ML19309D510: Difference between revisions

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   +/                                          SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC a gas COMPANY      '!,? ' 'H O [p ,'
   +/                                          SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC a gas COMPANY      '!,? ' 'H O [p ,'
                                                                                                          '      '
                                                                                                ,- -.          -
post ornce som rea CotuMe:A,Soutw CAmoWNA 29288 T.C . NicnotsWm.                                                      , )[f ni v.cr P.coms., == caov toscoveva mi.      ,=c,    . ..m. o      .
post ornce som rea CotuMe:A,Soutw CAmoWNA 29288 T.C . NicnotsWm.                                                      , )[f ni v.cr P.coms., == caov toscoveva mi.      ,=c,    . ..m. o      .
f  [i[[ ,*      g CCSV-03-0114-No February 5, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reilly Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement
f  [i[[ ,*      g CCSV-03-0114-No February 5, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reilly Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement
    '
       ,            U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Phrietta St., N.W., Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 o
       ,            U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Phrietta St., N.W., Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 o
Re: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit #1 Docket No.: 50-395 Report: RII:JLS 79-41
Re: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit #1 Docket No.: 50-395 Report: RII:JLS 79-41
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Attached are our responses to the referenced report which summarizes Mr. J. L. Skolds' inspections November 10 through December 31, 1979. Specifi-cally we have addressed the infraction dealing with Administrative Procedure 204.1, " Safety Tagging" where five safety tags were improperly hung, and the deficiency involving an out of specification chemistry sample taken during the " Steam Generator and Main Steam flydro Test", MS-01-H-1.            We consider that the actions we have taken are appropriate to assure that these t/pe of events will not recur.
Attached are our responses to the referenced report which summarizes Mr. J. L. Skolds' inspections November 10 through December 31, 1979. Specifi-cally we have addressed the infraction dealing with Administrative Procedure 204.1, " Safety Tagging" where five safety tags were improperly hung, and the deficiency involving an out of specification chemistry sample taken during the " Steam Generator and Main Steam flydro Test", MS-01-H-1.            We consider that the actions we have taken are appropriate to assure that these t/pe of events will not recur.
Should you have any questions or comments, please contact us at your convenience.
Should you have any questions or comments, please contact us at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
Very truly yours, T. C. Nichols                        /
                                                                          .                                    <
T. C. Nichols                        /
ARK:nfb                                            ce President & Group Executive '
ARK:nfb                                            ce President & Group Executive '
Power Production & System Operations cc:      W. A. Williams
Power Production & System Operations cc:      W. A. Williams
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                         ,'O. W. Dixon M. Whitaker J. L. Skolds (Resident Inspector)
                         ,'O. W. Dixon M. Whitaker J. L. Skolds (Resident Inspector)
File (2)
File (2)
O. S. Bradham
O. S. Bradham 8 0 04100 V k'
'
8 0 04100 V k'


    .      ,
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND CAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1
  ..,
* SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND CAS COMPANY
          *
* VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1
- 9)
- 9)
Docket Number:  50-395 Report Number:  50-395/79-41/ Notice of Violation    A..
Docket Number:  50-395 Report Number:  50-395/79-41/ Notice of Violation    A..
Event Date:      30 November 1979 Description of Event Safety Tags 11-128-79, 11-151-79 and 11-260-79 were issued to safely implement startup repair work in the component cooling system. In attaching the required tags, five (5) tags were attached in violation
Event Date:      30 November 1979 Description of Event Safety Tags 11-128-79, 11-151-79 and 11-260-79 were issued to safely implement startup repair work in the component cooling system. In attaching the required tags, five (5) tags were attached in violation of Paragraph 3.5 of Administrative Procedure 204.1, Safety Tagging.
      -
of Paragraph 3.5 of Administrative Procedure 204.1, Safety Tagging.
(1) Tag Number 11-128-79-9 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B (2) Tag Number 11-128-79-10 for valve 9589B was placed on valve 9594B (3) Tag Number 11-128-79-11 for valve 9594B was placed on valve 9484B (4) Tag Number 11-151-79-1 for valve 9587A was placed on valve 9590A            *
(1) Tag Number 11-128-79-9 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B (2) Tag Number 11-128-79-10 for valve 9589B was placed on valve 9594B (3) Tag Number 11-128-79-11 for valve 9594B was placed on valve 9484B (4) Tag Number 11-151-79-1 for valve 9587A was placed on valve 9590A            *
(5) Tag Number 11-260-79-2 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B Probable Consequence The valven being safety tagged closed isolated component cooling water to the reactor coolant pump B dermal barrier heat exchanger and oil coolers. Since all valves required to be tagged closed were in fact tagged and closed the intent of the safety tagging was satisfied and there was no detrimental ef fects either to personnel safety or equip-ment protection.
(5) Tag Number 11-260-79-2 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B Probable Consequence The valven being safety tagged closed isolated component cooling water to the reactor coolant pump B dermal barrier heat exchanger and oil coolers. Since all valves required to be tagged closed were in fact tagged and closed the intent of the safety tagging was satisfied and there was no detrimental ef fects either to personnel safety or equip-ment protection.
                                                '
Cause of Event The primary cause of the event was operator error. Contributing factors were the auxiliary operator's unfamiliarity with the component cooling water system and inadequate valve indentification methods, i .e. , pe rmanent valve idendification tags not installed.
Cause of Event The primary cause of the event was operator error. Contributing factors were the auxiliary operator's unfamiliarity with the component cooling water system and inadequate valve indentification methods, i .e. , pe rmanent valve idendification tags not installed.
Immediate Corrective Action Taken The improperly attached safety tags were attached to the correr valves.
Immediate Corrective Action Taken The improperly attached safety tags were attached to the correr valves.
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(1) All' active tag out sheets and tags were in agreement.
(1) All' active tag out sheets and tags were in agreement.
(2) All. safety tags were attached to the proper equipment.
(2) All. safety tags were attached to the proper equipment.
                                                                                  .  ---      - . .


     . . , ' I ',
     . . , ' I ',
  ,
Subsequent Corrective Action s-Administrative Procedure 204.1, " Safety Tagging", has been revised to reflect :
Subsequent Corrective Action s-Administrative Procedure 204.1, " Safety Tagging", has been revised to reflect :
(1)  Requirement that personnel requesting safety tags verify proper placement of tags prior to initiating work. While the Shift Supervisor retains the responsibility and authority to approve, issue and remove safety tags, this does not relieve a Maintenance or Startup Supervisor from his responsibility of verifying a safe working environment for his personnel.
(1)  Requirement that personnel requesting safety tags verify proper placement of tags prior to initiating work. While the Shift Supervisor retains the responsibility and authority to approve, issue and remove safety tags, this does not relieve a Maintenance or Startup Supervisor from his responsibility of verifying a safe working environment for his personnel.
(2)  Requirement for a quarterly audit of active safety tag out sheets to insure they are accounted for and required.
(2)  Requirement for a quarterly audit of active safety tag out sheets to insure they are accounted for and required.
(3)  Requirement for a semi-annual 100% audit of all safety tags installed to insure proper placement and agreement with safety tag out sheets.
(3)  Requirement for a semi-annual 100% audit of all safety tags installed to insure proper placement and agreement with safety tag out sheets.
                                                                                          .
Improve equipment identification by walking down all systems to identify, number, and label all valves to reflect as built conditions.
Improve equipment identification by walking down all systems to identify, number, and label all valves to reflect as built conditions.
Improve auxiliary operator training. An on shift system checkout program for the auxiliary operators to compliment their on-the-job training has been developed.
Improve auxiliary operator training. An on shift system checkout program for the auxiliary operators to compliment their on-the-job training has been developed.
.


_ .                                .      .--            ..                . - . -          .-    _      -    . - -  -  - . ..
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                  . .
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1                        .
       - ,                                          SOUTil CAP.0 LINA ELECTRIC AND CAS COMPANY
       - ,                                          SOUTil CAP.0 LINA ELECTRIC AND CAS COMPANY
     ' V                                          ' VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. I
     ' V                                          ' VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. I Docket Number:              50-395 Report Number: RII:JLS 79-41/ Notice of Violation B.
!
Event Date:                September 21, 1979 l
'
Description of Event
Docket Number:              50-395 Report Number: RII:JLS 79-41/ Notice of Violation B.
Event Date:                September 21, 1979
                                                                                                                                      '
l Description of Event
  ,                    Step 3.2 of Startup Test Instruction NS-01-H-1, " Steam Generator and Main j
  ,                    Step 3.2 of Startup Test Instruction NS-01-H-1, " Steam Generator and Main j
Steam Ilydro Test" states in part that the water in the Condensate Storage Tank and the Steam Generator shall be verified to be in specification with                                    i
Steam Ilydro Test" states in part that the water in the Condensate Storage Tank and the Steam Generator shall be verified to be in specification with                                    i the water chemistry requirements listed in that step. The hydrazine specifi-                                  !
          -
the water chemistry requirements listed in that step. The hydrazine specifi-                                  !
cation was 75-150 ppm. On September 21, 1979, a sample of the Condensate                                      !
cation was 75-150 ppm. On September 21, 1979, a sample of the Condensate                                      !
Storage Tank indicated a hydrazine concentration of 153 ppm.                        Paragraph 4.4.1          !
Storage Tank indicated a hydrazine concentration of 153 ppm.                        Paragraph 4.4.1          !
of Startup Manual Procedure SUM B-1, " Preparation of Phase I Startup Instructions"                            l states in part that the Test Supervisor will assure the actions taken in, con-
of Startup Manual Procedure SUM B-1, " Preparation of Phase I Startup Instructions"                            l states in part that the Test Supervisor will assure the actions taken in, con-nection with deficiencies noted during the conduct of the test are properly I                      documented within the test instruction. Contrary to the above, no documen-tation existed to state what had been done in the evaluation of the out of specification chemistry reading.
,
l l                    Probable Consequences There were no detrimental effects caused by the out of specification condition because the hydrazine sample was only 3 ppm out of the limit stated in the proced ure.      It should also be noted that the limit was exceeded in the con-servative direction.
nection with deficiencies noted during the conduct of the test are properly I                      documented within the test instruction. Contrary to the above, no documen-tation existed to state what had been done in the evaluation of the out of
!
specification chemistry reading.
l l                    Probable Consequences
                                                                                                                                      '
There were no detrimental effects caused by the out of specification condition
* because the hydrazine sample was only 3 ppm out of the limit stated in the proced ure.      It should also be noted that the limit was exceeded in the con-servative direction.
                                                                                                                                      ,
,
Cause of Event                                                                                                !
Cause of Event                                                                                                !
I
I There are four primary factors which contributed to the "cause of event".                                      ;
* There are four primary factors which contributed to the "cause of event".                                      ;
"
These are as follows.                                                                                          ,
These are as follows.                                                                                          ,
                                                                                                                                      -
(1) The hydrazine limits specified in the test instruction were overly restrictive, i                                                                                                                                    i (2) The startup personnel involved were trying to operate too close to                                        r procedural chemistry limits.
(1) The hydrazine limits specified in the test instruction were overly restrictive, i                                                                                                                                    i (2) The startup personnel involved were trying to operate too close to                                        r procedural chemistry limits.
1 (3) Due to personnel error, the Test Supervisor failed to recognize this "out of specification" condition, to evaluate the condition, and to document the evaluation within the Test Instruction.                                                !
1 (3) Due to personnel error, the Test Supervisor failed to recognize this "out of specification" condition, to evaluate the condition, and to document the evaluation within the Test Instruction.                                                !
                                                                                                                                      ,
(4) There existed a lack of proper interface between the Startup Group and the Chemistry Department concerning the limits stated in the Startup Instruction.
(4) There existed a lack of proper interface between the Startup Group and the Chemistry Department concerning the limits stated in the Startup Instruction.
a
a 1
!
i
1 i
          . . _ _          __ ._          .      -              . _ _ _ _ _          ,
                                                                                            .    .    ._ _    __      _  _


-    r*
-    r*
4*    .
4*    .
e
e Immediate Corrective Action Taken Startup personnel wrote Startup Field  Report No. 1972 to document the evaluation of the hydrazine being out  of specification. In terms of the out of specification effect on  the system, no corrective action was necessary since the condition was  in the conservative direction.
          ,
,
Immediate Corrective Action Taken Startup personnel wrote Startup Field  Report No. 1972 to document the evaluation of the hydrazine being out  of specification. In terms of the out of specification effect on  the system, no corrective action was necessary since the condition was  in the conservative direction.
Subsequent Corrective Action To prevent reoccurrance of this type of non-compliance, directives werc given to all Startup Lead System Supervisors instructing them to (1) Insure that limits, such as chemistry limits, written into test procedures are not overly restrictive, (2) Run tests well within any stated limits when possible, and (3) Never sign-off procedure re-sults as being completed when there is an exception out-standing. The chemistry department has also taken actions to strengthen their inter-f aces with other organizations such as startup.
Subsequent Corrective Action To prevent reoccurrance of this type of non-compliance, directives werc given to all Startup Lead System Supervisors instructing them to (1) Insure that limits, such as chemistry limits, written into test procedures are not overly restrictive, (2) Run tests well within any stated limits when possible, and (3) Never sign-off procedure re-sults as being completed when there is an exception out-standing. The chemistry department has also taken actions to strengthen their inter-f aces with other organizations such as startup.
d
d
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Revision as of 11:39, 1 February 2020

Responds to NRC 800118 Ltr Re Violation Noted in IE Insp Rept 50-395/79-41.Corrective Actions:Attached Safety Tags to Correct Valves & Wrote Startup Field Rept 1972
ML19309D510
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/1980
From: Nichols T
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19309D508 List:
References
CGSV-03-0114-NO, CGSV-3-114-NO, NUDOCS 8004100402
Download: ML19309D510 (5)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:' o 

 +/                                           SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC a gas COMPANY       '!,? ' 'H O [p ,'

post ornce som rea CotuMe:A,Soutw CAmoWNA 29288 T.C . NicnotsWm. , )[f ni v.cr P.coms., == caov toscoveva mi. ,=c, . ..m. o . f [i[[ ,* g CCSV-03-0114-No February 5, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reilly Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement 

      ,            U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Phrietta St., N.W., Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 o

Re: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit #1 Docket No.: 50-395 Report: RII:JLS 79-41

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached are our responses to the referenced report which summarizes Mr. J. L. Skolds' inspections November 10 through December 31, 1979. Specifi-cally we have addressed the infraction dealing with Administrative Procedure 204.1, " Safety Tagging" where five safety tags were improperly hung, and the deficiency involving an out of specification chemistry sample taken during the " Steam Generator and Main Steam flydro Test", MS-01-H-1. We consider that the actions we have taken are appropriate to assure that these t/pe of events will not recur. Should you have any questions or comments, please contact us at your convenience. Very truly yours, T. C. Nichols / ARK:nfb ce President & Group Executive ' Power Production & System Operations cc: W. A. Williams

11. T. Babb D. A. Nauman
                        ,'O. W. Dixon M. Whitaker J. L. Skolds (Resident Inspector)

File (2) O. S. Bradham 8 0 04100 V k'

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND CAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1 - 9) Docket Number: 50-395 Report Number: 50-395/79-41/ Notice of Violation A.. Event Date: 30 November 1979 Description of Event Safety Tags 11-128-79, 11-151-79 and 11-260-79 were issued to safely implement startup repair work in the component cooling system. In attaching the required tags, five (5) tags were attached in violation of Paragraph 3.5 of Administrative Procedure 204.1, Safety Tagging. (1) Tag Number 11-128-79-9 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B (2) Tag Number 11-128-79-10 for valve 9589B was placed on valve 9594B (3) Tag Number 11-128-79-11 for valve 9594B was placed on valve 9484B (4) Tag Number 11-151-79-1 for valve 9587A was placed on valve 9590A * (5) Tag Number 11-260-79-2 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B Probable Consequence The valven being safety tagged closed isolated component cooling water to the reactor coolant pump B dermal barrier heat exchanger and oil coolers. Since all valves required to be tagged closed were in fact tagged and closed the intent of the safety tagging was satisfied and there was no detrimental ef fects either to personnel safety or equip-ment protection. Cause of Event The primary cause of the event was operator error. Contributing factors were the auxiliary operator's unfamiliarity with the component cooling water system and inadequate valve indentification methods, i .e. , pe rmanent valve idendification tags not installed. Immediate Corrective Action Taken The improperly attached safety tags were attached to the correr valves. All Shif t Supervisors have reviewed Administrative Procedure 204.1, 

             " Safety Tagging", with all qualified tagging personnel emphasizing the importance of hanging the tags at the proper place.

A 1.00% audit of all safety tags outstanding was completed, verifying that: (1) All' active tag out sheets and tags were in agreement. (2) All. safety tags were attached to the proper equipment. 

   . . , ' I ',

Subsequent Corrective Action s-Administrative Procedure 204.1, " Safety Tagging", has been revised to reflect : (1) Requirement that personnel requesting safety tags verify proper placement of tags prior to initiating work. While the Shift Supervisor retains the responsibility and authority to approve, issue and remove safety tags, this does not relieve a Maintenance or Startup Supervisor from his responsibility of verifying a safe working environment for his personnel. (2) Requirement for a quarterly audit of active safety tag out sheets to insure they are accounted for and required. (3) Requirement for a semi-annual 100% audit of all safety tags installed to insure proper placement and agreement with safety tag out sheets. Improve equipment identification by walking down all systems to identify, number, and label all valves to reflect as built conditions. Improve auxiliary operator training. An on shift system checkout program for the auxiliary operators to compliment their on-the-job training has been developed.

.

1 . 

      - ,                                           SOUTil CAP.0 LINA ELECTRIC AND CAS COMPANY
   ' V                                          ' VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. I Docket Number:              50-395 Report Number: RII:JLS 79-41/ Notice of Violation B.

Event Date: September 21, 1979 l Description of Event 

,                     Step 3.2 of Startup Test Instruction NS-01-H-1, " Steam Generator and Main j

Steam Ilydro Test" states in part that the water in the Condensate Storage Tank and the Steam Generator shall be verified to be in specification with i the water chemistry requirements listed in that step. The hydrazine specifi-  ! cation was 75-150 ppm. On September 21, 1979, a sample of the Condensate  ! Storage Tank indicated a hydrazine concentration of 153 ppm. Paragraph 4.4.1  ! of Startup Manual Procedure SUM B-1, " Preparation of Phase I Startup Instructions" l states in part that the Test Supervisor will assure the actions taken in, con-nection with deficiencies noted during the conduct of the test are properly I documented within the test instruction. Contrary to the above, no documen-tation existed to state what had been done in the evaluation of the out of specification chemistry reading. l l Probable Consequences There were no detrimental effects caused by the out of specification condition because the hydrazine sample was only 3 ppm out of the limit stated in the proced ure. It should also be noted that the limit was exceeded in the con-servative direction. Cause of Event  ! I There are four primary factors which contributed to the "cause of event".  ; These are as follows. , (1) The hydrazine limits specified in the test instruction were overly restrictive, i i (2) The startup personnel involved were trying to operate too close to r procedural chemistry limits. 1 (3) Due to personnel error, the Test Supervisor failed to recognize this "out of specification" condition, to evaluate the condition, and to document the evaluation within the Test Instruction.  ! (4) There existed a lack of proper interface between the Startup Group and the Chemistry Department concerning the limits stated in the Startup Instruction. a 1 i

- r* 4* . e Immediate Corrective Action Taken Startup personnel wrote Startup Field Report No. 1972 to document the evaluation of the hydrazine being out of specification. In terms of the out of specification effect on the system, no corrective action was necessary since the condition was in the conservative direction. Subsequent Corrective Action To prevent reoccurrance of this type of non-compliance, directives werc given to all Startup Lead System Supervisors instructing them to (1) Insure that limits, such as chemistry limits, written into test procedures are not overly restrictive, (2) Run tests well within any stated limits when possible, and (3) Never sign-off procedure re-sults as being completed when there is an exception out-standing. The chemistry department has also taken actions to strengthen their inter-f aces with other organizations such as startup. d 

           .}}
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