ML17073A093: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:LFCREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Cynthia R. Hafenstine Manager Regulatory Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 March 9, 2017 RA 17-0012
{{#Wiki_filter:LFCREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Cynthia R. Hafenstine Manager Regulatory Affairs March 9, 2017 RA 17-0012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to Technical Specification Bases -Revisions 74 and 75 To Whom It May Concern: The Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), Section 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program," provide the means for making changes to the Bases without prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval.
Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to Technical Specification Bases - Revisions 74 and 75 To Whom It May Concern:
In addition, TS Section 5.5.14 requires that changes made without NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
The Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), Section 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program," provide the means for making changes to the Bases without prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. In addition, TS Section 5.5.14 requires that changes made without NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e). The Enclosure provides those changes made to the WCGS TS Bases (Revisions 74 and 75) under the provisions to TS Section 5.5.14 and a List of Effective Pages. This submittal reflects changes from January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016.
The Enclosure provides those changes made to the WCGS TS Bases (Revisions 74 and 75) under the provisions to TS Section 5.5.14 and a List of Effective Pages. This submittal reflects changes from January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016. This letter contains no commitments.
This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4204.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4204.
Sincerely, kA;'- i /tA,-
CRH/rlt Enclosure cc: K. M. Kennedy (NRC), w/e B. K. Singal (NRC), w/e N. H. Taylor (NRC), w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e Sincerely, kA;'-i /tA,-/ -Cynthia R. Hafenstine P.O. Box 411 I Burlington, KS 66839 /Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET Enclosure to RA 17-0012 Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to the Technical Specification Bases (51 pages)
                                                                          /    -        ~r Cynthia R. Hafenstine CRH/rlt Enclosure cc:     K. M. Kennedy (NRC), w/e B. K. Singal (NRC), w/e N. H. Taylor (NRC), w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e P.O. Box 411 I Burlington, KS 66839 /Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
 
Wolf Creek-Unit 1 SR 3.4.6.4 RCS Loops -MODE 4 B 3.4.6 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel. Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations.
Enclosure to RA 17-0012 Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to the Technical Specification Bases (51 pages)
The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration.
 
Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE      SR 3.4.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)      RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.
Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may-be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.
the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the B 3.4.6-5 Revision 75 BASES RCS Loops -MODE 4 B 3.4.6 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 (continued)
RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may- be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Wolf Creek -Unit 1 maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the Wolf Creek- Unit 1                        B 3.4.6-5                                 Revision 75
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
 
This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4. The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE       SR 3.4.6.4 (continued)
: 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6 8 3.4.6-6 Revision 75 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
REQUIREMENTS maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
Wolf Creek-Unit 1 SR 3.4.7.2 RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 Verifying that at least two SGs are OPERABLE by ensuring their secondary side wide range water levels are ::?: 66% ensures an alternate decay heat removal method is available via natural circulation in the event that the second RHR loop is not OPERABLE.
This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4.
If both RHR loops are OPERABLE, this Surveillance is not needed. The 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of SG level. SR 3.4.7.3 Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump. If secondary side wide range water level is ::?: 66% in at least two SGs, this Surveillance is not needed. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
REFERENCES          1. USAR, Section 15.4.6 Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        8 3.4.6-6                                   Revision 75 I
SR 3.4.7.4 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel. Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations.
 
The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration.
RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE      SR 3.4.7.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued)      Verifying that at least two SGs are OPERABLE by ensuring their secondary side wide range water levels are ::?: 66% ensures an alternate decay heat removal method is available via natural circulation in the event that the second RHR loop is not OPERABLE. If both RHR loops are OPERABLE, this Surveillance is not needed. The 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of SG level.
Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as versus operating conditions.
SR 3.4.7.3 Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
If secondary side wide range water level is ::?: 66% in at least two SGs, this Surveillance is not needed. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of B 3.4.7-5 Revision 72 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Wolf Creek -Unit 1 RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 SR 3.4.7.4 (continued) accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
SR 3.4.7.4 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.
Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand~by versus operating conditions.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used tO monitor the susceptible location.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of Wolf Creek- Unit 1                        B 3.4.7-5                                 Revision 72
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
 
RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled
                                                            ~                              B 3.4.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.4.7.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),
the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used tO monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System giping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System giping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
: 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6. 2. NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of SGs to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation." B 3.4.7-6 Revision 75 BASES APPLICABILITY (continued)
REFERENCES          1.     USAR, Section 15.4.6.
ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 Since LCO 3.4.8 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion Times, it is not permitted to enter LCO 3.4.8 from either LCO 3.4.7, RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Filled," or from MODE 6, unless the requirements of LCO 3.4.8 are met. This precludes removing the heat removal path afforded by the steam generators with the RHR System is degraded.
: 2.     NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of SGs to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation."
If only one RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for RHR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal. B.1 and B.2 If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SOM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.4.7-6                                 Revision 75
Boron dilution requires forced circulation from at least one RCP for proper mixing so that inadvertent criticality can be prevented.
 
Suspending the introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SOM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation.
RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES APPLICABILITY      Since LCO 3.4.8 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion (continued)        Times, it is not permitted to enter LCO 3.4.8 from either LCO 3.4.7, RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled," or from MODE 6, unless the requirements of LCO 3.4.8 are met. This precludes removing the heat removal path afforded by the steam generators with the RHR System is degraded.
With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SOM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.
ACTIONS If only one RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for RHR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.
B.1 and B.2 If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SOM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron dilution requires forced circulation from at least one RCP for proper mixing so that inadvertent criticality can be prevented.
Suspending the introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SOM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SOM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.
The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.
SR 3.4.8.1 This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation.
SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation.
Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.
Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal.
B 3.4.8-3 Revision 42 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.
Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.4.8.2 RCS Loops -MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.4.8-3                               Revision 42 I
Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
 
RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.4.8.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued)        Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.
The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
SR 3.4.8.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of
SR 3.4.8.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of
* noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel. SeleCtion of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations.
* noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.
The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration.
SeleCtion of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. lf accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),
lf accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
Susceptible locations in the same system flow B 3.4.8-4 Revision 75 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.5.2.3 (continued)
RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.4.8-4                                 Revision 75
ECCS -Operating B 3.5.2 The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
 
In conjunction with or in lieu of venting, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) may be performed to verify the ECCS pumps and associated piping are sufficiently full of water. The design of the centrifugal charging pump is such that significant noncondensible gases do not collect in the pump. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require periodic pump casing venting to ensure the centrifugal charging pump will remain OPERABLE.
ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE       SR 3.5.2.3 (continued)
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
REQUIREMENTS The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.
Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. In conjunction with or in lieu of venting, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) may be performed to verify the ECCS pumps and associated piping are sufficiently full of water. The design of the centrifugal charging pump is such that significant noncondensible gases do not collect in the pump. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require periodic pump casing venting to ensure the centrifugal charging pump will remain OPERABLE.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met.
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and* determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety.
For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and*
determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
B 3.5.2-9 Revision 75 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                          B 3.5.2-9                                 Revision 75
Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.5.2.4 ECCS -Operating B 3.5.2 Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by the ASME Code. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. The following ECCS pumps are required to develop the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flow: Centrifugal Charging Pump Safety Injection Pump RHR Pump 2490 psid ;:::: 1468.9 psid ;:::: 183.6 psid This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the plant safety analysis.
 
SRs are specified in the applicable portions of the lnservice Testing Program, which encompasses the ASME Code. The ASME Code provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.
ECCS -Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.5.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)        Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by the ASME Code. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. The following ECCS pumps are required to develop the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flow:
SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6 These Surveillances demonstrate that each automatic ECCS valve actuates to the required position on an actual or simulated SI signal and on an actual or simulated RWST Level Low-Low 1 Automatic Transfer signal coincident with an SI signal and that each ECCS pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SI signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls.
Centrifugal Charging Pump                 ~    2490 psid Safety Injection Pump                     ;:::: 1468.9 psid RHR Pump                                  ;: : 183.6 psid This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the plant safety analysis. SRs are specified in the applicable portions of the lnservice Testing Program, which encompasses the ASME Code. The ASME Code provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.
The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned plant transients if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.
SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6 These Surveillances demonstrate that each automatic ECCS valve actuates to the required position on an actual or simulated SI signal and on an actual or simulated RWST Level Low-Low 1 Automatic Transfer signal coincident with an SI signal and that each ECCS pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SI signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned plant transients if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power.
The actuation logic is tested as part of ESF Actuation System testing, and equipment performance is monitored as part of the lnservice Testing Program. B 3.5.2-10 Revision 72 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.
Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.6.6.8 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections.
The actuation logic is tested as part of ESF Actuation System testing, and equipment performance is monitored as part of the lnservice Testing Program.
This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.5.2-10                                 Revision 72 I
Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a confirmation of OPERABILITY following maintenance activities that can result in obstruction of spray nozzle flow is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. Confirmation that the spray nozzles are unobstructed may be obtained by utilizing foreign material exclusion (FME) controls during maintenance, a visual inspection of the affected portions of the system, or by an air or smoke flow test following maintenance involving opening portions of the system downstream of the containment isolation valves or draining of the filled portions of the system inside containment.
 
Maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage is generally a result of a loss of foreign material control or a flow of borated water through a nozzle. Should either of these events occur, a supervisory evaluation will be required to determine whether nozzle blockage is a possible result of the event. For the loss of FME event, an inspection or flush of the affected portions of the system should be adequate to confirm that the spray nozzles are unobstructed since water flow would be required to transport any debris to the spray nozzles. An air flow or smoke test may not be appropriate for a loss of FME event but may be appropriate for the case where borated water inadvertently flows through the nozzles. SR 3.6.6.9 Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.6.6.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued)        With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a confirmation of OPERABILITY following maintenance activities that can result in obstruction of spray nozzle flow is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. Confirmation that the spray nozzles are unobstructed may be obtained by utilizing foreign material exclusion (FME) controls during maintenance, a visual inspection of the affected portions of the system, or by an air or smoke flow test following maintenance involving opening portions of the system downstream of the containment isolation valves or draining of the filled portions of the system inside containment. Maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage is generally a result of a loss of foreign material control or a flow of borated water through a nozzle. Should either of these events occur, a supervisory evaluation will be required to determine whether nozzle blockage is a possible result of the event. For the loss of FME event, an inspection or flush of the affected portions of the system should be adequate to confirm that the spray nozzles are unobstructed since water flow would be required to transport any debris to the spray nozzles. An air flow or smoke test may not be appropriate for a loss of FME event but may be appropriate for the case where borated water inadvertently flows through the nozzles.
Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations.
SR 3.6.6.9 Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.
The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration.
Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.6.6-9                                   Revision 72
B 3.6.6-9 Revision 72 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.6.6.9 (continued)
 
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE       SR 3.6.6.9 (continued)
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
REQUIREMENTS The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met.
Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.
Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the Containment Spray System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the Containment Spray System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
B 3.6.6-10 Revision 75 REFERENCES Wolf Creek -Unit 1 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41. GDC 42, and GDC 43, and GDC 50. 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. 3. USAR, Section 6.2.1. 4. USAR, Section 6.2.2. 5. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants. 6. Performance Improvement Request 2002-0945.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                          B 3.6.6-10                               Revision 75
B 3.6.6-11 Revision 75 BASES LCO (continued)
 
APPLICABILITY Wolf Creek-Unit 1 a. Fan is OPERABLE; EES B 3.7.13 b. HEPA filter and charcoal absorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function; and c. Heater, ductwork, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.
The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the auxiliary or fuel building boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls.
 
For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for auxiliary building or fuel building isolation is indicated.
==6.6 REFERENCES==
In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the Emergency Exhaust System is required to be OPERABLE in the SIS mode of operation to provide fission product removal associated with potential radioactivity leaks during the LOCA recirculation phase of ECCS operation.
: 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41. GDC 42, and GDC 43, and GDC 50.
: 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
: 3. USAR, Section 6.2.1.
: 4. USAR, Section 6.2.2.
: 5. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
: 6. Performance Improvement Request 2002-0945.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                B 3.6.6-11                           Revision 75
 
EES B 3.7.13 BASES LCO               a. Fan is OPERABLE; (continued)
: b. HEPA filter and charcoal absorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function; and
: c. Heater, ductwork, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the auxiliary or fuel building boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for auxiliary building or fuel building isolation is indicated.
APPLICABILITY      In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the Emergency Exhaust System is required to be OPERABLE in the SIS mode of operation to provide fission product removal associated with potential radioactivity leaks during the post-LOCA recirculation phase of ECCS operation.
In MODE 5 or 6, when not moving irradiated fuel the Emergency Exhaust System is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.
In MODE 5 or 6, when not moving irradiated fuel the Emergency Exhaust System is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.
During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building, the Emergency Exhaust System is required to be OPERABLE to support the FBVIS mode of operation to alleviate the consequences of a fuel handling accident.
During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building, the Emergency Exhaust System is required to be OPERABLE to support the FBVIS mode of operation to alleviate the consequences of a fuel handling accident.
The Applicability is modified by a Note. The Note clarifies the Applicability for the two safety related modes of operation of the Emergency Exhaust System, i.e., the Safety Injection Signal (SIS) mode and the Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS) mode. The SIS mode which aligns the system to the auxiliary building is applicable when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE.
The Applicability is modified by a Note. The Note clarifies the Applicability for the two safety related modes of operation of the Emergency Exhaust System, i.e., the Safety Injection Signal (SIS) mode and the Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS) mode. The SIS mode which aligns the system to the auxiliary building is applicable when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. In the FBVIS mode the system is aligned to the fuel building. This mode is applicable while handling irradiated fuel in the fuel building.
In the FBVIS mode the system is aligned to the fuel building.
Wolf Creek- Unit 1                        B 3.7.13-3                                 Revision 75
This mode is applicable while handling irradiated fuel in the fuel building.
 
B 3.7.13-3 Revision 75 BASES ACTIONS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 EES B 3.7.13 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.
EES B 3.7.13 BASES ACTIONS            LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent*
If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent*
of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.
of reactor operations.
With one Emergency Exhaust System train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the Emergency Exhaust System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable Emergency Exhaust System train, and the remaining Emergency Exhaust System train providing the required protection.
Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.
With one Emergency Exhaust System train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the Emergency Exhaust System function.
The 7 day Completion Time is based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable Emergency Exhaust System train, and the remaining Emergency Exhaust System train providing the required protection.
If the auxiliary building boundary is inoperable such that a train of the Emergency Exhaust System operating in the SIS mode cannot establish or maintain the required negative pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE auxiliary building boundary within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period and the availability of the Emergency Exhaust System to provide a filtered release (albeit with potential for some unfiltered auxiliary building leakage}.
If the auxiliary building boundary is inoperable such that a train of the Emergency Exhaust System operating in the SIS mode cannot establish or maintain the required negative pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE auxiliary building boundary within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period and the availability of the Emergency Exhaust System to provide a filtered release (albeit with potential for some unfiltered auxiliary building leakage}.
C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time or when both Emergency Exhaust System trains are inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable auxiliary building boundary (i.e., Condition B), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. B 3.7.13-4 Revision 57 BASES AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 APPLICABLE meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least SAFETY ANALYSES one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident (continued) conditions in the event of: LCO Wolf Creek -Unit 1 a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and b. A worst case single failure. The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3of10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time or when both Emergency Exhaust System trains are inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable auxiliary building boundary (i.e., Condition B), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 E Electrical Power System, separate and independent DGs for each train, and redundant LS ELS for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated OBA. Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. One offsite circuit consists of the #7 transformer feeding through the 13-48 breaker power the ES F transformer XNB01, which, in turn powers the NB01 bus through its normal feeder breaker. Transformer XNB01 may also be powered from the SL-7 supply through the 13-8 breaker provided the offsite 69 KV line is not connected to the 345 kV system. The offsite circuit energizing NB01 is considered inoperable when NB01 is only energized from the transmission network through the 345-50 and 345-60 main generator breakers.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.7.13-4                               Revision 57
For this configuration, switchyard breakers 345-120 and 345-80 are open. Another offsite circuit consists of the startup transformer feeding through breaker PA201 powering the ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn powers the NB02 bus through its normal feeder breaker. Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage.
 
This will be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE         meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least SAFETY ANALYSES one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident (continued)       conditions in the event of:
Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode. B 3.8.1-3 Revision 75 BASES LCO (continued)
: a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
APPLICABILITY ACTIONS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 Upon failure of the DG lube oil keep warm system when the DG is in the standby condition, the DG remains OPERABLE if lube oil temperature is ;:: 115 °F and engine lubrication (i.e., flow of lube oil to the DG engine) is maintained.
: b. A worst case single failure.
Upon failure of the DG jacket water keep warm system, the DG remains OPERABLE as long as jacket water temperature is ;;::: 105 °F (Ref. 13). Initiating an EDG start upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, tripping of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads, is a required function of LSELS and required for DG OPERABILITY.
The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3of10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
In addition, the LSELS Automatic Test Indicator (ATI) is an installed testing aid and is not required to be OPERABLE to support the sequencer function.
LCO                Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System, separate and independent DGs for each train, and redundant LS ELS for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated OBA.
Absence of a functioning ATI does not render LSELS inoperable.
Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.
The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete.
One offsite circuit consists of the #7 transformer feeding through the 13-48 breaker power the ES F transformer XNB01, which, in turn powers the NB01 bus through its normal feeder breaker. Transformer XNB01 may also be powered from the SL-7 supply through the 13-8 breaker provided the offsite 69 KV line is not connected to the 345 kV system.
For the offsite AC source, separation and independence are to the extent practical.
The offsite circuit energizing NB01 is considered inoperable when NB01 is only energized from the transmission network through the 345-50 and 345-60 main generator breakers. For this configuration, switchyard breakers 345-120 and 345-80 are open.
The AC sources and LSELS are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that: a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA. The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown." A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable DG. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4b., which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.
Another offsite circuit consists of the startup transformer feeding through breaker PA201 powering the ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn powers the NB02 bus through its normal feeder breaker.
B 3.8.1-4 Revision 71 BASES ACTIONS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 B.4.1. B.4.2.1, and 84.2.2 (continued)
Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 restoration of the LCO. Although highly unlikely, this could occur indefinitely if not limited. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.
Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.
This limits the time the plant can alternate between Conditions A, B, and E (see Completion Time Example 1.3-3). The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met. Tracking the 6 day Completion Time is a requirement for beginning the Completion Time "clock" that is in addition to the normal Completion Time requirements.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-3                                 Revision 75
With respect to the 6 day Completion Time, the ''time zero" is specified as beginning at the time LCO 3.8.1 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. This results in the requirement, when in this Condition, to track the time elapsed from both the Condition B "time zero," and the "time zero" when LCO 3.8.1 was initially not met. Refer to Section 1.3, "Completion Times," for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO portion of the Completion Time." The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states that Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 are only applicable for voluntary planned maintenance and may be used once per cycle per DG. Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 only applies when a DG is declared or rendered inoperable for the performance of voluntary, planned maintenance activities.
 
Required Action B.4.2.1 provides assurance that the required / Sharpe Station gensets are available when a DG is out of service for greater than 72 hours. The availability of the required gensets are verified once per12 hours by locally monitoring various genset parameters.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES LCO                Upon failure of the DG lube oil keep warm system when the DG is in the (continued)        standby condition, the DG remains OPERABLE if lube oil temperature is
The 7-day Completion Time of Required Action B.4.2.2 is a risk-informed allowed outage time (AOT) based on a plant-specific risk analysis.
                    ;:: 115 °F and engine lubrication (i.e., flow of lube oil to the DG engine) is maintained. Upon failure of the DG jacket water keep warm system, the DG remains OPERABLE as long as jacket water temperature is ;;::: 105 °F (Ref. 13).
The Completion Time was established on the assumption that it would be used only for voluntary planned maintenance, inspections and testing. Use of Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 are limited to once within an operating cycle (18 months) for each DG. Administrative controls applied during use of Required Action B.4.2.2 for voluntary planned maintenance activities ensure or require that (Ref. 16): a. Weather conditions are conducive to an extended DG Completion Time. The extended DG Completion Time applies during the period of September 7 through April 5. B3.8.1-11 Revision 39 I BASES ACTIONS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 B.4.1, B.4.2.1, and 84.2.2 (continued)
Initiating an EDG start upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, tripping of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads, is a required function of LSELS and required for DG OPERABILITY. In addition, the LSELS Automatic Test Indicator (ATI) is an installed testing aid and is not required to be OPERABLE to support the sequencer function. Absence of a functioning ATI does not render LSELS inoperable.
: b. The offsite power supply and switchyard condition are conducive to an extended DG Completion Time, which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge offsite power availability.
The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC source, separation and independence are to the extent practical.
Elective maintenance or testing that would challenge offsite power availability is that activity that could result in an electrical power distribution system (offsite circuit or transmission network) transient or make the offsite circuit(s) unavailable or inoperable (Reference 19). The operational risk assessment procedure provides a list of equipment that could challenge offsite power availability.
APPLICABILITY      The AC sources and LSELS are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:
: c. Prior to relying on the required Sharpe Station gensets, the gensets are started and proper operation verified (i.e., the gensets reach rated speed and voltage).
: a.     Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
The Sharpe Station is not required to be operating the duration of the allowed outage time of the DG, however, a minimum of 8 gensets must be capable of providing power to a dead bus (station blackout conditions) to power 1 ESF train. Within 8 months prior to utilization of Required Action B.4.2.2, a load capability test/verification will be performed on the Sharpe Station gensets. The load capability testing/verification will consist of either 1) crediting a running of the gensets for load for commercial reasons for greater than 1 hour, or 2) tested by loading of the gensets for greater than 1 hour to a load equal to or greater than required to supply safety related loads in the event of a station blackout.
: b.     Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
: d. No equipment or systems assumed to be available for supporting the extended DG Completion Time are removed from service. The equipment or systems assumed to be available (including required support systems, i.e., associated room coolers, etc.) are as follows:
The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."
ACTIONS            A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable DG.
There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4b., which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-4                                   Revision 71
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS            B.4.1. B.4.2.1, and 84.2.2 (continued) restoration of the LCO. Although highly unlikely, this could occur indefinitely if not limited. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. This limits the time the plant can alternate between Conditions A, B, and E (see Completion Time Example 1.3-3). The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
Tracking the 6 day Completion Time is a requirement for beginning the Completion Time "clock" that is in addition to the normal Completion Time requirements. With respect to the 6 day Completion Time, the ''time zero" is specified as beginning at the time LCO 3.8.1 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. This results in the requirement, when in this Condition, to track the time elapsed from both the Condition B "time zero," and the "time zero" when LCO 3.8.1 was initially not met. Refer to Section 1.3, "Completion Times," for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO portion of the Completion Time."
The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states that Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 are only applicable for voluntary planned maintenance and may be used once per cycle per DG. Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 only applies when a DG is declared or rendered inoperable for the performance of voluntary, planned maintenance activities. Required Action B.4.2.1 provides assurance that the required /
Sharpe Station gensets are available when a DG is out of service for greater than 72 hours. The availability of the required gensets are verified once per12 hours by locally monitoring various genset parameters.
The 7-day Completion Time of Required Action B.4.2.2 is a risk-informed allowed outage time (AOT) based on a plant-specific risk analysis. The Completion Time was established on the assumption that it would be used only for voluntary planned maintenance, inspections and testing. Use of Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 are limited to once within an operating cycle (18 months) for each DG. Administrative controls applied during use of Required Action B.4.2.2 for voluntary planned maintenance activities ensure or require that (Ref. 16):
: a.       Weather conditions are conducive to an extended DG Completion Time. The extended DG Completion Time applies during the period of September 7 through April 5.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                          B3.8.1-11                                 Revision 39 I
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS            B.4.1, B.4.2.1, and 84.2.2 (continued)
: b.     The offsite power supply and switchyard condition are conducive to an extended DG Completion Time, which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge offsite power availability. Elective maintenance or testing that would challenge offsite power availability is that activity that could result in an electrical power distribution system (offsite circuit or transmission network) transient or make the offsite circuit(s) unavailable or inoperable (Reference 19). The operational risk assessment procedure provides a list of equipment that could challenge offsite power availability.
: c.       Prior to relying on the required Sharpe Station gensets, the gensets are started and proper operation verified (i.e., the gensets reach rated speed and voltage). The Sharpe Station is not required to be operating the duration of the allowed outage time of the DG, however, a minimum of 8 gensets must be capable of providing power to a dead bus (station blackout conditions) to power 1 ESF train. Within 8 months prior to utilization of Required Action B.4.2.2, a load capability test/verification will be performed on the Sharpe Station gensets. The load capability testing/verification will consist of either 1) crediting a running of the gensets for load for commercial reasons for greater than 1 hour, or
: 2) tested by loading of the gensets for greater than 1 hour to a load equal to or greater than required to supply safety related loads in the event of a station blackout.
: d.       No equipment or systems assumed to be available for supporting the extended DG Completion Time are removed from service. The equipment or systems assumed to be available (including required support systems, i.e., associated room coolers, etc.) are as follows:
* Auxiliary Feedwater System (three trains)
* Auxiliary Feedwater System (three trains)
* Component Cooling Water System (both trains and all four pumps)
* Component Cooling Water System (both trains and all four pumps)
* Essential Service Water System (both trains)
* Essential Service Water System (both trains)
* Emergency Core Cooling System (two trains). If, while Required Action 8.4.2.2 is being used, one (or more) of the above systems or components is determined or discovered to be inoperable, or if B 3.8.1-12 Revision 75 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek-Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.7 See SR 3.8.1.2. SR 3.8.1.8 Not Used. SR 3.8.1.9 Not Used. SR 3.8.1.10 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping.
* Emergency Core Cooling System (two trains).
This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions.
If, while Required Action 8.4.2.2 is being used, one (or more) of the above systems or components is determined or discovered to be inoperable, or if Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-12                                     Revision 75 I
This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide for DG damage protection.
 
While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE       SR 3.8.1.7 REQUIREMENTS See SR 3.8.1.2.
The DG is considered OPERABLE while it is paralleled to the offsite power source, consistent with the Technical Evaluation (i.e., Section 4.0) contained in the Safety Evaluation provided for Amendment No. 154 (Reference 17). This includes consideration of the potential challenges to the DG, its response to a LOCA and/or a loss of offsite power, and appropriate operator actions to restore the DG. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This SR has been modified by a Note. The Note ensures that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible.
SR 3.8.1.8 Not Used.
When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of $; 0.9. This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG would see under design basis accident conditions.
SR 3.8.1.9 Not Used.
Under certain conditions, however, the Note allows B 3.8.1-23 Revision 74 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)
SR 3.8.1.10 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than s; 0.9. These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to s; 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the DG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the DG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the DG excitation limits. SR 3.8.1.11 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.( 1 ), this Surveillance demonstrates the as-designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time. The DG autostart time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.
The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide for DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.
The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected toads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation.
The DG is considered OPERABLE while it is paralleled to the offsite power source, consistent with the Technical Evaluation (i.e., Section 4.0) contained in the Safety Evaluation provided for Amendment No. 154 (Reference 17). This includes consideration of the potential challenges to the DG, its response to a LOCA and/or a loss of offsite power, and appropriate operator actions to restore the DG.
For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or residual heat removal (RHR)systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG systems to perform these functions is acceptable.
This SR has been modified by a Note. The Note ensures that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of $; 0.9. This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG would see under design basis accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, the Note allows Wolf Creek- Unit 1                          B 3.8.1-23                               Revision 74
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than s; 0.9.
These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to s; 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the DG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the DG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the DG excitation limits.
SR 3.8.1.11 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.( 1), this Surveillance demonstrates the as-designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.
The DG autostart time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.
The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected toads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or residual heat removal (RHR)systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG systems to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                      8 3.8.1-24                                  Revision 74
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.
The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed forthe purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
SR 3.8.1.12 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for ~ 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on an ESF signal without loss of offsite power.
The requirement to verify the connection of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-25                                Revision 74
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems.
The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-26                                Revision 74  I
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.13 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that DG noncritical protective functions are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the OBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.
The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed atthe 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
SR 3.8.1.14 Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, (Ref. 3), requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, ~ 2 hours of which is at a load not greater than 110% of the continuous duty rating (short-time rated load) and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating (continuous rated load) of the DG. The short-time rated load and the continuous rated load may be applied in either order.
The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.
The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG.
Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
Administrative controls for performing this SR in MODES 1 or 2, with the DG connected to an offsite circuit, ensure or require that:
: a. Weather conditions are conducive for performing this SR.
: b. The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive for performing this SR, which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed.
: c. No equipment or systems assumed to be available for supporting the performance of the SR are removed from service.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-27                                Revision 74
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The DG is considered OPERABLE during performance of the Surveillance, i.e., while it is paralleled to the offsite power source, consistent with the Technical Evaluation (i.e., Section 4.0) contained in the Safety Evaluation provided for Amendment No. 154 (Reference 17).
This includes consideration of the potential challenges to the DG, its response to a LOCA and/or a loss of offsite power, and appropriate operator actions to restore the DG.
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients outside the power factor range will not invalidate the test. Note 2 ensures that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of s 0.9. This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG would see under design basis accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, Note 2 allows the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than s 0.9. These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to s 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the DG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the DG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the DG excitation limits.
SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3).
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-28                                    Revision 74
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.15 (continued}
REQUIREMENTS (continued)        This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.
SR 3.8.1.16 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and the DG can be returned to ready to load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the autostart logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready to load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive a close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.
The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.
The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to' be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-29                                  Revision 74 I
 
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
SR 3.8.1.17 Demonstration of the test mode (parallel mode) override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions will not be compromised as the result of testing and the DG will automatically reset to ready to load operation if a Safety Injection actuation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready to load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 13),
paragraph 6.2.6(2).
The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12. The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading was not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
8 3.8.1-24 Revision 74 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.
The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed forthe purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.
The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-30                                Revision 74  I
This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.
 
These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)
SR 3.8.1.12 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability.
REQUIREMENTS independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on an ESF signal without loss of offsite power. The requirement to verify the connection of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of B 3.8.1-25 Revision 74 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)
SR 3.8.1.18 Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the LSELS. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation.
The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.
In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable.
The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.8.1-31                                  Revision 74 I
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
 
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.19 REQUIREMENTS In the event of a OBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.
The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems. The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.
This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.
The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.
These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. The reason for Note 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.
B 3.8.1-26 Revision 7 4 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.13 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 This Surveillance demonstrates that DG noncritical protective functions are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition.
The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                       B 3.8.1-32                                    Revision 74  I
The DG availability to mitigate the OBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed atthe 18 month Frequency.
 
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.8.1.20 REQUIREMENTS (continued)        This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.
SR 3.8.1.14 Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, (Ref. 3), requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, 2 hours of which is at a load not greater than 110% of the continuous duty rating (short-time rated load) and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating (continuous rated load) of the DG. The short-time rated load and the continuous rated load may be applied in either order. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions.
The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9).
The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.
Administrative controls for performing this SR in MODES 1 or 2, with the DG connected to an offsite circuit, ensure or require that: a. Weather conditions are conducive for performing this SR. b. The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive for performing this SR, which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed.
SR 3.8.1.21 SR 3.8.1.21 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST using the LS ELS automatic tester for each load shedder and emergency load sequencer train except that the continuity check does not have to be performed, as explained in the Note. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.
: c. No equipment or systems assumed to be available for supporting the performance of the SR are removed from service. B 3.8.1-27 Revision 74 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)
REFERENCES          1. 1O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 The DG is considered OPERABLE during performance of the Surveillance, i.e., while it is paralleled to the offsite power source, consistent with the Technical Evaluation (i.e., Section 4.0) contained in the Safety Evaluation provided for Amendment No. 154 (Reference 17). This includes consideration of the potential challenges to the DG, its response to a LOCA and/or a loss of offsite power, and appropriate operator actions to restore the DG. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients outside the power factor range will not invalidate the test. Note 2 ensures that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible.
: 2. USAR, Chapter 8.
When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of s 0.9. This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG would see under design basis accident conditions.
: 3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3.
Under certain conditions, however, Note 2 allows the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than s 0.9. These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to s 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the DG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the DG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the DG excitation limits. SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3). B 3.8.1-28 Revision 74 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
: 4. USAR, Chapter 6.
Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.15 (continued}
: 5. USAR, Chapter 15'.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
: 6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.
The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions.
: 7. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.
Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. SR 3.8.1.16 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and the DG can be returned to ready to load status when offsite power is restored.
: 8. 1O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
It also ensures that the autostart logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of off site power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready to load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive a close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance.
: 9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, August 1977.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to' be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.
: 10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 0, January 1978.
This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                      B 3.8.1-33                                  Revision 74  I
These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a B 3.8.1-29 Revision 7 4 I BASES AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)
 
REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES          11. ANSI C84.1-1982 (continued)
SR 3.8.1.17 Demonstration of the test mode (parallel mode) override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions will not be compromised as the result of testing and the DG will automatically reset to ready to load operation if a Safety Injection actuation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready to load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 13), paragraph 6.2.6(2).
The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12.
The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading was not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.
This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated B 3.8.1-30 Revision 7 4 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.
These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
SR 3.8.1.18 Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the LSELS. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents.
The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated.
Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or. enhanced.
This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.
These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
B 3.8.1-31 Revision 7 4 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 SR 3.8.1.19 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 In the event of a OBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.
This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months. This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. The reason for Note 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.
This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes.
These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.
B 3.8.1-32 Revision 7 4 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
REFERENCES Wolf Creek -Unit 1 AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 SR 3.8.1.20 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised.
Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.
The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.
SR 3.8.1.21 SR 3.8.1.21 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST using the LS ELS automatic tester for each load shedder and emergency load sequencer train except that the continuity check does not have to be performed, as explained in the Note. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data. 1. 1 O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17. 2. USAR, Chapter 8. 3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3. 4. USAR, Chapter 6. 5. USAR, Chapter 15'. 6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974. 7. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984. 8. 1 O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18. 9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, August 1977. 10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 0, January 1978. B 3.8.1-33 Revision 7 4 I BASES REFERENCES (continued)
Wolf Creek -Unit 1 11. ANSI C84.1-1982
: 12. IEEE Standard 308-1978.
: 12. IEEE Standard 308-1978.
AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 13. Configuration Change Package (CCP) 08052, Revision 1, April 23, 1999. 14. Amendment No.161, April 21, 2005. 15. Not used. 16. Amendment No. 163, April 26, 2006. 17. Amendment No.154, August4, 2004. 18. Amendment No. 8, May 29, 1987. 19. Condition Report 15727. B 3.8.1-34 Revision 7 4 I BASES ACTIONS Wolf Creek-Unit 1 RHR and Coolant Circulation  
: 13. Configuration Change Package (CCP) 08052, Revision 1, April 23, 1999.
-High Water Level B 3.9.5 RHR loop requirements are met by having one RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, except as permitted in the Note to the LCO. If RHR loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations.
: 14. Amendment No.161, April 21, 2005.
Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation.
: 15. Not used.
Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration.
: 16. Amendment No. 163, April 26, 2006.
This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.
: 17. Amendment No.154, August4, 2004.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies in the core. With no forced circulation cooling, decay heat removal from the core occurs by natural convection to the heat sink provided by the water above the core. A minimum refueling water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat sink. Suspending any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition.
: 18. Amendment No. 8, May 29, 1987.
: 19. Condition Report 15727.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                  B 3.8.1-34                           Revision 74 I
 
RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS            RHR loop requirements are met by having one RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, except as permitted in the Note to the LCO.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations.
Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies in the core.
With no forced circulation cooling, decay heat removal from the core occurs by natural convection to the heat sink provided by the water above the core. A minimum refueling water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat sink.
Suspending any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition.
Performance of Required Action A.2 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.
Performance of Required Action A.2 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be initiated and continued in order to satisfy RHR loop requirements.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be initiated and continued in order to satisfy RHR loop requirements. With the unit in MODE 6 and the refueling water level ~ 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, corrective actions shall be initiated immediately.
With the unit in MODE 6 and the refueling water level 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, corrective actions shall be initiated immediately.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.
If RHR loop requirements are not met, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere.
Wolf Creek- Unit 1                      B 3.9.5-3                                   Revision 32
Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.
 
B 3.9.5-3 Revision 32 BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 A.4 (continued)
RHR and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS            A.4 (continued)
RHR and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level B 3.9.5 The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time. SR 3.9.5.1 This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator in the control room for monitoring the RHR System. SR 3.9.5.2 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel. Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations.
The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.
The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration.
SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.9.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator in the control room for monitoring the RHR System.
Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
SR 3.9.5.2 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by. B 3.9.5-4 Revision 75 BASES RHR and Coolant Circulation  
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.
-High Water Level B 3.9.5 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)
Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),
REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Wolf Creek -Unit 1 subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by.
Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                        B 3.9.5-4                               Revision 75
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.
 
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE       SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
REQUIREMENTS subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
: 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7. 2. SAP-06-113, "Loss of RHR Analysis with the Refuel Cavity Flooded and Upper Internals Installed," November 16, 2006. B 3.9.5-5 Revision 75 I BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Wolf Creek -Unit 1 RHR and Coolant Circulation  
REFERENCES          1.     USAR, Section 5.4.7.
-Low Water Level B 3.9.6 SR 3.9.6.3 (continued)
: 2.     SAP-06-113, "Loss of RHR Analysis with the Refuel Cavity Flooded and Upper Internals Installed," November 16, 2006.
The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations.
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                          B 3.9.5-5                               Revision 75   I
If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of th Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILIT is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined b subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable QY the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits. RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location.
 
Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.9.6.3 (continued)
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.
REQUIREMENTS The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.
Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.
Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),
The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or~
brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of th Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILIT is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined b subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable QY the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.
RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.
Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.
: 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7. 2. Generic Letter No. 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal." B 3.9.6-5 Revision 75 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
: 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.
: 2.      Generic Letter No. 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal."
Wolf Creek - Unit 1                          B 3.9.6-5                                Revision 75
 
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE <1l            REVISION NO. 2
                                        <> CHANGE DOCUMENT <3l DATE EFFECTIVE/
IMPLEMENTED <4l

Revision as of 05:52, 30 October 2019

Changes to Technical Specification Bases - Revisions 74 and 75
ML17073A093
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/2017
From: Hafenstine C
Wolf Creek
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA 17-0012
Download: ML17073A093 (50)


Text

LFCREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Cynthia R. Hafenstine Manager Regulatory Affairs March 9, 2017 RA 17-0012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to Technical Specification Bases - Revisions 74 and 75 To Whom It May Concern:

The Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), Section 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program," provide the means for making changes to the Bases without prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. In addition, TS Section 5.5.14 requires that changes made without NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e). The Enclosure provides those changes made to the WCGS TS Bases (Revisions 74 and 75) under the provisions to TS Section 5.5.14 and a List of Effective Pages. This submittal reflects changes from January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016.

This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4204.

Sincerely, kA;'- i /tA,-

/ - ~r Cynthia R. Hafenstine CRH/rlt Enclosure cc: K. M. Kennedy (NRC), w/e B. K. Singal (NRC), w/e N. H. Taylor (NRC), w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e P.O. Box 411 I Burlington, KS 66839 /Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET

Enclosure to RA 17-0012 Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to the Technical Specification Bases (51 pages)

RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may- be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.4.6-5 Revision 75

RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 8 3.4.6-6 Revision 75 I

RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that at least two SGs are OPERABLE by ensuring their secondary side wide range water levels are ::?: 66% ensures an alternate decay heat removal method is available via natural circulation in the event that the second RHR loop is not OPERABLE. If both RHR loops are OPERABLE, this Surveillance is not needed. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of SG level.

SR 3.4.7.3 Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.

If secondary side wide range water level is ::?: 66% in at least two SGs, this Surveillance is not needed. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.4.7.4 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand~by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.4.7-5 Revision 72

RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled

~ B 3.4.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used tO monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System giping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6.

2. NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of SGs to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation."

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.4.7-6 Revision 75

RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES APPLICABILITY Since LCO 3.4.8 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion (continued) Times, it is not permitted to enter LCO 3.4.8 from either LCO 3.4.7, RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled," or from MODE 6, unless the requirements of LCO 3.4.8 are met. This precludes removing the heat removal path afforded by the steam generators with the RHR System is degraded.

ACTIONS If only one RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for RHR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.

B.1 and B.2 If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SOM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron dilution requires forced circulation from at least one RCP for proper mixing so that inadvertent criticality can be prevented.

Suspending the introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SOM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SOM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.

The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that one loop is in operation.

Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.4.8-3 Revision 42 I

RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.

The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.4.8.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of

  • noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

SeleCtion of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. lf accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.4.8-4 Revision 75

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. In conjunction with or in lieu of venting, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) may be performed to verify the ECCS pumps and associated piping are sufficiently full of water. The design of the centrifugal charging pump is such that significant noncondensible gases do not collect in the pump. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require periodic pump casing venting to ensure the centrifugal charging pump will remain OPERABLE.

If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met.

Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety.

For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.

Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and*

determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.5.2-9 Revision 75

ECCS -Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by the ASME Code. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. The following ECCS pumps are required to develop the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flow:

Centrifugal Charging Pump ~ 2490 psid Safety Injection Pump  ;:::: 1468.9 psid RHR Pump  ;: : 183.6 psid This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the plant safety analysis. SRs are specified in the applicable portions of the lnservice Testing Program, which encompasses the ASME Code. The ASME Code provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.

SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6 These Surveillances demonstrate that each automatic ECCS valve actuates to the required position on an actual or simulated SI signal and on an actual or simulated RWST Level Low-Low 1 Automatic Transfer signal coincident with an SI signal and that each ECCS pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SI signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned plant transients if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power.

The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

The actuation logic is tested as part of ESF Actuation System testing, and equipment performance is monitored as part of the lnservice Testing Program.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.5.2-10 Revision 72 I

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a confirmation of OPERABILITY following maintenance activities that can result in obstruction of spray nozzle flow is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. Confirmation that the spray nozzles are unobstructed may be obtained by utilizing foreign material exclusion (FME) controls during maintenance, a visual inspection of the affected portions of the system, or by an air or smoke flow test following maintenance involving opening portions of the system downstream of the containment isolation valves or draining of the filled portions of the system inside containment. Maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage is generally a result of a loss of foreign material control or a flow of borated water through a nozzle. Should either of these events occur, a supervisory evaluation will be required to determine whether nozzle blockage is a possible result of the event. For the loss of FME event, an inspection or flush of the affected portions of the system should be adequate to confirm that the spray nozzles are unobstructed since water flow would be required to transport any debris to the spray nozzles. An air flow or smoke test may not be appropriate for a loss of FME event but may be appropriate for the case where borated water inadvertently flows through the nozzles.

SR 3.6.6.9 Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.6.6-9 Revision 72

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met.

Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.

The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the Containment Spray System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.6.6-10 Revision 75

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.

6.6 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41. GDC 42, and GDC 43, and GDC 50.
2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
3. USAR, Section 6.2.1.
4. USAR, Section 6.2.2.
5. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
6. Performance Improvement Request 2002-0945.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.6.6-11 Revision 75

EES B 3.7.13 BASES LCO a. Fan is OPERABLE; (continued)

b. HEPA filter and charcoal absorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function; and
c. Heater, ductwork, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the auxiliary or fuel building boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for auxiliary building or fuel building isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the Emergency Exhaust System is required to be OPERABLE in the SIS mode of operation to provide fission product removal associated with potential radioactivity leaks during the post-LOCA recirculation phase of ECCS operation.

In MODE 5 or 6, when not moving irradiated fuel the Emergency Exhaust System is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.

During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building, the Emergency Exhaust System is required to be OPERABLE to support the FBVIS mode of operation to alleviate the consequences of a fuel handling accident.

The Applicability is modified by a Note. The Note clarifies the Applicability for the two safety related modes of operation of the Emergency Exhaust System, i.e., the Safety Injection Signal (SIS) mode and the Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS) mode. The SIS mode which aligns the system to the auxiliary building is applicable when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. In the FBVIS mode the system is aligned to the fuel building. This mode is applicable while handling irradiated fuel in the fuel building.

Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.7.13-3 Revision 75

EES B 3.7.13 BASES ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent*

of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

With one Emergency Exhaust System train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the Emergency Exhaust System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable Emergency Exhaust System train, and the remaining Emergency Exhaust System train providing the required protection.

If the auxiliary building boundary is inoperable such that a train of the Emergency Exhaust System operating in the SIS mode cannot establish or maintain the required negative pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE auxiliary building boundary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a OBA occurring during this time period and the availability of the Emergency Exhaust System to provide a filtered release (albeit with potential for some unfiltered auxiliary building leakage}.

C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time or when both Emergency Exhaust System trains are inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable auxiliary building boundary (i.e., Condition B), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.13-4 Revision 57

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least SAFETY ANALYSES one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident (continued) conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3of10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System, separate and independent DGs for each train, and redundant LS ELS for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated OBA.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

One offsite circuit consists of the #7 transformer feeding through the 13-48 breaker power the ES F transformer XNB01, which, in turn powers the NB01 bus through its normal feeder breaker. Transformer XNB01 may also be powered from the SL-7 supply through the 13-8 breaker provided the offsite 69 KV line is not connected to the 345 kV system.

The offsite circuit energizing NB01 is considered inoperable when NB01 is only energized from the transmission network through the 345-50 and 345-60 main generator breakers. For this configuration, switchyard breakers 345-120 and 345-80 are open.

Another offsite circuit consists of the startup transformer feeding through breaker PA201 powering the ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn powers the NB02 bus through its normal feeder breaker.

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions.

Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-3 Revision 75

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES LCO Upon failure of the DG lube oil keep warm system when the DG is in the (continued) standby condition, the DG remains OPERABLE if lube oil temperature is

115 °F and engine lubrication (i.e., flow of lube oil to the DG engine) is maintained. Upon failure of the DG jacket water keep warm system, the DG remains OPERABLE as long as jacket water temperature is ;;
:: 105 °F (Ref. 13).

Initiating an EDG start upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, tripping of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads, is a required function of LSELS and required for DG OPERABILITY. In addition, the LSELS Automatic Test Indicator (ATI) is an installed testing aid and is not required to be OPERABLE to support the sequencer function. Absence of a functioning ATI does not render LSELS inoperable.

The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC source, separation and independence are to the extent practical.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources and LSELS are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable DG.

There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4b., which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-4 Revision 71

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.4.1. B.4.2.1, and 84.2.2 (continued) restoration of the LCO. Although highly unlikely, this could occur indefinitely if not limited. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. This limits the time the plant can alternate between Conditions A, B, and E (see Completion Time Example 1.3-3). The "AND" connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

Tracking the 6 day Completion Time is a requirement for beginning the Completion Time "clock" that is in addition to the normal Completion Time requirements. With respect to the 6 day Completion Time, the time zero" is specified as beginning at the time LCO 3.8.1 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. This results in the requirement, when in this Condition, to track the time elapsed from both the Condition B "time zero," and the "time zero" when LCO 3.8.1 was initially not met. Refer to Section 1.3, "Completion Times," for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO portion of the Completion Time."

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states that Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 are only applicable for voluntary planned maintenance and may be used once per cycle per DG. Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 only applies when a DG is declared or rendered inoperable for the performance of voluntary, planned maintenance activities. Required Action B.4.2.1 provides assurance that the required /

Sharpe Station gensets are available when a DG is out of service for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The availability of the required gensets are verified once per12 hours by locally monitoring various genset parameters.

The 7-day Completion Time of Required Action B.4.2.2 is a risk-informed allowed outage time (AOT) based on a plant-specific risk analysis. The Completion Time was established on the assumption that it would be used only for voluntary planned maintenance, inspections and testing. Use of Required Actions B.4.2.1 and B.4.2.2 are limited to once within an operating cycle (18 months) for each DG. Administrative controls applied during use of Required Action B.4.2.2 for voluntary planned maintenance activities ensure or require that (Ref. 16):

a. Weather conditions are conducive to an extended DG Completion Time. The extended DG Completion Time applies during the period of September 7 through April 5.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B3.8.1-11 Revision 39 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.4.1, B.4.2.1, and 84.2.2 (continued)

b. The offsite power supply and switchyard condition are conducive to an extended DG Completion Time, which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed that would challenge offsite power availability. Elective maintenance or testing that would challenge offsite power availability is that activity that could result in an electrical power distribution system (offsite circuit or transmission network) transient or make the offsite circuit(s) unavailable or inoperable (Reference 19). The operational risk assessment procedure provides a list of equipment that could challenge offsite power availability.
c. Prior to relying on the required Sharpe Station gensets, the gensets are started and proper operation verified (i.e., the gensets reach rated speed and voltage). The Sharpe Station is not required to be operating the duration of the allowed outage time of the DG, however, a minimum of 8 gensets must be capable of providing power to a dead bus (station blackout conditions) to power 1 ESF train. Within 8 months prior to utilization of Required Action B.4.2.2, a load capability test/verification will be performed on the Sharpe Station gensets. The load capability testing/verification will consist of either 1) crediting a running of the gensets for load for commercial reasons for greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or
2) tested by loading of the gensets for greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to a load equal to or greater than required to supply safety related loads in the event of a station blackout.
d. No equipment or systems assumed to be available for supporting the extended DG Completion Time are removed from service. The equipment or systems assumed to be available (including required support systems, i.e., associated room coolers, etc.) are as follows:
  • Component Cooling Water System (both trains and all four pumps)

If, while Required Action 8.4.2.2 is being used, one (or more) of the above systems or components is determined or discovered to be inoperable, or if Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-12 Revision 75 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.7 REQUIREMENTS See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8 Not Used.

SR 3.8.1.9 Not Used.

SR 3.8.1.10 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits.

The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide for DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

The DG is considered OPERABLE while it is paralleled to the offsite power source, consistent with the Technical Evaluation (i.e., Section 4.0) contained in the Safety Evaluation provided for Amendment No. 154 (Reference 17). This includes consideration of the potential challenges to the DG, its response to a LOCA and/or a loss of offsite power, and appropriate operator actions to restore the DG.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR has been modified by a Note. The Note ensures that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of $; 0.9. This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG would see under design basis accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, the Note allows Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.8.1-23 Revision 74

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than s; 0.9.

These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to s; 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the DG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the DG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the DG excitation limits.

SR 3.8.1.11 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.( 1), this Surveillance demonstrates the as-designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG autostart time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected toads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or residual heat removal (RHR)systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG systems to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 8 3.8.1-24 Revision 74

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed forthe purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

SR 3.8.1.12 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for ~ 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on an ESF signal without loss of offsite power.

The requirement to verify the connection of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-25 Revision 74

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems.

The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-26 Revision 74 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.13 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that DG noncritical protective functions are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the OBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed atthe 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.1.14 Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, (Ref. 3), requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, ~ 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of which is at a load not greater than 110% of the continuous duty rating (short-time rated load) and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating (continuous rated load) of the DG. The short-time rated load and the continuous rated load may be applied in either order.

The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG.

Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

Administrative controls for performing this SR in MODES 1 or 2, with the DG connected to an offsite circuit, ensure or require that:

a. Weather conditions are conducive for performing this SR.
b. The offsite power supply and switchyard conditions are conducive for performing this SR, which includes ensuring that switchyard access is restricted and no elective maintenance within the switchyard is performed.
c. No equipment or systems assumed to be available for supporting the performance of the SR are removed from service.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-27 Revision 74

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The DG is considered OPERABLE during performance of the Surveillance, i.e., while it is paralleled to the offsite power source, consistent with the Technical Evaluation (i.e., Section 4.0) contained in the Safety Evaluation provided for Amendment No. 154 (Reference 17).

This includes consideration of the potential challenges to the DG, its response to a LOCA and/or a loss of offsite power, and appropriate operator actions to restore the DG.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients outside the power factor range will not invalidate the test. Note 2 ensures that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible. When synchronized with offsite power, testing should be performed at a power factor of s 0.9. This power factor is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG would see under design basis accident conditions. Under certain conditions, however, Note 2 allows the Surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than s 0.9. These conditions occur when grid voltage is high, and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to s 0.9 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. Under these conditions, the power factor should be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 while still maintaining acceptable voltage limits on the emergency busses. In other circumstances, the grid voltage may be such that the DG excitation levels needed to obtain a power factor of 0.9 may not cause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the excitation levels are in excess of those recommended for the DG. In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to 0.9 without exceeding the DG excitation limits.

SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3).

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-28 Revision 74

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.15 (continued}

REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.

SR 3.8.1.16 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and the DG can be returned to ready to load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the autostart logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready to load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive a close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to' be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-29 Revision 74 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

SR 3.8.1.17 Demonstration of the test mode (parallel mode) override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions will not be compromised as the result of testing and the DG will automatically reset to ready to load operation if a Safety Injection actuation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready to load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 13),

paragraph 6.2.6(2).

The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12. The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading was not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable.

This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-30 Revision 74 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

SR 3.8.1.18 Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the LSELS. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

The restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or.

enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed Surveillance, a successful Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when the Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-31 Revision 74 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.19 REQUIREMENTS In the event of a OBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. The reason for Note 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

The Note 2 restriction from normally performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 or 2 is further amplified to allow portions of the Surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post-work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial Surveillance, a successful partial Surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODE 1 or 2. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-32 Revision 74 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.20 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9).

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.21 SR 3.8.1.21 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST using the LS ELS automatic tester for each load shedder and emergency load sequencer train except that the continuity check does not have to be performed, as explained in the Note. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

REFERENCES 1. 1O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. USAR, Chapter 8.
3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3.
4. USAR, Chapter 6.
5. USAR, Chapter 15'.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.
7. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.
8. 1O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, August 1977.
10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 0, January 1978.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-33 Revision 74 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES 11. ANSI C84.1-1982 (continued)

12. IEEE Standard 308-1978.
13. Configuration Change Package (CCP) 08052, Revision 1, April 23, 1999.
14. Amendment No.161, April 21, 2005.
15. Not used.
16. Amendment No. 163, April 26, 2006.
17. Amendment No.154, August4, 2004.
18. Amendment No. 8, May 29, 1987.
19. Condition Report 15727.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-34 Revision 74 I

RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS RHR loop requirements are met by having one RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, except as permitted in the Note to the LCO.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations.

Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies in the core.

With no forced circulation cooling, decay heat removal from the core occurs by natural convection to the heat sink provided by the water above the core. A minimum refueling water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat sink.

Suspending any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition.

Performance of Required Action A.2 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be initiated and continued in order to satisfy RHR loop requirements. With the unit in MODE 6 and the refueling water level ~ 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, corrective actions shall be initiated immediately.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.

Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.9.5-3 Revision 32

RHR and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS A.4 (continued)

The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator in the control room for monitoring the RHR System.

SR 3.9.5.2 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of the Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILITY is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined by.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.9.5-4 Revision 75

RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

2. SAP-06-113, "Loss of RHR Analysis with the Refuel Cavity Flooded and Upper Internals Installed," November 16, 2006.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.9.5-5 Revision 75 I

RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If the accumulated gas is eliminated or~

brought within the acceptance criteria limits during performance of th Surveillance, the Surveillance is met and past system OPERABILIT is evaluated under the Corrective Action Program. If it is determined b subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable QY the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.
2. Generic Letter No. 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.9.6-5 Revision 75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE <1l REVISION NO. 2

<> CHANGE DOCUMENT <3l DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4l TAB - Title Page Technical Specification Cover Page Title Page TAB - Table of Contents 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 ii 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 iii 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 TAB- B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS {SLs)

B 2.1.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 2.1.1-2 14 DRR 03-0102 2/12/03 B 2.1.1-3 14 DRR 03-0102 2/12/03 82.1.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 2/12/03 B 2.1.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 2.1.2-2 12 DRR 02-1062 9126102 8 2.1.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB- 8 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILTY 8 3.0-1 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 8 3.0-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.0-3 O Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.0-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 8 3.0-5 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 83.0-6 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 8 3.0-7 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 8 3.0-8 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 83.0-9 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 8 3.0-10 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 8 3.0-11 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-12 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-13 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-14 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-15 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 8 3.0-16 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 TAB- B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.1-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 83.1.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-5

  • 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.3-4 0 Amend. No: 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE (1l REVISION NO. (2> CHANGE DOCUMENT C3l DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4 >

TAB - B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ~continued)

B 3.1.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-6 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 83.1.4-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.5-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.7-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B3.1.7-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-5 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1'.7-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.1.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-3 15 ORR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.1.8-4 15 ORR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.1.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-6 5 ORR 00-1427 10/12/00 TAB - B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B3.2.1-1 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.1-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-4 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-5 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-6 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-7 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-8 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-9 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.2.1-10 70 ORR 15-0944 4/28/15 B 3.2.2-1 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.2.2-3 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-4 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-5 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-6 70 ORR 15-0944 4/28/15 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ii Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE REVISION NO. <2J CHANGE DOCUMENT DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED C4l TAB- B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS (continued)

B 3.2.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-3 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-5 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.4-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-7 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 TAB- B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.3.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.1-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.1-7 5 ORR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.3.1-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-10 29 ORR 06-1984 10/17/06 8 3.3.1-11 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-12 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.1-14 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-15 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-16 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-17 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-18 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-19 66 ORR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-20 66 ORR 14-2329 11/6/14 8 3.3.1-21 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-22 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-23 9 ORR 02-0123 2/28/02 8 3.3.1-24 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-25 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-26 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-27 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-28 2 ORR 00-0147 4/24/00 8 3.3.1-29 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 8 3.3.1-30 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-31 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-32 20 ORR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-33 48 ORR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-34 20 ORR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-35 19 ORR 04-1414 10/13/04 B 3.3.1-36 20 ORR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-37 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-38 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-39 25 ORR 06-0800 5/18/06 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iii Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE (1l REVISION NO. (2l CHANGE DOCUMENT <3l DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4l TAB- B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.1-40 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-41 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-42 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-43 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-44 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 83.3.1-45 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-46 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 83.3.1-47 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-48 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-49 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-50 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-51 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.1-52 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-53 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-54 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-55 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.3.1-56 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-57 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-58 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.3.1-59 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83~.2~ 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-6 7 DRR 01-0474 5/1/01 B 3.3.2-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.2-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-10 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-11 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-12 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-14 2 DRR 00-0147 4/24/00 B 3.3.2-15 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-16 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-17 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-18 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-19 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-20 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-21 37 DRR08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-22 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-23 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-24 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.3.2-25 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 83~.2~6 ~ DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.3.2-27 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-28 37 DRR08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-29 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-30 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-31 52 DRR 11-0724 4/11/11 Wolf Creek- Unit 1 iv Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 1 2 3 PAGE Cl REVISION NO. <> CHANGE DOCUMENT C > DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4>

TAB- B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.2-32 52 DRR 11-0724 4/11/11 B 3.3.2-33 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3~.2~4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-35 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-36 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-37 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-38 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2~9 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.3.2-40 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-41 45 Amend. No. 187 (ETS) 3/5/10 B 3.3.2-42 45 Amend. No. 187 (ETS) 3/5/10 B 3.3.2-43 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-44 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-45 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-46 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.3.2-47 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-48 37 DRR08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-49 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-50 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-51 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-52 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-53 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-54 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-55 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-56 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-57 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 83.3.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-2 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.3.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-6 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-7 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-8 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-9 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-10 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.3.3-11 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.3.3-12 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-13 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-14 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-15 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.4-2 9 DRR 02-1023 2/28/02 B 3.3.4-3 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.3.4-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.3.4-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.4-6 9 DRR 02-0123 2/28/02 B 3.3.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.5~ 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 Wolf Creek- Unit 1 v Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE <1J REVISION NO. <2> CHANGE DOCUMENT <3J DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4>

TAB- 8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B3.3.5-4 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 B3.3.5-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-6 22 ORR 05-1375 6/28/05 B 3.3.5-7 22 ORR 05-1375 6/28/05 83.3.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.3.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.3.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.3.6-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.3.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.7-2 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.3.7-3 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.3.7-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.7-6 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.3.7-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.3.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.3.8-3 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.3.8-4 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B3.3.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-6 24 ORR 06-0051 2/28/06 B 3.3.8-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB - B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM {RCS)

B 3.4.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-2 10 ORR 02-0411 4/5/02 B 3.4.1-3 10 ORR 02-0411 4/5/02 B 3.4.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.1-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-1 67 ORR 15-0116 2/10/15 B 3.4.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.4-2 29 ORR 06-1984 10/17/06 83.4.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.4.5-2 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/11 8 3.4.5-3 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 vi Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE REVISION NO. <2> CHANGE DOCUMENT C 3

) DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4l TAB- B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued)

B 3.4.5-5 12 ORR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.5-6 12 DRR02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.6-1 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/11 B 3.4.6-2 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-3 12 ORR02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.6-4 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-5 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.4.6-6 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.4.7-1 12 ORR02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.7-2 17 DRR 04-0453 5/26/04 B 3.4.7-3 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-4 42 ORR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.4.7-5 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-6 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.4.8-1 53 ORR 11-1513 7/18/11 B 3.4.8-2 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.4.8-4 75 DRR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.4.8-5 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.9-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.10-1 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.4.10-2 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.4.10-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.10-4 32 ORR 07-0139 217107 B 3.4.11-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-2 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-3 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.4.11-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-5 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-7 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B 3.4.12-1 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-2 61 ORR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-4 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-5 61 ORR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-6 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.4.12-7

  • 61 DRR 14-0346 2127/14 B 3.4.12-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12118/99 B 3.4.12-9 56 ORR 12-1792 11/7/12 83.4.12-10 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-11 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-12 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B 3.4.12-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-14 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B 3.4.13-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.13-2 29 ORR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.13-3 29 ORR 06-1984 10/17/06 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 vii Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE <1J REVISION NO. <2> CHANGE DOCUMENT <3J DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4 >

TAB- B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued)

B 3.4.13-4 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.4.13-5 35 DRR 07-1553 9128107 B 3.4.13-6 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.14-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-5 32 ORR 07-0139 217107 B 3.4.14-6 32 ORR 07-0139 217107 B 3.4.15-1 31 ORR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-2 31 ORR06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-3 33 ORR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.4.15-4 33 ORR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.4.15-5 65 ORR 14-2146 9/30/14 B 3.4.15-6 31 ORR06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-7 31 ORR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-8 31 ORR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-1 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-2 31 ORR06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-3 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-4 31 ORR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-5 31 ORR06-2494 12/13/06 83.4.17-1 29 ORR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.17-2 58 DRR 13-0369 02/26/13 B 3.4.17-3 52 ORR 11-0724 4/11/11 B 3.4.17-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-5 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-6 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-7 58 ORR 13-0369 02/26/13 TAB- B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-3 73 DRR 15-2135 11/17/15 B 3.5.1-4 73 DRR 15-2135 11/17/15 B 3.5.1-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-6 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-7 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.5.1-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-4 O Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-6 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.5.2-7 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.5.2-8 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-9 75 DRR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.5.2-10 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 83.5.2-11 72 DRR15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-12 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 viii Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE <1l REVISION NO. CHANGE DOCUMENT <3l DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4>

TAB- B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) (continued)

B 3.5.3-1 56 ORR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.3-2 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 83.5.3-3 56 ORR 12-1792 1117/12 B 3.5.3-4 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-6 26 DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.5.5-1 21 ORR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.5.5-2 21 ORR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.5.5-3 2 Amend. No. 132 4/24/00 B 3.5.5-4. 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 TAB - B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-4 17 ORR 04-0453 5/26/04 B 3.6.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.6.2-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.6.3-4 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 83.6.3-5 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 83.6.3-6 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-7 41 ORR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.6.3-8 36 DRR08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-9 36 DRR08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-10 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.6.3-11 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-12 36 ORR08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-13 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/11 B 3.6.3-14 36 DRR08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-15 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.3-16 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.3-17 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-18 36 ORR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-19 36 DRR08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.4-1 39 ORR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.4-2 o. Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.5-2 37 DRR08-0503 4/8/08 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ix Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE REVISION NO. CHANGE DOCUMENT DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4>

TAB- B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)

B3.6.5-3 13 ORR 02-1458 12/03/02 B 3.6.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.6-1 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.6.6-2 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/14 B 3.6.6-3 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.6.6-4 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 Baa~5 o Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.6-6 18 DRR 04-1018 9/1/04 B 3.6.6-7 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-8 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-9 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-10 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.6.6.11 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B3.6.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.6.7-2 42 ORR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.6.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.7-4 29 ORR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.6.7-5 42 ORR 09-1009 7/16/09 TAB B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.7.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B3.7.1-5 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B3.7.1-6 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B 3.7.2-1 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-2 44 ORR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-3 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-4 44 ORR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-5 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 83.7.2-6 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B3.7.2-7 44 ORR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-8 44 ORR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-9 44 ORR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-10 44 ORR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-11 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.3-1 37 DRR08-0503 4/8/08 B3.7.3-2 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/11 83.7.3-3 37 ORR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-4 37 ORR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-5 37 ORR 08-0503 4/8/08 B3.7.3-6 37 DRR08-0503 4/8/08 83.7.3-7 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-8 37 ORR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-9 66 ORR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.7.3-10 66 ORR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.7.3-11 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.4-1 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B3.7.4-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 x Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE REVISION NO. CHANGE DOCUMENT DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED C4l B 3.7.4-3 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 TAB - B 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.4-4 . 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.7.4-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.5-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.5-2 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.5-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.5-4 60 DRR 13-2562 10/25/13 B 3.7.5-5 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.5-6 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.5-7 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B 3.7.5-8 14 DRR 03-0102 2/12/03 B 3.7.5-9 32 DRR 07-0139 217107 B 3.7.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-4 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 83.7.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.7.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.7.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.9-1 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 83.7.9-2 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 8 3.7.9-3 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 8 3.7.9-4 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 83.7.10-1 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 83.7.10-2 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 8 3.7.10-3 41 DRR09-0288 3/20/09 8 3.7.10-4 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.10-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 83.7.10-7 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 8 3.7.10-8 41 DRR09-0288 3/20/09 8 3.7.10-9 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 8 3.7.11-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.7.11-2 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.7.11-3 63 ORR 14-1572 7/1/14 8 3.7.11-4 63 ORR 14-1572 7/1/14 B 3.7.12-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.7.13-1 24 DRR 06-0051 2/28/06 B 3.7.13-2 '1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 8 3.7.13-3 75 ORR 16-1909 7/16/09 8 3.7.13-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.7.13-5 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.7.13-6 64 ORR 14-1822 8/28/14 8 3.7.13-7 64 ORR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.13-8 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.14-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xi Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE <1l REVISION NO. <2> CHANGE DOCUMENT <3> DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4>

B 3.7.15-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB- B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS !continued}

B 3.7.15-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.15-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.16-1 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.16-2 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.7.16-3 5 ORR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.17-1 7 ORR 01-0474 5/1/01 B3.7.17-2 7 ORR 01-0474 5/1/01 B 3.7.17-3 5 ORR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.18-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.18-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.18-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.19-1 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.19-2 54 ORR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-3 54 ORR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-4 61 ORR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.7.19-5 61 ORR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.7.19-6 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-7 54 ORR 11-2394 11/16/11 TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1-1 54 ORR 11-2394 11/16/11 B3.8.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.1-3 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.8.1-4 71 ORR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.8.1-5 59 ORR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-6 25 ORR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.8.1-7 26 ORR 06-1350 7/24/06 8 3.8.1-8 35 ORR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.8.1-9 42 ORR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.8.1-10 39 ORR 08-1096 8/28/08 8 3.8.1-11 36 ORR 08-0255 3/11/08 8 3.8.1-12 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 8 3.8.1-13 47 ORR 10-1089 6/16/10 83.8.1-14 47 ORR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-15 47 ORR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-16 26 ORR 06~1350 7/24/06 83.8.1-17 26 ORR 06-1350 7/24/06

.8 3.8.1-18 59 ORR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-19 26 ORR 06-1350 7/24/06 8 3.8.1-20 26 ORR 06-1350 7/24/06 8 3.8.1-21 33 ORR07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-22 33 ORR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-23 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 B 3.8.1-24 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 B 3.8.1-25 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 8 3.8.1-26 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 8 3.8.1-27 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 8 3.8.1-28 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 B 3.8.1-29 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 B 3.8.1-30 74 ORR 16-1182 7/7/16 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xii Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE (ll REVISION NO. (2l CHANGE DOCUMENT <3l DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4l B 3.8.1-31 74 DRR 16-1182 7/7/16 TAB- 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS {continued}

B 3.8.1-32 74 DRR 16-1182- 7/7/16 B 3.8.1-33 74 DRR 16-1182 7/7/16 B 3.8.1-34 74 DRR 16-1182 7/7/16 B 3.8.2-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.. 8.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.2-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-7 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.3-1 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.8.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-4 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-7 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 83.8.3-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 8 3.8.3-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/9.9 B 3.8.4-5 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/11 B 3.8.4-6 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/11 B 3.8.4-7 6 DRR 00-1541 3/13/01 B 3.8.4-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.8.4-9 2 DRR 00-0147 4/24/00 8 3.8.5-1 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.5-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 83.8.5-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 83.8.5-5 57 DRR 13:-0006 1/16/13 8 3.8.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.8.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.8.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 83.8.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12118/99 B 3.8.7-1 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 83.8.7-2 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 83.8.7-3 69 ORR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.8-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.8.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.8-3 69 ORR 15-0493 3/26/15 83.8.8-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 8 3.8.8-5 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 8 3.8.9-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 8 3.8.9-2 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 Wolf Creek- Unit 1 xiii Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 2

PAGE REVISION NO. <> CHANGE DOCUMENT <3> DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED (4 >

B 3.8.9-3 54 ORR 11-2394 11/16/11 TAB- B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.8.9-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-5 69 ORR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-8 1 ORR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-1 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-4 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-5 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-6 57 ORR 13-0006 1/16/13 TA8-8 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 83.9.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.9.1-2 19 ORR 04-1414 10/12/04 8 3.9.1-3 19 ORR 04-1414 10/12/04 8 3.9.1-4 19 ORR 04-1414 10/12104 B 3.9.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.3-1 68 ORR 15-0248 2/26/15 8 3.9.3-2 68 ORR 15-0248 2/26/15 83.9.3-3 51 ORR 11-0664 3/21/11 B 3.9.3-4 68 ORR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.4-1 23 ORR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.9.4-2 13 ORR 02-1458 12/03/02 B 3.9.4-3 25 ORR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.9.4-4 23 ORR 05-1995 9/28/05 8 3.9.4-5 33 ORR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.9.4-6 23 ORR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.9.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.5-2 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 83.9.5-3 32 ORR 07-0139 217107 B 3.9.5-4 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 83.9.5-5 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.9.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.6-2 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9:6-3 42 ORR 09-1009 7/16/09 8 3.9.6-4 72 ORR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-5 75 ORR 16-1909 10/26/16 B 3.9.7-1 25 ORR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.9.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xiv Revision75

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE REVISION NO. CHANGE DOCUMENT (3l DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED <4l Note 1 The page number is listed on the center of the bottom of each page.

Note 2 The revision number is listed in the lower right hand comer of each page. The Revision number will be page specific.

Note 3 The change document will be the document requesting the change. Amendment No.

123 issued the improved Technical Specifications and associated Bases which affected each page. The NRC has indicated that Bases changes will not be issued with License Amendments. Therefore, the change document should be a ORR number in

.accordance with AP 26A-002.

Note 4 The date effective or implemented is the date the Bases pages are issued by Document Control.

Wolf Creek- Unit 1 xv Revision74