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| issue date = 01/21/2013 | | issue date = 01/21/2013 | ||
| title = Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI 11) Regarding Confirmatory Action Letter Response (TAC Me 9727) | | title = Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI 11) Regarding Confirmatory Action Letter Response (TAC Me 9727) | ||
| author name = St.Onge R | | author name = St.Onge R | ||
| author affiliation = Southern California Edison Co | | author affiliation = Southern California Edison Co | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA | {{#Wiki_filter:SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Richard I. St. Onge Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Emergency Planning An EDISON INTERNATIONAL Company January 21, 2013 10 CFR 50.4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 | ||
==Subject:== | ==Subject:== | ||
Docket No. 50-361 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI 11)Regarding Confirmatory Action Letter Response (TAC No. ME 9727)San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 | Docket No. 50-361 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI 11) | ||
Regarding Confirmatory Action Letter Response (TAC No. ME 9727) | |||
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 | |||
==References:== | ==References:== | ||
: 1. Letter from Mr. Elmo E. Collins (USNRC) to Mr. Peter T. Dietrich (SCE), dated March 27, 2012, Confirmatory Action Letter 4-12-001, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Commitments to Address Steam Generator Tube Degradation | |||
: 2. Letter from Mr. Peter T. Dietrich (SCE) to Mr. Elmo E. Collins (USNRC), dated October 3, 2012, Confirmatory Action Letter - Actions to Address Steam Generator Tube Degradation, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 | |||
: 3. Letter from Mr. James R. Hall (USNRC) to Mr. Peter T. Dietrich (SCE), dated December 26, 2012, Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Confirmatory Action Letter, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 | |||
==Dear Sir or Madam,== | |||
On March 27, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) (Reference 1) to Southern California Edison (SCE) describing actions that the NRC and SCE agreed would be completed to address issues identified in the steam generator tubes of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3. In a letter to the NRC dated October 3, 2012 (Reference 2), SCE reported completion of the Unit 2 CAL actions and included a Return to Service Report (RTSR) that provided details of their completion. | |||
On March 27, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) (Reference | By letter dated December 26, 2012 (Reference 3), the NRC issued Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the CAL response. Enclosure 1 of this letter provides the response to RAI 11. | ||
P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92672 | |||
By letter dated December 26, 2012 (Reference 3), the NRC issued Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the CAL response. | |||
Enclosure 1 of this letter provides the response to RAI 11.P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92672 Document Control Desk | Document Control Desk January 21, 2013 There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please call me at (949) 368-6240. | ||
Sincerely, | |||
==Enclosures:== | ==Enclosures:== | ||
: 1. Response to RAI 11 cc: E. E. Collins, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV J. R. Hall, NRC Project Manager, SONGS Units 2 and 3 G. G. Warnick, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, SONGS Units 2 and 3 R. E. Lantz, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region IV ENCLOSURE 1 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING RESPONSE TO CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER DOCKET NO. 50-361 TAC NO. ME 9727 Response to RAI 11 Page 1 RAI 11 Please submit an operational impact assessment for operation at 70% power. The assessment should focus on the cycle safety analysis and establish whether operation at 70% power is within the scope of SCE's safety analysis methodology, and that analyses and evaluations have been performed to conclude operation at 70% power for an extended period of time is safe.The evaluation should also demonstrate that the existing Technical Specifications, including limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power.RESPONSE Note: This response includes information requested in RAI 14 associated with the operational impact assessment for operation at 70% power. RAI 14 states: "Provide a summary disposition of the U2C1 7 calculations relative to the planned reduction in power operation." SCE has evaluated the extended reduced power operation for its impacts on the Unit 2 Cycle 17 reload core design and safety analysis. | : 1. Response to RAI 11 cc: E. E. Collins, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV J. R. Hall, NRC Project Manager, SONGS Units 2 and 3 G. G. Warnick, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, SONGS Units 2 and 3 R. E. Lantz, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region IV | ||
The power levels evaluated range from 50% to 100%rated thermal power, which bounds the planned operation at the 70% power level. The assessments were performed in accordance with NRC approved SONGS reload methodology and topical reports referenced in the UFSAR and Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1.5, and the SONGS Core Reload Analyses and Activities Checklist procedure. | |||
The impacts of extended reduced power operation on Unit 2 Cycle 17 core design and reload analyses, including UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses are summarized in Table 1, the impact assessment table. The impact assessment table is organized consistent with the SONGS Core Reload Analyses and Activities Checklist procedure. | ENCLOSURE 1 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING RESPONSE TO CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER DOCKET NO. 50-361 TAC NO. ME 9727 Response to RAI 11 Page 1 | ||
For each analysis, the Reload Checklist item number is listed in the second column from the left; when applicable, the second column also lists the UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis section number. The determination of impact for each analysis is summarized in the right column of the table.Safety Analysis Methodology The NRC approved safety analysis methods, as described in TS 5.7.1.5, are used to establish the core operating limits specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) which encompass from Mode 6 up to Mode 1 operation at the rated thermal power. Therefore, operating at the 70% power level is within the scope of SCE safety analysis methodology. | |||
No change to the safety analysis methodology is required for extended reduced power operation. | ===RAI 11=== | ||
Safety Analysis The reload and safety analyses determined to be impacted by extended reduced power operation were re-analyzed. | Please submit an operational impact assessment for operation at 70% power. The assessment should focus on the cycle safety analysis and establish whether operation at 70% power is within the scope of SCE's safety analysis methodology, and that analyses and evaluations have been performed to conclude operation at 70% power for an extended period of time is safe. | ||
The conclusions of the reload analyses, including safety analyses, for extended reduced power operation are as follows: (1) All safety analyses results meet the established acceptance criteria, and (2) The radiological dose consequences for all safety analyses remain bounded by the dose consequences reported in the UFSAR.Page 2 Technical Specifications The existing TS, including limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power. The impact assessment for TS surveillance requirements is described in the following section.Impact Assessment for Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements The TS surveillance requirements were evaluated for the impacts of reduced power operation. | The evaluation should also demonstrate that the existing Technical Specifications, including limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power. | ||
The evaluation concluded all TS surveillance requirements under the reactor core design and monitoring program that would have been performed at approximately 82% power or at full power will be performed with the plant operating at approximately 70% power. The evaluation is summarized in Table 2.Two surveillance procedures related to monitoring Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow were revised to (1) reduce the minimum power required to perform the surveillances from 85% to 68% power, and to (2) account for the slightly increased RCS flow uncertainty at reduced power operation. | |||
No other surveillances were identified to be impacted by plant operation at 70%power.Conclusions Extended reduced power operation at 70% power has been evaluated and determined to be acceptable with respect to Unit 2 Cycle 17 reload core design and safety analysis. | ===RESPONSE=== | ||
Reload analyses needed to support reactor startup and operation at 70% power have been completed. | Note: This response includes information requested in RAI 14 associated with the operational impact assessment for operation at 70% power. RAI 14 states: "Provide a summary disposition of the U2C1 7 calculations relative to the planned reduction in power operation." | ||
All TS LCO and surveillance requirements under the reactor core design and monitoring program normally performed at or above 70% power will be performed with the plant operating at approximately 70% power. The above evaluations demonstrate that the existing TSs, including limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power.Page 3 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | SCE has evaluated the extended reduced power operation for its impacts on the Unit 2 Cycle 17 reload core design and safety analysis. The power levels evaluated range from 50% to 100% | ||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM 1# (UFSAR SECTION) DESCRIPTION | rated thermal power, which bounds the planned operation at the 70% power level. The assessments were performed in accordance with NRC approved SONGS reload methodology and topical reports referenced in the UFSAR and Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1.5, and the SONGS Core Reload Analyses and Activities Checklist procedure. | ||
The impacts of extended reduced power operation on Unit 2 Cycle 17 core design and reload analyses, including UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses are summarized in Table 1, the impact assessment table. The impact assessment table is organized consistent with the SONGS Core Reload Analyses and Activities Checklist procedure. For each analysis, the Reload Checklist item number is listed in the second column from the left; when applicable, the second column also lists the UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis section number. The determination of impact for each analysis is summarized in the right column of the table. | |||
Safety Analysis Methodology The NRC approved safety analysis methods, as described in TS 5.7.1.5, are used to establish the core operating limits specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) which encompass from Mode 6 up to Mode 1 operation at the rated thermal power. Therefore, operating at the 70% power level is within the scope of SCE safety analysis methodology. No change to the safety analysis methodology is required for extended reduced power operation. | |||
Safety Analysis The reload and safety analyses determined to be impacted by extended reduced power operation were re-analyzed. The conclusions of the reload analyses, including safety analyses, for extended reduced power operation are as follows: (1) All safety analyses results meet the established acceptance criteria, and (2) The radiological dose consequences for all safety analyses remain bounded by the dose consequences reported in the UFSAR. | |||
Page 2 | |||
Technical Specifications The existing TS, including limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power. The impact assessment for TS surveillance requirements is described in the following section. | |||
Impact Assessment for Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements The TS surveillance requirements were evaluated for the impacts of reduced power operation. | |||
The evaluation concluded all TS surveillance requirements under the reactor core design and monitoring program that would have been performed at approximately 82% power or at full power will be performed with the plant operating at approximately 70% power. The evaluation is summarized in Table 2. | |||
Two surveillance procedures related to monitoring Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow were revised to (1) reduce the minimum power required to perform the surveillances from 85% to 68% power, and to (2) account for the slightly increased RCS flow uncertainty at reduced power operation. No other surveillances were identified to be impacted by plant operation at 70% | |||
power. | |||
Conclusions Extended reduced power operation at 70% power has been evaluated and determined to be acceptable with respect to Unit 2 Cycle 17 reload core design and safety analysis. Reload analyses needed to support reactor startup and operation at 70% power have been completed. | |||
All TS LCO and surveillance requirements under the reactor core design and monitoring program normally performed at or above 70% power will be performed with the plant operating at approximately 70% power. The above evaluations demonstrate that the existing TSs, including limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power. | |||
Page 3 | |||
Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM 1 | |||
# (UFSAR SECTION) DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 0.1 Reload Ground Rules (RGR) Review No change to analysis is required. | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 0.1 Reload Ground Rules (RGR) Review No change to analysis is required. No change to Rated Thermal Power (RTP). RGR still addresses 0% to 100% RTP operation. RGR addresses the full range of power independent and power dependent operating parameters, including those applicable at reduced power. The RGR Analysis Value defines the maximum or minimum value which must be bounded in the safety analysis. The number is not necessarily equivalent to the value used in an analysis (or Technical Specification) but will be conservative with respect to that value. The RGR Analysis Value includes applicable uncertainties and margins for which the safety analyses must be bounding. | ||
No change to Rated Thermal Power (RTP). RGR still addresses 0% to 100% RTP operation. | 2 1.1.3 Design Models and Depletions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
RGR addresses the full range of power independent and power dependent operating parameters, including those applicable at reduced power. The RGR Analysis Value defines the maximum or minimum value which must be bounded in the safety analysis. | Calculation revised to document depletion at 50% power from Beginning of Cycle (BOC) to End of Cycle (EOC) and comparison to 100% power. SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 ($2C17) at 50% power results in radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) essentially identical to depleting the core at 100% power. | ||
The number is not necessarily equivalent to the value used in an analysis (or Technical Specification) but will be conservative with respect to that value. The RGR Analysis Value includes applicable uncertainties and margins for which the safety analyses must be bounding.2 1.1.3 Design Models and Depletions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | As the radial power distributions and distortion factors have been determined to be valid, no downstream analyses are impacted. | ||
Calculation revised to document depletion at 50% power from Beginning of Cycle (BOC)to End of Cycle (EOC) and comparison to 100% power. SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 ($2C17)at 50% power results in radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup)essentially identical to depleting the core at 100% power.As the radial power distributions and distortion factors have been determined to be valid, no downstream analyses are impacted.Impact of extended reduced power operation on generic axial shapes and scram curves is addressed in Item 10 (1-D HERMITE model.)3 1.1.4 Design Parameters and FR Versus No change to analysis is required. | Impact of extended reduced power operation on generic axial shapes and scram curves is addressed in Item 10 (1-D HERMITE model.) | ||
Radial power distributions and generic axial shapes Power remain applicable. | 3 1.1.4 Design Parameters and FR Versus No change to analysis is required. Radial power distributions and generic axial shapes Power remain applicable. Individual Control Element Assembly (CEA) worth, CEA bank worth, scram worth, peaking factors, distortion factors that are strongly dependent on the radial power distribution remain applicable. Extended reduced power operation results in less Pu-239 inventory. As such, generic bounding parameters (i.e., Fuel Temperature Coefficient (FTC), Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC), kinetics parameters) remain applicable. Critical Boron Concentrations (CBC) at Beginning of Cycle (BOC) are not affected. CBC at End of Cycle (EOC) is similar. Therefore, bounding boron concentration requirements and Inverse Boron Worths (IBW) are not impacted. Representative design parameter and Fr values for Reload Analysis Report (RAR) are not impacted. | ||
Individual Control Element Assembly (CEA) worth, CEA bank worth, scram worth, peaking factors, distortion factors that are strongly dependent on the radial power distribution remain applicable. | Page 4 | ||
Extended reduced power operation results in less Pu-239 inventory. | |||
As such, generic bounding parameters (i.e., Fuel Temperature Coefficient (FTC), Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC), kinetics parameters) remain applicable. | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM ICHECKLIST C ITEM 11 SECTION) DESCRIPTION | ||
Critical Boron Concentrations (CBC) at Beginning of Cycle (BOC) are not affected. | |||
CBC at End of Cycle (EOC) is similar. Therefore, bounding boron concentration requirements and Inverse Boron Worths (IBW) are not impacted. | |||
Representative design parameter and Fr values for Reload Analysis Report (RAR) are not impacted.Page 4 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM ICHECKLIST ITEM 11 | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)4 1.1.5 Physics Input to LOCA, TORC, and No change to analysis is required for the physics inputs to LOCA analysis and TORC FATES Analysis (including Pin code analysis. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 4 1.1.5 Physics Input to LOCA, TORC, and No change to analysis is required for the physics inputs to LOCA analysis and TORC FATES Analysis (including Pin code analysis. BOC, limiting boron concentration, reactivity are not affected. Radial Census) power distribution and peaking data remain applicable. Generic LOCA and TORC input parameters remain applicable. | ||
BOC, limiting boron concentration, reactivity are not affected. | Re-analysis was performed for the physics input to Fuel Performance Analysis (FATES) code analysis. Radial fall-off curves, Fr, and fast flux data were regenerated for reduced power operation. Generic axial shapes remain applicable. | ||
Radial Census) power distribution and peaking data remain applicable. | 5 1.1.6 Physics Input to Fuel Mechanical Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Generic LOCA and TORC input parameters remain applicable. | Design Calculation revised to provide power history data for AREVA Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) mechanical design analysis. Also updated maximum core residence time for Westinghouse analysis. Other generic parameters for Westinghouse mechanical design analysis remain applicable due to similar radial power distribution. | ||
Re-analysis was performed for the physics input to Fuel Performance Analysis (FATES)code analysis. | 6 1.1.7 Physics Input to ASGT No change to analysis is required. Physics Input to Asymmetric Steam Generator Transient (ASGT) is performed at EOC with most negative Technical Specification MTC. | ||
Radial fall-off curves, Fr, and fast flux data were regenerated for reduced power operation. | Calculations performed at multiple power levels (90%, 70%, 50%, and 20%). Due to similar power distributions, results remain applicable. | ||
Generic axial shapes remain applicable. | 7 1.1.8 Physics Input to Post-Trip Steam Line No change to analysis is required. Analysis performed at EOC. Radial power distributions Break Analysis (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. The MTC is tuned to the most negative Tech Spec value (-3.7E-4 Ak/k/fF). Cooling down adds reactivity. More reactivity is added cooling from 100% power (higher T-fuel and T-mod) than reduced power to lower temperatures (e.g., 5450 F, 3000 F, 2000 F, 68°F) 8 1.1.9 Physics Input to CEA Ejection Analysis No change to analysis is required. Physics data in this analysis were generated at multiple power levels and the reduced power operating range is covered. Since the reduced power operation results in power distributions essentially identical to those from 100% power operation, the data generated from the original analysis are applicable to reduced power operation. | ||
5 1.1.6 Physics Input to Fuel Mechanical Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | 9 1.1.10 Physics Input to CEA Withdrawal No change to analysis is required. Calculations performed at multiple power levels. | ||
Design Calculation revised to provide power history data for AREVA Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA)mechanical design analysis. | Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essential identical. | ||
Also updated maximum core residence time for Westinghouse analysis. | |||
Other generic parameters for Westinghouse mechanical design analysis remain applicable due to similar radial power distribution. | |||
6 1.1.7 Physics Input to ASGT No change to analysis is required. | |||
Physics Input to Asymmetric Steam Generator Transient (ASGT) is performed at EOC with most negative Technical Specification MTC.Calculations performed at multiple power levels (90%, 70%, 50%, and 20%). Due to similar power distributions, results remain applicable. | |||
7 1.1.8 Physics Input to Post-Trip Steam Line No change to analysis is required. | |||
Analysis performed at EOC. Radial power distributions Break Analysis (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | |||
The MTC is tuned to the most negative Tech Spec value (-3.7E-4 Ak/k/fF). | |||
Cooling down adds reactivity. | |||
More reactivity is added cooling from 100% power (higher T-fuel and T-mod) than reduced power to lower temperatures (e.g., | |||
Physics data in this analysis were generated at multiple power levels and the reduced power operating range is covered. Since the reduced power operation results in power distributions essentially identical to those from 100% power operation, the data generated from the original analysis are applicable to reduced power operation. | |||
9 1.1.10 Physics Input to CEA Withdrawal No change to analysis is required. | |||
Calculations performed at multiple power levels.Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essential identical. | |||
CEA worth remains applicable since it is strongly dependent on power distribution. | CEA worth remains applicable since it is strongly dependent on power distribution. | ||
Limiting axial power shapes from axial shape index (ASI) search remain applicable. | Limiting axial power shapes from axial shape index (ASI) search remain applicable. | ||
Page 5 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | Page 5 | ||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM IE DESCRIPTION | |||
Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM IE DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)10 1.1.11 1-D HERMITE Model Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 10 1.1.11 1-D HERMITE Model Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Analysis is revised to establish applicability of the generic axial shapes used in the design analyses and applicability of the SCRAM curves used in the design analyses. Analysis also shows that depletion at reduced power leads to essentially the same limiting shapes from ASI search as those selected for the analyses of the design depletions. | ||
Analysis is revised to establish applicability of the generic axial shapes used in the design analyses and applicability of the SCRAM curves used in the design analyses. | 11 1.1.12 Physics Input to Steam Line Break No change to analysis is required. This EOC event begins at 0% power. Radial power Return-to-Power for Cycle N-1 distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | ||
Analysis also shows that depletion at reduced power leads to essentially the same limiting shapes from ASI search as those selected for the analyses of the design depletions. | Configuration 12 1.1.13 FR Versus Temperature for Cooldown No change to analysis is required. Bounding distortion factors were determined based on Events multiple CEA configurations, temperature ranges at BOC and EOC. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | ||
11 1.1.12 Physics Input to Steam Line Break No change to analysis is required. | 13 1.1.14 Boron Requirement for SITs and No change to analysis is required. The case run for this calculation is performed at hot BAMU Tanks zero power (HZP). The Xenon starting condition is Hot Full Power (HFP) which is conservative. | ||
This EOC event begins at 0% power. Radial power Return-to-Power for Cycle N-1 distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | 14 1.1.15 LOCA and Non-LOCA Source Term No change to analysis is required. This analysis tests the Cycle 17 conditions of interest against the parameters required for applicability of the LOCA and Alternative Source Term (AST) source terms. The power level is used as a maximum not to be exceeded. Running Cycle 17 at reduced power results in less "short half-life" nuclides. Increase in "long half-life" nuclides due to extended calendar time is bounded by the lower production from extended reduced power. | ||
Configuration 12 1.1.13 FR Versus Temperature for Cooldown No change to analysis is required. | 15 1.1.16 Tritium Production No change to analysis is required. Reduced power results in a decrease in tritium production. The analysis at 100% power is conservative. | ||
Bounding distortion factors were determined based on Events multiple CEA configurations, temperature ranges at BOC and EOC. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | 16 1.1.17 STAR Physics Verification No change to analysis is required. This analysis uses BOC (HZP) conditions (Mode 3) for an assessment for S2C 17 inclusion in the Startup Test Activity Reduction (STAR) program. | ||
13 1.1.14 Boron Requirement for SITs and No change to analysis is required. | 17 1.1.18 Digital Setpoints Physics Data No change to analysis is required. The case sets encompass LCO and Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) ASI ranges. Power level does not impact axial shapes significantly, so reduced powers are covered by the case set. | ||
The case run for this calculation is performed at hot BAMU Tanks zero power (HZP). The Xenon starting condition is Hot Full Power (HFP) which is conservative. | Page 6 | ||
14 1.1.15 LOCA and Non-LOCA Source Term No change to analysis is required. | |||
This analysis tests the Cycle 17 conditions of interest against the parameters required for applicability of the LOCA and Alternative Source Term (AST) source terms. The power level is used as a maximum not to be exceeded. | Table I SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM I ICHECKLIST CAECTION) ITEM1 DESCRIPTION | ||
Running Cycle 17 at reduced power results in less "short half-life" nuclides. | |||
Increase in "long half-life" nuclides due to extended calendar time is bounded by the lower production from extended reduced power.15 1.1.16 Tritium Production No change to analysis is required. | |||
Reduced power results in a decrease in tritium production. | |||
The analysis at 100% power is conservative. | |||
16 1.1.17 STAR Physics Verification No change to analysis is required. | |||
This analysis uses BOC (HZP) conditions (Mode 3) for an assessment for S2C 17 inclusion in the Startup Test Activity Reduction (STAR)program.17 1.1.18 Digital Setpoints Physics Data No change to analysis is required. | |||
The case sets encompass LCO and Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) ASI ranges. Power level does not impact axial shapes significantly, so reduced powers are covered by the case set.Page 6 Table I SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM ICHECKLIST | |||
DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)18 1.1.19 Physics RAR Inputs Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 18 1.1.19 Physics RAR Inputs Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. RAR has been updated to reflect actual Cycle 16 EOC burnup and Cycle 17 reduced power operation. | ||
RAR has been updated to reflect actual Cycle 16 EOC burnup and Cycle 17 reduced power operation. | 19 1.2.1 Fuel Performance Analysis (FATES) Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
19 1.2.1 Fuel Performance Analysis (FATES) Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | Reduced power results in fuel performance data that is not bounded when compared to the Generic Fuel Performance data generated for ZIRLOTM in Cycle 14 (data used in LOCA Analysis). A revision to the Fuel Performance and Setpoints Analyses was performed to determine the appropriate penalty factors such that the Generic Fuel Performance data remained bounding. | ||
Reduced power results in fuel performance data that is not bounded when compared to the Generic Fuel Performance data generated for ZIRLOTM in Cycle 14 (data used in LOCA Analysis). | 20 1.2.2 T-H Input Summary No change to analysis is required. Calculation is a collection of input data that are not impacted by reduced power. | ||
A revision to the Fuel Performance and Setpoints Analyses was performed to determine the appropriate penalty factors such that the Generic Fuel Performance data remained bounding.20 1.2.2 T-H Input Summary No change to analysis is required. | 21 1.2.4 T-H Limiting Assembly and CETOP No change to analysis is required. Power is not an input. Calculation is a benchmark of Benchmarking Analysis CETOP to TORC computer codes at reference departure from nucleate boiling (DNBR) points rather than a benchmark at a given power. This benchmark is mainly driven by power distributions from physics. Physics Models & Depletions has validated the power distributions used in the original calculation. | ||
Calculation is a collection of input data that are not impacted by reduced power.21 1.2.4 T-H Limiting Assembly and CETOP No change to analysis is required. | 22 1.2.5 Mechanical Design Analysis (Fuel Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Power is not an input. Calculation is a benchmark of Benchmarking Analysis CETOP to TORC computer codes at reference departure from nucleate boiling (DNBR)points rather than a benchmark at a given power. This benchmark is mainly driven by power distributions from physics. Physics Models & Depletions has validated the power distributions used in the original calculation. | Vendor) Westinghouse performed calculations to determine the impact of reduced power on the fuel mechanical design. | ||
22 1.2.5 Mechanical Design Analysis (Fuel Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | AREVA performed calculations to determine the impact of reduced power on the Lead Fuel Assembly fuel mechanical design. | ||
Vendor) Westinghouse performed calculations to determine the impact of reduced power on the fuel mechanical design.AREVA performed calculations to determine the impact of reduced power on the Lead Fuel Assembly fuel mechanical design.23 1.2.6 Power Operating Limit Partial No change to analysis is required. | 23 1.2.6 Power Operating Limit Partial No change to analysis is required. The calculation is driven by a large family of axial Derivative Verification shapes, which are not impacted by the power reduction. | ||
The calculation is driven by a large family of axial Derivative Verification shapes, which are not impacted by the power reduction. | 24 1.2.7 Setpoints Input Summary Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
24 1.2.7 Setpoints Input Summary Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | Calculation has been revised to address the increased reactor coolant system (RCS) flow uncertainty at reduced power. | ||
Calculation has been revised to address the increased reactor coolant system (RCS) flow uncertainty at reduced power.25 1.2.8 RCS Flow Uncertainties Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | 25 1.2.8 RCS Flow Uncertainties Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Has been reanalyzed. RCS flow uncertainty increases due to reduced delta-temperature and increased secondary calorimetric power uncertainty. | ||
Has been reanalyzed. | Page 7 | ||
RCS flow uncertainty increases due to reduced delta-temperature and increased secondary calorimetric power uncertainty. | |||
Page 7 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)26 1.2.9 Fuel Mechanical Design Verification No change to analysis is required. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 26 1.2.9 Fuel Mechanical Design Verification No change to analysis is required. The objective of the fuel mechanical design verification calculation is to document the design of the fuel based on the fuel vendor Bill of Materials, Design Drawings and the design and material specifications transmitted from the fuel vendor. Reduced power operation has no impact on this analysis. | ||
The objective of the fuel mechanical design verification calculation is to document the design of the fuel based on the fuel vendor Bill of Materials, Design Drawings and the design and material specifications transmitted from the fuel vendor. Reduced power operation has no impact on this analysis.27 1.2.11 Secondary Calorimetric Power No change to analysis is required. | 27 1.2.11 Secondary Calorimetric Power No change to analysis is required. Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the Uncertainty original calculation. | ||
Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the Uncertainty original calculation. | 28 1.2.12 Delta-T/Turbine Power Uncertainties No change to analysis is required. The analysis uses a reference power error of 1.3% at full power. The increase in reference power (i.e., secondary calorimetric power) associated with performing delta-t/turbine power calibrations at reduced power would increase the uncertainties. The bounding results include -0.50% of conservatism; therefore, the analysis of record (AOR) remains bounding. Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the original calculation. | ||
28 1.2.12 Delta-T/Turbine Power Uncertainties No change to analysis is required. | 29 1.2.13 Cycle Independent Data and Setpoints No change to analysis is required. CIDSAL provides cycle independent values to use or to Assumptions List (CIDSAL) be verified in downstream analyses. Reduced power operation does not impact the requirements for downstream analysis verification. None of the calculations explicitly performed in the analysis section are dependent upon nominal plant operating conditions or the power shapes/distributions at reduced power operation. | ||
The analysis uses a reference power error of 1.3% at full power. The increase in reference power (i.e., secondary calorimetric power)associated with performing delta-t/turbine power calibrations at reduced power would increase the uncertainties. | 30 1.2.16 Core Protection Calculator (CPC) No change to analysis is required. Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the Calibration Allowances original calculation. Due to less decalibration, full power bounds lower power levels. | ||
The bounding results include -0.50% of conservatism; therefore, the analysis of record (AOR) remains bounding. | 31 1.2.17 Fuel Duty Index No change to analysis is required. Full power bounds lower power levels. | ||
Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the original calculation. | 32 1.2.18 T-H MSCU Verification No change to analysis is required. Power is not an input. Calculation is a verification of response surface at reference DNBR points rather than a benchmark at a given power. | ||
29 1.2.13 Cycle Independent Data and Setpoints No change to analysis is required. | 33 1.2.19 CEA STAR Verification No change to analysis is required. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. At reduced power the plan is to continue to operate with all rods out. The duration and depth of lead bank CEA insertion beyond the typical all-rods-out position is monitored per the core follow procedure with notification/action to review the conservative CEA life analysis when insertion exceeds an insertion assumption within the analysis. | ||
CIDSAL provides cycle independent values to use or to Assumptions List (CIDSAL) be verified in downstream analyses. | Page 8 | ||
Reduced power operation does not impact the requirements for downstream analysis verification. | |||
None of the calculations explicitly performed in the analysis section are dependent upon nominal plant operating conditions or the power shapes/distributions at reduced power operation. | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
30 1.2.16 Core Protection Calculator (CPC) No change to analysis is required. | |||
Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the Calibration Allowances original calculation. | |||
Due to less decalibration, full power bounds lower power levels.31 1.2.17 Fuel Duty Index No change to analysis is required. | |||
Full power bounds lower power levels.32 1.2.18 T-H MSCU Verification No change to analysis is required. | |||
Power is not an input. Calculation is a verification of response surface at reference DNBR points rather than a benchmark at a given power.33 1.2.19 CEA STAR Verification No change to analysis is required. | |||
Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | |||
At reduced power the plan is to continue to operate with all rods out. The duration and depth of lead bank CEA insertion beyond the typical all-rods-out position is monitored per the core follow procedure with notification/action to review the conservative CEA life analysis when insertion exceeds an insertion assumption within the analysis.Page 8 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)34 1.3.1 Summary of Transients Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 34 1.3.1 Summary of Transients Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Calculation was revised to perform an evaluation of all Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15 events for extended reduced power operation. | Calculation was revised to perform an evaluation of all Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15 events for extended reduced power operation. | ||
35 1.3.2 CENTS Cycle Update and Action No change to analysis is required. | 35 1.3.2 CENTS Cycle Update and Action No change to analysis is required. Calculation and associated computer files already Modules accommodate power levels from 0 to 100 percent. | ||
Calculation and associated computer files already Modules accommodate power levels from 0 to 100 percent.36 1.3.3 (15.10.1.3.1.1) | 36 1.3.3 (15.10.1.3.1.1) Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) No change to analysis is required. Pre-trip SLB is analyzed @100% power (with Pre-Trip uncertainty). The generic physics inputs remain unchanged. Since the VOPT is generated on the rate of change in power setpoint (DELSPV), the actual trip occurs at the same power rise, independent of the starting power level. As this is a Required Over Power Margin (ROPM) event, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event. | ||
Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) No change to analysis is required. | 37 1.3.4 (15.10.1.3.1.2) MSLB Post-Trip No change to analysis is required. This event is limiting at hot zero power (HZP). HZP cases show greatest return to power since there is minimum initial stored energy, decay heat and scram worth at HZP conditions. There is no impact to the HZP cases since HZP physics inputs and initial conditions do not change. A reactivity balance for reduced power showed that net reactivity change remained negative. | ||
Pre-trip SLB is analyzed @100% power (with Pre-Trip uncertainty). | 38 1.3.5 (15.10.4.1.4) Chemical Volume Control System No change to analysis is required. This is a BOC event that is not analyzed in Mode 1. | ||
The generic physics inputs remain unchanged. | (CVCS) Malfunction - Boron Dilution The reactivity addition due to a boron dilution event is less adverse than the CEA Withdrawal event at Power and therefore Mode 1 and the higher power portion of Mode 2 are not explicitly addressed. | ||
Since the VOPT is generated on the rate of change in power setpoint (DELSPV), the actual trip occurs at the same power rise, independent of the starting power level. As this is a Required Over Power Margin (ROPM) event, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event.37 1.3.4 (15.10.1.3.1.2) | 39 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.1) CEA Bank Withdrawal from Subcritical No change to analysis is required. Event is evaluated at subcritical conditions. Note that (CEAW @ SC) this event is being re-evaluated to address the extended shut down. | ||
MSLB Post-Trip No change to analysis is required. | 40 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.1) CEA Bank Withdrawal at Low Power No change to analysis is required. Event is evaluated at hot zero power conditions. | ||
This event is limiting at hot zero power (HZP). HZP cases show greatest return to power since there is minimum initial stored energy, decay heat and scram worth at HZP conditions. | (CEAW @ HZP) 41 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.2) CEA Bank Withdrawal at Power No change to analysis is required. CEAW at reduced power is enveloped by CEAW @ | ||
There is no impact to the HZP cases since HZP physics inputs and initial conditions do not change. A reactivity balance for reduced power showed that net reactivity change remained negative.38 1.3.5 (15.10.4.1.4) | (CEAW @ Power, 50% & 100%) 50% Power and CEAW @ 100% Power; and the results are acceptable. | ||
Chemical Volume Control System No change to analysis is required. | 42 1.3.8 (15.10.1.1.3) Increased Main Steam Flow (IMSF) No change to analysis is required. The system response is the same as IMSF+SF. | ||
This is a BOC event that is not analyzed in Mode 1.(CVCS) Malfunction | Page 9 | ||
-Boron Dilution The reactivity addition due to a boron dilution event is less adverse than the CEA Withdrawal event at Power and therefore Mode 1 and the higher power portion of Mode 2 are not explicitly addressed. | |||
39 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.1) | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST (USA ITEM1 SECTION) DESCRIPTION | ||
CEA Bank Withdrawal from Subcritical No change to analysis is required. | |||
Event is evaluated at subcritical conditions. | |||
Note that (CEAW @ SC) this event is being re-evaluated to address the extended shut down.40 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.1) | |||
CEA Bank Withdrawal at Low Power No change to analysis is required. | |||
Event is evaluated at hot zero power conditions.(CEAW @ HZP)41 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.2) | |||
CEA Bank Withdrawal at Power No change to analysis is required. | |||
CEAW at reduced power is enveloped by CEAW @(CEAW @ Power, 50% & 100%) 50% Power and CEAW @ 100% Power; and the results are acceptable. | |||
42 1.3.8 (15.10.1.1.3) | |||
Increased Main Steam Flow (IMSF) No change to analysis is required. | |||
The system response is the same as IMSF+SF.Page 9 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)43 1.3.8 (15.10.1.2.3) | # (UFSAR SECTION) 43 1.3.8 (15.10.1.2.3) IMSF with Single Failure (SF) No change to analysis is required. IMSF+SF (fast & slow) analyzed @100% power. The generic physics inputs remain unchanged. The fast case credits the VOPT which is generated on the rate of change in power (DELSPV) setpoint, as such the actual trip occurs at the same power rise, independent of the starting power level. Since the fast case is a Required Over Power Margin (ROPM) event, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event. The limiting event is the slow trip, which is initiated from a Power Operating Limit. As such, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event. | ||
IMSF with Single Failure (SF) No change to analysis is required. | 44 1.3.9 (15.10.4.3.2) CEA Ejection Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. The event is normally analyzed at multiple power levels. It was reanalyzed to address reduced power data from the fuel performance analysis. | ||
IMSF+SF (fast & slow) analyzed @100% power. The generic physics inputs remain unchanged. | 45 1.3.10 (15.10.3.3.1) Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Seizure No change to analysis is required. Bounded by Reactor Coolant Pump Sheared Shaft (RCPSS). | ||
The fast case credits the VOPT which is generated on the rate of change in power (DELSPV) setpoint, as such the actual trip occurs at the same power rise, independent of the starting power level. Since the fast case is a Required Over Power Margin (ROPM) event, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event. The limiting event is the slow trip, which is initiated from a Power Operating Limit. As such, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event.44 1.3.9 (15.10.4.3.2) | 46 1.3.10 (15.10.3.3.2) Reactor Coolant Pump Sheared Shaft No change to analysis is required. This is a margin/ fuel failure calculation event. The (RCPSS) thermal margin loss for this event is initiated by the loss of flow from one pump (either seized rotor or sheared shaft). The reduction of thermal margin due to the loss of flow from one pump is not a function of the initial power (i.e., is constant at any power level). | ||
CEA Ejection Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | In addition, at reduced power, the initial thermal margin is larger than at the 100% power condition. Therefore, the analysis at full power is bounding. | ||
The event is normally analyzed at multiple power levels. It was reanalyzed to address reduced power data from the fuel performance analysis.45 1.3.10 (15.10.3.3.1) | 47 1.3.11 (15.10.2.1.3) Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV) No change to analysis is required. Bounded by LOCV+SF 48 1.3.11 (15.10.2.2.3) LOCV with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. This event is driven by plant response and not by detailed core physics. There are two criteria (peak RCS pressure and peak secondary pressure). At lower powers, there is less internal energy in the reactor core, which translates into a slower RCS pressure transient that is more rapidly mitigated by main steam safety valves (MSSVs). The peak secondary pressure event is evaluated at multiple power levels to establish the allowed power level as a function of the number of gagged MSSVs (Tech Spec 3.7.1). | ||
Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Seizure No change to analysis is required. | 49 1.3.12 (15.10.6.3.2) Steam Generator Tube Rupture No change to analysis is required. The SGTR is a slow event and not sensitive to initial (SGTR) power. Furthermore, at lower powers there is a higher secondary pressure that translates to lower primary-to-secondary rupture flow (i.e., lower activity release). | ||
Bounded by Reactor Coolant Pump Sheared Shaft (RCPSS).46 1.3.10 (15.10.3.3.2) | Page 10 | ||
Reactor Coolant Pump Sheared Shaft No change to analysis is required. | |||
This is a margin/ fuel failure calculation event. The (RCPSS) thermal margin loss for this event is initiated by the loss of flow from one pump (either seized rotor or sheared shaft). The reduction of thermal margin due to the loss of flow from one pump is not a function of the initial power (i.e., is constant at any power level).In addition, at reduced power, the initial thermal margin is larger than at the 100% power condition. | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
Therefore, the analysis at full power is bounding.47 1.3.11 (15.10.2.1.3) | |||
Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV) No change to analysis is required. | |||
Bounded by LOCV+SF 48 1.3.11 (15.10.2.2.3) | |||
LOCV with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | |||
This event is driven by plant response and not by detailed core physics. There are two criteria (peak RCS pressure and peak secondary pressure). | |||
At lower powers, there is less internal energy in the reactor core, which translates into a slower RCS pressure transient that is more rapidly mitigated by main steam safety valves (MSSVs). The peak secondary pressure event is evaluated at multiple power levels to establish the allowed power level as a function of the number of gagged MSSVs (Tech Spec 3.7.1).49 1.3.12 (15.10.6.3.2) | |||
Steam Generator Tube Rupture No change to analysis is required. | |||
The SGTR is a slow event and not sensitive to initial (SGTR) power. Furthermore, at lower powers there is a higher secondary pressure that translates to lower primary-to-secondary rupture flow (i.e., lower activity release).Page 10 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)50 1.3.13 (15.10.1.1.4) | # (UFSAR SECTION) 50 1.3.13 (15.10.1.1.4) Inadvertent Opening of a Steam No change to analysis is required. See IOSGADV+SF Generator Safety or an Atmospheric Dump Valve (IOSGADV) 51 1.3.14 (15.10.1.2.4) IOSGADV with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The IOSGADV+SF is analyzed at a power level of 1 1 MWt. | ||
Inadvertent Opening of a Steam No change to analysis is required. | 52 1.3.15 (15.10.9.1.1) Asymmetric Steam Generator No change to analysis is required. The ASGT event was analyzed in the AOR at multiple Transient (ASGT) power levels (90%, 70%, 50%, and 20%). | ||
See IOSGADV+SF Generator Safety or an Atmospheric Dump Valve (IOSGADV)51 1.3.14 (15.10.1.2.4) | 53 1.3.16 (15.10.1.1.1) Decrease in Feedwater Temp (DFWT) No change to analysis is required. Since feedwater heating is reduced at reduced power, the potential loss in feedwater heating is also reduced. Impact at reduced power is also mitigated by increased mass in RCS and Steam Generators (SGs) and increased recirculation in SGs at lower power. | ||
IOSGADV with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | 54 1.3.17 (15.10.1.2.1) DFWT with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Since feedwater heating is reduced at reduced power, the potential loss in feedwater heating is also reduced. Impact at reduced power is also mitigated by increased mass in RCS and Steam Generators and increased recirculation in SGs at lower power. | ||
The IOSGADV+SF is analyzed at a power level of 1 1 MWt.52 1.3.15 (15.10.9.1.1) | 55 1.3.18 (15.10.1.1.2) Increase in Feedwater Flow (IFF) No change to analysis is required. Primary to secondary heat transfer is dominated by heat of vaporization (Hfg) which is considerably greater than steam generator enthalpy rise resulting from sensible heat. Consequently, cool downs resulting from Increases in Feedwater Flow events are limited by Increases in Main Steam Flow events. Further, Increases in Steam Flow events occur more rapidly as changes in Feed Water are mitigated by the liquid mass and recirculation flow in the steam generators. Further factors that mitigate Increasing Feedwater Flow events at reduced power include greater RCS / | ||
Asymmetric Steam Generator No change to analysis is required. | SG mass, increased recirculation flow in the sfeam generators, greater steam generator pressure and earlier reactor trip from increased feedwater flow - steam flow mismatch. | ||
The ASGT event was analyzed in the AOR at multiple Transient (ASGT) power levels (90%, 70%, 50%, and 20%).53 1.3.16 (15.10.1.1.1) | 56 1.3.18 (15.10.1.2.2) IFF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The most adverse single failure postulated for IFF is the opening of all Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) valves. Because the Increase in Main Steam Flow (IMSF) event postulates the opening of all SBCS valves and assumes that Main Feedwater flow increases to match steam flow, the IFF with Single Failure is the essentially the same event as the IMSF event. Therefore, conclusions regarding IMSF are applicable to IFF with Single Failure. | ||
Decrease in Feedwater Temp (DFWT) No change to analysis is required. | Page 11 | ||
Since feedwater heating is reduced at reduced power, the potential loss in feedwater heating is also reduced. Impact at reduced power is also mitigated by increased mass in RCS and Steam Generators (SGs) and increased recirculation in SGs at lower power.54 1.3.17 (15.10.1.2.1) | |||
DFWT with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
Since feedwater heating is reduced at reduced power, the potential loss in feedwater heating is also reduced. Impact at reduced power is also mitigated by increased mass in RCS and Steam Generators and increased recirculation in SGs at lower power.55 1.3.18 (15.10.1.1.2) | |||
Increase in Feedwater Flow (IFF) No change to analysis is required. | |||
Primary to secondary heat transfer is dominated by heat of vaporization (Hfg) which is considerably greater than steam generator enthalpy rise resulting from sensible heat. Consequently, cool downs resulting from Increases in Feedwater Flow events are limited by Increases in Main Steam Flow events. Further, Increases in Steam Flow events occur more rapidly as changes in Feed Water are mitigated by the liquid mass and recirculation flow in the steam generators. | |||
Further factors that mitigate Increasing Feedwater Flow events at reduced power include greater RCS /SG mass, increased recirculation flow in the sfeam generators, greater steam generator pressure and earlier reactor trip from increased feedwater flow -steam flow mismatch.56 1.3.18 (15.10.1.2.2) | |||
IFF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | |||
The most adverse single failure postulated for IFF is the opening of all Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) valves. Because the Increase in Main Steam Flow (IMSF) event postulates the opening of all SBCS valves and assumes that Main Feedwater flow increases to match steam flow, the IFF with Single Failure is the essentially the same event as the IMSF event. Therefore, conclusions regarding IMSF are applicable to IFF with Single Failure.Page 11 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)57 1.3.19 (15.10.2.1.1) | # (UFSAR SECTION) 57 1.3.19 (15.10.2.1.1) Loss of External Load (LOL) No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV. | ||
Loss of External Load (LOL) No change to analysis is required. | 58 1.3.19 (15.10.2.2.1) LOL with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load with single failure, Turbine Trip with single failure, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum with single failure are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV+SF. | ||
The system response to the Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV.58 1.3.19 (15.10.2.2.1) | 59 1.3.19 (15.10.2.1.2) Turbine Trip (TT) No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV. | ||
LOL with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | 60 1.3.19 (15.10.2.2.2) TT with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load with single failure, Turbine Trip with single failure, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum with single failure are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV+SF. | ||
The system response to the Loss of External Load with single failure, Turbine Trip with single failure, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum with single failure are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV+SF.59 1.3.19 (15.10.2.1.2) | 61 1.3.20 (15.10.2.1.4) Loss of Normal AC Power (LONAC) No change to analysis is required. See LONAC+SF 62 1.3.20 (15.10.2.2.4) LONAC with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink. | ||
Turbine Trip (TT) No change to analysis is required. | 63 1.3.21 (15.10.2.2.5) Loss of Normal Feedwater (LONF or No change to analysis is required. See LOFW+SF LOFW) 64 1.3.21 (15.10.2.3.2) LOFW with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink. | ||
The system response to the Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV.60 1.3.19 (15.10.2.2.2) | Page 12 | ||
TT with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | |||
The system response to the Loss of External Load with single failure, Turbine Trip with single failure, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum with single failure are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV+SF.61 1.3.20 (15.10.2.1.4) | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
Loss of Normal AC Power (LONAC) No change to analysis is required. | |||
See LONAC+SF 62 1.3.20 (15.10.2.2.4) | |||
LONAC with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | |||
Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink.63 1.3.21 (15.10.2.2.5) | |||
Loss of Normal Feedwater (LONF or No change to analysis is required. | |||
See LOFW+SF LOFW)64 1.3.21 (15.10.2.3.2) | |||
LOFW with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | |||
Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink.Page 12 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)65 1.3.22 (15.10.2.3.1) | # (UFSAR SECTION) 65 1.3.22 (15.10.2.3.1) Feedwater System Pipe Breaks (FSPB No change to analysis is required. Peak primary and secondary pressure events were or FWLB) analyzed at the least negative MTC value and main feedwater enthalpy corresponding to full power. The slightly higher MTC corresponding to reduced power is offset by the lower main feedwater enthalpy at reduced power. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink. The energy in the plant is less at reduced power relative to full power, and therefore pressurizer overfill is bounded by the full power response. | ||
Feedwater System Pipe Breaks (FSPB No change to analysis is required. | 66 1.3.23 (15.10.5.1.1) CVCS Malfunction No change to analysis is required. See CVCS Malfunction+SF. | ||
Peak primary and secondary pressure events were or FWLB) analyzed at the least negative MTC value and main feedwater enthalpy corresponding to full power. The slightly higher MTC corresponding to reduced power is offset by the lower main feedwater enthalpy at reduced power. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink. The energy in the plant is less at reduced power relative to full power, and therefore pressurizer overfill is bounded by the full power response.66 1.3.23 (15.10.5.1.1) | 67 1.3.23 (15.10.5.2.1) CVCS Malfunction with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The energy in the plant is less at reduced power relative to full power, and therefore pressurizer overfill is bounded by the full power response. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink. | ||
CVCS Malfunction No change to analysis is required. | 68 1.3.24 Pressurizer Spray Malfunction No change to analysis is required. See Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Dynamic Filter Analysis. | ||
See CVCS Malfunction+SF. | 69 1.3.25 (15.10.4.1.5) Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) - Start No change to analysis is required. Modes 1 and 2 were not analyzed because operation Up of an Inactive Loop in these Modes is only allowed with all 4 RCPs running. | ||
67 1.3.23 (15.10.5.2.1) | 70 1.3.27 (15.10.4.3.2) CEA Ejection (peak pressure analysis) No change to analysis is required. The event is limiting at hot zero power (HZP). | ||
CVCS Malfunction with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | 71 1.4 (15.10.6.3.3) Emergency Core Cooling System Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Impact (ECCS) Analyses including LBLOCA, assessment addressed in analyses performed by Fuel Vendors. | ||
The energy in the plant is less at reduced power relative to full power, and therefore pressurizer overfill is bounded by the full power response. | SBLOCA and LTC 72 (15.10.5.1.2) Inadvertent Operation of ECCS at No change to analysis is required. The system response to the IOECCS and CVCS Power (IOECCS) malfunction events are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such this event continues to be bounded by CVCS malfunction event. | ||
Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink.68 1.3.24 Pressurizer Spray Malfunction No change to analysis is required. | 73 (15.10.5.2.2) IOECCS with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The system response to the IOECCS with single failure and CVCS malfunction with single failure events are essentially the same. | ||
See Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Dynamic Filter Analysis.69 1.3.25 (15.10.4.1.5) | Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. | ||
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) -Start No change to analysis is required. | As such this event continues to be bounded by CVCS malfunction event with single failure. | ||
Modes 1 and 2 were not analyzed because operation Up of an Inactive Loop in these Modes is only allowed with all 4 RCPs running.70 1.3.27 (15.10.4.3.2) | Page 13 | ||
CEA Ejection (peak pressure analysis) | |||
No change to analysis is required. | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
The event is limiting at hot zero power (HZP).71 1.4 (15.10.6.3.3) | |||
Emergency Core Cooling System Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | |||
Impact (ECCS) Analyses including LBLOCA, assessment addressed in analyses performed by Fuel Vendors.SBLOCA and LTC 72 (15.10.5.1.2) | |||
Inadvertent Operation of ECCS at No change to analysis is required. | |||
The system response to the IOECCS and CVCS Power (IOECCS) malfunction events are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such this event continues to be bounded by CVCS malfunction event.73 (15.10.5.2.2) | |||
IOECCS with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | |||
The system response to the IOECCS with single failure and CVCS malfunction with single failure events are essentially the same.Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power.As such this event continues to be bounded by CVCS malfunction event with single failure.Page 13 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)74 (15.10.6.3.1) | # (UFSAR SECTION) 74 (15.10.6.3.1) Primary Sample or Instrument Line No change to analysis is required. Mass releases are driven by energy in the primary Break (PSILB) system which is highest following operation at HFP. The event does not fail fuel, and there is no ROPM requirement. | ||
Primary Sample or Instrument Line No change to analysis is required. | 75 (15.10.6.3.4) Inadvertent Opening of a PSV (IOPSV) No change to analysis is required. The IOPSV event is bounded by small break LOCA. | ||
Mass releases are driven by energy in the primary Break (PSILB) system which is highest following operation at HFP. The event does not fail fuel, and there is no ROPM requirement. | 76 1.5.1 Applicability Evaluation of Source No change to analysis is required. There is no change to core activity inventory source Terms in Dose Analyses term. | ||
75 (15.10.6.3.4) | 77 1.5.2 Cycle Specific Dose Analysis No change to analysis is required. No Cycle 17 event-specific dose analysis was performed, therefore no impact for reduced power. | ||
Inadvertent Opening of a PSV (IOPSV) No change to analysis is required. | 78 1.5.4 Applicability Evaluation of Dose Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Revised Analyses to document that the currently modeled radial peaking factors are conservatively greater than the increased radial peaking factors at reduced power. | ||
The IOPSV event is bounded by small break LOCA.76 1.5.1 Applicability Evaluation of Source No change to analysis is required. | The transient analyses and mass release analyses are evaluated at the current 8% steam generator (SG) tube plugging limit. The dose calculation uses mass release data per the transient analyses and their assumed 8% SG tube plugging models. The calculation is revised with discretionary conservatism to model 20% SG tube plugging in the calculation of the RCS dilution volume and mass considered for non-LOCA events which have clad damage. Evaluated RCS dilution mass at RCS temperatures for both 50% and 100% | ||
There is no change to core activity inventory source Terms in Dose Analyses term.77 1.5.2 Cycle Specific Dose Analysis No change to analysis is required. | power, which envelopes powers between 50% and 100%. | ||
No Cycle 17 event-specific dose analysis was performed, therefore no impact for reduced power.78 1.5.4 Applicability Evaluation of Dose Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | The mass release calculations are evaluated for a core inlet temperature (Tcold) of 560F, which maximizes core average temperature (Tave). Currently modeled mass release values in the Summary of Transients (SOT) correspond to full power operation. The SOT did not identify an increase in the amount of steam released from the secondary side because it remains more limiting compared to operation at lower power level due to lower sensible heat in the RCS and lower post trip decay heat. | ||
Revised Analyses to document that the currently modeled radial peaking factors are conservatively greater than the increased radial peaking factors at reduced power.The transient analyses and mass release analyses are evaluated at the current 8% steam generator (SG) tube plugging limit. The dose calculation uses mass release data per the transient analyses and their assumed 8% SG tube plugging models. The calculation is revised with discretionary conservatism to model 20% SG tube plugging in the calculation of the RCS dilution volume and mass considered for non-LOCA events which have clad damage. Evaluated RCS dilution mass at RCS temperatures for both 50% and 100%power, which envelopes powers between 50% and 100%.The mass release calculations are evaluated for a core inlet temperature (Tcold) of 560F, which maximizes core average temperature (Tave). Currently modeled mass release values in the Summary of Transients (SOT) correspond to full power operation. | Page 14 | ||
The SOT did not identify an increase in the amount of steam released from the secondary side because it remains more limiting compared to operation at lower power level due to lower sensible heat in the RCS and lower post trip decay heat.Page 14 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM 1 | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM 1 | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION) DESCRIPTION 79 n/a Fuel Corrosion and Oxide Thickness No change to analysis is required.(BOA Code) analysis The Westinghouse BOA code analysis for cycles 15, 16 and 17 was performed as part of the Zinc Injection project. This calculation compared predicted values for corrosion and oxide thickness, Fuel Duty Index and crud dryout to the Westinghouse Chemistry Guideline limits.Maximum values of Fuel Duty Index and Crud Dryout are driven by fresh fuel operating at high power. Operation at reduced power would be bounded by the 100% power cases run in the analysis of record (AOR).Maximum values of corrosion and oxide thickness are driven by both power level and effective full power days (EFPD). The AOR assumed a core operating strategy which would maximize corrosion and oxide; running fuel for three full cycles, a total of 1830 EFPD. Table 2-1 of the AOR showed that the maximum predicted oxide thickness for U2C1 7 is 28.4 microns, well below the 100 micron limit. Operation at reduced power for longer time would not significantly change the fuel rod corrosion rate, and there is substantial margin to the 100 micron limit.80 n/a AREVA Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | # (UFSAR SECTION) DESCRIPTION 79 n/a Fuel Corrosion and Oxide Thickness No change to analysis is required. | ||
compatibility Compatibility was verified by AREVA as documented in revised U2C17 Reload Analysis Report (RAR).81 n/a WEC Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | (BOA Code) analysis The Westinghouse BOA code analysis for cycles 15, 16 and 17 was performed as part of the Zinc Injection project. This calculation compared predicted values for corrosion and oxide thickness, Fuel Duty Index and crud dryout to the Westinghouse Chemistry Guideline limits. | ||
compatibility Compatibility was verified by Westinghouse as documented in revised U2C17 RAR.82 n/a AREVA and WEC Chemistry Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | Maximum values of Fuel Duty Index and Crud Dryout are driven by fresh fuel operating at high power. Operation at reduced power would be bounded by the 100% power cases run in the analysis of record (AOR). | ||
concurrence Concurrence for reduced power operation was performed by Westinghouse and AREVA as documented in revised U2C17 RAR.83 1.6.1 Reload Analysis Report (RAR) Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | Maximum values of corrosion and oxide thickness are driven by both power level and effective full power days (EFPD). The AOR assumed a core operating strategy which would maximize corrosion and oxide; running fuel for three full cycles, a total of 1830 EFPD. Table 2-1 of the AOR showed that the maximum predicted oxide thickness for U2C1 7 is 28.4 microns, well below the 100 micron limit. Operation at reduced power for longer time would not significantly change the fuel rod corrosion rate, and there is substantial margin to the 100 micron limit. | ||
Revised to address extended operation at reduced power.84 1.6.2 Engineering Change Package (ECP) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | 80 n/a AREVA Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
and | compatibility Compatibility was verified by AREVA as documented in revised U2C17 Reload Analysis Report (RAR). | ||
New 10CFR50.59 review issued to address the extended operation at reduced power.ECP: Affected Section Change (ASC) issued to address the extended operation at reduced power.Page 15 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | 81 n/a WEC Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEMI | compatibility Compatibility was verified by Westinghouse as documented in revised U2C17 RAR. | ||
DESCRIPTION | 82 n/a AREVA and WEC Chemistry Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
concurrence Concurrence for reduced power operation was performed by Westinghouse and AREVA as documented in revised U2C17 RAR. | |||
83 1.6.1 Reload Analysis Report (RAR) Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Revised to address extended operation at reduced power. | |||
84 1.6.2 Engineering Change Package (ECP) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | |||
and 10CFR5O.59 Review 10CFR50.59: New 10CFR50.59 review issued to address the extended operation at reduced power. | |||
ECP: Affected Section Change (ASC) issued to address the extended operation at reduced power. | |||
Page 15 | |||
Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM | |||
# CHECKLIST ITEMI SAECTION) DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)85 2.1.2 Physics Input to FLCEA Drop Analysis No change to analysis is required. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 85 2.1.2 Physics Input to FLCEA Drop Analysis No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and and PFDTME Verification burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels. | ||
Power distributions at the same power level and and PFDTME Verification burnup are essentially identical. | 86 2.1.3 Physics Input to PLCEA Drop Analysis No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels. | ||
Analysis performed at multiple power levels.86 2.1.3 Physics Input to PLCEA Drop Analysis No change to analysis is required. | 87 2.1.5 Physics Input to CEA Deviation Within No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and CPC Deadband burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels. | ||
Power distributions at the same power level and burnup are essentially identical. | 88 2.1.9 Refueling Boron Concentration No change to analysis is required. Analyzed at BOC, Mode 6. | ||
Analysis performed at multiple power levels.87 2.1.5 Physics Input to CEA Deviation Within No change to analysis is required. | 89 2.1.10 CIDSAL Physics Verification No change to analysis is required. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. T-inlet program remain unchanged. | ||
Power distributions at the same power level and CPC Deadband burnup are essentially identical. | 90 2.2.1 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Deviation within No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and Dead Band (DWDB) burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels. | ||
Analysis performed at multiple power levels.88 2.1.9 Refueling Boron Concentration No change to analysis is required. | 91 2.2.2 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - PLR Drop - No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and Power < 50% burnup are essentially identical. Event scenario is defined at < 50% Power. Scenarios at | ||
Analyzed at BOC, Mode 6.89 2.1.10 CIDSAL Physics Verification No change to analysis is required. | >50% power are discussed in "CEA Misoperation - Single Part Length CEA Drop (PLR Drop) - Power > 50%." | ||
Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. | 92 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Single Full Length No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and CEA Drop (FLCEA Drop) burnup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels. | ||
T-inlet program remain unchanged. | 93 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Single Part Length No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and CEA Drop (PLCEA Drop) - Power > burnup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels. | ||
90 2.2.1 (15.10.4.1.3) | 50% | ||
CEA Misoperation | 94 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Sub Group CEA No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and Drop bumup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels. | ||
-Deviation within No change to analysis is required. | 95 2.2.4 AOPM Analysis No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and burnup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels. | ||
Power distributions at the same power level and Dead Band (DWDB) burnup are essentially identical. | 96 2.2.5 Transient Thermal Margin Summary No change to analysis is required. Analyzed at multiple power levels. | ||
Analysis performed at multiple power levels.91 2.2.2 (15.10.4.1.3) | Page 16 | ||
CEA Misoperation | |||
-PLR Drop -No change to analysis is required. | Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | ||
Power distributions at the same power level and Power < 50% burnup are essentially identical. | |||
Event scenario is defined at < 50% Power. Scenarios at>50% power are discussed in "CEA Misoperation | |||
-Single Part Length CEA Drop (PLR Drop) -Power > 50%." 92 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) | |||
CEA Misoperation | |||
-Single Full Length No change to analysis is required. | |||
Power distributions at the same power level and CEA Drop (FLCEA Drop) burnup are essentially identical. | |||
Analyzed at multiple power levels.93 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) | |||
CEA Misoperation | |||
-Single Part Length No change to analysis is required. | |||
Power distributions at the same power level and CEA Drop (PLCEA Drop) -Power > burnup are essentially identical. | |||
Analyzed at multiple power levels.50%94 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) | |||
CEA Misoperation | |||
-Sub Group CEA No change to analysis is required. | |||
Power distributions at the same power level and Drop bumup are essentially identical. | |||
Analyzed at multiple power levels.95 2.2.4 AOPM Analysis No change to analysis is required. | |||
Power distributions at the same power level and burnup are essentially identical. | |||
Analyzed at multiple power levels.96 2.2.5 Transient Thermal Margin Summary No change to analysis is required. | |||
Analyzed at multiple power levels.Page 16 Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)97 2.2.6 (15.10.3.1.1) | # (UFSAR SECTION) 97 2.2.6 (15.10.3.1.1) Partial Loss of RCS Flow (PLOF) No change to analysis is required. Bounded by TLOF. | ||
Partial Loss of RCS Flow (PLOF) No change to analysis is required. | 98 2.2.6 (15.10.3.2.2) PLOF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Bounded by RCPSS. | ||
Bounded by TLOF.98 2.2.6 (15.10.3.2.2) | 99 2.2.6 (15.10.3.2.1) Total Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant No change to analysis is required. The total loss of coolant flow event was analyzed for a Flow (TLOF) bounding scenario at 100% power and a MTC of +0.5x10-4 Ap/°F. This scenario bounds all powers from 0 to 100%. | ||
PLOF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | 100 2.2.6 (15.10.3.3.3) TLOF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Bounded by RCPSS. | ||
Bounded by RCPSS.99 2.2.6 (15.10.3.2.1) | 101 2.2.7 CPC Dynamic Filter Analysis (including No change to analysis is required. The bounding events considered include CEA the Pressurizer Spray Malfunction) - Withdrawal, Excess Load events, etc. As the system response time for these events has not changed, the dynamic filter analysis remains conservative. | ||
Total Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant No change to analysis is required. | 102 2.3.4 MSOUA Database and Files No change to analysis is required. The impact of RCS flow uncertainty changes has been captured in MSOUA Post-Processor. | ||
The total loss of coolant flow event was analyzed for a Flow (TLOF) bounding scenario at 100% power and a MTC of +0.5x10-4 Ap/°F. This scenario bounds all powers from 0 to 100%.100 2.2.6 (15.10.3.3.3) | 103 2.3.5 CPC Reload Data Block (RDB) Update No change to analysis is required. Reduced power has been implemented through CPC Type 2 addressable constants, and not CPC RDB. | ||
TLOF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. | 104 2.3.6 MSOUA Post Processor Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Bounded by RCPSS.101 2.2.7 CPC Dynamic Filter Analysis (including No change to analysis is required. | Calculation has been revised for RCS flow uncertainty and the change in UNCERT from the FATES fuel performance analysis. | ||
The bounding events considered include CEA the Pressurizer Spray Malfunction) | 105 2.3.7 Core Operating Limits Supervisory No change to analysis is required. Calculation is a prediction of operating margin at full System (COLSS) & CPC Operating power. Reduced power increases operating margin. | ||
-Withdrawal, Excess Load events, etc. As the system response time for these events has not changed, the dynamic filter analysis remains conservative. | Margin Assessment 106 2.3.8 COLSS Database No change to analysis is required. No changes are being made to the manner in which COLSS functions or responds. Therefore the cycle independent constants do not require change. The installed Primary AT power Block I constants were verified to be bounding. | ||
102 2.3.4 MSOUA Database and Files No change to analysis is required. | The cycle specific constants that are impacted by reduced power operation have been addressed in the COLSS As-built Database and Test Cases calculation. | ||
The impact of RCS flow uncertainty changes has been captured in MSOUA Post-Processor. | 107 3.1.1 Full Core Load Map No change to analysis is required. Fuel management not changed. | ||
103 2.3.5 CPC Reload Data Block (RDB) Update No change to analysis is required. | Page 17 | ||
Reduced power has been implemented through CPC Type 2 addressable constants, and not CPC RDB.104 2.3.6 MSOUA Post Processor Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | |||
Calculation has been revised for RCS flow uncertainty and the change in UNCERT from the FATES fuel performance analysis.105 2.3.7 Core Operating Limits Supervisory No change to analysis is required. | Table I SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses | ||
Calculation is a prediction of operating margin at full System (COLSS) & CPC Operating power. Reduced power increases operating margin.Margin Assessment 106 2.3.8 COLSS Database No change to analysis is required. | {ITEM[ CHECKLIST ITEM ITEM SECTION) 1 DESCRIPTION | ||
No changes are being made to the manner in which COLSS functions or responds. | |||
Therefore the cycle independent constants do not require change. The installed Primary AT power Block I constants were verified to be bounding.The cycle specific constants that are impacted by reduced power operation have been addressed in the COLSS As-built Database and Test Cases calculation. | |||
107 3.1.1 Full Core Load Map No change to analysis is required. | |||
Fuel management not changed.Page 17 Table I SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | |||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses{ITEM[ CHECKLIST ITEM | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT | ||
# (UFSAR SECTION)108 3.1.3 As-Built Models and Depletions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | # (UFSAR SECTION) 108 3.1.3 As-Built Models and Depletions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Calculation was revised to address extended reduced power operation and to verify Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) compatibility operational requirements. | Calculation was revised to address extended reduced power operation and to verify Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) compatibility operational requirements. | ||
109 3.1.4 CECOR Coefficients Impacted, and all results were acceptable. | 109 3.1.4 CECOR Coefficients Impacted, and all results were acceptable. Calculation was revised to address extended reduced power operation. | ||
Calculation was revised to address extended reduced power operation. | 110 3.1.5 As-Built Mini Depletion Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
110 3.1.5 As-Built Mini Depletion Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | |||
Calculation revised to address extended reduced power operation. | Calculation revised to address extended reduced power operation. | ||
111 3.1.6 Decay Heat No change to analysis is required. | 111 3.1.6 Decay Heat No change to analysis is required. Decay heat was evaluated at end of Cycle 16 condition. The calculation specifically addresses outage times past 99 days. | ||
Decay heat was evaluated at end of Cycle 16 condition. | 112 3.1.7 Simulator Data Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
The calculation specifically addresses outage times past 99 days.112 3.1.7 Simulator Data Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | |||
Calculation revised to address extended reduced power operation. | Calculation revised to address extended reduced power operation. | ||
113 3.1.8 Special Nuclear Material Database No change to analysis is required. | 113 3.1.8 Special Nuclear Material Database No change to analysis is required. The change to Cycle 17 operating power will have no Update effect on prior cycle spent fuel and its characteristics. | ||
The change to Cycle 17 operating power will have no Update effect on prior cycle spent fuel and its characteristics. | 114 3.1.9 Plant Physics Data Book Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Data Book has been revised to address extended reduced power operation. | ||
114 3.1.9 Plant Physics Data Book Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | 115 3.1.10 Startup Physics Test Predictions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Data Book has been revised to address extended reduced power operation. | Calculation has been revised to address changes to startup testing power plateaus. | ||
115 3.1.10 Startup Physics Test Predictions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | 116 3.2.1 COLSS As-built Database and Test Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
Calculation has been revised to address changes to startup testing power plateaus.116 3.2.1 COLSS As-built Database and Test Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | Cases Calculation has been revised to address extended reduced power operation impact on the cycle specific COLSS reload constants for DNBR & Linear Heat Rate (LHR) penalties. | ||
Cases Calculation has been revised to address extended reduced power operation impact on the cycle specific COLSS reload constants for DNBR & Linear Heat Rate (LHR) penalties. | 117 3.2.2 CEFAST Database Analysis Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | ||
117 3.2.2 CEFAST Database Analysis Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. | |||
Calculation has been revised to address extended reduced power operation impact on the cycle specific CPC reload constants for DNBR & Local Power Density (LPD) penalties. | Calculation has been revised to address extended reduced power operation impact on the cycle specific CPC reload constants for DNBR & Local Power Density (LPD) penalties. | ||
Page 18 Table 2 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation | Page 18 | ||
-Summary of Impact Assessment of Core Design and Monitoring Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements I # Power Applicability and Summary of Impact Assessment for | |||
Table 2 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Core Design and Monitoring Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Surv # | |||
I # | |||
Surveillance Topic Power Applicability and Surveillance Frequency I Summary of Impact Assessment for Performing at 68-70% Power 3.1.3.1 Reactivity Balance Every 31 EFPD Steady state power (not full power) is required 3.1.4.1 MTC within positive limit Prior to Mode 1 Performed at Hot Zero Power and projected to BOG 70% | |||
conditions 3.1.4.2 MTC within negative limit Within 14 EFPD of peak Boron @ Peak boron occurs at BOG, - performed at Hot Zero Power RTP and projected to HFP EOC conditions 3.1.4.2 MTC within negative limit Within +/- 30 EFPD of Steady state power (not full power) is required; projected to 2/3 of expected core burnup HFP EOC conditions 3.2.2.1 CPC & COLSS Fxy > Between 40% - 85% (i.e., prior to 68%-70% is within the power range required for measured Fxy (CECOR) exceeding 85%) surveillance 3.2.2.1 CPC & COLSS Fxy > Every 31 EFPD Steady state power (not full power) is required Measured Fxy (CECOR) 3.2.3.3 CPC Azimuthal Tilt > Every 31 EFPD Steady state power (not full power) is required Measured Tilt (CECOR) 3.3.1.2 RCS Flow in CPCs < Every 12 hours (not required until Procedure changed to perform surveillance at Ž68% power Measured RCS Flow 12 hours after power > 85% RTP) 3.3.1.5 RCS Flow by calorimetric Every 31 days (not required until Procedure changed to perform surveillance at > 68% | |||
12 hours after power > 85% RTP) power, and to require additional margin when surveillance is performed during extended operation at < 95% power 3.3.1.11 CPC Shape Annealing Prior to exceeding 85% A minimum ASI change, rather than a specific power level, Matrix (SAM) Verification is required N/A Startup Test Activity Normally performed after reaching Results are already adjusted from actual test conditions to Reduction Program full power RTP conditions as a part of the test method Reactivity Balance HZP - HFP Page 19}} |
Latest revision as of 08:59, 6 February 2020
ML13022A411 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | San Onofre ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/21/2013 |
From: | St.Onge R Southern California Edison Co |
To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
TAC ME9727 | |
Download: ML13022A411 (21) | |
Text
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Richard I. St. Onge Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Emergency Planning An EDISON INTERNATIONAL Company January 21, 2013 10 CFR 50.4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Docket No. 50-361 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI 11)
Regarding Confirmatory Action Letter Response (TAC No. ME 9727)
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
References:
- 1. Letter from Mr. Elmo E. Collins (USNRC) to Mr. Peter T. Dietrich (SCE), dated March 27, 2012, Confirmatory Action Letter 4-12-001, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Commitments to Address Steam Generator Tube Degradation
- 2. Letter from Mr. Peter T. Dietrich (SCE) to Mr. Elmo E. Collins (USNRC), dated October 3, 2012, Confirmatory Action Letter - Actions to Address Steam Generator Tube Degradation, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
- 3. Letter from Mr. James R. Hall (USNRC) to Mr. Peter T. Dietrich (SCE), dated December 26, 2012, Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Confirmatory Action Letter, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
Dear Sir or Madam,
On March 27, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) (Reference 1) to Southern California Edison (SCE) describing actions that the NRC and SCE agreed would be completed to address issues identified in the steam generator tubes of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3. In a letter to the NRC dated October 3, 2012 (Reference 2), SCE reported completion of the Unit 2 CAL actions and included a Return to Service Report (RTSR) that provided details of their completion.
By letter dated December 26, 2012 (Reference 3), the NRC issued Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the CAL response. Enclosure 1 of this letter provides the response to RAI 11.
P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92672
Document Control Desk January 21, 2013 There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please call me at (949) 368-6240.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
- 1. Response to RAI 11 cc: E. E. Collins, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV J. R. Hall, NRC Project Manager, SONGS Units 2 and 3 G. G. Warnick, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, SONGS Units 2 and 3 R. E. Lantz, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region IV
ENCLOSURE 1 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING RESPONSE TO CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER DOCKET NO. 50-361 TAC NO. ME 9727 Response to RAI 11 Page 1
RAI 11
Please submit an operational impact assessment for operation at 70% power. The assessment should focus on the cycle safety analysis and establish whether operation at 70% power is within the scope of SCE's safety analysis methodology, and that analyses and evaluations have been performed to conclude operation at 70% power for an extended period of time is safe.
The evaluation should also demonstrate that the existing Technical Specifications, including limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power.
RESPONSE
Note: This response includes information requested in RAI 14 associated with the operational impact assessment for operation at 70% power. RAI 14 states: "Provide a summary disposition of the U2C1 7 calculations relative to the planned reduction in power operation."
SCE has evaluated the extended reduced power operation for its impacts on the Unit 2 Cycle 17 reload core design and safety analysis. The power levels evaluated range from 50% to 100%
rated thermal power, which bounds the planned operation at the 70% power level. The assessments were performed in accordance with NRC approved SONGS reload methodology and topical reports referenced in the UFSAR and Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1.5, and the SONGS Core Reload Analyses and Activities Checklist procedure.
The impacts of extended reduced power operation on Unit 2 Cycle 17 core design and reload analyses, including UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses are summarized in Table 1, the impact assessment table. The impact assessment table is organized consistent with the SONGS Core Reload Analyses and Activities Checklist procedure. For each analysis, the Reload Checklist item number is listed in the second column from the left; when applicable, the second column also lists the UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis section number. The determination of impact for each analysis is summarized in the right column of the table.
Safety Analysis Methodology The NRC approved safety analysis methods, as described in TS 5.7.1.5, are used to establish the core operating limits specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) which encompass from Mode 6 up to Mode 1 operation at the rated thermal power. Therefore, operating at the 70% power level is within the scope of SCE safety analysis methodology. No change to the safety analysis methodology is required for extended reduced power operation.
Safety Analysis The reload and safety analyses determined to be impacted by extended reduced power operation were re-analyzed. The conclusions of the reload analyses, including safety analyses, for extended reduced power operation are as follows: (1) All safety analyses results meet the established acceptance criteria, and (2) The radiological dose consequences for all safety analyses remain bounded by the dose consequences reported in the UFSAR.
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Technical Specifications The existing TS, including limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power. The impact assessment for TS surveillance requirements is described in the following section.
Impact Assessment for Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements The TS surveillance requirements were evaluated for the impacts of reduced power operation.
The evaluation concluded all TS surveillance requirements under the reactor core design and monitoring program that would have been performed at approximately 82% power or at full power will be performed with the plant operating at approximately 70% power. The evaluation is summarized in Table 2.
Two surveillance procedures related to monitoring Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow were revised to (1) reduce the minimum power required to perform the surveillances from 85% to 68% power, and to (2) account for the slightly increased RCS flow uncertainty at reduced power operation. No other surveillances were identified to be impacted by plant operation at 70%
power.
Conclusions Extended reduced power operation at 70% power has been evaluated and determined to be acceptable with respect to Unit 2 Cycle 17 reload core design and safety analysis. Reload analyses needed to support reactor startup and operation at 70% power have been completed.
All TS LCO and surveillance requirements under the reactor core design and monitoring program normally performed at or above 70% power will be performed with the plant operating at approximately 70% power. The above evaluations demonstrate that the existing TSs, including limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements, are applicable for extended operation at 70% power.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM 1
- (UFSAR SECTION) DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 0.1 Reload Ground Rules (RGR) Review No change to analysis is required. No change to Rated Thermal Power (RTP). RGR still addresses 0% to 100% RTP operation. RGR addresses the full range of power independent and power dependent operating parameters, including those applicable at reduced power. The RGR Analysis Value defines the maximum or minimum value which must be bounded in the safety analysis. The number is not necessarily equivalent to the value used in an analysis (or Technical Specification) but will be conservative with respect to that value. The RGR Analysis Value includes applicable uncertainties and margins for which the safety analyses must be bounding.
2 1.1.3 Design Models and Depletions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation revised to document depletion at 50% power from Beginning of Cycle (BOC) to End of Cycle (EOC) and comparison to 100% power. SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 ($2C17) at 50% power results in radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) essentially identical to depleting the core at 100% power.
As the radial power distributions and distortion factors have been determined to be valid, no downstream analyses are impacted.
Impact of extended reduced power operation on generic axial shapes and scram curves is addressed in Item 10 (1-D HERMITE model.)
3 1.1.4 Design Parameters and FR Versus No change to analysis is required. Radial power distributions and generic axial shapes Power remain applicable. Individual Control Element Assembly (CEA) worth, CEA bank worth, scram worth, peaking factors, distortion factors that are strongly dependent on the radial power distribution remain applicable. Extended reduced power operation results in less Pu-239 inventory. As such, generic bounding parameters (i.e., Fuel Temperature Coefficient (FTC), Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC), kinetics parameters) remain applicable. Critical Boron Concentrations (CBC) at Beginning of Cycle (BOC) are not affected. CBC at End of Cycle (EOC) is similar. Therefore, bounding boron concentration requirements and Inverse Boron Worths (IBW) are not impacted. Representative design parameter and Fr values for Reload Analysis Report (RAR) are not impacted.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM ICHECKLIST C ITEM 11 SECTION) DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 4 1.1.5 Physics Input to LOCA, TORC, and No change to analysis is required for the physics inputs to LOCA analysis and TORC FATES Analysis (including Pin code analysis. BOC, limiting boron concentration, reactivity are not affected. Radial Census) power distribution and peaking data remain applicable. Generic LOCA and TORC input parameters remain applicable.
Re-analysis was performed for the physics input to Fuel Performance Analysis (FATES) code analysis. Radial fall-off curves, Fr, and fast flux data were regenerated for reduced power operation. Generic axial shapes remain applicable.
5 1.1.6 Physics Input to Fuel Mechanical Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Design Calculation revised to provide power history data for AREVA Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) mechanical design analysis. Also updated maximum core residence time for Westinghouse analysis. Other generic parameters for Westinghouse mechanical design analysis remain applicable due to similar radial power distribution.
6 1.1.7 Physics Input to ASGT No change to analysis is required. Physics Input to Asymmetric Steam Generator Transient (ASGT) is performed at EOC with most negative Technical Specification MTC.
Calculations performed at multiple power levels (90%, 70%, 50%, and 20%). Due to similar power distributions, results remain applicable.
7 1.1.8 Physics Input to Post-Trip Steam Line No change to analysis is required. Analysis performed at EOC. Radial power distributions Break Analysis (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. The MTC is tuned to the most negative Tech Spec value (-3.7E-4 Ak/k/fF). Cooling down adds reactivity. More reactivity is added cooling from 100% power (higher T-fuel and T-mod) than reduced power to lower temperatures (e.g., 5450 F, 3000 F, 2000 F, 68°F) 8 1.1.9 Physics Input to CEA Ejection Analysis No change to analysis is required. Physics data in this analysis were generated at multiple power levels and the reduced power operating range is covered. Since the reduced power operation results in power distributions essentially identical to those from 100% power operation, the data generated from the original analysis are applicable to reduced power operation.
9 1.1.10 Physics Input to CEA Withdrawal No change to analysis is required. Calculations performed at multiple power levels.
Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essential identical.
CEA worth remains applicable since it is strongly dependent on power distribution.
Limiting axial power shapes from axial shape index (ASI) search remain applicable.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM IE DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 10 1.1.11 1-D HERMITE Model Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Analysis is revised to establish applicability of the generic axial shapes used in the design analyses and applicability of the SCRAM curves used in the design analyses. Analysis also shows that depletion at reduced power leads to essentially the same limiting shapes from ASI search as those selected for the analyses of the design depletions.
11 1.1.12 Physics Input to Steam Line Break No change to analysis is required. This EOC event begins at 0% power. Radial power Return-to-Power for Cycle N-1 distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical.
Configuration 12 1.1.13 FR Versus Temperature for Cooldown No change to analysis is required. Bounding distortion factors were determined based on Events multiple CEA configurations, temperature ranges at BOC and EOC. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical.
13 1.1.14 Boron Requirement for SITs and No change to analysis is required. The case run for this calculation is performed at hot BAMU Tanks zero power (HZP). The Xenon starting condition is Hot Full Power (HFP) which is conservative.
14 1.1.15 LOCA and Non-LOCA Source Term No change to analysis is required. This analysis tests the Cycle 17 conditions of interest against the parameters required for applicability of the LOCA and Alternative Source Term (AST) source terms. The power level is used as a maximum not to be exceeded. Running Cycle 17 at reduced power results in less "short half-life" nuclides. Increase in "long half-life" nuclides due to extended calendar time is bounded by the lower production from extended reduced power.
15 1.1.16 Tritium Production No change to analysis is required. Reduced power results in a decrease in tritium production. The analysis at 100% power is conservative.
16 1.1.17 STAR Physics Verification No change to analysis is required. This analysis uses BOC (HZP) conditions (Mode 3) for an assessment for S2C 17 inclusion in the Startup Test Activity Reduction (STAR) program.
17 1.1.18 Digital Setpoints Physics Data No change to analysis is required. The case sets encompass LCO and Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) ASI ranges. Power level does not impact axial shapes significantly, so reduced powers are covered by the case set.
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Table I SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM I ICHECKLIST CAECTION) ITEM1 DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 18 1.1.19 Physics RAR Inputs Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. RAR has been updated to reflect actual Cycle 16 EOC burnup and Cycle 17 reduced power operation.
19 1.2.1 Fuel Performance Analysis (FATES) Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Reduced power results in fuel performance data that is not bounded when compared to the Generic Fuel Performance data generated for ZIRLOTM in Cycle 14 (data used in LOCA Analysis). A revision to the Fuel Performance and Setpoints Analyses was performed to determine the appropriate penalty factors such that the Generic Fuel Performance data remained bounding.
20 1.2.2 T-H Input Summary No change to analysis is required. Calculation is a collection of input data that are not impacted by reduced power.
21 1.2.4 T-H Limiting Assembly and CETOP No change to analysis is required. Power is not an input. Calculation is a benchmark of Benchmarking Analysis CETOP to TORC computer codes at reference departure from nucleate boiling (DNBR) points rather than a benchmark at a given power. This benchmark is mainly driven by power distributions from physics. Physics Models & Depletions has validated the power distributions used in the original calculation.
22 1.2.5 Mechanical Design Analysis (Fuel Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Vendor) Westinghouse performed calculations to determine the impact of reduced power on the fuel mechanical design.
AREVA performed calculations to determine the impact of reduced power on the Lead Fuel Assembly fuel mechanical design.
23 1.2.6 Power Operating Limit Partial No change to analysis is required. The calculation is driven by a large family of axial Derivative Verification shapes, which are not impacted by the power reduction.
24 1.2.7 Setpoints Input Summary Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation has been revised to address the increased reactor coolant system (RCS) flow uncertainty at reduced power.
25 1.2.8 RCS Flow Uncertainties Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Has been reanalyzed. RCS flow uncertainty increases due to reduced delta-temperature and increased secondary calorimetric power uncertainty.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 26 1.2.9 Fuel Mechanical Design Verification No change to analysis is required. The objective of the fuel mechanical design verification calculation is to document the design of the fuel based on the fuel vendor Bill of Materials, Design Drawings and the design and material specifications transmitted from the fuel vendor. Reduced power operation has no impact on this analysis.
27 1.2.11 Secondary Calorimetric Power No change to analysis is required. Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the Uncertainty original calculation.
28 1.2.12 Delta-T/Turbine Power Uncertainties No change to analysis is required. The analysis uses a reference power error of 1.3% at full power. The increase in reference power (i.e., secondary calorimetric power) associated with performing delta-t/turbine power calibrations at reduced power would increase the uncertainties. The bounding results include -0.50% of conservatism; therefore, the analysis of record (AOR) remains bounding. Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the original calculation.
29 1.2.13 Cycle Independent Data and Setpoints No change to analysis is required. CIDSAL provides cycle independent values to use or to Assumptions List (CIDSAL) be verified in downstream analyses. Reduced power operation does not impact the requirements for downstream analysis verification. None of the calculations explicitly performed in the analysis section are dependent upon nominal plant operating conditions or the power shapes/distributions at reduced power operation.
30 1.2.16 Core Protection Calculator (CPC) No change to analysis is required. Intermediate powers were explicitly analyzed in the Calibration Allowances original calculation. Due to less decalibration, full power bounds lower power levels.
31 1.2.17 Fuel Duty Index No change to analysis is required. Full power bounds lower power levels.
32 1.2.18 T-H MSCU Verification No change to analysis is required. Power is not an input. Calculation is a verification of response surface at reference DNBR points rather than a benchmark at a given power.
33 1.2.19 CEA STAR Verification No change to analysis is required. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. At reduced power the plan is to continue to operate with all rods out. The duration and depth of lead bank CEA insertion beyond the typical all-rods-out position is monitored per the core follow procedure with notification/action to review the conservative CEA life analysis when insertion exceeds an insertion assumption within the analysis.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 34 1.3.1 Summary of Transients Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation was revised to perform an evaluation of all Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15 events for extended reduced power operation.
35 1.3.2 CENTS Cycle Update and Action No change to analysis is required. Calculation and associated computer files already Modules accommodate power levels from 0 to 100 percent.
36 1.3.3 (15.10.1.3.1.1) Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) No change to analysis is required. Pre-trip SLB is analyzed @100% power (with Pre-Trip uncertainty). The generic physics inputs remain unchanged. Since the VOPT is generated on the rate of change in power setpoint (DELSPV), the actual trip occurs at the same power rise, independent of the starting power level. As this is a Required Over Power Margin (ROPM) event, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event.
37 1.3.4 (15.10.1.3.1.2) MSLB Post-Trip No change to analysis is required. This event is limiting at hot zero power (HZP). HZP cases show greatest return to power since there is minimum initial stored energy, decay heat and scram worth at HZP conditions. There is no impact to the HZP cases since HZP physics inputs and initial conditions do not change. A reactivity balance for reduced power showed that net reactivity change remained negative.
38 1.3.5 (15.10.4.1.4) Chemical Volume Control System No change to analysis is required. This is a BOC event that is not analyzed in Mode 1.
(CVCS) Malfunction - Boron Dilution The reactivity addition due to a boron dilution event is less adverse than the CEA Withdrawal event at Power and therefore Mode 1 and the higher power portion of Mode 2 are not explicitly addressed.
39 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.1) CEA Bank Withdrawal from Subcritical No change to analysis is required. Event is evaluated at subcritical conditions. Note that (CEAW @ SC) this event is being re-evaluated to address the extended shut down.
40 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.1) CEA Bank Withdrawal at Low Power No change to analysis is required. Event is evaluated at hot zero power conditions.
(CEAW @ HZP) 41 1.3.6 (15.10.4.1.2) CEA Bank Withdrawal at Power No change to analysis is required. CEAW at reduced power is enveloped by CEAW @
(CEAW @ Power, 50% & 100%) 50% Power and CEAW @ 100% Power; and the results are acceptable.
42 1.3.8 (15.10.1.1.3) Increased Main Steam Flow (IMSF) No change to analysis is required. The system response is the same as IMSF+SF.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST (USA ITEM1 SECTION) DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 43 1.3.8 (15.10.1.2.3) IMSF with Single Failure (SF) No change to analysis is required. IMSF+SF (fast & slow) analyzed @100% power. The generic physics inputs remain unchanged. The fast case credits the VOPT which is generated on the rate of change in power (DELSPV) setpoint, as such the actual trip occurs at the same power rise, independent of the starting power level. Since the fast case is a Required Over Power Margin (ROPM) event, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event. The limiting event is the slow trip, which is initiated from a Power Operating Limit. As such, the actual initial power level chosen is not significant to the event.
44 1.3.9 (15.10.4.3.2) CEA Ejection Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. The event is normally analyzed at multiple power levels. It was reanalyzed to address reduced power data from the fuel performance analysis.
45 1.3.10 (15.10.3.3.1) Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Seizure No change to analysis is required. Bounded by Reactor Coolant Pump Sheared Shaft (RCPSS).
46 1.3.10 (15.10.3.3.2) Reactor Coolant Pump Sheared Shaft No change to analysis is required. This is a margin/ fuel failure calculation event. The (RCPSS) thermal margin loss for this event is initiated by the loss of flow from one pump (either seized rotor or sheared shaft). The reduction of thermal margin due to the loss of flow from one pump is not a function of the initial power (i.e., is constant at any power level).
In addition, at reduced power, the initial thermal margin is larger than at the 100% power condition. Therefore, the analysis at full power is bounding.
47 1.3.11 (15.10.2.1.3) Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV) No change to analysis is required. Bounded by LOCV+SF 48 1.3.11 (15.10.2.2.3) LOCV with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. This event is driven by plant response and not by detailed core physics. There are two criteria (peak RCS pressure and peak secondary pressure). At lower powers, there is less internal energy in the reactor core, which translates into a slower RCS pressure transient that is more rapidly mitigated by main steam safety valves (MSSVs). The peak secondary pressure event is evaluated at multiple power levels to establish the allowed power level as a function of the number of gagged MSSVs (Tech Spec 3.7.1).
49 1.3.12 (15.10.6.3.2) Steam Generator Tube Rupture No change to analysis is required. The SGTR is a slow event and not sensitive to initial (SGTR) power. Furthermore, at lower powers there is a higher secondary pressure that translates to lower primary-to-secondary rupture flow (i.e., lower activity release).
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 50 1.3.13 (15.10.1.1.4) Inadvertent Opening of a Steam No change to analysis is required. See IOSGADV+SF Generator Safety or an Atmospheric Dump Valve (IOSGADV) 51 1.3.14 (15.10.1.2.4) IOSGADV with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The IOSGADV+SF is analyzed at a power level of 1 1 MWt.
52 1.3.15 (15.10.9.1.1) Asymmetric Steam Generator No change to analysis is required. The ASGT event was analyzed in the AOR at multiple Transient (ASGT) power levels (90%, 70%, 50%, and 20%).
53 1.3.16 (15.10.1.1.1) Decrease in Feedwater Temp (DFWT) No change to analysis is required. Since feedwater heating is reduced at reduced power, the potential loss in feedwater heating is also reduced. Impact at reduced power is also mitigated by increased mass in RCS and Steam Generators (SGs) and increased recirculation in SGs at lower power.
54 1.3.17 (15.10.1.2.1) DFWT with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Since feedwater heating is reduced at reduced power, the potential loss in feedwater heating is also reduced. Impact at reduced power is also mitigated by increased mass in RCS and Steam Generators and increased recirculation in SGs at lower power.
55 1.3.18 (15.10.1.1.2) Increase in Feedwater Flow (IFF) No change to analysis is required. Primary to secondary heat transfer is dominated by heat of vaporization (Hfg) which is considerably greater than steam generator enthalpy rise resulting from sensible heat. Consequently, cool downs resulting from Increases in Feedwater Flow events are limited by Increases in Main Steam Flow events. Further, Increases in Steam Flow events occur more rapidly as changes in Feed Water are mitigated by the liquid mass and recirculation flow in the steam generators. Further factors that mitigate Increasing Feedwater Flow events at reduced power include greater RCS /
SG mass, increased recirculation flow in the sfeam generators, greater steam generator pressure and earlier reactor trip from increased feedwater flow - steam flow mismatch.
56 1.3.18 (15.10.1.2.2) IFF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The most adverse single failure postulated for IFF is the opening of all Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) valves. Because the Increase in Main Steam Flow (IMSF) event postulates the opening of all SBCS valves and assumes that Main Feedwater flow increases to match steam flow, the IFF with Single Failure is the essentially the same event as the IMSF event. Therefore, conclusions regarding IMSF are applicable to IFF with Single Failure.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 57 1.3.19 (15.10.2.1.1) Loss of External Load (LOL) No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV.
58 1.3.19 (15.10.2.2.1) LOL with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load with single failure, Turbine Trip with single failure, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum with single failure are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV+SF.
59 1.3.19 (15.10.2.1.2) Turbine Trip (TT) No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV.
60 1.3.19 (15.10.2.2.2) TT with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The system response to the Loss of External Load with single failure, Turbine Trip with single failure, and the Loss of Condenser Vacuum with single failure are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such these events remain bounded by LOCV+SF.
61 1.3.20 (15.10.2.1.4) Loss of Normal AC Power (LONAC) No change to analysis is required. See LONAC+SF 62 1.3.20 (15.10.2.2.4) LONAC with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink.
63 1.3.21 (15.10.2.2.5) Loss of Normal Feedwater (LONF or No change to analysis is required. See LOFW+SF LOFW) 64 1.3.21 (15.10.2.3.2) LOFW with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 65 1.3.22 (15.10.2.3.1) Feedwater System Pipe Breaks (FSPB No change to analysis is required. Peak primary and secondary pressure events were or FWLB) analyzed at the least negative MTC value and main feedwater enthalpy corresponding to full power. The slightly higher MTC corresponding to reduced power is offset by the lower main feedwater enthalpy at reduced power. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink. The energy in the plant is less at reduced power relative to full power, and therefore pressurizer overfill is bounded by the full power response.
66 1.3.23 (15.10.5.1.1) CVCS Malfunction No change to analysis is required. See CVCS Malfunction+SF.
67 1.3.23 (15.10.5.2.1) CVCS Malfunction with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The energy in the plant is less at reduced power relative to full power, and therefore pressurizer overfill is bounded by the full power response. Operation at lower power level is less challenging with respect to maintaining an adequate heat sink.
68 1.3.24 Pressurizer Spray Malfunction No change to analysis is required. See Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Dynamic Filter Analysis.
69 1.3.25 (15.10.4.1.5) Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) - Start No change to analysis is required. Modes 1 and 2 were not analyzed because operation Up of an Inactive Loop in these Modes is only allowed with all 4 RCPs running.
70 1.3.27 (15.10.4.3.2) CEA Ejection (peak pressure analysis) No change to analysis is required. The event is limiting at hot zero power (HZP).
71 1.4 (15.10.6.3.3) Emergency Core Cooling System Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Impact (ECCS) Analyses including LBLOCA, assessment addressed in analyses performed by Fuel Vendors.
SBLOCA and LTC 72 (15.10.5.1.2) Inadvertent Operation of ECCS at No change to analysis is required. The system response to the IOECCS and CVCS Power (IOECCS) malfunction events are essentially the same. Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power. As such this event continues to be bounded by CVCS malfunction event.
73 (15.10.5.2.2) IOECCS with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. The system response to the IOECCS with single failure and CVCS malfunction with single failure events are essentially the same.
Therefore, the relationship between the events will remain the same at reduced power.
As such this event continues to be bounded by CVCS malfunction event with single failure.
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Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 74 (15.10.6.3.1) Primary Sample or Instrument Line No change to analysis is required. Mass releases are driven by energy in the primary Break (PSILB) system which is highest following operation at HFP. The event does not fail fuel, and there is no ROPM requirement.
75 (15.10.6.3.4) Inadvertent Opening of a PSV (IOPSV) No change to analysis is required. The IOPSV event is bounded by small break LOCA.
76 1.5.1 Applicability Evaluation of Source No change to analysis is required. There is no change to core activity inventory source Terms in Dose Analyses term.
77 1.5.2 Cycle Specific Dose Analysis No change to analysis is required. No Cycle 17 event-specific dose analysis was performed, therefore no impact for reduced power.
78 1.5.4 Applicability Evaluation of Dose Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Revised Analyses to document that the currently modeled radial peaking factors are conservatively greater than the increased radial peaking factors at reduced power.
The transient analyses and mass release analyses are evaluated at the current 8% steam generator (SG) tube plugging limit. The dose calculation uses mass release data per the transient analyses and their assumed 8% SG tube plugging models. The calculation is revised with discretionary conservatism to model 20% SG tube plugging in the calculation of the RCS dilution volume and mass considered for non-LOCA events which have clad damage. Evaluated RCS dilution mass at RCS temperatures for both 50% and 100%
power, which envelopes powers between 50% and 100%.
The mass release calculations are evaluated for a core inlet temperature (Tcold) of 560F, which maximizes core average temperature (Tave). Currently modeled mass release values in the Summary of Transients (SOT) correspond to full power operation. The SOT did not identify an increase in the amount of steam released from the secondary side because it remains more limiting compared to operation at lower power level due to lower sensible heat in the RCS and lower post trip decay heat.
Page 14
Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM 1
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) DESCRIPTION 79 n/a Fuel Corrosion and Oxide Thickness No change to analysis is required.
(BOA Code) analysis The Westinghouse BOA code analysis for cycles 15, 16 and 17 was performed as part of the Zinc Injection project. This calculation compared predicted values for corrosion and oxide thickness, Fuel Duty Index and crud dryout to the Westinghouse Chemistry Guideline limits.
Maximum values of Fuel Duty Index and Crud Dryout are driven by fresh fuel operating at high power. Operation at reduced power would be bounded by the 100% power cases run in the analysis of record (AOR).
Maximum values of corrosion and oxide thickness are driven by both power level and effective full power days (EFPD). The AOR assumed a core operating strategy which would maximize corrosion and oxide; running fuel for three full cycles, a total of 1830 EFPD. Table 2-1 of the AOR showed that the maximum predicted oxide thickness for U2C1 7 is 28.4 microns, well below the 100 micron limit. Operation at reduced power for longer time would not significantly change the fuel rod corrosion rate, and there is substantial margin to the 100 micron limit.
80 n/a AREVA Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
compatibility Compatibility was verified by AREVA as documented in revised U2C17 Reload Analysis Report (RAR).
81 n/a WEC Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
compatibility Compatibility was verified by Westinghouse as documented in revised U2C17 RAR.
82 n/a AREVA and WEC Chemistry Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
concurrence Concurrence for reduced power operation was performed by Westinghouse and AREVA as documented in revised U2C17 RAR.
83 1.6.1 Reload Analysis Report (RAR) Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Revised to address extended operation at reduced power.
84 1.6.2 Engineering Change Package (ECP) Re-evaluation was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
and 10CFR5O.59 Review 10CFR50.59: New 10CFR50.59 review issued to address the extended operation at reduced power.
ECP: Affected Section Change (ASC) issued to address the extended operation at reduced power.
Page 15
Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM
- CHECKLIST ITEMI SAECTION) DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 85 2.1.2 Physics Input to FLCEA Drop Analysis No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and and PFDTME Verification burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels.
86 2.1.3 Physics Input to PLCEA Drop Analysis No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels.
87 2.1.5 Physics Input to CEA Deviation Within No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and CPC Deadband burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels.
88 2.1.9 Refueling Boron Concentration No change to analysis is required. Analyzed at BOC, Mode 6.
89 2.1.10 CIDSAL Physics Verification No change to analysis is required. Radial power distributions (at the same power level and burnup) are essentially identical. T-inlet program remain unchanged.
90 2.2.1 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Deviation within No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and Dead Band (DWDB) burnup are essentially identical. Analysis performed at multiple power levels.
91 2.2.2 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - PLR Drop - No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and Power < 50% burnup are essentially identical. Event scenario is defined at < 50% Power. Scenarios at
>50% power are discussed in "CEA Misoperation - Single Part Length CEA Drop (PLR Drop) - Power > 50%."
92 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Single Full Length No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and CEA Drop (FLCEA Drop) burnup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels.
93 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Single Part Length No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and CEA Drop (PLCEA Drop) - Power > burnup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels.
50%
94 2.2.3 (15.10.4.1.3) CEA Misoperation - Sub Group CEA No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and Drop bumup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels.
95 2.2.4 AOPM Analysis No change to analysis is required. Power distributions at the same power level and burnup are essentially identical. Analyzed at multiple power levels.
96 2.2.5 Transient Thermal Margin Summary No change to analysis is required. Analyzed at multiple power levels.
Page 16
Table 1 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses ITEM CHECKLIST ITEM DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 97 2.2.6 (15.10.3.1.1) Partial Loss of RCS Flow (PLOF) No change to analysis is required. Bounded by TLOF.
98 2.2.6 (15.10.3.2.2) PLOF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Bounded by RCPSS.
99 2.2.6 (15.10.3.2.1) Total Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant No change to analysis is required. The total loss of coolant flow event was analyzed for a Flow (TLOF) bounding scenario at 100% power and a MTC of +0.5x10-4 Ap/°F. This scenario bounds all powers from 0 to 100%.
100 2.2.6 (15.10.3.3.3) TLOF with Single Failure No change to analysis is required. Bounded by RCPSS.
101 2.2.7 CPC Dynamic Filter Analysis (including No change to analysis is required. The bounding events considered include CEA the Pressurizer Spray Malfunction) - Withdrawal, Excess Load events, etc. As the system response time for these events has not changed, the dynamic filter analysis remains conservative.
102 2.3.4 MSOUA Database and Files No change to analysis is required. The impact of RCS flow uncertainty changes has been captured in MSOUA Post-Processor.
103 2.3.5 CPC Reload Data Block (RDB) Update No change to analysis is required. Reduced power has been implemented through CPC Type 2 addressable constants, and not CPC RDB.
104 2.3.6 MSOUA Post Processor Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation has been revised for RCS flow uncertainty and the change in UNCERT from the FATES fuel performance analysis.
105 2.3.7 Core Operating Limits Supervisory No change to analysis is required. Calculation is a prediction of operating margin at full System (COLSS) & CPC Operating power. Reduced power increases operating margin.
Margin Assessment 106 2.3.8 COLSS Database No change to analysis is required. No changes are being made to the manner in which COLSS functions or responds. Therefore the cycle independent constants do not require change. The installed Primary AT power Block I constants were verified to be bounding.
The cycle specific constants that are impacted by reduced power operation have been addressed in the COLSS As-built Database and Test Cases calculation.
107 3.1.1 Full Core Load Map No change to analysis is required. Fuel management not changed.
Page 17
Table I SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Reload and UFSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analyses
{ITEM[ CHECKLIST ITEM ITEM SECTION) 1 DESCRIPTION
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- (UFSAR SECTION) 108 3.1.3 As-Built Models and Depletions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation was revised to address extended reduced power operation and to verify Lead Fuel Assembly (LFA) compatibility operational requirements.
109 3.1.4 CECOR Coefficients Impacted, and all results were acceptable. Calculation was revised to address extended reduced power operation.
110 3.1.5 As-Built Mini Depletion Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation revised to address extended reduced power operation.
111 3.1.6 Decay Heat No change to analysis is required. Decay heat was evaluated at end of Cycle 16 condition. The calculation specifically addresses outage times past 99 days.
112 3.1.7 Simulator Data Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation revised to address extended reduced power operation.
113 3.1.8 Special Nuclear Material Database No change to analysis is required. The change to Cycle 17 operating power will have no Update effect on prior cycle spent fuel and its characteristics.
114 3.1.9 Plant Physics Data Book Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable. Data Book has been revised to address extended reduced power operation.
115 3.1.10 Startup Physics Test Predictions Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation has been revised to address changes to startup testing power plateaus.
116 3.2.1 COLSS As-built Database and Test Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Cases Calculation has been revised to address extended reduced power operation impact on the cycle specific COLSS reload constants for DNBR & Linear Heat Rate (LHR) penalties.
117 3.2.2 CEFAST Database Analysis Re-analysis was performed to determine impact, and all results were acceptable.
Calculation has been revised to address extended reduced power operation impact on the cycle specific CPC reload constants for DNBR & Local Power Density (LPD) penalties.
Page 18
Table 2 SONGS Unit 2 Cycle 17 Reduced Power Operation - Summary of Impact Assessment of Core Design and Monitoring Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Surv #
I #
Surveillance Topic Power Applicability and Surveillance Frequency I Summary of Impact Assessment for Performing at 68-70% Power 3.1.3.1 Reactivity Balance Every 31 EFPD Steady state power (not full power) is required 3.1.4.1 MTC within positive limit Prior to Mode 1 Performed at Hot Zero Power and projected to BOG 70%
conditions 3.1.4.2 MTC within negative limit Within 14 EFPD of peak Boron @ Peak boron occurs at BOG, - performed at Hot Zero Power RTP and projected to HFP EOC conditions 3.1.4.2 MTC within negative limit Within +/- 30 EFPD of Steady state power (not full power) is required; projected to 2/3 of expected core burnup HFP EOC conditions 3.2.2.1 CPC & COLSS Fxy > Between 40% - 85% (i.e., prior to 68%-70% is within the power range required for measured Fxy (CECOR) exceeding 85%) surveillance 3.2.2.1 CPC & COLSS Fxy > Every 31 EFPD Steady state power (not full power) is required Measured Fxy (CECOR) 3.2.3.3 CPC Azimuthal Tilt > Every 31 EFPD Steady state power (not full power) is required Measured Tilt (CECOR) 3.3.1.2 RCS Flow in CPCs < Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (not required until Procedure changed to perform surveillance at Ž68% power Measured RCS Flow 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after power > 85% RTP) 3.3.1.5 RCS Flow by calorimetric Every 31 days (not required until Procedure changed to perform surveillance at > 68%
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after power > 85% RTP) power, and to require additional margin when surveillance is performed during extended operation at < 95% power 3.3.1.11 CPC Shape Annealing Prior to exceeding 85% A minimum ASI change, rather than a specific power level, Matrix (SAM) Verification is required N/A Startup Test Activity Normally performed after reaching Results are already adjusted from actual test conditions to Reduction Program full power RTP conditions as a part of the test method Reactivity Balance HZP - HFP Page 19