ML20054L391
| ML20054L391 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1982 |
| From: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Borgmann E CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| 820630, NUDOCS 8207080031 | |
| Download: ML20054L391 (47) | |
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CDocument_ Control ( N50-358)')
NRC PDR JUN 2 31982 L PDR NSIC TERA Docket lio.: 50-358 LB#1 Reading MRushbrook GDick fir. Earl A. Borgmann GEdison Senior Vice President Attorney, OELD Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company I&E Post Office Box 960 ACRS (16)
Cincinnati, Ohio 45201
Dear Mr. Borgmann:
Subject:
Evaluation of Offsite Emergency Preparedness for the Zinmer Nuclear Power Station Exercise
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Enclosed are informational copies of the FEMA reports evaluating the
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emergency preparedness exercise held on November 18, 1981.
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The reports indicate that, even though there are some deficiencies which l.
should be corrected, the plans of the involved counties in both thd State of Ohio and the Connonwealth of Kentucky are adequate to protect the,!public.
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Sincerely, "Originni signed by:
f B. J. Yotmetloed j
B. J. Youngblood, Chief
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Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Asl stat'ed ~"
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cc: See next page 8207080031 820623 4
PDR ADOCK 05000358 I
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anc ronu ais tio son uncu o24o OFFiClAL RECORD COPY vsam i,.i_.m.
s Mr. Earl A. Borgmann Senior Vice President Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Post Office Box 960 Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 Deborah Faber Webb Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
7967 Alexandria Pike cc:
Conner, Moore & Corber Alexandria, Kentucky 41001 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Andrew B. Dennison, Esq.
200 Main Street Mr. William J. Moran Batavia, Ohio 45103 General Counsel Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company George E. Pattison, Esq.
Post Office Box 960 Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 462 Main Street Batavia, Ohio 45103 Mr. Samuel H. Porter Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Mr. Waldman Christianson 37 West Broad Street Resident Inspector /Zimmer Columbus, Ohio 43215 RF0 1, Post Office Box 2021 U. S. Route 52 Mr. James D. Flynn, Manager Moscow, Ohio 45153 Licensing Environmental Affairs Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Mr. John Youkilis Post Office Box 960 Office of the Honorable William Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 Gradison United States House of Representatives David Martin, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
20515 Office of the Attorney General 209 St. Clair Street Timothy S. Hogan, Jr., Chairman First Floor Board of Comissioners Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 50 Market Street, Clermont County Batavia, Ohio 45103 James H. Feldman, Jr., Esq.
216 East 9th Street Lawrence R. Fisse, Esq.
Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 462 Main Street W. Peter Heile, Esq.
Batavia, Ohio 45103 Assistant City Solicitor Room 214, City Hall Mr. James G. Keepler Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 U. S. NRC, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road John D. Woliver, Esq.
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Legal Aid Security Post Office Box #47 550 Kilgore Street Batavia, Ohio 45103
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4 Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 2 6 M AY 1982 O-MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian Grimes Director Division of Emergency Preparedness U.S. Nuclear egul t y Commission FROM:
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Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
Evaluation of Offsite Emergency Preparedness for the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Exercise Attached are reports prepared by Regions IV and V evaluating the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station exercise held on November 18, 1981.
A response from the State of Kentucky addressing deficiencies noted in the Region IV portion of the exercise is included. Region V has indicated that the State of Ohio is continuing to address the deficiencies noted in the Region V portion of the Zimmer exercise.
Region IV indicates that the State of Kentucky and involved counties are capable of implementing their offsite emergency plans even though plan and plan execution capability improvements are needed. Region V indicates that l
even though deficiencies were noted in both the offsite plans and the l
November 18, 1981 exercise, the plans are adequate to protect the public, and once corrected, will improve upon the overall offsite emergency response capability.
Contact Vernon E. Adler, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 287-0200 for additional information.
l Attachment As Stated IE35
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fDRADOCM 05000358' PDR
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MAY I 3 y MEMOHNIDIDi 70R: Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural and Technological Eazards FROM:
Chairman, Ragional Advisory Committaa, Region 7
SUBJECT:
Final Report - Zi:nmar Site-Specific Off-Site Exercise, Ohio /Clarmont County, November 18, 1981 Attached is the Zinmaar Nuclear Power Station Site-Specific Off-site Final Report. The report follows the guidance prescribed in the April 5, 1982, memorandum regarding REF Exercise Evaluation Reports.
Also attached is the scenario of the November 18, 1981, exercise.
This report will become a part of *h Ragional Director's Evaluation (350 submission).
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MY13 q Mr. Curtis Griffith, Jr.
Deputy Director Disaster Services Agency 232.5 West Cranv111a Road Worthington, Ohio 43085 Dear Mr. Griffith Previously you were provided "Exarcrit Composites" with a sumanary of f4=dia== pere =4=4a! to the 21===e Nuclear Power Station site-epecific off-sita exercise of November 18, 1981. This format has been super-sedad by a new and different reporting format.
To better facilitate the dissemination of f4=A4 age, the evaluation of the exercise has been rewritten in the new format at the request of our National Office. Paeta w is the " Final Report" for the 2t===e site-specific off-sita exercise of November 18, 1981.
Please provide the following information for each of-the significant deficiencies listed in Part 1Y of the enclosure A statement of ::cor-rective actions r=k=n (Stata/ County) for each deficiency and the date the action was complaced; or, the projected data for completion of corrective action for each deficiency. Please provida FEMA Hagion 7 this information by June 25, 1982. If this data presents you difficulty, please inform us in writing and proposa an alternata date.
S carely yours,
.')? hS w gd,1n v. n.u.u Chairman Eagional Advisory Committaa Enclosure l
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PART I l
FINAL REPORT William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power S'tation Full-Scale Exercise November 18, 1981 EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS NUMBER OF EVALUATORS State of Ohio 7 Federal 3 Contract Clermont County 9 Federal 4 Contract State of Kentucky and Bracken, Campbell, and Pendleton Counties Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company This Report State of Ohio and Clermont County May 1982 Technological Ha ards Branch Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V Federal Center Battle Creek, Michigan 49016 9206T5 Glim-6sO62o PDR ADOCK 05000358 F
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PART II EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report contains the findings of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the. Regional Advisory Committee's Region V analysis of the participation and performance of Ohio and Clermont County during the Winiam H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station exercise November 18, 1981. The report is based on the observations and evaluations of 23 Federal evaluators.
The evaluators were assigned to emergency operations centers located in and near the lo-mile Emergency Planning Zone. Those locations are Ohio State EOC (Worthington), Clermont County EOC (Batavia).
In addition to the above, evalu-ation was made of responsa activities conducted at the State Communications Van, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility, Cincinnati General Hospital, Clermont County Hospital and host-reception care centers.
All evaluators received advance information materials along wita a copy of the scenario, evaluator exercrit forms and assignment sheets. A pre-exercise brief-l ing was held November 17, 1981, where the exercise materials were discussed and l
questions were answered. All evaluators were in place prior to activation of the emergency operations centers on exercise day.
i The exercise began at 7:00 a.m., November 18, 1981, with an " Alert" classifica-tion from the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. The termination of the exercise was at 4:00 p.m. the same day.
l The simulated accident at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station involved an off-site release of radioactive material which necessitated simulated protective actions by the licensee, the two States (Ohio, Kentucky), and local governments (Clermont I
County, Ohio; Bracken, Campben, and Pendleton Counties, Kentucky).
The off-site agencies at the State and local levels of government in Ohio generany demonstrated a good capability. The evaluation of Kentucky and its three Counties l
1s to be prepared by FEMA Region IV.
The evaluation of the licensee and the den-onstration of capability on-site is not part of this report.
It is available from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III.
The exercise was conducted from the unified general scenario produced by the l
consulting firm of Stone & Webster Engineering Inc. This may very well have l
contributed to the good coordination between Cincinnati Gas and Electric, Ohio J
and Kentucky, although the means for good coordination between the three had a period of eight months grooming prior to the exercise through specialized planning l
meetings.
Following the exercise, team leadern met with their team members for a de-briefing to begin to consolidate their findings into a composite exercrit. Later that day and into the day fonowing the exercise, the team leaders presented their findings to the Regional Advisory Committee Chairman.
The joint exercise critique was presented to the officials and participants of the States and Counties November 19, 1981, at the New Richmond High School, New Richmond, Ohio.
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The results of this report will become a significant contribution to the
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" Regional Director's Evaluation." This report represents the most recent assessment of off-site planning for Ohio regarding an accident at the William H. Zinner Nuclear Power Station.
CONCLUSION It is my assessment that the overall response capabilities of the Ohio response organizations have the human and material resources to implement their emergency plans and the implementation of their plans would provide the necessary actions to protect the public health. There are some significant and minor deficiencies which are highlighted on pages 28 through 30 of this report.
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3 PAR,T III I
NARRATIVE ~ DESCRIPTION AND SUM'.ARY LISTINGS The subsequent pages of this report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the William H. Zinner full-scale exercise conducted November 18, 1981.
The exercise scenario included the governmental units of Ohio and Clermont County Disaster Services Agency, Kentucky and Bracken, Campbell and Pendleton Counties Disaster and Emergency Services.
The licensee, Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company conducted an on-site exercise simultaneously with the off-site exercise. Those findings are not a part of this report.'
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Regional Advisory Committee Region V, evaluated the off-site portion of the exercise at the Ohio State EOC, Worthington; Clermont County EOC, Batavia; the News Media Center / Emergency Operations Facility, Moscow Elementary School, Moscow; two area hospitals, the State Communications Van; and host-reception care centers.
The formatting of exercise findings is arranged by primary governmental unit (State then County) in the sequence as listed on the FEMA Exercrit Form.
OHIO State EOC, Worthington
SUMMARY
I Emergency Operations Facilities & Resources (Scace, Internal Comm., Displavs, Security)
The west wing basement of the Robert B. Beightler Armory serves as the State's Emergency Operations Center during all emergencies. This facility is well designed and provides the necessary space and amenities to support an emergency response staff for an extended period of time.
There are adequate primary and backup communications systems between the State and contiguous local governments to carry out the emergency response procedures. Internal consnunica-tions and message handling procedures are acceptable to meet the needs of the emc gency. The communication van's facili-ties and resources were ad&quate to carry out the assigned functions. The layout faciiltates coordination and coussuni-I cations among the staff within the van.
The security of the mobile van was adequate for this exercise. A map of l
sampling points was prominently displayed with current positions of monitoring teams shown.
Other maps showing the locations of host care centers and shelter areas were not available.
4 C1c Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources Needed to Support Federal Response State resources in support of Federal response are adequate.
Use of National Guard members and material, plus a qualified staff demonstrates an ability to support the emergency.
F1b Adequacy'of Communications Systems (Primarv and Backup) with Contiguous State / Local Governments within the EPZs Landline telephone and radio are the primary and backup means of communications between State EOC, County EOC, EOF, and teams in the field. The State mobile communications van with a backup mobile van from the State Guard serve as a link and backup.
F 1. c Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriaty with Federal Emergency Response Organizations Cosmiunications with Federal emergency response organizations were adequate.
F1d Adequacy of Communications Systems Between the Nuclear Facility and Near-Site EOF, and State and for Local ~EOCs Telephone, radio, and mobile, communications vans served to link communications between all EOCs, the EOF and mobile units in the field.
Adequacy of EOC Working Space and Amenities i
Some details are recorded in H 3 below. The EOC is located l
l in the sub-level and is utilized daily as office space. The i
overall layout is a large, well-designed EOC that does not require movement of materials to establish it as an operational l
EOC.
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Adequacy of EOC Internal Communications, including Equipment, Displays, and Massage-Handling' Procedures The internal communications and message handling procedures are good; multiple TV units are in the operations room to notify department heads of status. A new message form has aided internal y tiple message releases in an effective manner.
l Adequacy of EOC Security Measures Security of the EOC was implemented at the " Alert" classifi-cation Ith the utilization of Military PM itt.
Security was extremely effective along with badging of participants and observers with adequate logging.
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5 H3 overall Adequacy of the Emergency Ooerating Center (EOC)
The EOC is utilized by the State for all emergencies and is totally self-contained with a generator for power. The facility is spacious and provides for convenience of its members with bunking, kitchen, showers, etc.
Overall, it is very impressive.
J 10 a Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas A map was displayed showing sampling points and was very compre-hensive. However, maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers and shelter areas were not displayed. Recommend the above maps be displayed.
J 10 b Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Population Distribution Near Nuclear Facility by Evacuation Areas No maps were displayed depicting population distribution.
Recommend the above map be displayed.
SUMMARY
II Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff (Staffing, 24-Hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)
Alerting and mobilization of the State emergency response staff was accomplished in a timely manner.and demonstrated an adequate capability for a continuous 24-hour operation.
The Nuclear Preparedness Officer and Public Information Officer were dispatched via helicopter to the licensee's facility (EOF) to ensure that adequate response procedures were implemented.
The Emergency Services Director was in close contact with the Governor to ensure that he was informed of the emergency pro-cedures being implemented to protect the population.
The mobile communications van is in a continuous state of readiness.
It was on-site and operational in approximately three hours after the initial notification of " Alert" con-dicion.
Staffing is adequate to provide around-the-clock operations.
A1e Capability for 24-Hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Communications
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Telephone and/or beeper constitutes the primary communication system. During non-duty hours an answering service is utilized whereby the service activates the system. The answering service is instructed to ensure a contact is made.
Communi-cations in the State EOC is not manned 24-hours per day under normal conditions.
6 A4 Capability for 24-Hour Continuous Emergency Response Operations The shift change was not demonstrated, but the staffing level in the EOC does indicate the capability for a 24-hour continu-ous response, as the staff was double in most areas throughout the day. An actual shift change is recommended including briefings of relief personnel.
E2 Adequacy of Procedures Used for Alerting, Notifying and Mobilizing Emergency Response Personnel The emergency response alerting system worked well. There are sufficient procedures available for notification and mobilization of response personnel.
E1 Adequacy of Procedures Used for Notification of Emergency Response Organizations All organizations were called in accordance with SOPS.
I C2a If Appropriate. Timely Dispatch of a Representative to Licensee's Near-Site EOF Representatives were sent to the EOF from the State EOC via aircraft in a timely manner.
F1a Damonstration of an Emergency Response Communications Network with Prompt Notification An emergency communications network exists utilizing landline telephones. The backup system is radio communication within the State Highway Patrol.
F1e Adequacy of Communications Used for Alerting and Activating Emergency Response Personnel The system demonstrated was that described above (F 1 a) which was adequate.
F2 Capability to Communicate with Fixed and Mobile Medical Support Facilities Not observed y
H4 Demonstration of Timely and Efficient Activation and Staffing of EOCs and other Facilities The staff at the State EOC was in place in a timely manner.
The EOC staff had personnel and materials in place on site for some emergency response organizations prior to the " Alert."
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SUMMARY
III Emergency Operations Management (Organization, Control, Leadership, Support by Officials, Decision Making)
Leadership throughout the entire organization is well defined and implemented. Prior training and involvement in actual
.l emergencies contributed to the effective implementation of protective measures.
It was apparent that the line of authority as established by the Governor was well implemented, and any request for Federal assistance would not be inhibited through a decision-making process.
The mobile van personnel and members of the Radiological Health teams were on hand for the exercise. Both teams per-formed their functions in a competent manner. The emergency classifications were consistent with that of the utility.
However, it was not' posted. The layout of the mobile van made regular briefings unnecessary.
A1a Evidence that Snecific Organizations have been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response Adequate organizations were present as part of the overall response.
A1d Demonstration that a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effactively in Charge of Emergency Response Leadership throughout the entire organization is well defined and implemented. The decision makers and participants know I
their roles and performed in an effective manner.
A2a Demonstration that Primary & Support Functions & Responsi_-
bilities have been Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements The calculating of dose, initiating evaluation and specifying evaluation boundaries were conducted by the State, County, and licensee. Coordination was lacking,to some degree in s
the gathered data, making it difficult for the State to appropriately implement the actions as specified in the State Plan.
TheClermontCobtyPlanspecifiesvariousagencyresponsibili-ties that appear to differ from responsibilities established in the State Plan.
C1a Evidence that a Specific Person Has Been Authorized to Request Federal Assistance (State Only) i The line of authority to request and obtain Federal assistance and obtain State resources is established.
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8 D3 An Emergenev Classification System was Effectively Used and was Consistent with that of the Utility The emergency classification system is consistent with that of the utility and was effectively used.
D4 Adequate Written Procedures are Used for Emergency Actions Consistent with Facility RECC and Local Of fsite Conditions
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State performed according to procedures.
The utility wanted to act counter to the State Plan on the evacuation boundary.
The State was able to prevail after strong objection. Plans were available and referred to periodically.
Specific pro-cedures, e.g., SOPS for individual participants were not evident.
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Demonstration of Effective Coord. Between Emergency Response Dir. & Staff, thru Oral Briefings, Staff Meetings, etc.
There was effective coordination among staff members. This was accomplished through staff briefings, TV monitors, message forms, and emergency status data recorded on infor-mation sheets. More frequent oral briefings are recommended to bring all staff members into more active play.
SUMMARY
IV Public Alerting & Notification (Means of Notification -
Sirens, Vehicles, or Other Systems Not observed E5 Evidence of a Reliable System for Dissemination to the Public of Appropriate Info Received from the Licensee, e.g.. E3S Not observed E6 Adequacy of Means Used for Notification and Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume Exposure Pathway Not observed E7 Effective use of Instructional Messages for the Public in Af f ected Areas Not observed i
J 10 c Adequacy of Means Used for Notifying all Segments of Transient and Resident Population Not observed l
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SUMMARY
V Public and Media Relations (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination)
The Deputy Director of Emergency Services is appointed as spokesperson to coordinate and diss==hmte information to the news media.
A point of contact with the news media is located on the first floor of the Robert B. Beightler Armory and provides ample space and security for this purpose.
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l NEWS MEDIA CENTER - Moscow l
l Media briefings and releases were well coordinated between the two State PIOS, the State EOCs and thd utility. However, the briefings and releases were not as timely as possible.
There were long delays between briefings and the media was not l
kept apprised of the events as they were occurring. If hard copy is not inunediately available, verbal releases should be l
given. The briefings and releases at times lacked compre-l hensiveness - more explanation and details could have been I
provided. The inclusion of the State Liaison Officer in some f
of the briefings was very beneficial. During the briefings, the media was handled in a professional manner. Materials provided by the State to the media in press packets were good l
and well written. It is understood that the press facility is. temporary; more phone linas are critically needed.
It appears that more groundwork could have been accomplished in the pre-exercise briefing with the State and ut..'lity.
At these pre-exercise briefings, there needs to be a more active role taken by both the State and the utility to more adequately prepare the press during the exercise as to the preas' role.
G1 Evidence of Periodic Dissemination of Information to the Public, Such as Annual Publications Etc.
Infomation given to the press was not done in a timely manner -
at one point there was a 3-hour delay between briefings. At 10:50, evacuation was ordered. However, no information was given to the media. The media was not kept apprised of the events as they happened. The releases given were sketchy -
more details and explanation needs to be included. This resulted in confusion among the media. The statement "This is an exercise or drill" must be used before each release.
f In addition, the EOF was closed and the exercise terminated long before this information was provided to the media.
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G2 Evidence of a Public' Info Program for Permanent & Transient Pop in the Plume EPZ, Such as Posted Notices, Etc.
The delay in information given to the press resulted in the public not receiving timely information other than through EBS. The transient population was to have been notified by the Coast Guard. However, more attention needs to be given to campers and hotel / motel guests.
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G3a Appropriate Points of Contact for the Media Have Been Designated I
l It was clear that the News Media Center was the contact point l
for the media. The media remained throughout the exercise day.
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The News Media Center for the State is located in the Armory.
on the first floor. The room is adequate and offers security.
Adequacy of Joint Media Facility, Where Appropriate The News Media Center at the licensee's EOF was barely adequate.
This is a temporary facility. More phone. lines (there were only two) need be provided as well as tables, typewriters, etc.
G4a A Media Spokesperson Has Been Designated who has Access to All Necessary Information At the News Media Center, the State PIO had access to all infor-mation.
The PIO needs to be more aggressive in ensuring that the media receives the information.
The media spokesperson is the Deputy Director appointed to I
coordinate and disseminate information to the news media as needed.
G4b Adequacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information Among Spokespersons Coordination was good - the two State PI0s worked closely together and the utility was continuously consulted.
G4c Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control Measures l
It is importand that the State give more thought to providing for rumor control other than relying on information given to the media. A hot line would be a good way to coordinate
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rumor control.
11 SUMMART VI Accident Assessment (Staff'& Field Ooerations. Monitoring, Equipment, Technical Calculations. Use of PAGO)
The State demonstrated an adequate ability to make field measurements and to collect field samples for future laboratory analysis.
The State should not rely on Federal contractor facilities for these sample analyses, but should establish an independent State analytical capability. The State capability is necessary to insure sample integrity to make comparative analyses with Federal results and to ensure State leadership and citizens confidence in the reported results. Although an adequate and timely ability to perform
- a. dose assessment through a computer generated analysis was evidenced, the dose calculation SOPS were not available for RAC review prior to the exercise to ensure adequacy.
The mobile van facilitated rapid communications between the State and the monitoring teams, as facilitated by the com-munications van was a significant factor, allowing rapid assessment of data obtained in the field. However, could not assess the overall capability of the system from this location.
H7 Adequacy of Offsite Radiological Monitoring Equipment Not observed H 12 An' Adequate Central Point Has Been Established for Receipt and Analysis of Field Monitoring Data and Sample Media The central point for receipt and analysis of field data was at the Clermont County, Ohio, National Guard facility.
I7 Adequacy of Capability and Resources for Field Monitoring Within the Plume EPZ Field teams were equipped and utilized.
I8 Adequate Capability to Make a Rapid Assessment of Magnitude
& Location of Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards Capability to assess liquid hazards was not demonstrated.
Assessment of air hazards based on utility reports and field measurements, plume dimensions were never fully located by field teams. State EPA kept teams in the field unnecessarily long, not fully recognizing exposure hazards at time.
Capability of State team to collect samples was evident.
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I9 Capability for Measurement of Radiofodine Concentrations in Plume EPZ Under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)
The State has three monitoring teams and Clermont County has two partially trained teams. The State has the lead re-sponsibility for the measurements.
I 10 Capability for Relating Measured Parameters to Dose' Rates and Estimated Integrated Doses (State Only)
The calculation of integrated doses were not completed.
Capability for relating measurement parameters to dose rates were accomplished.
l I 11 Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)
The State has the capability.
It was not demonstrated adequately during the exercise.
J 10 m Capability to Recommend. Protective' Action. Based on PAGs, in Plume EPZ (State Only) i The State demonstrated adequate and timely ability to perform dose assessment through computer generated analysis.
l C3 Evidence of Availability & Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only) j The State should independently be able to analyze its own I
samples without relying solely upon Federal contractor l
facilities.
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SUMMARY
VII Actions to Protect the Public (Sheltering. Evacuation, Reception & Care. Transportation)
A capability existed at the State level for identifyfng and resolving evacuation impediments.
Capabilities for imple-menting food chain protective measures which is an enormous effort was not totally demonstrated. The State dose assess-ment team experienced difficulty in resolving what relocation center was being opened and the status of the center.
J2 Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite Individuals to Offsite Locations Not observed J9 Capability for Implementation of Protective Measures Not observed
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J 10 d Adequacy of_ Methods Used for-Protecting Mobility Impaired Persons, Including Ins'.itutionally Conflued Not observed J 10 g Adequacy 'of Methods Used for Imole nyting Relocation 'of Populace
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J 10 k Adequacy of Organizations'Identifica_rion_of and Means for l
Dealing with Potential-Impediments to _ Evacuation The State possesses the ability to identify evacuation impediments and deal with them.
J 11 Adequaev 'of Protective Measures 'in Ingestion E?d Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Pl: tuts. Etc. (State Only)
Procedures for providing information for-protective actions are in place. The information on crops needs.to be'apdated a
frequently (seasonally). This requires an enomous affort and should be more adequately demonstrated during an ' exercise.
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J 12 Adequacy of Registration and' Monitoring of Evacuees in Relocation Centers
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l J 10 h Adequate Reloention Centers Have Been* Established at I. east 5 Miles & Preferably 10 Miles Outside the Plume EPZ J
Substantial tiac was consumed verifying status qf ralocations.
centers. The County EOC was not able to provide timely'infor-
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j mation on request. j
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SUMMARY
71II Health, Medical, and_ Enosure Control Measures (Access Control, Adequacy of Equipment-Use of KI)
Radiological Health personnel in the'Segte comunications van kept track of the dostseter readings of tha three. field terms'.
They were careful not to send them mere th h once,into a highly contaminated avoi. Problems arose in adhering to the State position on administration of!KI. The compatibility of -
State, County, and utility decontamination standards were not established.
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J 10 e Adequacy of Provisions for Use of pfor E::tergenev 'Jorkers and Institutional 1:ed Persens 1:i Pluse EPs_,
The official position of the State is not to dispense KI.
However, in the exercise KI was reco= ended to be n'aken. The conflict should be resc1ved.
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The State m.A a definite and documented decision not to
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administer KI.
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Not observed H ~K3a Adequaev.of a 24-Ecur A Dav Capability to Determine Dose Received by Emergency Workers g,.
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Demonstration of Adsente and Frequent Emergency Worker Dosimeter Readings a Maintenance of Dosage Records No observations of personnel dose records being kept other than those of the three field teams which were kept by State Radiological Health personnel in the State Communications Van.
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with State dose assessment team. Limits have been set by Health Department and local monitoring equipment is good.
Frequency of dose recdings not observed but plan specifies that readings be recorded.
F K5a Evidence that Appropriate Action Levels Have Been Specified for Determining Need for Decontamhation Set levels for decont== hacion in Clermont County SOPS differ from those of State Plan,Section II, Part J.3.3.5.
K5b Adequacy of Measures for Decont== hation of Emergency Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal The capability exists for decontamination of instruments, pyrsonnel, and equipment.
L1 Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup Hospital and Medical Services for Handling Personnel s
Observations were made by evaluators at Cincinnati General Hospital and Clermont County Hospital and found to be adequately prepared to handle contaninated patients.
L4 Adequate Capability Demonstrated for Transportation of Radio-logical Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities Not observed l
15 M4 Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population Exposure (State Only) 1 NUREG 0654 should be revised to use total integrated dose as a criteria for recovery and reentry not population exposure.
State Plan should be amended to reflect this.
SUMMARY
II Recovery and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry procedures were not implemented during this particular exercise and therefore could not be evaluated.
.It is recommended that future exercises allow for the imple-mentation procedures for recovery and reentry.
M3 Adequacy of' Established Means for Informing Response Org that~ Recovery and Reentry Can Be Initiated (State Only)
The response organizations were briefed by State personnel that recovery and reentry could be initiated. However, the abrupt transition from " Site Area Emergency" status to exer-cise termination did not permit a demonstration of capability.
M1 Adecuacy of Procedures' Demonstrated for Reentrv and Relaxation of Protective Measures Allowing Reentry Did not exercise relaxation of protective measures.
SUMMARY
I Relevance of the 'Exercisa Experience (Benefit to Participants, Adequacy of the Scenario)
The exercise was of particular benefit to all participants in that it enabled them an opportunity to parricipate as a team l,
and thus gain a worthwhile training experience.
The scenario did not adequately include provisions for evalu-ating recovery and reentry implementation and definitely should be included in future exercises.
l The exercise did test the major portions of the comenmications systems.
It provided the Radiological Health personnel an opportunity to cope with various problems in the field. They
)
used sound judgment in solving the problems that confronted them.
It is believed all partic1 pants gained from their experience during the exercise.
N1b Adequaev of Scenario to Test Canability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources No significant deficiencies of the scenario were noticed.
The impression was given that not all agencies' staffs were tested.
16 N1a Adequaev of Exercise to Test Integrated Capa. & Major Portiens of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected Erg.
The scenario did not incorporate recovery and reentry pro-
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cedures and therefore did not afford the State and County i
the opportunity to test their plans in this regard.
1 It is believed the sxercise participants gained experience from the exercise.
Clermont County EOC, Batavia S M ARY I Emergency Operations Facilities'& Resources (Space, Internal Comm.,' Displays, Security)
The EOC is adequate. A split-level concept separated two basic functions of decision and response quite well. The County demonstrated ' good c. -.ications through the exercise through use of the amateur radio club, their own radio equip-ment, and both dedicated and commercial telephone lines.
The message control system was adequate and EOC working space was efficient.
Deficiencias requiring appropriate corrective actions include the following: no backup radio system existed between the County EOC, the utility, and the EOF; radios located outside the communications room were too noisy; radiological assess-ment personnel had insufficient working space; TV status display was inadequate, some maps were not labeled for popu-lation distribution; shelter and relocation maps were missing entirely; security measures interfered with. prompt EOC acti-vation, otherwise security was good.
C1c Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources Needed to Support Federal Response Not observed F1b Adequacy of Communications Systems (primary and Backup) with Contiguous State / Local Governments Within the EPZs Radio communications with Counties within the EPZ in Kentucky were handled by the Milford Amateur Radio Club. They did, in fact, have radio contact with other amateur radio operators in Kentucky. Normally the County works through the State to reach Kentucky. The amateur radio operators performed in a highly skilled manner. The dedicated line to the Sheriff's office functioned well.
Radio co==unications to the State EOC and the State Communications Van functioned adequately.
17 F1c Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriate, with~ Federal Emergency Response Organizations Not observed F1d Adequacy of Communications.~ Systems Between the Nuclear Facility and Near-Site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs The County has a. dedicated telephone.-line and commercial lines to utility, EOF, and the State. No radio backup system exists. Recommend appropriate backup radio system.
' Adequacy of'EOC ' Working Space and Amenities The area is 'large enough for its functi'n, but somewhat noisy. Recommend that. radiological asseasment personnel be provided a separate work area and earphones for hand-held radios in order to reduce their contribution to overall noise. Large downstairs room with ove ead projector and adequate map space served its function well.
Ad'equacy of'EOC Internal Communications, Including Equipment, Displays, and Message-Handling Procedures i
The message control system was very good. The TV status i
display did not show implemented actions,.ocly recommendations.
There was not a posting of the previous implemented actions.
Internal communication problems included a noisy radio and a telephone breakdown between the executive and operations rooms, i
Adequacy of EOC Security Measures Security was adequate, but could have been streamlined to facilitate a more rapid entry upon activating the EOC.
H3 Overall Adequacy of 'the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)
The EOC was adequate. The split-level concept separated two basic functions of decision and response.
J 10 a Adecuate Maps Displaved Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas Relocation and shelter area maps were not displayed. They were available for use by EOC personnel. Maps of sampling points and evacuation routes were 'not clearly labeled.
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Nuclear ' Facility 'by Evacuation Areas Population distribution maps were not posted in the EOC.
The plan map which was referred to was inadequate since popu-lation distribution is specified at 2, 5, and 10-mile radii.
Population must be shown by sectors at one-mile increments up to 10 miles to be useful for protective action decisions.
1 18
SUMMARY
II Alerting and Mobilization of Officials'and Staff'(Staffing, 24-Hour Capability, Alerting Ti=eliness)
The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were prompt and effective through the use of various communica-tions systems. A 24-hour capability to receive emergency notifications was demonstrated by the sheriff's office.
Medical facility communications generally were adequate and well demonstrated.
The deficiencies requiring corrective actions include the following: a complete shift change was not demo'nstrated; the County plan is not consistent with the demonstrated initial EOC activation; the initial emergency classification message notification was not verified; the hospital radio communica-tions to the EOC is lacking; and full EOC staffing was slow.
A l'e Capability for 24-Hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Comunications Notification of the simulated incident was received by dedi-cated telephone lines to the County Sheriff's office. That office is staffed on a 24-hour basis.
A4 Capability for~24-Hour Continuous Emergency Response Operations A partial shift change was demonstrated. Areas for future demonstration should include radiological assessment personnel and field teams.
E2 Adequacy of Procedures Used for Alerting, Notifving and Mobilizing Emergency Response Personnel EOC was activated at the " Alert" classification instead of at
" Site Area Emergency," as required by the plan. This was done to insure timely EOC staffing.
Plan should be changed accord-ingly if this is what is to be implemented.
E1 Adequacy of Procedures Used for Notification of Emergency Response Organizations The notification message was received in the Sheriff's Office via dedicated line. Since receipt was over a dedicated line, it was not verified. Verification should have been made.
The " Alert" classification message was disseminated immediately to those agencies with emergency responsibilities. Verifi-cation was received by those agencies. It took 40 minutes to complete the notification calls using radio and telephones.
o 19 C 2 a-If Appropriate,' Timely Dispatch of a Representative'to l
Licensee's Near-Site EOF Not observed F1a Demonstration of an Emergency Response' Communications Network with Prompt Activation Notification of " Alert" status from the Sheriff's Office was carried out promptly, using several alternate communication modes.
F1e Adequacy of Communications Used for Alerting and Activating Emergency Response Personnel Telephones, radios, and pagers were utilized effectively for alerting and activating emergency response personnel.
F2 Capability to Communicate with Fixed and Mobile Medical Support Facilities The capability to -comenmience with fixed and mobile medical support was adequately demonstrated during the transport of the simulated radiologically injured person. The hospital (Cincinnati General) was in direct connunication with the facility and the transport ambulance via radio. However, no radio communication capability exists between the EOC and either hospital (Cincinnati General, Clermont County).
H4 Demonstration of Timely and Efficient Activation and Staffing of EOCs and Other Facilities Initial activation and key staffing was timely. Complete staffing could have been more complete in shorter time frame.
SUMMARY
III Emergency Operations Management (Organization, Control, Leadership, Support by Officials, Decision Making)
The EOC was established as a key response organization and its internal structure was well-defined. The emergency classification system utilized was consistent with that of the utility.
The deficiencies requiring corrective actions include the following:
leadership both in the EOC and in the host re-caption center was inadequate; coordination between the Emergency Response Director and the EOC staff was ineffective; and support and participation by elected officials was minimal.
A1A Evidence that Specific Organizations Have Been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response Specific response organizations were established in the EOC for overall response.
20 A1d Demonstration that a Specific ' Individual, by Title, was l
Ef f ectively in Charge of Emergency Response Although the plan specifically identifies the County Sheriff as the official in charge of emergency response, it appeared the Director of CCDSA was in charge.
A2a Demonstration that. Primary & Support Functions & Responsi-bilities Have Been ' Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements The EOC executive, assessment, and communication groups' duties were well-divided and understood.
Within the host reception center, neither the State nor local health department, the local fire chief, nor the American Red Cross representative knew who was responsible for the manage-ment of the center.. Hospitals within the area have been designated for the treatment of radiologically contaminated injured persons.
C1a Evidence'that a Specific Person Ras Been Authorized to'Reouest Federal Assistance (State Only)
Not observed D3 An Emergency Classification System'vas Effectively Used and was ' Consistent with that of the Utility Emergency classification levels were used effectively and consistent with the utility.
D4 Adequate Written Procedures are Used for Emergency Actions Consistent with Facility RECC and Local Offsite Conditions Not observed Demonstration of Effective Coord. Between Emergency Response Dir. & Staff, Thru Oral Briefings, Staf f Meetings, Etc.
No formal briefings were held by the Energency Response Di-rector in the executive and assessment groups, but the EOC controller briefed operations persoanel periodically and at critical moments within the limits of his authority. An example of the difficulties this caused was that the deputy sheriff failed to inform his staff of an increase in the level of protective actions taken during the " General Emer-gency." The sheriff independently discovered and rectified this error 90 minutes later. A formal staff briefing night have precluded this problem.
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21 Adequacy of Support and/or Participation by' Elected' Officials t
Participation and support by elected officials were minimm1
SUMMARY
IV
'Public Alerting & Notification (Means of Notification - Sirens, Vehicles, or Other Systems The 15-minute prompt notification was not demonstrated since the " system" had not been installed. The County effectively demonstrated backup varning systems to include telephones, radios, EBS, helicopter, and simulated notification from i
dispatched fire vehicles.
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E5 Evidence of 'a Reliable System for ' Dissemination to the Public of' Appropriate Info Received ^from the Licensee, e.g.,'EBS Initial notification was accomplished by use of telephones i
to schools, radios to municipalities, and mobile sirens /PA systems on fire trucks and sheriffs' vehicles. The EBS was notified of " Site Area Emergency" 35 minutes after it was declared.
Installation of the proposed ENS should improve notification efficiency.
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E6 Adequacy of Means~Used for Notification and Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume Exposure Pathway The deputy sheriff estimated the time required to warn the population in the EPZ to be 45 minutes. This does not meet the 15 minute " Prompt Alerting and Notification System" requirement.
It is necessary that a demonstration of capa-bility be Laplemented so an evaluation of adequacy can be assessed. Until such demonstration, the requirement is inadequate.
l E7 Effective Use of Instructional Massages for the Public in Affected Areas Not observed l
J 10 c Adequacy of Means Used for Notifying All Segments of Transient and Resident Pooulation The local EBS radio station was effectively used to notify l
resident population and a' helicopter was dispatched to notify l
the transient population.
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l ECMMARY V Public and Media Relations (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination)
[
l The News Media Center was located at Moscow School.
The County spokesperson was present in the County EOC.
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22 G1 Evidence of Periodic Dissemination of Information to the Public, Such as Annual Publications, Etc.
Not observed G2 Evidence of a Public Info Program for Permanent &~ Transient Pop in the Plume EPZ, Such as Posted Notices,' Etc.
Not observed G3a Appropriate Points of Contact for the' Media Have'Been Designated
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Not observed Adequacy of~ Joint Media Facility, Where Appropriate Not observed G4a A Media'Spokesperson Has Been Designated Who Has Access to All Necessary Information The County PIO is located at the County EOC where he assists in coordination of releases from the EOC.
G4b Achqtacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information Among Spokespersons Materials prepared at the EOC and the EOF News Media Center were exchanged by telecopier for coordination prior to the information being released.
G4c Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control Measures Not observed
SUMMARY
VI Accident Assessment (Staff & Field Operations, Monitoring, Equipment, Technical Calculations, Use of PAGs Radiological monitoring equipment was in place and properly used and was sufficient for the purpose. The central point for receipt and analysis of field data was the Clermont County Ohio National Guard Armory.
H7 Adequacy of Offsite Radiological Monitoring Equipment Radiological monitoring equipment was in place and was properly used and sufficient for the purpose.
H 12 Jul Adequate Central Point Eas Been Established for Receipt and Analysis or rield sanitoring Data ano sample Mecia The central point for receipt and analysis of field data was the Clermont County Ohio National Guard Armory.
23 I7 Adequacy. of Capability rnd Resources for Field Monitoring Within the Plune EPl Not observed I8
' Adequate Capability.to.Make a. Rapid' Assessment'of Magnitude
& Location of' Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards County exhibited capability for measuring air samples.
I9
' Capability for Measurement 'of Radiciodine Concentrations in Plume EPZ Under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)
Not observed I 10
' Capability'for Relating Measured Parameters'to Dose Rates and Estimated Integrated' Doses (State Only)
Not observed i
I 11 Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive i
Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)
I Not observed 1
J 10 m Capability to Recommend, Protective Action, Based on PAGs, j
in Plume EPZ (State Only) i Not observed C3 Evidence of Availability & Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only)
Not observed
SUMMARY
VII Actions to Protect the Public (Sheltering, Evacuation, Reception & Care, Transportation)
The County effectively demonstrated its capability for imple-mentation of protective measures as plant conditions deterio-rated.
Registration was adequate. Monitoring was handled by untrained personnel.
Adequate host care centers are designated for other locations within Clermont County.
J2 Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite Individuals to Offsite Locations.
Not observed s
5
24 J9 Capabiliev for Implementation of Protective Measures The County effectively demonstrated its capability for taplementation of protective measures as plant conditions deteriorated.
J 10 d Adequacy-of Methods Used for' Protecting / Mobility Impaired Persons, Including Institutionally Confined Not observed J 10 g Adequacy of Methods Used for' Implementing Relocation of l
Populace Not observed J 10 k Adequacy of Organizations Identification of and Means for Dealing with Potential Impediments to Evacuation Not observed J 11 Adequacy of Protective Measures in Ingestion EPZ, Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Plants, Etc. (State Only) i iSc Not observed J 12 Adequacy of Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees in Relocation Centers Registration was adequate. Monitoring was handled by un-trained personnel.
J 10 Adequate Relocation Centers Rave Been Established at Least 5 Miles & Preferably 10 Miles Outside the Plume EPZ Adequate host care centers are designated for other locations within Clermont County.
SUMMARY
VIII Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures (Access Control, Adequacy of Equipment, Use of KI)
With the exceptions of the deficiencies observed regarding access control and dosimeter distribution, the County demon-strated a good capability to transport, handle, and treat injured and contaminated patients. The plan needs modifi-r cation to assure thorough access control for all emergency l
workers. National Guard personnel must be issued dosimeters.
J 10 e Adequacy of Provisions for Use of KI for Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Persons in Plume EPZ Not observed
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25 J 10 f Adequacy--of Methods Used by~ State Health' Department in 1
Decisions to Administer KI to-Central Population (State Only)
Not observed J 10 j Adequacy of Control of' Access to Evacuated' Areas Tne County did not demonstrate adequateaccess control to the restricted area due to the existence of several secondary roads which were unaccounced for in the plan. The County Sheriff, Ohio Highway Patrol, and Ohio Department of Trans-portation demonstrated competence in establishing timely roadblocks and recognizing gaps.
K3a Adequacy ~of a 24-Hour'A Day Capability to Determine' Dose Received by Emergency Workers County teams were issued self-reading dosimeters which were monitored periodically. National Guard personnel assisting Clermont County Sheriff in access control were not issued dosimeters.
K3b
'Demonatation of' Adequate and Frequent Emergency Worker Dosinater Readings & Maintenance of Dosage Records An EOC representative was in constant communications with County radiological teams to insure frequent dose readings and mainteaance of dose records.
K4 Evidence That an Adequate Decision Chain Has Been Established to Authorize Exposure for Emer Workers in Excess of PACS A County representative was designated to authorize exposures in excess of PAGs.
K5a Evidence That Appronriate Action Levels Have Been Specified for Determining Need br Decontamination Not observed K5b Adequacy of Measures for Decontamination of Emergency Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal Not observed L1 Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup Hospital and Medical Services'for Handling Personnel Cincinnati General Hospital demonstrated adequate capability for handling personnel.
Cler=ont County Hospital is a well-equipped, well-managed facility.
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26 L4 Adeauate Capability Demonstrated for Transportation of Radiological Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities A simulated injured and contaminated patient was promptly transported to Cincinnati General Hospital for treatment.
M4 Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population Exposure (State Only)
Not observed
SUMMARY
IX Recovery and Reentrv' Operations The EOC staff was prepared and eager with great anticipation to demonstrate its recovery and reentry capability but was unable to do so because the scenario did not provide for this activity.
M3 Adequacy of' Established Means for Informing Response Org That Recovery and Reentry Can Be Initiated (State Only)
Not observed M1 Adequacy ~of Procedures / Demonstrated for Reentry and Relaxation of Protective Measures Allowing Reentry Not observed
SUMMARY
X Relevance of the Exercise Experience (Benefit to Participants, Adequacy of the Scenario) i The scenario wcs adequate to test the County capability to mobilize resources and personnel. The scenario failed to provide for any recovery and reentry operations.
N1b Adequacy of Scenario to Test Capability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources The scenario was adequate to test the County's capability to mobilize resources and personnel. The scenario failed to provide for any recovery and reentry operations whatsoever.
N1a Adecuacy of Exercise to Test Integrated Capa. & Maior Portions of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected er5.-
The exercise was adequate to test the following integrated elements: EOC, alerting and nob 111:ation, notification, direction and control, accident assessment, protective action and health medical exposure control.
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27 Benefit of Exercise to Participants Participants stated the exercise provided them valuable training, pointed out areas of deficiency for future corrections, and was a great overall benefit.
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28 PART IV
SUMMARY
LISTING OF'SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES Ohio State Emergency Operations Center C3 Independent analysis of samples collected by and for the State should be conducted by the State in its laboratories to provide a check against those analysis made by outside laboratories.
E6 The State shows a significant portion of the responsibility for this element as well as the County.
It is realized full compliance cannot be achieved until the " Prompt Alerting and Notification System" is installed and operationally tested.
Until a Federal evaluation is conducted, the element remains deficient.
I8 The Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, located on the Ohio River, has a potential for a release of radiological liquid. During the exercise, there was not a demonstration of capability to collect and measure the liquid hazard pathway. Air hazard measurements were never fully located by field teams. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on this facet of emergency capa-bility.
J 10 b Mapa need to be displayed in the Emergency Operations Center depicting population distribution. This will give greater comprehensive dissemination of information to those staffing the Emergency Operations Center.
Clermont County EOC E6 The " Prompt Alerting and Notification System" was in process of being installed at the time of the exercise. The full
" system" will have to be tested in readiness for the Federal evaluation.
J 10 b Population distribution maps were not posted in the Emergency Operations Center. The map in the plan is not adequate since population distribution is specified at 2, 5 and 10-mile radii and not given within sectors in one mile increments.
J 10 j Although skill and competence were exhibited in the establish-ment of roadblocks to the evacuated area, adequate access control was not demonstrated. Several secondary roads were not covered and are unaccounted for in the plan.
29 PART V
SUMMARY
I.ISTING20F MINOR DEFICIENCIES While not necessarily areas of significant deficiencies, it is recommeni.ed that in future updates of the plan, more attention be given to:
Ohio State Emergency Operations Center D4 The licensee needs to work more closely with the State in carrying out the agreed to procedures as stated in the State plan.
Consistency is more important on coordinated issues to adequately protect the public.
J 11 The State plan needs specific provisions for actions to be en1ren on a seasonal basis in the ingestion EPZ due to the seasonal change in agricultural products.
Clermont County Emergency Operations Center E2 A plan change is suggested for the activation of the County EOC at the " Alert" classification rather than at the " Site Area Emergency" as specified in the plan.
In the area of training, more attention should be given to:
Ohio State Emergency Operations Center l
J 10 e Consistency of the State plan and actions taken regarding l
potassium iodide needs to prevail. The State plan takes,
l the official position of not dispensing potassium iodide.
However, during the exercise, its use was recommended.
Clermont County Emergency Operations Center J 12 Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the training of those specialists conducting the radiological monitoring of evacu-ees so they can perform a more adequate job.
In the area of resources, more attention should be given to:
l Ohio State Emergency Operations Center J 10 a In the EOC there is a need for maps which display evacu-l ation routes, relocation centers and shelter areas.
I 10 There is a need for a complete demonstration of the calcu-lation of integrated doses during the next exercise.
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Clermont County Emergency Operations Center J 10 a Relocation and shelter maps were in the EOC but were not posted or displayed' In addition, sampling points and evacuation routes were not clearly labeled.
K3a There is a need for Ohio National Guard personnel==aning access control points.co be issued dosimeters for their personal health protection.
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31 PART VI SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION'0F SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES Ohio Disaster Services Agency has not forwarded to FEMA Region V the State
~and Clermont County response to the corrective actions as outlined in the "Zimmer Post-Exercise. Composite Exercrits." This action is most necessary for this report and in preparation for the completion of the " Regional Director's Evaluation."
We have established June 25, 1982, for FEMA Region V's receipt of the schedule of corrective actions of significant deficiencies.
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A REPORT ON THE 18 NOVEMBER 1981 ACCIDENT RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR THE WILLIAM H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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%MJ KENTUCKY DIVISION OF DIS ASTER AND EMERGENCY SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS 1 FEBRUARY 1982 i
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8206100189-820526, PDR ADOCK 05000350 F
TABLE OF CONTENT'.
I.
Introduction 1
II. Exercise Chronology 6
III. Exercise Summary and State Level Recommendations 10 IV. County Level Summary arid Recommendations 18 V.
Appendices 26
- 1) Zimer Exercise Participants
- 2) Emergency Planning Zones 3). Nuclear Plant Emergency Action Levels
- 4) Emergency Response Equipment for Kentucky
- 5) Federal Emergency Management Agency Critique This report was printed with state funds.
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lNTRODUCTION, t
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On 18 November 1981 several agencis. <;f Kr.ntucky state government, along with l
l seven Kentucky counties participat'.< in an exercise designed to test the state's ability to respond to an accident et the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station.
The Zimmer Nuclear Power ',tation (ZNPS) is situated in Clermont County, Ohio, along the Ohio River. Chio agencies and counties also participated.
There are three Kentucky counties wnich according to federal criteria could be significantly affected by a Zimmer Station accident. Portions of these risk counties are within a ten mile radius of the plant.
They are Bracken, Campbell, and Pendleton counties. Four other near-by counties could be directly involved in a Zimmer incident in another manner.
These counties would primarily receive
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The Zimer Nuclear Power Station, under construction near Moscow, Ohio, is seeking an operating license from the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
Its proximity to the Kentucky counties of Bracken, Campbell and Pendleton necessitated the development of offsite energency plans.
2
persons evacuated frm. Hracken, Campbell, or Pendleton and care f or them until an incident termi !te'..
These host counties are:
Boone, Grant. Harri son, and Mason.
Together with *>everal key state agencies these counties comprised the Kentucky response echanism for the ZNPS exercise (See Appendix 1 for listing of participating age :ies).
The construction and licensing of this facility falls primarily within the jurisdiction of tre Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and applicable state of Ohio regulations. Because of the proximity of the facility to Kentucky, the NRC determined that Kentucky and its agencies should participate in the area of off-site emergency planning.
Off-site emergency planning was given an increased emphasis by federal and state agenc.ies followin; the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant accident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was given the lead role in assisting states with their planning effort.
FEMA is the Kentucky Division of Disaster and Emergency Services (DES) counterpart agency at the federal level. As such, and I
because of its role as the state emergency / disaster coordinating agency, DES I
became the lead agency at state level in FNF plan development. As previously mentioned, there are three Kentucky counties which lie within a ten mile radius i
of the ZNPS (See 7,ppendix 2).
In order to insure the citizens of each county would have a viable mechanism to respond to an FNF incident, DES felt obligated j
to develop sound emergency plans for their use. Disaster and Emergency Services neither endorses nor opposes construction / licensing of the Zimmer Facility.
This position was officially adopted by Billy G. Wellman, The Adjutant General, i
in April,1980. General Wellman recognized that if the NRC granted the facility j
an operating license, Kentucky and its counties must be prepared to deal with an accident.
3
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':ditionally, commitments were made by the Adjutant General to the Secretaries Of the Department for Human Resources, the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and the County-Judge Executives of Campbell, Pendleton, and Bracken counties that no state and/or county plans would go forward to federal officials for review until approved by the aforementioned and the Gbvernor.
l.
The following plans are presently in the final draft stage and together comprise Kentucky's response mechanism to an FNF emergency at the Zirrmer Station:
Kentucky Radiological Emergency Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facilities Kentucky Radiological Emergency Plan for the W. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Bracken County Radiological Emergency Plan for the W. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station.
Campbell County Radiological Emergency Plan for the W. H. Zimmer. Nuclear Power Station Pendleton County Radialgical Emergency Plan for the W. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station.
The plans are presently undergoing final revision.
However, input and suggestions can still be included when appropriate.
Certain standard operating procedures are in initial draft stages at this time.
These procedures are i
scheduled for completion well before the plant will be operational, if licensed.
In order to develop viable FNF energency response plans, Xentucky used federal criteria developed expressly for this purpose. That guidance is entitled
" Criteria for Preparedness and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Reponse Plans and Preparedness In Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1). All plans were developed in conjunction with and assistance by the 4
appropriate state officials and on the co, ty level with the appropriate County Judge / Executive, DES Coordinator, and oth** key individuals.
The county officials were encouraged to contact as me',y other people as were required to assist in plans development.
Wilbur R. Buntin, Jr., Executive Director 'sf the Kentucky Division of Disaster l
and Onergency Services decided to sponsor public meetings in Bracken, Campbell, and Pendleton Counties to give citizens the opportunity to discuss portions of the county emergency plans. Mr. Buntin also solicited written input from those attending and indicated such input could be provided at any time prior to plans submittal.
The plans were distributed in draft stage to key locations in advance so the citizens could review them. DES was not required to sponsor such meetings by any federal regulation.
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. EXERCISE CHRONOLOGY.
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':ation by 9:59 a.m.
At this point both the state and counties implemented full trisation of their respective E0Cs.
I
%:ification of a " General Emergency" was received by DES at 9:49 a.m.
All agencies were notified of the status change by 10.01 a.m.
1 i
l ' '.
..e state mergency response personnel stayed in frequent contact with county cf ficials from the first noti fication.
State agency representatives were t.-iefesas the? reported to the ~EOC.
The first informt. tion from the facility l
t7at would ' require a decision as to pr.otettive action implemention for the s
s counties was received with the second Site Emergency notification.
The facility s
recommended a precautionary two mile evacuation even though 'no ridioactive ma-terials had %ee'rU rr State personnel from the Radiation and Product Saf-s ety Branch 'of the Department > Tor Human F.esources performed an analysis of the i
situation.
The state analysis agreed with the Zinner rec.ommendation and, in
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addition to a two mile evacuation, counties were also advised to place lactating animals on stored feed through6ut the e:ntrgency plannini; zo.1e (approximately ten i
g miles). The latter measure anticipated a deteriorating situation at the facil-ity. This information was immediately recommended to each county.
(Radiation
)
Branch personnel. from\\
i* -
the Department for fuman Resources have played a signifi-cant role in the develo'pment of the entire Zimer ef fort.
They have served as the statre's prim 1ry authority concerning radiation and those systems / equipment o
acquired frc CG&E.)'
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, s The 'next rep 1rt *trou the facility escalated into a General Emergency.
The state recommended to the counties to further evacuate to a distance of roughly eight miles,' which~was.a more conservative maasure than the facility recoraT. ended (that l
is,,'the state rbommendation provided a greater margin. of safety). A decision l
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J-w was also made :Itry, all river traffic and reroute air fMghti away t run' the Additio ally,, the countiet were advised to ; adopt"sh::ltering area.
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, i.e. remain.
ing in their h.mei,' for individualsttroughout thefrest of the emergency pla
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ning zone not Scludsd in the evacuation orde,
~
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Campbell County chose to extend its evacuation order to include all resid ents within the rous-ly ten mile emergency planning zone.
They implegented the necessary traff':
and access control points to accomplish this action.
The facility de-escalated its General Emergency to Site Emergency at 9:20 p.m..
(exercise time).
At 10:12 p.m. (exercise time) the drill terminated and state officials began their recovery phase which consisted of soil, water
, and air analyses in order to determine levels of' radioactive contaminants present During the hours that elapsed from incident on-set until termination
, state'and county EOC personnel were dealing with a multitude of problems relating to Zimmer and some tnat were not. The exercise was designed to includ! problems ranging from securing food and shelter for simulated evacuees through d with hazardous maserials incidents totally unrelated to Zimmer e
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4 O
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
AND STATE LEVEL RECOMMEND ATIONS e
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well in One srouid recognizi that county and state personnel performed very There were hundreds of decisions made and actions taken on exercise many e eas.
The measures instituted demonstrate that concerned individuals can perform day.
the necessary tasks to protect the citizenry.
It should be noted that this do-cumen-by design focuses on deficiencies identified more so than achievements.
These There were several problem areas identified common to each participant.
were the most significant problems and will require attention in the near fu-ture. Those are:
1.
Training
)
The nost significant problem area was providing adequate training to all parti-l Each county experienced problems due to inade-cipants prior to the exercise.
The main reason for this deficiency seems to be the short quate training.
amount of time available after the exercise date was agreed to in which to achieve this monumental task.. State personnel and their consultants were not As a result able to conduct all necessary training in the time frame allowed.
A some confusion existed at several response levels as to correct procedure.
comnitment to conduct full training prior to the operation of the ZNPS has been made and a schedule is presently being established which will also include refresher courses in future years.
11
Specifically, trairing wa. inadequate in the following areas:
Emergency Opera *. ion Center (EOC) Procedures a.
Many county officiais were not well versed in the internal operational proce-dures necessary to ef fectively run their respective E0Cs. As a result, message flow became erratic and status boards were not utilized properly, b.
Radiological Training Courses were sponsored to train county individuals in various aspects of radio-l logical monitoring and decontamination orior to the exercise. Due to a number of problems this training was not adequate.
Recruitment of volunteer personnel to complete this training was a significant problem.
In some cases scheduled classes were postponed when participants didn't show up.
The counties must have further personnel training in decontamination procedures.
Some further informa-tion concerning contamination levels is warranted as well as exposure control techniques for all energency workers.
2.
State / County Coordination There was a significant time lag between notification to the counties of recom-mended protective actions by the ZNPS and the official recommendation of state personnel in Frankfort. In order for state officials to independently verify ZNPS findings, a certain time lag is necessary.
The state took betweeen 15 and 25 minutes to notify each county as to whether they agreed with the ZNPS recom-mendation.
It must be noted that state recommendations to the counties did not coincide with those of the plant in every case. The state was generally more conservative in its recommended action, that is, the state actions provided a greater margin of safety.
12
l Computar equipment is scheduled for installation prior to Zimmer licensing for I
use by state agencies and should reduce this time lag significantly.
3.
Notification Systems The Integrated Prompt Notification System was not in place for the exercise.
This was recognized as a severe limitation from the outset but one to be cor-rected prior to licensing.
The proposed system includes outdoor sirens, Nation-al Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather radios, and special dedicated radios all designed to provide a warning to area citizens in the event,
of an incident. This system must be fully tested by federal and state offic41s when completed.
4.
Communications The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (CG&E) has agreed to provide adequate com-munication systems to both risk and host counties to help ensure an effective i
Zimmer response.
These systems were not fully installed and operational for the exerci se. As a result, several problems occurred as counties were basically using existing systems.
Procedures for using existing systems were not adequat-ely defined and personnel were not fully trained prior to the exercise.
The State Field Radiological Center (FRC) near Falmouth did not receive infoma-I tion from the county EOCs pertaining to actions they had undertaken.
This tend-ed to isolate the FRC staff and force them to operate in a vacuum.
The informa-tion sharing between the FRC and state EOC was infrequent and contributed to this problem.
13
As noted before, the majority of systems and equipment committed to the Commnwealth by CG3E was not in place and operating prior to this exercise.
Once this equipment is installed and tested, many of tre problem areas mentioned above should be substantially solved.
For a list of the systems to be installed, see Appendix 4.
1 STATE LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS Specific ways to enhance operations at state level include:
1.
Comunication, infonnation feed-back, message flow, and overall contact should be strengthened between the state EOC and the involved counties.
2.
State agency personnel routed to the Zimmer area to undertake specific analysis and implement decontamination measures should have further training.
3.
More detailed information from the facility should be received in the state EOC.
4.
Procedures must be developed to significantly shorten any time lag involved in protective action recommendations to the counties.
5.
Xentucky and Ohio should enhance their mutual contact and relationship during an event.
6.
Public information procedures must be improved and staff augmented in order to deliver a more comprehensive analysis of the overall situation to the press.
14
8 7.
Coordination bet'aten Radiation and Product Safety Branch personnel and state operations personnel snould be enhanced to insure complete understanding of all protective actions r6* ommended and then carried out.
Operational situation briefings in the state EOC should be more frequent.
8.
Field Radiological Center An intergal part of the state response operations was the Field Radiological Center (FRC) established near Falmouth, Kentucky.
The FRC personnel conducted field monitoring and analyses to determine potential significant levels of contaminants in the environment.
The Radiacion Branch personnel performed the lead agency function and were assisted by the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection and the Kentucky State Police.
The Kentucky National Guard deployed troops to provide security and access control.
The individuals assigned performed extremely well. The field monitoring teams dispatched from the FRC ef fectively provided the necessary information.
Specific ways to improve FRC operation includes:
1.
Additional floor space should be obtained for FRC personnel.
2.
FRC staff must be augmented to perform all functions on a protracted basis.
3.
Communications among the FRC, state EOC operations personnel, and Radiation Branch personnel at state level should be strengthened.
4.
Standard Operating Procedures should be reevaluated and revised in the areas of sample collection, sample disposal. record keeping, and re-entry measures.
15
Iapport Agencies The Kentucky National Guard played a vital role in the conduct of the exercise.
There were approximately 145 Guardsmen activated.
The Guard established a sup-
- lementary communication system between the State EOC and the following points
the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) near Moscow, Ohio; the FRC near Falmouth; and the Campbell County EOC in Alexandria (the EOF is the offsite operations-At the State EOC the public information center established by the utility).
Guard provided security and utilized several aircraf t to transport personnel to the counties.
At the county level, the 223rd Military Police Canpany (Louisville) provided l
l access control at designated points in the risk counties. The control points
[
The Guard also pro-were constantly shifted to reflect the evolving situation.
vided security for some county operations and during the recovery phase assisted with radiological sample delivery. The National Guard personnel carried out f
their assigned functions in an efficient and well organized manner.
l The Kentucky State Three other state agencies played key roles in the exercise.
Police transported the Field Radiological Monitors throughout the EPZ.
They
[
also served as the conmunications link between the Field Monitors and the FRC.
The State The KSP manned access control points in the three risk counties.
Policemen exhibited a high degree of professionalism.
1
!i The Department of Natural Resources and Enviramental Protection provided per-These Monitors were sonnel to collect air, water, soil, and vegetation samples.
i.
They dispatched frem. the FRC to various locations in the counties of concern.
l performed their tasks systematically and efficiently.
16
~
W The USDA representative:s in the EOC provided valuabl e assistanch to the Radia-tion Branch personnel in the Recovery phase At the local level many indivi-i duals from the agricultural community participated as members of the local EOC staff.
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Menters of the Campbell County Emergency Operations Center worked together to solve the many problems generated on exercise day.
18
BOONE COUNTY
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The Boone County personnel displayed a very fine capability for emergency re-sponse. Organization of their response effort was a strong point.
All parti-cipating groups met and were briefed; monitors reported to their appropriate stations; the auxiliary police secured the area; shelters were quickly estab-
~.
lished; and the simulated evacuation into the county was monitored closely.
Recommendations for improved emergency response:
1.
A firmer coordination with school personnel is needed to complete pro-cedures for sheltering.
2.
Procedures to, handle the press and provide briefings must be improved.
3.
Decontamination procedures should be refined, particularly those which pertain to contaminated vehicle handling.
4.
Communications with the risk county (Campbell) must be strengthened to insure effective inter-county coordination.
19 l
BRACKEN COUNTr Brauen County officials discharged their decision making responsibility in a can'ident and ef ficient manner, The EOC personnel demonstrated the ability to worr together and improved their EOC procedures as the exercise progressed.
Rec:mendations for improved v.w gency response:
1.
EOC procedures and message handling must be improved and new message forms developed.
2.
Security measures should be refined in order to control access to the EOC of unai.thorized personnel.
3.
Further training should be conducted for all those groups participating in 1
the exercise.
'Oe G
9 20 l
I CAMPBELL COUNTY Co -ty officials and emergency workers performed well during the exercise.
The ste'f conducting emergency response activities performed its tasks in a serious anc workman-like manner.
They digested available information and made firm and effective decisions to enable their citizens to respond.
After the decision to eve:uate was made, access control points were readily established.
The staff of Sai-t Luke's Hospital should also be commended for its role in the exercise; a siculated evacuee was brought to the hospital and received excellent care from a well-trained staff.
Recommendations for improved emergency response:
1.
Training in several areas was again a problem.
Training in radiation expo-sure control techniques, emergency operations center procedures, and decontamin-ation should be significantly strengthened.
2.
Students at Northern Kentucky State University were given training prior to the exercise and were tu have participated as monitors at an established decon-tamination center.
Due to the fact that the University's official notification and instructions were received late these students were unaware of the exercise date and time.
As a result, no decont_ amination center was established on exer-cise day in Campbell County. Measures should be taken to insure a decantamina-tion center is established.
-3.
The Campbell County School superintendent chose not to participate in this exercise. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for school emergency response were incomplete at exercise time.
The local EOC officials did, however, simu-late school notification. All SOPS should be fully implemented prior to plant operation.
21
GRANT COUNTY Local EOC personnel were set up and ready to function only minutes af ter the initial notification. The EOC staff did a fine job of responding to their county's problems.
In addition to those problems generated by the exercise it-self, additional ones were initiated and handled to fully test all aspects of emergency response, not just the Zimmer incident.
Updates were given in a timely manner to keep the staff aware of the evolving situation.
Security was well defined and handled adequa tely.
Recommendations for improved emergency response:
1.
Communications between the risk county of Campbell and Grant County needs to be improved.
2.
The decontamination center personnel did an adequate job considering that the school used was in session; however, further training on decontamination procedures should be conducted.
3.
Some forms used in the decontamination center and local EOC need modifica-tion to enhar.ca the internal response time of the personnel.
22
HARRISON COUNTY An excellent working attitude was displayed by all Harrison County personnel in -
every aspect of the exered e from planning through execution.
Radio communica-tion was very effective and reliable as many messages were passed to state and county responders via amateur radio.
The decontamination / reception center was activated and individuals were processed in an efficient manner.
Shelters were also o;ened and individuals processed.
Recommendations to improve emergency response:
1.
More security should be provided to insure sightseers and other unauthorized personr.el are handled adequately.
l 2.
Some conmunications problems were experienced, primarily as the result of a procedural breakdown between counties.
Inter-county procedures should be improved.
3.
The decontamination center training must be improved to insure a complete l-understanding of the techniques and procedures involved.
4.
More training for medical personnel is warranted to insure understanding of personal decontamination measures.
l 23 I
v.
MASON' COUNTY The Mason County participants demonstrated a. fine degree of competence in many areas.
The EOC procedures and supplementary standard operating procedures were followed and personnel showed their familiarity with same.
Emergency public in-formation was well simulated and a local radio station actually presented a live broadcast of the events through the efforts of the designated E0C Public Infor-mation Officer. Complete records were maintained by the radiological personnel on evacuees as well as emergency responders.
Recommendations to improve emergency response:
1.
Coordination among the EOC staff and local police and hospital personnel should be well defined.
2.
Hand-held radios should be supplied to improve intra-county communications.
3.
Access control procedures should be strengthened.
4.
Decontamination center personnel must be trained further to insure a com-plete understanding of methgds.
24
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e PENOLETON COUNTY The Pendleton o'ficials were decisive and carried out their tasks in an effi-cient manner.
for example, protective actions were implemented promptly and correctly by the decision makers. Excellent cooperation was received from each local agency.
Recommendations to improve emergency response:
Displays in -he EOC must be improved to depict evacuation routes and relo-1.
cation centers.
Security measures should be better defined to keep unauthorized personnel 2.
from the EOC.
3.
More telephor.es should be installed in the EOC.
4.
Procedures should be solidified to insure notifications from ZNPS are re-ceived in a timely manner; during the exercise the. Alert notification was not
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received soon enough.
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i APPENDICES PMDI [M["3;.. ;.g--?eE ub=
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,A Exercise particicants briefed the media from the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) near Moscu, Ohio.
26 I
j
APPENDIX 1 ZIMMER STATION EXERCISE PARTICIPATING AGENCIES 1 - State Level Agriculture, State Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Disaster and Emergency Services, Division of Education and Humanities Cabinet Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Human Resources, Department for Radiation and Product Safety Branch Justice, Department of State Police Bureau Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Department of Public Fratection and Regulation Cabinet Red Cross American Transportation, Department of 2 - Observers State NJClear Issues Committee Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I.V Nuclear Regulatory Commissinn 3 - County Level a.
Soone County County Judge / Executive's Office Disaster and Emergency Services, Office of I
Sheriff's Office Boone/Kenton County Water Rescue Board of Education, Superintendent's Office Burlington Volunteer Fire Department Florence Volunteer Fire Department Burlington City Police l
Northern Kentucky Amateur Radio Club Red Cross Boone County Ministerial Association Boone County Police 1-1
County Judge /Fxecutive's Office Disaster at:t [mergency Services, Office of Brooksville Volunteer Fire Department Augusta Vol',nteer Fire Department Germantown tolunteer Fire Department Red Cross Sheriff's Office Agricultural Emergency Board Bracken County School System c.
Campbell Cot.ity County Judge / Executive's Office Disaster and Emergency Services, Office of Campbell Cou1ty Police Department Southern Can; bell County Fire Department Highland Heights Volunteer Fire Department Red Cross St. Luke, Hospital Campbell County Vocational School Agricultural Emergency Board Transt t Authority of Northern Xentucky Northern Kentucky Anateur Radio Club d.
G ant County County Judge / Executive's Office Disaster and Emergency Services, Office of Williamsburg Mayor's Office Dry Ridge Mayor's Office Williamsburg Police Department Grant County Rescue and REACT Sheriff's Office Williamsburg Volunteer Fire Department l
Grant County School System Grant County Memorial Hospital Grant County Road Department Agricultural Emergency Board Red Cross e.
Harrison County Cynthiana/ Harrison County Civil Defense Cynthiana Fire Department Harrison County School System Sheriff's Office Harrison County Fire and Rescue Harrison County Memorial Hospital Harrison County Junior ROTC Red Cross, Harrison County Chapter-Harrison County REACT Harrison County Health Department Brown Ambulante Service Bluegrass Amateur Radio Club 1-2
f.
Mason County Disaster and Emergency Services, Of fice of Maysville City Police Mason County School System Maysville Fire Department Sheriff's Office Agricultural Emergency Board Maysville/ Mason County Ambulance Service Mason County High School ROTC Civil Air Patrol Hayswood Hospital WFTM Radio Red Cross DeForrest Amateur Radio Club Mason County Health Department g.
Pendleton County County Judge / Executive's Office Disaster and Emergency Services, Office of Falmouth City Police Falmouth Volunteer Fire Department Sheriff's Office Northern Pendleton Fire Department Agricultural Emergency Board Pendleton County School System Red Cross Pendleton County Road Department Pendleton County Health Department Northern Kentucky Amateur Radio Club e
i 1-3
Aipendix 2 l
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES 10 Hilr* Raillise. - Plume Ixposure* loni*
SO Hile Radius - Ingestion Exposure Zone
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Zimmer Nuclear l
NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS l PROPOSED) k og, KENTUCKY us,w. mn w
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1 State asul/ur Local Ut~tsite Class 1.icensea Actions Authority Actions NOTiflCATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local 1.
Provide fire or security offsite authorttles of nature of assistance if requested Class Description unusual condition as soon as discovered 2.
Escalate to a more severe Unusual events are in process or class, if appropriate have occurred which indicate a 2.
Augment on-shift resources as potential degradation of the level needed 3.
Stand by untti verbal of safety of the plant. No closeout releases of radioactive material 3.
Assess and respond requiring offsite response or annitoring are expected unless 4.
Escalate to a more severe class.
further degradation of safety if appropriate systems occurs.
or Purpose 5
Close out with verbal sumanary to Purpose of offsite notification offsite authorttles; followed by is to (1) a'ssure that the first written sunnary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> step in any response later found to be necessary has been carried out.(2)bringtheoperating staf f to.a state of readiness,
,and(3)providesystematic handling of unusual events information and decisionmaking.
3-1
i State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions 4
ALEltf 1.
Promptly infona State and/or local 1.
Provide fire or security authorities of alert status and assistancd if requested Class Description reason for alert as soon as discovered 2.
Auguent resources and bring l
Events are in process or have primary response centers and occurred which involve an 2.
Augment resources and activate f05 to standby status actual or potential substantial on-site Technical Support Center degradation' of the level of and on-site operational support 3.
Alert to standby status Ley t
safety of the plant. Any center. Bring Emergency Operations emergency personne1 including releases expected to be factitty(EOF)andotherkey u nitoring teams and limited to small fractions emergency personnel to standby associated communications of the EPA Protective Action status Guideline exposure levels.
4.
Provide confinnatory offsite
~
3.
Assess and respond radiation monitoring and Purpose ingestion pathway dose 4.
Dispatch on-site monitoring teams projections if actual releases Purpose of offsite alert is and associated consnunications substantially exceed technical to (1) assure that caergency specification limits personnel are readily available 6.
Provide periodic plant status to respond if situation updates to offsite authorttles 5.
Escalate to a a re severe becomes are serious or to (at least every 15 minutes) class, if appropriate perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required, and 6.
Provide periodic meteorological 6.
Maintain alert status untti (2)provideoffsiteauthorities assessments to offsite authorities verbal closeout or reduction current status information.
and, if any releases are occurring.
of emergency class dose estimates for actual releases 7.
Escalate to a a re severe class, if appropriate 8.
Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class by verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by written suumary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of closecut or class reduction 3-2 W
State and/or Local Off' site Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local 1.
Provide any assistance requested offsito authoritins of sllo arna 2.
If shuttering near the site Class Description essergency status and reason for is desirable, activate
,,ggggc,gg,,3,,gg,,gg{uhlic emergency as soon as discovered g,
Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual 2.
Augment resources by activating at yeast two agjes of the plant l
l or likely major failures of on-site Technical Support Center, 3.
Provide public within at least l
plant functions needed for on-site operational support center about 10 miles periodic updates protection of the public.
and near-site Emergency Operations on emergency statut Any releases not expected facility (EOF) to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure 3.
Assess and respond primary response centers levels except near site 6.
Dispatch key emergency personnel boundary.
4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring including monitoring teams and teams and associated communications associated coeuunications 5.
Dedicate an individual for plant status 6.
Alert to standby status other Purpose of the site area updates to offsite authorities and
$']'Y bn) d oe emergency declaration is to periodic ressure briefings (perhaps (1)assurethatresponse
,loint wit offsite authorities) centers are manned (2) assure n r e ut ttos that monitoring teams are 6.
Make senior technical and management 7.
Provide offsite monitoring dispatched.(3 i assure that staff onsite available for consultation results to licensee. 00E and personnel requi red for with NRC and State on a periodic basis others and,fointly assess them t$ons 7.
Provide meteorological and dose esti-8 Continuously assess information areas ea d s
I " "' II " "# '"d # N'II' if situation becomes more mates to offsite authorities for actual serious (4) provide releases via a dedicated individual or sonttorleig with regard to f{'"9((0{8I
consultation with offsite automated data transmission S
g, p
g authorities,and(5) provide updates for the public 8.
Provide release and dose projections mobilizing evacuation resources through offsite authorities.
based on available plant condition 9.
Recorneend placing milk animals information and foreseeable contingencies within 2 miles on stored feed and assess need to extend 9.
Escalate to general emergency class, distance if appropriate
- 10. Provide press briefings. perhaps or with licensee
- 10. Close out or recommend reduction la
- 11. Escalate to Seneral cwergency emergency class by briefing of offsite class, if appropriate authorities at EOF and by phone followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of
- 12. Maintain site area emergency closecut or class reduction status until closeout or reduction of emergency clas!
3-3
State and/cr Local Offsito Class licensee Actions Authority Actiocs l
GtNERAL [HERGENCY
).
Frungstly inform State and local off site 1.
Provida any assistaino aut crities of general emergency status requested j
Class Description and reason for emergency as soon as 2.
Activate issuediate public j
discovered iParallel notification of notification of emergency Events are in process or have State /locall status and provide pubile occurred which involve actual periodic updates j
or feminent substantial core 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site l
degradation or melting with Technical Support Center. on-site 3.
Iteconnend sheltering for 2 potential for loss of contaln-operational support center and near-mile radius and 5 miles down-ment integrity. lleleases can site Emergency Operations facility (EOF),
wind and assess need to extend l
i be reasonably expected to distances. Consider advisa-l exceed EPA fratective Action 3.
Assess and respond hility of evacuallon (projected time available vs.
Culdeline exposure levels j
offsite'for more than the 4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring estimated evacuation times) lasnedtate site area.
teams and associated communications 4.
Augment resources by activating Primary response centers Purpose 6.
Dedicate an individual for plant status updates to offsite authorttles and 6.
Dispatch key emersency personnel Purpose of the general emergency periodic press briefings (perhaps joint including monitoring teams and declarationisto(1)inillate withoffsiteauthorttles) associated communications 4
predetermined protective actions 6.
Dispatch other emergency j
for the public. (2) provide 6.
Make senior technical and management staff personnel to duty stations I
continuous assessment of onsite available for consultation with within 5 mile radius and alert Infonaation from licensee and Neic and State on a periodic basis all others to standby status l
sents.(3)gantrationmeasure-offsite or Initiate additional 7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates 7.
Provide'offsite s.onitoring i
i seasures as indicated by actual to offsite authorities for actual results to licensee. DOE and i
orpotentialrelea.es.(4) releases via a dedicated Individual or others and jointly assess them provide consultation with automated data transmission g,
go,gg,,,,3jy,33,33 g,go,,,,
ovf u a es (o the 8.
Provide release and dose projections f
5 t
regari public througi offsfle based on avaliable plant condition changes to protective actions authorities.
Infonaation and foreseeable contingencies already initiated for public
- "d
- IM I'I"8 '"*II""
9.
Close out or recessend reduction of emergency class by briefing of offsite authorttles at EAF and by phone followed 9.
Recomenend placing r.llk animals by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of within 10 miles on stored feed closecut or class reduction and assess neel to extend distance
- 10. Provide press briefings. perhaps with licensee
- 11. Maintain general emergency status until closecut or reduction of emergency class 3-4
~
I em
i'
.l'
- _3 APPENDIX 4
,7' EMERGENCY RESPONSE EQUIPMENT FOR KENTUCKY In order to ensure an ef fective response to a ZNPS emergency, certain equipment and systems are necessary. The
~^
Division of Disaster & Emergency Services required the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company td provide the items
,7 listed. When fully operational, this equipment will enable the State to ef fectively respona,to a ZNPS inci.
dent.
The items will also be utilized for response to any natural disaster / emergency.
Additional equipnent or modifications to that committed may be required.
STATE / COUNTY ITEM QUANTITY STATUS
- tate Agencle.
a) Ky Radiation Branch 1.
Air Movers 8
Delivered 2.
Aluminum Probes & Ratemeters 3
Delivefed 3.
. Antenna System (for FRC) 1 Ins talled 4.
Anti-Contamination Kits 3
Deliverea 5.
Base Station (for FRC) 6.
DEC Writer (for state E0C).
1 Inr,tal led 1
Delivered 7.
Mobile-Portable Adapter.
1 Delivered 8.
Photon Detector, Tubes 8
' Delivered 9.
Pocket Pagers.
6 01 Order 10.
Potassuim Iodide (KI)
To Be Provided 11.
Portable Radios 8
Delivered 12.
Ring Monitoring 'Systen 7
To Be Provided 13.
Silver Absorber Cannisters 150 Delivered 14.
TLD Cards 400 To De Provided
- 15. Water Samplers 6-To Be Provided b) Ky DES 1.
Data MODEM 2
Installed 2.
KEWS System Additions Lot To-Be Provided i
3.
Microwave System Lot To Be Provided j
4.
Phone / Teletype Equipment Lot To Be Provided l
S.
Prompt Notification System a
Fixed Strens 15 Installed b
NOAA In-Home Radios 2,103 Out for Bids 4-1
j i
i STATE 600NTY ITEM QUANTITY STATUS 9.
Portable 2-Way Radio 4
Delivered 10.
Stand-by Generator 2
Delivered d) llost Counties 1.
Amateur Radio Systems and Other To Be Delivered Boone Equipment yet to be finalized.
Grant llarrison Mason 4
4-3
- n..
.w. a.
$ J (%1; Federal Enicigency Ma*1%$bh Agency A : _k j
-(((/.-
I ::gion IV 13 7 5 l'n.< hirce Su cct. NE Ati. inia,-( corgia :4009 i.it M 10 DEC 2' 1931
- 7.. f 'U. 0 Major General Billy G. Wellman Director, Dis aster and Emergency Services Th e F.0C Iuilding Boene Center Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 Attention: Erigadier General Wilbur R. Buntin, Jr.
Dear General Well=an:
Enclosed is a list of deficiencies noted in the Plant Zimmer REP Exercise conducted on I; ave =ber 18, 1981. Tnese deficiencies were observed by the Regional Assis tance Ccr.::nittee and FDiA IV Staf f.
We are a :are that corrections are currently being made in the State and Site-Specific Plans as a result of the Exercise and participant Critique conducted on ?;ovember 19, 1981.
Thus, at the earliest convenience, please provide the TEM IV Regional Director with a report on how and when the noted deficiencies will be corrected.
Upon receipt of this report, the process of plan review and acceptance may proceed.
We compliment Kentucky for the excellent Radiological Emergency Preparedness effort and sasure you that RAC IV and FEMA IV Staff remain committed to future support of REP activities in your State.
Sincerely,
/A
~2 Jack D. Richardson Chairman, RAC IV l
In:lesure 1
f 1
5-1 f
f L
I DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN THE PLANT ZD21ER REP EXERCISE I
f CONDUCTED IN t
NORTHERN KENTUCKY NOVDGER 18, 1981 f
i l
l l
1 5-2
DEFICI LNCIES NOTED in THE 7.IY.MER REP EXERCISE (1)
Emergency Oncration, Facilities and Resources No noted deficiencies at State EOC (Frankfort).
e Additional space for operations is required at the field radiological e
center (Falmouth) particularly the comrnand and control and display area.
Campbell County of ficials will have an excellent f acility when they e
move into their new space.
Bracken and Pendleton Counties need additional space and communications improvements.
(2)
Alertine and Notification of Officials and Staff No noted deficiencira at State EOC/ Campbell and Bracken Counties.,
e e There was some delay in notification in Pendleton County due to a pro-cedural problem and the need for additional training.
No noted deficiencies at FRC (Falmouth) e (3)
Emergenev Ooerations Management State EOC operational situation briefings should be given more fre-e quently and in more detail -- Plant conditions and off-site radio-logical situations should be brought clearly to the' attention of all staff.
Ohio evacuation decisions and actions were not made clear to the e
Recommend more freqbent cocnunication between RAD Health and State e
Operations Officer.
(4)
Public Alerting and Notification e Current system does not meet the requirements of NUREG 0654/FDfA REP-1.
o The system is to be tested at a later date (prior to on-line operation).
(5)
Public and Media Relations (S tate EOC)
Hard copy pr rss releases were not provided to the State EOC initially e
and in a timely manner.
5-3
2 Technical inf er.ation briefings for media were lacking at State EOC.
e Tnere was limited public infor nation staf f to do the job.
e More frequent press briefings would be required for a f ast developing e=ergency situation.
A utility spokesperson be located at State EOC to assist in providing e
information to the media may be advisable.
Otility EOF (Media Center)
E Kentucky PI Staff needed to be more aggressive in getting information e
from the utility -- time lapse caused problems on timely press releases.
Briefings (ideally involving a panel of experts) should be scheduled e
on a regular basis for consistency and continuity.
News releases should contain more information on evacuation locations as an example.
Initial briefings to media should include a comprehensive explanation e
of exercise purpose and objectives.
Media should not be made aware of exercise start times. Notify when e
EOF is activated.
(6) Accident Ass essment 1
The State RAD Eenith staff did a good job of accident assessment. How-e ever, staff limitations would be a problem in sustained operations over a protracted period.
The assignment of a utility representative to the State EOC to ensure e
proper exchange of technical data may be advisable.
Field monitoring teams operated effectively in providing radiation e
readings.
However, additional comrnunications capability and training are needed to operate more effectively.
Additional radiological equipment is also required in emergency kits.
(7) Actions to Protect the Public f
There appeared to be some delay in initiating the initial evacuation e
order.
However, when the final decision was made State and Local.
Governments put procedures into eff ect pro =ptly.
1 5-4
~
e 3
Mealth, Medica *. aqd, Exposure Control _
Lukes Hospital went well and pr e.cedures were (8)
Tne medical drill at St.
e carried out p r r.,pe rly.
sium iodide to Plans and proc :dures for administration of potas d
emergency werrers should be reviewe.
ion, perconnel dosimetry, e
~
i Additional training is needed in decontam nat and exposure c<antrol methodology.
e Goe ra tions_
Recoven and 7 eer.try (9) in this area.
Additional plans and exercises are needed e
to de-escalate to a e
i State should have challenged the utility decis ondue to off-site conditions.
site area er.ergency from a general emergencyd off-site readings did e
People were evacuated and housed in shelters an de-escalation.
not warrant Relevance of the Exercise Experience _
i i g experience for State (10)
The exercise provided a good learning and tra n n e
and local participants.
ii in most all areas
'Ihe exercise identified the need for more tra n ng d local level.
of emergency response both at State an were learned, e
j d specific lessons While definite impro'vements are needed, an ble of implementing the Kentuck i
the public Kentucky and the involved counties are capain order to protect I
e ces.
portion of the Zimmer site-specific planat Zimmer which may have of f-site con of an accident f
in the event b
e e,
t 1
4 5-5 1
-