IR 05000348/2011009

IR 05000348-11-009 & 05000364-11-009; on 03/07-11/2011 - 03/21-25/2011; Joseph M. Farley, NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report

ML112310661
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	08/17/2011
From:	Nease R NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
To:	Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-11-009
Download: ML112310661 (31)

Text

UNITED STATES ust 17, 2011

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2011009 AND 05000364/2011009

Dear Mr. Stinson:

On March 25, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The preliminary inspection results were discussed on that date, with you and other members of your staff. As a result of post-inspection analysis of the preliminary inspection findings by the NRC in conjunction with additional information provided by your staff, the nature of the results changed from that discussed on March 25, 2011, and these changes were discussed by telephone with Mr. R. Martin, Engineering Programs Manager, and others on April 29, 2011. On July 22, 2011, a final exit meeting was conducted to discuss the results of the inspection with you, and other members of your staff.

During this inspection, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to public health and safety and compliance with the Commission=s rules and regulations.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with licensee personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

SNC 2 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 0500348/2011009 and 05000364/2011009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 License No.: NPF-2, NPF-8 Report No.: 05000348/2011009 AND 05000364/2011009 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, Alabama 36319 Dates: March 07 - 11, 2011 (Week 1)

March 21 - 25, 2011 (Week 2)

Inspectors: Necota Staples, Senior Project Inspector (Lead Inspector)

Pauline Braxton, Reactor Inspector Mina Sheikh, Senior Project Inspector Gerald Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by: Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2011-009, 05000364/2011-009; 03/07 - 11/2011 and 03/21 - 25/2011;

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection.

This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a team of four regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

==1R05 Fire Protection

==

This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection (TFPI) for a plant in transition to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition. This inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection-NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial).

The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of 3 risk-significant fire areas (FAs) to verify implementation of the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) fire protection program (FPP) and to verify site specific implementation of at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment.

The team selected three fire areas/fire zones (FZ) for detailed review to examine the licensees implementation of the FPP. The three fire areas chosen for review were selected based on risk insights from the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External Events, information contained in FPP documents, results of prior NRC triennial fire protection inspections, and in-plant tours by the inspectors. In selecting the B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the inspectors reviewed mitigating strategy operating license conditions 2.G (Unit 1) and 2.I (Unit 2), licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three FAs and one B.5.b mitigating strategy for addressing large fires and explosions.

This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the IP by selecting three FAs and at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy. The three FAs chosen were:

• FA 1-006, FZs 6-A (Rooms 189-190, 193-195, 199), 6-B (Rooms 241-243), 6-C (Room 185), 6-D (Room 191), 6-E (Room 192) Component Cooling Water Pump and Heat Exchanger Room, Elevation 100 foot (ft) - 175 foot, North West (NW)and South West (SW) Quadrant

• FA 1-21A, FZ 21-A (Rooms 229, 233), Unit 1 Train B 4kV Switchgear Room, Elevation 121 ft, SW Quadrant

• FA 1-040, FZ 40-A (Room 318), Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room, Elevation 139 ft, NW Quadrant For each of the selected fire areas, the inspection team evaluated the licensees FPP against the applicable NRC requirements. The specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

.01 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown From Main Control Room (Normal Shutdown)

a. Inspection Scope

Methodology The team reviewed applicable portions of FNP Units 1 and 2 post-fire safe shutdown analysis A-350971, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Fire Protection Program, Rev. 4 (SSA), abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), standard operating procedure (SOP), piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), applicable electrical one-line drawings, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from the main control room (MCR) for postulated fires in FA 1-006 (FZs 6-C and 6-E) and FA 1-21A (FZ 21-A).

Plant walkdowns were performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the fire hazards analysis (FHA) and SSA. These inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support system functions. The team reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage.

Operational Implementation The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) and performed walkthroughs of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. The team reviewed and performed independent walkthroughs of applicable sections of fire response procedure AOP 29.0, Plant Fire, Rev. 38 for FA 1-006, FZ 6-C and FZ 6-E and FA 1-21A, FZ 21-A.

Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R specifies the separation and design requirements to protect one train of cables and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from fire damage when redundant trains are located within the same fire area. In cases where the separation requirements of Section III.G.2 were not met and local operator manual actions (OMAs) were utilized by the licensee in lieu of cable protection, the team verified during procedure walkthroughs that unapproved OMAs, in the selected fire areas were feasible utilizing the criteria in 2 of NRC IP 71111.05TTP.

The team reviewed calculation SE-C051326701-007, Revision 2, Post-Fire Manual Action Feasibility Analysis, to verify that the licensee had identified OMAs for post-fire SSD in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 designated areas and had placed these issues in their corrective action program. For OMAs not previously approved by NRC, the licensee has committed to adopt NFPA 805 and transition the FNP fire protection licensing basis to the performance based standard of 10 CFR 50.48 (c). During this transition, unapproved OMAs are considered compensatory measures according to the FPP. The team verified that the licensee had plans in place to track resolution of OMA issues as part of the plant-wide risk evaluation for transition to NFPA 805.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.02 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected FAs/FZs, the team evaluated the potential for fires, the combustible fire load characteristics, and the potential exposure fire severity. The team reviewed the FNP UFSAR, Appendix 9B; Procedure FHA; FNP-0-SOP-0.4, Fire Protection Program Administration and, selected plant administrative procedures which established and implemented controls and practices to prevent fires and to control the storage of permanent and transient combustible materials and ignition sources. This review was performed to ensure that the objectives established by the NRC-approved FPP were satisfied. The team also reviewed selected licensee fire incident reports, combustible tracking logs, maintenance procedures, housekeeping inspection reports, and general employee training covering control of ignition sources and transient combustibles.

These reviews were accomplished to ensure that the licensee had properly evaluated in-situ combustible fire loads, controlled hot-work activities, and limited transient fire hazards in a manner consistent with the plant administrative and FPP procedures.

Additionally, the team toured the selected plant FA/FZs to observe whether programmatic procedures for limiting fire hazards, waste collection, housekeeping practices, and cleanliness conditions were implemented consistent with the UFSAR, administrative procedures, and other FPP procedures. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected FAs, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, fire dampers and structural steel fireproofing. The team reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals to ensure the fire barrier features were of the appropriate fire rating. The team compared the installed barrier configurations to the approved construction details, and supporting fire endurance test data, which established the ratings of the fire barriers. The team verified that the as-built configurations met the engineering design, standard industry practices, and were properly evaluated or qualified by appropriate fire endurance tests. The team reviewed licensee evaluations of the non-standard fire barrier penetration seal configurations for FA 1-21 and FA 1-06. The team also reviewed the FHA to verify the fire loading used by the licensee to determine the fire resistance rating of the fire barrier enclosures. In addition, the team reviewed licensing bases documentation, such as NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) and exemptions from NRC regulations, to verify that passive fire protection features met license commitments.

The team walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs to observe the material condition of the passive fire barriers. In addition, a sample of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals were reviewed to ensure that these passive fire barriers were being properly inspected and maintained. The passive fire barriers included in the review are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.04 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected FAs, the team reviewed the adequacy of the design, installation, and operation of the automatic detection and alarm system to actuate in the early stage of a fire. The review included walk downs of the systems and an examination of the types of detectors, detector spacing, the licensee=s technical evaluation of the detector locations, and the ceiling, steel beam reinforcing plans to assess whether the areas were protected by fire detectors in accordance with the applicable NFPA code of record requirements.

The inspectors also reviewed the FHA, UFSAR Appendix 9B, Section 9B.4.1.13; licensees submittals; and associated NRC SERs for FAs 1-21 and 1-40 to verify that the fire detection systems for the selected fire areas were installed in accordance with the design and licensing basis of the plant.

The team reviewed the automatic and manual suppression surveillance instructions, as well as, the most recently completed surveillance tests for each of the selected FAs. The team reviewed the fire protection water supply system and operational valve lineups associated with the electric motor-driven and diesel-driven fire pumps and plant fire water distribution piping system. During plant tours, the team observed placement of the fire hoses and extinguishers to verify they were not blocked and were consistent with the fire fighting FZ datasheets and FPP documents.

The team reviewed the secondary fire brigade staging and dress-out areas to assess the operational readiness of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. The fire brigade personal protective equipment and the self-contained breathing apparatus were reviewed for adequacy and functionality. The team also reviewed fire fighting FZ datasheets and fire response procedures for the selected FAs to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members to identify safe shutdown equipment and to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact safe shutdown capability. The team walked down the selected FAs to compare the associated datasheets and drawings with as-built plant conditions and fire response procedures. This was done to verify that fire fighting FZ datasheets and drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditions described in the FHA. The inspectors also evaluated whether the fire response procedures and fire zone datasheets for the selected fire areas/rooms could be implemented as intended.

The team also reviewed operator and fire brigade staffing, fire brigade response reports, offsite fire department communications and staging procedures, fire fighting pre-plan strategies, fire brigade qualification training, and the fire brigade drill program procedures. Fire brigade response-to-drill scenarios and associated brigade drill evaluations/critiques that transpired over the last 12 months for or in the vicinity of the selected FAs/FZs were reviewed. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Through a combination of in-plant inspection and drawing reviews, the team evaluated the selected FAs to determine whether redundant trains of systems required for post-fire SSD could be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. The team considered the effects of water, drainage, heat, hot gasses, and smoke that could potentially damage redundant trains. Additionally, the team checked that fire fighting water would either be contained in the fire affected area or be safely drained off.

The team addressed the possibility that a fire in one FA could lead to activation of an automatic suppression system in another FA through the migration of smoke or hot gases, and thereby adversely affect local operator actions required for SSD. Air flow paths out of the selected FAs were reviewed to verify that inter-area migration of smoke or hot gases would not inhibit necessary local operator actions. This portion of the inspection was carried out through a combination of plant walk-downs and drawings, and records review. Documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.06 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room (Alternative Shutdown)

a. Inspection Scope

Methodology The team reviewed the licensees alternative shutdown (ASD) methodology to verify conformance with applicable requirements for the identified components and systems used to achieve and maintain post-fire SSD conditions for FA 1-040, FZ 40-A. The team reviewed applicable portions of the licensees analysis, A-350970, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, Alternative Shutdown Capability, Rev. 14; UFSAR; procedure FNP-1-AOP-28.1, Fire or Inadvertent Fire Protection System Actuation in the Cable Spreading Room, Rev. 32; P&IDs; electrical drawings; and other supporting documents for a postulated fire in FA 1-040, FZ 40-A. The reviews focused on ensuring that the required functions for post-fire SSD and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions were included in the procedures. The review included assessing whether hot and cold shutdown from outside the MCR could be implemented, and that transfer of control from the MCR to the alternative shutdown control stations could be accomplished. This review also included verification that shutdown from outside the MCR could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power. The team reviewed the adequacy of the systems and components at the hot shutdown panel HSP credited for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

Operational Implementation The team reviewed the training lesson plans for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify that the training reinforced the ASD methodology in the SSA for the selected FAs.

The team also reviewed shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using the alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available on-site, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members. The team reviewed operator training lesson plans and job performance measures (JPMs), and discussed the training with operators to verify that ASD activities were appropriately included in the training program.

For a significant fire in FA 1-040, ASD from the Hot Shutdown Panels (HSP) was credited for use for establishing SSD. The team reviewed the operational implementation of the ASD capability for a fire in FA 1-040 to verify:

(1) the procedures used for ASD were consistent with the SSA methodology and assumptions;

(2) the procedures were written so that the operator actions could be correctly performed within the times assumed in the SSA. The team performed independent walkthroughs of the post-fire ASD procedures FNP-0-AOP-29.0 and FNP-1-AOP-28.1, to verify that the procedures could be performed within the required times, given the minimum required operator staffing level, with or without offsite power. Also, the procedure walkthroughs were performed to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. Time critical actions reviewed included: electrical power distribution alignment, establishing control at the dedicated shutdown control stations, establishing reactor coolant makeup, and establishing decay heat removal.

The team also reviewed the periodic test procedures and test records of the alternative shutdown transfer capability, and instrumentation and control functions, to ensure the tests were adequate to verify the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.

Electrical schematics were reviewed to verify that circuits for SSD equipment, which could be damaged due to fire, were isolated by disconnect switches and by swapping power supplies for selected Motor Control Centers. In addition, the team reviewed wiring diagrams for instrumentation located on the alternative shutdown control stations to verify that necessary process monitoring was available as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.07 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

This segment is suspended for plants in transition because a more detailed review of cable routing and circuit analysis will be conducted as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805. However, a review of the licensees preliminary cable routing information was used by the team to assess the adequacy of the licensees fire response procedures in the selected fire areas. The routing information was based upon a list of safe shutdown components selected by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.08 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of actions to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions. The team also reviewed the communication systems available at different locations within the plant that would be relied upon to support fire event notification and fire brigade fire fighting activities to verify their availability at different locations. The team reviewed the electrical power supplies and the cable routing for the phone system to ensure that the required communication systems remained functional following a fire in the selected FAs.

Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.09 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the adequacy of the emergency lighting units (ELUs) used to support plant personnel during post-fire safe shutdown for the selected FAs. The team performed plant walkdowns and observed the placement and coverage area of fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lights throughout the FAs to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. The team reviewed completed test records of ELU battery 8-hour capacity tests to ensure that they were sized, tested, and maintained consistent with vendor guidance, license requirements, and licensee commitments. This review also included examination of whether backup ELUs were provided for the primary and secondary fire emergency equipment storage locker locations and dress-out areas in support of fire brigade operations should power fail during a fire emergency. The team performed plant walkdowns of FAs to observe the placement and coverage area of credited, fixed 8-hour battery pack ELUs. The team reviewed vendor manuals to ensure that the emergency lights were being maintained consistent with the manufactures recommendations. The team also reviewed the battery power supplies to verify they were rated for at least an 8-hour capacity. The team observed a blackout test of normal lighting to demonstrate the emergency lighting adequacy at the Unit 1 dedicated HSP. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees SSA to determine if any repairs were necessary to achieve cold shutdown. The need and provisions for post-fire repairs to transition from hot shutdown to a cold shutdown condition were evaluated by the team in relation to the selected FAs/FZs. SSD procedure AOP 28.1 describes methods for repairing fire damaged equipment needed to bring the unit from hot standby to cold shutdown. The team reviewed procedure EIP-16, Emergency Equipment and Supplies, and verified through observation that the repair materials were available on the site. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, or pumps, valves or electrical devices providing SSD functions or capabilities). The team reviewed selected items on the fire protection impairment log and compared them with the FAs/FZs selected for inspection. The compensatory measures that had been established in these FAs/FZs were compared to those specified for the applicable fire protection feature to verify that the risk associated with removing the fire protection feature from service was properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with the approved FPP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.12 B.5.b Mitigating Strategy Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees established program for responding to a large fire or explosion event consistent with the established license condition. The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the licensees mitigation measures to depressurize the steam generator to reduce inventory loss for a large fire or explosion. The inspectors reviewed applicable SERs and submittals which supported the elements outlined by the license condition. The inspectors reviewed applicable training of staff as well as credited procedures used for strategy implementation. The inspectors also assessed the adequacy of surveillance and maintenance of credited equipment by reviewing a sample of completed records. The inspectors conducted tabletops of applicable strategies under review with licensee personnel credited for responding to an event. The inspectors performed walkdowns with individuals provided by the licensee staff to assess the implementation capabilities of the individuals and the adequacy of procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed condition reports (CRs) related to the Farley FPP, and the capability to successfully achieve and maintain the plant in a SSD condition following a plant fire, as well as selected fire brigade response, emergency / incidents, and fire safety inspection reports were reviewed. This review was conducted to assess the frequency of fire incidents and effectiveness of the fire prevention program and any maintenance-related or material condition problems related to fire incidents. In addition, the team reviewed a sample of the FPP audits which the licensee performed in the previous one-year period to assess the types of findings that were generated and that the findings were appropriately entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP).

The team also reviewed other CAP documents, including completed corrective actions documented in selected CRs, and operating experience program documents to verify that industry-identified fire protection problems potentially or actually affecting CR database were appropriately entered into, and resolved by the CAP process. Items included in the operating experience program effectiveness review were licensee responses NRC Regulatory Issue Summaries, Information Notices, Generic Letters, industry or vendor-generated reports of defects and noncompliance under 10 CFR Part 21, and vendor information letters. The team evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for a sample of identified issues. Specifically, the team performed a detailed review of the corrective actions for NCV (Non-Cited Violation) 05000348, 364/2008006-01,Fire Protection Credits Unreliable Indication; NCV 05000364/

2005006-003, Unapproved Local OMA for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown; and NCV 05000364/2008006-02, Areas Where OMAs Are Performed Did Not Have ELUs Installed. The team evaluated the thoroughness of the CAP to properly classify and prioritize any safety concerns or action items associated with the CRs. The licensee was transitioning FNPs fire protection licensing basis to 10 CFR 50.48 (c). Corrective actions for the above NCVs were being implemented through this process. The corrective actions to date included performing an extent of condition review, and implementing the appropriate compensatory measures in a manner consistent with safety and compliance. Additionally, the team reviewed the licensees short term compensatory measures (compensatory fire watches) to verify that they were adequate to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken, and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On March 25, 2011, the lead inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Stinson, Site Vice President and other licensee staff members. The licensee acknowledged the findings. A conference call was conducted by the lead inspector with Mr. R. Martin, Engineering Programs Manager, and other licensee staff members on April 29, 2011, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings.

The NRC subsequently conducted two additional conference calls with members of the licensees staff on July 7, 2011 and July 13, 2011, to request additional information for in-office review. A final exit was conducted by Ms. P. Braxton on July 22, 2011 with Mr. M. Stinson and other licensee staff members. Proprietary information is not included in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Bryson, Fire Protection Systems Engineer

D. Christiansen, Training Manager

D. Davidson, Plant Fire Marshal

J. Giles, SNC Fire Protection Engineer

A. Gray, Engineering Programs Supervisor

B. Griner, Engineering Director

J. Hayes, Training

T. Youngblood, Plant Manager

R. Herrin, Operations Superintendent

M. Stinson, Site Vice President

J. Lattner, Principal Fire Protection Engineer

D. Lisenby, Project Lead

T. Nesbit, Operations Shift Support Supervisor

R. Martin, Engineering Programs Manager

B. Oldfield, Principal Licensing Engineer

S. Odom, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

NRC personnel

E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Shaeffer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II

R. Nease, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II

N. Merriweather, Sr. Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety,

Region II

M. Thomas, Sr. Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None