ML20128E447: Difference between revisions
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a BACKGROUND In December 1979 Cincinnati Gas and Electric (CG&E) hired private investigator Thomas Applegate as a'n undercover. agent. | a BACKGROUND In December 1979 Cincinnati Gas and Electric (CG&E) hired private investigator Thomas Applegate as a'n undercover. agent. | ||
His assignment, outlined in a letter from CG&E's director of media services, was to investigate "any possibility of mis-conduct on the part of anyone involved in the construction of the Zimmer Nuclear Power station." (See December 5, 1979 letter from David Altamuehle to Major Cox, attached as j | His assignment, outlined in a letter from CG&E's director of media services, was to investigate "any possibility of mis-conduct on the part of anyone involved in the construction of the Zimmer Nuclear Power station." (See {{letter dated|date=December 5, 1979|text=December 5, 1979 letter}} from David Altamuehle to Major Cox, attached as j | ||
/' | /' | ||
Exhibit 2.) His specific assignment was to obtain evidence W ,p* d of time-cheating by certain employees. In December 1979 and F early January 1980, Applegate worked undercover as a " cost accounting engineer" at the site. He was authorized, through his cover, to roam freely throughout the plant and to compara construction sheets against the construction contract held by Kaiser Engineering International ("KEI"). (See June 6, 1980 Affidavit of Thomas Applegate at 7-8, attached as Exhibit 3.) | Exhibit 2.) His specific assignment was to obtain evidence W ,p* d of time-cheating by certain employees. In December 1979 and F early January 1980, Applegate worked undercover as a " cost accounting engineer" at the site. He was authorized, through his cover, to roam freely throughout the plant and to compara construction sheets against the construction contract held by Kaiser Engineering International ("KEI"). (See June 6, 1980 Affidavit of Thomas Applegate at 7-8, attached as Exhibit 3.) | ||
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9e= usur.da__?.3%-e , | 9e= usur.da__?.3%-e , | ||
On March .$,-I980, investigators led by Mr. Phillip met with Mr. Applegate and reviewed Jgmut of his contentions and allegations. The follow-ing week they informed him that the NRC would pursue three limited areas of investigation. The three investigative charges included two charges of faulty welds, as well as an improper shortcut in the flushing system that cleans the piping. | On March .$,-I980, investigators led by Mr. Phillip met with Mr. Applegate and reviewed Jgmut of his contentions and allegations. The follow-ing week they informed him that the NRC would pursue three limited areas of investigation. The three investigative charges included two charges of faulty welds, as well as an improper shortcut in the flushing system that cleans the piping. | ||
(See March 11, 1980 letter from Phillip to Applegate, attached as Exhibit 6.) The investigator's letter neither mentioned the quality assurance program, nor Mr. Applegate's charges of i mismanagement ~and criminal activity at the plant. | (See {{letter dated|date=March 11, 1980|text=March 11, 1980 letter}} from Phillip to Applegate, attached as Exhibit 6.) The investigator's letter neither mentioned the quality assurance program, nor Mr. Applegate's charges of i mismanagement ~and criminal activity at the plant. | ||
l Corresponding'ly, his July 1, 1980 report fails to provide i | l Corresponding'ly, his July 1, 1980 report fails to provide i | ||
an accurate record of the allegations. In fact, Mr. Phillip l failed to mention the mismanagement and crimina'l charges at all. | an accurate record of the allegations. In fact, Mr. Phillip l failed to mention the mismanagement and crimina'l charges at all. | ||
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==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF FACTS Following the receipt of allegations by telephone on February 28, 1980, arrangements were made to interview the alleger to obtain more detailed information. During an interview on March 3,1980, the individual made 9 several allegations, three o,f which involved matters under the juris- | OF FACTS Following the receipt of allegations by telephone on February 28, 1980, arrangements were made to interview the alleger to obtain more detailed information. During an interview on March 3,1980, the individual made 9 several allegations, three o,f which involved matters under the juris- | ||
[y diction of the NRC. By letter dated March 11, 1980, the allager was yr advised that an investigation would be conducted regarding those allega-Gy tions which were as follows: | [y diction of the NRC. By {{letter dated|date=March 11, 1980|text=letter dated March 11, 1980}}, the allager was yr advised that an investigation would be conducted regarding those allega-Gy tions which were as follows: | ||
: 1. Defective velds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among' | : 1. Defective velds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among' | ||
- them were velds CY606, HR42 and K811. | - them were velds CY606, HR42 and K811. | ||
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r | r | ||
: 3. Allegations Based on the information obtained through the interview with the alleger, a review of the taped conversations and his investigative reports, three allegations involving activities under NRC jurisdiction were developed. | : 3. Allegations Based on the information obtained through the interview with the alleger, a review of the taped conversations and his investigative reports, three allegations involving activities under NRC jurisdiction were developed. | ||
By letter dated March 11, 1980, the alleger was advised that an investi-gation of these allegations would be conducted. A copy of this letter-with the alleger's identification deleted is attached to this report as Exhibit A. These allegations and information regarding them obtained during che investigation are set forth below. _, | By {{letter dated|date=March 11, 1980|text=letter dated March 11, 1980}}, the alleger was advised that an investi-gation of these allegations would be conducted. A copy of this letter-with the alleger's identification deleted is attached to this report as Exhibit A. These allegations and information regarding them obtained during che investigation are set forth below. _, | ||
Allegation 1: Defective welds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among them were welds CY606, HR42 and K811. | Allegation 1: Defective welds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among them were welds CY606, HR42 and K811. | ||
The identification of the specific welds in this allegation was ob-tained from a review of the tape the allager had made surreptitiously of his conversations with site personnel. According to the informa- | The identification of the specific welds in this allegation was ob-tained from a review of the tape the allager had made surreptitiously of his conversations with site personnel. According to the informa- | ||
Latest revision as of 23:11, 21 August 2022
| ML20128E447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1980 |
| From: | Phillips G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Applegate T AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127A137 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-415 NUDOCS 8505290390 | |
| Download: ML20128E447 (62) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:p 'g . ( UNITED STATES . ( [' 3 huCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4ECl!N lit 790 R00Sav8LT RCAo
\ *...* - SLEN ELLYN. ILLINCIS 80137 WE .1 1 N *
.. Mr.'Thoass ip'plegate -
'2712 James Avenue Covington, KY 41014 . .
Dear Mr. Applegata ,
This refers to the meeting between you, Mr. L. Williamson of the NRC Eeadquarters Office, and me on March 3,1980. - On the basis of the.information you provided we plan to conduct an investigation at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant regarding the following alleged matters:
- 1. Defective welds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among them were welds CY 606, NR 42 and K 811.
- 2. Five defective welds were identified in pre-fabricated piping .
but the pipe was accepted and installed in a safety-related system.
- 3. The amaner in which safety-related installed ' piping was fAushed was inadequate and a scheduled 6-week flush was reduced to 2 weeks.
You will be informed of our findings following completion of our investigation. ,
,, Sincerely.
,pp. G. A. Phillip Investigation Speeialist .
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{ e e. . # Analysis of, Time Cheatir:n ' The impact of time cheating can be best demonstrated by th!y amaapler
- December 21, 1979, Jim Muwel (see time cheating report):
Ques tional Ilmg, g
. 1.5 hrs 9 $16,71 $25.01 2.5 hrs 9 $25.07 62.68 .
Total questional Time Paid M3 His total day's pay for December 21, 1979 based on the ratu tw is paid comes to $226.42 -- $87.68 or 39% is unearned. Assuming this percentage holds, that is 39% of his monthly paycheck is
- J unearned: .
.,' . . .I,/T Q/T mours 161 49.5 M '
, Pay $2,690.31
, $827.13 $ 3,517.46 8 39% .
' Total unearned wages $1,371.81 No te: The subject was on vacation for a week during this month which makes this example invalf d as a monthly averagw.
Using the same formula as above, Walter Hamm's Tjme Choattni: Report on the 20th of December worked own, no. be $41.46 or 41.8% in unearned wages . 9 9 *
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. .* tE I- Report of Misappropriation of Materials (Sale of Belt Buckles)
SULIECT: John McC1mg.
, CLIENT: Cincinnati Cas & Electric Co.
On January 3,1980dgm McClung, security guard at cho y.trxner site, sold for $20.w each two (2) belt bucklus to Agent 920. This transaction was recorded by 920 with the body recorder. . The material for this buckle came from the pipo fitt ern. I n f. . t , ie is bellowed that the pipetitters make these buckles in the shop on company time, using company materisi and equipment. These buckles will be held by this office as evidence for latur disposition *as the client wishes. o e
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C [REPCRT BY THEoS. . . General Accountino" Office . fge z .: Reporting Unscheduled Events At Commero!ci Nuclect Facilities: . Opportunities To' Improve Nuclear Reguictory Commission Oversight . The 'duclear Regulatory Commission requires nuclear facility and materials licensees to re-port unscheduled events to the Commission so it can inspect, evaluate operating esperi- . eiwes, and inform the oublic. The Commission should it.) prove its evalua-tion mothr.ds and extend reporting require-ments to 1) pes of events not now covered to
- 3a*.re that it islamilies oli skicty .eisteel pauh.
e .. Also, the c hs of the Commissinn mandsting - industry participation in industry's voluntary ' nuclear powerplant reliability rewrting sys-tem may exceed tlie benefits. The Commis-sion intends to further study the issue while ' raising its financial support for the system.
- GAO favors deciding the issue using rule-ma. king procedures.
/D STAQ .
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- JANUARY 28,1973
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i - CHAPTER 2 E TENS,E!, REPORTS SHOUID PE
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EHD_! LORE,E(({,CHgg NRC requires licensees to report incidents and unplanned event.s associated with the construction and coera-e tion of nuclear powerplants and the use of nuclear materials. NRC has identified safety-related problems by assessing these reports. More effective use of these reports, however, is , hampered by a Jack of clearly defined assessment objectives and methods, responsibilities, and procedural contrels. As a result NRC does not know lf it is promptly finding and iden- ' tifying all potential safety-related problems. Furthermore, its report review procedures arv fragmented. Finally, it. a cannot be certain it has received and appropriately reviewe,d l all reports. . NRC also encourages utilities coerating nuclear power-plants to participate in a nuclear industry system for vol-untar.11y reporting minor mishaps and component failures at
. these plants in order to develop a reliable data base for j NRC and industry to use in improving powerplant designs and operating practices. The President has asked NRC to mandate l full nuclear industry participation in this reliability re-
- port system; but NRC has not yet decided if the benefits from -
a a:ndatory industry participation program outwG.ib the addi- . taonal anaustry twputi.ang burden--empecaally in va== os the present duplication between the voluntary reliability report system and NRC's licensee event report system. We suggest that NRC consider resolving this question by means of rule-
- making procehres.
! NPC NEEDS TO SETTER MANACE ItEPORTS vtRM WBMHmTRUEEIM-
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NRC has established an extensive reporting system--called a licensee event rept.rt system--to gather information on the operating experience at nuclear powerplants. During 1977 util-itles submitted about 3,000 reports to NRC descraing incie j dents and unplanned events at powerplants. Depending on their i safety significance, utilitieu are reaukeed.to report the events Ismediately, wi'.hin 24. hours, or within 30 days of their occurrence. ,
* !amediate or 24-hour reports are re ulted fo'r important events such as excessive releases,of rad ation, overexposures
! to individuals, or attempted sabotage. Utilities must report i .
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c c.- . CHAPTEP- 3 NRC SHOULD EXTEND CERTAIN l REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 'ho
* . {
LICENSEES 'NOT Nott INCLUDED , 29
' NR'C's event-oriented reporting requirements ate not s sufficiently
' licensees and broad typ'es and ofshould events,be specifically, extended to cover'. additional -
[ require NRC should
--all utilities operating nuclear powerplants to report the same unscheduled events, .
, -nuclear materials licensees to raport. equipahnt failures ' which could cause or contribute to safety-related inci-dents, and
-medical licensees to report misadministrations 1/ of 1
j radiation or radioactive materials to patients. NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN NUCLE.\R *' ' i NRIFLTiFID5NfTiW
- NRC's nuclear powerplant reporting requirements are much more comprehensive than for other types of licenses. In 1977 i
utilities operating 64 W w='picnts reported about 3.000 event:. These inc1Wed such thaniqs as small ertoras an instrumentation 3 j gauges, valve malfunctions, utility f ailures to make periodic l surveillances, and inoperative emergency equipment. .. t The requirements for nuclear power established in NRC's licensing process. plant reporting are submits detailed informatforf on the nuclear powerplant,At that time includ- a utility ing proposed operating limits for the plant's systems, NRC re-j views them foe thelicensing proposed operating limits and, if accentable, approves purposes. i This part of the license is re-1 ferred to as the " technical aper.ifications" and becomes the re-quirements by which the utility must operate the plant. The technical specifications also describe what deviations from i these operating limits must be reported to NRC. Ut,ilities t 4 1/ Error in administering a radioactive drug or r.sdiation treat- * ' ment to a patient, including (1) the wrong drug or radiation treatment source, (2) the wrong patient, or (3) a dose or > i method of administration other than prescribed. 13 ' 1-, . l . ,
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t'. pf w;st.h is th. tu t , v cf r:,s:W: ir spi *e:o = t. satec%f :s..tv. n.he
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- 1:UCL1 *.E POWinleI.At:T COM-
- s
. SThUCIION -
~, .
D .I. G .E. .S. .T. . - Constructing a nucicar poverplant er.n enploy .-
. several't.k. cur:nd cocctruction workern 24 hours a dsy, 7 days, a wwok. They will
--make about 25,000 welds, ..
-Pour about 360,000 tons of concrete, and
- - --usi 726 tonc of cc; pet and 34,6G0 tone of iron.
.. , 4
.i
- idl this i:: required for creh of the 7a nu-clonr pewcepitnts r.:V cndor construction in
- the Unit.::1 f.tntes. .
To 1..%.: 1. * : *: they are b.'il : cr.fol i el en:: ".: .' .t.att :y Ci.:. irr101 !.ec :y tha !!u-
- fu id: . *. .i: J t.':e ccl..+ uc tic.: c.:.' pro . t.::
ti. :n cr*- cler r t. : . G *.r: .tt:. Ti.1:, es.:a. t it'. c;: ti :c -
- .tio:: o n:. : prrqr: .. ::.4 . cle::dy r.s.t.rw4
. p ri;g.:t :: s. rrc; tht.?. orry1;r r.:V C: .n' raicn it..;; s:: :: I! c:,.':
th*:r.4.;iM I .. elet.r ; .4 .r:,5 t .'L s. fc.t/ cc pas,r.tt. fer nu-1.t coven c.cnctructiu . cit.an, G*:0 1..t$rvicad
- 40/ vori:urs, it: h.::ir.g ;07 censtri:ction -
crof t:::".i:i, 6.? ci.-li ty :::surs. :::o or conter.1 p' :. .a :.1.4 e . .-W o.9 et.:. > .-:: .'n ~~. : r ti c r.: . All : :.r r.r.. .. no!.re v::r e ent. ~.8 8 c.t'.e.1.-l.; r :.ir -i l y o r b:: r. e." ). i sn-
!!ith th: cid c2 e proferrinnal *.r:.cinN:, Gio :.:cA.r indepen.Nni: -
. obrerv:,tiot.s of cu:rcat construction anel evaluated s.or!: previourly perform:d t:y Cc:t-miccion insp:setore :t 11:: of the co*mrplcnt sites to detarcino it tlcir reports were co:spleto, arcurate, cad L acad upn a ther- .
i ough ravi=>r of all availsble data.
- GAO also visited six nuclear compenent manufacturing pisnes arcund ti.e con.itry DfD-78-80 '
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- and ovclu:ted worh p: evict.:17 perforr.H Jay
- Cor.miscien
- p. 3.) -
inspc*.:tcra ct thora plar.i.e. ..G.:o *
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t...,.c :. ..;.1 i~.:... --- - CommisEioninspoctoreshouldkncvtbcutthe day-to-d:y a:ctiif ties et a conette cica cite and deter::ine for thmnelves the cuality ef construction work, but C.'.0's review revealed
, that the Co.?.n:ission ins.pector: .
--do little indapond: tnt testing of constree-tion work, and rely her.vily uren the util ity ccmpany self-eva.luction; .
- -spend little ti=:e chccrying cucoing cen-struction t.erh; e.ud
--de not co m.::lesta cortir. :2y vi'.h pcoc lo who do th:t a:'Lu:.1 c0r.: tructic. t' ucch.
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C2.0 fort.R M:.t cr:-h Cr;. irsion i.ap.0tcr -
" sponG:J t.kunt 4 tr .-::!; , c. , :: pc: ycc..: c; cc:v-
* .ing tact: O P ee.7.,rets s .r. t or ..yt. t.".f.. h y t; <s ,
. utilit.y or its cr.ntreete r.*:. I:::er:t for son = cir@le r.o.<ce.-J r. (evicar, t!'.7 Ot.u.:in -
aion cWes n.t I:r.v . tha egt i,. en: r u. +. r t . . . y to y.cr!.c.:...cet ty,c ef a.uir.g.
!:cch of ther Coteirnica it:cpactods en sito -
s tirae is cred to revieo th? : ess or docu ::n-tation that is*caintsince'at : ecnstruction site.as a basis for judgine the t.hquec; of the uti.'ity'n pro; t= for insuring e.uclity .
. const r~uctie.n. (See pp. 5 to 7.) .
_ Ins.pec. tors do not routine.lv. - co::.. .un.t c r.te . s ta un.e r.:.c 2.: wrio p. t c,.::4 cor.ntmeeler. s eri: GAO interviewed craftemen at cevon nuclear powerplant constructica sitas. The men
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appeerej; to be mature, crperienced, t.r.d :' into. c:tt.d !n t;;a quality of con tructics and the future ante o;.cration of the nu*,
-c} car pouerplants they were building. .
Thut. vazha:n told '.*.0 of r.:ny irrog:Ceri- l
- tir.'e rolz.tr.3 to >.:f sty q:debicns, four of
- hich were cen2itand by the Cor uniscion.
Cor.=icsion ing eetors arc' not recuired to -
~+-
tall. uli.h craI :.:t.:n and craf te.aen r.re reluc-tant to init.irt: co".veent.Lic.. t.'ith Co. .=is-sion irespetors for fear of repriscis fro = their enployet.s. ** CAO found that riore than half of the crafts-ron interviewed htd never received any train-ing en the importance of good quality enscr-ance. tuin of ten Icada crtite en to c:inun-i
- derntar$
of t.%:2. the quclity of co-h that is re;uf.rso (Sec pp. 7 to 9.) Conr:ler.!en The b. f.rc. !.,;f.en'c irbn:tica prr. etic s ns.td - t r :. 1.c , : nv3.rit: t. <. ore '.; ; ret;.h rx3 ir..M ;; .' : : t eet Ox !.u, :.I '.h-3 g :, lity .-f - pr.s u ::... :.~r.rzu c ! :. 1:u- . 1. i'.h. .n t r e- h . 8 t.r. o t r i t i.t i t . , th .t tr 1:..sirn h:.c to rely crf uc .ivel;- ( r. the- ,:re 12111ty ra..: vo.11Jity l cf ev 19: t.ia. :.r: , :N b;. titility ec. j;.r. ire r:$ th;!r e. ,1: .Sctern u:f c .nn .t it:de; :sCtntly
- *.cr.-
r.d:.:sur.:wly. t.r. . b3irpicnt n se bcing cor.. truct.cc
':e* : : o .*: t ! . c G.*.0 :4 . r : .' .' er;nt ti.e Cc:: .:it nie.n 1: r.re.:::
s the in:. pu..C.r. : ca.6 cr.. c of 1es Jr.Q:ction by -
--incret, sing inder.:n. tent merirurecente and
. direct c.buerVctions of construcelon :: rk;
(.. .
--inititting for:si, prf nte ini.orviers tiith
. -crafts.4cn at construction sites, and l
--requirir.g licensees to train con.struction craf tsr.en in the principle = of quality assuran=c.
(see p. 11.) s.
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With the aid of a professional ansincer, Ghr) revie red incroctic:: re. orts et c.11 the
' Cta.: sis: .iott rc,cf or.c3 of ficca en!. si of thi sev2n nucing putari:1:.stt caractet.ccica sites visited. In total, G.'.0 rovioved 45 int.psc- ,
. tion report itses, cnd concidered 31 defi- -
cient either becaus:: of in d ,qccta reperting, inadeep.te attention to dats!1c, ceceptr.nce of it.cdequate licensec action on deficient itents, or inadequr.te investigatica. The -
- Connaicsion rec::ca:ined the deficio.it reports but did not i'dentify major safety concercz '
in any of ths 31. 7 . f ., In eddition, GAO for:nd that Cc:c 1::sfon in-
'spactors are not required to r.rintain say typo of docc.nontation or hupport for their int.se.ction re This: recans that t!.=
do:.nir.t.i o.. hr.por ts. littio evidtr.ce to sul ,crt 1 t!.c e:: tout cad qut.li;.y of the inu? :ction . effcet. (E.:n pp.1:1 to 17. ) tit:fr re : . ni ing .: etn.-c ' _'ET. "..' ".i 'i .:. ..e..M. i.c.' E. ' ' ' ** ~ ~ - Ce!.: .:3 r.-inn i.a.op etcre opr. .il che : 22 ;ar-
- ccr.t nf t.hdr 022icic 1 rar (it g tir.u--s hout
. 50 dayn : c Yux--p.:rforuita, swrh ce car.-
l t
- struct. ion sik,u.
Ehile in:pectors he tic' :!ucctienci crcIsn -
- tinio e.nd are ...
- n ri> :.re d , tro r.>. o f t.u :. ba-liwt. t!.cf r tt chr.!e.cl e qsrtis : t.r.:: t:: ..in-ing aro r.ct b si .g er:o.: to the f ullitet 9::t::.t.
.. Gro concura. Mcv; of t.ha in::pec;; ora' cdr ir. .
s istrative tas!:s could be parfor: ad Iqy para-l- - profession:Is or, clerks, g,(,ying th,e profc:- slo'nal ir.sp+ctor more time to de direct in-spections. The Coraiscio.i noted, howevar, that cu ront budgeting pri.ctices, with man- . povar and dollar ceilings, disecursge tho
- increas'ed use of paraprefessionals and l
i. clerks. (See pp.17 to 20.) - iv - l i .
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.. i: .:
.i.s1
- Co.. mission inspactors are spending more of.
q: .the).r timo investigating ellegations. of 1:2-1,- pro::: . con =truction ectiviti:ts, nit.:.: st the ear.'anse of thair riorp 1 inopoctica c: tivi-
; tics. A nett requiction regttirce utility
; companics to post notices inforring 5 orkers
; that they ::.ay report r.uspectsd d:fectivo .
; werk to the Co:niscisn. : hic nao publicity
; will increase the nu:>bar of allegations re-ceived by the Cccaission. Houcver , the Con-mission should revi+w organizational elc:.:ents*
. , and seek addit'ional i:tn ~f to investigate .
,; . theco allsgationc without .disre;. ting the nor-
; mal inspection uork.
The Co:.ni :i*en h':s net developed e rcer:0 t- -
. tion to protect construction veri:sen frc:::
reprit<c1: chan those t*0rt ore bring cor.ct:ue-tica prebic .tr. to t:.a ett?ntier. of ti:e cc a-
- t. J.t i c n. Over :: ycce ..gc, Cl.0 rece... n*, eft
- thr.t euch a . r eletJc n : = n".::: c. t:r.
Cor.* :ita.i.W a , . :.. , bu t t!:o r e.,u.1.t' c. . h:.:' i not hw:: t i A.,.4., t .: ., .' e:;. e t n :. r. :.u-
. cle w p : . r ,1:.:t e o:. .u::::t!.t.: : ! w. I i .: ':. a
- . fired :.: a:.: 11, . 11c:..J17 for n%ii.:,l'..i the, Cu:::.irei.e.t e2 def', tiv. cen",tru t.t.'.:. : v. r.: .
- j (Sio :;. 2*. v.s d. )
cc.r.rir ica. The cc n=f.culen enn Iwyrove tha c.'tclity of
. nucl 4:.: ps cr :lat crn : tree tbm t'P ..Qup f r.-
i tr ire... . c;f ;- . :. ' i c;.: t : ir.; r.r, < ' : s. t I . . hr Cen :is.::t rer: f.n r re':ea ::, in y:. t :c
- r.r . :: ..J to be cort .gi.r'.ccive 1:: Scr uti n
- r!.ur: C.0 folletting up on the ite:2.s they r. :1c.ci:. f or
~
revicv. Also, the Co t.11::sion need:i to ire- - crease the productivity of its inrpsetors by reliAvinry th;m cf rany cicrical duticn. - The Co:mi cion =isculd such eddition:1 ettff
- and org ni::ctient.1 unite to invectir:tu al- - -
- legations of poor constructfon vork s'rithout
, distupting the routino in:.pection prog,ren.
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c GAO rcco'.nnds that thz Cor.::ission -*
* * -he more actressive in its in'spectics activ-
- itiys and pey Pore attention to in:.r.:stien and reporting Octeilcr -
--irsprove practices its documentation and reporting -
--improve the p cductivity of its eteff by increening the tir.v incpectors cpand par-U ;
. forming work at constructio:: sites and by .
* . evaluating the pctential for ucing clerks or tor pcreprofe sf onals to aid t.'o int.Mc-
=r and
.- -review orscnitational ele:aente and coe.h adcitional atsff so it can centinua to investigato clietn.tienu of irregulcritiers -
at nuelt .: its routin? in:pection efforts.reperpl..:stn (du without p. dinenpting
- 23.) .
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A::.4. . . . ,2.; z. .: . iha Cc:..u!.. ::io be gnn c go ::':.: in in j., to ' re v1w th ' '?. n !cr:; eho :.rp;..t y na.ii ty-:<O .ad con vdont: ior neci. rr po* cut 1:. :to. yaa a2tc: '* hic t'.o 'C::*.
- k: loa recli::n 1
- .r bout 53 ; trec nt of r.11 nt.cle.ar p *. :rpl:.nt I conr:rru: tion r.n.t o.:ertwion r:r'.2 c;.: 3 w.:e tcect c'. .u f. : Y :.t :: L.: : :.: a :.C
' --utilit.y ec..;p:. etic ; w: o not p:npiely in -
. spectir.c then: vendora to na::o* c'uro ti.ht they were produsing qu Citt coat.;cnonte.
i Thehad has Cc:micsienks
- t. positive e22cet Vendo:en In:Netion the accetf Pectrren of
- nucient powerpit.nts but bizfore its full ps-tentiel to be imp canWed. be realized the program:needs Specifically, i:aprove:sent.s need to be =tde in the vender inspectors' -
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-w--t4 - ' - %,t ww-.p.-rpey a,ug.-4-r- -- w---.+-y- -.g.--..s-w%m-y -.-ev..----e--g m- w--.-me g+-ye---ww-y.ey g--t-w= vw,,,yg.-ye-e,.s*M+we Nee'~ 99-*#*N'M *.-rO'8 "T--rs-**-h*
(
~
--re;.ortir..; pra:tice ,
,~ .
~atte-tion to inepactic.. dc. tails, - ,
--doc mentation of inspection work, and b.$ -
-investiga ticr.: . *
- .' The Com:.tisrion hr.c net id:ntified all ven-
- dors of sciety- cIntcf equi::ncnt.and does .
* *- not have e cycte=atic rathed of selectin .
these ve;:r.; ors for irs 2ctica. In fact t is larcaly neglectir.g or., group og venc,e:g, ..,, that r r.nufs:turess elect:i=cl ecs;.one.nts and . - , other op2rotions instrut.:entsin the pl:.nt. that control critical in particule.r e The Co;mi=sica,
. . .: . needs to az= ion ::cre inc:;,: c-tors to ite vendor in:ptetion t.ctivitv l
--currently there nec en11* 11 vendor 1ne;:=-
,: tore trio 1:uct safety-rt:1 tedrevier equip.snt. cvor 200 cu : Fliers of (Sea pp. 24 to 29.)* ..,,,3
- cc.co.-~. r.u . ':.' en s
.-~~
1 C.*.7. rc : c: . n B t.6j.* t!.:: c.y .:3:::ie.7, it. :e ye it.' bc; ' (c.: W.4.4.'r in... c enien I:y d . .:2 : pi:..,
- r::::.M to ip..r.t fy r.nd t tt.tia-tice.11;* t..*:lre': ?P /:ert. for 'ineg2ctica;
!n:. ..-.?in:? t.ka jn petic..:u of venderc th. t
- ent::c':rtre cleei..-1::::1 cc:< nente r.nd in-
- 'in:tlat ..*:.nta.
Isl:. .tth: ; : cor..::e1 critict.1 o7.rt.tio :a l: - ro.C:it ; 3 7::;::i1 t w 1 i. u :.. : .: i i . tot t% va.: 'e in::m ev.::: p;o, :ng::=t;;;e
, r; boing note eggrarniva in its int;fection -
r activities and paying =sre attention to innpaction cr.d' r=;:orting*actuilst and b -
- iraproving itn do:urtntation end reporting pr t.= tico s .
(See pp. 29 and 30.) .
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. In its ferr.nl rr'ly to this rc.aorr, the C;:.nirscl.en Curiceslly tJret.6 t*i*.h tho
- thruet of G.so's cen.;,1teri.:n . a.:.0 recs..r.ca-dations. Tha C*r..t,:.ian t . n.s2g,c gnag igg own evalue. tion of th2 in:;retion pre.~;r.n
.. "romultod in attentien iced e r.cntf atlly *
. tho ::::a i:::er: v;.v:o new or it.prov. d r.ethods should be congic.wred for incorporation."
. The Comis$1on did not fully agree with G;.o*
concluciond* and roep:=endatior.a as to: 1
--uie of rs:npe::er utilizctica dr.ta, .,
--us2 of cont:tructicn craf tcuen ir.tcrvie.t s
- as an in*;ectir.,a tec;inican, tr.' ,
. --n*,cd to ircreve ir..e;:: tion do=unr.t . tion :
cnd repetfr.g re! 0;.1::. :.t. - l C.*.0 cousc!C rc!. ti . C';. *! e.$.cn ' .~ vie".1 in e.cc'.a t.f '.1,; . ..t.e. ? c . ,...i. b t.1 !.: t J. * :.! .? c* .v.'.;- ic:::' i.:. ' i * >* ..: *n ..:. 's:.. . . ' . ' : '. l ;. . E ch :..te: 1:. . . . r..* :. *. '. :: , r t . .. .'. ! 'e t* *- :r fn . tha body of th. rs.r..rt. (!M : :.- *, . .!i t+: .t'.)
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- rpsed nors ti:2 in t!!c act!vf ty.
denom:t:Lua Li.c b:nctics of ob:.e:ving one s.ing ccnstructionThe fo11cuina tvi u w vork. 3 . . L
- p. nc.. ..t ,. 1 .
pie.ntDuring of theenvirgitti: invect19etion of cliccatiene as the North Anr.a n10ctri: cnd fevar cc=p ny (V::PCO), a'n KI.0 ir.:r nctc: cit.rt).y ne,ted th:t reinforcit.? stcol (reber) stan bair.7 joined 1:ith ut' being preperly citaned, ne made that ohnev..ti.rn tihile conct:ietion rito.s t c1hin; by, on: cute to another crea of thu Although thi's was not the subjcet *o* an
- allogetion, the incpoctor pursued tho' issue to deterriit.o if *
' pront procedhren trere being follottad. !mC conclu::ed that the icproperly wnlded rebar was unssfa c.nd violated VIO::O's cor.:ait-sents he uae t.ho irc :ct 17:10 integrityofth'sbuiitis.g. er wolds could t'a repartud the 7 :en 5
the structural probiera to the cor.tencter end t: e trc14:r, were rejected. C:neris, 2 - lit:iner 7. nurvi.intres trip th:::.h t:n T ..:.w e e V: u..we Auth:r!.ty'.u cui ci:r..: rec te.: :,.h p.t . :t r.h IM.0 1"ii;chc cbwrt oo cls:c'.i!.-
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. *swered t.y 1:LC incpi.: tors.. havn ette:tj,gtsp.trhich could be en-Un independently sksetc.)
o i' 347 cruf ts:.en at reven rutelear -
. power;1r.:.t conct tt= tion sitet. Ice:tod th::tithdut t'Le country and intsrvi,ettad the.m privetoly to got their view of 11RC, ob-tain their cr.ndid opiniens relative to the quality of construc-tion atnuclost build the plants, po'serpinnts. and to lonen more about the craftsmen who ~ '
i l We selected craf tsmen who vore at the jo'urnoyman or. fore-
. man levol, uho had worked at the sit: for 5 cenths or more i
(with a few exceptions), and who had performed safety-related . e - l
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construction vork. Thess cr&ftenen aro the ones yho build the rtructureu, nystems, or cenponents thn: prevent cr citi-sate the consequences of postulated accidents tirat could
. cause undu,e rick to the health and cafety., of the public.
In out view, the craftt:.ru espeared to to unture, experi-ence4, and genvinely inters:ted in the gutitty of con =tre tion and the futuro sera operction of the nucicar pcuerpinnts they were building. Most of the craftsnsn indicated that they had
- never been interviecod at the site' privately by U7.C, nd many wers of the opinian that they could provide H.7C in=ps.cors
- with some insight en to the quality of picnt construction and day-to-day problems which ctherwise may never be br5ught to the attention of HDC.
- i
- During our l~n tervious with the craftsmen, many of them expressed dissatief&ction and concerns about the quality of ;
the cor. truction 'tork. Uc=t of the di satisfaction involved ; managscent-labor difference: and many of the cor cerne about tha quality of the work involv:d items which ecce obviounly not related to s:fety. E:vever, /.3 craftemon stCe 57 alle-gationc of. irr.ge:crf.tien uhich cpp Arad to u: to involve safety conri?:rntionn. Uitle the peine knsi:ledce end ap;roec1 of thozo craft:hort, tro conve/.d t;ho n11cgntin.ir. to "::C. 1*7 C reccted 1.;l cer.trM.im.* th.2 erL *ter.: n er.i trarfr. t r # g reivi>
- uat h et the subb ci ceuster.ctica vite.c to C:tcrof a : the vali6ity of the alley.ittenai Enc repcet%) tt,s.t fosir of thh allagttic..-Iwarasub:ttn- '
- tiated and thrac utility cc:.panion 'iste cited fer hair; in noncenp11: r.e: eith retul t::;> requircrents, for arczplc, at one pir.nt n:.C verific.d tilotations roir. ting to p: r ucrhysn-ship &nd* int pucc* ion practics: in thz ft bricetion of piru ucida and pipe rup ure rectrei-tz. A noticu of violatien uns is:vid and cerra(ti'.: r.ction requirud.
I in riva othur :::as, utC confir. ed, or p:.rtially con-
.; firLtd, t! at itreguinrition 1 u
- eeevered but that they did not ccnstitute' a citable effonna. In addition, NRC reported that i *
- some indict.tions of irregularities,were noted on four of the Items but thct. further review ucek would be necessary before a finsi detschinscion could be cado.
' NRC repor,tod that the renainder 'of thd allegations could not be substantiated, were probicms which had already been de-tected and properly dealt with by the utilitt company, were substantiated but were not related to safety, or were apper- .
! ent.'y based upon the craf ts=ca's micundurct nding of the sp- ' plicable construction practice.. MAC of ficials told us that their investigation of these allegations required about one-half stattyea'. of effort. ' g I' - - - l
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cenesurser.s s We believe that.pr.0's inspection precess needs to provide i ,. a more thorough and independent uvalu4 tion of the quality of powerplant cui,2tructicn ::et.h. Uithcou cuch en catlurtien, Mr.:: h:s to relv.tn L: undum crtcut en tha crcCibility or valicity of evaluation: ca.de by utility eccuenias. Thts 1:nc's inc .wc-e
. tion pecgram cannot indepaedently escure that nuclor.r pcvar-plants are constrdetec adenuately. Tao fellot*ing sir.ple ce-scription of the enormity of nu=1 oar poveralcnt ccastruction activitiesandthecurrentERCinspaction[evelunderscores our position. . .
Seventy-eight nuclear powerplants are now in variers stages of co..struction. A typical poverplcat censtruction site may involva severn1 thousced constreetion verkers and supervicory percor.nel--in many caces, working 24 hours a day, 7 dcys a week. A single pararpitat roccire: making about
, 25,000 we143, pouring about 3GU,0C0 tons of concreta, cad usir.g 725 tous of coppar ar.d 34,662 tonu of iren. I:an c r.n-plexelcetricalcadcorputeritudrystemsaresitoinveI"ved.
Inenbiortocc: guantionnaire to 1:1:0 inspattorr.. tha 53 .'
. r rc'.petenta inifer::cJ tio.t c:11 rt'. rly thny crch cy.nl c:.:.y chaht 2'! p.* restu'. of th:.f r offic!.1 vor::'n.f tjuo, or c:.;: t M dr3 n p.: r yer *: . t.t cc:.tt.in;tf.cn 1. '.'.Y:. C;..iy f."; LLr !ntlu:.n t'.
th:1 they ece4 caly eb:,u. 3.: y,re:nt of that tiau D utur 14 dcy: p:r ycnt) to dota.rnir.0 Car theesolve: ;Ln ;::1!.ty of ren-ebr.c ev!.:.. stru:tio . by Darfer:.;jny c:structica ver! ,.on cb:.n vorh v ng it consteve
- sui,s.u.,7 turto u.4 of ca y1;t.5 ce tc1 king eith conutructisn verk.tr . Therca'ero, in 1 yet.r, cil 76 n <C cet.ncroctf un in6pactorn and r.utarvirorn cpont che,et 1,216 ote.ffer.7:--or .about 5-1/2 r.21.f'raara e r rort--in direct .
innpretien vork. At er.ch of the 70 po*:grplantn thsn, En0's
. g .ccr.uci direct in: pscri:n 1:. ch.a..t 11 (rya, .
. For noch of the ptet 2 years, hc.rever,-tMic hr.s been ro-evt.lua tin.) its inye:nica philor phy rind 5.p.rcaches . s It rre-present cyatum, such ogni=es as the 11ot'r.y citedofarount the shorteeminga of direct innpoetog,,th,iens and verification
, and the limited time ita 16apectors ep.nd ontite observin; construction vort and talhing uiuh centtruction ucchers. UFC is ovaluating the need to parforn scae type st independunt veriflest$on of the gun 11ty of construction work and is insti-tuting a program to assign resident inspectors to powerplant sites--both under construction arid in operation. This, NRC
- < . ar.ticipates, will increase *an inspector's ensito in pection
- tine from about 22 percent to 75 percent, will parait greater observation and surveillance of construction activities, and will make its inspectors more accessible to construction ,
craftsmen. *
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. . natters ifcatified in tha . order cad on Juns IC,1972, c.
.,three-memb2r set a schedulet*nc for hearinJ resolving Vo::d the ret to Casino the f6uuua and prcblem. '
.. Ue believu that this incident--evsn 'tt.ee:h' *ith nature cad
- cause have not kcca d:tercina4--ur.:ltr:cstnr t;.4 need for LOC
- to have spacific cuthority to prettet vort:ern vhe ecs::ina-tioucly bring Gehails of peor conctryction practists to the attentlon of NRC. .
In this regard, the Subcommittee on !!c= lear Regulation - of the Sancte Committee on Environ.~ent end Pchlic Werka has
- incorporated provisions in MitC's ficcal year 1979 authoriza-
- tion workers. b.11 that would give such protection to construction-ity at nuclear We powerplants.
balieve*this would aid CaC in its.overall author-l tetiCF.Usit;: .
-- We believe that N.1C con laprova ite bacia fer deterhining theincraction its cality of necicar poeter1:at and toportiet conchruutier. by cdje tii.3
!.rs.cticts. Usertexa "*a: p;rcuri u e rather i!=ited medit c.f L tility 6t.tc c:ic erarcticas, t'a think it is "tr.cry cerut.'.nies ic?srttnt
; f s?.? c.. upthe.%
on th its instectoro sin:c cices?.y fer revicu. U2 "cun *. y;:41Au W A;th:. . ri. u . c." ;;;tJ24c ci;
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i.t.n s v.:ruf-neticau, uf ?h tho titte.1tieh t..it th 2 inrpse'.crn cLya te t.z o the'y ecivetr' ti.0 cf itens t::urov.tsi itt.riccd, th:P andet.vi9...C, with ths d6 uikh vucnt t!.a b% es" Iou og 1.cscutier: activitics. 08: Yurthor, in our thinton the tirao vre.it by. E'.C init;*1cesrn nontechnic:1 work je c::c:rtive and should bu rcGuced. ibis would unable the int .cetors to p:ticen t: ore inJ:sth urriva-tions of c:ptruction cort. Un h41,en tiv.r. In:C ::hou?.c S h s etops to ib.lre.n;s*1t: 1;t :."a *.ie s ?,'r..".04 :18:* the tism end tidunts et th ;.re!;.clont.2 inrp/147 or.;;c.bakt_r
- c. c:i:::
tionsRovever, it nustdivert also ha raccgnicod tHkt n:C investich- ' of allagaticas inepectors fro.s their reguler ecrk which tion work. could co=promice the quality"at'the precrt.:..?cd inc;:c-Furthernerv, if the recently itipit: cated requis-3 tions cause the volene of allegaticas to it.:rctics significant-ly, NRC will be bnable to investigata all oC the allegations
- while continuing to perforu all of the inurection work that we believe is necessary. . -
.i
- For inva=tigations of allegations to be effectiva, hett-I ever, nr.C must develop a rule or regulation to protect cen-struction workers from reprisals by their employers when they bring construction problems to the attention cf H3C.
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maaa t C - C . Reviewed: . 8 O K. E. 5hewmaker, Kentor Structural / Dat4 e
; , . Engineer. Division of Reactor Construction , ;
Ins ection , :-
- 7.7 () !
- o,r.,ee .
. M. D. Thornburg, Director, DiMston Date ;
ReactorConstructionInspect1% * - j Investfoation Summary: ', Investigation November 10, 1979 through February 7.1980 (Report No. 4 50-498/79-19; 50-499/79-19).
- Areas investicated: 5pecial investigation of allegations concerning lack of ,
QC managJaenL support, intimidation and harassment of quality ortrol inspector 3 i and the assessment of the effectiveness of the quality assurance / quality
! control program at the South Texas Project. The investigation involved 1113 -
! inspector-hours by one investigator and five NRC inspectors. . l Results: Nine of the initial 12 and 10 of the 19 additional allegations were i substantiated. One of the initial 12 allegations was partially substantiated. Eight of the additional allegations require further investigation and are con- , sidered unresolved. A total of 3 allegations were unsubstantiated. Twenty-two j items of noncompliance were identified: , 1 . ; [ The quality control inspection function lacked support and organizational l freedce, paragraph E.1.d; failure to complete the special process of back- l
+
filling in accordance with the qualified procedure, paragraph E.3.a; failure l to take prvapt corrective action on nonuniarming ten equip 7er.t. paray.sph : , E.3.c; failure to establish procedures for sampling as part of a systematic ! testing program, paragraph E.3.a; failure to maintain records, paragraph , i E.3.d; failure to take effective correction action, paragraphs E.7.d, E.2.b; l
, inspection and testing personnel not qualified per procedure,* paragraph E.2.c; '
failure to maintain controlled documents up-to-date, paragraph E.4.a; welding
- activities not adequately controlled, paragraph E.4.c(2)(c); failure to l provide adequate control of special processes, paragraphs.E.5.b(?)(a),
l E.5.b(2)(b). E.5.a(2); radiography not performed,to. code, paragraph E.4.b; ; I failure to take proper corrective action, paragraph E.1.b (Allegation 10A); : I failure to take action on repetitive deficiencies, paragraph E.9.b(3); deficient l ! conditions not documented per procedure, paragraph E.9.a(1); knowing use of ! equipment identiffed as nonconforming,' paragraph E.3.f; inadequate test contrn1, , paragraph E.3.f; failure to conduct an effective audit program, paragraphs-E.8.c. E.8.d(2) E.8.d(3) E.8.d(1) E.9.a(3), E.8.d(2), E.8.d(3); inadequate ;
, inspection, paragraph.E.2.b; welding procedures and specification changed
! without proper review and approval *, paragraph E.4.c(3)(d); and interim changes i to procedures not controlled per requirements, paragraph E.5.b(1)(a). . o,
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- _i-- . ~L .- . x :---.. . . _ - - - - _ ,
o . 3 . . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page, A. INTRODUCTION .....................,............................... 5
~ , . .
- 1. Purpose of Investigation ...............................S7... 5
- 2. Scope of Investigation / Inspection ......................*..... 5
., 3. Facility Description .................................. ...... 6 B. ALLEGAT!0NS ...................................................... 6 C. CONOUCT OF INVESTIGATION ..................s..................... .
7
- 1. I n t e rv i ew s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 2. Investigation Team .......................................... 7
. 3. Man a g eme n t Me e t i ng s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 4. Persons contacted .....:..................................,.... 8
~
D. SUPSARY OF FIN 0!NGS.............................................. 9 E. REPORT DETAILS .................................................. 11' ,
- 1. ALLEGATIONS AND CONCERNS ................................... 11
- a. Initial Allegations ................................... 11
- b. Additional Allegations ................................ 25 C. Comments and Concerns ................................. 47 *
., d. Summary of Conclusions :................................ 49 .
- 2. STRUCTUR L CbHCRETE ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 . /. . . .
- a. 5pecifications and Procedures ......................... 50 Field Activities ..*... . ............ ..../.. ...... 82
- c. Quality Assurance Records ............................. 55
, d. Cadwel' ding Activities ................................. 59
- 3. PLANTBACKFII.L............................................ 60
- a. Speci fica tions and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
- b. Test Fill ................................i............ 62
- c. Soll Sampling Program.............,.......:.*............
64
- d. Records ........................ .. ................... 64
- e. F i e l d Ac t l ~v i t i e s . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . 65
- f. Additional Soft Penetration Tests ..................... 66
- 4. REVIEW 0F.WELOIN'G ACTIVITY ................................. ,
68
- a. Review of Welding Procedures .......................... '
68 -
- b. WelderNelding Operating Performance .
Qualification Test Records ................*............ 69
- c. Observation Welding Activities ........................
- .79. , .-.
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(' L. ~ Tablo cf Cent:nts (continued) * - - hage
- 5. .NONOESTRUCTIVE E.XAMINATION ACTIVITIES ...................... 75
, a .. Liquid Penetrant Examination ..................... ,.... 75
- b. Radiographic Examination ..........................i.... 76
. c. Personnel Qualification Records .................:..... 82
- d. Radiological Safety ............................ ......
83
- 6. QUALITY CONTROL PERSONNEL TURNOVER ......................... 84 -
. a. Civil QC Inspectors ............s...................... 84
- b. Mechanical /NDE. Inspectors .......................'...... 85
- c. Summary and Concl u s ion s .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 7.
.MONCONFORMANCE ACTION . . . . .REPORTS . . . . . AND
. . . FIELO
. . . . . . . . .;R'EQUESTS FOR 87 ENGINEERIN
- s. Nonconformance Reports ............. 87 Action,..................
- b. Field Requests for En ................ 90
- c. Trending ............gineering .................................. 91
. d. Summary and Conclusions ............................... 94
- 8. PROJECT AUDIT SYSTEMS ...................................... 95
- a. Scope of Reviewg....................,.................. 95
- b. Purpose of Review ..................... ............... 95 -
- c. Review of Procedures ...............................i.. 95
- d. Audit Requirements .................................... 96
- 9. PROJECT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM ............................... 102 a.
5. HL&P Surveillance .-................... ............... 102 B&R Site Internni Survettlance ....... .............. 104
- c. Audi tor Qua l i fi cati' no . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 F. SUMMAnY OF ITEMS ............................................... 107
- 1. NONCOMPLIANCES .................... ................'....... 107
- 2. UNRESOLVED ITEMS ...............~.............. ............ 110
- 3. OPEN ALLEGATIONS ............................. .........,.. 113 4,
OPEN ITEM 5 FOR REFERRAL . . s . . . . . . . . . . era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 REPORT ATTACHMENTS N APPEN0!X 1 - Summary Previous Investigation Findings' . APPEN0!X 2 - Summary of Statements . APPENDIX 3 - Summary of Results of Interviews APPENDIX 4 - First Interim Report: Liner Plate Bulge, Unit 2 RC8, 3/24/80 APPENDIX 5'- Brochure: Implementation of the B&R QA , Program at the STP Jobsite . ,, .c *
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( { - 5 A. INTRODUCTION - .
- 1. Purpose of Investication
.This investigation was initiated by the Nuclear Regulato y Commission's of.' ice of Inspection and Enforcement (NRC.: DIE) on November 10., 1979, under the provisions of 10 CF.R Part 50.70. Its
. purpose was to: (1) investigate and determine the validity of recent allegations made by a South Texas Project employee concerning lack of support of quality control inspectors by their management, harass-ment and intimidation of Quality Control personnel and discresancies in the construction.and quality assurance program for concreta *
. placement work; and (2) assess the effectiveness of the Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) program at the Houston Lighting and Power Company's (HLt.P) south Texas Nuclear Power Plant, (STP).
- 2. Scope of Investication/ Inspection -
The investigation / inspection effort was div.ided int o two parts. The first was the investigation of the specific allegati* ons recently
' received from a worker at the South Texas Project. The second was the inspection of selected construction activities to assess the effectiveness of the QA/QC program for the South Texas Project.
1 The need for the second phase was dictatad by past allegations that also concerned lack of support by canagement, threats and harassment
. . of Brown and Root Inc. quality control inspectors. Some of these past allegations have received considerable media interest which has generated inquiries from several Congressmen and the NRC Commissioners.
Appendix 1 lists the inspection reports that document the results of the NRC OIE investigation into these past allegations. These investigations were cenducted without the use of signed, sworn statements. o The following site activities were reviewed to determine if an
- effective QA/QC program is being implemented. ,
- a. Observation of on going work and review of records relative to the: -
. (1) production, placement, testieg and curing of concrete and associated activities such.as Cadwelding. A significant portion of the investigation /trepection effort was concen-
. . trated in this area because the majority of the allega-
- tions, both past and present, concern'the construction and
- QC inspection activities for the placem.ent of concrete.
(2) Installation and testing of plant engineered backfill. (3) Installation and welding of safety-related piping.
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1 threatened or intimidated quality control inspectors. The employee initially conveyed his concerns to the Region IV Resident Inspector and subsequently expressed 12 specific allegations that co ered threats to QC
. inspectors, dominant influence of construction craft personnel over QC management, non-support of QC inspectors by QC management, an( question-able construction practices. -
i C'. - CON 00CT OF INVESTIGATION
- 1. Interviews l i During the course of this investigatior's 57 formal interviews were '
conducted, by the assigned investigator, and approximately 50 i
; informal interviews / discussions were conducted in the field by the i NRC investigator and inspectors. . Formal interviews were b 9 th selec- .
tive and random. Selected interviewees were identified by co-workers l
. who claimed they had pertinent information. Random interviewees
- . were identified,from employee rosters. In addition, the sequence of
! the interviews between rasidow and selective intereiawees was vartud ! in a effort to protect the identity of personnel.
- Investigation by the inspectors consisted of routine inspection and -
- investigation techniques including observations, review of documen- i i tation, performanca of tests and interviews and discussions with j site personnel. Those interviewed included HL&P and S&R construction 4 and QA/QC management personnel; B&R QC inspectors and engineers; . .
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory personnel; and other site personnel ' such as pipefitters, iron workers, welders, warc'.ouse, training and i office personnel. The summaries of the signed, sworn statements l . are contained f r Appendix 2 and the summaries of interviews are contained in Appendix ,3. c An allegation was considered to be substantiated if *he information i developed during the investigation demonstrated that it tes reasonable
- to conclude that the alleged event did occur. . ;
{ . .
, 2. Investication Team ,
! The NRC onsite investigation team was comprised:of five 01E ! inspectors and one investigator. One inspector and the in"vestigator ! were from Region IV, one inspector eacte were from Regions I, and II, , and two inspectors were from Region III. -
- 3. Manacemant Meetinas ,
A formal entrance meeting was conducted on November 19, 1979, with , the top HL&P QA and Project management site personnel. The Itcensee
- personnel were informed that in connection with the investigation
- and inspection efforts the NRC investigator and inspectors would be f i conductirig formal and informal interviews and discussions with HL&P., (
! and their contractor personnel; that the interviews would be ephdukted I without HL&P personnel present; that statements would be taken from ,, p i
- 3 -
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l . 2-L , E aait 1.. C. C Transcription, Conversation between Mr. Tom Applegate and Mr. Ernest Alredge, President of Peabody-Magnuflux. j I Mr. Tom Applegate: Bello?- , Mr. Ernest Airedge l Bello, Mr. Applegate? . 44 TA:s,Yes. . - ER: Ernest,Alredge here. TA: Mr. Alredge. ,. EA: Now are you, dad?-(Laughter) TA: We're like passing ships,in the night. Your's travelling I take it? EA: Yes. I'm down in ,Mouston. TA: That sounds like the legal staff. EA:. Yup. TA: Rave you kept yourself abrest of what's happening here in Cincinnati?
- EA
- I have, of course,.seen the newspaper article in the Chicago sun-Times i we have been contacted again hewspaper article they've re byopened the HRCs theirapparently because ofPhillip investigation...Mr. the had been interviewing some of our people down at the CG&E site, and
, that's been about it really. l TA: The NRC didn't really reopen its' investigation, it never closed. , Also, it's not closed yet and there are some more issues surfacing. s r . Again, I feel like your company is still. . .and what I'd like to t
'know from you is,why some things are happening. Now, I talked to some of your employees with the respect due to them. I haven't used j any of them, none of them have been quoted in the news media. I still stand by the fact that your company did an' honest job down there.
But some of your people have really taken a beating oyer this. You' know yourself you were asked to leave the job effective April 1 ! because a clause in the contract, I'm not real sure what it means and i maybe you can qualify that for me, but it's something to do with l "we-don't-need-to-give-you-a-reason," at the convenience of the l contractor. 1 EA: Youv's worded it exactly, " quote end quote" almost. 1 L TA: Yeah.- Was n't there any feeling within your people that there was l d something more to this than just asking you to leave? 6 EA's Uh, well, yes, there is. Our situtaion has been dictated by Stamford corporate people and there position is that they are ,i on alot of utilities and alot of power plants not only in testing, j but in building precipitators, scrubbers, and enviromental contro 7
. . . . . - . . ~-e-
2. in other areas. And we've been told basically that to try to go in and defend this issue might have an adverse on the other utilities taking the position that Peabody is going after a sister utility here work. and maybe we shouldn't be considering them for any further TA: Your'saPeabody.Magnaflux,yourhomeofficesareikChicago. Who's stamford? Is there a company that owns you?' EA:'.Yes. We're owned by Peabody International, a New York Stock Exchange company headquartered in stamford. The company does about $600 million a year in business, and probably half of that is derived from air pollution or water pollution control equip-ment, or testing directed towards the uJ111 ties. We have a very la large job with colorado Power, a $60 million pollution control device going into their new power plant. They have a large job in Mississippi. TA: The thing that concerns me, I can understand stamford saying
'* Don't go in, so forth, and push this too hard" because you might lose more contracts, and you know, what we'd call comann-sense, business-wise. IT may not exactly be right, but that decision's for each individual to make. The thing that concerns me G the people that you had working down there. for you, and I'm talking here particularly of Steven and Allan sellars:
Steve Benning and Dave Mang, who were individuals in your company who I indicated to you were men who were doing a proper job, who were. conscientious about their job. Steve Benning, from what I
, understand, because 4agnaflux was taken off the job quickly, Steve Benning is without a job. Wayne Drafer for one reason or another is taking a vacat. ion in Florida. Ahd Dave Rang, your level three .(3) radiograph man, has suddenly been taken away from ,
you and is now working for Kaiser quality assurance. I don't know I talked to l4r. Woods, not from Mr. Woods, but from some other individua'Is, (that) the NRC, there was a pause in their
'investig'ation. It started on Manday, went through to Wednesday, they said "we'll be back," then when:this hit the newspaper, CG&E put and on thena when full crew and they the WRC cametried backto change some of that piping, it said, alright." well, the piping looks But the ARC still hasn't let them off the hook totally.
The thia 7 that bothers me is that these are honest men and that they' made an honest judgement on that pipe before it went in. It was ind stalled anyway, and talking to Steve Benning this morning, I said, "Well, it just doesn't pay to be an honest man on that job down there. And, he said, "Youv's got that right." I hear I hear what your's telling me about Peabody being responsible to its' stockholders and so forth and the people in stamford saying don't get embroiled in it because of our other contracts and everythir. but still it seems like Kaiser, the big giant, is putting you people in your place when all you tried to do was an honest job. EA: Well, your's right. (pause) payroll. I'll have to see why I didhappened. that* not know steve was off the3 TA: Quite frankly, he sounds *Like a scared man. 'To me, he said, he's just trying keep his nose clean and his mouth shut. There's e
, = = . - -
Jo {. { millions of dollars at stake in this project down here, but there's other issues that didn't have anything to do with P-M, even Mr. Woods told me, CG&E and Raiser have done an about face and they're trying to become buddy-buddy now and all that other kind of stuff. :taybe it's easier for those guys at Kaiser to sit up th' ere abd make the decisions and this being their first plant and wanting it to come out immacualately cle46, but even a company like yourself, your's not that small, but it just seems like theyr's trying to push you in one direction, and I feel badly
' for you, because I feel that you were right. And it seems to me there's And God people putting the hush on you that shouldn't be doing that.
knows it certainly has to do with .aillions of dollars on this contract down here and millions of dollars in building this nuclear pwer plant, but that's the whole problem here, that we're talking about a nuclear power plant, not an office building This affects half of the eastern side of cincinnati. These men - were right when they called the pipe wrong, and now. ..I just can't understand it. It.would seem to me that ' would have an excellent lawsuit against Kaiser.yourI company know Kaiser's big, but.no was Goliath, you know. I don't mean to be any type of moralist in making that comparison. But youv's got a big company here telling a smaller company that this is the way your's gonna do it because it benefits us. 34: well, your's correct, and it's not a very enjoyable position to be in. You don't know me Very well, but I'm a career guy and have come up thru the ranks, a 20 year man, and I found that you do what your's told. But these fabricators can really lay it ti you. TA: Your's talking about the-- Xellogg of Pennsylvania. . EA: Yeah. When you work for a closed industry, it's very tight. of course it's common knowledge now in the industry that we've been thrown off the site and... __ _. -
,TA:
,Wilf this, affect your performance in the future in ither areas?
EA: Oh, it'll hurt us, it'll be a temporary blip in our performance record TA: But it should't be. You're the ones who were:right , EA: Yes, Applegate, but you know... TA: But there's idealism and there's reality. EA: I'll be off every fabricator withinmajor 30 days.RFQ The request computerfor bid alllist of aatsudden every won major t have us in the bidding bank. All this work is bid work. Your ' , struggle like hell to get on the Rechtel's and the Braun's and the Parsons and the Re11ogg's and the Raiser's and all t'd e contractors lists, and you bid the work for all the utilities. TA: Mas Peabody worked on any other nuclear jobs? A i O
, EA:
(. Oh, we have soma 20 jchT going right now. (~ l l TA: Bas this over happened at any of the others? i EA: Jo,not'.to my knowledge, not taat's been uncovered...We produce the data and the data is taken from us. To my knowledge this is the only 3ob where we have been overruled, apparently, and data taken from us without any follow-up. But I don't know that it hasn't happened in other areas. ; TA: ' well, Mr. Alredge, you have my sympathies, of course. This has not stopped. THere's people in Washington that are gonna want to know about this. But the media never got anything from me about your company. EA: Yes, I owe you a debt of gratitude for that. TA: Well, I'm trying to hold off from telling people that you people got the shaf t down there. . .I $hink if anything comes out about your con'peny. . . - EA: well, our people don't have a lid on 'em. They can chat with whoever they want to chat with. . TA: But I've kept your people out of it as much as possible because I believe your's in the most vulnerable position. . .But if you got yourself a hold of a damn good corporate lawyer, which probably do have down there in Texas, he could tell you that you could take it against Xaiser, because they're trying to tell you what to do.and that's not what they contracted you for. They contracted you for to' be down there and.tell them the truth. Now, if they don't like the truth, that's tough luck. But we're not building an office building down there, its a nuclear power plant. .. You know, one thing I was concerned about was the break-in at your trailer the weekend after I left. Do you have copies of your original radiographs to bear yourself out, shoul this come out in something like a Washington hearing? EA: We do not have the radiographs. They took the radiographs when they terminated us. When you say "they" took the radiographs, wh 7 TA: EA: The customer. They go on the assumption that they bought it, CG&E bought it, it's their property. The day we were relieved, that same morning they had a man there to take the film and we didn't have any discussion at it. TA: Almost like " hand it over or get shot," huh? EA: It was one of those, fastest transferring of data I can reca'll. We don't have the negatives, we have hopefully some of our inspection reprts, but these's holes in that now that we've had some possible pilferage of our material, and frankly, I don't know if we hav,e a particularly documented ( indistinct) here. e 9 s
*- ' a m e+ s-w-
- 5
(. . l-
- TA
well, it's certainly not beyond the imanginatior.,:o believe that the { . oould have not only taken your data but replaced it wit 5 their own. l EA: Could.be. It's possible.
, TA: .
I know that supposed totheshow pipes are numbered, the number on it. and any time yet X-Ray, it's i And I've heard that it's not j that hard to take an X-Ray i,and have it actually be a picture of another. look like it's a picture of one pipe ! EA: Oh, it's true.
- You know, if someone's gonna lie and cheat, it's very hard to go against the grain, especially if the intent to defraud is there originally. -
TA: Well, I hope theyr"e not defrauding us into another Three Mile Island. EA: Well, I hopeinthat is involved it. also, and I think the best thing is that the NRC Theyr'c good people. TA: Oh, I believe that. I was talking to Gerry Phillip of NRC this morning, abd I slow. Theyr's not aggressive. told him the only thing about them is they move too EA: It's a bureaucratic organization, they just don't move very fast. TA: And it's the lack of aggressiveness that ends up allowing CG&E to do
.what theyv's done, to cover up this, that and the other thing.
pleasantries and Good byes. END CONVERSATION . 4
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5 ExsIBIT # 11
, Cincinnati Enquirer .
. Friday May 9, 1980
. 4 -(
e 33fShifts. Charges go NRC The Fed:ral Bureau of Invest!gs. uttllty. Clactnnatt Gas is Ele:ttle Lion (FD1) Thursday pnssed the Co., and the plant's but!ders K1!str buck and es citt:: of the Olmmer nu. Engmetring, , clear power p! ant to the ;;u:! ear . .' Regulatory Comm!ssten (?:nc).
- MCANWII!t.E. ME?.!B?P.S of the The crit!c-private Investtgator NP.C's reg::nal str.fi m Cht:ago, Thornas Applecate-had char:ed who also were present for the ptsy.'
piping at the pt ntin ?.!ctrow Chlo, ing of the tapes, sa'.d they r.re nct was secretly rep! aced and reccros sure that wh:.t they heard warrants Lampared with to keep fiRC Invest!. an invest:Catton. caterA from disectoramt faulty con. "I want to review the tape traln." ntruction avid inspactlen practices. Anid NltC Investigatt$n special'st Allistentte's cVidenee for the (l.A. I'littllp, he aunft he said he Cr::1 .. rhurl:an is cot:taltieta in tapeel ensi. eint opsite foul tile conyctsatiosta ven.ntlost.1 w!L!t of fitta!M of l'rntantly enurludet whut Applegate hai Tnstiteit f.er%Icch, t h u firin rosi. charmt. trurled In perform X. ray testin: on l'htllip raid he felt the informa. pt;;e3 und welds at tr.e Wl;!!nm !!. Linn un the tapes was "uns;::ct!!:." Zimmer fluc!:ar Puner Stallon. stui he added. "The fallas that are talksme are not at the site (of the . AFTI:n I.I.*i'l!!NING tn those plantl." tapes. however, the F31 dettaed in,1
- tay Z llosevur, the N RC investigator enver.up accusatlog,s Dullders vivre the f...w conc!mmer's ern, nul<! that when he is " armed with a
. FBI Special A*pnt Itottrt Lluck' clearer undcritanding" of what is ley sa!d. af ter heartn the evidencu* on the tape, ne p!ans to interv:ew he saw nothing viitatu the burgau's one of the speakers per: ant!!y. *- Jurisdiction. ' That speaker, a Pes 3:dy execu. But that doesn't mean that tne tive. Indicated on tape tnst his FDI won't cbme in to mvest!;ste workers have not come fr. ward
- Applegate's n!!egations later on, with kno AledJe of shodcy work.
Duckley added.. manship ht Ilminer for fear of
, The U.S. Department of Energy, tuing ostractsed witam tne nuttsar the NRC and the TUI participate in Industry. .
a co operative re!stionship to see Applegate took his ev!dence to
, that the Atomic Energy Act is fol. the FLl! In Chicago ott the adytte of l
lowed.the ngent exp!r.!ned. NRC sentor invest!gitor Wi!Itam'
We're going to watt for the NRC Waro in WashingtJn.' Ward told to complet4 their report." ne said. lg Applegitt' Wednesday that his the NRC can come up with ev6sence c!stms of deception and cover up to support Applegate's charges, he seemea to indieate criminal .
enntinued then the FDI may to activity. called in to inveAttrata and to fur. stinh nidiur the prosecution ut inv -RIT ClORDA,No . 9
.s Ae g 0 6 . ,
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. GOVEMoluTY PROJECT k.
Institute for Policy Studes 1901 Que Street. N.W., Washington. D.C. 20009 . (202)234 0382 June 13, 1980 , Memorandtma , , 19: Imuis Clark, Director From: Tem Devine, Associate Director Re: Verification of Allegations in Thomas. Applegate's June 6, 1980 Affidavit: Rita Giordano Rita Giordano is the journalist who covered the sinner story for the Cincinnati. Enquirer in a series of articles. - She first had contact with Mr. Applegate in an April 19 tele-phone conversation. She began to work closely with him in May, after he produced tapes of d.iscussions with employees at the asialear plant. Ms. Giordano prepared the questions for Mr. Applegate's taped discussion pinning down a top' peabody official on the coverup of faulty welds in the piping at Enumer. She consented to release of a memorandum on our conversation and is glad to help congressional investigators. Ms. Giordano was impressed with Mr. Applegate's sincerity
.and thoroughness. She stated that he was as thorough in his ,
research as he possibly could be under the circumstances. Significantly, she also recounted that Mr. Applegate was the only individual she spoke with on the events at sinner who maintained a consistent story. The others, including utility officials and government representatives, all shifted their , positions as more evidence was revealed. Ms. Giotdano added
. that App, legate had independent sources to verify his allegations.
Finally, Ms. Giordano evaluated Mr. Applegate as fairly conser-vative politically. She did not feel that he was looking for a scandal. Ne simply was unwilling to' ignore it.
~
In terms of the reliability of Applegaie's allegations, Giordano stated that the disclosures of employee-management misconduct are " completely true. " In her opinion, these practices are well-known within the industry, but no one is willing to discuss the problem publicly. She stated that no utility or government official she spoke with made any attempt to deny the pattern of widespread drunkpnness on the dob. In terms of the faulty w,eJos, Giordano is persuaded that the charges are serious."/ She added that it is difficult to persuade officials to speak freely about this issue even in private, which explained the technique of asking a peabody official significant questions and waiting for him to agree or disagree./\ The official wouldn't have volunteered the information. She ., \ aise noted that the utility agreed there had been extra work - activity before phillip's. final visit. The utility insisted, however, that the activity represented " rout'ine preparations."
. 'She cautioned, however, that she lacks the expertise for technical conclusions. .
. GOV
^
- s ' A(.LITY PROJECT
( Iristitute for Policy Studies ' 1901 Que Street. N.W...Weshington. D.C. 20009 . (202)234 9382
. , June 12, 1980
- 4*
Memorandum . . To: Louis Clark, pirector From: Thom Devine, Associate Director Re: Verification of Allegations in Thomas Applegate's June 6, 1980 Affidavit: Joan tieans Ms. Means was !!r. Applegate's landlady until he left town last month. She has known him since cecember 1973. Ms. Means consented to public release of our brief conversa-ti 9n.
.e Means has an extremely,high opinion of Applegate, whom she considers like an " adopted son." she thinks he is decol sincere and concerned about the potential dangers at sinw.u .y
, Ms. Means had had no personal involvement at simmer due
.to her own initiative.- she confirmed that she had been threatened with sexual torture, however.
e e O s . e 4 ee.o eo i 6 8 e
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1 s 'i %, ( tl : (g ( January 5,1981 l'D'0P.h,1,pu!! 'FOR: Chaiman Ahearne ,
.3 rpO': Janes J. Cunnings, Director . .,*. *. .,w, . .
Office of Inspector and Auditor g% SUOJECT: THbtAS 11. APPLECATE ALLFGAT!nt't Attached is a letter to you fren the Office of the Special rounsel dated pecenber 29, 1980, which was directed to this office. As you requested in pur peceber 15, 1980, renorandun to no, this office will investicate the adequacy of the office of Inspection and Fnforcenent's (!E) handling of Applegate's allenations. l'e will also refer to appropriate law enforcenent agencies any allenations of crininal activity beyond the scope of IE's current investipation of the safety issues raised by ifr. Applegate. l Mttachment: As stated. cc: Cennissioner Gilinsky, w/cy Special Counsel Itr ronrissioner Hendrie, w/cy Special Counsel Itr Connissioner Rradford, w/cy Special Counsel Itr Victor Stollo, w/ attach L. Rickwit, w/ attach Distribution UTA 81-18
% Gamble Sinclair CONTACTS: David Gamble John $1nclair OIA - 27170 4 p.3g
,,,c e p O!A OIA
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to:, reos oc nec..c: o OFFICIAL RECORD COPY *
I ( , ( . GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTAB.luTY PROJECT , ej.ctra institutefor Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 g g, gs 33 (202)234 9382 O cember 10. 1980 No. - M Eastwood Clici,if M
- Acting peoial Counsel of th's Merit Systems Protection Board -
1717 "N" street, N.W. ' Wa n. D.C. 20419 Dear Ms."Eastwoods The Government Accountability Project is representing Mr. Thomas W. Applegate in his request for an. investigation pursuant to 5 U.s.C. e1206 (b) (7). While Mr. Applegate is not a government em Special Counsel's policy is to accept under 51206 (b) (2)ployee, the disclosures
- from non-government employees for investigations under 81206 (b) (7) .
Mr. Applegate's whistleblowing disclosure allages that the Naolear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Investigator Gerald Phillip of NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement for Region III, failed to perform a thorough and oonplete investigation of serious allega'tions he made to the Commission about the Sinner Nuclear Power Facility in Moscow, Chio. More specifically, Mr. Applegate alleges: I. Violation of law, abuse of authority, mismanagement, perpetuating gross waste and perpetuating substantial and specific danger to public health and safety, by Mr. Phillip through excluding issues within the scope of MRC jurasdiction. ,
- 11. Mismanagement, abuse of authority, perpetuation of gross waste ,
and perpetuation of subs tantial and specific danger to public health or safety, by Mr. Phillip through faulty investigative techniques. III. Missanagement, abuse of authority, and perpetuating a substantial and specifig danger to public health or safety, by Mr. Phillip, through inaccurate investigative conclusions. On November 20, 1980, following a careful investigation by the Government Accountability project Legal Clinio, the GAP Whistleblower Review Fanel unanimously concluded that Mr. Applegate's charges were founded on a " reasonable belief," and it approved submission of this disclosure. . We look forward to your reply within 15 days. Sino rely,
= %
1,ouis Clark Director 4
.e 6
4 e mame , .
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTAaluTY PROJECT (*. (
' Institute for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W., Washington. D.C. 20009 (202)234 9382 December 15, 1980 Ms. Mary Eastwood -
Acting special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board *
- 1717 E St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20419
- Dear Ms. Eastwoodt .
The Government Accountability Project, as you know, is repre-senting Mr. Thomas W. Applegate in his request for an investigation pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 51206 (b) (7) . He has authorized us to allow you to disclose his name to anyone within government who will consi-der his allegations and inform lation. Mr. Applegate expressly does not want his affidavit.provided to private parties. Thank you for considering this request. Yours truly, _p p
., Louis Clark, Director Atte.ntion: Ron Barber LC/pp
.S
r S C. C BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL OF THE. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD .
, REQUEST FOR AN INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO 5 USC S1206 (b) (7)
On behalf of Mr. Thcmas W. Applegate, the Government
- Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies ,
( " GAP ") submits the following disclosure pursuant to 5 USC
$1206 (b) (2) . Mr. Applegate ch
-) Phillip with violations of law _arges r NRC investigator masmanagement as defined Gerald in 5 CFR 1250.3(a); aby,se of authority as defined in i 5 CFR 1250.3 (f);
perpetuating groas waste as defined in 5 CFR 1250.3(d); and perpetuating a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety. Mr. Applegate _ requests that the Special Counsel order a response from NRC Chairman Ahearna, as provided by 5 USC 51206 (b) (7) . More specifically, Mr. Applegate charges that
<~,.m-- Waiti
_ 1 1-- r 2 - = ,, c a c 3
. Mr.Applegate disclosed well-documented instances of thef t and black-market smuggling operations at the plants auctions of
" hot weapons"; illegal shadow businesses that operated out of the plant to manufacture belt buck 1'es with nuclear grade steels widescale drunkenness among enployees at i
the plant; serious safety defects, including faulty welds on 20% of the prefabricated piping in the plant; and coercion and retaliation against the quality control . radiograp)}ers who uncovered safety defects. .' - Unfortunately, , on the Zimmer Nuclear Power,St 6 ion, U. .. , uc ear Regu Of fice of Inspection and Enforcament for,, atory, Regios Commission III, (Final" Review, 1.,ea m July 3,1980) ("NRC Report," attached 'as Exhibit! 1) . t e 4 ..u-w _ _ __1 -_ _ z_ _ :__. w + - =_ g n ,1
= - - - - ' ' __ __
-c. Mr. Applegate charges that the 5 3 l -
his investigation to a superficial review of three specific pipes. As a result, ths citizens of Ohio remain as vulnerable to a grossly mismanaged, dangerous plant as they were before the NRC effort. e
.n. .. . . . _ . . .
__ ---,____________..,__.___,__.,___,_,,s , , _ . , _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ , _ . _ , , _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , , . _ , _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . ,
i s.
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( a BACKGROUND In December 1979 Cincinnati Gas and Electric (CG&E) hired private investigator Thomas Applegate as a'n undercover. agent. His assignment, outlined in a letter from CG&E's director of media services, was to investigate "any possibility of mis-conduct on the part of anyone involved in the construction of the Zimmer Nuclear Power station." (See December 5, 1979 letter from David Altamuehle to Major Cox, attached as j
/'
Exhibit 2.) His specific assignment was to obtain evidence W ,p* d of time-cheating by certain employees. In December 1979 and F early January 1980, Applegate worked undercover as a " cost accounting engineer" at the site. He was authorized, through his cover, to roam freely throughout the plant and to compara construction sheets against the construction contract held by Kaiser Engineering International ("KEI"). (See June 6, 1980 Affidavit of Thomas Applegate at 7-8, attached as Exhibit 3.) His pretext also enabled him to speak with personnel from .
~
all levels of site construction and management. Before long, he had gained the confidence of both union officials and plant employees. (See generally Mr. Applegate's Confidential Repdrts to the utility, attached as Exhibit 4.) In four weeks Applegate documented a scheme of labor-management collusion to permit and coverup illegal, dangerously negligent behavior among plant personnel; as well as
' dangerously faulty welds in k'ay piping, indicative of a breakdown we. . -
in quality' assurance ("QA") practices. . M22pgigE33 an**ff" evideseire a af e4mm cham &4nn hu& . 1--- 2 ^- 22-me. a2 ' "C d = f =~ - 2 ..;; . .. 15 .l . Instead,'Mr. Murray ord'ered Mr. Applegate to root out any reason to fire peabody Magnaflux ("PM") , ' the company performing nuclear x-rays (radiography) for the plant's quality assurance program. (Af fidavit, at 4.) Applegate fo11osed instructions but found that the radio-graphers were among the most conscientious employees on the site. His research only further confirmed serious problems in the plant's safety-related quality control program. When Mr. Applegate pressed these safety concerns, his position as CG&E undercover agent was terminated abruptly in early January. Soon af ter, the utility fired the employees who had been the targets of his time-cheating investigation. Curiously, these same employees were vocal critics of lax safety practices at the plant and had provided Mr. Applegate with the early leads for his probe into quality control.
,CG&E knew of these amployees' dissent, because Applegate cited their allegations in his confidential reports. After the mass firings, CG&E blew Mr. Applegate's cover. Contrary to normal procedure, the utility informed the dismissed employees of Applegate's role in their termination. Mr. Applegate's life .,
since has been threatened on numerous occasions. (Affidavit, " 6
- e. . . . - . . ..
, - - - _ _ . ~ . _.
..- - _ ., * ._y_- - _ . - - . _ _ . - - - . _ _ _ - , , - . -
(*' s
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at 20-21.) On April 1,1980, after a mysterious break-in and theft of records from the PM trailer, the utility fired the radiographers, against whom Applegate had been unable to find any evidence of impropriety. , t w v . b -... w - te inen u ,- Amel *C4_te teigphyph4-% Muc wps%nm.w- q ~ m u,umm.._w- -__ q w p, m
. _. (See Mr. Applegate's telephone' records, attached as' Exhibit 5.) Simultaneously, he sent his evidence for analysis to Mr. Upchurch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(" FBI") in Cincinnati. Mr. Applegate also provided his g-evidence to Mr. Cissel of the United States Attorney's Office
.in CincinnacLEach of these offices and agencies assured Mr.
Applegate that his charges would be pursued. Those assurances rang hollow as time wore on and nothing was done. (Affidavit, at 13.)
; c.
- _.;.aune m r rfi Winvem ra.rmrn;.n y m ,@
9e= usur.da__?.3%-e , On March .$,-I980, investigators led by Mr. Phillip met with Mr. Applegate and reviewed Jgmut of his contentions and allegations. The follow-ing week they informed him that the NRC would pursue three limited areas of investigation. The three investigative charges included two charges of faulty welds, as well as an improper shortcut in the flushing system that cleans the piping. (See March 11, 1980 letter from Phillip to Applegate, attached as Exhibit 6.) The investigator's letter neither mentioned the quality assurance program, nor Mr. Applegate's charges of i mismanagement ~and criminal activity at the plant. l Corresponding'ly, his July 1, 1980 report fails to provide i an accurate record of the allegations. In fact, Mr. Phillip l failed to mention the mismanagement and crimina'l charges at all. By comp,letely omitting the bulk of Mr. Applegate's disclosure, Mr. Phillip limited the possibility of future review of his exercise of professional discretion. In effect, he also precluded referral of those issues to some other agency for appr.opriate review. . Even for th'e narrow issues he considered, Mr. Phillip's
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l
- effort represents the most shallow level of investigation and documentation. The report offers no outline of investigative strategy; no sampling of the criteria by which Phillip made critical judgments on the scope of the probe; no list of l documents reviewed or interrogatories; and'.no references to l sworn statements. Mr. Phillip's report is a disservice to l the public and to Mr. Applegate, who literally risked his life to blow the whistle on rampant crime, dangerous safety flaws, illegal retaliation, criminal scams, and wasteful mismanage-ment at the Zimmer plant. .
. L
\ . 1
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1 - -
5 - e . (- (- JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF PROOF Pursuant to 5 USC 51206 (b) (2) , the Office of the Special Counsel "shall promptly submi't" to the appropriate agency head any information which the applicant " reasonably believes" evidences a " violation of any law, rule or regulatibn, mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
. substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. . . . "
5 CFR 1252.3 requires that the agency head transmit to the Special Counsel within 60 days the written response required by 5 USC 51206 (b) (7) . , While Mr. Applegate is not a government employee, the Special Counsel's policy is to accept under $1206 (b) (7) non-government employee disclosures based on a " reasonable belief." Letter from Acting Special Counsel Mary Eastwood to Thomas Devine (June 9,1980) . Under this interpretation, Mr. Applegate's disclosure is eligible for the Special Counsel's whistle-blower disclosure conduit. The regulations do not define " reasonable belief", the standard of proof that a whistleblower must satisfy in a disclosure. We propose .that Mr. Applegate's disclosures be tested under the following definitions of " reasonable belief":
"an honest and rationally justified conviction at the time of disclosure, based on inference -
from personal ' experience or information derived. from others." , This key phrase requires a new definition, because it
- traditionally means the " probable cause" standard for an arrest. But the legislative history of 'the Reform Act
- specifically rules out the criminal standard. The Senate Report on the A'ct states, " The Special Counsel would not require information amounting to ' probable cause' to. conduct a an investigation." (S. Rep. No. 95-969, 95 th Cong. , 2d Sess.
- 32) -(Hereinaf ter " Senate Report") . This ingtruction is logical. It would be absurd to expect an employee to muster the same degree of proof to demonstrate " reasonable belief" that the police department investigative machinery must gather to show " probable cause." If the OSC requires a high standard of proof, an employee who acts in the public interest by contacting the Special Counsel early in a budding scandal could be rejected entirely and left vulnerable to reprisals.
Our proposed definition is similar to judicial tests in different contexts. For instance, as a justification for acting in self-defense, " reasonable belief" means "(a) belief begotten by attendant circumstances fairly creating it, and honestly entertained." Howard v. State, 110 Ala. 92, 20 . So. 365-66 (1896). '[ e
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( ( ' our proposed definition also is consistent with that of the well-defined term " good faith," which the courts sometimes have treated as equivalent to " reasonable belief." Placer Co. v. Lee, Alaska, 553 P.2d 54,58 (1976); Hutsell.v..
- Commonwealth, 25 Ky. Law Rep.262, 75 S.W. 225, 227.31903).
Basically, a " good faith" belief is a "real or act6al" belief,
' Raab v. Cooper,124 Cal. Reptr. 590,.594, 51 C.A.3d 866 (1975),
a belief grounded in " honesty of purpose" an,d freedom from fraudulent intent. Wendling v. Cundall, Wyo., 568 P.2d 888, 890 (1977). In administrative law cases on unemployment compensation, " good faith" is equivalent to " genuine." Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review -v. Pinger, 21 Pa.' Comwlth. 61, 342 A.2d 781, 782 (1975). The phrase is flexible, and includes " honest mistakes (s) " within its purview. Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble r 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 S.E.2d 852, 858 (1960).. ' The above analysis is persuasive authority for our ~
~p roposed definition.
But since " reasonable belief" is new to the administrative law context, we examined legal definitions for each term. Out definition inco'porates r " reasonable" through the phrase " honest and rationally justified." This interpretation is consistent with legal authorities and , judicial precedents. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines
" reasonable" as inter alia, "just; rational. " (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1022 (lF4 FT) . Black's Law Dictionary (4tn Ed.
1968) turns to Cass v. Stater 124 Tex. Cr..R. 208, 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933) to define the term as "synonomous with rational; honest; equitable; fair...." Black's cites several other I ' decisions to apply the term in specific contexts. As a test of whether administrative rules are unreasonable, the court in Columbus Green Cabs, Inc. v. Board of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 184 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1961), expl'ained that "(r)easonable means fair, honest and just." In applying criteria' for appealability in a tort, the court in Anderson
- v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo. App., 367 S.W.2d 657, 660 (1963), stated, "* Reasonable' means rational, just, f air-minded, proper, sensible, probable, sangj moderate."
Our proposed definition interprets " belief" as " conviction ' i at the time of disclosure, based on inference from personal
- experience or information derived from others." Our proposed application of the term derives from numerous authorities.
(Ballantine's Law Dictionary 129 (3d Ed. 1969) ) . Bouvier's defines " belief" as "(c)onviction of the mind, arising not from actual perception or knowledge, but by way of inference, or from evidence received or information derived from others. " (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 118 (1948)). Black's Law Dictionary applies " belief" in the context of a test of management , motives in a dispute over compliance with an NLRB order:
"'Believe'...means to be convinced or to feel that something is true or at least probable." NLRB v. Pape Broadcastinc Co.,-
217 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir,. 1954). The court in NLRS v. Pape Broadcasting Co. also defined ", reasonable grounds. to .
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, , 6-b'elieve" as " rationally justified belief," Id., again consistent with the standard we have proposel?
It is important that " belief" remain a flexible . standard not requiring absolute knowledge or certainty. Similar to the phrase " good faith," there is room for honest mistakes within our proposed definition of " reasonable belief." As the court
'Tx. Civ. App.
. in Industrial Bank of Houston v. Wylie, , 493 S.W.2d 293, 295 (1973), explained with respect' to the verification of affidavits, The words 'believe' and
' knowledge' do not have the same meaning. . . . " This flexibility is essential for whistlebicwers who voice rational and sincere concerns. Without a flexible standard qualifying them for protection, they may well choose not to risk their careers because of the possibility of a mistake.
, I. VIOLATION OF LAW, ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, MISMANAGEMENT, PERPETUATING GROSS WASTE AND PERPETUATING A SUBSTANTIAL i AND SPECIFIC DANGER TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, BY MR. PHILLIP THROUGH EXCLUDING ISSUES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF NRC JURISDICTION.
Investigator Phillip spent two days with Mr. Applegate ' reviewing the charges. But Phillip steadfastly refused to inquire into Applegate's charges evidencing criminal activity,
, breaches of licensing conditions, threats to the integrity of the quality assurance structure, and mismanagement by KEI
. and CG&E. Phillip's only concern was with several specific welding and flushing problems which resurfaced during Applegate's month as a CG&E spy. He showed no interest in allegations of the sale of stolen guns on the construction site; labor and management diversion of labor and materials 4
for personal use; fabrication and sale of belt buckles made
'of nuclear grade steel intended for use at the plant; theft,
- . smuggling and sale of two _thousand pounds of copper cable; I frequent time-card padding; drunkenness on the site; and l an unreported fire that illustrated an ineffective alarm system. In short, the charges that Phillip ixcluded revealed a cesspool of misconduct at the Zinmer plant. (Affidavit at 15, 23.)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was preceded by the Atomic Energy Commission, whose jurisdiction is defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (P.L. No. 83-703 (Aug. 30, 1954)). The Act Sets out a pattern for licensing and regulation of certain nuclear materials and facilities on the basis of the common defense. and security, and radiologica~1 health and safety. The regulatory pattern requires, in general, that the construction 2 , and operation of .... utilization facilities (nuclear _ reactors used for the production o,f e
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J power; medical therapy, research and testing) ..., be licensed and regulated by the Commission.
'10 CFR 8. 4 (b) . ,
, According to the AEA, the Commission's general "' authority and responsibility" extended to include regulation of "the construction and operation of production or . utilization j
g i facilities," including the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. 10 CFR 8.4 (a) (1) . An Inspection Division was designated to perform surveillance and inspection of nuclear facilities. The Division's responsibilities included ~
" gathering information to show whether or not the contrac' tors, licensees, and officers and employees of the Commission are-complying with ... this chapter .. . and the appropriate rules and regulations of the Commission." 42 USC $2O35 (c) . Further, to enforce the Act and to safeguard " facilities, equipment, materials and other property of the Commission," th's President
,may request the services of any government agency, including ~
the FBI and the Department of Justice. _42 USC $2271(a) and (b), When the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished .by the Energy Reorganization Act, p.1. 93-438 (Oct. 11, 1974), AEC's authority was vested in the NRC and the Energy Research and Development Administration . ("ERDA") . The Division of Inspection and Enforcement was created to conduct NRC investigations. Any worker 6r repres.entative can trigger the process by forwardin'g a reasonable complaint that he or she
- witnessed some violation of regulations ur licensing conditions.
An inspection must take place as soon as is practicable. Most important, the investigation need not be limited to those issues raised in the employee's original " complaint. 10 CFR 19.16(b). There is no section of the C' ode of Federal Regulations which lists all areas of NRC jurisdiction. Instead, individual sections of the regulations flatly proscribe certa,in activities and create guideli'nes for others. The NRC apd the FBI have joint' jurisdiction over criminal activities; the NRC has the responsibility to refer criminal allegations and ev' ence f'to the FBI for investigation. NRC and FBI Memorandum of Understanding, 44 Fed. Reg. 75535 (1979). The Memorandum summarizes the NRC's role as follows:
"(When an attempted criminal act occurs] the immediate contingency role of the NRC would i be one of gathering and assessing information j to determine the situation, appraising and cooperating with the FBI in order to assist FBI response, and arranging-for other needed and feasible contingency response assistance .,
that is requested through NRC channels." l j Id. at 77536 . L
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The scope ~ of the joint efforts includes "but (is] not ' limited to threats, material thefts and diversions, incursions ! or in'filtrations, extortions, conspiracy, and sabotage I relating to all facilities, activities and materials lj. censed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. " I_5,. w.~ --
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- 1. sale of stolen guns on the site; 42 USC SS2201(k) ,
_' 277 8 A(a)Confident,i'l 12-28-79 , (b) & (c),a 2271 (a')'& (b) 2(Affidavit at 9; ' Repolts at )
- 2. ' diversion of labor and materials for the personal ~
benefit of a KEI superintendent, at a cost to CG&E of
- f .' ,.7,' ,. . more than $30,000; Memorandum of Understanding, 44 FR S" ; c .f 75535 (December 20, 1979), 42 USC S2271(a) (Affidavit ic *^ &#
t ~~ at 4-5; 12-17-79, Confidential Reports at 2, 3; 12-18-79, Confidential Reports at 1)
- 3. fabrication and sale over seven years of belt buckles constructed from nuclear grade steel worth f millions of dollars in. labor and materials intended for 'use in pipes, braces and components at the plant; .
I Memorandum of Understanding, 42 USV S2271(a) (Affidavit at 5; 12-10-79 Confidential Report at 2, 4; 12-17-79
. Confidential Reports at 1-2; Confidential Report:
" Report of Misappropriation of Materials".)
4 ,. theft: of two thousand pounds of copper cable smuggled in small lots and resold within a week for
$15,000 on the black market by 30 plant personnel, to finance a Christmans party complete with prostitutes:
Memoranduni of Understanding, 42 USC S2271(a) . (Affidavit at 6; l-2-80 Confidential Reports at 1) l S. an entrenched system of time card padding, implicitly sanctioned by KEI and CG&E, wasting significant amounts l of time and money; Memorandum of Understanding, Zimmer Power Station-1 Final Safety Analysis Reports (ZPS-1 (1975) , FSAR") 17.1.2.7 (Affidavit at .3-6; Confidential l Reports: " Analysis of Time Cheating," Confidential Reports generally.)
- 6. drunkenness on the site; 79-1 (1975), FSAR 17.1.2.7. (Affidavit at 3, Conf).dential Reports generally) e l
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( ( J7 . an unreported fire in the containment building i suppression chamber ind.icative that fire-watch and communication are ineffective in that area of.the plant; , U.S. General Accounting Office, Reporting Unsdheduled l Events at Commercial Nuclear Facilities: Opportunities to Improve Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight, at EMD 79-16 at 3, 13 (January 26, 1979); (12-14-79 Confidential Report at 1-2). (Exhibit 7) As a legal measure of the implications of Mr. Phillip's default, his misconduct satisfies the requirements for all of the whistleblowing disclosure categories in 5 USC S1206 (b) . Initially, the omissions violate mandatory legal duties for an NRC investigator. (See pp. 6-8, supra) The omissions also constitute " mismanagement,'" defined .
.5 CFR 51250.3 (e') fl980) as "krongful or arbitrary and ' ~
capricious actions that may have an adverse effect on the efficient accomplishment of the agency mission. " His excuse that the NRC lacks jurisdiction simply was wrong. (See pp. 6-8 supra.) That mistake alone satisfies the first half of the definition. Alternatively, both misapplication of the law and failure to consider relevant facts consitute arbitrary and capricious action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402'(1971); Starr v. Federal Aviation Administration, 589 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1978); Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States,
- 203 Ct. Cl. 566, 492 F.2d 1200 (Ct. C1. 1974); Antilles Indus., Inc. v. Government of Virgin Islands, 388 F. Supp.
"' . %. L h v.s. 1975). _
The error,in judgment interferes with the efficient
- accomplishment of the NRC mission in two respects. On the j
{ most basic level, Mr. Phillip's exclusion of relevant evidencej prevented the NRC from pursuing its mission of enforcing its I own rules and regulations for safe, efficient construction f of nuclear plants. 42 USC 52035 (c) . (See pp. 6-7, supra.) More specifically, by his action he impeded an intricate interagency enforcement process for. referral of criminal allegations to law enforcement authorities. 44 FR 75535.
> (See p.7-8 supra.) ~~
Similarly, the exclusion represents " abuse of authority," defined in 5 CFR 1250.3(f) as " arbitrary or capricious exercice l of power by a Federal official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or that results in personal
. gain or advantage' to himself or to perferred other persons."
l As seen above, it was arbitrary and capricious to ignore relevant facts by misapplying the law. The action benefited :: l .
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the utility and the construction firm, who are now off the hook. The exclusions discriminated .against the public, which remains. vulnerable to the dangerous abuses at Zimmer. Mr. Phillip's action perpetuated " gross wastei" defined in 5 CFR $1250.3 (d) as " unnecessary expenditure of substantial sums of money, or a series of instances of unnecessary expenditures of smaller amounts." Cost overruns and construction delays already have saddled CG&E with millions of dollars in inflation penalties and interest due on its construction financing. CG&E ordered the Zimmer plant in 1969 for an estimated cost of $240 million, with completion date set for 1975. Recent estimates have set the cost somewhere over $1 billion, and the plant will not go on line before late 1982. (August 31, 1980 interview with' journalist Mark Hertsgaard) ("Hertsgaard interview") . CG&E customers already pay for this non-operative plant in their monthly utility bills. In addition, CG&E has filed a controversial request for a new rate increase to offset the cost of construction delays. Mr. Applegate's disclosure goes a long way toward explaining delays and cost overruns. For example, a full examination of his charges would be highly relevant for utility commissio.n decisions on rate hikes. Surely the ratepayers - shouldn't subsidize'the thriving underworld existing under CG&E's nose (as well as the NRC's) at Zimmer. In short, the public interest demands that the issues raised by Mr. Applegate's disclosure ~be pursued fully.' Mr. Phillip turned a deaf ear to that demand. Finally, the omission perpetuated a " substantial and specific danger to public health or safety." 5 USC S1206 (b) . Nuclear power plants rely on an extremely dangerous technology.
. The slightest mistake - human, structural, mechanical --
could lead to disaster. Obviously, the public safety is compromised when those who build the plant are drunk, or when the fire alarm system is inadequate. It also threatens public safety when security is so loose that black market manufacturing, smuggling and sales operations thrive in the o plant. If it is possible to divert nuclear steel and smuggle hs out copper wiring, it may be possible to do the same with nuclear fuel. Vulnerability to sabotage and blackmail is of the utmost concern to the public. Unfortunately, Mr. Phillip dee.med those issues irrelevant. em 9 5 mm e nt G e e
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- k. 11 II. MISMANAGEMENT, ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, PERPETUATION OF GROSS WASTE, AND PERPETUATION OF SUBSTANTIAL AND SPECIFIC DANGER TO PUBLIC HEALTH OR SAFETY, BY MR.
PHILLIP THROUGH FAULTY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES.
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=C--M on the sign 1a ssues covered asa ncomp1**athe report is.little moredd
, an the utility's version of the facts. It pales in comparison with other objective, thorough NRC reports. ,
There is a well-developed body of legal guidance and authoritative recommendations for the conduct of NRC investigations. Investi,gators are authorized to administer oaths and subpoena documents, 42 USC S2201(c), and to consult workers in order .to perform effective and thorough investiga - - tions. 10'CFR 19.15(a). The General Accounting Office has recommended that NRC investigators contact workers, since craftsmen building nuclear plants can provide valuable information on the quality of construction work. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. General Accounting Office, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Needs to Aggressively Monitor and Independently Evaluate Nuclear Power Plant Construction (EMD 78-80 at 7
. (September 7 ) ("EMD-7 8-8 0 ") . (. Exhibit 8)
Investigators even are authorized to expand their investigations beyond the matters raised by complaints, in order to fully investigate'the issues raised. 10 CFR 19.16(b) (1980). GAO recommends this practice, having found that reports too often are, unduly limited in scope and detail. (EMD-78-80, at- 22.) Mr. Phillip ianored these authoritative guidelines, g
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4;r r~ Fa*E"EII'Efi many s 2.c e M +h- M 1 J .,r example, he failed to wrtnesses who would have verified Mr. Applegate's allegations. And for those people he questioned,'Mr. Phillip's report makes no reference to his authority to take sworn affidavits and subpoena relevant documents. These steps would have made witnesses accountable for their assertions, ofung333pmmamass . (NRC Report, at 5.) Several of the CG&E officials he contacted were themselv'es the targets of Applegate's charges. Others had nothing to contribute. But Phillip ignored employees who could have verified the allegations and expanded on the disclosure. Two CG&E officials Phillip contacted were intimately familiar with Mr. Applegate's charges: Mr..Schwiers, the Quality Assurance Manager, and Mr. Swain, the Construction
(.' ( Manager, were suspect of wrongdoing at Zimmer. Plant employees contacted by Mr. Applegate and GAP named Swain as the man most responsible for overruling quality assurance rejections of faulty welds. Further, Schwiers is one of 'two CG&E officials who denied Applegate permission to pursue.hi's leads on quality assurance deficiencies. Both men had obvious selfish interests in the outcome of this probe. Yet neither . was questioned. under oath, and the report provides'no record of the questions asked. ~ Only three of the eight KEI of ficials Mr. Phillip contacted -- Messrs. Marshall, Pallon and Hang -- are - significant for Applegate's allegations. Project Superintendent Marshall was not placed under oath, .although Applegate charged him with misallocation of funds and mismanagement, including home and automobile repairs at the ratepayers' expense. (Affidavit, at 4-5) . Si*nce Mr. Phillip provided no record of questions asked and topics raised, it is impossible to conclude whether those issues were covered by the interview. Both Messrs. Mang and Pallon played key roles in the dispute about faulty welds, and both have' a' personal stake in avoiding a full exposure of events at Zimmer. While employed as a PM radiographer, Hang had complained to Applegate that KEI was approving welds that Hang had rejected. When l Phillip spoke with Hang, he already had taken a new job with
.KEI. Pallon was the man at the center of the faulty weld controversy -- he approved the welds PM had rejected. By merely accepting their statements without question, Mr. Phillip nay have furthered a suspected coverup of safety. defects at Zimmer. (Documentation for these allegations is available upon request, on tapes Mr. Applegate made of conversations with PM personnel. ),("Applegate tapes")
S' elf-interest also is an issue in Phillip's contacts with NES and PM officers, but again he took no sworn statements. NES was PM's successor 'at the plant and a competitor. NES assessments in a probe of welding problems uncovered by PM radiographers could be suspect on grounds of conflict-of-l interest. Similarly, when Phiilip came to Zimmer PM already had lost its radiography contract. It would be naive not to suspect that PM President Ernest Aldrege's responses might be tempered by legitimate fears of reprisal .from within a closed nuclear industry. In fact, A1 dredge hLmself had characterized nuclear construction as a " closed industry" in a taped conversation with Mr. Applegate. (Infra, at 20-21) In the same conversation, Aldredge informed Applegate that PM's parent corporation had ordered the subsidiary to avoid criticism of the'Zimmer p.lant due to fears.of industry blackballing. Mr. Phillip was well aware of Aldredge's fears 3
. about speaking freelyi Applegate played the tape for Phillip.
(Affidavit at 21-3.)
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Phillip never contacted any craftsmen or others referred by Mr. reports. Applegate, either directly or through his confidential Several of GAP rspresentatives. these individuals have made statements to These statements and affidavits are available with proper assurances of confidentiality, and the individua,1s permission. The significance of this omission cannot be understated. If Mr. Phillip had bothered to speak with the line employees who construct the plant daily, he would have learned the full scope of the problems at Zimmer. For instance, euung4puummy ia.m # 1-=
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KEI knowingly installed and ripped out unsuitable 1. main steam relief piping, at an estimated labor cost of $320,000.
. ~
- 2. 2000 pound fittings were installed in 19i9 on residue -
head valves, although 5000 pound fittings are required.
- 3. A radioactive waste xdrain is clogged with concrete which carelessly was poured into the drain.
- 4. A residue heat valve broke when a pipefitter -
bu= ped into it, raising new questions about the quality of metal used for valves. ,
- 5. Sensitive. parts on'Nelding rods are possibly ~
damaged through storage at improper temperatures, and possibly
' lost through failure to' follow proper paperwork and labelling requirements .
- 6. Argon gas valves for flushing oxygen frem pipes routinely are*left open by the day crew, causing the night crew to be overcome by gas, a problem about which CG&E Safety Director Cummin'gs expressed disinterest.
- 7. Prefabricated piping receivad in 1977 has defective welds, but construction supervisors told crews not to repair them because the welds were made off-site.
- 8. At least three sources contacted by Applegate confirmed that an estimated 20% of the plant's prefabricated welds are defective.
- 9. Engineering " designs" routinely ar'e drawn af ter the fact to conform with piping that already had been installed.
- 10. Shock-absorbing electrical tray hangers previously found unsatisfactory are still unsafe due to faulty welds, and electrical cable trays remain dangerously full.
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- 11. Sand and mud choke the feedwate'r pumps and intake
' flues . carrying makeup water to the cooling tower, because of a flaw in the plant's design. Pumps used to' rectify the flaw . . quickly burn out. .
- 12. A design flaw in the heat exchanger control panel permitted an. operator mistakenly to force 1200 pounds of pressure through pipes only meant to handle 300 pounds, ripping the pipe and soaking electricians with a hard spray of water that would have been radioactive had the plant been in operation. -
- 13. There have been periods when there were no security surveillance cameras during nuclear fuel deliveries to the site, and perimeter security consisted for an extended period of only a four foot chickenwire fence.
- 14. A lax attitude toward employee behavior was evidenced by complete disregard of drinking and drug use on the site, and routine hiring of temporary 1aborers prone to violence.
" 15. Employees fired for time cheating had been cheating with the express approval of management, and the only time cheaters fired were vocal and knowledgeable critics of plant QA and safety.
l
. 16..CG&E had warned PM management to silence the radio-graphers at Zimmer, who were criticizing CG&E's consistent l
approval of welds rejected by PM. -
- 17. Union pipefitters and PM employees have been intimidated by fear of utility and industrywide reprisals should they complain about QA practices.
- 18. A KEI employee has kept a detailed journal of safety hazards and incidents at Zimmer.
' 19. A common " joke" among pipefitters 'et Zimmer is that they will be hundreds of miles away when the plant goes on line, due to their predictions of a disastrous accident.
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--..,~_n.. . .m._ _2 l 10 CFR 50.55 (e) (1) (1) and (iii). Phillip could have learned of these issues with a minimum of investigative effort and a promise of confidentiality. In short, the probe was
- crippled by his failure to look behind the unsworn statements l of management representatives -- nearly all of whom had l identifiable conflicts-of-interest -- and to question the 1.
t workers with first-hand knowledge. 1 em me
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Mr. Phillip's documentaryi research and on-site inspections were equally unimpressive. For example, one of the keys to Applegate 's allegations is that the radiographers ' inability to perform their jo.bs free from management constraints has tainted the qual,ity assura.nce program.' E.ven so, Mr. Phillip failed to look beyond the paperwork by perform-
- ing independent tests or radiographs.on any,of the pipes and welds in question. Instead, he relied on the documentation
. and interpretations of officers at NES, CG&E and KEI, all whom have a clear financial stake in the outcome of the probe.
GAO has criticized the NRC for not performing independent verifications, calling the practice a barrier to assurances of adequate plant construction. (EMD-78-80, at 10.) . Mr. Phillip since has claimed that companies have nothing to gain from cheating on Quality Assurance paperwork, - since they risk censure'by the public and NRC if ca'ught. But there is little r4sk of exposure when an investigator ignores most of the relevant witnesses and issues, and is satisfied not to obtain independent verification of management assertions. As a result, the evidentiary omissions constitute mismanagement and an abuse of authority. Further, the omissions perpetuate gross waste and a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. (Supra, at 10) Mr. Phillip did not even steadily pursue the limited
., investigation he conducted. He came to Zimmer after hearing charges of safety deficiencies and coverups. Yet after announcing his investigation and conducting a preliminary review, he left the site for three weeks. (NRC Report,
' Cover Sheet.) The time gap cannot be justified. Three weeks is sufficient time to alter or destroy Quality Assurance records, to establish a " party line" response on key issues and to silence critics within the organization. As a result,
'the interruption also constitutes mismanagement. (Supra, at 9)
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- hat W '_ - .... ., m: .rnr-.m all NRC reports are susceptible to_ that - -l ._' .1. T - -- 4 " m . Not evaluation.
For instance, the South Texas Project investigation, released in April 1980, is an example of detailed reporting on nearly identical issues as those rai' sed at Zimmer -- flaws in quality assurance, intimidation of QA staff, and management complicity. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offi'ce of Inspection and Enforcement for Region IV. R l 79-19 on the South gexas Nuclear Project (Fieport No. 50-498/ nal Review April 22,1980) .tT~nat probe included independent field investigation. The investigators researched broad issues as well as narrow underlying examples. The investigators listed all issues disclosed, and elicited confidential sworn state-ments. Phillip's effort was shoddy by comparison, and a disservice both to the public and the NRC. . i -
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-16.-
III. MISMANAGEMENT, ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, AND PERPETUATING A SUBSTANTIAL AND SPECIFIC DANGER TO TUB'fIC HIALTH OR
' SAFETY, BY MR. PHILLIP, THROUGH INACCURATE INVESTIGATIVE CONCLUSIONS. .
The flaws ~ discussed above are only examples of the substandard quality of the NRC effort at Zimmer. A section-i by-section analysis reveals that Mr. Phillip's report on Applegate's charges is packed with misquotations, misrepre-sentations and faulty conclusions. As a result, the report as a whole fits the definition for all whistleblowing disclosure categories except ' violation of law'... (Supra, at 6-10) - Mr. Phillip's workproduct will only legitimize dangerous, wasteful nuclear plant construction practices.
. A. Introductory Summary On March 3,1980 Applegate met with Phillip and NRC investigator Williamson. Applegate and Phillip met again the next day. But the report's summary and " reason for investiga '
tion" do not begin to summarize the contact Phillip had with the " alleger." The piping weld problem was only one of more than a dozen problems, and each was merely a symptom of deteriorating safety practices throughout the plant. As described above (supra , at 6-9) the report is totally silenE--' about the charges Phillip ignored for whatever reason. Consequently, his sammary of allegations and his disposition is incomplete and misleading. Additionally, there are direct inaccuracies in the summary. Eor instance, r' 11__ -=m -.. . - k -- = t_ a;_ _ m2 -- -
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l Similarly, Mr. Phillip describes the alleger as a private investigator brought in by CG&E to p, robe " time card l padding by site personnel." (NRC Report, at 6.) But Applegate [ was not only hired to document time padding -- his mission was to find "any possibility of misconduct on the part of anyone involved in the construction of the plant." (Supra, at 2) Phillip refused to recognize the broad base of Applegate's work at Zimmer, thereby undercutting the basis for and reliability of his evidence. :.
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In the same vein, the report asserts that Applegate screened and played " parts of the tapes" for Phillip on March 3. That is simply inaccurate. Mr. Applegate provided all of his evidence to the NRC investigators. It was Phillip who excluded sections, without explaining his reasons to Applegate at the time. (Affidavit at 14.) The coarse quality of the tapes might ha.ve created difficulties for Mr, Phillip; they were made surrepticiously with the use of a concealed body recorder in some instances. But Phillip could have arranged the necessary audio work to improve the quality. Applegate himself has undertaken this task, with favorable results.. In a reasonable probe of alleged coercion and coverup, these taped conversations would have been invaluable. But Mr. Phillip squandered this vital evidence. , B. Findings . Mr. Phillip investigated three narrow issues in the Applegate disclosure:
- 1. Defective welds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among them were welds CY606, HR42 and K811.
- 2. Five defective welds were identified in prefabricated
~-
piping but the pipes we,re accepted and installed in a
, safety-related. system.
- 3. The manner in.which safety-related installed piping was flushed was inadequate and a scheduled six-week flush was reduced to two weeks. ~
(NRC Repbrt, at 3.) We will examine his analysis on each issue. j 1. Allegation #1. Mr. Phillip concluded that Allegation $1 was not substantiated by his investigation. Phillip's characterization, . however, is misleading. " Acceptance" is a trade term meaning final approval. Applegate charged that unacceptible welds were installed at Zimmer, despite the radiographers' independent recommendations to reject them. (Affidavit, at 7.) In fact, Mr. Phillip's detailed analysis supports Mr. Applegate's charge. discrecancies_" 4" _" 7 L - 7t rn'- we Mgp l wr= " " n_J..,f3.g_ J4 % .;. 6 ,fi,iM)$.__mc
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Mr. Phillip went beyond inconsistent argumentation and concl.usions, however. 'C ' -"- = hium #=" "Nw. This superficiality is illustrated by his analysis of the welds in question. He failed to test any of the welds independently, despite charges that the records he examined were misl~eading and possibly fraudulent. (Af fidavit, at 8.)
- He tpok NES '
evaluations of the records at face value, despite the possibility'of conflict-of-interest. (NRC Report at 7-8, supra at 12) On. this questionable basis and a spot check of CG&E's own records, Phillip inferred that PM's performance may have been substandard and that. the utility may have rejected more welds as unsafe than did the PM radiographers. In fact, PM rejected approximately 39% of the Zimmer welds, or three times the industry average. (Hertsgaard interview.) In one instance, Mr. Phillip was content simply to abandon an allegation rather than to learn the truth. A defective weld was buried in concrete and possibly dug up
'for repairs. Instead of resolving the uncertainty, Mr.
Phillip',, dropped the issue. (NRC Report, at 6.) The J- - Larmmn1m+e. For instance, he reported " unresolved discrepancies" in'the r~ecords for welds HR42 and CY606. (Id. , at 8. ) Unfortunately, the report stops with this tantalizing hint. Weld K811 had been found d 'fective in 1977 and replaced with weld K916. But the new weld never was radiographed af ter the repair, and Mr. Phillip chose not to pursue the issue further. ( d .') , on another level, employees charggd that records might be unreliable because KEI pressured the radiogr.aphers to rush the x-rays and perform the tests under imperfect conditions. This " pressure to produce" was likely to produce low-quality radiogr&phy. A KEI official's evaluation of PM confirmed the contractor's attitude: "[W]e had lots of welds that needed x-raying, but Peabody was ... slowing down production." (KEI Vice President for Construction and Field OEerations, Don Sahlberg, quoted in Hertsgaard interview.) Phillip never explored the underlying relationship between this production pressure and intimidation of the radiographers. Apparently he was not interested in the NRC requirement that Quality Assurance shall be free from cost and production pressures. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion I. In short, Mr. Phillip disregarded the 'GAO advice to go beyond the " paperwork" approach to resolving safety disputes at' nuclear plants. Even on the paperwork level, he failed to justify his choice of NES' interpretation over PM's initial findings. This arbitrary approach to exoneration is inadequate to protect the public health and safety. t
l* C C 1 *
- 2. Allegation #2. ,
Mr. Phillip reported th,at the alleger identified five . defective welds in prefabricated piping (NRC Report, at 10.), , i but Applegate's charge against the ,nlant's prefabricated piping was far more sweeping. He merely had identified five welds
' as examples of more broad-based allegations.: He had passed along the employees' estimate that about 20% of the prefabricated piping contains defective welds. (Affidavit, at.8.) Further, he reported that KEI policy forbids repairing these defects even after radiographic detection. (Hertsgaard interview.)
The factual background highlights the seriousness of the allegation. The incident in question occurred late in the - evening of July 3,1979 i-- not in October, as Phillip erroneously reported (NRC Report, at 10.) A shipment of Pullman Kellogg , ' piping was.receiv'ed improperly after business and delivery hours. Contrary to standard procedure, the pipe spools were rolled off the Pullman truck and fell to the ground. PM was
, instructed to x-ray the pipes to ascertain the damage. The i
radiographers learned that the drop hadn't damaged the piping. However, the PM x-rays showed that the prefabricated piping was defective on arrival. (Affidavit, at 8.) KEI disregarded the finding ~ and installed the piping in the Main Steam Relief System / a critical safeguard. In retrospect, KEI offered two reasons for ignoring PM's x-rays: (1) PM's instructions were "to check the pipes but not the welds!" (emphasis added) (NRC Report, at 10.) (2) Pullman's inspection sheets showed the pipes were acceptable before shipment. (Id.) In other words, PM was ignored because it took the initiative to expose inaccurate records. When Mr. "Phillip investigated the charge, he merely looked at PM's test results and Pullman's QA records (Id . ,at 11) , - an ill-advised strategy given each party's stake in the proceedings. Further, he didn't even disclose both sides of
. the paperwork. The report includes Pullman's QA stamp of i
self-approval (NRC Report, Exhibit D.) , but it doesn't contain the documents with PM's original findings. Either Mr. Phillip arbitrarily omitted key evidence and abused his i authority in the process, or the records are lost and the utility violated the terms of its license. ZPS-1, FSAR ,
. 17.0.1.1, 17.1.17 (1978). -
As a result of his probe, Phillip found CGEE in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, for 4 releasing the pipes and not using " hold tags." But the 4 evidence suggests that more than a minor paperwork violation was involved. Phillip discovered that the pipes were released e
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(. ( af ter the QA man felt "some pressure ... from construction to get the spool pieces released. " (NRC Report, at 13.) Further, an unhamed CG&E official (who now denies involvement with the incident) ordered the QA Document Control Supervisor to alter a nonconformance report and thereby free the piping fo'r installation before it s.*as declared acceptable. (NRC Report, Exhibit 1.) surear r.hir findIn~gTa'Ged 'se,rious questions about the,,..#. ~- integrity of the QA program at Zimmer. It should have sparked a more intensive investigation, But Mr. Phillip was content to conclude his work by confirming the obvious paperwork violation. He failed to report the nature of the pressure exerted on the warehouseman, or by whom it was exerted. He also failed to j apply the handling of this incident to an analysis of . intimidation and coercion against PM.- (Infra, at 21-3) By d failing to pursue this lead, Mr. Phillip ef fectively avoided
. investigating tha ^ i e organization atEZIidmerI ~ ' ' ~
46u - PM later reinspected the same set of prefabricated pipes at Phillip's request. This time the radiographers . . . reportedly agreed with the NES April 28, 1980 tests. (NRC Report, at 13.) However, Mr. Phillip knew or should have known that the allegation on prefabricated piping was based on an interpretation dispute between PM, who x-rayed the welds and rejected them, and Pullman, who shipped the pipes under their corporation's seal of approval. Mr. Phillip also knew that PM by then had been fired and was under intense pressure to remain silent. .Phillip even heard Ernest Aldredge, PM's president, characterize Pullman as another " silencer in the nuclear industry." (Transcript of tape . recording of May 6, 1980 conversation between Thomas Applegate and Ernest Aldredge, at 2, attached as Exhibit 10) ("Aldredge transcript") Despite these conditions, Mr. Phillip accepted without qualifikation PM's shif t to the suspiciously conciliatory position that nothing truly had been wrong.
- 3. A11ecation #3. * -
l This allegation protests a shortcut from six weeks to l two in the flushing, or cleaning, procedure for piping. l Phillip reported that the crew foreman on the flush took credit for shortening the time period. (NRC Report, at 9.) Phillip does not reveal, however, that the f;oreman who was t "abl l
\ a(n p.e to accomplish a job in i
Id ) in fact had quit his job, af ter four years at Zimmer, rotert over this shortcut. It seems the foreman removed pile of muc8 by hand immediately af ter the piping had been
" flushed . " Af ter demonstrating the failure of the shortcut, the foreman quit in disgust. (Documentation is available through Applegate tape recordings and statements taken from ?
l GAP interviews with a'nonymous witnesses, supra at 13.) l l -
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. By May 1980, when Mr. Phillip conducted his investigation, the flushing procedure had been judged substandard twice since January 1979. (NRC Report, at 9.) Phillip's curious claim in the general summary that " problems in this area have l been identified and resolved"- (Id., at 3.) was generous, to l say the least. When the report was filed in July J.980, !
CG&E'is noncompliance had been excused for 16 months. Phillip i apparently decided that the allegation need :not be pursued, ! because ratesting tentatively was set for Summer 1980. (Id.) l Since CG&E had been unable to pass an inspection for so 15Eg, at a minimum Phillip should have recommended that the NRC monitor the summer flushing procedure. .
- 4. Additional Allegations.
- These allegations . focus on the harassment and retaliation against PM, referred to above on May 6, 1980, subsequent to the NRC visits to Zimmer. Applegate recorded conversations with three individuals from PM management. PM had been
" thrown off" a job for the first time in its corporate history. In the taped conversations, PM officials, including Mr. Aldredge, confirmed that the radiographers had been fired for pushing too hard on safety violations. Mr. Aldredge also confirmed a break-in and theft of quality control records at the PM trailor. Most significantly, Aldredge emphasized that
. he could not criticize the utility publicly, or PM would be
- blackballed within a month.
' In fact, Aldredge was concerned thati his company might be driven to bankruptcy if it stood up t;o the utility.
(Aldredge transcript, at 1-5 . ) After listening to this taped conversation, Mr. Phillip
- spoke with Aldredge. Aldredge now found nothing wrong. He reported that his firm had not been forced to accept faulty welds. Of course, contrary to Phillip's characterization, Mr.
Applegate did not claim that PM was pressured to accept bad work .- (Id. , at2-3) Rather, he charged that 'PM was being pressureT to remain silent about all the overrides of the radiographers' rejections. .(Id.) Aldredge's contradiction with the earlier tape was predictable. In the tape A1 dredge explained why he had to deny that KEI and CG&E had applied improper pressure to obtain quality assurance records, for example. But Mr. Phillip accepted the shift in position at face value in the report. If there were any doubt, a time-line chronicle to PM's
- final months at Zimmer reveals how Phillip's "see no evil" conclusion overlooked the[otvious:
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- 1. December-January 1980: Applegate tapes conversations with pipefitters and radiographers who tell him that PM has been threatened with loss of contract unless they stop complaining about corporate acceptance of faulty-welds.
(Applegate tapes.) 4
- 2. January 1980: There is a mysterious break-in at ,
the PM trailer on the site, and records of controversial i welds are pilfered. (Aldredge tape, Exhibit 10. at 4. )
- 3. March 1, 1980: PM receives notice of contract termination. The company has never lost a contract before.
(Affidavit, at 17.) -
- 4. April 1, 1980: PM leaves the Zimmer site, returning all records to KEI during an unceremonious and hurried
, transfer of data. Aldredge later' characterized the doeurents , transfer as "the fastest transferring of data I can recall." (Aldredge tape transcript, E' xhibit 10, at 4 .)
- 5. April 7-8, 30, May 1-2, 1980: NRC reviews records at Zimmer and speaks with management. (NRC Report.) ,
- 6. May 6, 1980: Applegate records conversations with
, PM President Aldredge and two other PM managers. The PM i . executives clearly acknowledge the coercive nature of the industry as the reason for the firm's silence throughout the investigation. (Aldredge tape transcript, Exhibit 10, at 1 .)
- 7. May 8, 1980: App,legata contacts Phillip with new evidence of coverup and coercion. Applegate plays the tapes made only days before. (Affidavit, at 22.)
- 8. May 20, 1980: Phillip contacts the individual ;
executives who were recorded on May 6. They deny being pressured to approve bad welds. (NRC Report, at 15.) l If this chronology and Aldredge's admissions were not - i enough, Applegate also provided tapes by KEI_and PM employees l documenting the threats. The conversations took place before l PM was fired. In fact, the workers predicted the reprisals that occurred. FM workers had been told by the KEI QA supervisor to "do what we were told when we were told to do it" l 'or they would lose their jobs. (Applegate tapes.) Mr. Phillip chose ~not to acknowledge the evidence in his report. ~ , On Phillip's suggestion, Applegate played the May 6 tapes for Phillip and Mr. Buckley of the Chicago FDI office. Phillip reports that Buckley concluded the tapes "did not appear to him to be evidence of criminality." (NRC Report, at 14.) However, Buckley's memory of the meeting conflicts with Phillip's account. Buckley since has explained that he felt himself an inappropriate arbiter of this dispute. (September 16, 1980!- conversation between GAP staff assistant Rachel Bellis and . Mr. Buckley.) l
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Phillip's characterization of Buckley's response also conflicts with the.public record of the meeting. On,the record, Buckley stated that the FBI might inv.estigate and prosecute if re-quested by the NRC. (Giordano, " FBI Shifts Charges to'NRC," 2
' Cincinnati Enquirer, May 9,1980.) (Exhibit 11) Ph'illip improperly portrays Buckley's evaluation as the final rejection of the coverup allegation. In fact, Buckley was stating that tha NRC would have' to do its job before he could do his.
VERIFICATION STUDY , , } Due to the serious nature of Mr. Applegate 's charges, GAP conducted an unusually thorough verification study to
! determine the reliability and accuracy of his disclosure.
Law enforcement officiais from the local to the national level have confirmed Applegate's credibility as an investigator. Journalists and reporters who conducted their own verification studies of Mr. Applegate's initial charges have confirmed - the accuracy of his facts. GAP has conducted confidential interviews with Zimmer employees who corroborated facts behind the charges. Mr. Applegate's landlady even has i confirmed that she and Mr. Applegate have been threatened with physical violence. Finally, Mr. Applegate himself has previded more than enough facts and supporting evidence -- tape recordings, investigative field reports, sworn statements
-- to enable a reasonable person to conclude that these serious charges are accurate. (See. Exhs.12 & '13. for nonconfidential statements.)
GAP does not undertake permanent gepresentation of any
- client before receiving approval from its Whistleblower Review Panel. , The Panel is composed of *two well-known govern-i ment whistlebl'owers, Dr. Fred Greenhut and Dr. Tony Morris; a public interest attorney, Andra Oakes, Esq.; and a former l Administrator of GAP, Ms. Marjorie Bernard. On November 20, 1980 the Review Panel unanimously concluded that Mr. Applegate's charges are based on a reasonable belief, and approved GAP's representation and called for a full investigation of his allegations. '
i CONCLUSION In our-opinion, the citizens of Cincinnati are still , waiting for the NRC to do its job. In a month's undercover work, Applegate was able to find widescale theft, drunkenness, black market operations, widescale faulty piping in key safety I systems, fire hazards and retaliation against the most quality-conscious employees at the plant. In approximately a month-long verification study, GAP was able to confirm Mr. Applegate's assertion that his disclosure represents only the :. tip of the iceberg -- there may be over a dozen additional y.___..m y._ .. ,- ,w.,._._ . , , .
c (- safety defects at Zimmer that threaten the public. In short, Mr. Applegate's prediction that Zimmer ii "another Three Mile Island waiting to occur" (Affidavit, at 24) may be frighteningly accurate. . By contrast, Mr. Phillip's approach to his thsk served to contain the scandal,. rather than uncover the full story. Contrary to GAO guidelines, Phillip " investigated" by asking management for its side of the story and then accepting the denials nearly at face value. Phillip even ignored the bulk of the evidence Applegate provided at the start of the probe. - The results were predictable. With all the resources of the U.S. government, Mr. Phillip was only able to find a single paperwork violation. His' investigation and report are a caricature of effective regulation. Unfortunately, the
, joke is on,the citizens of Ohio.
Respectfully submitted, TA.Cld h.k'" . Rachel Bellis Staff Assistant
~
.. s Thomas Devine
, Asso ste Dir r ouis Clark Director l
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. Exhibit il '
- U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFCRCDfENT E
RECION III f 3 . I Report No. 50-358/80-09 '4 .. 9 * ,* *j).
; 7 Docket No. 50-35,8 License No. CPPR-88 i - -
, Licensee: Cincinnati Cas and Electric Company
- 4. 139 East 4th Street .
Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility: Wa. H. Zinner Nuclear Power Station
, Investigation At: Moscow. 0H '
. Chicago,'IL .
Dates of Investigati'on: April 7-9 and 30, May 1-2 and 20, 1980 Investigators:
' CT A. Phillip b *
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- a. D. v-d YY l/dffO Dace
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/lN M T. E.*'Vandel "
'Da te Reviewed By: k * / '7-1-W
. E. ' Norelius
/^ Date i
t Assistant to the Director i R. C. Knop, Chief Y'AAb% '
- 7 W8 jCatd l
t Construction Projects Section 1 . i 7,, Investination Summary: Investication on April 7-9 and 30. May 1-2 and "
- 20. 1980 (Report No. 50-358/80-09) ,
Areas Investimated: Because of allegations made primarily relatin8 to the adequacy of piping velds,. performed a review of recorda and procedures, i
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meda indeoendent evaluatitas cad etnductcd istcrvieva ,cf s;resansi. The investigation involved 94 investigation hours by three investigators. Results: Of four allesations one. which related to the installation of wre-fabricated ninina having defective welds. was cartially substantiated La that the sines were installed before ouestions renardina their accent-ability were resolved. One iten of noncomoliance, an infracfion. was 3
. - identified: (1) 10 CFR 50. Anoendix B. Criterion XV. releasi of material
] from saarenation and failure to use hold taas. : ?-
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REASON FOR INVESTIGATION on February 28, 1980, an individual.who contacted the NRC by telephone made allegations regarding the Ms. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. One
- of these allegations was that piping having defective velda Rad been installed in a safety-related system.
i, ,
SUMMARY
OF FACTS Following the receipt of allegations by telephone on February 28, 1980, arrangements were made to interview the alleger to obtain more detailed information. During an interview on March 3,1980, the individual made 9 several allegations, three o,f which involved matters under the juris- [y diction of the NRC. By letter dated March 11, 1980, the allager was yr advised that an investigation would be conducted regarding those allega-Gy tions which were as follows:
- 1. Defective velds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among'
- them were velds CY606, HR42 and K811.
- 2. Five defective welds were identified in prefabriacted piping but the pipes were accepted and installed in a safety-related system.
- 3. The manner in which safety-related installed piping was flushed was inadequate and a scheduled six-week flush was reduced to two weeks.
Allegation No.1 was not substantiated. - Allegation No. 2 was partially substantiated in that three of five identi-fied pipes had been installed in the main steam relief system before ques-tions as to their acceptability had been resolved. 'Dro items of noncompliance were identified,in this regard. It was also determined that at the time of the investigatio'n a nonconforming report requiring disposition remained open concerning the ace,eptability of the three pipes. During the investigation additional examinations were made of the pipes and they were determined to be acceptable. Regarding Allegation No. 3, it was determined througli contact with the primary source of the information upon which the allegation was based, that he had lef t the site in November 1978 and problems in this area had been identified and resolved through NRC inspections conducted between November 1978 and the receipt of the allegations in March 1980. Following completion of the investigation at the Zimmer site. the allager contacted Region III and alleged he had evidence of a criminal
(- ( conspirsty cud thet tho wel'd3 es th's throo cbsve-rcatiencd pipcs h:d been cut out and repaired during the course of the investigation and this information was withheld from the NRC. The basis for these allegations, which consisted of recordings of three telephone'-conversations, was ob-
, tained'.from the allegar during an interview on May 8, 1980. fNo in-formation or evidence was obtained to confirm these all.egati/ns during 3
7 the interview or during subsequent investigation. , y 1 One item of noncompliance, an infraction, was identified duYing this
. invescigation.-
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.o . [ - DETAILS ,
- 1. Persons Contacted i f 1 Cincinnati Cas and Electrie Cosmany (CG&E) y )
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- -*B, K. Culver, Project Manager y ,
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*W. W. Schwiers, QA Manager
$. *R. L. Wood,,QA Engineer .
*D. C. Kramer, QA and S Engineer S. Swain, Construction Manager
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*J. F. Weissenberg, QA and S Engineer ,
hk v."f('*,y:(.p . Kaiser Entineers. Inc. (KII)
*R. Marshall, Project Superintendent V
*E. V. Knox, QA Manager, K. R. Baumgarten, QA Marnager ,
R. M. Dorr, Construction Engineer A. Pallon, Weld'ng/NDE i QA Engineer F. Oltz, Analysis and Procedures Supervisor, QA ' J. Deerwester, Supplier QA D. Haag, QA Inspector Peabody Testins Services (Peabody) Ernest A1 dredge, President
. Charles Wood, Manager, Cincinnati Office (via telephone)
Wayne Draffon, Sup'ervisor (via telephone) . Alan Sellars Field Supervisor D. Burdsal, Level II Inspector Nuclear Energv Services. Inc. (NES) R. Bott, NDE Supervisor
- 1. A. Zieber"; NDE Inspector
- 2. Introduction On February 28, 1980, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement NRC Headquarters advised Region III of a telephone conversation with an individual who made allegations concerning activities at the Wa. H. Zissner Nuclear Power Plant Construction site, and requested that the individual be contacted. Later the same day during a tele-
, phone conversation with ' Region III, and during an- interview on March 3,1980, the individual made several allegations. r
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Th3 individuni stated that ha hed bacn empicycd by a privata dotcetivo agency, and the licensee, CG&E, through his employer, had engaged him to work under cover at_ the Zimmer site to investigate time card padding by site personnel. His investigation effort began on December 10, 1979 and ended on January 4,1980. In addition to information
. regarding worker time card padding, he obtained information regarding d other activities which was the basis for several allegat2ons, some of
- . which r=1me 8 te - eter- 'ar the_ jm 4 = die sim^' che Etc.
S - 5, The individual stated he had earlier brought his information to the
~ FBI. He indicated he was uncertain as to what action, if any, would be taken by that agency. ' The individual stated he had docunencation relating to his allegations in the form of weekly reports he had prepared and tapes of several of his conversations with site personnel. During the interview on 1980, the individual played those parts of the tapes which
_ h,ha March sai contained 3 pertinent information and made available copies of 3 bris reports. r
- 3. Allegations Based on the information obtained through the interview with the alleger, a review of the taped conversations and his investigative reports, three allegations involving activities under NRC jurisdiction were developed.
By letter dated March 11, 1980, the alleger was advised that an investi-gation of these allegations would be conducted. A copy of this letter-with the alleger's identification deleted is attached to this report as Exhibit A. These allegations and information regarding them obtained during che investigation are set forth below. _, Allegation 1: Defective welds in safety-related systems have been accepted, among them were welds CY606, HR42 and K811. The identification of the specific welds in this allegation was ob-tained from a review of the tape the allager had made surreptitiously of his conversations with site personnel. According to the informa- ! tion obtained by the alleger, weld CY606 was buried in concrete between the Radvaste Building and the Containment Building. He
'said it was his understanding that they dug it_up to repair it, but ~
he was uncertain whether this was done. Regarding veld HR42, the alleger said that he had informed CC&E that this veld was defective. He said he had heard that another testing firm had been hired as a consultant, and this firm had confirmed the veld was defective. He also said it was his understanding that
- this defect _was reported to the NRC.
j Regarding veld K811, the alleger said he was informed that this weld r i had "an insert f ault" and that KEI had ordered that it be accepted. i
- l l
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C C
. The alleger stated that Peabody Testing Services (Peabody), also referred to as Magnaflux, personnel had informed him. that some welds that Peabody, the nondestructive testing contractor,' had rejected as faulty were subsequently accepted by KEI, the site construction management contractor. He said that a-Peabody em-
, .ployee had records identifying. the welds rejected by Pea 6ody which db were subsequently accepted by KEI. He indicated that by say of eiplanation, CG&E had informed him that the interpretatiIn of the 1
~
film.obtained through radiographic examinations of weld's is a
, judgment call. The appearance of an item on a radiographic film may be judged to be a defect by one individual and not by another and KEI could overrule Peabody.
Findinz: - On April 7,1980, the Peabody field supervisor was interviewed. He stated that he had no records showing the welds Peabody had initially rejected which were subsaquently declared acceptable by KEI. He indicated that, although he was aware that this had occurred, he did not know how of ten and he could not provide any specific instances. He also stated that the results of radiographic examinations are : recorded on reader sheets. The radiographic film and the original reader. sheets are turned over to KEI. He said Peabody only had carbon copies of the reader sheets.- I As a means of further evaluating whether KEI was accepting welds identified as defective by Peabody, a safecy-related rystem, the High Pressure Core Spray System, was selected and all reader sheets pertaining to it were reviewed. Of 99 welds in the system which were radiographed, two instances were noted in which Peabody had
. checked the reject column and KEI had lined that check out and had checked the accept column. The radiographs of these two welds were reviewed by an NRCn1'spector.who is a certified KDE Level III.
#'? He concurred that the welds were acceptable. Conversely, it was
# >' Ub noted that ih several instances, between five and . ten, the original
)Q,v ). / b gaccept check mark entered by Peabody had been lined through and a u
4 f reject check had been entered by KEI. t Regarding the subject of welds and radiographs of them, an NRC i inspection conducted on November 8-9, and December 12-13, 1978 (Report No. 50-358/78-30) identified several discrepancies in , radiographic techniques and reports. During a subsequent inspection on September 18-20, and December 11-12,1979 (Report No. 50-358/79-17) several more discrepancies were identified. CG&E then hired NES to o rareview radiographs and reports of all welds which had been accepted
, for turnover prior to operation. This review began in October 1979 l
!. - and was completed in early April 1980. The review included 2,390 l . radiographed welds. Of those, 958 had report discrepancies, 543 l had some technique problems and 14 velds were found to bd unaccept-able because of defects. [ ee 2 m 4
-. . .mm, _ _ - . - . . -, ~,y - . - . , , _ -
1 ( . ( Th3 KEI Prcjcet Superint ndent cdviscd on May' 1,1980, ths 14. v21da were being re-examined and resolution regarding them had not been completed. He stated that one of the 14 welds found to be unaccept-able was the subject of a nonconformance report and, therefore, had not been accepted for turnover. This veld, he said, should not
, have been included in the NES review. Another veld hadabeen cut dk out of the pipe for examination and it was deter =ined that, although it appeared to have a defect on the radiographic fiLn,.3t was, in 5 fact, an acceptable weld. -
Regarding weld No. K811, a review of records showed it was velded on November 9,1977, but because an Authorized Nuclear Inspector hold point was missed at the ficup, the weld was cut out and replaced
. The missed hold point was documented by Noncon-formance (byveldNo.K916. Report (NR) No..E-2138R1. This NR indicates that the disposition was to cut out and replace the weld. It was deter =ined that veld No. K916 had not yet received final acceptance.
Regarding veld No. RH42, records indicated this veld was first
. radiographed on August 9,1976, and found to have unacceptable porosity and slag in the areas of 36-48. The areas were repaired , and a raradiograph performed on August 10, 1976 found it to be acceptable. A review was made of the radiographs for veld quality, techniques', and report accuracy by an NES Level II radiographer on January 25, 1980 as part of the above-mentioned re-review initiated after the 1978-79 NRC inspections. The NES Level II radiographer found some discrepancies which have not been resolved, and the weld has not been given final acceptance.
Regarding veld No. CY606, a review of records showed this weld was first radiographed on July 15, 1976 and found to have incomplace fusion and penetration in the areas of 0-13 and 13-16. The areas were repaired and the weld re-radiographed on June 8,1977 and
.found to be acceptable. A review was made of the radiographs for veld quality, techniques and report accuracy by a,n NES Level III radiographer on October 12, 1979 as a result of the NRC inspection conducted in 1978. The Level III found some discrepancies which have,not been resolved and the weld has not received final accept-ance.
Allegation 2: The manner in which safety-rela ed install'ed piping was flushed was inadequate end a scheduled six-week flush was reduced to two weeks. I , The allager provided information that a site employee informed him on December 27, 1979, that another individual who had been employed l
> as a general foreman at the site had objected to the flushing pro-
,- cedures used. He had also objected when a particular flush that i
should have taken six weeks was cut to two weeks. On one occasion the individual had demonstrated the flushing was inadequate by pounding on a pipe which released. sediment and slag during the flush. The identity of the former general foreman was provided by the allager. :. l ' l
~ - .m~-w n-e m e- em+ . , ,
C C Findina: On April 7,1980, the former general foreman was contacted and ince'r viewed. This individual said he had worked at the Zimmer site from June 1973 until November 1978/ In 1978 he was the general foreman of the flush group. f jg Regarding the six-week versus tvo-week flush, the indiv/ dual indicated
; it had been anticipated six weeks would be needed to ptipara for and 3 flush one of the systems. He, however, was able to ace 6mplish a I
-- satisfactory flush in two weeks. He indicated,that th's shorter
. - time did not mean the flush was not done according to the require-ments. Rather, it was a case of he and his men being able to accom-plish a job in less time than expected.
This individual stated that in his opinion the welding 'done os the critical systems, such as the main steam lines and in the reactor building, was - good. He said, however, that several problems were encountered in the flushing activities while he was at the site but he was unable to provide information regarding any specific require-ments that were not met. . NRC inspections conducted subsequent to the departure of 2his indivi-dual from the site included an examination of flushing activities and some specific problems were identified. On the basis of one of these inspections, conducted January 3-6 and 8,1979 (Report No. 50-358/,79-01), one item of noncompliance and one deviation were identified. The noncompliance related to a failure to close a valve during a flush and an inadequate procedure to assure boundary valves
, are closed. The deviation was that the procedura did not require tagging of boundary-valves. 'A s'acond inspection conducred February 27-28, March 1-2, 19-23, and April 9-11, 1979 (Report No.*50-358/79-06) . resulted in one item of noncompliance regarding flushing activities.
This related to a failure to maintain control of flushing waters re-sulting in the flooding of equipment in a system which had been turned l over for. pteoperational testing. The individual indicated a matter of concern to him was that a hydrotest of the reactor containment was successfully performed, but af ter the test some instrument lines were cut out which invalidated-
. the hydrotest. He indicated he was uncertain as to whether CG&E would attempt to use this test as meeting test requirements or whether the l
NRC was aware the test had been invalidated by the subsequent modifi- ! cations. l On April 8,1980, the NRC Resident Inspector advised that he as well
- as CG&E were aware that the initial hydrotest was not valid because of the subsequent modification of the instrument lines. He stated that another hydrotest was tentatively scheduled to be performed during I the summer of 1980. ;
k In visu of the above, further investigation at the site $in the area
, of flushing activities was not pursued. -
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x_ All actien 3: Fivo daftetiva waldivaro identificd in prefabricated J piping, but the pipe was accepted and installed in a safety-related
~
system. . . ll Through a review of reports written.by the alleger and. the tapes of
, conversations with site personnel as well as informatiod supplied
- $ through interview on March 3, 1980, the following infontiattion was
~
obtained regarding this allegation. S*
*h
- I, During the NRC hearings in November 1979, a ' question was raised concerning an accident which involved the dropping of fuel rods.
A former site employee had provided information to attorneys who were opposed to the licensing of the plant whir.h was the basis for raising this question. A miscommunication between the former em-playee and the attorneys occurred, however. The question about an accident should have referred to piping being dropped fro = a tractor trailer rather than fuel.being dropped. . The _ alleger advised that in about October 1979, a trailer load of pipes fabricated at the Kellogg Company, located in Pennsylvania, arrived at the site in the middle of the night. -Since personnel and proper equipment were not available to unload it properly a member of CG&E management issued instructions ,.o push the pipe
~~from the truck onto the ground.
When th's pipes were found on the ground the following day, it was decided that the pipes would have to be inspected by x-ray to determine whether they had been damaged. Peabody was instructed to x-ray,(radiograph) the pipes and 5 to 8 f aulty welds were identified. Since Peabody had been instructed to check the pipes but not the welds, and since the welds had been tested and found to be acceptable before shipment by Kellogg, the pipes were approved by KEI Quality Assurance.. These pipes were installed in the Main Steam Relief . System, a safety-related system. Findina: A bill of lading dated June 29, 1979 showed that Pullman ' Power Products, a division of Pullman, Inc., Williamsport, Pennsylvania, i formerly known as M. W. Kellogg Company, released to the Daily Express Company five pieces of pipe assembly I/S, weighing 6,700 pounds, for delivery to the CG&E Zimmer site on Monday, July '2,1979. A packing slip accompanying the shipment listed the following pieces:
- IMS08BB12-6B L INSO9BA12-1AH i' - - IMSO8BA12-5BH I
IMS11B12-75H
- IMS10BA12-ICH
?
A KEI receiving stamp shows it was received on July 3,1979. Copies of the bill of lading and the packing slip were obtained and are attached to the report as Exhibits B and C, respectively. i : 1 .. - . . - . . . . _ . _
(. (
. Each of these pipes (spool pieces) were for the Main Steam Saf'ety Relief Valve discharge and were carbon steel pipe assemblies ap-proximately' 15' 7 5/8" long, 12 3/4" in diameter and having a vall thickness of .687".
f i On hand at the Zimmer site weia QA documentation packagd for each
! of these 5 spool pieces received from Pullman. A copy:97 one *
., package was obtained and is attached to this report as Exhibit D.
.s '
on July 5, 1979, Nonconformance Report (NR) No.' E-1911 was prepared indicating " Spools were rolled off of truck onto ground and striking other spools" and listing the above identification numbers. The issuance of this NR had the effect of placing these pipe spools in a hold status in the KEI warehouse. On July 10, 1979, the KEI Construction Engineer entered the following disposition on this NR
" Rework. (1) Perform liquid penetrant test on all velds; (2) perform visual inspection of weld and preps. Accept on basis of inspection (1) and (2). Should an'y pipe spool fail due to inspections (1) and (2) -a separ' ate .Nonconformance will be issued." A KEI QA engineer concurred in th's i disposition on the same date. A copy of NR E-1911 is attached to this report as Exhibit E.
NR E-1911 was voided and superseded by NR E-1911 Rev.1 on the same date, July 10, 1979. KEI and CG&E personnel advised that the dis-position shown on N2 E-1911 was reconsidered because they wished to avoid removing the paint from the welds which would be necessary before a liquid penetrant examination could be performed. NR E-1911
- Rev.1 changed the first iteln of the disposition to: " Perform RT examination of All' welds." A copy of NR E-1911.Lav.1 is attached to this report as Exhibit F.
A QA Sitrveillance Report dated July 23, 1979, addressed to a CG&E QA engineer signed by the KEI NDE QA engineer, showed that on three
' spool piec6s wald X4 had rejectable indicatiot}s., and requested to be advised concerning the dispositioning of these rejections.
The CG&E QA ' engineer stated that to the best of his racc11ection, j he did nothing in response to this request and could not recall having discussed the matter with anyone. A copy of this Surveillance bReportis.attachedtothisreportasExhibit!G t CG&E and KEI personnel stated all five spool pieces were radiographed on an "information only" basis but only the films for those three Referred to in the Surveillance Report were retained. The X4 weld is a weld which joins a solid cap to one and of the spool piece. Radi~o-graphy is not the appropriate technique employed to examine a weld
- of this kind since the gamma rays must pass through the cap (about 12' of metal) a. sell as the veld. The KEI Construction Engineer 1 said the radiographs were done with the thought 'that thdy might show surf ace damage, even though it was recognized the quality of the film would not be good and it vss rec:gnized that the film would -
not meet any ecde standards. i
\ .-
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NR E-19'11 Rev. 4 was. voided cnd superscded by.ad E-1911 Rev. 2, on July 31, 1979. The dieposition shown on.the latter was to perform RT examinations of all " butt-weld,s" and to perform visual aw==4n=tions of all " fillet-welds." - AQASurveillanceReportdatedAugust8,1979showedchar$allfive ~
, 1 spool pieces were visually examined and were found acceptsble. A
! copy of this Surveillance Report is attached to 'this repict as 1
- Exhibit H. '
- l
+ 3 .
. Since two spool pieces had shown no indication of damage ^ through radiographic examination and visual examination another NR, No. E-1997, dated August 9,1979, was prepared as a mechanism to remove those two spool pieces from a hold condition but to retain an open NR on the other three. NR E-1911 Rev. 2 was closed by KEI QA ou August 9,1979, with the notation " Exceptions on ) See NR E-1997." A copy of the NR E-1911 Rev. 2 is attached as Exhibit I.
NR E-1997 showed that the spool pieces IMSO9BA12-1AH and IMS08BA12-5BH were acceptable.- 'On August 13, 1979 the KEI construction Engineer placed a notation on NR E-1997 "CG&E to disposition." The KEI Construction Engineer stated that this was appropriate since CG&E , has responsibility' for off-site vendor supplied items. On August' 19,1979 the CG4E Construction Engineer added the disposition " Accept-As-Is" and described the reasons for this disposition. A copy of NR E-1997 is attached to this report as Exhibit J. Quality Assurance Instruction, QACMI No.-G-4, Ncuconforming Material Control, requires that NRs dispositioned " Accept-As-Is" be signed by the Material Review Board before they are closed out. NR E-1977
- was closed out on October.17,1979 with a comment added by the Sargent '
& Lundy (S&L) board member to the effect that " Welds rejected by radiograph are covered by NCR E-2020." A copy of the closed NR E-1997 is. attached to this report as Exhibit K.
NR E-2020 showed the same information as NR E-1797", but at the time of the investigation, E-2020 had not been closed out. A copy of NR E-2020 is attached to this report as Exhibit 1,. A review of records at the warehouse showed that the three spool pieces, which were the subject of the open NR had been released to construction for installation as follows: Item Issue Date IM511312-73H 9/18/79 IM510BA12-ICH 9/24/79 l }- IM508BB12-6B 9/28/79 ,
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( n' : . On April 8,1980, it was astablished that these spool pieces had been installed and no " Hold" tag. or "Def,1ciency" tag had been placed on,them. This is in noncompliance 10 CFR 50 Appendix 3, criterion IV, and KEI Quality Assurance Procedure No. Ip 4 i It was ascertained that the spool pieces ha,d be,en relaaaad from the
! varehouse on the basis of a later version of NR E-1911.3ev. 2 on 3 which the above-mentioned notation referencing NR E-1997 had been .
=
lined through on September 14, 1979. A copy of, this version of NR
!., E-1911 Rev. 2 is attached to this report as Exhibit M.
It was determined that the QA Document Control Supervisor had lined out the notation. He indicated that he had heard that NR E-1997
-was being voided so he felt there was no point in it being cross-referenced any longer on NR E-1911 Rev. 2. . The supplier QA man in the warehouse indicated to him that some pressure was being felt from construction to get the spool pieces released. The Document Control Supervisor info'rmed the warehouse that NR E-1911 Rev. 2 had been closed out,and it was all right to release the spool pieces.
He said this was done on the assumption that what was considered to be a paper problem would be cleared up. The Document Control ' ' Supervisor as well as other site personnel indicated the accept-ability of the spool pieces was regarded as a paper problem rather than a real problem. It was indicated that the probability of actual damage to pipes of that size and wall thickness due to
- mishandling upon delivery was extremely remote.
The supplier QA man advised that the spool pieces were released from the warehouse on the basis of the version of NR I-1911 Rev. 2 which had the reference to NR E-1977 lined through (Exhibit M). He indicated that the Document Control Supervisor was instructed to j line through the notation by a CG&E official. The latter indivi-dual, however, denied any recollection of having given that instruc- - l tion. The improper close out of NR E-1911 Rev. ,2, which resulted in the release of spool pieces for installation befoia their accept-ability had been established is in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, j Appendix 3, Criterion XV, and KEI Quality Assurance Procedure No.
- l. 16.
On April 23, 1980, Deficiency Tags were placedin the spool pieces and during the period April 25-28, 1980, Peabody personnel perfor=ed ' magnetic particle and ultrasonic inspections of the welds in question. The reports of these inspections were reviewed and the Peabody in-spectors performing these examinations were interviewed on May 1, 1980. The Peabody personnel stated that they had concluded on the
; basis of these examinations that the spool pieces were acceptable.
, It was also ascertained that on April 28, 1980, Pullman personnel visited the Zimmer site and also performed ultrasonic inspections of the velds. On the basis of these examinations, Pullman provided a statement to CG&E that these welds were acceptable. P, embody
( personnel advised that they had observed the examinations performed by Pullman and they agreed with the results. :. t
. - . - , . . _ , _ , _ - _ , , . , , . . - . . .-,--,.,-.,a.,-e -
-,.-.,,_-m
{- .
- 4. Additional Alleantions .
During telephone contacts with the NRC on May 5 and 7,1980, the alleger stated that he had evidence of criminal actions relating to the spool pieces which were the subject of Allegation No[. 3 above. He stated that he had evidence that between the two' visfes to the
. O-Zimmer site by the NRC investigations team on Kpril 7-9 had April
] 30-May 1-2, tlie welds had been cut out and/or repai::ed.,"This he alleged, was the reason that the velds were judged to be acceptable 5
during the second visit. He also stated he had evidence' that pressure was exerted upon Peabody personnel to withhold information from the NRC in connection 'with the investigation. - On May 8,1980, the allager was interviewed jointly .by NRC and 73I personnel. During this interview the alleger provided for review a tape recording of three telephone conversations he had had with Faabody personnel. Af ter listening to the three conversations, the FBI representative indicated that they did not appear to him to be evidence of criminality. The tape was furnished to the NRC for further review and follow up. The first conversation, according to the alleger, took place on May 5,1980 with a supervisor in the Peabody, Cincinnati office. At one point during this conversation the supervisor said: "They cut some of those velds out." The allegar responded: "You mean since the l NRC had begun their investigation?" The supervisor then said:
"Oh, yes, they did that the next Monday." Later in the conversa-tion, the supervisor said: "I do know they started repairing some
, welds."- ' On May 20, 1980, the supervisor who had made the above statements,
, was interviewed by telephone. ' He stated that he had no first-hand knowledge of activities at the Zimmer site and that his comments to the alleger were based upon his conversations with another Peabody employee. This second individual visite the Zimmer site and may j have' acquired the information himself, or through conversations t
with another Peabody individual who does work at the site. He stated he did not know whether the information he received con-carning the repairs of welds related to the three spool pieces or to some other pipes. * : The second Peabody employee was also interviewed by telephone on May 20, 1980. He advised that the welds that were repaired were some which had been identified as bad during the NES audit. He said to his knowledge no repairs had been made on any 12" pipe welds. He added that he had reviewed the results of the ultrasonic examinations performed on the 12" pipes and he had conc 1uded the welds are acceptable. , Sh e
+
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, , (
. Tho third Peabody individual, who is empicyedNt tho Zima;r sien, was also interviewed by telephone on May 20. Ibis individual stated that the paint had been removed from the wilds on the 12" pipes so that the tests could be made of* them. He said this was done with'vire wheels and there were no repairs or even grinding done on the velds. f
, . 4 S ThesecondtapedconversationtookplaceonMay5,19804eeveenthe
] alleger and a radiographer employed by Peabody. This Odiographer had been identified by the alleger as being one of the individuals
. who had been involved in performing the radiography on the spool pieces in July 1979. During the conversation the allegar asked the radiographer whether the pipes were bad. The radiographer responded:
"I can't really say." The alleger then stated he had been informed the velds were cut out and repaired. The radiographer responded:
'"I don't know." The alleger again raised the question as to whether the velds were defective and the radiographer responded: "I didn't read the film. I was a Level I and not qualified to interpret the film." The radiograph 4r then identified the Peabody employee who had read the film. The latter individual had been interviewed on May 2,1980. He had stated that all five spool pieces that had been dropped from the truck had been examined and no indications of defects had been found except the three which were documanced by an
, _ _ _ nn. .
-~~-..._
The third taped conversation took place on May 6,1980 between theN
~
allager and the president of Peabody. The primary topic of conver-sation was the action taken by CG&E in early April 1980 in trans-
., ferring the radiography work .from Peabody to another contractor, NES. The President stated that he did not dispute the actlen taken i
because it would have a detrimental effect on his firm's position s) in the industry, and adversely affect their efforts to obtain
~
[ s future contracts. On May 20,.1980, the President of Peabody was interviewed con-4 . carning this conversation. He stated that the action taken by CG&E, and his. posture regarding it, had nothing to do with the quality of work at the Zimmer site.- He said that, to his know-i ledge, no Peabody employees had been pressured to accept or approve
. defective velds. He stated that Peabody's contract provides for their performing the radiography and that the ' acceptance or re-jaccion of a weld rested with KEI. Peabody had no responsibility in this regard and, therefore, an allegation that they were forced or pressured to approve bad work was meaningless. All film and original records relating to radiography examinations were turned over to'
- KEI according to the terms of the contract. He indicated that it
- vas his understanding the NRC required that these materials be
retained at the site and available for inspection.
- 5. Mananement Discussion On May 2,1980, the results of the investigation were discussed "
with CG&E and KEI personnel identified by an asterisk (*) in the Persons Contacted section of this rep 7rt. . I 4 . l
- - , , , aw,--- -,
C . C
. Attachments: Exhibits A through M .
t List of Exhibits - A - Ltr.dtd 3/11/80 NRC to A11ager - B - Bill of Lading
- jik C - Packing List -(
- C D - QA Documentation Package
- ?,
M E - NR E-1911 *
T F - NR E-1911 Rev. 1
*'G - Surveillance Report dtd 7/23/79 E - Surveillanca Report dtd 8/8/79 I - NR E-1911 Rev. 2 J - NR E-1997' -
K - NR E-1997 (closed) L - NR E-2020 M - NR E-1911 Rev. 2 (closed) . O 6 % 4 p
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9
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', Exhibit'.2 .
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- 5. .N g".,1&L.? .";i..
THE - CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC -, ' COMPANY Mdisesh P M E cmcipei.omio esaci
. . M Divio 9 Auewuc c . .
3 = ,
==.===== -
December 5, 1979 Mr. Major W. Cox confidential Service, Inc..
'3333 Vine Street .
2nd Floor
- Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 ,
c .
Dear Mr. Cox:
Following up on our telephone discussion of last Wednesday, our company is interested in looking further into any possibility of misconduct on the part of anyone involved in the construction of the-Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. As indicated earlier, this has been our position since this potential situat).on was brour^t to our attention by Mr. Thomas W. Applegate of your firm 'durit.g a discussion with me and three of our engineering personnel. , Perhaps by now you have given my call additional thought and have
, had the opportunity to review certain tapes in your possession, particularly ones which you thought "could contain information
-tending to indicate a need to tighten the ship" at the Zimmer Project.
In either event, we w6uld like to pursue this matter further with you.
'We respect your personal and professional integrity, and have no desire to become involved in any domestic situation that may relate to any client of yours. As a matter of fact, it o c curs to me that we are a potential client in a different case.
- Meanwhile, we are continuing our.own investigation of the matters. relating to us. Your willingness and ability to assist us could be beneficial.
For that reason, we would like to discuss this further with you with a view toward obtaining any information in your possession that may pertain to' the Zimmer Project.
- Sincerely, N..~fl. .
u .
/ ~-
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/ *
(. . ( AFFIDAVIT My name is Thomas William Applegate, Jr. This affidavit
, constitutes my disclosure of serious threats to public health ~
i and safety at the William H. Zinner nuclear power station under construction in Moscow, Ohio. The plant is owned by the j Cincinnati, Columbus and' Dayton Utility Cooperative of Ohio, and managed by Cincinnati Gas and Electric of Cincinnati, Ohio ("CGriE") ., My disclosure concerns allegation of white-collar crime, mismanagement at the construction site, thievery, and substa$dard constructl.on practices. More specifically, I am concerned about defective welds in piping that isas installed in the plant's safety system, drunkenness, thefts and black-i market activities operating out of the plant, unauthorized absenteinism by labor personnel, coverups and collusion by managerial personnel, and criminal activity relating to coverups by executive operators of major companies involved in management and construction of the plant. I am particularly concerned that when Peabody-Magnaflux, Inc. ("PM") ,of Chicago, the quality control radiograph contractors [n the site, attempted to pursue the key issues I raised on the pipes, they were removed from the job and their data seized without explanation or followup.
. I am 28 years old, frcza Columbus, Ohio. I graduated from high school in Ohio and attended college for two years. Since 1972, I have worked at a variety of jobs, mostly as a private. ,,
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3 .. ( Page 2 investigator. In January 1978 I was appointed as an investigatorfortheStateofOhioDepartmentofpmmerce, Division of Licensing. My position entailed the responsibilities
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of licensing and enforcement of private investigators for the western region of the state. - nc E,~ whistle on *ha maae" ' - 7 ~
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. While privately employed, I hava acted 1
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cooperatively with the Cincinnati Police Department, the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and others in the successful prosecution of organized crime figures. In one organized l crime investigation my efforts kicked off,' thirteen people were indicted. All were pr'esecuted successfully and.were incarcerated.' I have also participated in investigations with other federal agencies. In 1979, while employed as a contract agent for Confidential Servic'es, Inc. of Cincinnati, in the handling of a routine domestic case, I became aware of some wrongdoing by employees I
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j at the Zimmer nuclear power plant construction site. , Initially my information concerned cheating on time cards and selling stolen weapons. After taking this information to David G. Altemuhle, Director of Media Services at the CG&E Co., on December 5, 1979 my firm was retained by CG&E to further investigate the information in my possession. My company was to receive $2,000 per week. I was to receive $10 per hour, , 20 cents. per mile and necessary expenses. ,
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(- , P,2ga 3 { My position was undercover, o the pretext of being a j cost accounting engineer under the alias of Tom Jackson. 9 .v(.
/ g7 CG&E provided.the ID's for the cover. I was to % on the job Monday - Friday from 4:00 or 5:00 P.M. to 4:00 o'r 5:00 A.M.,
I . depending on circumstances. In my first week, December 10-16, I was able to v.orify factually allegations of labor personnel padding their time cards .with work hours not spent on the construction site. They were able to succ~eed only with the cocperative efforts and collusion of security and managerial personnel of the con; tractor,. Kaiser Engineering of Oakland, California. As an example of how the system worked, security guards would insure that employees. were properly signed in, even
, when the employees were not at the plant. Specifically, indiv'iduals involved included a pipefitter union steward,
, laborers, security guards, the assistant superintendent of construction., the personnel manager and others. I can i identify these individuals by name and location.
An analysis I did that week of the time-cheating indicated that an average of 40% of the time these e#mployees'were to be at an assigned position was spent in local bars engaging in social activity. Frequently the employees had dates with members of the opposite sex, including suspected prostitutes, and conducted criminal activity relating to the illegal sale and distribution of firearms suspected to be stolen. While arrangements were made at the bar, hot guns were raffled in s pools of hundreds of employees at the plant site. G iy. -+ 4, e.w.%.-- %.%m .
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., At the end of the first week I reported my findings to Bill Murray, my contact and Assistant Dired: tor of construction
, for CGAE. AlthoughIspokewithhimdailyonthh~ phone,I
. met with him at his home shortly after December 17 to turn .
in my report. He was the number two project engineer on this job for CG&E. Mr. Murray was pleased with my progress.' He said he was amazed at the amount and depth of wrongdoing. My information confirmed his own suspicions. He said I shculd continue until I . learned the full extent of misconduct. He . Q . also instructed me specifically to find any misconduct - no matter how trivial - by employees of Peabody-Magnaflux, l
- i the company handling radiograph (nuclear x-ray) quality
. assurance work.
In"my second week, December 17-23, I continued to noto
- . the pattern of time cheating by employees. I also confirmed the collusion of Kaiser managerial personnel with these employ.ees . I sat with a management executive who was drinking with a plant worker and criticizing the time spent off-site, which frequently was paid as overtime. The discussion concluded with the Kaiser official stating that he knew'what
- was going on, and warning "just don't get caught."
? I also was able to obtain information that Kaiser's superintendant of construction stole materials from the site for his own personal use. He had his wife's car overhauled j completely at the motor pool mechanic facilities and paint j shop. It is significant that when I told Mr. Murray of this' r LTT:D_ _ . ._. . - ::::::^--_... -- .-- . _ _ - -- . N _ -- - - --
[' , (' PC.ge 5 ( I' information during my weekly briefing, he responded that the utility had previously caught the same individual in the exact sameactivitytoanevengrhaterdegree. SpeciffhalIy,the s, construction superintendent had stolen materials from and used labor from the construction site to add a room to his house. The theft had been worth approximately $30,000. , On that , particular occasion, rather than dismissal, this individual had only been reprimanded and compelled to restitute CG&E
- for the stolen materia 1s. Murray was incensed that the practice was continuing.' .
Returning to my investigation during the second week, I discovered evidence of labor personnel misusing their time
- and misappropriating materials while on the job site to make -
, , ., elaborate belt buckles out of nuclear grade stainless steel that was supposed to be used for fabricating pipes, braces and
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other components. I further discovered that this was a practice the. utility and the contractor has known about for years. The estimated cost to the utility, including labor and materials, was between $200-300 per belt buckle. Over a period of' years, there were literally thousands of buckles constructed, or a minimum of millions of dollars lost. I started to notice , the buckles during the second week, because so many employees were wearing them. I eventually personally saw around 100 belt . buckles being worn. Employees would give the buckles as gifts, or sell them at $20-50 apiece. One employee even prepared a l l catalog of the different designs. On January 3, I bought two 9 9 e
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{ Pcg3 6 ( belt buckles at $20 a piece, turning one in to CGEE and ke.eping one.- 'I bought the) "^ h; fw - . ==curhy w ud. [ During the second week, I also discovered Qxness in ecurity that violated NRC regulations on search).ng vehicles n l that entered and left the plant site. The guards allowed F certain employees they knew to drive in and out of the plant t [ site without checking the trucks.[There was plutonium on , the plant site that could have.been diverted to the black l\j market, although I have no direct or indirect knowledge of plutonium leaving the site. , I did learn indirectly from another employee that some copper and other non-lethal construction materials had disappeared. Apparently a series of approximately 30 employees would cut enough copper to fit in their lunch boxes, smuggle it o'ut, and resell the metal to raise money for a Christmas party. Within a week, they raised $15,000 for the party, which I learned involved suspected prostitutes. When I told Mr. Murray the rest of what I had found the second week, he again was astounded and amazed. Again, he hadknownofthistypeoftheftearlier,[ut24workershad been fired in an earlier incident. He was angry- that the practice had begun again. He again stressed the importance of looking into the activities of Peabody-Magnaflux employees, which I hadn't had the opportunity yet to pursue. He said . CG&E wanted to dismiss Peabody, because the utility suspected O
( ... , g ~ . Pcg3 7 k . . t 4 the radiograph company was producing shoddy work. He said I was doing a good job and to, keep up the good work.
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- Thefollowingweek, December 24-30,Iobtaibedmoredata 4 , on the time cheating. But, following instructions, I began to make contact with employees of Peabody Magnaflux. I found they were doing a good job and could find no irregularities on the site. For example, one evening I accidentally wandered into an area where shooting of x-rays on the welds was in progress.
I promptly was asked to comply with the " Restricted Area" signs and leave, because I could be exposed to an overdose of x-rays. This professional conduct and adharance to safety requirements was unique. The PM employees I spoke with were f concerned that pipes they had rejected under the quality i
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assurance program were being installed anyway. They were i
, uncomfortable that their rejections were being ignored by construction personnel. At this point I began to wear a 4
body tape re' corder to record technical conversations with PM j and union con $itruction personnel. The conversations concerned coverups by Kaiser and CG&E of faulty construction materials and improper quality assurance practices. It should be noted at this point that my pretext was played so well as to make these individuals believe that, as a new employee, assigned as a contract auditing engineer, Kaiser and CG&E might be using me to help in this coverup. . My " official duties" were to compare the construction contract
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( Pcg3 8 ( i with the inspection sheets. But the pe'rsonnel I spoke with said the inspection sheets bore little relation to reality. They wantedpetoknowthattheinspectionsheetswer% fraudulent. For instance, certain union personnel informed me that up to 20% of the prefabricated piping welds were faulty. They i provided one example, where a group of pipes were surrepticiou^ sly i brought in one evening from the Kelloggs Company steel fabricators in Pennsylvania. (Standard construction practice t was to deliver the pipes during normal working hours when adequate personnel were available to careful).y unload the pipe.) When the truck with the pipes arrived, an employee __ whose identity is still unknown told the truck driver to just
" push them off the truck," a drop of about five feet. Because the pipes were heavy gauge steel, the drop couldn't have damaged the pipes. But as a routine precaution, PM x-rayed
.the welds to check for damage. PM employees then detected construction faults in the welds, not defects as a result of the accident. The piping was substandard, not damaged due to 7
accident. Again in this incident, PM personnel were overridden by Kaiser and CG&E on the analysis of the pipes as substandard.1 l {Ilaterlearnedthatthepipingsubsequentlywasinstalledin ( the main steam relief piping system,the exact same system that broke down at Three Mile Island. This system is the key sa"ety-related system in a. nuclear plant. PM quality assurance
- i. radiograph employees were going to arrange for me to examine j their documentation on this matter ,.the following week. They e
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' were already being overridden 'and feeling pressure so they hoped that I could assist through my " job" as contract auditing engineer. .
Also during this week I was introduced to an employee who indicated to me that he could provide some handguns that I might be looking for. The employee didn't give me his name but said he worked the " day shift with the pipefitters. The employees raffling guns at the~ construction site introduced him to me. This employee gave me a telephone number and name on a scrap of paper. The employee said he still had eight handguns left out of the same batch from which he had sold thirteen for $1000 to the other employees who had the raffle. When I reported my discoveries to Mr. Murrey, he ; immediately became,defensiv's about substandard quality - assurance practices at the site. He dismissed them as " absurd, . J.
. ridiculous, hearsay and gossip." He indicated that in his i
i wildest imagination he couldn't believe such a thing could occur (. with all the checks and balances that are involved in the inspection process. He also tried to explain this away as . = . the x-rays being "a matter of interpretation" and that Kaiser and CG&E quality assurance people simply had a more " correct interpretation" than did Peabody Magnaflux. . He tried to convince me that this was indicative of the " shoddy workmanship" that PM was doing. He felt very uncomfortable with my i l suing any matters relating to quality assurance and insisted
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i that I focus my investigative efforts on the possibility of :: f 15 e
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" find them sleeping on the job, drinking on the job or absent for. no reason from the job site," practices that,yould provide reasons to take Peabody off the job. I accepted his instructions, although I made my skepticism known. I tried to make him realize that my cover was so solid there, was no l reason for these people to lie to me.
My final week on the job began on December 31st. During 2 the week I was actually able to purchase two of the belt i buckles that had been discussed previously. I also continued to develop the allegations of defective construction materials being used at the Zimmer site,as well as strange practices concerning intimidations of PM personnel. PM emoloyees told m Jey wara hah;.re;zzif.! den repeatedly _odeir findings _ of faulty' welds,_and._ threatened._with losa of t hair--j ba in. general,. E At was'dnting thirweek'that I learned the piping PM had'" rejectedin'theaccidentincidEtwasinstalledinthemain
\ steam relief ' system of the plant. __..___.__.... ,
L The matter of my " cover" and personnel security became
=
i an issue during this week when copies of my confidential reports i to Mr. Murray were left unsecured @ his desh at the construction l site. I discovered this while (.lookfiig for a peheil one everiing. Although Mr. Murray indicated outrage that I would look in his ' desk, he informed me that no one else would and the reports 1 were quite safe. . on January 3, in the middle of this week, CG&E terminated a j the services of our firm, explaining that. they felt enough
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( (~ PCgo 11 information had been obtained for theli purposes and that no further investigation was warranted. I told Mr. Murray that we were just starting to uncover what I felt wasdraluable F . investigative data pertinent to quality assurance problems. I Mr. Murray felt that perhaps the quality assurance people might want me to continue. He arranged a conference insnediately with CG4E's man in charge, Mr. Bill Schwears. During this conference, Mr. Schwears and Mr. Murray both communicated to me that it was "beyond the realms of imagination"- to believe that this type of activity in quality assurance was occurring. They stated that they would take matters into consideration and '- let us know if they wished to pursue the quality assurance matters at all. I indicated to them that a break or an absence of myself from the site would' jeopardize my pretext.and therefore i jeopardize my ability to further investigate these matters. ' They should give it their most immediate consideration. I received absolutely no contact from CG&E personally ever again. My employer was told that our termination was final, and l l that any reports, evidence, etc. should be tendered with a
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l final statement immediately. 'l Because I had my suspicions of wrongdoing by CGsE executives, I began immediately to take steps to secure the evidence l which I had gathered. I rented a safety deposit box and left l. the key with my attorney. After a conference with my employer, i it was clear to me that his attitude and any further action on his part in this matter were purely financially motivated. l e e 9 , e,-n..,, . , . .., ,n, ,,,_,,ym,,. .
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. I resigned effective January 16, 1980.- Although one belt buckle was in my employer's possession, I was able to retain theotherinmypossession,alongwiththetapesinadeby ,
, use of the body recorder, exact duplicates of my original reports, and the original letter of authorization my company 4
, had received from CG&E. .
Because of my feeling that PM was being in some way k intimidated or hushed up, I made immediate contact with officials o,f the PM Testing Service local offices in Cincinnati and the corporate home offices in Chicago, Illinois. I found these individuals to be quite receptive and extremely appreciative, as they told _me that *hav h=i_t,l}t_.qLeme feelings of a coveru Q procre1 A For example, the Cincinnati PM representative said CG&E was doing everything possible to get
'PM off the job.' During the period of mid-January to early May, I was in regular contact with these individuals, and we shared information*which confirmed my suspicions that CGsE and Kaiser Engineering o'f Oakland, California were indeed involved in a coverup about events at Zimmer. For example, during our discussions I was told by a supervisor of PM in Cincinnati that their trailer on the construction site had been broken into.
t Their documents pertinent to faulty welding had been t
" pilfered," the exact term used by the supervisor. The break-in took place the weekend following my dismissal from
, the site.
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l (- Pcg3 13 ( In late January-early February *I attempted to contact the Nuclear Regulatory commission. I reached a Mr. James Cummings in Nashington, D.C.
- For a month he told mq he w% "lookin 5
into" my concerns, without any further explanation. At the same time, I contacted officials of the FBI cincinnati office on my findings. The FBI took my. evidence for analysis, and I continued my attempts to make progress with the NRC. Within two weeks, the FBI reported back to me that the U.S. Attorney, Mr. James Cissel, and his s g ial prosecutor for white collar crime, Mr. Bernard Gilday, had found no evidence in my material to warrant investigatio the part of any branch of the U.S. Justice Department. They i did indicate, however, that they would immediately forward a report of their contac_t_with__me to the Justice Department in l , Washington, D.C. for referral to the NRC. i In late February it became apparent to me that my efforts to contact the NRC were falling on deaf ears. I then made an urgent attempt to contact the chairman of the NRC, Mr. Jefhn Ahearne. t ,. Within hours, I was contacted by conference call by Mr. Bill Ward, chief of inspection and enforcement for the Commissien, and Mr. Dudley Thompson, an NRC administrative officer. In L this conversation they informed me that no information on this ! disclosure had bsen passed to them either by Mr. Cummings of I i their department, or anyone from the Justice Department. They i advised me that they would dispatch immediately two , l individuals of the NRC staff to come to Cincinnati and speak :
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t Pcg3 14 c with me about my information. They also advised that any evidence I had to show these representatives would be greatly , appreciated.
' OnMarch3,Mr.GeraldA.Phillipand,p.L.Williamson -
s of the NRC met,with me in my home in Covington, Ken'tucky. Mr. P'hillip mentioned that he was the same investigator who was 4 waiting for Karen Silkwood the night she died. He had been one of.the first people to arrive at the scene of the fatal accident. I was concerned at Phillip's stptement that he had been unable to find a hint of foul play, even in the Silkwood case.
- At this meeting, which lasted approximately 9 hours, I told s .,
, Mr. Williamson and Mr. Phillip everything I knew to that point. I showed them and provided the opportunity to copy all physical evidence in my possession. Mr. Williamson left my home with the stated intention of xeroxing my reports and talking to individuals in the Cincinnati FBI office. Mr. 1 Phillip stayed and listened to all he wanted to hear of the 1 taped material . It should be emphasized that Mr. Phillip, because of his own " time limitatien," did not take the opportunity to listen to all of the tapes. For instance, he did not choose to listen to the belt buckle dransaction I . l \ recorded, nor the tape of a conversation with a security guard j that corroborated shoddy workmanship on_ the_pJpesland the _ l belt buckle sales. The next day, March 4, Mr. Phillip called me and I indicated that the NRC had reviewed my evidence. Pending any l unexpected turn of events, they vould return to C4 -4 = ati and,g i conduct an. investigation. In a letter to me dated March 11, t i
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h . , ( Mr. Phillip informed me that on the basis of my information, the NRC planned to conduct an investigatdozi at the Zimmer plant on: 1. defective welds accepted for safety related systems;
- 2. defective welds in the five prefabricated pipins that had been dropped; and 3. the flushing, or pressure-cleaning process for safety-related piping. (one of my disclosures to 4
Mr. Murray concerned a pipefitting supervisor who had exposed l the flushing process as missing literally piles of slag, and sediment or crusty rust that forms on the inside of pipes.) r Further, the standard flushing time had been reduced from six weeks to two weeks. The company had been upset at having their inadequate work " ruined," and the supervisor quit in disgust. , Mr. Murray had professed ignorance of the problem. , In early April Mr. Phillip called me and indicated the
, NRC investigation at the plant was about to begin. He would
. inform me of the preliminary results before they left.
l Two days later, Mr. Phillip called again and said the commission had finished the preltminan investigation. With respect to the allegedly defective welds in safety-related { piping they found the problems to have he n valid but already I corrected by CG&E. With regard to the inadequate flushing, again he agreed with the accuracy of my charges but said the prob /.em had been corrected. Concerning the faulty welds in
. the prefabricated pipes, Mr. Phillip indicated that there was not only validity to my allegations, but this information was previously unknown to the NRC and the utility would most 3
" definitely" be found "out of compliance." He had already
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[ . [ Pag 3 16 b informed the utility it was "out of compliance." He further indi'cated that the NBC would have to investigate further to l determine how far out of compliance and what, if ny, actions
, the NRC would have to take. . ,
Although I was pleased to see that my efforts were 4 4 making progress, I was concerned over how long the NRC had known
- about two of my three allegations. I wondered why the flushing system and safety related pipes were still faulty only two months earlier, and why Mr. Murray had adamantly ' insisted that my charges were beyond th's realms of imagination -- if the NRC
. had already determined the charges were accurate.
Because I still had my suspicions that the scandal was not being thoroughly investigated and reported, and that some issues like theft,. sale of' firearms, etc. were being totally ignored, I decided to make contact with the news media in an attempt to add the light of public scrutiny on this entire matter. To* that end, on April 15, I contacted the Chicago Sun Times and told,them my story. On April 16, the Chicago ! Sun Times assigned an investigative reporter to my charges. On April 20, a story appeared in the Chic go Sun Times. It touched off a fair amount of news media publicity regarding the Zimmer scandal. , During my contacts following this publicity, I was l informed by a PM supervisor that CG&E and Kaiser had, to his ! knowledge, put on a " full crew" of workmen to somehow alter the prefabricated pipes that were now the subject of a graag o
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( , , POg3 17 ( ,. deal of controversy. He also ' inform d me for the first time that, effective April 1, PM had been ordered off the site. Their contract for utility x-ray testing at the site had been
, terminated. , I frantically began making calls to my existing contacts to confirm what he had told me. I started to find that these individuals, although previoGsly cooperative, were now mysteriously silent. I am referring to PM technicians and radiographars with who'n I had been speaking. Finally, on May 6 I was able to talk with a chief executive of PM with whom I had previously spoken. He confirmed ng worst fears.
He, indicated to me that the break-in and pilfering of data had severely crippled his company's ability to defend itself. He further confirmed thAt his company was terminated from the site for absolutely no reas'en other than the " convenience of
. the contractor." He also indicated that in this dismissal
. all data relevant or irrelevant was saizwd from them. I asked if he meant t.he data was taken forcibly, and he said he would put it this way: "It was the fastest transfer of data I have ever seen." He told me that in his 20 years experience as a
- company man, he had learned tc "do what I am told." He also told me that their policy and stance in this matter had been dictated to them by officials of Peabody International ("PI"),
the holding company that owned PM, and that PI's position was "if we went in and defended this matter too strongly, it might appear to the other utilities - them taking the attitude that i Peabody Magnaflux is going after a sister utility. Maybe we l . . e 9 ,
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shouldn't consider them for any further'. work." He explained to me that to take any other position would most certainly destroy his company within'30 days. He expounded [-on the ex-planation by' telling me that the reality of this situation t was that PM was part of a " closed industry" and that Kaiser, Kellogg and other ciompanies wielded total control and , domination of what would and would not be done by the subcontractors. . During the conversation I asked him a number of questions
, framed by an investigative reporter, for his confirmation.
J Re agreed with me unequivocally that my charges were accurate, and that there had been a coverup regarding my attempts to expose faulty construction at Zimmer. He also agreed that PM had been fired because it tried to do its job honestly within the system. . He indicated that of the 20 or so nuclear jobs that his company was on, it was definitely the first time that PM had been overridden without any type of followup. He also agreed that his company and legal staff had formed this policy of keeping quiet due to intimidation by Kaiser. It should be noted at this point that I recorded this c5nversat[on, and that it was witnessed by independant third parties. It was then I realized that for any resolution of this l j matter, I must seek help and bring it to the attention of people l in. Washington, D.C. who might be able to take action._ I ' l i traveled to Washington, D.C., and spoke with representatives f of Ralph Nader's Critical Mass organization and briefly with l
' he t Government Accountability Project of the Institute for
[ . l +
(. Pego 13 ( . Policy Studies. Although the Nader group was extremely supportive concerning overall policy 1.ssues, they suggested I work in -depth with GAP to pursue my indiv. dual disclosure. I c topped off newspaper summaries to GAP and promised to. share my documentation. During this period an aide to Senator Metzenbaum was also supportive of my efforts. Before we could meet to begin work, however, I exhausted my funds and was forced to return to Cincinnati. Quite frankly, I was concerned and feeling guilty t th'at I had left my landlady alone. I had also been aware since the inception of my investigation of serious threats to myself and to my family, of grievous bodily injury or even death. I was aware of these threats due to several incidents that had occurred. At one point, while at the site, I was told by an individual who worked there' that if I was not who I'said I
,- was I would die from a shotgun blast aimed at my face. That way,.not even my family would recognize me.
. On anNther occasion, shortly before the NRC investigation in March, while driving my automobile, I was forced off the
- l. road and collided with a steel utility pol _e. A car had followed me for several miles. The vehicle accelerated and pushed my car off the road with the right rear fender by
! colliding with my vehicle as it brushed past. It forced i i me off the road as soon as we reached an area strewn by the steel poles. But for the fact that I was wearing my seat belt, I could have been killed. The individuals that I witnessed 44
r .- c Pcg3 20 c-doing this had no license, plate or registration tags whatsoever, temporary or permanent, to identify the car. 1 And after forcing me off the road, they began tol ack up. ! At this point I fired two rounds into the ground from my pistol and they immediately fled. There was no incident reported by anyone as to either an accident having occurred, or a , gun being discharged in that area that night. Very shortly after this ' incident I began receiving harassing and intimidating phone calls at my residence. The phone would ring immediately after my landlady or I entered the house. Then the phone would click, or the caller would laugh ominously. I assumed the purpose of these calls was to inform me that my landlady and I were being followed. It should be noted that I lived with a former Covington police officer and his mother, who also treated me like a son. The former police officer was in temporary residence elsewhere. As a result, my landlady and myself were the only occupants when the calls began. I finally realized these incidents were getting out of hand when one afternoon between May 10-15 this woman, whom I
- s j had known for six years and referred to as " Mom", received a i phone call in which the caller told her that they were going l to " butt-fuck you until you have hemorrhoids and then make you eat them." When she asked why, the response was, "You know why. "
The caller then hung up. - I knew things had gone far enough. I was unwilling to expose my landlady or my family to any danger. Accordingly;:I t I 1 ee+.=.=-, w.
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.-: - c' Pcgo 21 c packed my bags, sold my car and other possessions, made out a will and left town on May 1.6. The calls stopped within a week.
I don't know specifically who was behind t$i threats or I i
, violence. However I did know that Mr. Murray and Mr. Earl
'Borgman, vice president of CGEE, as early as mid-February, had conveyed copies of my confidential reports to thosa
' individuals whom I had investigated and were subsequently
^
terminated from their. positions. This was a flagrant breach of , standard. security procedures designed to protect private investigators, as well as a violation of an agreement he had made with me. Mr. Murray was also aware of the death threat against me by shotgun blast if my cover was blown, because I had informed him. I know that as early as January 10, 1980 Mr. Barney Culver, . Chief Project Engineer, had called officials in Oakland, California and related to them the details of my l confidential reports. In mid-February Mr. Murray told me of i
- 1 these breach.es of security in an implied warning to give up my efforts.
When I left town, I spent a weekend with my family and , then left Cincinnati for a safe location. I kept in contact with GAP by phone, and knew that it would be necessary to return to D.C. and begin working in depth to pursue my charges. I arrived in early June and began the hard work of preparing my disclosure for release to Congress and the media. I also knew I would have to go to Washington persona 11'y because of the fairdre of the NRC to follow up thoroughly od their initial findings.' To my surprise I read newspaper We
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c c Pcg3 22 ' l articles during late April that indicat'ed the NRC was
" finished," d'or all intensive purposes, with the Zimmer investigation and would not be pursuing it any f.idther.
. Apparently when'Mr. Phillip returned to Zimmer more than a ;
week. after his early visit, this time with the NRC's egert radiographer, the welds were no longer faulty and passed NRC inspection. (Of course, I knew and had told Mr. Phillip that crews had worked feverishly to repair the damage during : the interim.) Since PM's original records and x-rays had been stolen, and the company took possession of all other data, Kaiser appeared to be succeeding in a well-planned coverup. With PM's fear of speaking out publicly, I was now the only obstacle to prevent the coverup from succeeding.
. I' told all this to Mr. Phillip but he dismissed my
- concerns. In a newspaper interview he said it would have been impossible to replace the key Pipes in the plant without attracting attention. Of course, I had never made such a j silly accusation. What I did tell him, and what he ignored, was that the faulty welds had been repaired.
At that point I contacted Mr. Bill Ward of the NRC in Washington and told him that I felt additional evidence which had come into my possession would bear out my allegations of coverup. As I was in Chicago, he insisted that I should proceed immediately to the local FBI office. Later that day a cincinnati reporter informed me that not only was I implored to i I
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go to the NRC and FBI in Chicago, but that if I didn't, the NRC would subpoena my evidence. At any rate, I had set up an appointment the next day, May 1. - I met with fte. Phillip, l 1
. s, the NRC Region III Director, and Mr. Buckley of the FBI white collar crime section in Chicago. I met with them and {
played the tape of my conversation with the top PM executive.
'The response was almost humorous. The FBI agent was impressed that there was a serious question of criminal activity, but insisted that the NRC would have to first decide the commission had been lied to and then invite the FBI in fo.r l
help. Mr. Phillip of the NRC, on the other hand, claimed he l didn't understand the tape clearly and wasn't sure what he had .c heard. I gave him a copy of the tape and-he said he would i
. check it again.
During the entire 2-21/2 hour meetiing the Regional Director did not say anything beyond introductions 4 and good-byes. My latest contact with Mr. Phillip was on June 4, when heinformedmNthatthePMofficialswereunwillingtomake
- any specific accusations against CG&E. Mr_. Phillip also was unable to recall the significant sections of the tape with the PM official that dealt with a coverup. I suggested he listen more carefully. Mr. Phillip promised a report would be available soon on the Zimmer investigation. I'm not expecting much. The NRC has shown an absolute unwillingness to pursue the i
hard question necessary to learn the full scope of the danger at Zimmer. And Mr. Phillip's long time delays gave CG&E a chanbe to 4 cover its tracks at the' plant site. ' e se
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( . C Page 24 My motives in making this disclosure have nothing to l f i do with personal gain, as utility officials have c)$5rged '
. already. To the contrary, my career as a private investigator may have been ruined by my action. Much worse, I have placed my life in jeopardy. I feel guilty that I have risked danger to my family and friends.
I am taking these risks, be'cause I am afraid for the
. people of Ohio, and because I am determined that the public ~be warned of the truth about another potential Three Mile Island disaster. Every worker at the Zimmer plant that I spoke with
- privately insisted that when the switch is finally pulled and the power turned on, he had no intention of being anywhere within hun'dreds of miles of the Zimmer plant. In short, no one involved in the construction, outside of management, has any confidence in the safety of the plant.
l But the NRC seems determined to minimize ~the danger as a routine failure of quality control systems. If the situation at Zimmer is routine, we all should be terrif,ied. I .could not live with myself if I did not do everything in my power to l alert the public to the threat represented by the " closed industry" I was exposed to at Zimmer. I have read the above twenty four (24) page affidavit. To the best.of my knowledge, it is true, accurate and complete. M h! T es, D. c. M e.Sia s. s.' i O: 014:* :.d av to before as
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. Exhibit 4
, INVESTICATIVE R.EPORT
(
SUMMARY
) J-PERIOD: December 10, through December 16, 1979 N
- s, CLIENT: Cincinnati Cas & Electric Co. .
SUBJECT:
Ucder Cover Investigative Activitics at the Zimmer Plant During this period Agent 920 was successful in establishing his pretext as an employee at the' site. Additionally, he feels comfort-abic enough with his " cover" that .in the coming week or so he will be able to socialize with the group of. employees who have been tentatively identified as investigative cargets. , The general concern'of the client that several employees may be working in collusion to " pad" time cards with work hours that were not spent on the site was varified. Agent 920 reported several employees he observed passing through the gate without recording their time in or out. Apparently these employees and guards are
- friendly enough with each other that they conspire to fabricate time sheets.
. 'Ihe following named employees hava been observed by Agent 920 pas-sing throu-5 the gate without recording time in or out:
- 1. James Huwel 12-10-79 7:25 p.m.
- 2. Walter Hamm 12-12-79 9:25 p.m.
- 3. Terry Hamm 12-'11-79 9:30 p.m.
~
Agent 920 has observed certain vehicles passing through the gate without being searched. There has been-no evidence of employee thef t developed at this point. However, 920 feels that he is excluded from certain conversations where these matters may be discussed. s During the coming period the off-site investigator *w'ill attempt , to" identify and record empicyee's who may b'E o'f'f site while not signed out. In ' general, it is felt that good progress was mada during the - period. , Respectful _1y submitted,
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f INVESTICATIVE REPORT - DATE: 12-10 ,, .
. . ACENT: 920 .. .
i?; 4:00 p.m. . Het with Mr. Culver and Mr. Murray to discuss investigative objectives. 3:30 p.m. This agent had an opportunity to acet and tsik with the guard identified by the first name Dempscy in the office. This man in with W & W Security. At this point it appests that we will have difficulty working out of the main uffice building until approximately 10:00 p.m. in the evening as . : there are cleaning pers'onnel .and also Kaiser employees ' mov,ing in and.out of the main office area. Cuard Dempsey
, related to me .that all security personnel have been advised i of my. position and my flexibility insof ar as moving, about the plant site. He also related that all guards are aware of my having keyed access to the main office building.
6:00 p.m. While drifting in the construction area, most specifically
. the auxiliary building, this agent had an opportunity to talk to several craf ts people from the electrical workers' group and the carpenter workers' group. During this con- .
versation, it was relayed to this agent by a carpenter craf ts person identified by the first name Joe, that "the pipefitte'rs got a damn rscket going, is what they've goc!" 4 In general, discussing attitudes with these workers we find that people's time on the second shif t is pretty well their own. This n'rea in the Auxiliary Building seemed very com-fortable as the entire group sat around for a period of at least an hour and a half calling it a coffee break. 7:00 p.m. Cuard Dempsey checked me out of the main gate. He did not make any attempt to search'my vehicle nor did I sign any register to get out, however, I did note at a later time on the record where Guard Dempsey entered in a notation that I had been signed out at 7:00 p.m. and my vehicle had been ,
. searched and he also signed.me.back in at 7:35 p.m.
. 7:55 p.m. From my position in the Administration Building, James Huwel l was observed leavi.ng the premises. He got in his car and j proceeded east on Route 52. 8:30 p.m. This agent, while again drifting through the Auxiliary Room area, had occasion to stop and talk to personnel in.the l Control Room area. It is noted that two of the employees l in the Control Room area were drinking sof t drinks when this j agent entered, contrary to posted notification of no eating or drinking in the Control Room area. In discussion with,g one Control Room person identified as Bill Moss, this employee
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' 8:30 p.m. stated that the pipefitters or someone not identified in the pipefitters' group were selling belt buckles made of stain-less stuel.
9:30 p.m. This agent went to 'the guard shack located at the a-in. gste and sat to listen to the Monday night footbaLi game with guards Dempsey and another guard identified by the first name Dave. During the course of the game, there were calls from all over the Plant - notably the electric and carpenter
' people and Control Room personnel who wanted to keep posted on the game progress.
g At approximately midnight guards Dempsey and Dave were re . If eved by a guard identified 6y the first name Brian. At
'approximately 12:15 Brian checked the brass and staccd that James lluwel should still be here, however, this, agent has no ;
evidence of James lluwel's having returned to the construc-tion site as of yet. His car is not in evidence at this time and af ter a quick exsmination of the areas that he ; ' might be in, he is not found to be on the premises. It is believed that he is still'off the premises since originally leaving at 7:55. 12:45 a.m. This agent began a' physical search of the pisnt site for
. James Huwel. In examining the area around the Containment Building, I found no one to be present other than three inspectors from Peabody. 1 proceeded to search the areas of the Auxilisry Building and settled into a conversation again with the night shif t personnel in the Control Room.
Although relatively unsupervised from my observatfun, this
' seemed to be a more effective and business-like, group of individuals. In the conversation earlier with Control Room personnel *, it was discussed that certain pipefitters were selling belt buckles made of stainless steel to the
, construction personnel and other individuals at the Zimmer sit'e . Upon leaving the Auxiliary Building sad the Reactor Building areas of the plant site. I proceeded toward the front gate. At this time, I observed Jamcw Iluwel coming through the front gate carrying some soffee and Pepsi. I approached Mr.~Huwel and mentioned to some indi-
, vi. duals that I spoke to ear,},4ey, cold em,him he might thatbe svare of where I might purchase some silver buckles made by pipc-fitters. Mr. Iluwel indicated to me that he was not aware of anyone on the night shif t involved,in that type of activity, however, he felt that probably on the day shif t there were. He also displayed to me a belt buckle that he said he had fashioned from stain 1 css secci while work-ing in the pipefitter's prefab shop. The silver belt buckle in question is a flowered design with a fif ty cent piece mounted in the center. At this meeting Mr. Huwel reeked of mouth vash. !!e also seemed rather incoherent and dazed; appearing to be intoxicated. Mr. Huwel imparted to me in a ' casual . conversation..that after comorrow he will be taking a two- week vacation. In discussing general
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a.m. I had told him that I was looking for him earli'er in the evening. , He indicated that he had been invited to' listen to the ball game or possibly to watch the ball game in an area called the Rad Waste, Area. It:vas a ~ E . particular person's name mentioned, 'I believe*, began with a "V". Bowever. Mr. Huwel's incoherency tended to garble what he was saying about events earlier in the evening as to his whereabouts. Mr. Huwel indicated in this conversa-tion that he had been in the Control Room previously in
. the evening and he had been in the R$d Waste area later in the evening to watch the football game. It should*be
- noted at this point that during my earlier surveillance of the area around the Control Room, Mr. Huwel was not present. I then left Mr. Huwel and indicated to.htm that when he gets back from vacation that he should look me up there at the Plant site as we both indicated a strong '
, boredom for the hours spent there.
1:45 a.m. Af ter leaving the Zimmer Plant site, I proceeded to the
~~ Riverview Inn west of the Zimmer site on Route 52. There I had an occasion to find two of the security personnel from the pinne that were on the previous shift. These-l- security personnel previously identified to me as' first 4 , name Dempsey and first name John, possiUy last name McClung. We sat and discussed in general conversa- .
tion events of the day and also events at the Zimmer Plant site. The guard -ide'ntified as Dempsey indicated to 'me that his permanent employment before becoming involved with W & W Security was as a guard for the Federal Reserve Bank in Cincinnati. This conversation led to general discussion of the security at power plants. We discussed thd security problems at the Steward Station
. Power Plant in the-early winter of 1977. Gradually the conversation drif ted towards this specific security situation at the Zimmer Station. I indicated on pretext that I had been involved in working at many mejor con-struction projects. Upon discussing the specific problems of the Steward Station Plant during its strike, we discussed the death of a security guard r .This led the guard identified
- as Dempsey to discuss the possibility that people have been killed at the Zimmer site. He could not exactly figure
- tlut whether it was at the site here or ewhether the indivi-d,uals who were allegedly killed were killed as a result of activity conducted at the site. He mentioned that several bodies had been found floating in the Ohio specifi-cally. This lina of conversation, I believe. to be highly speculative at this ~ point. Especially given the fact that the guard' identified as Dempsey had probably been drinking for a period of at least 'an hour and a half. I indicated
, to the pair of guards, John and Dempsey, that I was ;
interested in talking to Jim HuQel this evening because I had understood that the pipefitters .or someone in the
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12-20-7' - ' (- UURIIULil!M f . 1:45 c.c. pip fittnes cight havs had cese bolt buckles for sala. Tho guard identified as John then explained to me that at one time Walter Hamm had given him a gift of a stainless steel
- belt buckle. The guard, John, indicated that Manus gave him
. this belt buckle and said, "Here, this is a twenty-five i dollar Christmas gift" for you." The guard identified as j Dempsey then indicated that on an occasion recent,1y, Walter j Mama took four individuals, including himself, tb a bar by i the name of Marion's Room. He indicated that Mr. Hamm paid ;
for all the drinks. He further elaborated that he knew that within an hour there had been a hundred dollars worth of liquor between the men and some women at the bar paid for by Mr. Hsam. I then indicsted to the guard named John on pretext that having worked at other major construction pro- .
. jects "I was aware of many women" acting as sort of hangers-on to construction personnel. John then indicated to me . .g that he would have Walt Hamm sesy over a little tomorrow - -
until about 4:'l0 or 5:00. His purpose for doing so he ,.
. stated was that Walter Hamm could, "Cet me laid". The *
- guard identified as Dempsey then said, " Yeah, but how much will it cost him?" The guard identified as John then took me aside and said,'" Don't worry, it won't cost you a thing."
The guard identified as John further stated, '".isitur Hamm is the man that you really need to know on the Zinsner site." - e 2:30 a.m. After exchanging pleasantries, we all vent our separate ways . from the Riverview lounge. .
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, INVESTICATIVE REPORT
- DATE: 12-11-79' - .
- ACENT: 920 " *
. 4:00 p.m. -On duty enroute to Zimmer site.
4:35 p.m. Checked in at the Zimmer site. 5:00 p.m. This agent had a briefing with Bill Murray of CC&E as to the i previous days' activities. 6:00 p.m. While drifting through .the Auxiliary Building area this ' agent had occasion to find and become involved in converss-
. tio.n with J. Huwel. Mr. Huwel was situated behind some electrical panels in the Control Room and was basically just sitting there available to Control Room ooerstors for pipe-fitter consulting work. During this conversation. tir. Iluwel indicated that he was anxious to go on vacation as the bore-dos on the job was getting to him. Nothing much cise of substance was discussed with Mr. Huwel at this time.
7:30 p.m. While sitting in the guard shack area socializing with the guard identified as John McClung and another guard - identified as Dave,. last name unknown, the guard identified ae John received a telephon'a call- f rom Jim Huwel'in the Control Room. -Mr. Huwel ev$dently asked John to send so=e-
. one out for his dinner. The guard identified as Dave took i
an order for, Mr. Huwel to get a chicken dinner at Frischs. It should be noted at this time that the guards seemed en + respond to 7fr.,Iluwel's direccives. 8:00 p.'s. Mr..lluwel arrived at the guard shack. Entering a converss- - tion with the guards and Mr. Iluwel some suspicions of other
-workers, in particulat the electrical cnd carpencer crafts-men, were discussed as to my purpose _here on the job site.
This is to be expected and should no:" reflect any lack of confidence in this agent's pretext.
- Ifor where it should be no'ted that the're'is a gener'If fieling of paranoia amongst l the workers on the second shif t with regards to supervisory i
personnel checking on them. l -9:30 p.m. Terry llamm was checked out without any signing in or out,
- l. nor did he drop his brass. Addendum to'the eight o' clock section of this report - at approximately 8:00 p.m., Walter Hamm was dbserved checking out to the guard station. lie did drop his brass and was signed out by the guard, John.
f7 This section of thfs report, this agent accompanied the ,,
', superine.endent or, supervisor of the craf tsmen working in -
Containment Building over to the Containment Building and-
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. 9:30 p.m. in general h'c relayed some fecitngs of mistrust as to what l
- (cont.) my position was here on the site. }!y pretext'was to got somewhat more interest'ed in what he and his men were doing, and the ensuing conversation with him and other crafts people'ytelded much positive results toward defending my pretext. .
. 10:30 p.m. While back at the guard station this agent ok erved Terry
' Hama returning to the job site, and again there was no '
s, signing in or picking up of his brass'. At this time dis-cussions became more open with reference to Walter llamm.
' During this conversstion the guard named John relac'ed an incident that occurred on Dec' ember 5 where Walter !! nam, in
~
order to promote himself, for the position of Business Agent with the pipetitters union, reserved the Four Acres 11otel on route 52 and hired the services of five prostitutes to socialize with craf ts people from here at t}}e Zi=mer site. j The guard ide.ntified as' John indicated that he was present i at this social gathering sponsored by !!r. Namm. This led a discussion of Walter Haen's attempts to be elected as ' Business Agent for the pipefitters' union. During this conversation Mr. Huwel indicated that he did not feel Mr. Hamm woul' d become elec'ted as he had pulled off a lot of,
" shady deals" up here at the Zimmer site that had adversely effected some of the crafts people here. He also indicated that some of these shady dealings were of an extraordinary nature which frightened some of the crafts people and intimidated them. He also related that he felt that these -
. activities conducted by Mr. Hamm were of a self-serving nature for the entire Hamm family. During this conversa-tion, Mr. Huwel reisted that Mr. Hamm will be most likely appointed'to take his place during his vacation for the
, next two weeks on the second shift.
12:00 a.m. J,. Huwel was checked out by the guard John McClung at (midnight) the job site. This agent was invited to join J. Huwel and the guard HucClutcheon at the Riverview Lounge when 1 got
- off work. I indicated to them that I would probably wrap -
up in about a half an hour to forty-five minutes and that
. I would meet them there.
12:45 a.m. the diverview
~
I.had occasion t;o find John,..,M,c,Clun at i Lounge. ,
- l. 1:00 a.m. Sidney Hamm came in with a female introduced to me as l Jane t .- This female is approximately sixteen to eiahteen, 5' 4", 105 pounds. caucasian, green eyes, brunette hair, shoulder length. During the conversation, it was related
. to this agent that James lluwel had met this girl, Janet, l vhile she worked as a dancer at Marion' Room on route 125, l Mt. Washington. Nothing much more was discussed about the Zimmer site other than both John and Jim were convinced that they were sure the rumors about me woule die down f very quickly. : l . l . JJb 1 i U t. . . ' ;
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,. 1:00 a.m. I feel certain at this ooint that my pretext is solid and
-(coat.) in tact. We broke up ana vont our separate ways at 2:30 a.m.
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INVESTICATIVE REPORT l 1 DATE: 12-12-79 1 AGENY: 920 .
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5:',0 p.m. On duty at the Zimmer site.
, 9:00 p.m. This agent received a call from the guard identified as Dave.
He told me my cigarettes had been left in the guard shack. I then proceeded to the guard shack area and sa't witti them
. for a while.
9:25 p.m.
- Walter Hamm and Terry Hana came back from being of f the site.
When they came through the gate, they were not signed in and had* not been signed out apparently. There was no evidence of them picking up their brass either. While Terry lisam was talking to me about irrelevant matters, this agent noted a heavy smell of alcohol on his breath. .
- 10:20 p.m. This agent lef t the construction site for a period of approxi-mately thirty minutes and I was not signed in or out upon my leaving or returnino.
10:45 p.m. Upon returning to the plant site a Muscow police officer by name of Al Jamesod 'was in the guard shsek talking.to the ' guards Jo'hn and Dave. It is felt that t,he security guards in the gused shack probably have access to computer information through this Moscow police officer Al Jameson. This could consist of NC, ,IC computer leads, as well as BMV and BCI j informational leads. 11:30 p.m. . This agent checked off the plant site officially. 11:45 p.m. This agent had occasion to' stop at the Riverviee 1.oungo on l State Route 52 where 1 found guards John !!ucClutcheon and the guard identified with first name .pcapsey to be drinking. ,
. A little later., approximately, Shirty minutes or so, Jim
[ Huwel.came into the Riverview. What followed in converss-tion with Jim Huwel and' Dempsey was some extreme feelings on theii part that I might not be who,I say I am. At this'
, time, Jim Huwel threatened me* several times .saying thst, "If
(, I'm not who I say I am, he's going to kill me." Tlw guard i~ Dempsey reiterated this stating thst, if I was who be thought 1 was, I'd better, get the hell out of Claremont County. At this point this type of feeling is normal and, we believe that this is due to normal suspicions of the employees with anyone new on the job site. 1:00 a.m. . A Control Room technician by the name of Yohans stopped ik WO
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' l 1:00 a.m. the Riverview. In ennvernistion wl,t h thin emp[oyce, he re-(cont.) lates to me that he understood what these peopis were talking l
about and that he had heard some of the rumors as to my positt,or. at the plant. However, he assured me that in a
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short while this. attitude of fear with regards to my position on the part of the crafts people and others at'the plant would subside. In discussion about work being done at the plant as relating to these employees', personal opinions re-garding the safety of the plant, the employee identified as Yohans indicated that he is keeping a journal. He also related that he has severe doubts as to whether or not he will continue to work at the. Zimmer plant once it becomes operationa1. This sentiment was cchoed by Jim iluwol na he stated that the' craf ts people he knew were looking forward - to leaving the plant once it.becomes operational. It is their personal feeling that knowing the construction of the plant as they Ao, they don't feel it to be safe or the- it will be safe when it becomes operational. 2:30 a.m. Everybody at the Riverview left ar.d went their separate ways. 4 I l . k
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INVESTICATIVE RF. PORT . DATE: 12-13-79 y . ACENT: 920 ~ 5
. 8:00 p.m. Have arrived at the-job site. During the period from 8:00 to 12:00 midnight this agent sat in the office in an attempt to insure my pretext. It is felt that general suspicion has gotten around most of the plant and while this is not scen ;
to be a problem, it is more the new-kid-on-the-block. type ;
. syndrome where everybody vants to know who someone is. i During this time the guard identified by the first name Wesley or Wes did come in and sit and talk for'd while.
This guard sebas to be very reserved; doesn't .know much of anything about what's going on around the plant and keeps to hisself. He seems to be stationed up there in the otfice and doesr.'c really kaov what's going on throughtout the rest , of the plant. L I did receive a call f rom John McC* ung askin g me i f I
- wanted to stop down to the Riverview for a drink before I went home. However, I declined. I lef t the job site at approxi,mately midnight. .
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12:00 a.m. Midnight.to 2:00 a.'m. ad=inistrative time was spent develop-ing current reports. .- 2,:00 a.m. Off duty. , g 8 e , .. 9 .# l l-j- . . t . . e i O e l \ , (.
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, INVESTICATIVE REPORT
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DATE: 12-14-79 , .' . ACENT: 920 ,
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.9 5:40 p.m. Arrived at the job site. I was informed oy duard John McClung that Mr. Murray had been on the premises and lef t with a load of firewood, but that he would be returning.
, 6:00 p.m. The guard identified by the first name Dave joined me in the l office up at the main Administrative Bu'ilding and was watch-
, ins TV witti me., Guard Dempsey Combs called on extension 365 to tell me that he would inform me when Mr. Murray came back through the gate.
I did receive a call shortiv before meet-ing Mr. Murray at 6:45 p'.m. *
- 6:45 p.m. In tka discussion with Mr. Murray we examined areas relating to auditing of personnel time records.
7:40 p.m. While on pretext of obtaining information from inspection sheets in the suppressien chamber, this agent esso upon a fire in progress. Apparently the boiler makers who were working in the area had lefe and I had to climb back out to the third floor level of the Containment Building before I came upon two workers who were eating their lunch. These . two workers and I climbed back down into' the suppression chamber and put out the fire. The fire seems to be of - suspicious ^ origin as in conversations later with the foreman of the boiler makers working in- that area ve find that the l area where th
- were too far ,efrom fire was eachand other thetoarea havewhere had .chethey fire were to working be -
- caused by sparks. The fire only consisted of rag, an oily l' rag, draped over a cement mixer. The cloth was approximately l .
4' by 4' in dimension and was folded over several times. . then* draped over the cement mixing machine. It should be noted at this point that the ventilation in the suppression chamber is very poor, if not inadequate, as this smalt fire filled the top two levels and made it Wery difficult to get out of-the smoke once we had put the' fire out. Also it should be noted that there i'd*n6'cocanunication nor means by
- l. which an individual might call for' help in event of an emer-L gency from the suppression chamber.
l 8:15 p.m. I left the premises ostensibly for lunch. Again I was not checked out and not searched. i i 8:45 p.m. I returned'to the job site and was iniormed by guard.Dempsey Combs that I was to talk with safety engineer, Dan Parleer j and the foreman of the boiler makers, Claude Renfro. l . .% r - Y' Y e hf{(I.Usih [ .
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'8:45 p.m. In discussions with Dan Par 1cer I found him to be r,enutncly (cont.) - concerned with regsrds to the incident in tha suppression chamber, especially given the consequences that had I not sone in and found the' fire in its early stage it could have become much worse: And also there was concetrn,shown by Mr.
Parleer that getting help down to that area vgs a problem. Mr. Renfro also esse to the main office to discuss the
. incident and indicated that he did have the proper fire watch personnel posted during the time that the welders and cutter were doing their work. One of these gentlemen in charge of this detail was with him and explained that he did have o,ne man per crew posted down on the floor to vutch for aparks that.might ignite rismmable materials. The only excuse they could give for the fire that occurred was that
- a. spark must have been smouldering before they lef t for lunch and wen,t unnoticed. This will bear on l' ster informa- l tion discussed with Mr. Renf ro in the suppression chamber.
Neither Mr. Parleer nor Mr. Renfro felt that there was any need to make out a report on the incident. Mr. Parlaer
. indicated that he would see to it that the fire extinguisher that was used was replaced. The general attitude of Mr..
Renfro, as well as the other crafts people, was that this was getting excited over something that was very minor. 9:00 p.m. Again the guard identified as Dave came out to watch tele-vision with me. During the conversation with this indivi-
. dual've discussed the potential for seriousness of the fire incident and this individual related to me that he was aware that there might have been other fires set during the even-ing on previous occasion,s and that he believes some crafts people involved in that type of activity.
10:15 p.m. L vent back to.the suppression chsaber ostensibly to do the
. work that I was supposed to have done earlier. On my way inno that area I then had an occasion to talk with Mr.
Claude Renfro. Mr. Renfro secompanied me to the i . floor of the suppression chamber so that we miuht examine [ the area so that he could show me what probably occurred. l: While on the floor of the suppressius chamber Mr. Renfro j , , pointed out to me where the men had*bten working previous
- to lunch - previous to the*M r'e'. ,I sat and watched for a N while' as these men worked in that area and it is not believed by this agent that sparks from that work area could have ;
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'* reached over to where the firm was located. Although in l
- putting out the fire we may have destroyed any evidence, I have some strong suspicions that this fire was intentionally set.
10:35 p.m. While wondering through the control Room area I have occasion to talk to the Control Room personnel and in particular an individual identified as the last name Yohans. Mr. Yohans invited ma'down to the Bad ,Was,te area to show me where he !. em e- , 3y@W k i Gig u ;in - ' " ' -
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' D +f?4 C , INVESTICATIVE REPORT
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SUMMARY
)' ; l PERIOD: 24-31 December, 1979 . l- , C1.IENT: Cincinnati Cas & Electric Co. .
'SUgJECT: Undercove'r Investigative Activities at the Zi=cer ' Plant During the period Agent 920 continued to expand upon his pretext while pene-trating deeper in the confidence of the e=ployees. -
'Ihc " time cheating" continued to be in evidence by those employees noted in previous reports. It appears that security guards, Dempsey Combs and John McClung, are the " key" to succe,ssful time cheating by those employees.
, With the help of Jim Huwel, whose confidence 920 has established, 920 was able to make contact with the Magnaflux supervisor who is providing him with information on faulty velds. It must be noted that this information regard-ing the' welds is so technical that 920 is having some difficulty in accuyace Ay retaining and reporting. A conference was held with Mr. Murray wherein it was decided that 920 would be equipped with a body recorder in order to capture this technical information about the ve.1ds ~. - _
920 was also introduced to an individual whom he believeg to. be..melling stolen
. guns on the site. It was decided that for the time being he should not get . involved with the guns. This could cause problems with his " cover", as this is a police matter which can be dealt with at a later date. -
During the coming week 920 vill continue to try and verify the information about the velds. It is hoped'that the body recorder will provide sufficient dialogue for this purpose. . [ Nt has been noted that Terry Ha=m receives a great number of telephone calls l at extension 317. 920 is looking into the possibility of monitoring that i telephone for a period.
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Jim Huwel's domestic situation continues to concern 920, as Mrs. Huvel vould recognize him should she visit the, site or or3g of, the'b'ars when 920 is present. Every consideration is 'being given' to 920's " cover" as he probes further in the relationship of Kaiser, Magnaflux and the Union. , In general, good progress was mada during the period. In the coming weeks as 920 continues to gain confidence in both his " cover" and the targeted e=ployees, he should be able to clear the conflicting in'for=acTobabout the velds. l Respectfully submitted,
.s.
Major W. Cox .' Director WC: cay . 3 ,l ?. , .; .,'
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INVESTICATIVE REPORT DATE: 12-26-79' ACENT: 920 .
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' 5:30 p.m. This agent arrived at the Zimmer site.
7:15 p.m. This agent. called Jim Huwel at extension 301 in the guard shack at the main gate. I asked him about going to dinner and he indicated to me that he was going to New Richmond to ' see his girlfriend, Janet. ] 7:45 p.m. Jim Huwel was observed leaving the plant sic'e., ,, 8:00 p.m. . This agent had occasion to be in the guard shack at the main In conversation with guard John McClung, 2tr. McClung indi-gate.
-cated to this agent that over the weekend ar.d Christmas holiday domestic difficulties with Mr. Huwel had accelerated greatly. He indicated that Mrs. Huwel was calling the site more of ten and that she had threatened to come Imoking for Mr. Huwel during his work hours.
9:15 p.m. Jim Huwel returned to the construction site and sar in the guard house with John McClung and myself. Mr. Enevi was not observed signing in at,this time. Most of the conversation during this period centered around Mr. Huwel's domestic dif-ficulties. He did bring with him a box of candy that he
. indicated was given to him by his girlfriend, Janet, while he was in New Richmond just previously. During this period there were many c' alls for Terry Hamm at extension 317 from outside the plant relayed by guard John McClung. Cuard
. McClung indicated that several these calls were from Terry Hamm's girlfriend Yvonne, some of the other calls
- he could not identify who was calling Terry Hacac.
i l 10:50 p.m. Jim Huwel left the guard shack to check out. He stated that l- , he did not believe Magnaflux people we,r(going to be working ! this evening. . J, . . , 11:30 p.m. This agent was invited to the Riverview Lounge by guard John
. McClung. Again guard McClung signed me,out on the Ing .m, at i 12,:00 midnight. I actually Icft the site at 11:45 p.m.
12:00 a.m. I arrived at the Riverview Lounge. Present were Jim Huwel,
- f (midnight) John McClung, Dempsey Combs and Donald Combs, Dempsey Combs' i son. ,
. 1:00 a'.m. A guard identified by the first name Brian arrived at the He indicated to Jim Huwel char the Magna-Riverview flux people had Lounge' s E in after all. Mr. Huwel stated that he' would have to get with Jack Carter tomorrow and zurn in a
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( lgg.t u.. .. : :.. ( . 1 00 a.m. late time report for the hours between midnight and 4:00 a.m. Jcont.) that he was supposed to,be with the Magnaflux people. 1:30 a.m. Jim Huwe'l received a teleph'one call from his wife. After this
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. the conversation started to center Magnsflux and their acti-vities at the plant site. ' Jim Huwel indicated}that Magnsflux l
was uncovering' faulty welds and in one way or"another was being , l
, pressured by either Kaiser Quality Assurance people or CC&E , 2 Management to pass inspection on faulty velds. ~ John McClung /
related an ine dent on faulty welds. Jc.'.c. M;;1ung ::L ;; ' en -~7
'::M::; :.w. me piping had arrived by truck and due to lack
- of proper equipment to unload.the material it was almoly pushed off the truck causing possihte damane to the material' Jim .
Iluwel indicated'that although there was damage to this piping f material, it was used for construction anyway and that the in- ' spection by Magnaflux of this material was approved by Kaiser. Quality Assurance although Magnaflux had rejected it. It should be'noted at this time that a great amount of techni-cal information was related to this agene Wy
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. , . - ' ic.m . i : - M :t with regards to stress testing and x-ray of piping, welds and this ag~ent 'is .
having some difficulty interpreting the technical aspects-of the welding inspection process. This agent believes that we shoul'd discuss with CC&E Management as to how specifically this process is accomplished in order to verify any discrepancies between what is ' occurring with
. the Magnaflux employees and what should be occurring in .
their work. 2:30 a.m. This agent discontinued investigative activit'iss for this L date. - I - l . . l i
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- C. G C r)u k. il L C INVESTICATIVE REPORT DATE: 12-27-79
'ACENT: 920 ,
'. 8:15 p.m. While on my way to the Zimmer construction site, this agent observed Jim Huwel's car parked in the lot of the Rivurview Lounge on State Route 52. I 'ceided d to stop at the Riverview and in doing so found Jim Huwc1 to be cating dinner with his girlfriend Janet. I then called John McClung, guard at the Zimmer site and asked him to sign me in on the log at 8:00 p.m.
- This agent had some conversation with Jim Huwel. and his girl- -
friend, Janet, but nothing that related directly to activities on 'the Zimmar site. 9:00 p.m. This agent 'got to the Zinner site and in checking in the guard shack looked at the log and found an entry on t'he CG6E sheet that said T. Jackson entered in 7:55 p.m. 9:15p.m./ Terry Hamm came into the guard shack from outside the site There was no check-in, signing-in or picking-up of his brans. Jim Huwel, who had come in a few minutes after.I did, told
, Terry Hamm that the time would be covered for them on Chrint-mas Eve that they should have spent there due to'the fact that Magnaflux employees came in and they were unsusre of it.
He told Terry Hamm that he had okayed this through a Mr. Cranston and that'Cranston would submit a late time report for them. '
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' At this time Jim Huwel also ' called Walter Hamm at a 1.ounge sostewhere in the vicinity- of State Route 132 and X State Route 125 and told him that the pipefitters' time for Christmas p Eve would be covered by Mr. Cranscon.
9:30 p.m. This agent proceeded to the main office for pretext work. l- 12:00 a.m. This agent called Jim Huwel*'st' extension 301 and asked hia j (midnight) about Magnaflux employees that we were supposed to meet l with that evening. Jim Huwel explained that they sometimes
. came in a little late. ,
1:00 a.m. Jim Ruwel was in the guard shack and approached this agent with the idea that we 30 to the Riverview Lounge and wait:, stating that the guard named Brian would call us when Steve, identified as the supervisor of the Magnaflux crew, came in. Jim Huwel also indicated to this agent that three men of the Magnaflux crew were already there on time. 1:10 a.m. While at the Ri.verview this agiint had occasion to becomo l- ^ involved in conversation with guards
- John' McClung and Dempsey j Combs as well as Jim Huwel about a load of pipe that wa:s
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. .' li( r 1:10 a.m. delivered late one evening. Cuard John McClung indicated (cont.) that someone in the. Cincinnati Cas & Electric Management had ordered that the truck be alloded in and told them to have the driver dump it somewhere in the storage compound.
Jim Huwel then stated that of this load of piping which he \ indicated was main
- steam relief piping, five fabricated welds had been x-rayed by Magnaflux personnel gnd were found )i to be defective. He indicated that the Quality Assurance }
personnel had forced Magnaflux into accepting the faulty welds n d n. Further in conversation, Jim Huwel indpated I/ that in speaking with safety coordinator, Dan Parlier 't know at least 20% of the welds alrea'dy installed in pipin(,he i throughout the plant to be faulty. Jim Huwel then beg':rn discussing a former employee by,the name of Tyne'r, who'uns a general foreman for the pip 2 fitters. He indicated that
- this individual named Tyner was now working at the Ford Plant in Batavia. In conversation he stated that this. person had
(, - objected to the, flushing procedure used to test the piping and had objected severely to the fact a particular flush that
\U e should have taken at least six weeks was cut to two weeks.
/ Jim Huwel deducted from what he knew of the incident at Three Mile Island that this was the problem that caused the problem there and that this was the reason that the general foreman identified was Tyner quit the Zimmer project. He stated that Tyner had repeatedly tried to object to"the method used to flush the main steam critical piping and at one time had even proved to the Control Room and Quality Assurance personnel that their flushing procedure was inappropriate by. pounding on sections of the main steam relief piping during a flushing pro'c edure, thus releasing sediment and slag which Tyner believed at a latier date could be released and cause problems such as stuck valves and, misread guages.
1:25 a.m. The. guard identified as Brian' called Jim Huwel from the guard
. shack at the Zimmer site and indicated to him that Steve, the supervisor for Magnaflux was there. This agent and Jim Huwel continued our conversation regarding the employee, Tyner, l and the specific problems relating to the improper flushing procedures done at the Zimmer site. : ,
2:30 a.m. James Huwel and this agent returned to the Zimmer plant. 2:45 a.m. James Huwel and myself entered the suppression pool aren looking for Steve, the supervisor of the Magnaflux crew. In conversa' t ion with this Magnaflux employee, identified as Steve, r j he indicated to this agent that of particular enneern to him !- was a supervisor in the Quality Assurance section named Tony l (last name begins with a P). He indicated to this agent that -
. this supervisor of Quality Assurance was definitely involved 1 in ordering the passing of faulty velds which Magnaflux re-ported. This employee indicated to me that he would show me the Magnaflux copies of x-ray reports and that these reports!:
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.- '(cont.) This employee of Magnaflux identified as Steva indicated
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that it was his feeling that KaiserpC&E was trying to get rid of Magnaflux from the job because they knew too
,. . much. As an exsaple, he pointed out that veld number K811 which he felt to be an insert fault on the x-ray in the main steam relief piping down in the suppressfon pool was
. ordered passed by Quality Assurance personne#.**
, Steve also indicated that he had some' suspicions of the ANI Inspectors on the site.
. 3:30 a.m. This' agent concluded investigative activities for this da a. . . l-l
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I : . 4 2, tl ( e' INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
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. DATE: 12-28-79
. . ; AGENT: 920 -
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, 6:00 p.m. This agent had occasion to meet with, Bill Murray of Cincia-nati Cas & Electric at his house. A briefing of recent
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activity was made, as well as some clarification on investi-1 gative objectives with Magnaflux employees at the Zimmer site. , 7:55 p.m. Enroute to the Zimmer construction site, this agent observed James Huwel's car in the parking lot of the, Riverview Lounge
. on state Route 52.
8:05 p.m. While checking in at the guard shack on the Z'immer site. Desprey Combs, a guard, indicated that John McClung, the guard, was off duty this evening and had gone to the Latonia i Race Track in Kentucky. Dempsey Combs also showed this agent three stainless steel belt buckles that he indicated were for l sale by John McClung.
. 8:15 p.m. This agent proceeded to the' sain office for pretext work.
11:00 p.m. James Huwel came into the Zimmer site from outside the plant with guard John McClung. John McClung indicated that he had stopped at the Riverview Lounge on State Route 52 and that he
. and Jim had come up to the site looking for me.
, 11:30 p.m. James Huwel in'vited this agent to the Riverview telling the guard identified as Brian to tell Steve jaff the Magnsflux e'aployees,co come down to the Riverview when he came in. Thi,s agent, along with John McClung and Jim Huwel in Jim Huwel's car then proceeded to the Riverview Lounge. 12:10 a.m. The individual named Steve, identified as the supervisor of the Magnaflux crew at the Zimmer site, came into the River-
. , view Lounge. .Sesve began sp}k,ing i o'f our former conversations .
i , regarding comparing the Magnaflux reports to the Quality [ Assurance reports by Kaiser. He indicated to me that the five x-rays of welds on the main steam relief piping that had been dumped from the truck that entered late one night would '
*be of particular interest . He further . indicated that although f there were serious defects in these welds that Kaiser Quality l
, . Assurance personnel had ordered them to be passed for inspec- '
. tion.
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. 12:45 a.m. Steve indicated that he must leave as he had to get on the job and had a lot of work to do up at the Zimmer site.
- Re then left. -
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{- Jl .u' i. :.' 's-1. (. -i..H'1 i 2 .c.. . k! < i * - l { 12-28 2 1:00 a.m. Terry Hama came into the Riverview lounge with his girlfriend, Yvonne. At this time during conversation, Jim Huwel stressed
- that although there were many instan':es of Magnsflux being overridden on faulty velds, that I would be able to easily determine from the five welds on the msin st(sm relief piping that had been dumped in the supply yard - ; fiat some sort of
- cover-up had occurred by Kaiser quality Assurance personnel.
2:00 a.m. Jim Huwel pointed out an individus1 to th'is agent that he stated was the individual that sold thirteen hand guns to Walter Hamm for raffling off at the Zi=:ser sica. 2:30 a.m. his agent approached the individual previously identified by Jim Huwel about the selling of guns at the Zim:nur site. his individual indicated to me that he still had eight guns for sale, and was looking to call them and woul'd do so to me. This , individual, although not directly identifying himself by name gave me a telephone number and a name on a sernp of paper which is illegible, h is individual also indicated that he was an employee at the Zicner site working on -days with the pipefitters. While leaving the Riverview Lounge, I observed this indivi-dual to be driving a blue Riviera or Toronado, license number Kentucky CVR160. 3:00 a.m. Jim Huwel dropped me off.at the plant and signed-in indi-
. , ca. ting that he was going back to work with the Magnaflux employees. I indicated to him that I would check the Magnaflux reports with Steve, the supervisor for the Magna-flux crew, next week.
3:15 a.m. 'ihis agent dis' continued investigative activities for this date. e . $A g y l . - e
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,gxh 44 Can't. INVESTICATIVE REPORT m .
PERIOD: December 17 through December 23,1979 CLIENT: Cincinnati Cas and Electric C'ompany -
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SUBJECT:
Under Cover Investigative Activities at the Zimmer P'lant During this period Agent 920 continued to maintain his pretext while expanding his contacts with the employees. 920 continued to note the
" time cheating".by the group of employees noted in the previous report, On' Monday and T'uesday of this period, 920 noted some interesting remarks -
about C. K. Smith. It appears that Mr. Smith may be included.in pur list of investigative targets, as the relationship butvcen Smith and Huwel may not be in the best interest
- of the plant.
920 continued to socialize with the employees af ter hours. We feel that this social activity will provide us with a great deal of information in the week ahead. - Ve will expand our investigation to include attempts to verify the , information given 920 about the X rays. (see December 17 1979 report). It appears that some of the welds may have been questionable. . Agent 920 was off on Wednesday,19 De,cember 1979 due to illness. , In general, good progress was made during this period. Respectfully submit,ted, . Major W. Cox Director ,
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U U c. ! ! i! ' ' (' INVESTICATIVE ,Rjg' ORT DATE: 12-17-79 . ACENT: 920 - i . -
, 6:00 p.m. On duty at the Zimmer Plant site; checked in by guard Dempsey Combs. At this point i proceeded to the of fice, and guard John McClung indicated the.he would stop up in a littic while to the msin officc. - -
7:15 p.u. An employee identified with the nickname Skeeter known to this agent as a janitorial person that cleans in the main office building had' occasion to sit down and talk with me in Mr. Murray's office. !Jht'le we were there'we were watching 1 television and I noticed that this individual had one of the belt buckles that appeared to have been made by the pipetitter, on his person. I commented about it und told him that I had been seeking to get one of these belt buckles. !!c Indient ed to me that he and his fucher had asny of them and that he wouh bring some of them in for mu to look at. He also indicated to me that these belt buckles were definitely made by the pi;ie-fitters. I told him that I had attempted to get them through the pipefitters and to this he responded that the pipefitters were somewhat leery of me at this point, and probsbly would not soll any belt buckles to me ur-il they got to know me be tte r. !!e reflected the same opinions of the other people who had discussed with me that I would be under some suspicion for a pe,riod of time until the employees out there got used to me and felt more comfortsble with my pretext. 7:30 p.m. Cused John'McClung stopped into the office to talk briefly.
. He indicatec to me that he was getting off at 8:00 p.m., and that he was going to the Riverview to meet Jim Huwel and vst.:h the football game. I told him thst I would love to come slung because I hated to think of the ides that I would be watching the football by myself, but that I didn't know whether or not I should bo signed out for that 'lo'ng a period of time. He indicated 'to me that thEr'e'*dould be no problem with my coming down there and that since Dempsey Combs was handling the front gate they would not enter my leaving the premises into the log:
At.this time the guard, John McCldng,. noticed the sign-in sheets and gate logs that were sitting on Mr. Murray's desk. I hsndled this'by indicatliy: to him that I think Mr. Murray did get copfus of the ions, but that he never really looked at them; it was only a matter of protocol to give a copy' to the CC&E peopic in char;;c nf the . pro ject. I also indicated to him that i believed the logs were several months old and had been sitting stound l'or some time. He did not examine them carefully and I covered them up with another book!:im=cdi-ately. At,,this point It aliould be stressed that this type _ of maccrisi should not be lef t sittins' around in the main e
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. 12-17 2 7:30 p.m. o.ffice area as it might create suspicions and security person-Jcont.) nel do have an opportunity to examine materials that are left lying around in that area. -
8:30 p.m. This agent luf c ttie plant site and in passing Ihrough the front gate Dempsey Combs indicated to me that(John McClung had aircady taikud to him and there would he nu probica as s-
'
- he didn't sign out or sign in CC&E employees when they lef t for lunch anyway no matter how long they were gone.
8:40 p.m. I arrived at the Riverview Lounge there to find John McClung and Jim Huwel in the comphny of C.K. Smith and Jim Sandlin. Wen I sut down .i positioned myscif next to C.K. Smith who was havinu a rather heated discussioh with Jim Huwel. In listening and overhearing their conversation, this agent over-heard C.K. Smith
- to say that he was aware of the fact that some of the pipefitters were spending time off .the premises
, while ,being paid on the clock at the plant site. Jim Huwel
, responded by asking Mr. Smith what he thought they were sup-posed to do. lie indicated that a man being down there for sixteen hours at a time with very little, if anything, to do
.. was bored to the point of insanity. Smith indicated that he understood what Huwel was saying and advised him, "Just don't get caught." Continuing their conversations they discussed an incident where Mr. Marshall had gon'e into the pipefitters' work shop and fired a group of pipefitters for making belt
, buckles w!aile on the job. At this point Mr. Huwel got rather upset and said that Marshall had a lot of nerve do'ing that' over something as petty as those belt buckles, while at the same time his personal car was being worked on in the paint shop apparently having body work and painting done to it.
I At this point .6tr. Smith responded by saying, "That wasn't Marshall's car, that was my car." le should be noted ' that this conversation between Mr. Huwel and Mr. Smith was so extensive as it made it impossible 'for this agunt to remem-ber everything that they were talking about. However, I do detect a spirit of some collusion here between Mr. Smith and Mr. Huwel as to irregular activities which occur on the job site. .Mr. Sandlin, who was present difring this conversation, seemed to understand what they were discussing but kept him-
- self rather removed from pascicipating in the conversation.
Mr. Smith and Mr. Sandlin lef t at approxiniately 10:00 p.m. r l ,
. In conversation with Jim Huwel, I asked him what the argument had been about. He indicated "to me that' Smith had come in and secused him of being off the job site without being signed out. lie further stated that Mr. Smith was somewhat intoxicated and apparently was only kidding around with him l , as Mr. Smith is aware that from time to time the pipefitters do spend time away from the job without being checked out, but that Mr. Smith had apparently had forgotten or did not know that at this particular time Jim Huwel was on vacation 0 From there the conversation, he stated, got a little bic l =- . F.} f 'I
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lW a c.L,fg? (- 12-17 3 . 8:40 p.m. more serious and they began discussing the other incidences (con t.,) that I had previously mentioned, such as the belt buckles and the car being repaired. . Mr. Huwel seemed upset that Mr.
- Smith was sort of intimidating him when all along he.knows that Mr. Smith is aware of the irregularities.3n the job site and apparently does not c.are. ,Mr. Huwel further indi-cated that Mr. Smith takes advantage of his position at the
!. plant site for his own persons 1 gain as much as any of the crafts people working on the job.
The conversation then led to discussing why it is exactly Lhat the pipcfitter on the second shif t has so much free
- timu avalluble to him. Mr. Iluvul indicated to te the rea-soning why a pipufitter has to be there when magnaflux is doing their x-ray work. .Ilu also stated that if someone
~
wanted to know the truth of the situation there were faulty wclds and misrepresented x-rays done by magnaflux and that
- he did not understand how they could be setting away with this utiless someone was tuying off or bribing the NRC in-spectors on the job. At this point John McClung became involved in the conversation and both he and Jim Huwel reitersted their feeling that from what they had seen and heard there was a great deal of poor workmanship being done on the project. It has been expressed many times by these-
' crafts people that I have spoken to that they do not feel the plant will be safe to operate and will be glad when
- their work is done and they can move out of the area. They i also indicated that there were operations personnel that )
worked in the Control Rcom who voiced the same fears and reservations about working at the plant once it beccmas
, operational. ,I then mentioned that Mr. Yohans had dis-cussed with me that very same sentiment. Jim Huwel then ,
indicated that.Yohans was no dummy and that he was keeping a record of irregularities that came to his attention. Mr. Huwel told me that Yohans had asked him to come to him and tell him anything he might know about faulty workmanship or unsafe construction that had been done. 12:15'a.m.
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This agent returned to the plant site and was admitted
, through the main gate by the,, guard 'ideritified with the ~ first name Brian. I proceeded to gather my equipment from the main office and then left again through the main gate. This
[ time I was signed out at 12:30'a.m. Therefore the los re-flected, that I had signed at 6:00 p.m. 'and signed out at 12:30 a.m. with no indication of the. time that I spent down at the Riverview between 8:30 p.m. and 12:15 a.m. 12:45 a.m. I returned to the Riverview. Non work related conversation took place and I feel that my pretext is becoming more solid as I am being more openly. accepted by the individuals at the plant. - 2:00 a.m. - Thisagentdiscontinuedinvestidativeactivitiesforthis
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t U U111 !!J Lilllirl C . INVESTICATIVE RZPORT DATE: 12-18-79 , . AGENT: 920 ,
'. 7:00 p.m. This agent arrived at the Zinsner constru'etion site and pro-coeded immediately to the main office.
8:00 p.m. In conversation with a janitorial person identified by the name, " Jim Shue". We discussed his belt buckle. This is one of the belt buckles fabricated in the pipefitter's shop from stainless steel on the site. He indicated to me that he had purchased this belt buckle from Terry Hamm. This agent indicated to him that .I was interested in seeing this l , - catalog that so many of the people at the si'te had been talk-ing.about. He indicated to me that the catalog was in the possession-of either Jim Huwel or Terry Hamm and that I would have to get it from them. 9:15 p.m. While in the guard shack at the main gate, this agent had occasion to talk with the guard identfied as John McClung. In this conversation, McClung indicated to me that during the argument between Jim Huwel and C.K. Smith at the River-view the previous night, that C.K. Smith had intentionally lied to Jim Huwel in telling him that it was his car that Huwel saw being worked on at the construction site. The ~ guard McClung indicated to .me that he knew for a fact that the. car belonged - to Mr. Marshall. He indicated, in fact, that it was Mr. Marshall's wife's car and that it had much more than just a paint job done to it. .He indicated that it had been in the motor pool area and had extensive break work
, and engine overhauling done to it. He also indicated that he knew phat it was Marshall's wife's car because he was on duty when Mrs. Marshall came and picked it up af ter it was finished.
1 - j- 11:30 p.m. This agent was signed out by guard John McClun~g and McClung entered 'it into the log as"1 midnight whereas this agent actu' ally left at 11:30 p.m. 11:45 p.m. In further conversation with guard John McClung at the River-
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view Imunge, he indicated to me that the reasoning behind 4 C.K. Smith's telling Jim Huwel that it was his car that had been worked on was that- C.K. Smith was covering for Marshall ! because Smith will be transferring to North Dakota in February I and can afford to take any type of fallout.
- 1
- 30 a.m. Although Jim Huwel was ' supposed to have come to the Riverview, he is evidently not going to ,,make it. .
1,43 a.m. , This agent discontinued investigative activities this date.
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- i 6:00 p.m This agent was on duty at the Zimmer site. I had a brief conversation with the guard identified as John McClung about Jim Huwel. This conversation centered mostly around Jim Huwel's, domestic difficulties. -
6:30 p.m. Guard Dempsey Combs called this agent at extension 365 and
' indicated that he was going out for dinner and would I like anything. I asked him to bring me back a dinner "along with
, the others he was getting.
7:00 p.m. This ag'ent was called at extension 365 to adivse se that the i dinners had arrived. I then proceeded to the guard at the main gate. While there, I overheard the guards answering and transferring several calls for Terry Hamm at extension 317 from his girlfriend Tvonne and his brother Walt. 8:00 p.m. Walter Hamm came into the guard shack from outside the plant site. He indicated that he had been looking for his brother, - '
- Terry, and was waiting for him down at the Point Lounge where Terry was supposed to have picked him up at 5:30. Dere was no evidence that Walter Hamm had either signed in or signed out. Walter Hamm indicated to this agent that a party was
- going to be thrown by the pipefitters the next day in Mt.
Carmel at a plact called the Old Saloon. He extended to me an invitation to. this party and indicated that it was to begin at 7:30 in the s.m.
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! 8:30 p.m. Walter Hamm left the construction site ostensibly to look l for his brother Terry. He indicated to guard John McClung that he was proceeding to the Point Lounge. At this time, superintendent, Jack Temple, came into the guard house at
, the , main gate and was talking,,ye,ry gehe' rally about the different crafts working the night shift. He indicated that although he felt c'onfident that the boiler makers under John Renfro were doing their jobs well, he believed the electri-l cians and carpenters to be goofing off,' as well as possibly stealing materials from the site. .
9:00,p.m. 21s agent proceeded back to the office for pretext work. l l . 11:00 p.m. his agent entered the guard shack at the main gate to find i Jim Huwel present. Mr. Huwel extended an invitation to me to come down co the Point Lounge. Guard John McClung signed: se out on the log as 12:00 midnight. This agent left the
, site at approximately 11:30 p.m. . .
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G !.llgf(, [Su (-- . 11:45 p.m. This agent proceeded to.the Point Lounge where I found Walter Hama there playing pool with a female that he intro- l duced to me as Cindy. This person has been previously identified to this agent as Walter Hamm's girlfriend who works in the expediting area for Kaiser. . . is- 1 There was some' general conversation, at this time, between l
- -, Walter Mann, James Huwel, John McClung Dempsey Combs and myself concerning the pipetitters' election to be held the i next day. ,
12:45 a.m.. Walter Hamm lef t the Point Lounge with his girlfriend,Cindy.
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1:30 a.m. James Huwel, Dempsey Combs, John McClung and myself departed the Point Lounge together. 1:45 a.m. In checking the parking lots around the plant site this agen't could not find Walter Hama's car in evidience anywhere. 2:15 a.m. This agent discontinued investigative activities for this date. a e a . .
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- INVESTIGATIVE REPORT DATE: : 12-21-79 ..
AGENT: 920
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. 3:00 p.m. This agent arrived at the Zimmer site and was' advised by i
guard John McClung that Mr. Bill Murray was in his office. Upon arriving at the main office, this agent had a brief-
. ing session with Mr. Murray as.well as searching for time records fror the night before.
7:00 p.m., This agent contacted Jim Hwel at extension 317 and dis-cussed with him about goin's to dinner at 8:00.. Mr. Hwel i indicated to me that he would meet me at the gate at 8:00 p.m. 8:00 p.m. His agent lef t the construction site with Jim Hwel in his i. car and proceeded to the Riverview Lounge. While at the Riverview, Mr. Hwel and this agent ace dinner. We also observed that Mr. C.K. Smith and Mr. Sandlin were present in the back room playing pool. Jim Huwel indicated, after finishing our meal, that he wanted to leave and go to the
. Point imunge as he did not want to get into another argtunent with C.K. Smith. ,
L ' 8':45 p.m. His agent stopped at 'the Point Lounge with Jim Huwel. While we were there, Mr. Huwel got a call from his girlfriend Janet. Jim Huwel then indicated to this agent that he would drop me off at the plant as he wanted to go to New Richmond to see his girlfriend Janet. . 9:25 p.m. Jim Huwel dropped me of f at th's construction site and then 1ef t proceeding west on State Route 52 towards New Richmond. . 10:30 p.m. This agent observed Jim Huwel coming back to the construction . site. 11:45 p.m. This agent was' called by Jim Huwel at. extension 365 and was asked to meet him in the guard' shack around midnight to go out. 12:05 a.m. nis agent lef t the construction site with Jim Huwel who did l not sign out or drop his brass. . 12:20 a.m., his agent was at the Point Imunge with, Jim Hwel. During conversation with Mr. Huwel he indicated that he did not believe Walter Hamm would win the pipefitters' election. He also discussed C.K. Smith and indicated that Mr. Smith had knowledge of what was poing on at the construction site with
- regards to people being paid while not being actually on the.1
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12:43 a.m. Jim Huwel invited this agent to the Riverview IAunge where PMC 'I RTT
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( [ , ) - 12-21 2 ' 12:45 a.m. he, believed Dempsey Combe and John.HeClung to be. (cont.) 12:50 a.a. This agent arrived at the Riverview Lounge along with
' Jim Huwel. Dempsey Combs was there, and therg was no real discussion about the work site. The bar maid at the Riverview, Nancy, told Jim huwel that C.K. Smith
. s, had been there until 12:30 a.m. and that he was extremely intoxicated. So much so that someone else had to drive his company truck home. Dempsey Combs confirmed this and stated that he had observed someone but he was not sure who it was driving C.K." Smith home in his company truck.
There was much discussion of C.K. Smith by Dempsey Combs and Jim Huwel,. most of it relating to their attitudes that Mr. Smith was hypocritical in his actions 'and attitudes in his position with Kaiser. 2:30 a.m. Jim Huwel indicated that he was going back to the plant in order to check out' . 2:45 a.m. - This agent discontinued investigative activities for this date, o
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Q. , q . . 1-2 2 15:30 p.m. (con t.) that some computer equipment had been stolen from the area which it was intended to be used. They indicated that it was moved in an ' attempt to steal it, however, the equipment was discovered before it could be surreptitiously taken s, from the site. This conversation relating to theft from the site was general in nature and no specifics with regards to people involved or dates, times, etc. were discussed. Both of these individuals indicated no direct contact with either of these chaf ts, however, this agent feels that' both individuals thefts. might have some, direct knowledge concerning the This agent then entered into conversation with Jim Huwel concerning faulty construction at the Zimmer site. At
- great deal' of this conversation was technical in scope and )
Mr. Huwel indicated that the Magnaflux employees would be able to shed more light on the subject for me. It should be noted at this point that the body recorder was 'in opern-tion at this time and reference to specific technical infor-mation on construction defects should be obtained from the recordings made during this conversation. 3fr. Huwel indi-cated to this agent that I would have an opportunity to meet with Magnaflux employees and discuss specific informa-tion with regards to the faulty construction on the site
*
- a t time . He also indicated to this agent that during the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings in November, the specific reference to the media's incorpretation of an accident occurring at the Zimmer site was misinterpreted.
He indicat'ed.co this agent that the information about an accident at the site should have referred to the pipe I , being dropped off the tractnr tenilcr rather than fuel rods being dropped.
'Mr. Huwel further indicated that this information with regards to the dropping of this pipe was an action taken by a former employee in the pipefitter's at the Zimmer site. He indicated that this was a pipe-fitter who had been dismissed for dr.anufacturing belt buckles on the site and was somewhat bitter. He further indicated that the informseion that this individual tried to relate to the attorneys fighting the licensing at the l
Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings was that main steam relief piping had been dropped and damaged. Some-
' where in the communication of that, however, this indivi-dual failed to give the proper information to these a t torneys.
\ . l 11:30 p.m. This sgent was invited to the Riverview Imunge by Jim l . Huwel to wait for the Magnaflux employees. Because of previous conversations, this agent was expecting to talk with Steve Sellars, a supervisor of Magnaflux, about :: specific construction defectsat the Zimmer site.
. 12:30 a.m. -
'1his agent was introduced to an individual who came into the Riverview lounge by the name of Allan Sellars. Mr.
Sellar was represented to be a supervisor of the Magnaflux
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C C INVESTIGATIVE REPORZ
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. . IRTE: 1-3-86 ' '
CLIENT: 920 , 7:15 p.m. While enroute to the Zimmer Construction .te, this agent < observed Jim Huwel's care in che parking lot of cl.e River-
. view Imunge. Upon entering the Riverview Lcunge this '
agent observed C.K. Smith of Kaiser just leaving. Jim
- Huwel was' seated at the bar at the Riverview 14unge.
3efore entering into any conversation with Mr. Huwel, this agent took the opportunity to call the guard shack at the Zimmer site. This agent contacted guard Dempsey Combs at the Zimmer project and asked guard Combs to enter .me on the log, which he stated he would do. > At this time, I then sat down with Jim Huwel and began talking with him. I indicated to Mr'. Huwel that I had .
- just seen Mr. Smith leave and asked him if he had spoken with him. Mr. Huwel indicated to me that he had an exten-sive conversation with Mr. Smith and that Mr. Smith had told Mr. Huwel he had just signed some requisitions for I late time on Mr. Huwel's behalf for Christmas Eve. This -
was the late time that Mr. Huwel put in for and was approved for Christmas Eve and that Magnaflux employees worked and i pipefitters were not contacted. He also indicated to me that Mr. Smith thought that Mr. Huwel was off the site and being paid again. Mr. Huwel indicated to me that he had not as yet checked in for the evening at the sito and that Mr. Salth was fn error. He indicated that Mr. Smith really didn't care as' he had just approved the time for Christmas
.. Eve which he knew Mr. Huwel was not deserving of, in that -
Mr. Huwel was not there. Mr. Huwel indicated that Mr. Smith's attitude was much the same as it had been reported in previous reports by this agent - that being that Mr. Smith didn't care if they spent time off the job al long as they, "didn't , get caught". **
- Some discussion was made about the fact that Mr. Huwel's wife was attempting to get ahold of him this evening and he fel that his wife might be out looking for him. Meer
.some irrelevant discussion, this agent left and proceeded to the Zimmer site.
- l 8:20.p.m. This agent arrived at the Zimmer site' and noted on the J
, sign-in sheet that guard Dempsey Combs had signed this agent in for 7:18 p.m. Guard John McClung indicated to i this agent at thta time that he had the belt buckles that I was interested in. I then examined two helt hu.'kles 3
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fashioned from stainless steel that guard John McClung (cont.) had indicated were manufactured by pipefitters from material- at the Zimmer site. I offered him twenty dollars *
. per belt buckle, as previously arranged, and he accepted
-chose arrangements.. I then gave him forty dbilars and received frod him the belt buckles. It shoQld be noted
! hat at this time the body recorder was in'une by this t
- . agent and that the entire belt buckle transaction was recorded. This agent stayed on for' congenial conversation between guards Dempsey Combs, and John McClung relating to football and other irrelevant topics. Nothing of rele-vance to the construction site was discussed.
During this time, several calls were placed to the River-view Imunge by guards John McClung and Dempsey Combs in an attempt to inform Jim Huwel, who was still' at the R1,verview 14,unge, that he had received several phone calla from his wife, as well as his daughter. 9:45 p.m. This' agent proceeded to the main effice area for pretext work, while indicating to guard John McClung to have Jim . - Huwel call when he arrived at the site. 10:30 p.m. 21s agent received a call at extension 365 in the main office from Jim Huwel. Mr. Huwel indicated that he was at the guard shack and had just arrived on the site.
- While in conversation with this agent. Mr. Huwel indicated that his wife had arrived at the site and that tihis agent should come down to the guard shack and meet her.
10:45 p.m. A janitorial person, identified as Jim Shue, came into the usin office area and indicated to this agent that he was just in the guard shack and had left immediately upon the
" arrival of Mr. Huwel's wife. He indicated that she was,
" bombed out of her mind" and that he had lef t istmediately due to reports and rumors of her being extremely violent.
l 11:15 p.m. Jim Huwel entered the main office area through the first ' aid room and approached this agent ih Mr. Murray's of ff ca. He invited me to come down to the gisa'rd shack and meet his wife. With suitable preteft' a'id extreme deference, this agent' declined Mr. Huwel's invita tion. It should be noted at this point that Mr. Huwel seemed extremely intoxic.ated, 12:00 a.m. .Mrs. Huwel, along with Mr. Huwel, were ,o served leaving F (midnight) the guard shack area by this agent from Barney Culver's
, office window.
12:15 a.m. h is agent took the opportuntiy to leave the plant site i , immediately as it was felt that any contact with Mr. Huwel's wife would endanger my pretext. s e. 12:30 a.m., investigative activities for c51s date. discontinued. \ .
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