ML20010C697

Ro:On 810717,while Performing Maint on Reactor Water Cleanup Sys,Individual Received Excessive Radiation Exposure.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Disciplinary Action Taken

ML20010C697
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	08/11/1981
From:	Dietz C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
BSEP-81-1441, NUDOCS 8108200323
Download: ML20010C697 (5)

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' Carolina Power & Light Company [][ g . .

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

-P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC. 28461 August 11, 1981 g \$_d @/ /r o) p N ~ ~ 'O

-FILE: .B09-13516.2 _

SERIAL: BSEP/81-1441 --

li 1 9 1981 %

94 v.s. emus seca>rosi Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission

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D 4 W Region II, Suite 3100 101.Marietta-Street, N.W. h,bll -

I Atlanta, CA 30303 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 i LICENSE NO. DPR-62 DOCKdT NO. 50-324 REPORT OF RADIATION OVEREXPOSURE

Dear Mr. 7'Reilly:

On July 17,11981, an individual. received a radiation' exposure in. excess.of the limit prescribed in 10CFR20.101(b)(1) while performing maintenance on the Unit No. 2 Reactor Water Cleanup System. The total cxposure received by this individual for.the third quarter.of 1981 was 4.212 rem.

I. Event Description On July 17, 1981,- two CP&L mechanic crews were assigned to perform mainte-nance on the 33B valves in the Unit No. 2 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU).

System. The ' purpose of this job was to free the 33B butterfly valve which was stuck in the closed position. RWP (Radiation Work Permit) No.

717-12 was initiated to cover this job; work area dose rates were indi-cated to be approximately 300 mR/hr, and airline respirator use was dictated based on high cont' amination levels and previous experience with work in this area. After receiving the paper clearances, work was com-menced.at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> by two muchanics. The initial entry lested for 15 T minutes. A subsequent entry was made by'the same ncchanics at 1403 hours0.0162 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.338415e-4 months <br /> for a duration of 20 minutes. During these entries, the mechanics were successful in loosening the flange bolts and lurning the valve to the open position. Some water leakage was. observed while the flange bolts were being loosened. This leak subsided once the valve was placed in the open position. . Continuous Health Physics coverage was provided for each of these entries by two different HP technicians. Upon completion of the g3,~

seconu entry, the two mechanics exited the work area. At this time, the ~ ,

. work area was resurveyed by .the HP technician; it was found' that dose

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rates in the vicinity of the valve had increased to-30 R/hr. (This was -

apparently'due:to the movement of a depleted resin slurry that.had been-Q108200323'810911-m y W ***** M

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, Jame: P. O'Rnilly 2 Augu:t 11, 1981 trapped above the valve.) The HP technician then exited the area and reported these findings to the second HP technician who was assisting in the dress-out of the second mechanic crew prior to entering the RWCU room for completion cf the valve maintenance work. This HP technician had provided coverage during the initial RFCU entry the same morning. The second mechanic crew proceeded to the work area entrance with the second HP technicir.n some distance behind. Prior to entering, a discussio; was held among these three individuals regarding the high dose rates to oe encountered. The HP technician requested that the mechanics limit their stay time to two minutes. The mechanics complained that two minutes was insufficient time to complete the job. The HP technician then requested the workers to complete the work as quickly as possible and restated the fact that there was no time to loiter or even pick up a dropped bolt or tool. (This communication was done near the werk site and was encumbered by respirators.) Work was allowed to proceed with no further discussion about dose rate or work time limits. One mechanic went to the 33B valve and completed the tightening operation with the other mechanic acting in support from a distance of approximately two feet. The work was completed in approximately six minutes; one minute of that time was used in getting into position to gerform the work and in exiting Cie work area. Due to the high exposure indication on their pocket dosimetero, the mechanics were sent immediately to the plant dosimet:y office for TLD badge processing. Upon completion of the TLD reading, it was verified that one of the mechanics had received a qusrterly exposure in excess of 10CFR20.10!(b)(1) limits. Follow-up surveys in the RWCU area indicated dose rates around the 33B valve to 45 R/hr.

II. Cause Description

1. The sudden increase in general area radiation dose rates without adequte surveys and response by the assigned HF technician.

2. Following his assessment of the radiological work conditions and designation of allowable " stay time," the HP technician allowed his best judgement to be compromised in favor of "getting the job done."

3. A breakdown of communication between the mechenics anu HP technician (complica* ' by the use of air supplied respirators) which allowed the job to continue without additional peoplanning following the dose rate increase.

4. The failure of the mechanics _to adhere to the guidance provided by the HP technician as prescribed in plant training (the exercising of individual responsibility in maintaining one's personal radiation exposure).

III. Corrective Actions i

1. This event was reviewen in detail with all HP technicians. Zmphasis was placed on recognizing plant areas where rapid radiological changes are likely to occur and the need to quickly reassess the radiological protection requirements and notify RP supervision once these changes do occur. It was stressed that certain conditions may require the work to be halted while reassessment is being conducted.

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_ ;. [ ,JJames P.'O'Reilly s August 11,'1981 3: g-

.The HP technician authority to stop work fut reevaluatica was emphasized.

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2. summary A of the. incident'and corrective actions was presented at

. the July Monthly Employee Information Meeting for plant personnel.

3.. All' three personnel involved in the incid'ent have been counseled by their supervisors and disciplinary action has been taken. The, mechanics have been assigned to work in areas outside the radiation s control areas.- The HP technicicn was removed from field coverage.

until-retraining is accomplished and it is determined (through examination) that he is fully qualified to resume normal field duties.

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.4. In addition to the normal radiation measurement devices, alarming dosimeters will be employed in future maintenance work in RWCU where the possibility exists for significant radiation exposures and/or.

potentially rapid changes in. area dose rates.

5. ' Evaluations will be performed on the RWCU valving components anId system operation in an effort to improve operability and maintenance frequency. The objective is to minimize the amount of maintenance activities conducted in this' type environment.

Very truly yours, C 1.g C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant LFT/tt-Attachments cc: Mr. V. Stallo, Jr.

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Overexposure Incident:

Gene R. Martin Birthdate: April 3, 1936

• SS No. *87-36-0335 Third Quarter Whole Body Dose: 4212 mrem d

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