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| , $4 tuna Pow;r Cornpany 600 North 18th Street Post Off.ce Boi 2641 B.rmgham. Aabama 3'0910400 Tsephone 205 2501837 W. G. H airston, til Sen.or V<e President N eear opere ons Alabama power tre swnn en s,v,n November 30, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Miniflov Evaluation - NRC Bulletin No. 88-04 URC Bulletin No. 88-04, "Potential Safety Related Pump Loss," requires Alabama Power Company to investigate and correct, if applicable, two miniflov design concerns.
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| The Bulletin requires that each safety-related system be evaluated for pump-to-pump interaction during miniflov operation. If pump-to-pump interaction is possible, the system is required to be evaluated from a flov division standpoint. The Bulletin further requires an evaluation to address the adequacy of the minimum flov bypass lines for safety-related centrifugal pumps with respect to damage resulting from operation and testing. | | $4 tuna Pow;r Cornpany 600 North 18th Street Post Off.ce Boi 2641 B.rmgham. Aabama 3'0910400 Tsephone 205 2501837 W. G. H airston, til Sen.or V<e President N eear opere ons Alabama power tre swnn en s,v,n November 30, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: |
| | Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C. |
| | 20555 Gentlemen Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Miniflov Evaluation - NRC Bulletin No. 88-04 URC Bulletin No. 88-04, "Potential Safety Related Pump Loss," requires Alabama Power Company to investigate and correct, if applicable, two miniflov design concerns. |
| | The Bulletin requires that each safety-related system be evaluated for pump-to-pump interaction during miniflov operation. |
| | If pump-to-pump interaction is possible, the system is required to be evaluated from a flov division standpoint. The Bulletin further requires an evaluation to address the adequacy of the minimum flov bypass lines for safety-related centrifugal pumps with respect to damage resulting from operation and testing. |
| The Bulletin reporting requirements include submittal of a short term (60 day) report which (a) summarizes the problems and the systems affected, (b) identifies the chort-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures er hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations, (c) identifies an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin, and (d) provides justification for continued operation particularly with regard to General Design Criterion 35 of Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50), | | The Bulletin reporting requirements include submittal of a short term (60 day) report which (a) summarizes the problems and the systems affected, (b) identifies the chort-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures er hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations, (c) identifies an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin, and (d) provides justification for continued operation particularly with regard to General Design Criterion 35 of Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50), |
| "Emergency Core Cooling" and 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling System for Light Vater Nuclear Pover Reactors."
| | "Emergency Core Cooling" and 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling System for Light Vater Nuclear Pover Reactors." |
| Additionally, a long-term resolution report is required to be submitted within 30 days of the completion of the long-term resolution actions. | | Additionally, a long-term resolution report is required to be submitted within 30 days of the completion of the long-term resolution actions. |
| By letter dated July 8, 1988, Alabama Pover Company provided a partial response to the Bulletin and committed to provide a status of evaluation efforts by November 30, 1988. The results of evaluations on safety-related pumps are outlined in Attachient 1. All evaluations are complete with the l | | By {{letter dated|date=July 8, 1988|text=letter dated July 8, 1988}}, Alabama Pover Company provided a partial response to the Bulletin and committed to provide a status of evaluation efforts by November 30, 1988. The results of evaluations on safety-related pumps are outlined in Attachient 1. |
| exception of the evaluation required for the auxiliary feedvater (AFV) 892020:41 ss3130 d gra aooa a:000343 FDC | | All evaluations are complete with the exception of the evaluation required for the auxiliary feedvater (AFV) l 892020:41 ss3130 gra aooa a:000343 d |
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| . . i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 30, 1988 Page 2 i
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| pumps. Due to the increased work load placed on the pump vendor by the ,
| | U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 30, 1988 Page 2 i |
| l Bulletin, a final evaluation of the AFV pumps vill not be completed until early 1989. Alabama Power Company vill provide the results of the AFV pump i evaluation and a long-term action schedule within 60 days of evaluation a completion. Continued operation of the AFV pumps until completion of the evaluation is ju2tified in Attachment 1. For all other pumps evaluated, evaluations have shown that there is no significant pump-to-pump interaction and the current minimum flow lines are adequate. ;
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| ! If there are any questions, please advise.
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| Respectfully submitted, ,
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| I -
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| I ALABAMA P0 ER COMPANY ,
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| J e
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| : . j l /p % V. G. Hairston, III :
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| ) VGH,III/REMapr-2.17 l Attachment s
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| cc: Mr. L. B. Long !
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| g Mr. M. L. Ernst t
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| { Mr. E. A Reeves I i Mr. G. F. Maxwell ,
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| d I
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| I i !
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| i i i r
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| : I 1
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| i i | | i i |
| t | | pumps. Due to the increased work load placed on the pump vendor by the l |
| ; I I l i
| | Bulletin, a final evaluation of the AFV pumps vill not be completed until early 1989. Alabama Power Company vill provide the results of the AFV pump evaluation and a long-term action schedule within 60 days of evaluation i |
| I | | completion. Continued operation of the AFV pumps until completion of the a |
| ! f i
| | evaluation is ju2tified in Attachment 1. |
| | For all other pumps evaluated, evaluations have shown that there is no significant pump-to-pump interaction and the current minimum flow lines are adequate. |
| | If there are any questions, please advise. |
| | Respectfully submitted, I |
| | - I J |
| | ALABAMA P0 ER COMPANY e |
| | l |
| | /p % V. G. Hairston, III j |
| | ) |
| | VGH,III/REMapr-2.17 l |
| | Attachment s |
| | cc: |
| | Mr. L. B. Long g |
| | Mr. M. L. Ernst t |
| | { |
| | Mr. E. A Reeves I |
| | i Mr. G. F. Maxwell i |
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| ATTACHMEN" 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION System: High Head Safety Injection / Charging Pumps: 3 Charging pumps (HHSI) per unit Miniflov | | ATTACHMEN" 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION System: |
| | High Head Safety Injection / Charging Pumps: |
| | 3 Charging pumps (HHSI) per unit Miniflov |
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| A miniflow line from each HHSI pump discharges into a common miniflov header. | | A miniflow line from each HHSI pump discharges into a common miniflov header. |
| Pump-to-Pump Interaction Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by the use of a 60 GPM high resistance minimum flov orifice in the miniflow line from each HHSI pump. The individual miniflov lines combine into a low resistance common header. | | Pump-to-Pump Interaction Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by the use of a 60 GPM high resistance minimum flov orifice in the miniflow line from each HHSI pump. The individual miniflov lines combine into a low resistance common header. |
| Adequacy of Miniflow: The HHSI pump miniflov lines have a greater capacity than originally required by the pump vendor. The system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially below the expected pump flov for all operating I modes. The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation. | | Adequacy of Miniflow: |
| System: Lov Head Safety Injection / Residual Heat i Removal (RHR) | | The HHSI pump miniflov lines have a greater capacity than originally required by the pump vendor. The system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially I |
| Pumps: 2 RHR pumps per unit Miniflow | | below the expected pump flov for all operating modes. The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation. |
| | System: |
| | Lov Head Safety Injection / Residual Heat i |
| | Removal (RHR) |
| | Pumps: |
| | 2 RHR pumps per unit Miniflow |
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| Each RHR pump has an independent miniflov ! | | Each RHR pump has an independent miniflov |
| line, Pump-to-Pump Interaction: Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by use of independent miniflov lines. l Adequacy of Miniflov: The RHR pump miniflov lines have a greater r capacity than originally required by the pump l vendor. The system designer, in conjunction l vith the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially l belov the expected pump flov for all operating i modes. The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected ! | | : line, Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| minimum flov vhich results from each mode of l operation. l i | | Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by use of independent miniflov lines. |
| Systems Containment Spray (CS) l Pumps: 2 CS pumps per unit l i | | l Adequacy of Miniflov: |
| | The RHR pump miniflov lines have a greater r |
| | capacity than originally required by the pump l |
| | vendor. The system designer, in conjunction l |
| | vith the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially l |
| | belov the expected pump flov for all operating i |
| | modes. |
| | The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of l |
| | operation. |
| | l i |
| | Systems Containment Spray (CS) l Pumps: |
| | 2 CS pumps per unit l |
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|
| . . Art chment 1
| | Art chment 1 System Descriptions and Evaluatitns Paga 2 Miniflov |
| * System Descriptions and Evaluatitns
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| * Paga 2 Miniflov
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| Each CS pump has a recirculation line which joins to form a common return header to the Refueling Vater Storage Tank (RVST). Normally locked closed valves are provided in tFe recirculation lines and in the common header for isolation. This piping arrar.gement is utilized as a means to test the spray pumps without spraying into containment. In addition, each pump has a spray eductor ; | | Each CS pump has a recirculation line which joins to form a common return header to the Refueling Vater Storage Tank (RVST). |
| recirculation line. 1 Pump-to-Pump Interaction: During accident situations, and all surveillance testing except for the "Spray and Phase B Actuation Test", the operation of the two trains is completely independent, with the l exception of a common portion of the suction line from the RVST. The pumps can develop cufficient discharge pressure to exceed the containment design pressure such that there is no possibility of deadheading a pump during i spray actuation. During individual pump surveillance testing (Spray Pump Monthly, , | | Normally locked closed valves are provided in tFe recirculation lines and in the common header for isolation. This piping arrar.gement is utilized as a means to test the spray pumps without spraying into containment. |
| Quarterly and Annual Testing) the spray header is isolated, however, each pump's miniflow path to the RVST is available to prevent ' | | In addition, each pump has a spray eductor recirculation line. |
| deadheading. During the "Spray and Phase B Actuation Surveillance Test" the discharge , | | 1 Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| headers are isolated, and the two pumps are ! | | During accident situations, and all surveillance testing except for the "Spray and Phase B Actuation Test", the operation of the two trains is completely independent, with the l |
| run simultaneously in parallel with flov directed to the common miniflov line. The ! | | exception of a common portion of the suction line from the RVST. The pumps can develop cufficient discharge pressure to exceed the containment design pressure such that there is no possibility of deadheading a pump during i |
| surveillance procedure requires that the time the spray pumps are run in parallel be held to a maximum of 1 minute. The resistance in the common miniflow path is high relative to that , | | spray actuation. |
| in the individual line. Hence, given a l mismatch between the pump developed heads. It , | | During individual pump surveillance testing (Spray Pump Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Testing) the spray header is isolated, however, each pump's miniflow path to the RVST is available to prevent deadheading. During the "Spray and Phase B Actuation Surveillance Test" the discharge headers are isolated, and the two pumps are run simultaneously in parallel with flov directed to the common miniflov line. The surveillance procedure requires that the time the spray pumps are run in parallel be held to a maximum of 1 minute. The resistance in the common miniflow path is high relative to that in the individual line. |
| is possible for the pressure at the junction ' | | Hence, given a l |
| point (where the discharge heads combine) to be high enough to prevent one pump from recirculating to the RVST. This condition is i considered acceptable because (1) the pumps I only run for one minute maximum and (2) the l spray eductor recirculation line in essence l provides an individual and independent mintaum I flov path. | | mismatch between the pump developed heads. It is possible for the pressure at the junction point (where the discharge heads combine) to be high enough to prevent one pump from recirculating to the RVST. This condition is i |
| L Adequacy of Miniflov The system designer, in conjunction with the [ | | considered acceptable because (1) the pumps I |
| pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the i ninimum flov lines. The required thermal , | | only run for one minute maximum and (2) the l |
| minimum flov is substantially below the { | | spray eductor recirculation line in essence l |
| expected pump flev for all operating modes. l The required mechanical minimum flov to ( | | provides an individual and independent mintaum I |
| prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical i damage is lover than the expected minimum flov ! | | flov path. |
| vhich results from each mode of operation. ? | | L Adequacy of Miniflov The system designer, in conjunction with the |
| e l | | [ |
| | pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the i |
| | ninimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially below the |
| | { |
| | expected pump flev for all operating modes. |
| | l The required mechanical minimum flov to |
| | ( |
| | prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical i |
| | damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation. |
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| | e l |
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| . . Att:chment 1 ,
| | Att:chment 1 System Descriptionr. cnd Evaluatiens Paga 3 t |
| . System Descriptionr. cnd Evaluatiens Paga 3 .
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| Systems Auxiliary Feedvater (AFV) ! | | Systems Auxiliary Feedvater (AFV) |
| Pumps: 2 motor driven ATV pumps per unit 1 turbine driven AFV pump per unit Miniflow | | Pumps: |
| | 2 motor driven ATV pumps per unit 1 turbine driven AFV pump per unit Miniflow |
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| A continuously open miniflov line from each AFV pump discharges into a common miniflov ' | | A continuously open miniflov line from each AFV pump discharges into a common miniflov header. |
| header. | | Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| Pump-to-Pump Interaction: Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by the use of a high resistance minimum flow orifice ' | | Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by the use of a high resistance minimum flow orifice and check valve in the miniflov line from each AFV pump. The miniflow orifice was supplied i |
| and check valve in the miniflov line from each ! | | by the pump vendor and installed following the vendor's technical manual. |
| AFV pump. The miniflow orifice was supplied i by the pump vendor and installed following the ; | | j r |
| vendor's technical manual. j r | | l Adequacy of Miniflove The use of the vendor supplied miniflov i |
| l Adequacy of Miniflove The use of the vendor supplied miniflov i l | | l orifice, installed following the vendor's technical manual, has resulted in a miniflov capacity which meets original requirements. |
| orifice, installed following the vendor's technical manual, has resulted in a miniflov 4 capacity which meets original requirements. t | | t 4 |
| . The pump vendor, in conjunction with the ;
| | The pump vendor, in conjunction with the system designer, is evaluating the adequacy of i |
| system designer, is evaluating the adequacy of i the miniflov line for long-term operation. ! | | the miniflov line for long-term operation. |
| Due to the pump vendor's workload and ' | | Due to the pump vendor's workload and engineering staff size, the evaluation is not expected to be completed until early 1989. |
| engineering staff size, the evaluation is not | | a Continued operation of the MDATV and TDAFV pumps is justified for the near term based on i |
| ; expected to be completed until early 1989.
| | the following considerations: |
| a Continued operation of the MDATV and TDAFV , | | l 1 |
| pumps is justified for the near term based on i the following considerations: l 1 | | ) |
| ) (a) Damage of the pumps due to internal l l | | (a) Damage of the pumps due to internal l |
| recirculation has not been experienced to , | | l recirculation has not been experienced to j |
| j date, nor is the manufacturer avare of !
| | date, nor is the manufacturer avare of minimum flow problems with similar type pumps in other plants. |
| minimum flow problems with similar type | | (b) The minimum flow rates are not affacted I |
| , pumps in other plants.
| | because of interaction during parallel l |
| (b) The minimum flow rates are not affacted I because of interaction during parallel l operation. This is a result of the high ! | | operation. This is a result of the high I |
| I flow resistances of the individual l minimum flov orifices, i
| | flow resistances of the individual l |
| ) r i
| | ) |
| j (c) The degradation due to operation with lov ; | | minimum flov orifices, i |
| ; minimum flow rates is gradual. Because i j of this and because the pumps operate i a
| | r i |
| infrequently at minimum flov, life of the l | | j (c) The degradation due to operation with lov minimum flow rates is gradual. Because i |
| ) pump vould not be degraded with less than [ | | j of this and because the pumps operate i |
| | infrequently at minimum flov, life of the l |
| | a |
| | ) |
| | pump vould not be degraded with less than |
| | [ |
| | desirable miniflov. |
| | j |
| ] | | ] |
| desirable miniflov. j Furthermore, required routine (
| | Furthermore, required routine |
| maintenance, inspections and surveillance { | | ( |
| testing are expected to detect any l excessive vear or damage vell before ! | | maintenance, inspections and surveillance |
| l l
| | { |
| system performance is degraded. : | | testing are expected to detect any l |
| i r | | l excessive vear or damage vell before l |
| | system performance is degraded. |
| | i r |
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| . +
| | Atttchment 1 |
| Atttchment 1 System Descriptic;s and Evaluations Pag 3 4 i
| | + |
| System Component Cooling Vater (CCV) ! | | System Descriptic;s and Evaluations Pag 3 4 i |
| l Pumps: 3 CCW pumps per unit ! | | System Component Cooling Vater (CCV) l Pumps: |
| Miniflow | | 3 CCW pumps per unit Miniflow |
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| A separate recirculation line from the CCV ; | | A separate recirculation line from the CCV pump discharge to the CCV pump suction is provided for each pump. The recirculation I |
| pump discharge to the CCV pump suction is provided for each pump. The recirculation I line contains a minimum flow orifice provided i | | line contains a minimum flow orifice provided i |
| ; by the pump manufacturer. A check valve is i located in the discharge line downstream of r the recirculation line connection for each [
| | by the pump manufacturer. A check valve is i |
| pump. > | | located in the discharge line downstream of r |
| i Pump-to-Pump Interaction: Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by , | | the recirculation line connection for each |
| prt iding a separate recirculation line for ( | | [ |
| | pump. |
| | i Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| | Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by prt iding a separate recirculation line for |
| | ( |
| eat'. pump. | | eat'. pump. |
| ! Adequacy of Miniflow: Duri.1g normal operation, the miniflow line is isolated and the system designer has t 2
| | Adequacy of Miniflow: |
| determined that the system flovrate is | | Duri.1g normal operation, the miniflow line is isolated and the system designer has t |
| ) adequate to prevent pump degradation. The .
| | determined that the system flovrate is 2 |
| Unit 2 Inservice Testing Program contains the ! | | ) |
| | adequate to prevent pump degradation. The Unit 2 Inservice Testing Program contains the |
| ] | | ] |
| only known requirement to run the CCV pumps ( | | only known requirement to run the CCV pumps |
| solely on miniflow. The Unit 2 Inservice [ | | ( |
| ; Testing Program is expected to be revised as ,
| | solely on miniflow. The Unit 2 Inservice |
| part of the second ten year update (spring t 1989 outage) to eliminate the requirement. | | [ |
| )l 1
| | Testing Program is expected to be revised as |
| The Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program has I | | )l part of the second ten year update (spring t |
| l already been revised to eliminate the t requirement. The system designer, in :
| | 1989 outage) to eliminate the requirement. |
| i conjunction with the pump vendor, has determined that the nintflow line is adequate provided that the duration of operation is 1 minimited.
| | I The Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program has l |
| I i t System Service Vater (SV) [ | | 1 already been revised to eliminate the t |
| ! Pumps: 5 SV pumps per unit l i
| | requirement. The system designer, in i |
| | conjunction with the pump vendor, has determined that the nintflow line is adequate provided that the duration of operation is 1 |
| | minimited. |
| | I i |
| | t System Service Vater (SV) |
| | [ |
| | Pumps: |
| | 5 SV pumps per unit l |
| ( | | ( |
| * Miniflov
| | i Miniflov |
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| The 5 SV pusps are divided as illustrated in l 4 Figure 1. SV pumps A and I are A train pumps. ; | | The 5 SV pusps are divided as illustrated in l |
| ! SV pumps D and E are B train pumps. SV pump C !
| | 4 Figure 1. |
| 1 is a sving pump which may be aligned to the A (
| | SV pumps A and I are A train pumps. |
| or 5 train. A common miniflov is provided for 7 pumps A and B. A common miniflov is provided ! | | SV pumps D and E are B train pumps. |
| for pumps D and E. Pump C is provided with its own miniflov line. The control valves for all of the mintflov lines are set to open at ; | | SV pump C 1 |
| i 130 psig. Additionally the SV system contains l 1 a 24 inch dilution bypass line which i i ultimately discharges to the river. The l
| | is a sving pump which may be aligned to the A |
| ! dilution bypass line control valve opens St ;
| | ( |
| j 100 psig. (
| | or 5 train. |
| i r l | | A common miniflov is provided for 7 |
| ! l
| | pumps A and B. |
| | A common miniflov is provided for pumps D and E. |
| | Pump C is provided with its own miniflov line. The control valves for all of the mintflov lines are set to open at i |
| | 130 psig. |
| | Additionally the SV system contains l |
| | 1 a 24 inch dilution bypass line which i |
| | i ultimately discharges to the river. The l |
| | dilution bypass line control valve opens St j |
| | 100 psig. |
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| | l l |
| | m - |
| | m |
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| . . Att cheent 1 i Systee Descriptions and EvaluatiCns :
| | Att cheent 1 i |
| Page 5 . | | Systee Descriptions and EvaluatiCns Page 5 l |
| l Pump-to-Pump Interaction: The SV system is not designed to preclude l pump-to-pump interaction while on miniflow. L Operation of pumps A and B or pumps D and E, l in conjunction with pump C, could result in ;
| | Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| multiple pumps discharging to a common header ; | | The SV system is not designed to preclude l |
| with miniflow protection. Plant operators are procedurally directed to start and secure SV ! | | pump-to-pump interaction while on miniflow. |
| pumps in order to maintain SV header pressure i between 70 to 100 psig. Vith the procedural guidance that is available to operators, pump-to-pump interaction in the SV header is , | | L Operation of pumps A and B or pumps D and E, l |
| precluded. ! | | in conjunction with pump C, could result in multiple pumps discharging to a common header with miniflow protection. |
| I Adequacy of Miniflow: The pump vendor has stated that "we do not ' | | Plant operators are procedurally directed to start and secure SV pumps in order to maintain SV header pressure i |
| recommend the minimum continuous throttled flow to be less than thirty-five percent (35%) : | | between 70 to 100 psig. Vith the procedural guidance that is available to operators, pump-to-pump interaction in the SV header is precluded. |
| of the pump capacity at Best Efficiency Point } | | I Adequacy of Miniflow: |
| (BEP). This calculates to approximately 3150 GPM..." The SV pump miniflow lines are sized 3 to handle 3150 GPM/ pump. Additionally, the ; | | The pump vendor has stated that "we do not recommend the minimum continuous throttled flow to be less than thirty-five percent (35%) |
| dilution bypass line, which opens before the l SV pump miniflow line, provides additional l protection for SV pumps during operation. The t system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has determined that there are no circumstances under which the SV pumps vill j operate at flow rates lov enough to adversely , | | of the pump capacity at Best Efficiency Point |
| affect the pumps. | | } |
| System Diesel Generator (DG) Fuel Oil (TO) l t | | (BEP). This calculates to approximately 3150 GPM..." |
| Pumps: 5 manual FO transfer pumps j 5 automatic To transfer pumps ; | | The SV pump miniflow lines are sized 3 |
| r Miniflov
| | to handle 3150 GPM/ pump. Additionally, the dilution bypass line, which opens before the l |
| | SV pump miniflow line, provides additional l |
| | protection for SV pumps during operation. The t |
| | system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has determined that there are no circumstances under which the SV pumps vill j |
| | operate at flow rates lov enough to adversely affect the pumps. |
| | System Diesel Generator (DG) Fuel Oil (TO) l t |
| | Pumps: |
| | 5 manual FO transfer pumps j |
| | 5 automatic To transfer pumps r |
| | Miniflov |
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| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| The DG F0 system has no miniflow lines. The F0 transfer pumps take a suction on the T0 storage tanks and discharge to the day tanks or other F0 storage tanks. l l-Pump-to-Pump Interaction: If the FO transfer pumps are operated in parallel, possible dead-heading of a pump ! | | The DG F0 system has no miniflow lines. The F0 transfer pumps take a suction on the T0 storage tanks and discharge to the day tanks or other F0 storage tanks. |
| could occur. Procedures do not provide for f operating pumps in parallel. A precaution j against parallel operation has been added to ; | | l l |
| the operating procedure. Therefore, ; | | Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| pump-to-pump interaction is precluded. ; | | If the FO transfer pumps are operated in parallel, possible dead-heading of a pump could occur. |
| t System Boric Acid Transfer (BAT) System Pumps: 2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps per unit | | Procedures do not provide for f |
| | operating pumps in parallel. A precaution j |
| | against parallel operation has been added to the operating procedure. Therefore, pump-to-pump interaction is precluded. |
| | t System Boric Acid Transfer (BAT) System Pumps: |
| | 2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps per unit |
| [ | | [ |
| i l | | i l |
| f | | f |
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| Attcchment 1 System Descriptitns cnd Ev0lutticns Paga 6 Miniflov 9cscription: Each BAT pump has an independent m!niflov line which recirculates to the boric acid tanks. | | Attcchment 1 System Descriptitns cnd Ev0lutticns Paga 6 Miniflov 9cscription: |
| | Each BAT pump has an independent m!niflov line which recirculates to the boric acid tanks. |
| However, the system may be physically aligned such that both pumps discharge to the same miniflow line. | | However, the system may be physically aligned such that both pumps discharge to the same miniflow line. |
| Pump-to-Pump Interaction: Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded through the use of procedures which prevent the operator from starting both pumps and operating them through the same miniflow line. | | Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| Adequacy of Miniflov The system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov line. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially belov the expected pump flov for all operating modos. | | Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded through the use of procedures which prevent the operator from starting both pumps and operating them through the same miniflow line. |
| | Adequacy of Miniflov The system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov line. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially belov the expected pump flov for all operating modos. |
| The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation. | | The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation. |
| Systems Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps: 2 Spent Fuel Pit Pumps per unit Miniflov | | Systems Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps: |
| | 2 Spent Fuel Pit Pumps per unit Miniflov |
|
| |
|
| == Description:== | | == Description:== |
| The Spent Fuel Pit system does not include a miniflow provision for these pumps. | | The Spent Fuel Pit system does not include a miniflow provision for these pumps. |
| Pump-to-Pump Interaction: Operating procedures provide for only one spent fuel pool cooling loop on service at a time. Therefore, pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by operating only one pump at a time. | | Pump-to-Pump Interaction: |
| Adequacy of Minifleva Normal operation of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system is to throttle flov across the pump to 54 psid. This operational philosophy results in system pumps operating in the vicinity of the best efficiency point. Since these pumps are not operated at flovs that vould require miniflov, no additional action is required. | | Operating procedures provide for only one spent fuel pool cooling loop on service at a time. Therefore, pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by operating only one pump at a time. |
| | Adequacy of Minifleva Normal operation of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system is to throttle flov across the pump to 54 psid. This operational philosophy results in system pumps operating in the vicinity of the best efficiency point. |
| | Since these pumps are not operated at flovs that vould require miniflov, no additional action is required. |
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217G0801999-10-0707 October 1999 Informs That on 990930,staff Conducted mid-cycle PPR of Farley & Did Not Identify Any Areas in Which Performance Warranted More than Core Insp Program.Nrc Will Conduct Regional Insps Associated with SG Removal & Installation ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity ML20212J8391999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards RAI Re Request for Amends to Ts.Addl Info Needed to Complete Review to Verify That Proposed TS Are Consistent with & Validate Design Basis Analysis.Request Discussed with H Mahan on 990930.Info Needed within 10 Days of This Ltr ML20212J8801999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses GL 98-01,suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util 980731,990607 & 03 Ltrs Provided Requested Info in Subj Gl.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Unit 1 ML20212E7031999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util Requested to Submit Plans & Schedules for Resolving Y2K-related Issues ML20212F1111999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal L-99-031, Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20212D4581999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun,Requesting Review of J Sherman Expressing Concerns That Plant & Other Nuclear Plants Not Yet Y2K Compliant ML20212C8041999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun Requesting Review of J Sherman Re Y2K Compliance.Latest NRC Status Rept on Y2K Activities Encl ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20211N8041999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That on 990930 NRC Issued GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Condition, to Holders of Nuclear Plant Operating Licenses ML20212C0071999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-05 & 50-364/99-05 on 990627- 0807.No Violations Noted.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Farley Plant Facilities Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations & Sound Engineering ML20211Q4801999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That on 990812-13,Region II Hosted Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program. List of Attendees,Copy of Slide Presentations & List of Questions Received from Participants Encl ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC ML20211G6851999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That During Insp,Technical Issues Associated with Design,Installation & fire-resistive Performance of Kaowool Raceway fire-barriers Installed at Farley Nuclear Plant Were Identified ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210T2021999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Draft SE Accepting Licensee Proposed Conversion of Plant,Units 1 & 2 Current TSs to Its.Its Based on Listed Documents ML20210Q4641999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr to La Reyes,As Listed,With List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210J8341999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re Util 990430 Amend Request to Allow Util to Operate Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Based on risk-informed Probability of SG Tube Rupture & Nominal accident-induced primary-to-second Leakage ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines ML20210G8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-04 & 50-364/99-04 on 990516- 0626.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed ML20196J6571999-07-0202 July 1999 Discusses Closure to TAC MA0543 & MA0544 Re GL 92-01 Rev 1, Suppl 1,RV Structural Integrity.Nrc Has Revised Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid,Version 2 as Result of Review of Responses ML20196J7471999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Cycle 16 Extension Request.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20196J5781999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981201 & s Requesting Amend to TS Associated with Replacing Existing Westinghouse Model 51 SG with Westinghouse Model 54F Generators.Respond within 30 Days of Ltr Date ML20196J6191999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Final Dam Audit Rept of 981008 of Category 1 Cooling Water Storage Pond Dam.Requests Response within 120 Days of Date of Ltr L-99-249, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA ML20196J3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards SE of TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at Westinghouse 3-Loop Pwrs L-99-024, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-025, Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.211999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196J8631999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA ML20196D1931999-06-22022 June 1999 Discusses Requesting Approval & Issuance of Plant Units 1 & 2 ITS by 990930.New Target Date Agrees with Requested Date ML20196A3401999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-03 & 50-364/99-03 on 990404-0515.No Violations Noted ML20196H9801999-06-10010 June 1999 Submits Two RAI Re ITS Section 4.0 That Were Never Sent. Reply to RAI Via e-mail ML20195F1731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal L-99-031, Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed L-99-249, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA ML20196J8631999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-024, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-025, Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.211999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.21 L-99-224, Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments1999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments L-99-217, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-225, Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants1999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195F0621999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195E9581999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195F1731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-022, Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments1999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments L-99-021, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-203, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program ML20195C6941999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program L-99-020, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program ML20195F2101999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests That Farley Nuclear Plant Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re W WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 L-99-180, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI ML20206F4321999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI ML20206C8021999-04-26026 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Rept, for Alabama Power Co.Encls Contain Financial Statements for 1998,unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 990331 & Cash Flow Projections for 990101-991231 ML20205S9501999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 L-99-172, Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.21999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 L-99-153, Forwards Correction to 960212 GL 95-07 180 Day Response. Level 3 Evaluation for Pressure Locking Utilized Analytical Models.Encl Page Has Been Amended to Correct Error1999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Correction to 960212 GL 95-07 180 Day Response. Level 3 Evaluation for Pressure Locking Utilized Analytical Models.Encl Page Has Been Amended to Correct Error L-99-125, Forwards Rev 0 to W Rept WCAP-15171, Analysis of Capsule Z from Alabama Power Co Jm Farley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program, Presenting Surveillance Capsule Test Results from Capsule Z1999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to W Rept WCAP-15171, Analysis of Capsule Z from Alabama Power Co Jm Farley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program, Presenting Surveillance Capsule Test Results from Capsule Z ML20205A2871999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to W Rept WCAP-15171, Analysis of Capsule Z from Alabama Power Co Jm Farley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program, Presenting Surveillance Capsule Test Results from Capsule Z ML20205A1531999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Corrected Typed & marked-up Current TS Pages for Replacing Previous Pages Submitted on 990222,re CR, Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Sys & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation L-99-012, Forwards 10CFR50.46 Annual Rept for 1998,re Effects of ECCS Evaluation Model Mod on Peak Cladding Temp Results Since 1997 Annual Rept & Most Recent PCT Error Rept Submitted 9809101999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards 10CFR50.46 Annual Rept for 1998,re Effects of ECCS Evaluation Model Mod on Peak Cladding Temp Results Since 1997 Annual Rept & Most Recent PCT Error Rept Submitted 980910 L-99-010, Forwards ISI Refueling 15,Interval 2,Period 3,Outage 3 for Jfnp,Unit 1, & Vols 1 & 2 to ISI Refueling 15,Interval 3, Period 1,Outage 1 for Jfnp,Unit 1. Summary of Results May Be Found in Tab B of Encl 21999-03-18018 March 1999 Forwards ISI Refueling 15,Interval 2,Period 3,Outage 3 for Jfnp,Unit 1, & Vols 1 & 2 to ISI Refueling 15,Interval 3, Period 1,Outage 1 for Jfnp,Unit 1. Summary of Results May Be Found in Tab B of Encl 2 ML20205A7611999-03-18018 March 1999 Forwards Annual DG Reliability Data Rept for 1998,per Plant TS 6.9.1.12 & 10CFR50.36.Rept Provides Number of Tests (Valid or Invalid) & Number of Failures for DGs at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Ltr Contains No New Commitments ML20205H2741999-03-18018 March 1999 Forwards Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(i) ML20204D4281999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards SG-99-03-001, Farley Unit-1 1999 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept, Per GL 95-05.Required Rept for Fall 1998 SG Insp Is Included in Rept ML20204E5841999-03-15015 March 1999 Submits Info on Current Levels & Sources of Insurance on Jm Farley Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-16
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20064A7131990-09-17017 September 1990 Advises That Due to Reassignment,Jj Clark No Longer Needs to Maintain Senior Reactor Operator Licenses ML20059J2811990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards List of Key Radiation Monitors Which Will Be Used as Inputs to Top Level Radioactivity Status Bar Re Spds.List Identifies Monitors Which Would Provide Concise & Meaningful Info About Radioactivity During Accidents ML20065D5961990-09-13013 September 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-19 & 50-364/90-19.Response Withheld ML20059J1661990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Rev 10 to ODCM ML20059L0751990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Revised Pages to Rev 3 to, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2911990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedules for FY91 Through FY94,per Generic Ltr 90-07.Requalification Schedules & Estimated Number of Candidates Expected to Participate in Generic Fundamental Exam,Also Encl ML20064A7111990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to Relief Request RR-1, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2891990-09-12012 September 1990 Confirms Rescheduling of Response to Fitness for Duty Program Notice of Violation 90-18-02,per 900907 Telcon ML20065D6621990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards NPDES Permit AL0024619 Effective 900901.Limits for Temp & Residual Chlorine Appealed & Stayed ML20064A3431990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Corrected Insertion Instructions to Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant ML20059D4711990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1990 ML20059B5101990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1990.No Changes to Process Control Program for First Semiannual Period of 1990 Exists ML20056B2751990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Relief Requests from Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Testing Program for Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves. Request Incorporates Commitments in 891222 Response to Notice of Violation ML20056B2741990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Unit Inservice Testing Program,For Review & Approval.Rev Incorporates Commitments Addressed in Util 891222 Response to Notice of Violation & Other Editorial & Technical Changes ML20058Q1481990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to FNP-1-M-043, Jm Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Second 10-Yr Inservice Insp Program,Asme Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20058P6201990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to FNP-2-M-068, Ten-Yr Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components, Per 891207 & 900412 Responses to NRC Request for Addl Info ML20055G7701990-07-18018 July 1990 Updates 900713 Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount ML20055F7411990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 & Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1989 Through May 1990.Repts Revised to Correct Typo on Value of Cumulative Number of Hours Reactor Critical ML20055F3781990-07-10010 July 1990 Submits Final Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.3 & 4.2.4.Util Position That Procedures Currently Utilized by Plant Constitute Acceptable Ongoing Life Testing Program for Reactor Trip Breakers & Components ML20055D4861990-07-0202 July 1990 Requests Authorization to Use Encl ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Case N-395 Re Laser Welding for Sleeving Process Described by Oct 1990,per 10CFR50.55a,footnote 6 ML20055D1001990-06-26026 June 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-12 & 50-364/90-12 on 900411-0510.Corrective Actions:Electrolyte Level Raised in Lights Identified by Inspector to Have Low Electrolyte Level ML20044A6191990-06-26026 June 1990 Suppls 900530 Ltr Containing Results of SPDS Audit,Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.One SPDS Console,Located in Control Room,Will Be Modified So That Only SPDS Info Can Be Displayed by Monitor.Console Will Be Reconfigured ML20043G4741990-06-11011 June 1990 Submits Addl Info Re 900219 Worker Respiratory Protection Apparatus Exemption Rev Request.Proposed Exemption Rev Involves Features Located Entirely within Restricted Area as Defined in 10CFR20 ML20043C1851990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Proposed Schedules for Submission & Requested Approval of Licensing Items ML20043B5941990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Rept of Unsatisfactory Performance Testing,Per 10CFR26,App A.Error Caused by Olympus Analyzer Which Allowed Same Barcode to Be Assigned to Two Different Samples. Smithkline Taken Action to Prevent Recurrence of Scan Error ML20042G7461990-05-10010 May 1990 Certifies That Plant Licensed Operator Requalification Program Accredited & Based Upon Sys Approach to Training,Per Generic Ltr 87-07.Program in Effect Since 890109 ML20042F0831990-05-0101 May 1990 Forwards Rev 18 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld ML20042G3081990-04-25025 April 1990 Forwards Alabama Power Co Annual Rept 1989, Unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 900331 & Cash Flow Projections for 1990 ML20042E4121990-04-12012 April 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per NRC 890803 Request.Relief Request RR-30 Requested Reduced Holding Time for Hydrostatically Testing Steam Generator Secondary Side ML20012E9571990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Rept,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.12.Rept Provides Number of Tests (Valid or Invalid),Number of Failures for Each Diesel Generator at Plant for 1989 & Info Identified in Reg Guide 1.108 ML20012D9661990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Annual ECCS Evaluation Model Changes Rept,Per Revised 10CFR50.46.Info Includes Effect of ECCS Evaluation Model Mods on Peak Cladding Temp Results & Summary of Plant Change Safety Evaluations ML20012D8901990-03-20020 March 1990 Clarifies 891130 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Use of Q-List at Plant,Per NRC Request.Fnpims Data Base Utilized as Aid for Procurement,Maint,Operations & Daily Planning ML20012C4701990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900201 Ltr Re Emergency Planning Weaknesses Identified in Insp Repts 50-348/89-32 & 50-364/89-21. Corrective Actions:Cited Procedures Revised.Direct Line Network Notification to State Agencies Being Implemented ML20012C6241990-03-14014 March 1990 Informs of Resolution of USI A-47,per Generic Ltr 89-19 ML20012C4651990-03-13013 March 1990 Provides Verification of Nuclear Insurance Reporting Requirements Specified in 10CFR50.54 w(2) ML20012C2051990-03-0505 March 1990 Forwards SPDS Critical Function Status Trees,Per G West Request During 900206 SPDS Audit at Plant.W/O Encl ML20012A1621990-03-0202 March 1990 Forwards Addl Info Inadvertently Omitted from Jul-Dec 1989 Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Including Changes to Process Control Program ML20012A1301990-03-0101 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Completed Questionnaire Encl ML20043A7481990-02-0202 February 1990 Forwards Util Exam Rept for Licensed Operator Requalification Written Exams on 900131 ML20006D2311990-01-31031 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003 Re Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Refueling Procedures Will Be Revised to Incorporate Guidance That Will Preclude Inadvertent Loss of Shutdown ML20006A9091990-01-23023 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting safety-related Equipment.Util Has Program to Perform Visual Insps & Cleanings of Plant Svc Water Intake Structure by Means of Scuba Divers ML20005E4931989-12-28028 December 1989 Provides Certification That fitness-for-duty Program Meets 10CFR26 Requirements.Testing Panel & cut-off Levels in Program Listed in Encl ML20005E3681989-12-28028 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-28 & 50-364/89-28 on 891002-06.Corrective Actions:All Piping Preparation for Inservice Insp Work in Containment Stopped & All Participants Assembled to Gather Facts on Incident ML20005E1971989-12-27027 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22 on 890911-1010.Corrective Actions:Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Closed & Core Operations Suspended.Shift Supervisor Involved in Event Counseled ML20011D5041989-12-22022 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-26 & 50-364/89-26.Corrective Actions:Personnel Involved in Preparation of Inservice Test Procedures Counseled. Violation B Re Opening of Pressurizer PORV Denied ML19332F2111989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Final Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Updated Inservice Insp Program,Summarizing Results of Addl Reviews & Providing Exam Listing Info ML19332F0791989-12-0707 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22.Corrective Actions:All Managers Retrained on Intent of Overtime Procedures & Sys Established to Provide Independent Check of All Time Sheets Each Pay Period ML19332F1141989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Description of Instrumentation Sys Selected in Response to Generic Ltr 88-17, Loss of DHR, Per Licensee 890127 Commitment.Hardware Changes Will Be Implemented During Unit 1 Tenth & Unit 2 Seventh Refueling Outages ML19332F1241989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per 891005 Ltr ML19353B0071989-12-0606 December 1989 Forwards Rev 1 to Safeguards Security Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld 1990-09-17
[Table view] |
Text
e
$4 tuna Pow;r Cornpany 600 North 18th Street Post Off.ce Boi 2641 B.rmgham. Aabama 3'0910400 Tsephone 205 2501837 W. G. H airston, til Sen.or V<e President N eear opere ons Alabama power tre swnn en s,v,n November 30, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Miniflov Evaluation - NRC Bulletin No. 88-04 URC Bulletin No. 88-04, "Potential Safety Related Pump Loss," requires Alabama Power Company to investigate and correct, if applicable, two miniflov design concerns.
The Bulletin requires that each safety-related system be evaluated for pump-to-pump interaction during miniflov operation.
If pump-to-pump interaction is possible, the system is required to be evaluated from a flov division standpoint. The Bulletin further requires an evaluation to address the adequacy of the minimum flov bypass lines for safety-related centrifugal pumps with respect to damage resulting from operation and testing.
The Bulletin reporting requirements include submittal of a short term (60 day) report which (a) summarizes the problems and the systems affected, (b) identifies the chort-term and long-term modifications to plant operating procedures er hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations, (c) identifies an appropriate schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin, and (d) provides justification for continued operation particularly with regard to General Design Criterion 35 of Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50),
"Emergency Core Cooling" and 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling System for Light Vater Nuclear Pover Reactors."
Additionally, a long-term resolution report is required to be submitted within 30 days of the completion of the long-term resolution actions.
By letter dated July 8, 1988, Alabama Pover Company provided a partial response to the Bulletin and committed to provide a status of evaluation efforts by November 30, 1988. The results of evaluations on safety-related pumps are outlined in Attachient 1.
All evaluations are complete with the exception of the evaluation required for the auxiliary feedvater (AFV) l 892020:41 ss3130 gra aooa a:000343 d
FDC
i i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 30, 1988 Page 2 i
i i
pumps. Due to the increased work load placed on the pump vendor by the l
Bulletin, a final evaluation of the AFV pumps vill not be completed until early 1989. Alabama Power Company vill provide the results of the AFV pump evaluation and a long-term action schedule within 60 days of evaluation i
completion. Continued operation of the AFV pumps until completion of the a
evaluation is ju2tified in Attachment 1.
For all other pumps evaluated, evaluations have shown that there is no significant pump-to-pump interaction and the current minimum flow lines are adequate.
If there are any questions, please advise.
Respectfully submitted, I
- I J
ALABAMA P0 ER COMPANY e
l
/p % V. G. Hairston, III j
)
VGH,III/REMapr-2.17 l
Attachment s
cc:
Mr. L. B. Long g
Mr. M. L. Ernst t
{
Mr. E. A Reeves I
i Mr. G. F. Maxwell i
2 d
I I
i i
i i
r I
1 i
i t
I I
l I
i f
i
ATTACHMEN" 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION System:
High Head Safety Injection / Charging Pumps:
3 Charging pumps (HHSI) per unit Miniflov
Description:
A miniflow line from each HHSI pump discharges into a common miniflov header.
Pump-to-Pump Interaction Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by the use of a 60 GPM high resistance minimum flov orifice in the miniflow line from each HHSI pump. The individual miniflov lines combine into a low resistance common header.
Adequacy of Miniflow:
The HHSI pump miniflov lines have a greater capacity than originally required by the pump vendor. The system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially I
below the expected pump flov for all operating modes. The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation.
System:
Lov Head Safety Injection / Residual Heat i
Removal (RHR)
Pumps:
2 RHR pumps per unit Miniflow
Description:
Each RHR pump has an independent miniflov
- line, Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by use of independent miniflov lines.
l Adequacy of Miniflov:
The RHR pump miniflov lines have a greater r
capacity than originally required by the pump l
vendor. The system designer, in conjunction l
vith the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially l
belov the expected pump flov for all operating i
modes.
The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of l
operation.
l i
Systems Containment Spray (CS) l Pumps:
2 CS pumps per unit l
i
Art chment 1 System Descriptions and Evaluatitns Paga 2 Miniflov
Description:
Each CS pump has a recirculation line which joins to form a common return header to the Refueling Vater Storage Tank (RVST).
Normally locked closed valves are provided in tFe recirculation lines and in the common header for isolation. This piping arrar.gement is utilized as a means to test the spray pumps without spraying into containment.
In addition, each pump has a spray eductor recirculation line.
1 Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
During accident situations, and all surveillance testing except for the "Spray and Phase B Actuation Test", the operation of the two trains is completely independent, with the l
exception of a common portion of the suction line from the RVST. The pumps can develop cufficient discharge pressure to exceed the containment design pressure such that there is no possibility of deadheading a pump during i
spray actuation.
During individual pump surveillance testing (Spray Pump Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Testing) the spray header is isolated, however, each pump's miniflow path to the RVST is available to prevent deadheading. During the "Spray and Phase B Actuation Surveillance Test" the discharge headers are isolated, and the two pumps are run simultaneously in parallel with flov directed to the common miniflov line. The surveillance procedure requires that the time the spray pumps are run in parallel be held to a maximum of 1 minute. The resistance in the common miniflow path is high relative to that in the individual line.
Hence, given a l
mismatch between the pump developed heads. It is possible for the pressure at the junction point (where the discharge heads combine) to be high enough to prevent one pump from recirculating to the RVST. This condition is i
considered acceptable because (1) the pumps I
only run for one minute maximum and (2) the l
spray eductor recirculation line in essence l
provides an individual and independent mintaum I
flov path.
L Adequacy of Miniflov The system designer, in conjunction with the
[
pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the i
ninimum flov lines. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially below the
{
expected pump flev for all operating modes.
l The required mechanical minimum flov to
(
prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical i
damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation.
?
e l
Att:chment 1 System Descriptionr. cnd Evaluatiens Paga 3 t
r
~
Systems Auxiliary Feedvater (AFV)
Pumps:
2 motor driven ATV pumps per unit 1 turbine driven AFV pump per unit Miniflow
Description:
A continuously open miniflov line from each AFV pump discharges into a common miniflov header.
Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by the use of a high resistance minimum flow orifice and check valve in the miniflov line from each AFV pump. The miniflow orifice was supplied i
by the pump vendor and installed following the vendor's technical manual.
j r
l Adequacy of Miniflove The use of the vendor supplied miniflov i
l orifice, installed following the vendor's technical manual, has resulted in a miniflov capacity which meets original requirements.
t 4
The pump vendor, in conjunction with the system designer, is evaluating the adequacy of i
the miniflov line for long-term operation.
Due to the pump vendor's workload and engineering staff size, the evaluation is not expected to be completed until early 1989.
a Continued operation of the MDATV and TDAFV pumps is justified for the near term based on i
the following considerations:
l 1
)
(a) Damage of the pumps due to internal l
l recirculation has not been experienced to j
date, nor is the manufacturer avare of minimum flow problems with similar type pumps in other plants.
(b) The minimum flow rates are not affacted I
because of interaction during parallel l
operation. This is a result of the high I
flow resistances of the individual l
)
minimum flov orifices, i
r i
j (c) The degradation due to operation with lov minimum flow rates is gradual. Because i
j of this and because the pumps operate i
infrequently at minimum flov, life of the l
a
)
pump vould not be degraded with less than
[
desirable miniflov.
j
]
Furthermore, required routine
(
maintenance, inspections and surveillance
{
testing are expected to detect any l
l excessive vear or damage vell before l
system performance is degraded.
i r
Atttchment 1
+
System Descriptic;s and Evaluations Pag 3 4 i
System Component Cooling Vater (CCV) l Pumps:
3 CCW pumps per unit Miniflow
Description:
A separate recirculation line from the CCV pump discharge to the CCV pump suction is provided for each pump. The recirculation I
line contains a minimum flow orifice provided i
by the pump manufacturer. A check valve is i
located in the discharge line downstream of r
the recirculation line connection for each
[
pump.
i Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by prt iding a separate recirculation line for
(
eat'. pump.
Adequacy of Miniflow:
Duri.1g normal operation, the miniflow line is isolated and the system designer has t
determined that the system flovrate is 2
)
adequate to prevent pump degradation. The Unit 2 Inservice Testing Program contains the
]
only known requirement to run the CCV pumps
(
solely on miniflow. The Unit 2 Inservice
[
Testing Program is expected to be revised as
)l part of the second ten year update (spring t
1989 outage) to eliminate the requirement.
I The Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program has l
1 already been revised to eliminate the t
requirement. The system designer, in i
conjunction with the pump vendor, has determined that the nintflow line is adequate provided that the duration of operation is 1
minimited.
I i
t System Service Vater (SV)
[
Pumps:
5 SV pumps per unit l
(
i Miniflov
Description:
The 5 SV pusps are divided as illustrated in l
4 Figure 1.
SV pumps A and I are A train pumps.
SV pumps D and E are B train pumps.
SV pump C 1
is a sving pump which may be aligned to the A
(
or 5 train.
A common miniflov is provided for 7
pumps A and B.
A common miniflov is provided for pumps D and E.
Pump C is provided with its own miniflov line. The control valves for all of the mintflov lines are set to open at i
130 psig.
Additionally the SV system contains l
1 a 24 inch dilution bypass line which i
i ultimately discharges to the river. The l
dilution bypass line control valve opens St j
100 psig.
(
r i
l l
m -
m
Att cheent 1 i
Systee Descriptions and EvaluatiCns Page 5 l
Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
The SV system is not designed to preclude l
pump-to-pump interaction while on miniflow.
L Operation of pumps A and B or pumps D and E, l
in conjunction with pump C, could result in multiple pumps discharging to a common header with miniflow protection.
Plant operators are procedurally directed to start and secure SV pumps in order to maintain SV header pressure i
between 70 to 100 psig. Vith the procedural guidance that is available to operators, pump-to-pump interaction in the SV header is precluded.
I Adequacy of Miniflow:
The pump vendor has stated that "we do not recommend the minimum continuous throttled flow to be less than thirty-five percent (35%)
of the pump capacity at Best Efficiency Point
}
(BEP). This calculates to approximately 3150 GPM..."
The SV pump miniflow lines are sized 3
to handle 3150 GPM/ pump. Additionally, the dilution bypass line, which opens before the l
SV pump miniflow line, provides additional l
protection for SV pumps during operation. The t
system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has determined that there are no circumstances under which the SV pumps vill j
operate at flow rates lov enough to adversely affect the pumps.
System Diesel Generator (DG) Fuel Oil (TO) l t
Pumps:
5 manual FO transfer pumps j
5 automatic To transfer pumps r
Miniflov
Description:
The DG F0 system has no miniflow lines. The F0 transfer pumps take a suction on the T0 storage tanks and discharge to the day tanks or other F0 storage tanks.
l l
Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
If the FO transfer pumps are operated in parallel, possible dead-heading of a pump could occur.
Procedures do not provide for f
operating pumps in parallel. A precaution j
against parallel operation has been added to the operating procedure. Therefore, pump-to-pump interaction is precluded.
t System Boric Acid Transfer (BAT) System Pumps:
2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps per unit
[
i l
f
Attcchment 1 System Descriptitns cnd Ev0lutticns Paga 6 Miniflov 9cscription:
Each BAT pump has an independent m!niflov line which recirculates to the boric acid tanks.
However, the system may be physically aligned such that both pumps discharge to the same miniflow line.
Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
Pump-to-pump interaction is precluded through the use of procedures which prevent the operator from starting both pumps and operating them through the same miniflow line.
Adequacy of Miniflov The system designer, in conjunction with the pump vendor, has evaluated the adequacy of the minimum flov line. The required thermal minimum flov is substantially belov the expected pump flov for all operating modos.
The required mechanical minimum flov to prevent hydraulic instability and mechanical damage is lover than the expected minimum flov vhich results from each mode of operation.
Systems Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps:
2 Spent Fuel Pit Pumps per unit Miniflov
Description:
The Spent Fuel Pit system does not include a miniflow provision for these pumps.
Pump-to-Pump Interaction:
Operating procedures provide for only one spent fuel pool cooling loop on service at a time. Therefore, pump-to-pump interaction is precluded by operating only one pump at a time.
Adequacy of Minifleva Normal operation of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system is to throttle flov across the pump to 54 psid. This operational philosophy results in system pumps operating in the vicinity of the best efficiency point.
Since these pumps are not operated at flovs that vould require miniflov, no additional action is required.
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