ML20067B133: Difference between revisions

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==Dear Ms. Adensam:==
==Dear Ms. Adensam:==


In the Matter of                        )                Docket Hos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority                )                            50-328 In response to a verbal request frm Carl Stahle of your staff in a Noventer 19, 1982 telephone conversation, enclosed is additional information regarding equipment survivability at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. 'lhis information is being provided to supplement the information provided in my November 1,1982 letter to you regarding hydrogen cmbustion and control for ice condenser plants.
In the Matter of                        )                Docket Hos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority                )                            50-328 In response to a verbal request frm Carl Stahle of your staff in a Noventer 19, 1982 telephone conversation, enclosed is additional information regarding equipment survivability at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. 'lhis information is being provided to supplement the information provided in my {{letter dated|date=November 1, 1982|text=November 1,1982 letter}} to you regarding hydrogen cmbustion and control for ice condenser plants.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M'. Mills,  nager Nuclear Licens ng Sworn        _subscr  d before me thi ay of    / W , 1982 Mh Nota. Public              ' y jt,[
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M'. Mills,  nager Nuclear Licens ng Sworn        _subscr  d before me thi ay of    / W , 1982 Mh Nota. Public              ' y jt,[

Latest revision as of 13:50, 31 May 2023

Forwards Response to 821119 Verbal Request for Addl Info Re Equipment Survivability.Info Suppls 821101 Response Re Hydrogen Combustion & Control for Ice Condenser Plants
ML20067B133
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/29/1982
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: Adensam E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8212060061
Download: ML20067B133 (2)


Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II November 29, 1982 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attentior.: Ms. E. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U.S. IAlclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:

In the Matter of ) Docket Hos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 In response to a verbal request frm Carl Stahle of your staff in a Noventer 19, 1982 telephone conversation, enclosed is additional information regarding equipment survivability at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. 'lhis information is being provided to supplement the information provided in my November 1,1982 letter to you regarding hydrogen cmbustion and control for ice condenser plants.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M'. Mills, nager Nuclear Licens ng Sworn _subscr d before me thi ay of / W , 1982 Mh Nota. Public ' y jt,[

My ission Expires 8///fb i /

Enclosure cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission (Enclosure)

Region II ATIN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 8212060061 821129 PDR ADOCK 05000327 >

An Equal opportunity Employer

4 RESPONSE 10 NOVEMBER 19, 1982 VERBAL REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL'INFORMATION ON EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY This response provides additional information regarding equipment survivability at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and is intended to supplement the information provided in the Tennessee Valley Authority's November 1,1982 submittal on the same subject. As agreed per our November 19, 1982 t el ephone conversation, clarification of the f ollowing items is provided; (1) hydrogen recombiners; (?) Barton transmitters; (3) core exit che rmocouple s ; (4) H 2

sample flow control valves; and (5) bounding conditions.

Hydrogen Recombiners:

Survivability of the hydrogen recombiners is discussed in supplement 5 to the Sequoyah Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0011) . The recombiners are included in the NUREG-0588 qualification program and have been qualified to 309'F. The Summary Component Evaluation Worksheets (SCEWs) for the hydrogen recombiners are provided on page 13 of table 3.11-4 in TVA's Electrical Equipment Qualification Report for unit 1 at Sequoyah.

Barton Level and Pressure Transmitters:

Barton transmitters are utilized to detenmine the " pressure of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and are utilized for level transmitters LT 63-176 through 63-179. There are different lots of barton transmitters in use at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and all have been qualified to temperatures in excess of those anticipated due to hydrogen combustion. Lot 1 tran=ritters have been qualified to 280'F and are scheduled for replacement by the second refueling outage on each unit. Lot 3 and 4 transmitters are fully qualified for the Sequoyah NUREG-0588 program. All level and pressure transmitters _on the list of equipment required to mitigate hydrogen burns are also iceluded in the

! Sequoyah NUREG-0588 program.

Core Exit Thermocouples:

The core exit thermocouples are located entirely within the pressure vessel and are not exposed to hydrogen burning. An electrical penetration in the pressure vessel head is provided for the wiring.

H2 Sample Flow Control Valves:

i

, Flow control valves FCV 43-201, 202, 207, and 208 have been qualified to 340*F.

Bounding Conditions

1 A listing of the equipment which must survive a hydrogen burn and the references for individual SCETs required in the EQ response to NUREG-0588 was l provided in the response to question 1 on TVA's November 1,1982 submittal.

The temperatures listed on the NUREG-0588 SCEWs (with the exception of the RTD and thermocouple cable temperatures) will bound equipment temperatures during hydrogen combustion for the events analyzed.

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