IR 05000321/2006005

IR 05000321-06-005, IR 05000366-06-005 and IR 072000036-06-003, on 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc

ML070170179
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, 07200036
Issue date:	01/16/2007
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Madison D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-06-003, IR-06-005
Download: ML070170179 (20)

Text

ary 16, 2007

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2006005, 05000366/2006005, AND 072000036/2006003

Dear Mr. Madison:

On December 31, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 10, 2007, with Mr. Steve Douglas and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366, and 72-36 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000321/2006005, 05000366/2006005, and 072000036/2006003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366, 72-36 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.: 05000321/2006005, 05000366/2006005, and 072000036/2006003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location: Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates: July 1 - September 30, 2006 Inspectors: D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector J. Hickey, Resident Inspector B. Anderson, Resident Inspector - Vogtle (Section 1R04)

E. Lea, Jr., Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

Accompanying Personnel: B. Caballero (Section 1R11)

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2006-005, 05000366/2006-005, 07200036/2006-003; 10/1/2006-12/31/2006;

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Quarterly Integrated Report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and two operations engineers. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) for the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100% RTP for the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite trains were removed from service. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 2A and 2C Station Service Battery chargers during 2B charger maintenance

• Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system during Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system maintenance

• 2A and 2C Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) during 1B EDG maintenance Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the following system. The inspectors performed a detailed check of valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the system or components by comparing the required position in the system operating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed control room logs to verify that alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Unit 2 RCIC System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours. The inspectors toured the following 12 risk significant plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed and that transient combustibles were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, were in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Standby Gas and HVAC, Unit 2 185' Reactor Building (RB)

• Working floor and stack monitoring, Unit 2 203' RB

• Unit 1 EDGs

• Unit 1 EDG switchgear rooms

• Unit 2 EDGs

• Unit 2 EDG switchgear rooms

• Intake structure

• Railroad airlock

• Condensate Storage Tanks

• Service Water valve pits

• EDG fuel oil storage tanks

• Reactor Water Cleanup equipment room, Unit 1 185' RB Fire Drill Observation. The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill conducted in the Warehouse Building PD-2. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-X43-001-1, Fire Procedure, and the drill scenario to verify proper response of the on-shift fire brigade to a simulated fire. The inspectors checked proper use of protective clothing, self contained breathing apparatus, fire fighting equipment, fire pre-plans, proper fire fighting strategy including smoke removal and fire propagation checks, communications, command and control, and coordination with offsite fire company support. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-drill critique to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

Internal Flooding. The inspectors reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)and the individual plant examination to determine the plant areas that were susceptible to internal flooding events. The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the following areas to determine potential sources of internal flooding and the condition of penetrations and sumps in the rooms. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Unit 2 RB diagonals

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Quarterly Observation. The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-50618-01, Turbine Building Steam Line Break, which included a piping break of a moisture separator reheater drain line, manual reactor scram, loss of condenser vacuum, loss of reactor feed pumps, loss of turbine bypass valves, main steam isolation valve closure, failure of the HPCI suction valve logic, RCIC flow oscillations in automatic control and reactor pressure control using safety relief valves.

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Review. The inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of simulator operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification program to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985. The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, licensed operator qualification records, watchstanding and medical records, simulator modification request records and performance test records, feedback forms, and remediation plans. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results. On December 15, 2006, the licensee completed the requalification annual operating test that was required to be given to all licensed operators pursuant to 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests and the crew simulator operating tests. The inspectors also reviewed the status and basis for four licensed operators who did not complete the 2006 requalification operating test. These test results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 609 Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two maintenance activities associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification. For the equipment issues identified below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated Condition Reports (CR), Maintenance Work Orders (MWO) and the licensees procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule. The review was to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation System

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Steam System Valve Performance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.

• POD for the week of 10/27-11/2

• POD for the week of 11/10-11/16

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specifications (TS)and the FSAR to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Corroded fire protection ventilation louver thermal links

• Non-Qualified Automatic Depressurization System timing relays

• 4160 volt breaker position sensing actuating rod failure

• Analog Transmitter Trip System relays in service beyond the design life expectancy

• Unit 1 HPCI low bearing oil pressure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the following three post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.

Following the maintenance activities, the inspectors reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 2E11F031D, 2D Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump discharge check valve inspection

• 2E11D003A, RHR Service Water strainer bolting replacement

• 1T41B005B, HPCI room cooler internal cleaning

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following three surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

Surveillance Tests

• 34SV-C51-005-0, Stroke time testing of NUMARC TIP Ball Valves

• 34SV-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Quantity Check In-Service Test

• 34SV-E11-001-1, Residual Heat Removal Pump Operability for the 1A&C RHR Pumps

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

For the emergency plan drill, the inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator, Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated events and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors discussed the post-exercise critique with plant staff to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Emergency Plan Drill conducted on October 18, 2006

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee submittals for the performance indicator (PI) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 4 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation And Reporting Of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.

Initiating Events Cornerstone

• Safety System Functional Failures The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected since October 2004 and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs, Licensee Event Reports, and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report and the individual PIs were correctly calculated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

.2 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following two CRs to verify the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CRs against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 2006111676, 1A RHR Motor Vibration, as well as the equipment vibration monitoring program

• 2001011455, Operator Work Around - U2 Generator Plant Circuit Breakers do not auto open following a turbine trip

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and associated documents in relation to mispositioning events to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. Although the inspectors review was focused on repetitive mispositioning issues, they also considered the results of daily inspector CR item screening discussed in section 4OA2.1, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of July 2006 through December 2006, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors compared the licensee Quarterly Trend Report with the results of the inspectors daily screening and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends in the data that the licensee had failed to identify.

4OA5 Other

.1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed ISFSI document control practices to verify that any changes to the required ISFSI procedures were performed in accordance with guidelines established in local procedures and 10CFR72.48. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Licensing Document Change Request 2006-046DC, Revision of the HNP 10 CFR 72.212 Report to incorporate CoC 1014, Amendment 2 and HI-STORM 100 FSAR 3

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/169, Mitigating Systems Performance

Index (MSPI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

During this inspection period, the inspectors completed a review of the licensees implementation of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) guidance for reporting unavailability and unreliability of monitored safety systems in accordance with NRC TI 2515/169.

The inspectors examined surveillances the licensee determined would not render a system or train unavailable for greater than 15 minutes, or during which the system could be promptly restored through operator action and therefore, would not be included in unavailability calculations. The inspectors also reviewed operating logs, work history information, maintenance rule information, corrective action program documents, and surveillance procedures to determine the actual times the MSPI systems were unavailable from planned and unplanned activities. These results were then compared to the baseline unavailability and actual planned and unplanned unavailability, as determined by the licensee, to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data.

Furthermore, the inspectors ensured the MSPI component unreliability data determined by the licensee identified and properly characterized all failures of monitored components. The unavailability and unreliability data were then compared with performance indicator data submitted to the NRC to ensure it accurately reflected the performance history of these systems.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The licensee accurately documented the baseline planned unavailability hours, the actual unavailability hours and the actual unreliability information for the MSPI systems. The licencee does not credit operator actions for prompt restoration of affected systems or trains. Therefore, all inoperability time was treated as unavailability time. No significant errors in the reported data were identified which could have resulted in a change to the index color. No significant discrepancies were identified in the MSPI basis document which could have resulted in:

(1) a change to the system boundary,

(2) an addition of a monitored component, or

(3) a change in the reported index color.

.3 (Opened) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000321,366/2006005-01, Main Control Room (MCR)

Pressure Boundary Door Open and Required Manual Operator Action to Close The door which separates the MCR pressure boundary from an adjacent office space was restrained open with procedural guidance for an operator to close the door upon MCR pressurization. Pending the results of a review of the basis for the door being restrained open, this issue will be tracked as URI 05000321,366/2006005-01, Main Control Room Pressure Boundary Operability.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On January 10, 2007, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Steve Douglas and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the observations. The inspectors confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

M. Ajluni, Plant Support Manager

J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager

S. Douglas, Plant Manager

B. Goodwin, Engineering Manager

G. Johnson, Operations Manager

J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Madison, Hatch Vice President

J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager

R. Varnadore, Maintenance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

05000321,366/2006005-01 URI Main Control Room Pressure Boundary Operability (Section 4OA5.3)

Closed

05000321, 366/2515/169 TI Mitigating Systems Performance Index Verification (Section 4OA5.2)