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Latest revision as of 11:05, 18 January 2022
ML21340A138 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Fermi ![]() |
Issue date: | 12/07/2021 |
From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
References | |
IR 2021012 | |
Download: ML21340A138 (19) | |
Text
December 7, 2021
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021012
Dear Mr. Dietrich:
On November 5, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment.
Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Signed by Feliz-Adorno, Nestor on 12/07/21 Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000341 License Number: NPF-43 Report Number: 05000341/2021012 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-012-0009 Licensee: DTE Electric Company Facility: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 Location: Newport, MI Inspection Dates: October 18, 2021 to November 05, 2021 Inspectors: M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Harvey, Project Manager K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Operations Engineer R. Ng, Project Engineer C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees Corrective Action Program, use of operating experience, self-assessments, and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the Corrective Action Programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the residual heat removal service water and mechanical draft cooling tower systems.
Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for use of operating experience, audits and self-assessments.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment of Corrective Action Program 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program was generally effective with opportunities for improvements and supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the Corrective Action Program. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the Corrective Action Program completely and accurately.
The team noted that the licensee utilized a number of Corrective Action Program support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit process and the Operating Experience Program. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, that had not been previously identified by licensee staff and were subsequently entered into the Corrective Action Program. For example, the licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits to identify issues in station processes. These identified deficiencies were entered into the Corrective Action Program for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both NRC and industry operating experience and entered them into the Corrective Action Program when they were applicable to the station.
The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the Corrective Action Program to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.
The team performed a 5-year review of the residual heat removal service water and mechanical draft cooling tower systems. Specifically, the team focused on corrosion and performance aspects of the systems. As part of this review, the team interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the plant health reports, and reviewed selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents. In addition, the team performed a partial system walkdown to assess the material condition of the system piping, selected components, and surrounding areas. The team concluded that piping degradation and performance concerns for the systems were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program at a low threshold and the corrective actions were adequate and timely commensurate with their safety significances. The team did identify a minor procedural violation related to the implementation of the compensatory action related to an operability evaluation. The details of the minor violation are described in the section below. For the areas walked down, the team did not identify any additional issues.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The Ownership Screening Committee and the Management Review Committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. The team observed a productive dialogue between the members of these committees and the members challenged each other when dispositioning issues. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming condition was identified, the Corrective Action Program directed that an equipment operability or functionality review be performed. As a result, the samples reviewed were evaluated in a timely manner.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in implementing corrective actions. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with Corrective Action Program requirements. The corrective actions assignments that were sampled by the team for selected NRC documented violations and for licensee event reports (LERs) were generally effective and timely.
Use of Operating Experience 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee's performance in the use of operating experience was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC operating experience information for applicability to the station. Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the Corrective Action Program to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented under the Corrective Action Program to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed the information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as Corrective Action Program issues reviews and investigations.
The team noticed that some of the operating experience processing steps were not formally incorporated into the licensee's operating experience procedures. For example, the licensee's operating experience coordinator has subscribed to a service that retrieves operating experiences from external sources, which was not described in the procedure.
While these actions were beneficial to the licensee, the lack of a formalized process could lead to missed operating experience response when unexpected turnover occurs. The licensee entered this issue into the Correction Action Program as CARD 21-29874 and is reviewing their internal process for potential process changes.
Self-Assessments and Audits 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the Corrective Action Program itself. Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) had identified deficiencies with the licensee's processes and those issues were addressed by the station through the Corrective Action Program.
Safety Conscious Work Environment 71152B During this inspection, the team assessed safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at Fermi. The team conducted individual interviews and facilitated supervisor and worker focus group meetings. The teams reviewed corrective action resolution documents (CARDS),
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel reports and the results of the June 2020 and January 2021 Nuclear Safety Culture Pulse Surveys. The team identified no SCWE issues.
An environment exists at Fermi where personnel are free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation.
During interviews and focus group meetings, employees described morale and trust concerns that may warrant plant management assessment and intervention. Morale concerns centered around workload and resources, issues brought on by work at home practices, and treatment of contract employees. Employees also described trust concerns between work groups.
Some described mistrust within work groups, due in part to the newness of supervisors brought in from outside the organization. The licensee is aware of these issues and is developing actions to address these concerns via CARD 21-29964.
Minor Violation 71152B Minor Violation: CARD 21-25216, "Oil Level "C" MDCT [mechanical draft cooling tower] Fan Gear Reducer is Low," documented the licensees discovery of a low oil level on the MDCT fan "C" gear reducer. This component is required to support operability of the Division 1 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The licensee determined the condition did not impact UHS operability and performed engineering functional analysis EFA-E11-21-005, revision 0, to further evaluate the system's ability to perform its safety function. This evaluation specified several compensatory actions to ensure operability. Compensatory Action 2 required, in part, to maintain the oil level at the high-level mark. Per the vendor of the gearbox, oil level indication would drop as oil is redistributed around the inside of gearbox during operation.
Therefore, it would be advantageous to maintain the oil level at the high mark with the fan in standby to account for this drop. However, the inspectors noted Compensatory Action 2 was not included in the Compensatory Monitoring List that the licensee used to implement compensatory actions. Instead, the Compensatory Monitoring List stated, in part, to check that the oil level is in band during standby and during operation only.
Step 3.4.4 of MQA11, "Corrective Action Program," Revision 49, requires that supervisors and managers ensure that immediate or compensatory corrective actions are taken for identified conditions. Thus, the inspectors determined that the failure to follow MQA-11 procedure was a performance deficiency and a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency was minor because the deficiency did not result in reasonable doubt about the equipments operability. The licensee had actions to monitor the oil leakage during standby and measure the oil level during operation ensuring adequate oil level when the fan is called upon to perform its safety functions.
Enforcement:
The licensee generated CARD 21-30007, "2021 NRC PI&R Inspection EFA Compensatory Measure Documents Don't Match," to restore compliance. This failure to comply with Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Work Control and Risk Management Concerns 71152B The team reviewed several CARDs from 2019, 2020 and 2021, documenting issues identified internally and externally related to the station's understanding of risk. For instance, CARD 19-29121, "Trend Identified with Operations Risk Management of Work Items," was generated on November 26, 2019, to capture several instances of work items authorized by Operations that resulted in an adverse impact to the plant. One example identified in this CARD was associated with the licensee's failure to consider mitigating factors defined in a fire protection engineering evaluation (FPEE) for a non-functional alternate diesel fire pump (ADFP). Specifically, the licensee performed work on the combustion turbine generators (CTGs) while the ADFP was non-functional. The CTGs were credited as a mitigating factor in that FPEE. This misunderstanding of risk to the station resulted in the licensee not being able to perform that mitigating action for the ADFP. Another example from this CARD was associated with the station's failure to recognize the risk and complexity associated with installing that ADFP as a temporary modification. The lack of understanding ultimately resulted in the temporary modification not meeting all necessary design requirements and a safety near miss when the ADFP recirculation line became dislodged during testing. NRC inspectors documented a Green finding with an associated violation related to this issue in Inspection Report 2019003 (ADAMS Accession Number ML19310E673). As a result, the licensee implemented actions to address the trend identified in CARD 19-29121. However, on November 12, 2020, CARD 20-32176, "Operations Performance Gap in Risk Management and Identification of Risk," was generated to document risk management problems in Operations. Two additional risk management related CARDs were created in 2021: CARD 21-21524, "NQA Audit 21-0100 Deficiency - Fermi has not Exhibited the Behaviors Necessary to Consistently Identify, Assess, Eliminate or Reduce, and Manage Risks Associated with Station Operations," and CARD 21-26403, "2021 WANO Peer Review
- AFI OF.2." The inspectors did not identify a violation or finding with the issues associated with these CARDs. However, the inspectors noted that this appeared to be a recurring observation and that a lack of understanding of risk identification and mitigation continued to be an apparent challenge for the station.
The inspectors also reviewed numerous CARDs over the last year related to work planning. For instance, CARD 21-29208, "23.307.16 Section 5.1 (EDG [emergency diesel generator] 13 Slow Start Surveillance) not Scheduled Prior to Critical Date," discussed the station's failure to schedule a Technical Specification required surveillance for the EDG 13 prior to the week the surveillance date went critical. The licensee identified this issue before the surveillance was past due and was able to rearrange the work week to perform the surveillance. The team noted that work management gaps can also lead to challenging the station's risk identification and mitigation as required work may not be incorporated into the overall risk profile for the work week.
The licensee generated CARD 21-29873, "2021 PIR - NRC Observation Risk Assessment,"
to capture the inspectors' observations.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On November 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to you and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71152B Corrective Action 09-27876 2009 Configuration Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) 10/08/2009
Documents Self-Assessment - Additional Unanalyzed HPCI/RCIC and
Room LOCA Heat Load
10-24554 HPCI and RCIC Gland Steam Leakage Higher than Expected 06/03/2010
10-30552 Generic Letter 2008-01 UT Examination: PM Event X058 11/12/2010
Detected Void in Div. 1 Core Spray
10-31129 UFSAR 6.2.1.6 Description of Mill Scale/Varnish Overstates 11/24/2010
Quantity and is Inconsistent with Design
11-29284 Legacy Circuit Design Associated with the RHR 4.16KV 10/12/2011
Load Shed Scheme
13-22655 UFSAR Section 15.6.4 Description of Main Steam Line Break 04/15/2013
Source Term Concentrations Appears to be Incorrect
13-28648 2013 NRC UHS Inspection: Potential Unanalyzed Condition 12/06/2013
Related to Limiting Post-Tornado Suppression Pool
Temperature
14-25130 P44F400A Div 1 EECW TCV AOV Abnormalities that were 06/20/2014
Identified During WO
14-25229 Design Discrepancy Related to Assumed High Energy Line 06/25/2014
Break Area for 15 Psig Heating Steam
14-25229 Design Discrepancy Related to Assumed HELB Break Area 06/25/2014
for 15 Psig Heating Steam
15-22830 Legacy Issues with Appendix R/Loop Drywell Temperature 04/20/2015
Response
15-23277 RHRSW Return from RHR HX High Temperature Alarm 05/07/2015
Setpoints Above Piping Design
16-23673 Independent RHRSW Inspection - Piping Calculation is 05/04/2016
Inconsistent with Drawing
17-20462 EDGSW Support Discrepancies 01/16/2017
17-21170 R1700S011A Inverter not Outputting as Expected 02/09/2017
17-28611 E1150F068B Packing Leak Root Cause Evaluation 05/23/2018
18-25183 Protected Area Camera CCTV 06 Loss of Video with 07/05/2018
Unknown Cause
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
18-25847 Div 2 MDCT Fan Brake Inverter Found with No Power 08/03/2018
18-26647 Valve External Has Corrosion 09/04/2018
18-26888 Localized Pit Discovered 09/13/2018
18-27268 Noted Flange Corrosion on Stage to Column Flange on 'B' 09/24/2018
18-27271 #13 EDGSW Pump Min Flow Line Approximately 3" Broke 09/24/2018
Off
18-27477 Indications on Removed Stem 09/28/2018
18-27533 Div 1 RHR Decant Pump Has Through Holes 09/29/2018
18-27571 OSC Cognitive Trend, RHRSW Corrosion 09/30/2018
18-27594 Observed Flange Corrosion on RHRSW A Pump Column 10/01/2018
18-27797 Request Work Orders for RHRSW Valves 10/04/2018
18-29220 Placing T4100D018, Control Room Humidifier in Service 11/26/2018
Caused Dripping Water in the Control Room and Computer
Room
18-29727 The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating 12/04/2018
No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off
18-30069 NRC Identified Potential Trend - Repetitive Failures of 12/13/2018
Important Equipment
18-30289 Damage to S. RHR HX RM Platform Beam B88 at Top of 12/20/2018
Steel (TOS) El. 613'-5"
19-20083 NQA Audit 18-0116 Deficiency - CDA Testing/Evaluations 01/03/2019
Not Completed
19-20762 RHRSW LIR - Recommendation 02/04/2019
19-20772 RHRSW LIR Deficiency - SW Pump Motor Corrosion 02/04/2019
19-21857 Site Excellence Plan Action Tracking 03/10/2019
19-22982 2019 Radiation Protection Excellence Plan 04/18/2019
19-24737 EDG 14 Surging in Idle During Surveillance Run 06/24/2019
19-25280 NRC Identified: Local Lake Level Indication Reads Higher 07/12/2021
than UFSAR Assumed Maximum Starting Level for Flood
19-25762 Lead Shielding in CFT Pump Room 08/02/2019
19-26201 Improper Configuration of Security Equipment - Microwave 08/16/2019
Zone 04 Receiver
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
19-26836 NRC Identified Reactor Feedwater System Bailey DCS 09/11/2019
Maintenance Incomplete Information
19-26837 NRC Identified: CTG Black Start Capability Removed when 09/11/2019
Relied Upon for FPEE-19-0003
19-27064 Review and Address CARD Quality Issued with CARD 20002 09/20/2019
19-27140 NRC Question to Determine if CTG 11.1 has the Correct 09/23/2019
19-27635 Adverse Trend for EQ Program PM Implementation 10/08/2019
19-27709 Reassess DCS S1401 CDA as Direct 10/09/2019
19-28279 NQA Audit 19-0110 Adverse Finding 10/30/2019
19-28748 NQA Audit 19-0111 Deficiency 11/14/2019
19-29121 Trend Identified with Operations Risk Management of Work 11/26/2019
Items
20-20091 Division 1 RHR Pump Room Dampers 01/06/2020
20-20456 Corrosion Identified on Roof Plug Anchor Above RHR 01/15/2020
Pump A
20-20580 CDAs Associated with CTG 11.1 Were Incorrectly Classified 01/17/2020
as Indirect
20-20727 Evaluation MWC10 and the WO Review/ALARA Planning 07/31/2020
Process
20-21776 Radworker Boundary Control Trend Identified 02/18/2020
20-21944 Trend of EDG Equipment Issues in 2019 02/21/2020
20-22759 Procedural CST Minimum Level Requirements Appear to be 03/13/2020
Non-Conservative Relative to Limits Established in
DC-5874 Vol I Rev A
20-23266 Corrosion of RHRSW Pipe at MDCT Penetration MK-151 03/26/2020
20-24300 LHRA Conditions Identified in the Torus Proper 04/11/2020
20-24960 NQA RF20 Adverse Trend in Identification and Control of 04/21/2020
20-25851 Unexpected DR Alarm During Scaffold Modification at 05/17/2020
MSIV D
20-26407 Notification of 10CFR Part 21 for Rosemont Model 1153, 06/01/2020
1154, and 3150 Series Transmitters Pressure Transmitters
20-26719 Stator Water Cooling Conductivity Meter Malfunction 06/09/2020
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
20-28926 Secondary Containment Isolation 08/03/2020
20-29403 Unable to Complete Work Order 53093540 (Trend Only) 08/19/2019
20-29842 NQA Audit 20-0108 Deficiency 09/01/2020
20-29870 RF20 Dose Overage 09/02/2020
20-30213 NQA Audit 20-0111 Deficiency - Outdated Revisions of 09/14/2020
Documents Identified at Emergency Response
Facility - Repeat Audit Issue
20-31803 Operations Missed Risk Assessment for CRD Suction from 10/30/2020
20-32176 Operations Performance Gap in Risk Management and 11/12/2020
Identification of Risk
20-32606 EDP 80072 MDCT Discrepancies Identified During 12/02/2020
Installation
20-32992 NRC IN 2007-12, Supplement 1: Pipe Wear Due to 12/16/2020
Interaction of Flow-Induced Vibrations and Reflective Metal
Insulation
20-33238 EDG 11 Crankcase Oil Exhibits Increased Fuel Oil in the 12/29/2020
Crankcase Oil
21-20377 RP Department Indicator for Level 2/3 PCEs Did Not Meet 01/13/2021
YE Goal
21-21536 CARD Quality Review Team Gap in Corrective Action 02/17/2021
Quality - Maintenance Electrical
21-21704 Apparent Cause Evaluation-Suction Hoses Installed Beyond 02/23/2021
Expected Depth
21-22253 CARD Quality Review Team: Gap in Countermeasure Action 03/11/2021
Quality-Training
21-22547 Apparent Cause Evaluation - Failure to Complete 03/22/2021
Compensatory Fire Watch Inspections - NRC Identified
21-22634 Trend in RP Technician Unplanned SRD Dose Rate Alarms 03/24/2021
21-22813 Torque Wrench with Fixed Contamination Possibly 03/29/2021
21-23492 Trend Noted on Roof Leaks 04/21/2021
21-23702 Watertight Penetration 04/27/2021
21-23855 Potential Unanalyzed Condition Following 05/03/2021
21-23904 Non-Conservative Assumption in MSLB/FWLB Design 05/04/2021
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Calculation
21-24537 #2 HPSV [High Pressure Stop Valve] Indicates Closed in the 05/23/2021
MCR [Main Control Room]
21-24629 Review NRC IN 2021-01 for Applicability to MOV Program 05/26/2021
21-25216 Oil Level "C" MDCT Fan Gear Reducer is Low 06/12/2021
21-25224 UNSAT Conditions on MDCT Gear Reducer Oil Level Do Not 06/13/2021
Show up RED on Operator Rounds
21-26030 Investigate Limit Switches on Remote Valves Causing MCRD 07/08/2021
21-27024 NRC Violation 2Q2021 - License Condition 2(C)(9), 08/21/2021
"Modifications for Fire Protection"
21-28309 NRFP Controller Not Indicating Properly 09/21/2021
21-28431 MDCT 'D' Spray Nozzle Inspection 09/23/2021
Corrective Action 1-29661 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified: CARD 18-25183 10/29/2021
Documents "Protected Area Camera CCTV 06 Loss of Video with
Resulting from Unknown Cause" Rescreened After Closure to Correct
Inspection Classification with No CARD Initiated to Document This
21-09785 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CA Closed to 11/03/2021
AIM
21-29217 Misalignment Between Hard Copy CARD Form and Web 10/18/2021
ARMs CARD Form
21-29296 Content of IWE Program in IWE Report 10/20/2021
21-29407 2021 PI&R - Evaluate the Process for Adding MCRD # to the 10/22/2021
WO in Maximo
21-29479 2021 NRC PI&R - Feedback from NRC on Investigation 10/25/2021
Details in eCARD for B/F CARDs
21-29589 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - Enhancement Action to Update 10/27/2021
Applicable Design Documentation Associated
to C11F412
21-29620 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Gap in CARD 10/28/2021
21-22878
21-29621 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified CARD Quality Issues for 10/28/2021
CARD 21-22535 (Evaluate OE 2021-0085 for
Potential Mitigating Actions)
21-29646 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified Delay in Initiation of CARD 10/29/2021
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
21-29628: NCAP Actions Closed Inappropriately
21-29673 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified: Potential CARD 10/29/2021
Re-Classification Miss for CARD 20-31731
21-29746 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Typo in 11/02/2021
CARD 13-28648
21-29785 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CA Closed to 11/03/2021
AIM
21-29812 2021 NRC PI&R (NRC Identified) - RP Org Effectiveness 11/05/2021
Review in CARD 20-29870 Found 3 Actions Incorrectly
Categorized as Corrective Actions
21-29819 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CARD Tag 11/04/2021
Hanging After CARD Closure
21-29821 2021 NRC PI&R CARD (NRC Identified) - DC-6004 VOL I 11/04/2021
Packing Friction Revision (Trend Only)
21-29831 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified: NCAP CARD 11/04/2021
Action Closure Inadequate
21-29850 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Question) - Survey the 11/04/2021
Industry on Tracking Methods for Comp Actions in CAP
CARDs
21-29851 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Enhancement 11/04/2021
Opportunity - Operator Rounds Validation
21-29855 2021 PI&R NRC Identified - Enhancement Action 11/04/2021
Categorized as a Corrective Action in CARD 20-26407
21-29869 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation 11/05/2021
21-29871 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to CRD System 11/05/2021
21-29872 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to the 11/05/2021
RP Program
21-29873 2021 PIR - NRC Observation Risk Assessment 11/05/2021
21-29874 2021 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to the OE 11/05/2021
Program
21-29881 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Gap from 11/05/2021
RFI-167
21-29903 QHSA - EFA Compensatory Measures Deficiency, 11/05/2021
MES27 5.2.3
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
21-29946 2021 NRC PIR Inspection - Potential Minor Violations 11/08/2021
21-29964 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection - Theme of Trust Noted in 11/08/2021
Interviews
21-30007 2021 NRC PI&R Inspection EFA Compensatory Measure 11/09/2021
Documents Don't Match
Engineering EQ1-EF2-063- Qualification Evaluation Report (QER) Revision 0 12/18/2019
Evaluations G01
Miscellaneous System Health Report for Residual Heat Removal 1Q2021
NQA-19-0110 Station Blackout and Maintenance Rule Programs 11/20/2019
NQA-19-0111 Corrective and Operation Experience Programs 12/20/2019
NQA-20-018 Radiation Protection, Radiological Effluent and Radioactive 10/16/2020
Material Transfer and Disposal Program
Procedures 23.412 Turbine Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 73
System
35.000242 Barrier Identification/Classification 60
MMR 03 Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Scoping 6
MMR 10 Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Monitoring 18
MMR-14 Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Structures 8
Monitoring
MMR03 Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual 6
MQA 11-100 Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing 4
Procedure - Operability Determination Process
MQA11-200 Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing Procedure 1B
MQA11-300 Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing 6
Procedure - Screening and Assignment
MQA11-400 Corrective Action Program - Condition Disposition 4
MQA11-500 Non-Corrective Action Program - Condition Disposition 5
ODE-6 Operator Challenges 20
Self-Assessments 2020 Fermi Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment 11/03/2020
20 FME Formal Self-Assessment 10/16/2020
Quick Hit Self-Assessment of Fluid Leak Management 10/09/2020
Program (MDI-59)
21 Latent Issue Review (LIR) for the IWE-Primary 02/26/2021
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Containment Inspection Program
19-0109 Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency Preparedness 09/17/2019
Program
19-0111 Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Corrective Action and 11/26/2019
Operating Experience Programs
21-0100 Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Operations, Fire 02/22/2021
Protection, and Emergency Operating Procedures Programs
21-0108 Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency 09/13/2021
Preparedness Program
NPRP-19-0087 QHSA: Radiation Protection Performance Improvement 10/16/2019
NPRP-20-0024 QHSA: 71124.01, Radiological Hazard Assessment and 03/09/2020
Exposure Controls, 71124.03, In-Plant Airborne Radiation
Control and Mitigation & 71124.04 Occupational Dose
Assessment
NPRP-21-0040 QHSA: Radiological Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment 06/08/2021
16