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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20147C768 | |||
| issue date = 02/22/1988 | |||
| title = Insp Repts 50-498/87-75 & 50-499/87-75 on 871201-31.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Slave Relay Surveillance Deficiency Due to Personnel Error,Tmi & Generic Ltr 83-28 Action Item Followup & IE Circulars | |||
| author name = Bess J, Bundy H, Carpenter D, Constable G, Haag R, Hildebrand E, Murphy M | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000498, 05000499 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| case reference number = TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-3.D.1.1, TASK-TM | |||
| document report number = 50-498-87-75, 50-499-87-75, GL-83-28, IEC-80-09, IEC-80-9, NUDOCS 8803030152 | |||
| package number = ML20147C748 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 18 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000498/1987075]] | |||
=Text= | |||
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APPENDIX B | |||
, | |||
U.S.' NUCLEAR; REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION IV | |||
~ | |||
NRC' Inspection: Report: = 50-498/87-75 Operating License: 'NPF-71 | |||
' 50-499/87-75 . Construction Permit (CP): CPPR-129 | |||
Dockets: 50-498 CP Expiration Date: | |||
~ | |||
December 1989 ' | |||
50-499 | |||
Licensee: Houston Lighting &-Power Company (HL&P) | |||
P.O. Box 1700 | |||
Houston, Texas 77001- | |||
Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP) | |||
' | |||
Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas | |||
. Inspection Conducted: Decembr141,1987 | |||
Inspectors: v w - | |||
Date | |||
* */N | |||
jr'R. CarpenW Senior Resident Inspector | |||
)roject Section D, Division of Reactor | |||
Projeets | |||
. | |||
. E. Bess 7 Resident Inspector, Project | |||
Y1 | |||
Dite ' | |||
'f2V | |||
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects | |||
, | |||
a y , | |||
'E P. fiildebYand, Resident Inspector, Project 06te / | |||
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects | |||
M. ~ E. Murphy 7PlanF SysWms Section, Division | |||
& z/W | |||
Sate ' | |||
of Reactor Safety | |||
, | |||
e | |||
1803030152 880223 | |||
.PDR | |||
ADOCK 05000498 | |||
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.R. Haag, Materid and. Quality Programs Date.- | |||
Section,. Division of Reactor Safety.' > | |||
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. fT B0ndy, Project Engineer, Project Date | |||
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.Section D, Division of Reactor Projects- | |||
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Other | |||
Assisting. . | |||
Personnel: J. P. Claus'ner, French Commissariar A L'Energie | |||
Atomique, Institute De: Protection Et De Surete | |||
Nucleaire | |||
. | |||
- | |||
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. Approved: c | |||
G. L."Constable, Chief, Project Section;D. | |||
. | |||
Date . ' | |||
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-Division of. Reactor Projects'. , , | |||
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Inspection Summary | |||
Inspection' Conducted December'l-31~, 1987'(Report 50-498/87-75; | |||
' 50-499/87-75) | |||
' Areas-Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection , including licensee action'on | |||
previous inspection findings, licensee action on previously reported items, | |||
slave relay surveillance- deficiency due' to personne11 error, THI and GL 83-28 | |||
.act ion item followup,' IE Circulars, Class 1E batteries inoperable, cold; weather- | |||
preparations, chemical-detection system inoperability, safety injection. pumps | |||
recirculation flow, Unit 2 preoperational test program,- incore thimble tube.- | |||
inspections, Unit 1 significant events, status of incomplete preoperational | |||
tests.(Unit 1)' status of auxiliary feedwater system failures (Unit 1), and | |||
, | |||
: siteLtours. | |||
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation (paragraph 10) and no | |||
deviations' were identified. | |||
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. DETAILS | |||
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. . . | |||
..... | |||
. 1. ' Persons Contacted . | |||
.. | |||
~ | |||
*J. E. Geiger, Genera 1LManager, Nuclear Assurance | |||
*M. R. Wisenburg, Unit 1 Superintendent | |||
*W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager | |||
*S.LM.' Dew, Operations Support' Manager. | |||
*G.'L. Jarvela, Manager, NP00 Technical Support | |||
*J. A.'Brady, Division Manager, Emergency Preparedness | |||
*T. E. Underwood, Chemical Operations and Analysis Manager | |||
*G; L. Parkey, Manager, Plant Engineering' | |||
*H. A. McBurnett, Manager, Site Licensing | |||
'*S. - M. ' Head, Supervisory Licensing Engineer | |||
*P..L.: Walker, Staff Engineer | |||
J. A. Constantin, Simulator Training Supervisor | |||
In addition-.to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with | |||
~ | |||
;various other licensee, architect engineer (AE),_ constructor, and | |||
contractor personnel during this inspection. | |||
* Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on | |||
January 6, 1988. _ | |||
, | |||
2. Unresolved Items - | |||
An unresolved item is a matter'about'wh'ich more information is' required to | |||
ascertain whether it is an acceptable 1 item, a deviation, or'a violation. | |||
Unresolved items are'identilied in paragraphs,5 and 11 of this report. | |||
3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings | |||
(Closed) Violation 498/8739-02 | |||
This violation concerns'the failure to follow the procedures for | |||
installing temporary modifications. The NRC inspector ~ reviewed the | |||
response given by the licensee (Letter ST-HL-AE-2354), the Procedure | |||
OPGP03-Z0-0003, "Temporary Modifications and Alterations" Revision 7, | |||
effective September 12, 1987, and the records which indicate training in | |||
temporary modifications has been conducted for responsible startup | |||
personnel. | |||
Corrective action and steps taken to prevent recurrence are considered | |||
acceptable. | |||
This violation is considered closed. | |||
- . | |||
_ | |||
.. | |||
, | |||
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' | |||
(Closed) Deviation 498/8741-01; 499/8741-01 | |||
This deviation involved failure to treat' components.in certain systems as | |||
quality related per STP Final Safety Analysis Report'(FSAR) requirements | |||
-in the preventive maintenance (PM) program and maintenance work | |||
request (MWR) program. The NRC inspector reviewed-records indicating that | |||
PMs which might not have had'the proper quality control (QC) inspections, | |||
have been reviewed and evaluated by the, licensee.- Out of 11 MWRs/PMs | |||
which would have required QC inspection, no discrepancies were found in | |||
the work packages. The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures OPGP03-AM-0002, | |||
"PM Program," effective September 2, 1987, and OPGP03-AM-0003,'"MWR | |||
Program," effective November 6, 1987, and they contained adequate. | |||
clarifications for determining proper quality classifications. The NRC- | |||
inspector also reviewed records for training conducted during the period | |||
- of June 29 to July 24, 1987, which indicated training in determining , | |||
quality classifications had been conducted for key maintenance personnel. | |||
This item is considered closed. | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8717-01 | |||
This item concerned the completion of emergency lighting installation and | |||
testing as well as the development of procedures to periodically check the | |||
operability of the lighting units. Tne installation and initial testing | |||
of emergency lighting has been completed. The NRC inspector reviewed the | |||
last preventive maintenance check procedure and completed data form , | |||
EM-1-LB-87013194 and found them acceptable. | |||
This item is considered closed. | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8717-02 | |||
This item concerned the completion of installation of all fire barriers, | |||
seals, wraps, detection devices, and fireproofing. The constructor has | |||
turned over to the licensee all systems and items related to these areas. | |||
The licensee's fire protection engineers have completed a review of all | |||
documentation and have conducted a satisfactory walkdown of all items. | |||
The NRC inspector completed a tour of selected plant areas that provided | |||
an adequate campling of the items of concern. Discrepancies noted were | |||
minor in nature and found to be already identified in the licensee's work | |||
item tracking system. | |||
This item is considered closed. , | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-05 | |||
This item concerned smoke stratification effect on smoke detectors in | |||
rooms with tall ceilings, large volumes, and low ventilation air flow | |||
rates. The licensee responded to this concern in Letter ST-HL-AE-2053, | |||
dated April 17, 1987. The response determined that these areas were not a | |||
concern based on the location of combustible materials and detectors. The | |||
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NRC inspector. toured each.of-the: rooms. identified' in <the above letter and | |||
; agrees with the licensee's assessment based on' detector location and | |||
~ | |||
quantity of~ installed combustible material. - | |||
'This item is considered closed. | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-06 | |||
' | |||
-This item concerned installed noncollapsible fire hoses which were not | |||
Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed. In a' letter dated April 17, 1987,. | |||
-the licensee committed to-hydrostatically test all.of these hoses, and to' | |||
~ | |||
replace them with UL listed hoses at--the first hose maintenance _'changeout. | |||
The hydrostatic testing has been: satisfactorily completed. The NRC | |||
inspector has reviewed the~ documentation-on,this. item and finds it | |||
acceptable. - | |||
, < | |||
. . . | |||
This item is considered closed. , | |||
' | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-07' | |||
This item concerned the installation of portab'le fire extinguishers in the. | |||
essential codling water intake structure in accordance with National Fire | |||
. Protection Association (NFPA) Standard No. 10. The NRC inspector verified | |||
that the fire extinguishers.were. permanently mounted in the intake | |||
structure as required. | |||
This item is considered closed. | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-08 | |||
This item concerned the development of procedures to maintain the | |||
emergency communication systems. The NRC inspector reviewed Station | |||
Procedures OPGP03-CN-001, "Radio Communication," Revision 0, dated | |||
June 16, 1987; OPGP03-CN-0002, "Telephone Communications," Revision 0, | |||
dated June 9, 1987; OPGP03-CN-0003, "Plant Public Address and Alarm | |||
System," Revision 0, dated June 9, 1987; and OPGP3-CN-0006, "Communication | |||
, | |||
Systems Testing Program," Revision 0, dated April 24, 1987. These | |||
* | |||
procedures appear to satisfy the commitments. | |||
This item is considered closed. | |||
(Closed) Open Item 498/8726-08 - | |||
This open item concerns the classification of the Interim Storage | |||
Facility (ISF) as a records storage facility per American National | |||
Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.2.9-1974. HL&P Technical Support conducted | |||
. | |||
an evaluation of the ISF and questioned whether the ISF can be classified | |||
' | |||
as a records storage facility. This uncertainty involves | |||
' | |||
paragraphs 5.6.7, 5.6.8, and 5.6.9 of ANSI N45.2.9-1974 which addresses: | |||
(a) use of halon as the suppression agent, (b) conduit penetrations, and | |||
(c) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct penetrations. | |||
, | |||
_. | |||
$ | |||
. | |||
-7- | |||
The' existing halon suppression system appears to provide "adequate. fire | |||
protection" as required by ANSI N45.2.9-1974. The licensee verified that | |||
conduit penetrations are properly sealed and.the. supply and return HVAC | |||
ducts contain dampers which exceed the required fire rating. This. | |||
verification also meets the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9-1974. The NRC | |||
inspector has reviewed this evaluation and agrees with the conclusions | |||
, | |||
reached by the licensee on these issues. | |||
This item is considered closed. | |||
4. Licensee Action on Previously-Reported Items | |||
The NRC inspectors reviewed the following incident review committee (IRC) | |||
reports and determined that the licensee has taken adequate action on the | |||
subject items, except as noted. | |||
(0 pen) IRC 400, Inadequate Cooling of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) High | |||
Voltage Cubicle Panels | |||
This item concerned inadequate cooling of the Unit 1 SDG high voltage | |||
cubicle panels which was discovered when a high temperature alarm actuated | |||
during a 100 hour test run of SDG 13. It was reported to the NRC under | |||
10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21. HL&P completed a design modification which | |||
involved installing a second fan and removing drip shields over the vents | |||
to provide additional cooling to the Unit 1 panels. Completion of a | |||
second 100 hour test run for SDG 13 without experiencing abnormally high | |||
panel temperatures verified the adequacy of this modification. The N9C | |||
inspectors have reviewed both the field installations and the | |||
documentation of this modification and consider it acceptable. This item | |||
is considered closed for Unit 1. A similar modification is planned for | |||
Unit 2 panels. This item will remain open for Unit 2 pending installation | |||
of this modification. | |||
c | |||
(Closed) IRC 399, Failure of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) Fuel l | |||
Injector Nozzle | |||
This item concerns a SDG fuel injector nozzle failure during a 100 hour | |||
SDG 13 endurance run. A previous failure had occurred on February 25, | |||
1987, during the 24 hour preoperational test run of SDG 11. During an IRC | |||
meeting on July 27, 1987, the licensee determined that this item was | |||
reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). | |||
Based on failure analysis results performed by Southwest Research | |||
Institute and on site testing of all spray nozzle tips (169) there were 20 | |||
tips with internal cracks identified, all from the same manufacturers Lot | |||
No. 001124. The licensee concluded that the most probable cause of | |||
cracking appeared to be due to manufacturing deficiencies associated with , | |||
' | |||
this lot. All spray nozzle tips from Lot No. 001124 were considered to be | |||
potentially susceptible to cracking and have been replaced. | |||
. | |||
T | |||
_. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ .__ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . _ . _ . _ _ _ | |||
_ - | |||
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, | |||
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-8- | |||
ThisitemaisoconcernsSDGfuellineleakswhichwerefoundduringa24 | |||
hour preoperational- test performed on SDG No.11. The root'cause has.been | |||
identified as being improper machining _ of the fuel line ferrule nuts. | |||
Corrective actions have been taken, fuel line repairs are complete and | |||
have been satisfactorily tested. | |||
The NRC inspectors have. observed portions ofithe field testing and | |||
maintenance activities, and have reviewed the associated documentation. | |||
The licensee's corrective actions appear to be acceptable. | |||
This item is considered closed. | |||
5. Slave Relay Surveillance Deficiency Due to Personnel Error (LER 87-019) | |||
The NRC inspectcr reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-019 which | |||
identified imprope. slave relay testing deficiencies due to personnel | |||
error. The licensee. also discovered that the required slave relay testing | |||
for "degraded undervoltage coincident with safety injection" had not been | |||
properly performed. The licensee has committed to review the criteria for | |||
slave relay testing. This review will be addressed in a LER which the | |||
licensee plans to submit to NRC. This item will remain an unresolved item | |||
(498/8775-02) until the LEt has been issued and corrective action has been | |||
implemented by the licensre and verified by the NRC inspector. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
6. Three Mile Island (THI) and Generic Letter Action Followup (GL) 83-28 | |||
/ | |||
(Closed) TMI Item I.G.1.3 and (0 pen) Open Item 498/8708-19, Training | |||
Requirements During Low Power Testing | |||
Open Item 498/8707-19 tracked completion of the training required by THI | |||
Item I.G.1.3 in the STP FSAR, Appendix 7A. The licensee committed to | |||
satisfying this requirement by training operators on Procedure | |||
1 PEP 4-ZX-10, "Natural Circulation Verification," Revision 0, utilizing the | |||
plant simulator. The NRC inspector examined training records verifying | |||
that training on this procedure had been completed for appropriate | |||
personnel at the simulator during the period of June 1 to July 3,1987. | |||
However, it was established that this training did not involve | |||
accomplishing and verifying natural circulation from the remote shutdown | |||
panel. TMI Item I.G.1.3 is considered closed. Completion of appropriate | |||
training on the remote shutdown panel will be tracked by Open | |||
Item 498/8708-19 and must be completed prior to exceeding 50% of full | |||
power. | |||
(Closed) GL 83-28, Item 2.2 and (Closed) Open Item 498/8739-04, Equipment | |||
Classifications and Vendor Interface | |||
The open item tracked licensee response to questions contained in NRC | |||
letter of May 4,1987, which related to the Nuclear Utility Task Action | |||
Comittee/ Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (NUTAC/VETIP) as | |||
- | |||
q- | |||
- | |||
s | |||
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9- | |||
. | |||
it is implemented at the STP Electric Generating Station and the quality | |||
assurance controls over vendor supplied service on safety-related | |||
equipment. The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's letter of January 5, | |||
.1988 (ST-HL-AE-2470), which appeared to be responsive to the NRR | |||
questions. Therefore, GL-83-28, Item 2.2 and Open I+,em 8739-04 are | |||
considered closed. However, these closures do.not preclude further NRR | |||
questions on these subjects. | |||
/. | |||
(Closed) TMI Item II.B.4 and (Closed) Open' Item 498/8723-09, Training for | |||
Mitigating Core Damage | |||
TMI Item II.B.4 was.open pending closure of Open Item 498/8723-09 | |||
regarding completion of training of health physics personnel on mitigation | |||
of core damage. The NRC inspector reviewed records which indicate | |||
appropriate personnel completed course RPT905, during the period of May 8 | |||
to August 4,1987, which covered the radiological aspects of a core damage | |||
accident. | |||
The TMI item and associated open item are considered closed. | |||
(Closed) TMI Item III.D.1.1,/ rimary P Coolant Outside Containment | |||
This item concerns the review of the TMI followup actions and the | |||
implementation of a program to reduce leakage from systems outside | |||
containment, that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during | |||
a serious transient or tecident, to as-low-as practical levels as required | |||
by NUREG-0737. | |||
To comply with this requirement, the licensee has established a program | |||
covering the systems (or portions) outside containment defined in FSAR | |||
Appendix 7A (7A.III.D.1.2, Amendment 53) and Technical Specification | |||
(TS) 6 i.3a. | |||
This program is described in the contaminated system leakage test program | |||
Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0028, Revision 0, effective date October 24, 1986. | |||
The inspector reviewed this program and the procedures for Contaminated | |||
System Leakage Test as follows: | |||
, 1 PSP 11-SI-0018, "Safety Injection System Train IC," Revision 0 | |||
. | |||
1 PSP 11-CM-0005, "Containment Monitoring System," Revision 0 | |||
. | |||
IPSP11-AP-0005, "Post Accident Sampling System," Revision 0 | |||
. | |||
1 PSP 11-CS-0008, "Containment Spray System Train IC," Revision 0 | |||
The NRC inspector considers these documents acceptable. However, the | |||
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) NUREG-0737, Supplement 2 (13.5.2.6, | |||
Item III.D.I.1) recomends that the applicant should also apply the | |||
leakage reduction program to the Chemical Volume and Control System | |||
(CVCS). STP TS, Section 6.8.3a requires the CVCS to be included in the | |||
program for systems to be tested. | |||
,_ . . ._ _- . - - , - . . - - - _ .. .__.. _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ | |||
.___ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ | |||
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The.NRC inspector discussed the above subject with licensee's | |||
representatives who stated that the CVCS was excluded because it is part | |||
of the inservice leakage test | |||
of. Mechanical Engineers (ASME) program | |||
. Section in accordance | |||
XI. This position waswith American | |||
stated by Society | |||
the licensee in the Letter ST-HL-AE-2001 on May 1, 1987. The NRC | |||
inspector observed that the licensee scheduled some tests on the CVCS | |||
prior to initial criticality. | |||
Although the TS, Section 6.8.3a requires the licensec to include the CVCS | |||
in their program, NUREG-0737 allows delaying compliance until receipt of a | |||
full power license. Inclusion of the CVCS in the leak reduction program | |||
and review by the NRC prior to issuance of the full power license will be | |||
an open item (498/8775-03). | |||
7. IE Circulars (IEC) | |||
(Closed) IEC 80-09, Internal Plant Comunications | |||
This IEC had been closed with the exception of followup on training for | |||
plant personnel. The NRC inspector has reviewed plant procedures | |||
OPGP03-CN-001, "Radio Comunications," Revision 0, dated June 6,1987; | |||
OPGP03-CN-0002, "Telephone Communications," Revision 0, dated June 9, | |||
1987; OPGP03-CN-0003, "Plant Public Address and Alarm System," Revision 0, | |||
dated June 9, 1987; and OPGP3-CN-0006, "Communication Systems Testing | |||
Program," Revision 0, dated April 24, 1987; and the revised General | |||
Employee Training I plan to ensure incorporation of the IEC concerns. | |||
They have been addressed in an acceptable manner. | |||
This IEC is considered closed. | |||
' | |||
8. Class 1E Batteries Inoperable LER 87-27 | |||
During this inspection period, the licensee declared all four trains of | |||
Unit 1 Class 1E 125 volt batteries inoperable because previous | |||
surveillance testing per Station Procedure 1 PSP 06-DJ-0004 had Leen | |||
performed using incorrect amperage values for the 120 minute discharge | |||
service test. | |||
The plant was subsequently placed in a Mode 5 (depressurized) status to | |||
satisfy the TS 3.8.2.2 Action Statement requirements. ; | |||
The cause of the inadequate testing appears to be due to an anomaly which | |||
exists in the numbering system used to identify the four trains. | |||
Specifically, Channels I, II, III, and IV are identified as Trains A, D, | |||
B, and C, respectively (a nonlogical letter sequence). Also contributing | |||
to the potential for error is the fact that Channels I, II, III, and IV | |||
have plant equipment designation numbers of 3E231EBT045A, 3E231EBT0458, | |||
3E231EBT045C, and 3E231EBT045D, respectively (a logical letter sequence). | |||
The amperage values for the 120 minute discharge service test were | |||
provided by Bechtel Engineering Calculation EC-5008, Revision 5. The | |||
amperage values were incorrectly. entered into the surveillance test | |||
- - _ | |||
q .. | |||
. | |||
-11- | |||
. | |||
procedure for 'oattery Trains B, C, and D. This _ error caused these battery | |||
trains to be tested using incorrect values. The new amperage values of | |||
Revision 7 of calculation EC-5008 had not been entered into the | |||
surveillance test in a- timely manner (approximately six months). The | |||
licensee has completed retesting of all four Class IE battery trains using | |||
the correct amperage values provided by Revision 7 of calculation EC-5008. | |||
All four battery trains are now considered operable by the licensee. | |||
The licensee's long term corrective action to prevent recurrence is | |||
unclear at this time. It should include, as a minimum, steps to ensure | |||
that revised calculations are correctly entered into the appropriate | |||
procedure immediately upon approval and the anomaly which exists in | |||
the identification of the battery trains is corrected. The | |||
corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be tracked as open item | |||
(498/8775-04). | |||
No violations are deviations were identified. | |||
9. Cold Weather Preparations | |||
An inspection was conducted on both units to ensure that adequate | |||
protective' measures have been taken by the licensee to assure that | |||
safety-related process, instrument, and sampling lines will not freeze | |||
during cold weather. | |||
'The freeze protection systems at STP have not yet been turned dver from | |||
construction to HL&P for operational control. This is expected to occur | |||
in January 1988. The system is currently under the control of startup | |||
engineering. | |||
The NRC inspector met with the cognizant startup engineer and the future | |||
HL&P plant engineer. Existing records of system status were found to be | |||
thorough and complete. | |||
Verification was made that licensee inspections are being conducted oa | |||
systems susceptible to freezing-to ensure the presence of heat tracing and | |||
space heaters, insulation is in place where required, proper thermostat | |||
settings are utilized, and the required circuits are energized. | |||
Field inspections were conducted in selected plant areas and no | |||
discrepancies were identified by the NRC which had not already been | |||
identified and tracked by startup engineering. Cold weather protective | |||
measures were verified to be reestablished af ter system maintenance. The | |||
NRC inspector was satisfied with the attention that the STP cold weather | |||
protection program has received and found no deficient conditions within | |||
the existing program. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
(: , | |||
Q .. | |||
. | |||
> -12- | |||
10. Chemical Detection System Inoperability (LER 87-22) | |||
During this inspection period, it was identified by the licensee that the | |||
~ | |||
Chemical Detection System toxic gas monitors were in the'"Not in the - | |||
Analyze Mode" while in Mode 4 of plant operations.. | |||
The STP TS, Section 3.3.3.7 requires a minimum of two chemical detection | |||
system channels for all modes of plant operation.. | |||
From December 4-6, 1987, while the plant was in Mode 4, both toxic gas | |||
monitors for the Control Room HVAC were found in the "Not in-Analyze Mode" | |||
condition. The toxic gas monitors had been in this condition for | |||
approximately 42 hours. .There were qualified technicians on shift taking | |||
data and reviewing sample = checks during this period. After identifying | |||
the problem, the licensee immediately.took corrective action by placing | |||
the toxic gas monitors in the "Analyze Mode " and then placing the Control | |||
Room HVAC.in recirculation as required by the TS. . Subsequently the toxic | |||
gas monitors nare functionally checked with satisfactory results and | |||
control room ventilation was returned to a normal status. | |||
The improper status of the toxic gas monitors and resulting inoperability | |||
of the Control Room HVAC system to automatically isolate the Control Room- | |||
in case of an accident is an apparent violation of NRC requirements. | |||
(498/8775-01) | |||
11. Safety Injection (SI) Pumps Recirculation Flow | |||
' | |||
During this inspection period, the licensee discovered that all six SI | |||
pumps recirculation flow measuring orifices were not the required size. | |||
The installed orifices were not compatible with the installed | |||
instrumentation. | |||
An improper condition was suspected during the preoperational test program | |||
due to the recorded pump recirculation flow data not being within expected | |||
val t.es. The indicated flow was higher than expected and a nonconformance | |||
report (NCR) was issued. This was dispositioned "acceptable as is" due to | |||
the fact-that the indicated recirculation flow values were conservative | |||
and the SI pumps delivered the required flow to the reactor coolant | |||
system (RCS) meeting their test acceptance criteria. The NCR disposition | |||
did not recognize that the wrong size orifices could be the cause of the | |||
indicated high recirculation flow condition. | |||
The cause of the incorrect orifice / indicator combinations was due to | |||
Westinghouse design errors on the "Shop Order 325" forms. The system | |||
construction was in accordance with the above documents. | |||
The licensee took corrective action as follows: | |||
. New orifices of the correct size were installed. | |||
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Nsw reference val'ue measurements were.obtained on all-six'SI' pump | |||
' | |||
.- - | |||
miniflow.' recirculation lines. | |||
- | |||
< . | |||
_ | |||
. The: low head SI _ pump minimum allowed recirculation flow is 186 GPM.- | |||
The post-corrective flows are: | |||
Pump A - 190 GPM | |||
Pump B - 185 GPM | |||
Pump C - 184 GPM | |||
~ | |||
. The high head SI pump minimum, allowed recirculation flow is 100 GPM. | |||
The post-corrective flows are: | |||
Pump A - 100 GPM | |||
Pump B - 101 GPM | |||
Pump C - 92 GPM , | |||
Two low head pumps .and one high head pump are below the allowed minimum | |||
flow value. Westinghouse, the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor, , | |||
has accepted this data as satisfactory for operation at this time but not | |||
permanently acceptable for long term operation. | |||
HL&P pla'nt engineering has recommended that the SI pump (s) recirculation | |||
line pressure breakdown orifices be replaced with larger elements to | |||
increase flow for long tenn acceptability. | |||
Additional corrective action taken by the licensee included inspecting | |||
other orifice / flow indicator combinations in the plant which could be | |||
affected by similar errors of Westinghouse on design documents. | |||
One additional problem was found during this inspection in which the | |||
orific2 and indicator were not matt.hed properly by the Westinghouse design | |||
document. This orifice is located in the refueling water purification , | |||
' | |||
pump discharge (a nonsafety system). The orifice will be changed and | |||
retesting performed. This error was not discovered during the | |||
preoperational test program. | |||
The cause for the errors on the Westinghouse design installation documents , | |||
(Shop Order 325 Forms) is considered an unresolved item (498/8775-05). | |||
Assurance that these flow indication discrepancies do not exist in other ; | |||
areas of the plant is considered an open item (498/8775-06), | |||
i | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
12. Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program | |||
Preoperational testing is continuing on plant support systems. The | |||
resident inspectors have allocated some time to monitoring prerequisite , | |||
testing. The conduct of testing was satisfactory. | |||
. . .- . . | |||
. . - . - | |||
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Startup engineering is making preparations for primary and secondary | |||
hydrostatic testing. Also, preparations are being made for initial SOG | |||
engine runs. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
13. Incore Thimble Tube Inspections | |||
Due to the recent thimble tube leakage problems on the European | |||
Westinghouse (14 foot core) reactors, the licensee has performed a | |||
baseline eddy current inspection of all incore thimble tubes. The | |||
inspection results were satisfactory and a report has been sent to NRR for | |||
review. Two low pressure seals were observed to be leakint and were | |||
replaced. One high pressure' seal was leaking due to galling of the | |||
seating surface at the reducer and was repaired. For detailed information | |||
see NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-498;499/87-74. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
14. Unit 1 Significant Events | |||
The following events resulted in licensee notifications to the NRC during | |||
this inspection period. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed these events | |||
and initial corrective actions to determine if any immediate safety | |||
concern was apparent. | |||
a. High head SI and low head SI recirculation line flow elements and | |||
indicators were not compatible. Indicated flows were not accurate. | |||
. Discovered December 15, 1987 (No LER) | |||
. Reported to NRC December 15, 1987 | |||
. LER Number - Not Reportable | |||
See Section 11 for additional information, | |||
b. Toxic gas monitors discovered "Not in Analyze Mode" | |||
. Discovered December 6, 1987 | |||
. Reported to NRC December 6, 1987 | |||
. LER No. - 87-022 | |||
See Section 10 for additional information. | |||
c. Key was found out of keyway on two motor operated valves; M0V CC542 | |||
and MOV CC297. | |||
. Discovered on October 10, 1987 | |||
. Reported to NRC December 8, 1987 | |||
. LER No. - 87-023 | |||
. _ _ __ _ . | |||
. _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - - - | |||
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' | |||
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2 | |||
: | |||
. . | |||
c | |||
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. | |||
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lLicenseeinvestigationrevealedthatthekeyswerethewrongsize.- | |||
~All potentially affected M0V's have been checked for this condition. | |||
The' resident inspectors monitored the 11censee's~ actions and consider | |||
them acceptable.. | |||
d. . Actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) during trouble shooting | |||
of ESF sequencer. | |||
. Occurred on November 30, 1987- | |||
. Reported to NRC December 1, 1987- | |||
. LER No. - 87-021 | |||
During trouble shooting of the ESF sequencer,.an unanticipated bus | |||
strip and "B" ESF SD6. start upon being deenergized was experienced. | |||
The sequencer was reenergized to release the bus strip. Upon | |||
repowering, it correctly started a loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) | |||
sequence, | |||
e. Inadvertent actuation of control room / auxiliary building ventilation | |||
by personnel pressing the wrong flow button on the Rii-23A_ module | |||
during surveillance testing. | |||
. Occurred on December 8, 1987 | |||
. Reported to NRC December 8, 1987 | |||
. LER No. - 87-024 | |||
This is another example of toxic gas monitor problems which are of | |||
concern to the resident inspectors. An apparent violation due to | |||
toxic gas monitors not being in the "Analyze Mode" when required is | |||
discussed in Section 10. | |||
f. "A" Train LOOP instantaneous undervoltage caused an "A" ESF bus | |||
strip, "A" ESF SDG start, and sequencing "A" ESF component loads onto | |||
the "A" 50G. | |||
. Occurred on December 9, 1987 | |||
Reported to HRC December 9, 1987 | |||
. LER Nc. - 87-025 | |||
This occurrence was due to personnel error during surveillance | |||
testing. The licensees actions are considered acceptable to resolve | |||
this occurrence, | |||
g. Failure to meet the required testing for "undervoltage condition | |||
coincident with a SI signal." | |||
. Discovered December 12, 1987 | |||
. Reported to NRC December 12, 1987 | |||
. LER No. - 87-026 | |||
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See Unresolved Item 498/8775-02 in' paragraph 5 for- additional | |||
informationi. | |||
h .- Surveillance-procedure-for Class 1E batteries contained incorrect | |||
-amperage values. | |||
. Discovered' December _30, 1987 | |||
. Reported to NRC December 30,1987 | |||
. LER'No. - 87-027~ | |||
. | |||
See Section 8 for. additional information. | |||
These events may be addressed in more detail in the future as the required < | |||
corrective action is. completed by the licensee. | |||
No deviations were identified. An apparent violation involving LER 87-022 | |||
is' identified in Section 10. | |||
15. Status of Incomplete Preoperational Tests (Unit 1) ! | |||
' | |||
The following Unit 1 preoperational tests have not been completed due to~ | |||
being restrained by plant mode-conditions: , | |||
. 1-HB-P-01 99% | |||
. 1-PS-P-01 99% | |||
. 1-RC-P-06 99% | |||
. 1-RC-P-07 99% | |||
. 1-RC-P-08 99% | |||
I | |||
. 1-RC-P-11 98% , | |||
. 1-SP-P-03 95% | |||
16. Status Auxiliary Feedwater System Failures (Unit 1) " | |||
. | |||
' | |||
During the November 1987 inspection period, there were several failures in | |||
the auxiliary feedwater (AF) system resulting in the licensee declaring | |||
the system inoperable. } | |||
" | |||
The failures were attributed to water hammer events which resulted in | |||
significant vibration and failures of AF piping and pipe supports. A. i | |||
detailed description of the failures and subsequent licensee actions is , | |||
contained in NRC IR 50-498;499/87-71, i | |||
During this inspection period (December 1987), the licensee's trouble | |||
' | |||
' | |||
shooting and test program was successful in duplicating the vibration | |||
event which caused the failures. | |||
. | |||
_. _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ ____ ____________-___ - _ - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ .. _ _ | |||
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17 | |||
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. | |||
The testing effort established that the vibration occurred only when the | |||
Train A and D flow control valves (FCV) were in a highly throttled, | |||
_ near-seat position.s The internal geometry of the FCVs created pressure | |||
pulsations at a 24 HZ frequency that matched'one of the hydraulic | |||
resonance frequencies of the piping system. This resonance provided the | |||
cyclic driving force which caused the AF system failures. , | |||
HL&P engineering submitted a detailed. report to NRR and Region IV | |||
inspectors. The report was complete and; demonstrates a professional, | |||
successful effort on the part of the licensee to resolve the AF system | |||
failures. . | |||
~ | |||
In their effort to establish' root cause for the failures, the licensee | |||
examined previous system testing during preoperational testing, performed- | |||
extensive testing to duplicate the damage causing event, obtained data | |||
from other utilities, analyzed potential causes of hydraulic transient | |||
events; e.g.,-fast valve operation, entrainment of noncondensable gases, | |||
pump instabilities, check valve closure, and other potential contributing ? | |||
possibilities. | |||
" | |||
Testing further revealed that no water hammer or initial "kick" was | |||
required to trigger the event. It was initially thought that system cross t | |||
connect header valve operation could be a contributor to the failures | |||
since water hammer had been experienced during valve operation. | |||
The pressure pulsations caused by the FCVs being in a highly throttled | |||
position were observed to dissipate when the valves were opened to deliver | |||
approximately 50 GPM or more flow. The following system modifications , | |||
' | |||
have been or will be made to the AF system to ensure future system | |||
operability. | |||
. Five additional high point vents were added to the system to provide | |||
additional air removal capability. , | |||
. Nine double valve connections had rejectable indications from | |||
nondestructive examination (NDE). These connections were repaired by i | |||
replacing the schedule 80 piping with schedule 160 material and | |||
deleting the second valve. | |||
. | |||
New cross-connect valve actuators will be installed on the Train A, | |||
B, and C valves. The actuators contain a higher spring force for | |||
' | |||
' | |||
' | |||
closing and will provide a greater margin from the 24 HZ system | |||
hydraulic natural frequency. , | |||
, | |||
. The Train D cross-connect valve exhibited a fast stroke time in the | |||
open direction. The valve actuator will be fitted with a needle | |||
valve in the air supply line to allow increasing the stroke time. | |||
. Additional pipe supports were added to the system mainly in the area | |||
of the cross-connect valves and FCVs. | |||
, | |||
a | |||
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. | |||
. | |||
. The FCVs have been fitted with travel stops to limit their closure to | |||
a highly-throttled position. This was accomplished by use of a close | |||
limit switch backed up by a mecnanical stop. | |||
The licensee's efforts have been closely monitored by the resident | |||
inspectors and were observed to be professional and thorough. .This | |||
monitoring will be continued throughout the completion of repairs and | |||
performance of proof testing in Modes 4 and 3 of plant operations. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
17. Site Tours | |||
During this inspection period, the NP.C inspectors continued to conduct | |||
tours of all plant areas of both units. Observations have been discussed | |||
with licensee management. Those observations requiring licensee attention | |||
were resolved in a responsive and timely manner. | |||
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of security department operations | |||
during this inspection period. Activities observed were the conduct of | |||
operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS), Secondary Alarm | |||
Station (SAS), and the badge issue area. The above activities witnessed | |||
by the NRC inspectors were in compliance with licensee procedures and were | |||
performed in a professional manner. | |||
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of the Health Physics (HP) | |||
department activities during the inspection period. The NRC inspectors | |||
witnessed the use of HP equipment by HP technicians as well as plant | |||
workers, use of radiation work permits (RWPs), and general conduct of | |||
shift HP activities. The HP activities appear to be acceptable and in | |||
compliance with licensee procedures. | |||
Plant maintenance activities were witnessed by the NRC inspectors during | |||
the repair process of the various plant system failures during the | |||
inspection period. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
18. Exit Interview | |||
The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in | |||
paragraph 1) on January 6,1988, and summarized the scope and findings of | |||
the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee | |||
management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss | |||
identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of | |||
the information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this | |||
inspection. | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 05:10, 8 August 2022
ML20147C768 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | South Texas ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/22/1988 |
From: | Bess J, Bundy H, Carpenter D, Constable G, Haag R, Hildebrand E, Murphy M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20147C748 | List: |
References | |
TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-3.D.1.1, TASK-TM 50-498-87-75, 50-499-87-75, GL-83-28, IEC-80-09, IEC-80-9, NUDOCS 8803030152 | |
Download: ML20147C768 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1987075
Text
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APPENDIX B
,
U.S.' NUCLEAR; REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
~
NRC' Inspection: Report: = 50-498/87-75 Operating License: 'NPF-71
' 50-499/87-75 . Construction Permit (CP): CPPR-129
Dockets: 50-498 CP Expiration Date:
~
December 1989 '
50-499
Licensee: Houston Lighting &-Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001-
Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
'
Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas
. Inspection Conducted: Decembr141,1987
Inspectors: v w -
Date
- */N
jr'R. CarpenW Senior Resident Inspector
)roject Section D, Division of Reactor
Projeets
.
. E. Bess 7 Resident Inspector, Project
Y1
Dite '
'f2V
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
,
a y ,
'E P. fiildebYand, Resident Inspector, Project 06te /
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
M. ~ E. Murphy 7PlanF SysWms Section, Division
& z/W
Sate '
of Reactor Safety
,
e
1803030152 880223
.PDR
ADOCK 05000498
+0 DCD
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.R. Haag, Materid and. Quality Programs Date.-
Section,. Division of Reactor Safety.' >
l
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. fT B0ndy, Project Engineer, Project Date
'
.Section D, Division of Reactor Projects-
. ..
's
Other
Assisting. .
Personnel: J. P. Claus'ner, French Commissariar A L'Energie
Atomique, Institute De: Protection Et De Surete
Nucleaire
.
-
- =
. Approved: c
G. L."Constable, Chief, Project Section;D.
.
Date . '
k
-Division of. Reactor Projects'. , ,
,
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1
.__-_-___:_---_---------______-_-_.--_-______-__-__----__-.-_ _
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Inspection Summary
Inspection' Conducted December'l-31~, 1987'(Report 50-498/87-75;
' 50-499/87-75)
' Areas-Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection , including licensee action'on
previous inspection findings, licensee action on previously reported items,
slave relay surveillance- deficiency due' to personne11 error, THI and GL 83-28
.act ion item followup,' IE Circulars, Class 1E batteries inoperable, cold; weather-
preparations, chemical-detection system inoperability, safety injection. pumps
recirculation flow, Unit 2 preoperational test program,- incore thimble tube.-
inspections, Unit 1 significant events, status of incomplete preoperational
tests.(Unit 1)' status of auxiliary feedwater system failures (Unit 1), and
,
- siteLtours.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation (paragraph 10) and no
deviations' were identified.
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. DETAILS
- \
. . .
.....
. 1. ' Persons Contacted .
..
~
- J. E. Geiger, Genera 1LManager, Nuclear Assurance
- M. R. Wisenburg, Unit 1 Superintendent
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
- S.LM.' Dew, Operations Support' Manager.
- G.'L. Jarvela, Manager, NP00 Technical Support
- J. A.'Brady, Division Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- T. E. Underwood, Chemical Operations and Analysis Manager
- G; L. Parkey, Manager, Plant Engineering'
- H. A. McBurnett, Manager, Site Licensing
'*S. - M. ' Head, Supervisory Licensing Engineer
- P..L.: Walker, Staff Engineer
J. A. Constantin, Simulator Training Supervisor
In addition-.to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with
~
- various other licensee, architect engineer (AE),_ constructor, and
contractor personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on
January 6, 1988. _
,
2. Unresolved Items -
An unresolved item is a matter'about'wh'ich more information is' required to
ascertain whether it is an acceptable 1 item, a deviation, or'a violation.
Unresolved items are'identilied in paragraphs,5 and 11 of this report.
3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Violation 498/8739-02
This violation concerns'the failure to follow the procedures for
installing temporary modifications. The NRC inspector ~ reviewed the
response given by the licensee (Letter ST-HL-AE-2354), the Procedure
OPGP03-Z0-0003, "Temporary Modifications and Alterations" Revision 7,
effective September 12, 1987, and the records which indicate training in
temporary modifications has been conducted for responsible startup
personnel.
Corrective action and steps taken to prevent recurrence are considered
acceptable.
This violation is considered closed.
- .
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.
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(Closed) Deviation 498/8741-01; 499/8741-01
This deviation involved failure to treat' components.in certain systems as
quality related per STP Final Safety Analysis Report'(FSAR) requirements
-in the preventive maintenance (PM) program and maintenance work
request (MWR) program. The NRC inspector reviewed-records indicating that
PMs which might not have had'the proper quality control (QC) inspections,
have been reviewed and evaluated by the, licensee.- Out of 11 MWRs/PMs
which would have required QC inspection, no discrepancies were found in
the work packages. The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures OPGP03-AM-0002,
"PM Program," effective September 2, 1987, and OPGP03-AM-0003,'"MWR
Program," effective November 6, 1987, and they contained adequate.
clarifications for determining proper quality classifications. The NRC-
inspector also reviewed records for training conducted during the period
- of June 29 to July 24, 1987, which indicated training in determining ,
quality classifications had been conducted for key maintenance personnel.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8717-01
This item concerned the completion of emergency lighting installation and
testing as well as the development of procedures to periodically check the
operability of the lighting units. Tne installation and initial testing
of emergency lighting has been completed. The NRC inspector reviewed the
last preventive maintenance check procedure and completed data form ,
EM-1-LB-87013194 and found them acceptable.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8717-02
This item concerned the completion of installation of all fire barriers,
seals, wraps, detection devices, and fireproofing. The constructor has
turned over to the licensee all systems and items related to these areas.
The licensee's fire protection engineers have completed a review of all
documentation and have conducted a satisfactory walkdown of all items.
The NRC inspector completed a tour of selected plant areas that provided
an adequate campling of the items of concern. Discrepancies noted were
minor in nature and found to be already identified in the licensee's work
item tracking system.
This item is considered closed. ,
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-05
This item concerned smoke stratification effect on smoke detectors in
rooms with tall ceilings, large volumes, and low ventilation air flow
rates. The licensee responded to this concern in Letter ST-HL-AE-2053,
dated April 17, 1987. The response determined that these areas were not a
concern based on the location of combustible materials and detectors. The
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NRC inspector. toured each.of-the: rooms. identified' in <the above letter and
- agrees with the licensee's assessment based on' detector location and
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quantity of~ installed combustible material. -
'This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-06
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-This item concerned installed noncollapsible fire hoses which were not
Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed. In a' letter dated April 17, 1987,.
-the licensee committed to-hydrostatically test all.of these hoses, and to'
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replace them with UL listed hoses at--the first hose maintenance _'changeout.
The hydrostatic testing has been: satisfactorily completed. The NRC
inspector has reviewed the~ documentation-on,this. item and finds it
acceptable. -
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This item is considered closed. ,
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(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-07'
This item concerned the installation of portab'le fire extinguishers in the.
essential codling water intake structure in accordance with National Fire
. Protection Association (NFPA) Standard No. 10. The NRC inspector verified
that the fire extinguishers.were. permanently mounted in the intake
structure as required.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-08
This item concerned the development of procedures to maintain the
emergency communication systems. The NRC inspector reviewed Station
Procedures OPGP03-CN-001, "Radio Communication," Revision 0, dated
June 16, 1987; OPGP03-CN-0002, "Telephone Communications," Revision 0,
dated June 9, 1987; OPGP03-CN-0003, "Plant Public Address and Alarm
System," Revision 0, dated June 9, 1987; and OPGP3-CN-0006, "Communication
,
Systems Testing Program," Revision 0, dated April 24, 1987. These
procedures appear to satisfy the commitments.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8726-08 -
This open item concerns the classification of the Interim Storage
Facility (ISF) as a records storage facility per American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.2.9-1974. HL&P Technical Support conducted
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an evaluation of the ISF and questioned whether the ISF can be classified
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as a records storage facility. This uncertainty involves
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paragraphs 5.6.7, 5.6.8, and 5.6.9 of ANSI N45.2.9-1974 which addresses:
(a) use of halon as the suppression agent, (b) conduit penetrations, and
(c) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct penetrations.
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The' existing halon suppression system appears to provide "adequate. fire
protection" as required by ANSI N45.2.9-1974. The licensee verified that
conduit penetrations are properly sealed and.the. supply and return HVAC
ducts contain dampers which exceed the required fire rating. This.
verification also meets the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9-1974. The NRC
inspector has reviewed this evaluation and agrees with the conclusions
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reached by the licensee on these issues.
This item is considered closed.
4. Licensee Action on Previously-Reported Items
The NRC inspectors reviewed the following incident review committee (IRC)
reports and determined that the licensee has taken adequate action on the
subject items, except as noted.
(0 pen) IRC 400, Inadequate Cooling of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) High
Voltage Cubicle Panels
This item concerned inadequate cooling of the Unit 1 SDG high voltage
cubicle panels which was discovered when a high temperature alarm actuated
during a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> test run of SDG 13. It was reported to the NRC under
10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21. HL&P completed a design modification which
involved installing a second fan and removing drip shields over the vents
to provide additional cooling to the Unit 1 panels. Completion of a
second 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> test run for SDG 13 without experiencing abnormally high
panel temperatures verified the adequacy of this modification. The N9C
inspectors have reviewed both the field installations and the
documentation of this modification and consider it acceptable. This item
is considered closed for Unit 1. A similar modification is planned for
Unit 2 panels. This item will remain open for Unit 2 pending installation
of this modification.
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(Closed) IRC 399, Failure of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) Fuel l
Injector Nozzle
This item concerns a SDG fuel injector nozzle failure during a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />
SDG 13 endurance run. A previous failure had occurred on February 25,
1987, during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> preoperational test run of SDG 11. During an IRC
meeting on July 27, 1987, the licensee determined that this item was
reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).
Based on failure analysis results performed by Southwest Research
Institute and on site testing of all spray nozzle tips (169) there were 20
tips with internal cracks identified, all from the same manufacturers Lot
No. 001124. The licensee concluded that the most probable cause of
cracking appeared to be due to manufacturing deficiencies associated with ,
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this lot. All spray nozzle tips from Lot No. 001124 were considered to be
potentially susceptible to cracking and have been replaced.
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ThisitemaisoconcernsSDGfuellineleakswhichwerefoundduringa24
hour preoperational- test performed on SDG No.11. The root'cause has.been
identified as being improper machining _ of the fuel line ferrule nuts.
Corrective actions have been taken, fuel line repairs are complete and
have been satisfactorily tested.
The NRC inspectors have. observed portions ofithe field testing and
maintenance activities, and have reviewed the associated documentation.
The licensee's corrective actions appear to be acceptable.
This item is considered closed.
5. Slave Relay Surveillance Deficiency Due to Personnel Error (LER 87-019)
The NRC inspectcr reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER)87-019 which
identified imprope. slave relay testing deficiencies due to personnel
error. The licensee. also discovered that the required slave relay testing
for "degraded undervoltage coincident with safety injection" had not been
properly performed. The licensee has committed to review the criteria for
slave relay testing. This review will be addressed in a LER which the
licensee plans to submit to NRC. This item will remain an unresolved item
(498/8775-02) until the LEt has been issued and corrective action has been
implemented by the licensre and verified by the NRC inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Three Mile Island (THI) and Generic Letter Action Followup (GL) 83-28
/
(Closed) TMI Item I.G.1.3 and (0 pen) Open Item 498/8708-19, Training
Requirements During Low Power Testing
Open Item 498/8707-19 tracked completion of the training required by THI
Item I.G.1.3 in the STP FSAR, Appendix 7A. The licensee committed to
satisfying this requirement by training operators on Procedure
1 PEP 4-ZX-10, "Natural Circulation Verification," Revision 0, utilizing the
plant simulator. The NRC inspector examined training records verifying
that training on this procedure had been completed for appropriate
personnel at the simulator during the period of June 1 to July 3,1987.
However, it was established that this training did not involve
accomplishing and verifying natural circulation from the remote shutdown
panel. TMI Item I.G.1.3 is considered closed. Completion of appropriate
training on the remote shutdown panel will be tracked by Open
Item 498/8708-19 and must be completed prior to exceeding 50% of full
power.
(Closed) GL 83-28, Item 2.2 and (Closed) Open Item 498/8739-04, Equipment
Classifications and Vendor Interface
The open item tracked licensee response to questions contained in NRC
letter of May 4,1987, which related to the Nuclear Utility Task Action
Comittee/ Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (NUTAC/VETIP) as
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it is implemented at the STP Electric Generating Station and the quality
assurance controls over vendor supplied service on safety-related
equipment. The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's letter of January 5,
.1988 (ST-HL-AE-2470), which appeared to be responsive to the NRR
questions. Therefore, GL-83-28, Item 2.2 and Open I+,em 8739-04 are
considered closed. However, these closures do.not preclude further NRR
questions on these subjects.
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(Closed) TMI Item II.B.4 and (Closed) Open' Item 498/8723-09, Training for
Mitigating Core Damage
TMI Item II.B.4 was.open pending closure of Open Item 498/8723-09
regarding completion of training of health physics personnel on mitigation
of core damage. The NRC inspector reviewed records which indicate
appropriate personnel completed course RPT905, during the period of May 8
to August 4,1987, which covered the radiological aspects of a core damage
accident.
The TMI item and associated open item are considered closed.
(Closed) TMI Item III.D.1.1,/ rimary P Coolant Outside Containment
This item concerns the review of the TMI followup actions and the
implementation of a program to reduce leakage from systems outside
containment, that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during
a serious transient or tecident, to as-low-as practical levels as required
by NUREG-0737.
To comply with this requirement, the licensee has established a program
covering the systems (or portions) outside containment defined in FSAR
Appendix 7A (7A.III.D.1.2, Amendment 53) and Technical Specification
(TS) 6 i.3a.
This program is described in the contaminated system leakage test program
Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0028, Revision 0, effective date October 24, 1986.
The inspector reviewed this program and the procedures for Contaminated
System Leakage Test as follows:
, 1 PSP 11-SI-0018, "Safety Injection System Train IC," Revision 0
.
1 PSP 11-CM-0005, "Containment Monitoring System," Revision 0
.
IPSP11-AP-0005, "Post Accident Sampling System," Revision 0
.
1 PSP 11-CS-0008, "Containment Spray System Train IC," Revision 0
The NRC inspector considers these documents acceptable. However, the
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) NUREG-0737, Supplement 2 (13.5.2.6,
Item III.D.I.1) recomends that the applicant should also apply the
leakage reduction program to the Chemical Volume and Control System
(CVCS). STP TS, Section 6.8.3a requires the CVCS to be included in the
program for systems to be tested.
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The.NRC inspector discussed the above subject with licensee's
representatives who stated that the CVCS was excluded because it is part
of the inservice leakage test
of. Mechanical Engineers (ASME) program
. Section in accordance
XI. This position waswith American
stated by Society
the licensee in the Letter ST-HL-AE-2001 on May 1, 1987. The NRC
inspector observed that the licensee scheduled some tests on the CVCS
prior to initial criticality.
Although the TS, Section 6.8.3a requires the licensec to include the CVCS
in their program, NUREG-0737 allows delaying compliance until receipt of a
full power license. Inclusion of the CVCS in the leak reduction program
and review by the NRC prior to issuance of the full power license will be
an open item (498/8775-03).
7. IE Circulars (IEC)
(Closed) IEC 80-09, Internal Plant Comunications
This IEC had been closed with the exception of followup on training for
plant personnel. The NRC inspector has reviewed plant procedures
OPGP03-CN-001, "Radio Comunications," Revision 0, dated June 6,1987;
OPGP03-CN-0002, "Telephone Communications," Revision 0, dated June 9,
1987; OPGP03-CN-0003, "Plant Public Address and Alarm System," Revision 0,
dated June 9, 1987; and OPGP3-CN-0006, "Communication Systems Testing
Program," Revision 0, dated April 24, 1987; and the revised General
Employee Training I plan to ensure incorporation of the IEC concerns.
They have been addressed in an acceptable manner.
This IEC is considered closed.
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8. Class 1E Batteries Inoperable LER 87-27
During this inspection period, the licensee declared all four trains of
Unit 1 Class 1E 125 volt batteries inoperable because previous
surveillance testing per Station Procedure 1 PSP 06-DJ-0004 had Leen
performed using incorrect amperage values for the 120 minute discharge
service test.
The plant was subsequently placed in a Mode 5 (depressurized) status to
satisfy the TS 3.8.2.2 Action Statement requirements. ;
The cause of the inadequate testing appears to be due to an anomaly which
exists in the numbering system used to identify the four trains.
Specifically, Channels I, II, III, and IV are identified as Trains A, D,
B, and C, respectively (a nonlogical letter sequence). Also contributing
to the potential for error is the fact that Channels I, II, III, and IV
have plant equipment designation numbers of 3E231EBT045A, 3E231EBT0458,
3E231EBT045C, and 3E231EBT045D, respectively (a logical letter sequence).
The amperage values for the 120 minute discharge service test were
provided by Bechtel Engineering Calculation EC-5008, Revision 5. The
amperage values were incorrectly. entered into the surveillance test
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procedure for 'oattery Trains B, C, and D. This _ error caused these battery
trains to be tested using incorrect values. The new amperage values of
Revision 7 of calculation EC-5008 had not been entered into the
surveillance test in a- timely manner (approximately six months). The
licensee has completed retesting of all four Class IE battery trains using
the correct amperage values provided by Revision 7 of calculation EC-5008.
All four battery trains are now considered operable by the licensee.
The licensee's long term corrective action to prevent recurrence is
unclear at this time. It should include, as a minimum, steps to ensure
that revised calculations are correctly entered into the appropriate
procedure immediately upon approval and the anomaly which exists in
the identification of the battery trains is corrected. The
corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be tracked as open item
(498/8775-04).
No violations are deviations were identified.
9. Cold Weather Preparations
An inspection was conducted on both units to ensure that adequate
protective' measures have been taken by the licensee to assure that
safety-related process, instrument, and sampling lines will not freeze
during cold weather.
'The freeze protection systems at STP have not yet been turned dver from
construction to HL&P for operational control. This is expected to occur
in January 1988. The system is currently under the control of startup
engineering.
The NRC inspector met with the cognizant startup engineer and the future
HL&P plant engineer. Existing records of system status were found to be
thorough and complete.
Verification was made that licensee inspections are being conducted oa
systems susceptible to freezing-to ensure the presence of heat tracing and
space heaters, insulation is in place where required, proper thermostat
settings are utilized, and the required circuits are energized.
Field inspections were conducted in selected plant areas and no
discrepancies were identified by the NRC which had not already been
identified and tracked by startup engineering. Cold weather protective
measures were verified to be reestablished af ter system maintenance. The
NRC inspector was satisfied with the attention that the STP cold weather
protection program has received and found no deficient conditions within
the existing program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. Chemical Detection System Inoperability (LER 87-22)
During this inspection period, it was identified by the licensee that the
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Chemical Detection System toxic gas monitors were in the'"Not in the -
Analyze Mode" while in Mode 4 of plant operations..
The STP TS, Section 3.3.3.7 requires a minimum of two chemical detection
system channels for all modes of plant operation..
From December 4-6, 1987, while the plant was in Mode 4, both toxic gas
monitors for the Control Room HVAC were found in the "Not in-Analyze Mode"
condition. The toxic gas monitors had been in this condition for
approximately 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />. .There were qualified technicians on shift taking
data and reviewing sample = checks during this period. After identifying
the problem, the licensee immediately.took corrective action by placing
the toxic gas monitors in the "Analyze Mode " and then placing the Control
Room HVAC.in recirculation as required by the TS. . Subsequently the toxic
gas monitors nare functionally checked with satisfactory results and
control room ventilation was returned to a normal status.
The improper status of the toxic gas monitors and resulting inoperability
of the Control Room HVAC system to automatically isolate the Control Room-
in case of an accident is an apparent violation of NRC requirements.
(498/8775-01)
11. Safety Injection (SI) Pumps Recirculation Flow
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During this inspection period, the licensee discovered that all six SI
pumps recirculation flow measuring orifices were not the required size.
The installed orifices were not compatible with the installed
instrumentation.
An improper condition was suspected during the preoperational test program
due to the recorded pump recirculation flow data not being within expected
val t.es. The indicated flow was higher than expected and a nonconformance
report (NCR) was issued. This was dispositioned "acceptable as is" due to
the fact-that the indicated recirculation flow values were conservative
and the SI pumps delivered the required flow to the reactor coolant
system (RCS) meeting their test acceptance criteria. The NCR disposition
did not recognize that the wrong size orifices could be the cause of the
indicated high recirculation flow condition.
The cause of the incorrect orifice / indicator combinations was due to
Westinghouse design errors on the "Shop Order 325" forms. The system
construction was in accordance with the above documents.
The licensee took corrective action as follows:
. New orifices of the correct size were installed.
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Nsw reference val'ue measurements were.obtained on all-six'SI' pump
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. The: low head SI _ pump minimum allowed recirculation flow is 186 GPM.-
The post-corrective flows are:
Pump A - 190 GPM
Pump B - 185 GPM
Pump C - 184 GPM
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. The high head SI pump minimum, allowed recirculation flow is 100 GPM.
The post-corrective flows are:
Pump A - 100 GPM
Pump B - 101 GPM
Pump C - 92 GPM ,
Two low head pumps .and one high head pump are below the allowed minimum
flow value. Westinghouse, the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor, ,
has accepted this data as satisfactory for operation at this time but not
permanently acceptable for long term operation.
HL&P pla'nt engineering has recommended that the SI pump (s) recirculation
line pressure breakdown orifices be replaced with larger elements to
increase flow for long tenn acceptability.
Additional corrective action taken by the licensee included inspecting
other orifice / flow indicator combinations in the plant which could be
affected by similar errors of Westinghouse on design documents.
One additional problem was found during this inspection in which the
orific2 and indicator were not matt.hed properly by the Westinghouse design
document. This orifice is located in the refueling water purification ,
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pump discharge (a nonsafety system). The orifice will be changed and
retesting performed. This error was not discovered during the
preoperational test program.
The cause for the errors on the Westinghouse design installation documents ,
(Shop Order 325 Forms) is considered an unresolved item (498/8775-05).
Assurance that these flow indication discrepancies do not exist in other ;
areas of the plant is considered an open item (498/8775-06),
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No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program
Preoperational testing is continuing on plant support systems. The
resident inspectors have allocated some time to monitoring prerequisite ,
testing. The conduct of testing was satisfactory.
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Startup engineering is making preparations for primary and secondary
hydrostatic testing. Also, preparations are being made for initial SOG
engine runs.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Incore Thimble Tube Inspections
Due to the recent thimble tube leakage problems on the European
Westinghouse (14 foot core) reactors, the licensee has performed a
baseline eddy current inspection of all incore thimble tubes. The
inspection results were satisfactory and a report has been sent to NRR for
review. Two low pressure seals were observed to be leakint and were
replaced. One high pressure' seal was leaking due to galling of the
seating surface at the reducer and was repaired. For detailed information
see NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-498;499/87-74.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Unit 1 Significant Events
The following events resulted in licensee notifications to the NRC during
this inspection period. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed these events
and initial corrective actions to determine if any immediate safety
concern was apparent.
a. High head SI and low head SI recirculation line flow elements and
indicators were not compatible. Indicated flows were not accurate.
. Discovered December 15, 1987 (No LER)
. Reported to NRC December 15, 1987
. LER Number - Not Reportable
See Section 11 for additional information,
b. Toxic gas monitors discovered "Not in Analyze Mode"
. Discovered December 6, 1987
. Reported to NRC December 6, 1987
. LER No.- 87-022
See Section 10 for additional information.
c. Key was found out of keyway on two motor operated valves; M0V CC542
and MOV CC297.
. Discovered on October 10, 1987
. Reported to NRC December 8, 1987
. LER No.- 87-023
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lLicenseeinvestigationrevealedthatthekeyswerethewrongsize.-
~All potentially affected M0V's have been checked for this condition.
The' resident inspectors monitored the 11censee's~ actions and consider
them acceptable..
d. . Actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) during trouble shooting
of ESF sequencer.
. Occurred on November 30, 1987-
. Reported to NRC December 1, 1987-
. LER No.- 87-021
During trouble shooting of the ESF sequencer,.an unanticipated bus
strip and "B" ESF SD6. start upon being deenergized was experienced.
The sequencer was reenergized to release the bus strip. Upon
repowering, it correctly started a loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
sequence,
e. Inadvertent actuation of control room / auxiliary building ventilation
by personnel pressing the wrong flow button on the Rii-23A_ module
during surveillance testing.
. Occurred on December 8, 1987
. Reported to NRC December 8, 1987
. LER No.- 87-024
This is another example of toxic gas monitor problems which are of
concern to the resident inspectors. An apparent violation due to
toxic gas monitors not being in the "Analyze Mode" when required is
discussed in Section 10.
f. "A" Train LOOP instantaneous undervoltage caused an "A" ESF bus
strip, "A" ESF SDG start, and sequencing "A" ESF component loads onto
the "A" 50G.
. Occurred on December 9, 1987
Reported to HRC December 9, 1987
. LER Nc.- 87-025
This occurrence was due to personnel error during surveillance
testing. The licensees actions are considered acceptable to resolve
this occurrence,
g. Failure to meet the required testing for "undervoltage condition
coincident with a SI signal."
. Discovered December 12, 1987
. Reported to NRC December 12, 1987
. LER No.- 87-026
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See Unresolved Item 498/8775-02 in' paragraph 5 for- additional
informationi.
h .- Surveillance-procedure-for Class 1E batteries contained incorrect
-amperage values.
. Discovered' December _30, 1987
. Reported to NRC December 30,1987
. LER'No. - 87-027~
.
See Section 8 for. additional information.
These events may be addressed in more detail in the future as the required <
corrective action is. completed by the licensee.
No deviations were identified. An apparent violation involving LER 87-022
is' identified in Section 10.
15. Status of Incomplete Preoperational Tests (Unit 1) !
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The following Unit 1 preoperational tests have not been completed due to~
being restrained by plant mode-conditions: ,
. 1-HB-P-01 99%
. 1-PS-P-01 99%
. 1-RC-P-06 99%
. 1-RC-P-07 99%
. 1-RC-P-08 99%
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. 1-RC-P-11 98% ,
. 1-SP-P-03 95%
16. Status Auxiliary Feedwater System Failures (Unit 1) "
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During the November 1987 inspection period, there were several failures in
the auxiliary feedwater (AF) system resulting in the licensee declaring
the system inoperable. }
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The failures were attributed to water hammer events which resulted in
significant vibration and failures of AF piping and pipe supports. A. i
detailed description of the failures and subsequent licensee actions is ,
contained in NRC IR 50-498;499/87-71, i
During this inspection period (December 1987), the licensee's trouble
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shooting and test program was successful in duplicating the vibration
event which caused the failures.
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The testing effort established that the vibration occurred only when the
Train A and D flow control valves (FCV) were in a highly throttled,
_ near-seat position.s The internal geometry of the FCVs created pressure
pulsations at a 24 HZ frequency that matched'one of the hydraulic
resonance frequencies of the piping system. This resonance provided the
cyclic driving force which caused the AF system failures. ,
HL&P engineering submitted a detailed. report to NRR and Region IV
inspectors. The report was complete and; demonstrates a professional,
successful effort on the part of the licensee to resolve the AF system
failures. .
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In their effort to establish' root cause for the failures, the licensee
examined previous system testing during preoperational testing, performed-
extensive testing to duplicate the damage causing event, obtained data
from other utilities, analyzed potential causes of hydraulic transient
events; e.g.,-fast valve operation, entrainment of noncondensable gases,
pump instabilities, check valve closure, and other potential contributing ?
possibilities.
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Testing further revealed that no water hammer or initial "kick" was
required to trigger the event. It was initially thought that system cross t
connect header valve operation could be a contributor to the failures
since water hammer had been experienced during valve operation.
The pressure pulsations caused by the FCVs being in a highly throttled
position were observed to dissipate when the valves were opened to deliver
approximately 50 GPM or more flow. The following system modifications ,
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have been or will be made to the AF system to ensure future system
operability.
. Five additional high point vents were added to the system to provide
additional air removal capability. ,
. Nine double valve connections had rejectable indications from
nondestructive examination (NDE). These connections were repaired by i
replacing the schedule 80 piping with schedule 160 material and
deleting the second valve.
.
New cross-connect valve actuators will be installed on the Train A,
B, and C valves. The actuators contain a higher spring force for
'
'
'
closing and will provide a greater margin from the 24 HZ system
hydraulic natural frequency. ,
,
. The Train D cross-connect valve exhibited a fast stroke time in the
open direction. The valve actuator will be fitted with a needle
valve in the air supply line to allow increasing the stroke time.
. Additional pipe supports were added to the system mainly in the area
of the cross-connect valves and FCVs.
,
a
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.
.
. The FCVs have been fitted with travel stops to limit their closure to
a highly-throttled position. This was accomplished by use of a close
limit switch backed up by a mecnanical stop.
The licensee's efforts have been closely monitored by the resident
inspectors and were observed to be professional and thorough. .This
monitoring will be continued throughout the completion of repairs and
performance of proof testing in Modes 4 and 3 of plant operations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17. Site Tours
During this inspection period, the NP.C inspectors continued to conduct
tours of all plant areas of both units. Observations have been discussed
with licensee management. Those observations requiring licensee attention
were resolved in a responsive and timely manner.
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of security department operations
during this inspection period. Activities observed were the conduct of
operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS), Secondary Alarm
Station (SAS), and the badge issue area. The above activities witnessed
by the NRC inspectors were in compliance with licensee procedures and were
performed in a professional manner.
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of the Health Physics (HP)
department activities during the inspection period. The NRC inspectors
witnessed the use of HP equipment by HP technicians as well as plant
workers, use of radiation work permits (RWPs), and general conduct of
shift HP activities. The HP activities appear to be acceptable and in
compliance with licensee procedures.
Plant maintenance activities were witnessed by the NRC inspectors during
the repair process of the various plant system failures during the
inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
18. Exit Interview
The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on January 6,1988, and summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee
management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss
identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
the information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.