectors evaluated the following change reviews:
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| * Selected corrective action program documents
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| * Selected 72.48 screenings and evaluations
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| ==INSPECTION RESULTS==
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| Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Severity Level IV Not 60855.1 Applicable NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Applicable Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146, Design Control for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle (CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
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| =====Description:=====
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| A new CTV was procured by the licensee for transporting TN-40/40HT casks between the Auxiliary Building and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad.
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| Calculation No. 2018-03457, "Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Loading Associated with New Cask Transport Vehicle," Revision 0, was a safety related analysis that included an evaluation of the stability of spent fuel casks (empty and full) and the CTV (loaded and unloaded). The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) ISFSI was licensed by the NRC in Renewed License SNM-2506, License for Independent Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Amendment 10. License Condition 9, Authorized Use, of SNM-2506, states, in part, that the basis for this license was submitted in the Safety Analysis Report dated August 31, 1990 and as further supplemented and amended in accordance with 10 CFR 72.70 and 10 CFR 72.48. Calculation No. 2018-03457 utilized the ISFSI design basis to establish the acceptance criteria for factors of safety against sliding and tipping. Specifically, section 6.1 of Calculation No. 2018-03457 states the factors of safety against sliding and overturning shall be 1.1 or greater per References 5a and 6a.
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| Reference 5a is Revision 18 of the PINGP ISFSI Safety Analysis Report which established 1.1 as the minimum factor of safety to sliding in section 4.2.1, Structures, for postulated earthquake loads. The TN-40/40HT cask is safety-related equipment and the Auxiliary Building slab foundation is considered a safety-related structure.
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| In Calculation No. 2018-03457, a sliding analysis was performed to assess whether the CTV will slide during a postulated design basis earthquake. The conclusion that the cask would not slide was based on an assumed coefficient of friction of 0.5 between the Auxiliary Building concrete slab and the CTV tracks. This coefficient of friction value was taken from Calculation No. 8708-320, Spent Fuel Storage Cask Transporter for Xcel Energy Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant," Revision 3. In Calculation No. 8708-320, the coefficient of friction was specified as coefficient of friction to road; however, the interfacing surfaces for this value are not described and the CTV travels over multiple surfaces on the haul path towards the ISFSI, including concrete and gravel. Calculation No. 2018-03457 also permits SS [stainless steel] deck plates or plywoods may be placed to protect concrete surfaces if the contact areas between CTV treads and SS deck plates/plywoods are not greater than 8.0 ft2 with maximum thickness of 3/8 in[ch].
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| Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Maintenance Procedure No. D95.10, "Tracked Cask Transporter Vehicle Operations," Revision 0, provided the detailed instructions for the inspection, startup, and operation of the tracked CTV. This procedure did not contain any limitations or guidance regarding the material, size, or placement of the protective surfaces between the Auxiliary Building slab and the tracked CTV. The actual configuration, as remotely observed by the inspectors during ISFSI operations on May 28, 2020, consisted of 1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets placed between the steel CTV treads and the painted Auxiliary Building concrete slab. Since the design for protective surfaces was not translated into a procedure, the installed protective surfaces were not as analyzed in Calculation No. 2018-03457 and deviations to the design were not controlled. Specifically, there were 3 examples where the interfacing surfaces relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was inadequately analyzed, deviations were not controlled, and the installation of these surfaces was not controlled by a procedure to ensure the configuration matched the design:
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| * The chosen coefficient of friction value of 0.5 for the surface between the Auxiliary Building floor and tracks of the CTV was taken from a haul path analysis where these surfaces differed from the interfacing surfaces in the Auxiliary Building (the Auxiliary Building had relatively smooth, painted, concrete floors).
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| * To protect the Auxiliary Building floor, Calculation No. 2018-03457 stated up to 8.0 ft2 of 3/8-inch-thick plywood or stainless-steel plates on the Auxiliary Building floor were permissible, but no analysis was provided about how these multiple surfaces impact sliding or tipping. That is, the analysis did not analyze the interfacing surfaces between the floor and plywood/plate, and similarly did not consider the interfacing surface between the plywood/plate and the tracks on the CTV.
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| * The 3/8-inch plywood or stainless-steel plates were not used. Instead, 1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets were used; however, the change in material and thickness was not analyzed for how it might impact the sliding and tipping analysis.
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| Corrective Actions: The inspector identified this concern during the transfer of the last cask in the loading campaign. Transfer of the loaded cask to the ISFSI was completed safely and without incident. The concern was placed in the corrective action program, and while corrective actions were still being developed at the conclusion of the inspection, preliminary actions include revising Calculation No. 2018-03457.
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| Corrective Action References: AR 501000041132; New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation; May 29, 2020
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| =====Performance Assessment:=====
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| Performance Deficiency: The inspectors concluded that measures were inadequate to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met which resulted in a performance deficiency.
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| Screening: The inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance using IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix E, "Example of Minor Issues." Example 3.e was found to be similar in that the licensee failed to establish measures to ensure that the procedures for setting up the CTV in the auxiliary building were in accordance with the design which lead to reasonable doubt whether the seismic sliding and tipping analysis requirements were met for a CTV loaded with spent fuel. In the 3.e example, the design was correct; however, the installed configuration was not. In this case, the design analysis had deficiencies as well as the procedure, which led to a conclusion that the multiple deficiencies was an issue of more than minor concern.
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| Significance: In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy, ISFSIs are not subject to the SDP and traditional enforcement will be used for these facilities. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
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| =====Enforcement:=====
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| Severity: The inspectors determined that the violation could be evaluated, using Section 6.5.d.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, as a violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) because the licensee failed to meet a regulatory requirement that had a more than minor safety significance.
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| Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control," states, in part, that the licensee shall establish measures to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as specified in the license for those structures, systems, and components to which this section applies, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures must include provisions to ensure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from standards are controlled.
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| Contrary to the above, on May 28, 2020, measures were inadequate to ensure the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
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| Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled.
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| Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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| Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation: Safeguards Breaker Racking 71152 Procedure Inappropriate to the Circumstances This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
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| Violation: Title 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to this requirement, on January 24, 2020, the licensee identified that a 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (D6 emergency diesel generator supply to Bus 26) with an incorrect amperage rating had been installed and in service within Bus 26 since October 11, 2019, due, in part, to insufficient acceptance criteria within Operating Procedure C20.5-1, "4.16kV Breaker Rack Out/Rack In," Revision 41.
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| Significance/Severity: Green. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was a deficiency affecting the qualification of Bus 26 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (a mitigating SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability.
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| Corrective Action References: AR 501000036932 Observation: D6 Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Breaker to Bus 26 71152 Undersized The inspectors reviewed a past operability review and root cause evaluation following the January 24, 2020, identification that Breaker 26-16 (D6 EDG Supply to Bus 26) was installed with an incorrect, undersized amperage since October 11, 2019. This condition was identified by the licensee during troubleshooting following load sequencer modifications for which post maintenance testing was not successful. The breaker was promptly replaced with a correctly-sized breaker prior to restoring operability of D6 and Bus 26. Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's evaluation, the inspectors did not identify any past operability or reportability concerns; however, a Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation of Very Low Safety Significance (Green) was identified and is discussed in this report.
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| Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152 Based on the spring of 2020 COVID-19 public health crisis, the inspectors performed a semi-annual trend review of the licensee's corrective action program during the first and second calendar quarters of 2020. The inspectors focused on whether any adverse trends existed related to human performance, equipment performance, and programmatic effectiveness during this timeframe and did not identify any concerns. For low-level trends that were identified by the licensee, the inspectors did not identify any concerns with the trend inputs, level of evaluation, and planned corrective actions.
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| ==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
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| The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
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| * On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
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| * On June 12, 2020, the inspectors presented interim ISFSI cask loading inspection results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
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| =DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
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| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
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| Procedure Date
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| 60855.1 ALARA Plans Radiation Protection Job Plan 2020 Dry Cask 45, 46, 47 Revision 0
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| Work
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| Radiation Work Permit 205000 Revision 0
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| Calculations 12911.54-SC-10 Design of Buried Electrical Ducts Subjected to Cask Revision 1
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| Transporter Loading
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| 2018-03457 Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Revision 0
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| Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter
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| Calc. No. 03457 Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for 12/16/2019
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| Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter
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| Corrective Action Selected Corrective Action Documents Created Since
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| Documents April 2018
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| Issue ID ISFSI Concrete Strength Greater than ISAR 02/14/2019
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| 501000023147
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| Issue ID ISFSI Dose Calc Incorrect Berm Height 11/04/2019
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| 501000034318
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| Corrective Action Issue ID ISFSI INS: Question 21 Response Time 05/28/2020
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| Documents 501000041017
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| Resulting from Issue ID Lesson Learned Observation of CASK 47 05/28/2020
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| Inspection 501000041018
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| Issue ID NRC ID's Steps Not Signed in PE 05/28/2020
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| 501000041059
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| Issue ID NRC ID's Signoffs in PM Not Transferred 05/28/2020
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| 501000041074
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| Issue ID New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation 05/29/2020
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| 501000041132
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| Miscellaneous 72.48 Evaluation PINGP ISFSI Expansion Calculation Methodology Revision 0
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| No. 1146 Departures
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| 2.48 Evaluation PINGP ISFSI Expansion: AB-5 Procedure and Dose Scaling Revision 0
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| No. 1150 Approach Evaluation
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| 2.48 Screening PINGP ISFSI Expansion Revision 0
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| No. 5565
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| 2.48 Screening EC60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV Revision 0
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| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
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| Procedure Date
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| No. 5640
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| 2.48 Screening EC 60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV Revision 0
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| No. 5641
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| 2.48 Screening EC601000002176; Sensitivity Analysis for Drop Eval of Revision 0
| |
| No. 5652 TN40HT
| |
| 2.48 Screening EC 601000002232 - Revise Calculation TN40HT-0512 Revision 0
| |
| No. 5659
| |
| Cask No. 47 Cask Inventory Verification 05/26/2020
| |
| D95.1 Cask Inventory Verification 05/26/2020
| |
| D95.1 Appendix A Cask Loading Report 05/26/2020
| |
| FP-MA-COM-02 Supplemental Worker Oversight Plan 01/17/2020
| |
| OP-2014-002 Prairie Island Dry Fuel Storage Project Oversight Plan Revision 5
| |
| Sample ID: SFP Spent Fuel Pool Boric Acid 05/26/2020
| |
| 0706 and 0715
| |
| NDE Reports BOP-PT-20-015 TN-40 Special Lift Fixture 04/23/2020
| |
| and BOP-MT-20-
| |
| 2008
| |
| Procedures AB-5 Buried Cask Revision 3
| |
| D95.1 TN-40 Cask Loading Procedure Revision 32
| |
| D95.10 Tracked Cast Transporter Vehicle Operation Revision 0
| |
| D95.3 TN-40 Cask Removal and Storage Procedure Revision 39
| |
| SP 1075.HT TN-40HT Fuel Selection and Identification Revision 4
| |
| Radiation Survey PI-M- Cask 46 Transferred to ISFSI Pad #41 05/21/2020
| |
| Surveys 20200521-9
| |
| Self-Assessments 2019 Nuclear Oversight Prairie Island Nuclear Generating 10/01/2019
| |
| Plant Audit of Programs
| |
| Master Lessons Learned Cask 41-44 05/03/2018
| |
| 600000598736 Snapshot 2020 NRC Inspection 02/28/2020
| |
| CR No. Fleet Cask Loading Challenge Board 04/09/2020
| |
| 603000004605
| |
| QF0406 2020 ISFSI NRC Inspection Snapshot 02/28/2020
| |
| Work Orders WO 7000059192 SP1077 Special Lift Fixture TN-40 Cask 04/17/2020
| |
| WO 700056472 AUX Building Crane Mechanical/Electrical Inspection 02/25/2020
| |
| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
| |
| Procedure Date
| |
| WO 700059191 SP 1057 TN-40 Fuel Selection & Identification 03/17/2020
| |
| WO 700061687 SP1076 ISFSI Qtr Sfty Status 03/16/2020
| |
| 71111.04 Drawings NF-39252 Flow Diagram, Caustic Addition System, Units 1 and 2 Revision 83
| |
| Procedures C1.1.7-1 Unit 1 Reactor Control Checklist Revision 10
| |
| 71111.05 Procedures C5-1 Rod Control System Checklist Revision 10
| |
| C6-1 System Prestart Checklist Rod Position Indication System Revision6
| |
| 71111.06 Calculations ENG-ME-732 Determination of HELB/Flooding Interactions in the Turbine Revision 1
| |
| Building
| |
| ENG-ME-759 GOTHIC Internal Flooding Calculation for the Turbine Revision 1
| |
| Building
| |
| Procedures TP 1398 Internal Flooding Walkdown Revision 10
| |
| 71111.12 Miscellaneous Prairie Island Maintenance Rule Basis Document 04/20/2020
| |
| Procedures FP-E-MR-03 Maintenance Rule Monitoring Revision 8
| |
| FP-E-MR-05 Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Revision 8
| |
| MSIP 5015 Swagelok Compression Tubing Fittings Revision 4
| |
| RPIP 3655 Sampling Unit 2 Pressurizer Revision 9
| |
| WO Replace Valve and Fittings as Needed Revision 0
| |
| #70000942010
| |
| 71111.15 Corrective Action AR 23 CFCU Damper Past Operability Review 05/04/2020
| |
| Documents 501000039494
| |
| AR 23 FCU Damper Did Not Reposition 04/08/2020
| |
| 501000039494
| |
| AR PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4 04/23/2020
| |
| 501000039981
| |
| AR 22 DDCLP Jacket Water Hose Leak POR 05/06/2020
| |
| 501000040177
| |
| Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
| |
| Procedure Date
| |
| AR Coolant Leak of 22 DDCLP Jacket Cooling 05/01/2020
| |
| 501000040177
| |
| 71111.19 Corrective Action AR PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4 04/23/2020
| |
| Documents 501000039981
| |
| 71111.22 Procedures SP 1089A RHR Quarterly Pump and Valve Test 05/08/2020
| |
| SP 1089A Train A RHR Pump and Suction Valve From RWST Quarterly Revision 32
| |
| Test
| |
| SP 1856 Bus 26 Undervoltage Test 04/28/2020
| |
| SP 1856 Monthly 4kV Bus 16 Undervoltage Relay Test (OMICRON) Revision 9
| |
| 71151 Procedures MSPI High Pressure Injection Data 2Q19 through 1Q20 04/22/2020
| |
| FP-E-MSPI-01 Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) Revision 10
| |
| 15
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| }} | | }} |
