ML19350F157

Ro:On 810617,one Set of Lines Found Not Meeting Criteria of IEEE Std 279-1971,Paragraph 4.7.3 for Random Failures.Cause Not Stated.Procedures Will Be Written.Training Will Be Provided to All Operators for Closure of Any Valves

ML19350F157
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	06/19/1981
From:	Dietz C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
BSEP-81-1239, NUDOCS 8106240285
Download: ML19350F157 (2)

Text

l i

1

. .. Tciccopicd 6/19/81 1 C9&L  ;

i Carolina Power & Light Company 9 ,

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant F l P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 6 /(( D i

O g[

U/V June 19,1981 *'4

/g / A , . , .

FILE: B09-13516 'br M '

l SERIAL: BSEP/81-1239  !

)M j Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street N.V.

Atlanta, GA 30303 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 LICENSE NO. DPR-62  ;

DOCKET NO. 50-324 l CONFIR'!ATION FACSIMILE OF AN IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE EVENT (2-81-56) l

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This facs 411e confirms the conversation between Mr. C. R. Dietz and Mr. Caudie Julian or your office at 1540 on June 18, 1981, concerning an immediately reportable event. This event has discussed with ' fir. D. F. Johnson, Senior l Brunswick Resident, at 1215 on June 18, 1981 and he was present for the phone l call referenced above.

At approximately 1600 on June 17, 1981, Brunswick plant personnel were informed ,

by on-site UE&C personnel that a review of .ertain Reactor Instrument l l

Penetration (RIP) lines had concluded that one sin. of lines did not meet the l criteria of paragraph 4.7.3 of IEEE Standard 279-1971 for random failures.

l These lines carry the N017 reactor vessel icw level one switches and the N004 feedwater control level switches. The fai'.ure of a RIP isolation device on this line could lead to a requirement for protective action which is partially blocked by the same failure. The simultaneous failure of a second device, as required by IEEE 279-1971, could prevent the receipt of a scram signal at low level one as assumed by the transient analysis, although a separate low level two scram is available on MSIV closure.

l S O'l 1 l

Ib l 1

8106240)85 5'

,..s e Immediate compensatory actions undertaken; until appropriate permanent corrective actions can be taken are as follows

. 1. The specific RIT isolation valves which can lead to this problem have been identified (RIP valves X53C, X53F, X69C, X69D). The position of these valves are annunciated in-the Control Room and these specific valves ~will

- be visually cued for easy recognition'.

2. Procedures will be written and training provided to all operators for closure of any of these valves to trigger prompt verification of actual level by checking all availabic indications and taking . appropriate corrective action.

3. We have informed General Electric so that they may evaluate this issue for its generic implications.

4. A detailed assessment of all RIP configurations to detect further problems of this type'will be done. A, preliminary evaluation has foun't ro other problems.

5. We have requested'that GE' perform a bounding analysis of the transient which could occur due to this problem.

6. - Our procedures will call for preferential operation with feedwater level control B, which mindmizes the problem for the specific . Brunswick configuration.

These ccmpensatory actions are sufficient to prevent any significant risk to the public health and safety until a permanent resolution can be achieved.

This event is being reported under Technical Specific'ation 6.9.1.81 and is also applicable to Unit No. 1.

Very truly yours, c_D.y C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant CSB/gvc cc: Mr. R. A. ' Hartfield

• Mr. V. Stello, Jr.

e 9

, , -. m +-y---.- -*"'-F

'