IR 05000397/2017301

NRC Examination Report 05000397/2017301

ML17100A960
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/10/2017
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:	Reddemann M Energy Northwest
References
50-397/17-01 50-397/OL-17
Download: ML17100A960 (13)

Text

UNITED STATES ril 10, 2017

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000397/2017301

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On March 3, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an initial operator license examination at Columbia Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the examination results and licensing decisions. The preliminary examination results were discussed on March 3, 2017, with Mr. B. Sawatzke, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of your staff. A telephonic exit meeting was conducted on March 24, 2017, with Mr. R. Meyers, Operations Training Manager, who was provided the NRC licensing decisions.

The examination included the evaluation of four applicants for reactor operator licenses, five applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and one applicant for upgrade senior reactor operator license. The license examiners determined that eight of the ten applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.

One license is being held in abeyance pending resolution of any potential written examination appeals, per the guidance of NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 10, ES-501.D.3.d. There were two post-examination comments submitted by your staff. Enclosure 1 contains details of this report and Enclosure 2 summarizes post-examination comment resolution.

No findings were identified during this examination.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21

Enclosures:

1. Examination Report 05000397/2017301 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information 2. NRC Post Examination Comment Resolution

REGION IV==

Docket: 50-397 License: NPF-21 Report: 05000397/2017301 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station MD 1023 76 North Power Plant Loop Location:

P.O. Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Dates: February 27 - March 24, 2017 T. Farina, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Engineer C. Osterholtz, Senior Operations Engineer Inspectors:

M. Hayes, Operations Engineer M. Bloodgood, Emergency Response Specialist Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Approved By: Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

ER 05000397/2017301; 02/27/2017 - 03/24/2017; Columbia Generating Station; Initial Operator

Licensing Examination Report.

NRC examiners evaluated the competency of four applicants for reactor operator licenses, five applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and one applicant for upgrade senior reactor operator license at Columbia Generating Station.

The licensee developed the examinations using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 10. The written examination was administered by the licensee on March 9, 2017. NRC examiners administered the operating tests on February 27 - March 3, 2017.

The examiners determined that eight of the ten applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued. One license is being held in abeyance pending resolution of any potential written examination appeals, per the guidance of NUREG 1021, Revision 10, ES-501.D.3.d.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA5 Other Activities (Initial Operator License Examination)

.1 License Applications

a. Scope

NRC examiners reviewed all license applications submitted to ensure each applicant satisfied relevant license eligibility requirements. Examiners also audited three of the license applications in detail to confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Examination Development

a. Scope

NRC examiners reviewed integrated examination outlines and draft examinations submitted by the licensee against the requirements of NUREG-1021. The NRC examination team conducted an on-site validation of the operating tests.

b. Findings

NRC examiners provided outline, draft examination, and post-validation comments to the licensee. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution prior to examination administration.

NRC examiners determined the written examinations and operating tests initially submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

.3 Operator Knowledge and Performance

a. Scope

On March 9, 2017, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examinations to all ten applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis and post-examination comments to the NRC on March 16, 2017.

The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating tests to all applicants on February 27 - March 3, 2017.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Eight of ten applicants passed the written exam, and all applicants passed all parts of the operating test. The final written examinations and post examination analysis and comments may be accessed in the ADAMS system under the accession numbers noted in the attachment.

The examination team noted five generic weaknesses associated with applicant performance on the dynamic scenario, administrative job performance measure (JPM),and simulator JPM sections of the operating tests. Specifically:

• During performance of dynamic scenario 1, all three crews failed to trip the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine following a malfunction of its speed controller, which caused the turbine speed to rapidly cycle between 0-4400 RPM approximately every ten seconds from the time the RCIC pump started. Multiple procedures provide direction that the RCIC pump turbine should have been tripped under these conditions. Specifically:

o Procedure SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC, RCIC RPV Injection - Quick Card, Basis 2.1: RCIC Turbine operation less than 2100 RPM can cause water hammer damage to the Turbine Discharge Check Valve.

o Procedure SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC, RCIC RPV Injection - Quick Card, Section 2.2, Stopping RCIC During Plant Transients, Note 1: Minimize the amount of time to less than approximately 1 minute that RCIC is in minimum flow (75-100 GPM) operation to prevent pump degradation. For continuous operation, the pump should be operated at a minimum of 300 GPM.

o Procedure SOP-RCIC-START, RCIC Start in Test Return Mode, Precaution and Limitation Step 4.1: To prevent low steam flow conditions in the exhaust line and the possibility of check valve damage from water hammer, do not operate the RCIC Turbine below a speed of 2100 RPM.

• During performance of dynamic scenario 2, two of three crews failed to recognize that annunciator 603.A7-5.8 (CRD PUMP SUCTION FLTR D/P HIGH)was caused by abnormally high system flow, due to CRD flow control valve controller CRD-FC-600 output failing high in automatic mode. These two crews incorrectly believed that the malfunction was due to a fouled CRD suction strainer, and focused their recovery efforts exclusively on that component, without evaluating diverse board indications for other potential causes of the alarm. Annunciator Response Procedure 603.A7-5.8 was also observed to contain inadequate guidance to diagnose all potential causes of this alarm, as it too only addresses the CRD suction strainer as a potential cause.

• During performance of administrative JPM A-9, three applicants demonstrated a weakness in determining if state criteria for administering KI were satisfied, given an offsite release. Given a dose assessment printout, the applicants were expected to determine that state criteria were met due to exceeding 250 mrem/hr thyroid or because an unfiltered/unmonitored release was in progress. Several applicants either initially determined that state criteria were not met, or incorrectly determined that state criteria for administering KI were met due to the release exceeding 1.4E-7 µCi/cc I-131. This reason was incorrect because the dose assessment printout included an I-131 release rate of 1.75 Ci/sec, but did not provide an atmospheric concentration of I-131 in

µCi/cc. This information is not available from the dose assessment printout, but rather must be obtained by reports from response teams in the field taking portable air samples. Portable air sample data was not available for this JPM.

• During performance of simulator JPM S-6, most applicants demonstrated a failure to understand that when opening a bypass valve in MANUAL mode, it takes approximately five iterations of pressing the JOG pushbutton to cause a fully-closed bypass valve to unseat and commence opening. Several applicants incorrectly believed that the JOG pushbutton was malfunctioning when they failed to observe a response from the bypass valve after two or three iterations.

• During performance of simulator JPM S-3, several applicants did not recognize that HPCS minimum flow bypass valve, HPCS-V-12, failed to automatically close when HPCS flow exceeded 1300 GPM during system initiation.

These applicants consequently failed to manually shut HPCS-V-12 prior to closing HPCS-V-4, injection valve. The examiners noted that Procedure SOP-HPCS-INJECTION-QC, HPCS RPV Injection - Quick Card, does not contain guidance to check the status of HPCS-V-12 during initiation of HPCS.

These issues were entered into the licensees corrective action program under Action Request (AR) 00362543. Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility Training Manager for evaluation and determination of appropriate remedial training.

.4 Simulation Facility Performance

a. Scope

The NRC examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during examination validation and administration.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Examination Security

a. Scope

The NRC examiners reviewed examination security during both the on-site preparation week and examination administration week for compliance with 10 CFR 55.49 and NUREG-1021. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. However, one minor violation of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests, was identified by the NRC during exam administration.

Specifically, an NRC examiner found completed log sheets for Reactor Building area temperatures from the second run of scenario 3 stuffed under the CRS desk during the third run of scenario 3. Had applicants identified and viewed this material, they could have gained insight into the major event for scenario 3. However the examiners determined that no applicant had been exposed to the exam material, no applicant gained an undue benefit, and that the equitable and consistent administration of the exam was not actually affected. Therefore this violation was determined to be minor.

The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as AR 00362548.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The chief examiner presented the preliminary examination results to Mr. B. Sawatzke, Chief, Nuclear Officer, and other members of the staff on March 3, 2017. A telephonic exit was conducted on March 24, 2017, between Mr. T. Farina, Chief Examiner, and Mr. R. Meyers, Operations Training Manager.

The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination as proprietary.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Meyer, Operations Training Manager

G. Wyatt, Simulator and Exam Group Supervisor

D. Crawford, Exam Writer

NRC Personnel

G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector