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| number = ML17130B006
| number = ML17130B006
| issue date = 05/10/2017
| issue date = 05/10/2017
| title = Columbia - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2017001
| title = NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2017001
| author name = Haire M S
| author name = Haire M
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
| addressee name = Reddemann M E
| addressee name = Reddemann M
| addressee affiliation = Energy Northwest
| addressee affiliation = Energy Northwest
| docket = 05000397
| docket = 05000397
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:May 10, 2017
[[Issue date::May 10, 2017]]


Mr. M. Chief Executive Officer Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968, Mail Drop 1023 Richland, WA 99352-0968
==SUBJECT:==
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2017001


SUBJECT: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2017001
==Dear Mr. Reddemann:==
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Columbia Generating Station. On March 30, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.


==Dear Mr. Reddemann:==
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Columbia Generating Station. On March 30, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
 
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
 
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark Haire, Branch Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000397/2017001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information


Sincerely,/RA/ Mark Haire, Branch Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21
x SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available x Non-Sensitive By: MHaire/dll x Yes No x Publicly Available Sensitive OFFICE SRI:DRP/A SRI:DRP/B C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 NAME GKolcum DBradley TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy HGepford SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 05/02/17 05/02/17 05/02/17 05/04/17 5/2/17 05/04/17 OFFICE TL:DRS/IPAT SPE:DRP/A BC:DRP/A NAME THipschman RAlexander MHaire SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 05/04/17 05/02/17 5/10/17


===Enclosure:===
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report 05000397/2017001 w/


===Attachment:===
==REGION IV==
Supplemental Information x SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available x Non-Sensitive By: MHaire/dll x Yes No x Publicly Available Sensitive OFFICE SRI:DRP/A SRI:DRP/B C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 NAME GKolcum DBradley TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy HGepford SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 05/02/17 05/02/17 05/02/17 05/04/17 5/2/17 05/04/17 OFFICE TL:DRS/IPAT SPE:DRP/A BC:DRP/A NAME THipschman RAlexander MHaire SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 05/04/17 05/02/17 5/10/17 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000397 License: NPF-21 Report: 05000397/2017001 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: North Power Plant Loop Richland, WA 99354 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2017 Inspectors: G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector D. Bradley, Acting Senior Resident Inspector P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Mark Haire Chief, Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects 2
Docket: 05000397 License: NPF-21 Report: 05000397/2017001 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: North Power Plant Loop Richland, WA 99354 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2017 Inspectors: G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector D. Bradley, Acting Senior Resident Inspector P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved Mark Haire By: Chief, Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
IR 05000397/2017001; 01/01/2017 - 03/31/2017; Columbia Generating Station; Integrated Inspection Report. The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2017, by the resident inspectors at Columbia Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green, greater than Green, White, Yellow, or Red), determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016. No findings were identified.
IR 05000397/2017001; 01/01/2017 - 03/31/2017; Columbia Generating Station; Integrated
 
Inspection Report.
 
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2017, by the resident inspectors at Columbia Generating Station and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green, greater than Green, White, Yellow, or Red), determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated April 29, 2015. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, dated July 2016.
 
No findings were identified.
 
=PLANT STATUS=
 
The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 1, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for a control rod pattern change. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 2, 2017.
 
On January 3, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 94 percent to troubleshoot a non-safety power supply channel to a recirculation pump. On January 9, 2017, the plant further reduced power to 70 percent to restore the nonsafety power supply channel to a recirculation pump. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 10, 2017.


3 
On January 28, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for control rod testing. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 29, 2017.


==PLANT STATUS==
On February 4, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 89 percent for shifting feedwater heater alignment. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 4, 2017.
The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 1, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for a control rod pattern change. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 2, 2017. On January 3, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 94 percent to troubleshoot a non-safety power supply channel to a recirculation pump. On January 9, 2017, the plant further reduced power to 70 percent to restore the nonsafety power supply channel to a recirculation pump. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 10, 2017.


On January 28, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for control rod testing. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 29, 2017. On February 4, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 89 percent for shifting feedwater heater alignment. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 4, 2017.
On February 25, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for steam valve testing and shifting feedwater heater alignment. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 26, 2017.


On February 25, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for steam valve testing and shifting feedwater heater alignment. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 26, 2017. On March 10, 2017, the plant began power coast-down to the next refueling outage. On March, 25, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 88 percent for control rod and steam valve testing. The plant returned to 95 percent power on March 25, 2017. The plant ended the inspection period at approximately 94 percent power.
On March 10, 2017, the plant began power coast-down to the next refueling outage.


4
On March, 25, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 88 percent for control rod and steam valve testing. The plant returned to 95 percent power on March 25, 2017.


=REPORT DETAILS=
The plant ended the inspection period at approximately 94 percent power.
 
REPORT DETAILS


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity {{a|1R01}}
{{a|1R01}}
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection==
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
Line 60: Line 80:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On January 18, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensee's procedures to respond to cold weather and ice, and the licensee's planned implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.
On January 18, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to cold weather and ice, and the licensees planned implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.


These activities constituted one sample of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
These activities constituted one sample of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R04}}
{{a|1R04}}
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
Line 72: Line 91:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:   January 24, 2017, 125 VDC and 250 VDC systems February 15, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator ventilation system March 7, 2017, primary containment venting system March 10, 2017, Division 2 and 3 emergency diesel generator starting air systems The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration. These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
* January 24, 2017, 125 VDC and 250 VDC systems
* February 15, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator ventilation system
* March 7, 2017, primary containment venting system
* March 10, 2017, Division 2 and 3 emergency diesel generator starting air systems The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
 
These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 80: Line 105:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 10, 2017, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the reactor building ventilation system. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, in-process design changes, temporary modifications, and other open items relative to the system tracked by the licensee's operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration. These activities constituted one complete system walk-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
On March 10, 2017, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the reactor building ventilation system. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, in-process design changes, temporary modifications, and other open items relative to the system tracked by the licensees operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
 
These activities constituted one complete system walk-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R05}}
{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection==
==1R05 Fire Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
Line 90: Line 116:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety:   January 31, 2017, main control room January 31, 2017, Division 1, 2, and 3 emergency diesel generators March 1, 2017, emergency core cooling system pump rooms on 422 foot elevation March 10, 2017, Division 2 and 3 emergency diesel generators For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety:
* January 31, 2017, main control room
* January 31, 2017, Division 1, 2, and 3 emergency diesel generators
* March 1, 2017, emergency core cooling system pump rooms on 422 foot elevation
* March 10, 2017, Division 2 and 3 emergency diesel generators For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.


6 These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R06}}
{{a|1R06}}
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 8, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensee's flooding analysis, the inspectors chose four plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components that were susceptible to flooding:   Residual heat removal 'C' room Low-pressure core spray room Reactor core isolation cooling room Control rod drive pump room The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.
On March 8, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis, the inspectors chose four plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components that were susceptible to flooding:
* Residual heat removal C room
* Low-pressure core spray room
* Reactor core isolation cooling room
* Control rod drive pump room The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.


In addition, on February 15, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected three underground vaults that contained risk-significant or multiple-train cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:   Manholes E-MH-E11, E-MH-E13, and E-MH-E15, each containing standby service water cables The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements. These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample and one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
In addition, on February 15, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected three underground vaults that contained risk-significant or multiple-train cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:
* Manholes E-MH-E11, E-MH-E13, and E-MH-E15, each containing standby service water cables The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.
 
These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample and one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R11}}
 
7
{{a|1R11}}
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
Line 115: Line 148:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On January 9, 2017, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the evaluated simulator scenario. These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
On January 9, 2017, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the evaluated simulator scenario.
 
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 123: Line 158:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On the following dates, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity or risk. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activities:   January 9, 2017, during a down-power for adjustable speed drive 1A2 work February 9 , 2017, for a low-pressure core spray surveillance run March 10, 2017, during a Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour surveillance run In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies. These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
On the following dates, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity or risk. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
* January 9, 2017, during a down-power for adjustable speed drive 1A2 work
* February 9 , 2017, for a low-pressure core spray surveillance run
* March 10, 2017, during a Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour surveillance run In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
 
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R12}}
 
8
{{a|1R12}}
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
Line 135: Line 172:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed four instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs):   January 23, 2017, mechanism operated cell (MOC) switch failures, resulting in the loss of the non-vital SM-3 electrical bus January 28, 2017, Division 3 emergency diesel generator, fan 32 coil failure January 31, 2017, Division 1 control room emergency chiller, tripped on overcurrent January 31, 2017, reactor water cleanup 1B pump piping flange leak The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions, in accordance with the Maintenance Rule. These activities constituted completion of four maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
The inspectors reviewed four instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs):
* January 23, 2017, mechanism operated cell (MOC) switch failures, resulting in the loss of the non-vital SM-3 electrical bus
* January 28, 2017, Division 3 emergency diesel generator, fan 32 coil failure
* January 31, 2017, Division 1 control room emergency chiller, tripped on overcurrent
* January 31, 2017, reactor water cleanup 1B pump piping flange leak The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions, in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
 
These activities constituted completion of four maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 143: Line 186:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 12, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's quality control activities through: (1) a review of the licensee's control of quality parts during maintenance associated with coils for 480 V AC breakers; and (2) a review of whether quality control verifications were properly specified, in accordance with the licensee's Quality Assurance Program, and were implemented as specified, during work associated with replacement of these coils.
On March 12, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the licensees quality control activities through:
: (1) a review of the licensees control of quality parts during maintenance associated with coils for 480 V AC breakers; and
: (2) a review of whether quality control verifications were properly specified, in accordance with the licensees Quality Assurance Program, and were implemented as specified, during work associated with replacement of these coils.


These activities constituted completion of one quality control sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
These activities constituted completion of one quality control sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R13}}
 
9
{{a|1R13}}
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed four risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:   January 3, 2017, Yellow risk for maintenance on Division 1 standby service water and control room emergency chiller systems January 12, 2017, high radiological risk for radioactive waste cask movement and surveys March 6, 2017, Yellow risk during fuel pool cooling pump maintenance March 19, 2017, Yellow risk during a Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour surveillance run The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments. The inspectors also observed portions of two emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event or to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:   January 18, 2017, Yellow risk for adverse weather and an ice storm January 25, 2017, Orange risk for a Division 3 emergency diesel generator fan failure The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
The inspectors reviewed four risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
* January 3, 2017, Yellow risk for maintenance on Division 1 standby service water and control room emergency chiller systems
* January 12, 2017, high radiological risk for radioactive waste cask movement and surveys
* March 6, 2017, Yellow risk during fuel pool cooling pump maintenance
* March 19, 2017, Yellow risk during a Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour surveillance run The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
 
The inspectors also observed portions of two emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event or to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:
* January 18, 2017, Yellow risk for adverse weather and an ice storm
* January 25, 2017, Orange risk for a Division 3 emergency diesel generator fan failure The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.


These activities constituted completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13
These activities constituted completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R15}}
{{a|1R15}}
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
Line 168: Line 217:
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
January 13, 2017, operability determination for Division 1 emergency diesel generator cable tray heating during welding under Action Request 360052 January 19, 2017, operability determination for Division 2 emergency diesel generator lubrication oil level under Action Request 360362 January 25, 2017, operability determination for control rod hydraulic accumulator pressure under Action Request 359340 January 31, 2017, operability determination for Division 2 emergency diesel generator room temperature under Action Request 359890 January 31, 2017, operability determination for secondary containment during crane activities under Action Request 359905 February 28, 2017, operability determination for reactor core isolation cooling room cooler maintenance under Work Order 02073920 The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC. The inspectors also reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators' ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. These activities constituted completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
* January 13, 2017, operability determination for Division 1 emergency diesel generator cable tray heating during welding under Action Request 360052
* January 19, 2017, operability determination for Division 2 emergency diesel generator lubrication oil level under Action Request 360362
* January 25, 2017, operability determination for control rod hydraulic accumulator pressure under Action Request 359340
* January 31, 2017, operability determination for Division 2 emergency diesel generator room temperature under Action Request 359890
* January 31, 2017, operability determination for secondary containment during crane activities under Action Request 359905
* February 28, 2017, operability determination for reactor core isolation cooling room cooler maintenance under Work Order 02073920 The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC.
 
The inspectors also reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
 
These activities constituted completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R18}}
{{a|1R18}}
==1R18 Plant Modifications==
==1R18 Plant Modifications==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18}}
Line 178: Line 235:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed two temporary plant modifications that affected risk-significant SSCs:   February 2, 2017, suppression pool temperature monitoring element under Engineering Change 16285 February 16, 2017, reactor core isolation cooling key switch under Engineering Change 16135 The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed these temporary modifications in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that these modifications did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modifications to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.
The inspectors reviewed two temporary plant modifications that affected risk-significant SSCs:
* February 2, 2017, suppression pool temperature monitoring element under Engineering Change 16285
* February 16, 2017, reactor core isolation cooling key switch under Engineering Change 16135 The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed these temporary modifications in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that these modifications did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modifications to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.


These activities constituted completion of two samples of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
These activities constituted completion of two samples of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R19}}
{{a|1R19}}
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:   January 26, 2017, Division 3 emergency diesel generator ventilation fan DMA-FN-32 under Work Order 02107019 January 27, 2017, high-pressure core spray maintenance under Work Order 02094658 January 27, 2017, Division 2 control room emergency chiller under Work Order 02093156 February 8, 2017, low-pressure core spray under Work Order 02092635 February 9, 2017, fuel pool cooling maintenance under Work Order 029132719 March 8, 2017, fuel pool cooling maintenance under Work Order 02050556 March 22, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator circuit breaker E-CB-DG2/8 under Work Order 02109179 The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs. These activities constituted completion of seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19 12
The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:
* January 26, 2017, Division 3 emergency diesel generator ventilation fan DMA-FN-32 under Work Order 02107019
* January 27, 2017, high-pressure core spray maintenance under Work Order 02094658
* January 27, 2017, Division 2 control room emergency chiller under Work Order 02093156
* February 8, 2017, low-pressure core spray under Work Order 02092635
* February 9, 2017, fuel pool cooling maintenance under Work Order 029132719
* March 8, 2017, fuel pool cooling maintenance under Work Order 02050556
* March 22, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator circuit breaker E-CB-DG2/8 under Work Order 02109179 The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
 
These activities constituted completion of seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R22}}
{{a|1R22}}
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions: In-service tests: January 10, 2017, Division 2 standby liquid control pump operability test Other surveillance tests: January 4, 2017, Division 1 emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance test January 11, 2017, reactor core isolation cooling suction transfer test January 18, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance test February 9, 2017, low-pressure core spray keep fill pump surveillance test March 9, 2017, Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour load test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the tests satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing. These activities constituted completion of six surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
The inspectors observed risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
* January 10, 2017, Division 2 standby liquid control pump operability test Other surveillance tests:
* January 4, 2017, Division 1 emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance test
* January 11, 2017, reactor core isolation cooling suction transfer test
* January 18, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance test
* February 9, 2017, low-pressure core spray keep fill pump surveillance test
* March 9, 2017, Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour load test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the tests satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
 
These activities constituted completion of six surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


===Cornerstone:===
===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness===
Emergency Preparedness
{{a|1EP2}}
{{a|1EP2}}
==1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing==
==1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing==
Line 210: Line 284:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector verified the adequacy of the licensee's methods for testing the primary and backup alert and notification system. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for identifying emergency planning zone locations requiring tone alert radios and for distributing the radios, and reviewed audits of distribution records. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the maintenance of the primary and 13 backup alert and notification system and reviewed a sample of corrective action program reports written for alert and notification system problems. The inspector compared the licensee's alert and notification system testing program with criteria in NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1; FEMA Report REP-10, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants;" and the licensee's current FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report, "Columbia Generating Station Alert and Notification System Design Report," Revision 2, dated November 15, 2016. These activities constituted completion of one alert and notification system evaluation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.
The inspector verified the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing the primary and backup alert and notification system. The inspector also reviewed the licensees program for identifying emergency planning zone locations requiring tone alert radios and for distributing the radios, and reviewed audits of distribution records. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the maintenance of the primary and backup alert and notification system and reviewed a sample of corrective action program reports written for alert and notification system problems. The inspector compared the licensees alert and notification system testing program with criteria in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1; FEMA Report REP-10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants; and the licensees current FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report, Columbia Generating Station Alert and Notification System Design Report, Revision 2, dated November 15, 2016.
 
These activities constituted completion of one alert and notification system evaluation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1EP3}}
{{a|1EP3}}
==1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System==
==1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.03}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.03}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector verified the licensee's emergency response organization on-shift and augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan commitments. The inspector reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on-shift emergency response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensee's methods for staffing emergency response facilities, including the licensee's ability to staff pre-planned alternate facilities. The inspector also reviewed records of emergency response organization augmentation tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments. These activities constituted completion of one emergency response organization staffing and augmentation testing sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.
The inspector verified the licensees emergency response organization on-shift and augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensees emergency plan commitments. The inspector reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on-shift emergency response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensees methods for staffing emergency response facilities, including the licensees ability to staff pre-planned alternate facilities.
 
The inspector also reviewed records of emergency response organization augmentation tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments.
 
These activities constituted completion of one emergency response organization staffing and augmentation testing sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1EP4}}
{{a|1EP4}}
==1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes==
==1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.04}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.04}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector performed an on-site review of the Emergency Plan, Revision 64, implemented January 4, 2017. Specifically, this revision:   Revised the description of the alert and notification system Clarified protective measures for the public by adding the term, "shelter in place"  Added "monitor and prepare" as an instruction to members of the public for whom immediate protective measures are not being recommended Changed the frequency of full-cycle tests of the alert and notification system from twice per year to once per year, as described in the revised "FEMA Design Report"  Added additional alert and notification warning sirens in the emergency planning zone Revised the requirement for an annual test of the alert and notification with regards to the annual test of the tone alert radio system This revision was compared to its previous revision, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revision adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that the revision did not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection.
The inspector performed an on-site review of the Emergency Plan, Revision 64, implemented January 4, 2017. Specifically, this revision:
* Revised the description of the alert and notification system
* Clarified protective measures for the public by adding the term, shelter in place
* Added monitor and prepare as an instruction to members of the public for whom immediate protective measures are not being recommended
* Changed the frequency of full-cycle tests of the alert and notification system from twice per year to once per year, as described in the revised FEMA Design Report
* Added additional alert and notification warning sirens in the emergency planning zone
* Revised the requirement for an annual test of the alert and notification with regards to the annual test of the tone alert radio system This revision was compared to its previous revision, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revision adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that the revision did not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection.


These activities constituted completion of one emergency action level and emergency plan changes sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04.
These activities constituted completion of one emergency action level and emergency plan changes sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1EP5}}
{{a|1EP5}}
==1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness==
==1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.05}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.05}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector reviewed the following for the period April 2015 to December 2016: After-action reports for emergency classifications and events After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises Independent audits and surveillances of the licensee's emergency preparedness program Self-assessments of the emergency preparedness program conducted by the licensee Licensee evaluations of changes made to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program Emergency preparedness program issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program Emergency response organization and emergency planner training records 15 The inspector reviewed summaries of 139 corrective action program reports associated with emergency preparedness, and selected 27 to review against program requirements to determine the licensee's ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspector verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments.
The inspector reviewed the following for the period April 2015 to December 2016:
* After-action reports for emergency classifications and events
* After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises
* Independent audits and surveillances of the licensees emergency preparedness program
* Self-assessments of the emergency preparedness program conducted by the licensee
* Licensee evaluations of changes made to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures
* Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensees corrective action program
* Emergency preparedness program issues entered into the licensees corrective action program
* Emergency response organization and emergency planner training records The inspector reviewed summaries of 139 corrective action program reports associated with emergency preparedness, and selected 27 to review against program requirements to determine the licensees ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspector verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments.


The inspector reviewed summaries of 103 licensee evaluations of the impact of changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures, and selected eight to review against program requirements to determine the licensee's ability to identify reductions in the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that evaluations of proposed changes to the licensee emergency plan appropriately identified the impact of the changes prior to being implemented. These activities constituted completion of one sample of the maintenance of the licensee's emergency preparedness program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.
The inspector reviewed summaries of 103 licensee evaluations of the impact of changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures, and selected eight to review against program requirements to determine the licensees ability to identify reductions in the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that evaluations of proposed changes to the licensee emergency plan appropriately identified the impact of the changes prior to being implemented.
 
These activities constituted completion of one sample of the maintenance of the licensees emergency preparedness program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1EP6}}
{{a|1EP6}}
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
Line 251: Line 343:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on January 10, 2017, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensee's assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the emergency operations facility, technical support center, and simulator; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on January 10, 2017, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the emergency operations facility, technical support center, and simulator; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.


These activities constituted completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
These activities constituted completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
Line 257: Line 349:
====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
16


===.2 Training Evolution Observation===
===.2 Training Evolution Observation===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 13, 2017, the inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensee's emergency plan. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
On March 13, 2017, the inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensees emergency plan.
 
The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.


These activities constituted completion of one training observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
These activities constituted completion of one training observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
Line 271: Line 363:


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
{{a|4OA1}}
{{a|4OA1}}
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification==
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification==
Line 278: Line 370:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
 
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 286: Line 380:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, to 17 determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
 
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 294: Line 390:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
 
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 302: Line 400:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluated exercises, emergency plan implementations, and selected drill and training evolutions that occurred between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) opportunities. The inspector reviewed a sample of the licensee's completed classifications, notifications, and PARs to verify their timeliness and accuracy. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspector reviewed the licensees evaluated exercises, emergency plan implementations, and selected drill and training evolutions that occurred between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) opportunities.
 
The inspector reviewed a sample of the licensees completed classifications, notifications, and PARs to verify their timeliness and accuracy. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
 
These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


===.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)
===.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector reviewed the licensee's records for participation in drill and training evolutions between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for drill participation opportunities. The inspector verified that all members of the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO) in the identified key positions had been counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspector reviewed the licensee's basis for reporting the percentage of ERO members who participated in a drill. The inspector reviewed drill attendance records and verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspector reviewed the licensees records for participation in drill and training evolutions between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees data for drill participation opportunities. The inspector verified that all members of the licensees emergency response organization (ERO) in the identified key positions had been counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspector reviewed the licensees basis for reporting the percentage of ERO members who participated in a drill. The inspector reviewed drill attendance records and verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
 
These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 318: Line 422:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector reviewed the licensee's records of alert and notification system tests conducted between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspector reviewed procedural guidance on assessing alert and notification system opportunities and the results of periodic alert and notification system operability tests. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspector reviewed the licensees records of alert and notification system tests conducted between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspector reviewed procedural guidance on assessing alert and notification system opportunities and the results of periodic alert and notification system operability tests. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
 
These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.  
No findings were identified. {{a|4OA2}}
{{a|4OA2}}
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}}
===.1 Routine Review===
===.1 Routine Review===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the 19 licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 338: Line 441:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors selected two issues for an in-depth follow-up:   On January 11, 2017, the main control room reported a fire in the emergency diesel generator corridor due to welding activities in the overhead, as described in Action Request 360052.
The inspectors selected two issues for an in-depth follow-up:
* On January 11, 2017, the main control room reported a fire in the emergency diesel generator corridor due to welding activities in the overhead, as described in Action Request 360052.
* On July 28, 2016, the Division 2 vital switchgear supply fan, WMA-FN-53B, air flow was found low as described in Action Request 352835.
 
For both issues, the inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the conditions.


On July 28, 2016, the Division 2 vital switchgear supply fan, WMA-FN-53B, air flow was found low as described in Action Request 352835. For both issues, the inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the conditions. These activities constituted completion of two annual follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
These activities constituted completion of two annual follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.  
No findings were identified.
{{a|4OA5}}
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities Temporary Instruction 2515/192, "Inspection of the Licensee's Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems."==
==4OA5 Other Activities==
 
Temporary Instruction 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems.


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The objective of this performance based temporary instruction was to verify implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition design vulnerability in electric power systems for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee implemented the following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are 20 installed and declared operable for the open phase condition design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following: The licensee identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned from the open phase condition events at the United States operating plants including the Byron Station open phase condition and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an open phase condition. The licensee updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions on off-site power sources credited for safe shutdown of the plant. The licensee established and implemented periodic walk-down activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power circuits to detect a visible open phase condition. The licensee ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
The objective of this performance based temporary instruction was to verify implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition design vulnerability in electric power systems for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee implemented the following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are installed and declared operable for the open phase condition design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following:
* The licensee identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned from the open phase condition events at the United States operating plants including the Byron Station open phase condition and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an open phase condition.
* The licensee updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions on off-site power sources credited for safe shutdown of the plant.
* The licensee established and implemented periodic walk-down activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power circuits to detect a visible open phase condition.
* The licensee ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.  
No findings were identified.
{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On February 2, 2017, the inspector presented the results of the onsite inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness program to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.==
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed. On March 21, 2017, the inspector presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/192 inspection results to Ms. D. Wolfgramm, Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. On March 30, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the final inspection results to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
===Exit Meeting Summary===


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
On February 2, 2017, the inspector presented the results of the onsite inspection of the licensees emergency preparedness program to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.


===Licensee Personnel===
On March 21, 2017, the inspector presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/192 inspection results to Ms. D. Wolfgramm, Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
: [[contact::A. Black]], Manager, Emergency Services
: [[contact::D. Brandon]], Design Engineering Manager
: [[contact::C. Forrester]], Acting Manager, Emergency Preparedness
: [[contact::D. Gregoire]], Manager, Regulatory Affairs
: [[contact::G. Hettel]], Vice President, Operations
: [[contact::G. Higgs]], Manager, Maintenance
: [[contact::M. Hummer]], Licensing Engineer
: [[contact::M. Khaudiser]], Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Safety
: [[contact::D. Kovacs]], Manager, Information Services
: [[contact::C. Moon]], Manager, Quality
: [[contact::G. Pierce]], Manager, Training
: [[contact::J. Pierce]], Manager, Continuous Improvement
: [[contact::R. Prewett]], Operations Manager
: [[contact::M. Rice]], Design Authority
: [[contact::B. Schuetz]], Plant General Manager
: [[contact::D. Suarez]], Regulatory Compliance Engineer
: [[contact::M. Sullivan]], Manager, Security Operations
: [[contact::D. Wolfgramm]], Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
Closed 2515/192 TI Inspection of the Licensee's Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (Section 4OA5) 


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
On March 30, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the final inspection results to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
==Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures Number Title Revision 1.3.76 Integrated Risk Management 48==
: SOP-COLDWEATHER-OPS Cold Weather Operations 29
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 360032
: 360112
: 360165
: 360166
: 360169
: 360205
: 360324 360380


==Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Procedures Number Title Revision 15.1.2 Fire Door Operability Surveillance 27==
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
: ESP-B11-A101 12 Month Battery Inspection of 125 VDC E-B1-1 12
: OMM 51A-008 Lead Acid Batteries 7
: SOP-CN-CONT-VENT-LU Containment Vent, Deinert, Purge, and Ventilating Valve and Breaker Lineup 1
: SOP-DG2-LU Emergency Diesel Generator (DIV 2) Valve and Power Supply Lineup 5
: SOP-HVAC/DG-LU Diesel Generator and Cable Cooling HVAC System Breaker Lineup 0
: SOP-HVAC/DG-SHUTDOWN Diesel Generator and Cable Cooling HVAC System Shutdown 0
: SOP-HVAC/DG-START Diesel Generator and Cable Cooling HVAC System Start 1
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 324622
: 325893
: 341250
: 342151
: 345814
: 346126
: 346758
: 349193
: 349813
: 351571
: 354531
: 358073
: 360191
: 360258 361454


==Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures Number Title Revision==
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
: SOP-FP-DRAIN Fire Protection System Drain 0
: SOP-FP-FILL Fire Protection System Fill 3
: SOP-FP-LU Fire Protection System Valve and Breaker Lineup 7
: SOP-FP-OPS Fire Protection System Operations 10
: SOP-FP-SHUTDOWN Fire Protection System Shutdown 6
: SOP-FP-START Fire Protection System Startup 6
: SOP-FP-STBY Placing Fire Protection System In Standby 5
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 357537
: 357556 362656


==Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Revision==
===Licensee Personnel===
: ME-02-02-02 Calculation for Reactor Building Flooding Analysis 2
: [[contact::A. Black]], Manager, Emergency Services
===Procedures===
: [[contact::D. Brandon]], Design Engineering Manager
: Number Title Revision 1.3.57 Barrier Impairment 36
: [[contact::C. Forrester]], Acting Manager, Emergency Preparedness
===Action Requests===
: [[contact::D. Gregoire]], Manager, Regulatory Affairs
(ARs)
: [[contact::G. Hettel]], Vice President, Operations
: 344460
: [[contact::G. Higgs]], Manager, Maintenance
: 344765
: [[contact::M. Hummer]], Licensing Engineer
: 357921
: [[contact::M. Khaudiser]], Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Safety
: 361219
: [[contact::D. Kovacs]], Manager, Information Services
: 361520
: [[contact::C. Moon]], Manager, Quality
: 361766
: [[contact::G. Pierce]], Manager, Training
===Work Orders===
: [[contact::J. Pierce]], Manager, Continuous Improvement
: 02094580
: [[contact::R. Prewett]], Operations Manager
: [[contact::M. Rice]], Design Authority
: [[contact::B. Schuetz]], Plant General Manager
: [[contact::D. Suarez]], Regulatory Compliance Engineer
: [[contact::M. Sullivan]], Manager, Security Operations
: [[contact::D. Wolfgramm]], Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs


==Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Date==
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
: LR002357 Evaluated Simulator Scenario January 9, 2017
: WO 3900-4000 Burns and Roe, Flooding Analysis of the Pipe Break and Missile Study October 15, 1982 Procedures Number Title Revision 1.3.1 Operating Policies, Programs, and Practices 121 5.1.1 RPV Control 21 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control 23 5.3.1 Secondary Containment Control 20 13.1.1 Classifying the Emergency 47 13.1.1A Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases 31
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: Number Title Date
: OI-9 Operations Standards and Expectation 66
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 360003
: 360147
: 360230
: 360377 360788


==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Procedures Number Title Revision 1.5.11 Maintenance Rule Program 15 10.25.13A 4.16KV Vacuum Breaker Maintenance with Stored Energy Mechanism 17==
===Closed===
: ABN-BKR-FAULT Failure of MOC Switch Activation for Safety Related Breakers 1
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 352504
: 294219
: 333584
: 284521
: 352567
: 351923
: 348362
: 360595
: 360597
: 360121
: 360121
: 360244
: 360168 359912


==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Miscellaneous Documents Title Revision Protected Equipment Tracking Sheets Various==
Inspection of the Licensees Interim Compensatory Measures 2515/192              TI      Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (Section 4OA5)


===Procedures===
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
: Number Title Revision 1.3.76 Integrated Risk Management 48 1.3.83 Protected Equipment Program 23 1.5.14 Risk Assessment and Management for Maintenance / Surveillance Activities 39
: WCI-4 Online Work Control Process 48
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 359919
: 360254
: 360351
: 360380
: 360498
: 360595
: 360597 361164
 
==Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Revision==
: EC 15111 Implementation of
: GE-Hitachi Safety Communication 0 FPF 1.2.3-2 Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation for Qualification of Darmatt
: KM-1 Raceway Fire Barriers 1 Manual 82301 Woodward MPU High Signal Selector 8272-132/-164/-310/-311 Installation and Operation Manual C Procedures Number Title Revision 1.3.66 Operability and Functionality Evaluation 33 10.25.177 Darmatt Fire Wrap Installation and Inspection 4
: OI-9 Operations Standards and Expectation 66
: OSP-CRD-C702 Control Rod Full Stroke Insertion Testing 5
: OSP-ELEC-M702 Diesel Generator 2 - Monthly Operability Test 61
: SWP-OPX-01 Operating Experience Program 0
: SWP-PRO-01 Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence 30
: SWP-PRO-02 Preparation, Review, Approval and Distribution of Procedures 045 Action Requests (ARs)
: 356356
: 359340
: 359392
: 359894
: 360052
: 360362
===Work Orders===
(WOs)
: 02082831
: 02106509
: 29132963 29133097
 
==Section 1R18: Plant Modifications Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Date==
: EC 16135 Place RCIC Low Disch Press Override Switch To Override December 29, 2016
: EC 16285 Substitute Input of Failed
: SPTM-TE-1A February 28, 2017 Procedures Number Title Revision 4.601.A4 601.A4 Annunciator Panel Alarms 39 5.6.2 Station Blackout (SBO) and Extended Loss of AC Power ELAP Attachments 6
: SOP-RCIC-STBY Placing RCIC in Standby Status 10
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 352594
: 353597
: 353607
===Work Orders===
: 02106227
 
==Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing Procedures Number Title Revision 10.25.13A 4.16KV Vacuum Breaker Maintenance with Stored Energy Mechanism 15 10.25.187 Motor Control Center Starter (Bucket) Maintenance 24==
: OSP-ELEC-M703 HPCS Diesel Generator Monthly Operability Test 64
: OSP-CCH/IST-M702 Control Room Emergency Chiller System B Operability 5
: OSP-FPC/IST-Q701 Fuel Pool Cooling System Operability Surveillance 37
: OSP-HPCS/IST-Q701 HPCS System Operability Test 50
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 10.25.13A 4.16KV Vacuum Breaker Maintenance with Stored Energy Mechanism 15
: OSP-LPCS/IST-Q701 LPCS System Operability Test 42
: SWP-TST-01 Post Maintenance Testing Program 16
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 360595
: 360597
===Work Orders===
: 02107019 02062362
 
==Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures Number Title Revision==
: ISP-RCIC-Q902 RCIC Suction Transfer on CST Low Level - CFT/CC 9
: OSP-ELEC-M701 Diesel Generator 1 - Monthly Operability Test 56
: OSP-ELEC-M702 Diesel Generator 2 - Monthly Operability Test 61
: OSP-LPCS-A702 Low Pressure Core Spray Keep Fill Integrity Test 5
: OSP-SLC/IST-Q701 Standby Liquid Control Pumps Operability Test 26
: TSP-DG1-B502 Standby Diesel Generator DG1 Load Testing 20
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 356328
: 356844
: 359298
: 360016
: 360021
: 361543
: 361861
===Work Orders===
: 02095267
 
==Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing Miscellaneous Documents==
: Title Date Columbia Generating Station Report of the Alert and Notification System Test Results July 28, 2015 Columbia Generating Station Report of the Alert and Notification System Test Results January 21, 2016 Columbia Generating Station Report of the Alert and Notification System Test Results June 14, 2016 First Quarter
: SFY 2015 EFSEC Quarterly Reports for Benton County WA and Franklin County WA October 29, 2014 Second Quarter SFY2015 EFSEC Quarterly Reports for Benton County WA and Franklin County WA January 22, 2015 Third Quarter
: SFY 2015 EFSEC Quarterly Reports for Benton County WA and Franklin County WA April 24, 2015 Fourth Quarter SFY2015 EFSEC Quarterly Reports for Benton County WA and Franklin County WA July 29, 2015 Washington State Annual Letter of Certification, January through December 2015 January 27, 2016
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision
: EPI-26 Tone Alert Radio Test and Survey 2
: TSI-6.3.3 EP Siren Batteries Preventative Maintenance 2
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 00360339 00360547
 
==Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System Miscellaneous Documents==
: Title Date After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the November 10, 2015, ERO Call-Out Drill December 10, 2015 After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the October 17, 2016, ERO Call-Out Drill November 11, 2016 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results March 24, 2015
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: Title Date Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results May 2, 2015 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results September 23, 2015 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results December 16, 2015 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results March 9, 2016 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results June 9, 2016 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results September 24, 2016 Quarterly Autodialer and Page Notification Drill Results November 29, 2016 Procedures Number Title Revision
: EPI-14 Actions in the Event of an Automated Notification System Failure 7
 
==Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Revision/Date==
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the 2015 ERO Team B Exercise conducted February 24, 2015 March 24, 2015
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the 2015 ERO Team A Exercise conducted July 7, 2015 July 30, 2015
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the 2015 ERO Team D Exercise conducted September 1, 2015 October 1, 2015
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the 2015 ERO Team C Exercise conducted October 27, 2015 November 28, 2015
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the 2016 ERO Team B Exercise conducted January 12, 2016 February 11, 2016
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the ERO Team B Exercise conducted February 23, 2016 March 23, 2016
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the ERO Team B Biennial Exercise conducted March 29, 2016 April 29, 2016
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: Number Title Revision/Date
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the ERO Team D Exercise conducted May 3, 2016 June 3, 2016
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the ERO Team A Exercise conducted August 30, 2016 September 22, 2016
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the ERO Team C Exercise conducted October 25, 2016 November 22, 2016
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the Fire Brigade First Responder Drill conducted March 15, 2015
: After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the Fire Brigade First Responder Drill conducted November 3, 2016
: Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan 62, 63, 64
: Columbia Generating Station Performance Summary, Second Quarter 2016
: Columbia Generating Station Performance Summary, Third Quarter 2016
: Continuous Monitoring Report
: SR-15-02, September 2014 through January 2015 April 9, 2015
: Continuous Monitoring Report
: SR-15-04, February 2015 through September 2015 November 17, 2015
: Continuous Monitoring Report
: SR-16-02, October 2015 through January 2016 March 18, 2016
: Continuous Monitoring Report
: SR-16-03, February 1 through May 15, 2016 July 27, 2016
: Continuous Monitoring Report
: SR-16-04, May 15 through September 15, 2016 October 31, 2016
: ERO Team Metrics, January 1, 2014, through December 27, 2016
: Just in Time Training, Indication of RCS Leakage December 8, 2016
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2015-05,
: PPM 13.7.5,
: Offsite Assembly Area Operations January 21, 2015
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2015-07,
: PPM 13.4.1,
: Revision 43 February 17, 2015
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2015-19,
: PPM 13.11.3 May 29, 2015
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2015-33,
: LE-15-031 November 5, 2015
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: Number Title Revision/Date
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2015-34, EPIP 13.2.2, Protective Action Recommendations December 15, 2015
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2016-16,
: EPI 20, Revision 3 February 9, 2016
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2016-49, EPIP 13.2.2 and
: EP-01 November 29, 2016
: Licensing Basis Evaluation 2016-54,
: EPC 26526 December 5, 2016
: May 2016 Regulatory Required Audit Frequency Eight Month Evaluation for Emergency Preparedness
: AR329860 CAS/SAS/Building 88 Security Monthly Walkdown June 14, 2015
: AR349205-01 CAS/SAS/Building 88 Security Monthly Walkdown June 23, 2016
: AR325524 Condition Evaluation
: AR338624 Condition Evaluation
: AR338676 Condition Evaluation
: AR335647 Focused Self-Assessment Report, Emergency Preparedness, Exercise Year November 11, 2015
: AR329846 Monthly EOF and Alternate EOF Walkdowns June 9, 2015
: AR338966 Monthly EOF and Alternate EOF Walkdowns November 13, 2015
: AR350286-01 Monthly EOF and Alternate EOF Walkdowns June 14, 2016
: AR367160 Monthly EOF and Alternate EOF Walkdowns November 9, 2016
: AR334085-03 Monthly Joint Information Center Walkdown August 4, 2015
: AR352975-03 Monthly Joint Information Center Walkdown August 24, 2016
: AR326769 OSC Monthly Walkdown May 27, 2015
: AR348775 OSC Monthly Walkdown May 2016
: AR00337204 Snapshot Self-Assessment, Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Program
: AR332547 TSC Monthly Walkdown July 14, 2015
: AR350511 TSC Monthly Walkdown July 2016
: AU-EP-15 Quality Services Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness March 5, 2015
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: Number Title Revision/Date KLD
: TR-781 Columbia Generating Station 2015 Population Update September 29, 2015 KLD
: TR-863 Columbia Generating Station 2016 Population Update Analysis September 26, 2016
: QAR-A-11843 Emergency Preparedness Eight-Month Evaluation, February 1 through August 31, 2015
: SA340189 Emergency Preparedness Non-Exercise Year Self-Assessment November 15, 2016
: WO02069668-01 Perform Field Team Portable Radio Functional Test August 18, 2015
: WO02086582-01 Perform EOF and Alt-EOF Field Team Portable Radio Functional Test April 4, 2016
: WO02102189-01 Perform EOF and Alt-EOF Field Team Portable Radio Functional Test December 15, 2016
: WO02068876-01 Replace Rubber Goods in the OSC Emergency Kits October 27, 2015
: WO02074982-01 OSC Emergency Protective Equipment Kit Inventory December 24, 2015
: WO02078615-01 OSC Emergency Protective Equipment Kit Inventory January 22, 2016
: WO02079995-01 OSC Emergency Protective Equipment Kit Inventory February 18, 2016 Procedures Number Title Revision 13.13.4 After Action Reporting 10-2, 10-3 13.13.8 Drill and Exercise Program 18, 18-1 13.14.4 Emergency Equipment Maintenance and Testing 52, 53 13.14.9 Emergency Program Maintenance 29-3 13.14.11 EP Equipment 10, 11
: EPI-01 Emergency Planner Responsibilities 8
: EPI-11 ERO Administration Program 8-1
: EPI-12 Evacuation Time Estimates Review and Revision 3, 4
: EPI-16 50.54(Q) Change Evaluation 14, 15
: EPI-19 Communications Tests 10
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: Number Title Revision/Date
: EPI-21 Drill and Exercise Development and Implementation 16, 17
: EPI-27 Emergency Planner Staff Training/Qualification 1
: EPI-30 Emergency Preparedness Condition Report Processing 2
: SWP-CAP-1 Corrective Action Program 36-1, 36-2
: SWP-LIC-02 Licensing Basis Impact Determinations 14
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 00322766
: 00324901
: 00325524
: 00326719
: 00327095
: 00331017
: 00331244
: 00332511
: 00333961
: 00334070
: 00334401
: 00334905
: 00335752
: 00335851
: 00337709
: 00338624
: 00338676
: 00339359
: 00342936
: 00343857
: 00345601
: 00347032
: 00348490
: 00349314
: 00354438
: 00354754
: 00357471
: 00360588
: 00361008
: 00361134
: 00361135 00361174
 
==Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation Miscellaneous Documents==
: Title Date Drill Scenario
: January 10, 2017 Drill Scenario
: March 14, 2017 Procedures Number Title Revision 5.1.1 RPV Control 21 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control 23 5.3.1 Secondary Containment Control 20 13.1.1 Classifying the Emergency 47 13.1.1A Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases 31
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 360003
: 360195
: 360639 360747
 
==Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification Procedures Number Title Revision 1.5.11 Maintenance Rule Program 15 13.1.1 Classifying the Emergency 47-1 13.1.1A Classifying the Emergency - Technical Basis 31-1 13.2.1 Emergency Exposure Levels / Protective Action Guides 22 13.2.2 Determining Protective Action Recommendations 18, 19, 20 13.4.1 Emergency Notifications 42, 43-3 13.10.1 Control Room Operations and Shift Manager Duties 35-3 13.11.1==
: EOF Manager Duties 44-1
: EPI-18 Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators 24
: TSI-6.2.22 EP Biannual Emergency Response Siren System Activation Test 3, 3-1, 3-2
: TSI-6.2.23 EP River Siren Polling Test 0
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 343395
: 346068
: 355989
: 359928 362108
 
==Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution Procedures Number Title Revision==
: ABN-FIRE Fire 39
: SWP-CAP-01 Corrective Action Program 36
: SWP-CAP-05 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) 20
: SWP-CAP-06 Condition Report Review 23
: SWP-CAP-07 Trending Program 10
: SWP-LIC-02 Licensing Basis Impact Determinations 13
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 349141
: 352207
: 352668
: 353671 361785


==Section 4OA5: Other Activities Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Revision==
: INPO Event Report (IER) L2-12-14, Automatic Reactor Scram Resulting from a Design Vulnerability in the 4.16-kV Bus Undervoltage Protection Scheme March 13, 2012
: NRC Inspection of Open Phase Design Vulnerability Compensatory Measures [CGS White Paper Evaluating Compensatory Measures] February 1, 2017
: Self-Assessment Report:
: NRC Inspection of Open Phase Design Vulnerability Compensatory Measures February 1, 2017
: 0000011851 Calculation # E/I-02-12-01 Basler Relay Setpoint
: April 15, 2013
: APC 13-35 Guidance Document for Open Phase Condition (OPC) Initiative December 23, 2013 E-502-1 Main One Line Wiring Diagram 53 E-502-1 Main One Line Wiring Diagram 53 E-507-3 Main Three Line Wiring Diagram 26 E514-17
: Backup & Start-Up Auxiliary Transformer Relay Settings & Description List
: TR-B &
: TR-S 17
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision
: ABN-ELEC-GRID
: Degraded Off-Site Power Grid 7
: MOT-XFRMR-1-2 PM Templet 14
: OSP-ELEC-W101 Weekly Offsite Station Power surveillance
: 29 PPM 1.5.14 Risk Assessment & Management for Maint./Surv. Activities 39 PPM 3.1.10 Operating Data and Logs 106 PPM 4.800.C4
: 4-3 Oscillography Started annunciator response 34
===Action Requests===
(ARs)
: 259724 261654
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 15:01, 19 December 2019

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2017001
ML17130B006
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 05/10/2017
From: Mark Haire
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To: Reddemann M
Energy Northwest
MARK HAIRE
References
IR 2017001
Download: ML17130B006 (37)
v • d • e


Text

May 10, 2017

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2017001

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Columbia Generating Station. On March 30, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark Haire, Branch Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21 Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000397/2017001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

x SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available x Non-Sensitive By: MHaire/dll x Yes No x Publicly Available Sensitive OFFICE SRI:DRP/A SRI:DRP/B C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 NAME GKolcum DBradley TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy HGepford SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

DATE 05/02/17 05/02/17 05/02/17 05/04/17 5/2/17 05/04/17 OFFICE TL:DRS/IPAT SPE:DRP/A BC:DRP/A NAME THipschman RAlexander MHaire SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

DATE 05/04/17 05/02/17 5/10/17

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 05000397 License: NPF-21 Report: 05000397/2017001 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: North Power Plant Loop Richland, WA 99354 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2017 Inspectors: G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector D. Bradley, Acting Senior Resident Inspector P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved Mark Haire By: Chief, Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000397/2017001; 01/01/2017 - 03/31/2017; Columbia Generating Station; Integrated

Inspection Report.

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2017, by the resident inspectors at Columbia Generating Station and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green, greater than Green, White, Yellow, or Red), determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated April 29, 2015. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, dated July 2016.

No findings were identified.

PLANT STATUS

The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 1, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for a control rod pattern change. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 2, 2017.

On January 3, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 94 percent to troubleshoot a non-safety power supply channel to a recirculation pump. On January 9, 2017, the plant further reduced power to 70 percent to restore the nonsafety power supply channel to a recirculation pump. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 10, 2017.

On January 28, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for control rod testing. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 29, 2017.

On February 4, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 89 percent for shifting feedwater heater alignment. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 4, 2017.

On February 25, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 75 percent for steam valve testing and shifting feedwater heater alignment. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 26, 2017.

On March 10, 2017, the plant began power coast-down to the next refueling outage.

On March, 25, 2017, the plant reduced power to approximately 88 percent for control rod and steam valve testing. The plant returned to 95 percent power on March 25, 2017.

The plant ended the inspection period at approximately 94 percent power.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Main article: IP 71111.01

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On January 18, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to cold weather and ice, and the licensees planned implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.

These activities constituted one sample of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Main article: IP 71111.04

.1 Partial Walk-Down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:

  • January 24, 2017, 125 VDC and 250 VDC systems
  • March 10, 2017, Division 2 and 3 emergency diesel generator starting air systems The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walk-Down

a. Inspection Scope

On March 10, 2017, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the reactor building ventilation system. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, in-process design changes, temporary modifications, and other open items relative to the system tracked by the licensees operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted one complete system walk-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Main article: IP 71111.05

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety:

  • January 31, 2017, main control room
  • March 10, 2017, Division 2 and 3 emergency diesel generators For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Main article: IP 71111.06

a. Inspection Scope

On March 8, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis, the inspectors chose four plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components that were susceptible to flooding:

  • Control rod drive pump room The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.

In addition, on February 15, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected three underground vaults that contained risk-significant or multiple-train cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:

  • Manholes E-MH-E11, E-MH-E13, and E-MH-E15, each containing standby service water cables The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.

These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample and one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Main article: IP 71111.11

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On January 9, 2017, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the evaluated simulator scenario.

These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

On the following dates, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity or risk. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:

  • January 9, 2017, during a down-power for adjustable speed drive 1A2 work
  • February 9 , 2017, for a low-pressure core spray surveillance run
  • March 10, 2017, during a Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.

These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12

.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs):

  • January 23, 2017, mechanism operated cell (MOC) switch failures, resulting in the loss of the non-vital SM-3 electrical bus
  • January 31, 2017, Division 1 control room emergency chiller, tripped on overcurrent
  • January 31, 2017, reactor water cleanup 1B pump piping flange leak The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions, in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constituted completion of four maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quality Control

a. Inspection Scope

On March 12, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the licensees quality control activities through:

(1) a review of the licensees control of quality parts during maintenance associated with coils for 480 V AC breakers; and
(2) a review of whether quality control verifications were properly specified, in accordance with the licensees Quality Assurance Program, and were implemented as specified, during work associated with replacement of these coils.

These activities constituted completion of one quality control sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:

  • January 3, 2017, Yellow risk for maintenance on Division 1 standby service water and control room emergency chiller systems
  • January 12, 2017, high radiological risk for radioactive waste cask movement and surveys
  • March 6, 2017, Yellow risk during fuel pool cooling pump maintenance
  • March 19, 2017, Yellow risk during a Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.

The inspectors also observed portions of two emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event or to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:

  • January 18, 2017, Yellow risk for adverse weather and an ice storm
  • January 25, 2017, Orange risk for a Division 3 emergency diesel generator fan failure The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.

These activities constituted completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Main article: IP 71111.15

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:

  • February 28, 2017, operability determination for reactor core isolation cooling room cooler maintenance under Work Order 02073920 The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC.

The inspectors also reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

These activities constituted completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.18

Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two temporary plant modifications that affected risk-significant SSCs:

  • February 16, 2017, reactor core isolation cooling key switch under Engineering Change 16135 The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed these temporary modifications in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that these modifications did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modifications to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.

These activities constituted completion of two samples of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:

  • March 22, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator circuit breaker E-CB-DG2/8 under Work Order 02109179 The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constituted completion of seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.22

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

  • February 9, 2017, low-pressure core spray keep fill pump surveillance test
  • March 9, 2017, Division 1 emergency diesel generator, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the tests satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constituted completion of six surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

Main article: IP 71114.02

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing the primary and backup alert and notification system. The inspector also reviewed the licensees program for identifying emergency planning zone locations requiring tone alert radios and for distributing the radios, and reviewed audits of distribution records. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the maintenance of the primary and backup alert and notification system and reviewed a sample of corrective action program reports written for alert and notification system problems. The inspector compared the licensees alert and notification system testing program with criteria in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1; FEMA Report REP-10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants; and the licensees current FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report, Columbia Generating Station Alert and Notification System Design Report, Revision 2, dated November 15, 2016.

These activities constituted completion of one alert and notification system evaluation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

Main article: IP 71114.03

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the licensees emergency response organization on-shift and augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensees emergency plan commitments. The inspector reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on-shift emergency response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensees methods for staffing emergency response facilities, including the licensees ability to staff pre-planned alternate facilities.

The inspector also reviewed records of emergency response organization augmentation tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments.

These activities constituted completion of one emergency response organization staffing and augmentation testing sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Main article: IP 71114.04

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed an on-site review of the Emergency Plan, Revision 64, implemented January 4, 2017. Specifically, this revision:

  • Revised the description of the alert and notification system
  • Clarified protective measures for the public by adding the term, shelter in place
  • Added monitor and prepare as an instruction to members of the public for whom immediate protective measures are not being recommended
  • Changed the frequency of full-cycle tests of the alert and notification system from twice per year to once per year, as described in the revised FEMA Design Report
  • Added additional alert and notification warning sirens in the emergency planning zone
  • Revised the requirement for an annual test of the alert and notification with regards to the annual test of the tone alert radio system This revision was compared to its previous revision, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revision adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that the revision did not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection.

These activities constituted completion of one emergency action level and emergency plan changes sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

Main article: IP 71114.05

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following for the period April 2015 to December 2016:

  • After-action reports for emergency classifications and events
  • After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises
  • Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensees corrective action program
  • Emergency response organization and emergency planner training records The inspector reviewed summaries of 139 corrective action program reports associated with emergency preparedness, and selected 27 to review against program requirements to determine the licensees ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspector verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments.

The inspector reviewed summaries of 103 licensee evaluations of the impact of changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures, and selected eight to review against program requirements to determine the licensees ability to identify reductions in the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that evaluations of proposed changes to the licensee emergency plan appropriately identified the impact of the changes prior to being implemented.

These activities constituted completion of one sample of the maintenance of the licensees emergency preparedness program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Main article: IP 71114.06

.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on January 10, 2017, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the emergency operations facility, technical support center, and simulator; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constituted completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Training Evolution Observation

a. Inspection Scope

On March 13, 2017, the inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensees emergency plan.

The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constituted completion of one training observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Main article: IP 71151

.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees evaluated exercises, emergency plan implementations, and selected drill and training evolutions that occurred between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) opportunities.

The inspector reviewed a sample of the licensees completed classifications, notifications, and PARs to verify their timeliness and accuracy. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees records for participation in drill and training evolutions between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees data for drill participation opportunities. The inspector verified that all members of the licensees emergency response organization (ERO) in the identified key positions had been counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspector reviewed the licensees basis for reporting the percentage of ERO members who participated in a drill. The inspector reviewed drill attendance records and verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Alert and Notification System Reliability (EP03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees records of alert and notification system tests conducted between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspector reviewed procedural guidance on assessing alert and notification system opportunities and the results of periodic alert and notification system operability tests. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Main article: IP 71152

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected two issues for an in-depth follow-up:

  • On January 11, 2017, the main control room reported a fire in the emergency diesel generator corridor due to welding activities in the overhead, as described in Action Request 360052.
  • On July 28, 2016, the Division 2 vital switchgear supply fan, WMA-FN-53B, air flow was found low as described in Action Request 352835.

For both issues, the inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the conditions.

These activities constituted completion of two annual follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

Temporary Instruction 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems.

a. Inspection Scope

The objective of this performance based temporary instruction was to verify implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition design vulnerability in electric power systems for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee implemented the following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are installed and declared operable for the open phase condition design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following:

  • The licensee identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned from the open phase condition events at the United States operating plants including the Byron Station open phase condition and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an open phase condition.
  • The licensee updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions on off-site power sources credited for safe shutdown of the plant.
  • The licensee established and implemented periodic walk-down activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power circuits to detect a visible open phase condition.
  • The licensee ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On February 2, 2017, the inspector presented the results of the onsite inspection of the licensees emergency preparedness program to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

On March 21, 2017, the inspector presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/192 inspection results to Ms. D. Wolfgramm, Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On March 30, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the final inspection results to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

A. Black, Manager, Emergency Services
D. Brandon, Design Engineering Manager
C. Forrester, Acting Manager, Emergency Preparedness
D. Gregoire, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations
G. Higgs, Manager, Maintenance
M. Hummer, Licensing Engineer
M. Khaudiser, Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Safety
D. Kovacs, Manager, Information Services
C. Moon, Manager, Quality
G. Pierce, Manager, Training
J. Pierce, Manager, Continuous Improvement
R. Prewett, Operations Manager
M. Rice, Design Authority
B. Schuetz, Plant General Manager
D. Suarez, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
M. Sullivan, Manager, Security Operations
D. Wolfgramm, Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

Inspection of the Licensees Interim Compensatory Measures 2515/192 TI Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (Section 4OA5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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