ML20247E415
| ML20247E415 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1998 |
| From: | Wigginton D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Mcgaha J ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, TAC-M95633, NUDOCS 9805180339 | |
| Download: ML20247E415 (11) | |
Text
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% UNITED STATES g ,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
- WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666 4 001
***** May 13, 1998 Mr. John R. McGaha, Jr.
Vice President - Operations Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, LA 70775
SUBJECT:
COMPLETION OF LICENSING ACTION FOR NRC BULLETIN 96-02,
" MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL, OVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR CORE, OR OVER SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT," DATED APRIL 11,1996, FOR RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - (TAC NO. M95633)
Dear Mr. McGaha:
On April 11,1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 96-02, " Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," to all holders of operating licenses. The NRC issued NRCB 96-07. for three principal reasons:
- 1. Alert addressees to the importance of complying with existing regulatory guidelines associated with the control and handling of heavy loads at nuclear power plants,
- 2. Request that all addressees review their plans and capabilities for handling heavy loads in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines and within their licensing basis as previously analyzed in the final safety analysis report, and
- 3. Require addressees to report to the NRC whether and to what extent they have complied with the actions requested in this bulletin.
Also the bulletin requested that Nebraska Public Power District determine whether current activities were within the licensing basis and to submit a license amendment request as necessary. In response to NRCB 96-02, you provided a letter dated August 29,1996, for River Bend Station. This submittal provided both the information requested and the responses required by NRCB 96-02. NRC staff review of the responses to NRCB 96-02 finds that, overall, the responses are acceptable; therefore, TAC No. M95633 is closed. A summary of the staff's review of licensee responses to the Bulletin is provided in the enclosure. The NRC will continue to review the issue of haavy loads through an ongoing Task Action Plan for heavy loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be obtained on a plant-specific basis. ( j y,/-{ - !
$ f .r 'Q1 9805180339 980513 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G PDR l
i John R. McGaha, Jr. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact David Wigginton at (301) 415-1301. Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY: David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-458
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next page plSTRIBUTION: Docket File PUBLIC PD4-1 r/f J.Hannon C.Hawes D. Wigginton T. Gwynn, RIV ACRS OGC E. Adensam (EGA1) Document Name: RB9602.LTR f / OFC PM/PD4-1 LA/PD4-1 PD/ 1 NAME DWigginton/vw CHawes JHa non DATE Il[/98 (/[#/98 h/((/98 COPY M/NO YES/NO YES/NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY i
John R. McGaha, Jr. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact David Wigginton at (301) 415-1301. Sincerely, David L. ginton, Senior Project Manager Projcct Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-458
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next page l l
l Mr. John R. McGaha l Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station cc: Winston & Strawn Executive Vice President and 1400 L Street, N.W. Chief Operating Officer l Washington, DC 20005-3502 Entergy Operations, Inc. I P. O. Box 31995 { Manager- Licensing Jackson, MS 39286 j Entergy Operations, Inc. i River Bend Station General Manager- Plant Operations P. O. Box 220 Entergy Operatione,, Inc. , St. Francisville, LA 70775 River Bend Station l P. O. Box 220 l Senior Resident inspector St. Francisville, LA 70775 I P. O. Box 1050 l St. Francisville, LA 70775 Director- Nuclear Safety Entergy Operations, Inc. President of West Feliciana River Bend Station Police Jury P. O. Box 220 P. O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, LA 70775 St. Francisville, LA 70775 Vice President - Operations Support Regional Administrator, Region IV Entergy Operations, Inc. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 31995 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Arlington, TX 76011 Attomey General l Ms. H. Anne Plettinger State of Louisiana 3456 Villa Rose Drive P. O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, LA 70806 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095 Administrator Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway Louisiana Radiation Protection Division P. O. Box 651 P. O. Box 82135 Jackson, MS 39205 Baton Rouge,1 A 70884-2135 m
SUMMARY
OF THE STAFF'S REVIEW OF LICENSEE RESPONSES TO NRC BULLETIN 96-02 ! Introduction The following summarizes the results of the staff's review of licensees' responses to NRC ' Bulletin (NRCB) 96-02, " Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated April 11,1996, and its associated Requests for Additional information (RAl). The bulletin reminded licensees of their responsibilities for ensuring that heavy load-handling operations are performed safely. It also requested that licensees review their plans and capabilities for handling heavy loads, and ensure that their load-handling operations are in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines and the plant's licensing basis. Also requested was that licensees identify and present schedules for licensing actions needed to support implementation of their heavy load-handling operations involving spent fuel dry storage casks. The licensees also were to provide schedules for moving dry storage casks. The RAI requested that selected licensees evaluate the hazards associated with an in-plant tip-over of spent fuel dry storage casks that could dislodge the cask lid and spent fuel elements, This summary closes the staff's review of licensee res'ponses to both the bulletin and the associated RAl. Futurs issues regarding the handling of heavy loads will be addressed generically under the Heavy Loads and Crane issues Task Action Plan (TAP) and on a plant-specific basis as needed. Plant specific reviews needed in the future mayirequire the staff to obtain additional information from individual licensees. , Backaround NRCB 96-02 was issued as an urgent generic communication that requested licensees' responses to the following: (1) For licensees planning to carry out activities involving the handling of heavy loads over ; spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or safety-related equipment within the next 2 years from 1 the date of the bulletin, provide the following: A report within 30 days of the date of the I bulletin that addrerses the licensee's review of its plans and capabil%s to handle heavy I I loads while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines. State whether the activities are within the licensing basis and, if necessary, submit a schedule for requesting a license amendment. Additionally, indicate whether changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) are required. (2) For licensees planning to perform activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at , power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) that involve a potential load drop accident that was not previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), submit a license amendment request 6-9 months in advance of the planned movement of the loads to give the staff sufficient time to perform an appropriate review. 1 (3) For licensees planning to move dry storage casks over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cald shutdown, refueling, and defueled) include, in item 2 above, c statement of the capability of performing the actions necessary for a safe plant shutdown in the presence of ENCLOSURE i
i a radiological source term that may result from a breach of the dry storage cask, damage to the fuel, or damage to safety-related equipment due to a load drop inside the facility. (4) For licerisees planning to perform activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), determine whether , changes to the TSs will be required to allow the handling of heavy loads (e.g., the dry l storage canister shield plug) over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool and submit the appropriate information 6-9 months in advance of the planned movement of the loads for NRC review and approval. Discussion . I The levels of detailin the licensees' responses to NRCB 96-02 varied significantly. Although some licensees presented detailed information about their heavy load-har.dling operations, some licensees (Catawba, Crystal River, Farley, Indian Point 2, Salem, St. Lucie, Summer, Dresden, 5 Fitzpatrick, Hope Creek, LaSalle, Quad Cities, and WNP-2), f ther omitted information pertinent to the staffs review in their submittal or referenced previous submittals associstsd with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." However, all of the licensees responded b the bulletin. In response to the bulletin, all the ficantees reviewed their plans and capabilities to handle heavy loads and indicated that their plans and capabilities are adequate. Some discussions about
- licensees' plans and capabilities to move heavy loads addressed the plant mode of operation (at
- power or during shutdowns), the type of crane used (non-single-failure-proof, single-failure-proof, j or upgraded cranes), and the methods and procedures for implementing the guidelines in l NUREG-0612, Phase 1. All the licensees indicated that their load-handling operations are in j accordance with the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Phase 1.
l The bulletin requested that licensees determine whether their load-handling operations are within j the licensing basis of the plant. Gome licensees stated that their operations are within the licensing basis; other licensees committed to evaluate their licensing basis. Some licensees l identified issues to be addressed with the NRC through licensing actions (amendment requests or 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations), and projected schedules for submitting the actions for NRC review. Following the responses to the bulletin, a few licensing actions have been reviewed and l approved by the NRC concoming the bulletin. The issues involve proposed changes to TSs, l scope changes to accident analyses, changes in loads and load paths, and updates to UFSAR l requirements. The bulletin also asked licensees to determine if their movement of heavy loads involves potential load drop accidents that were not evaluated previously in the FSAR and, if needed, submit a license amendment request. Most licensees stated that they move only analyzed loads. Some licensees indicated that they performed load drop or consequence analyses or both though the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 85-11 canceled the need to perform any analyses. Some licensees committed to evaluate the heavy loads identified previously when they responded to l NUREG-0612. Despite the analyses performed, all the licensees stated that they satisfy the recommended guidelines in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612. l
3 Licensees moving heavy loads at power and using load drops and consequence analyses indicated that they have adeonate capabilities to safely shutdown the plant if a heavy load drop occurs causing a release of radiation or damage to safety-related equipment. 1 The bulletin also requested that licensees identify plans and schedules for moving spent fuel dry storage casks. Some licensees stated that they planned to move casks in the'near future; other licensees indicated that they had not yet considered onsite dry cask storage. Based on requests in the bulletin, the staff reviewed the licensee responses to identify: (1) plant mode during the handling of heavy loads (at power or during plant shutdowns); (2) type of crane used to lift heavy loads; (3) evaluation of the licensing basis for handling heavy loads, including planned licensing actions associated with heavy loads (i.e., license amendment requests); (4) plans and schedules for moving heavy loads (particularly spent fuel dry storage and transportation casks); and (5) the type of analysis performed (load drop analysis or consequence analysis or both). Although the bulletin did not specifically request this information, the staff believes that this type of information covers the areas of concem about the licensees' heavy load-handling operations. On the basis of its review, the staff noted the following points. (1) Plant Mode Durina Load-Handlino Operations Review of the responses to the bulletin revealed that approximately 38 percent of the plants (21 PWRs and 20 BWRs) plan to move heavy loads at power. Some of these plants indicated that they move analyzed heavy loads at power and unanalyzed heavy loads during plant shutdowns. Tisese plants also indicated that heavy load movements over safety-related equipment are minimized to the extent practicable, and their procedures do not allow movements of heavy loads over fuel or over the reactor core in accordance with NUREG-0612. Some PWR licensees (i.e., Callaway, Shearon Harris, and Calvert Cliffs) indicated that their heavy load movements involve casks moved within a separate fuel building. As indicated by the licensees, the movement of casks in PWRs that have a separate fuel building involves little or no cask travel over systems needed for safe , shutdown functions. As a result, a dropped cask would not cause significant damage to l safe shutdown equipment and, therefore, would have negligible effect on the licensees' I ability to shut down the plant safely. Approximately 39 percent of the plants (28 PWRs and 15 BWRs) indicated that they move l heavy loads at plant shutdowns, and about 23 percent of the plants (23 PWRs and 2 BWRs) did not clearty indicate the plant status when heavy loads are moved. A few of these licensees (e.g., Oyster Creek) that plan to move heavy loads during plant shutdowns also j indicated that they plan to perform dry runs at power, before initially loading the cask. The staff finds that although some licensees have committed to move only analyzed Icads at power, they may not adequately consider the adverse safety consequences of a load i drop during the movement of heavy loads. Some 13censees' analyses consider methods l that may be used to preclude a load drop (e.g., enhancements to the load handling system, including upgrades to brakes, instrumentation, and controls, and the use of energy-absorbing structures throughout the load path). However, they may not consider the ! adequacy of their capabilities needed to mitigate or manage the adverse consequences of a load drop. Some examples of such capabilities are the abilities to shut down the piant l
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I . e 4 i l safely, continue normal operation, maintain personnel access to various areas in the plant, and mitigate potential accidents that could expose individuals to releases. The staff is also concemed that some licensees may not adequately address the potential consequences of a load drop during practice runs of cask movements while the reactor is at power. A drop of an empty cask during practice movements could result in similar adverse consequences to the operation of the plant as does the actual movement of a fully loaded spent fuel cask. Therefore, it is the staffs view that activities involving actual heavy load movements or practice runs of moving spent fuel dry storage casks are to be evaluated by the licensee for potential accidents and consequences. In addition, the staff is concemed with BWR licensees that move heavy loads while the reactor is at power because, in general, the safety-related systems required for safe shutdowns are susceptible to damage from a dropped heavy load. These licensees should exhaust all options of establishing safe load paths to minimize the risk of affecting safe shutdown equipment in the event a heavy load is dropped. . (2) Lags of Cranes Used in the responses to the bulletin, approximately 27 percent of the plants (6 PWRs and 23 BWRs) indicated that they use single-failure-proof cranes to lift heavy loads; 14 percent of the plants (12 PWRs and 3 BWRs) indicated that they have upgraded the reliability of their load-handling system in accordance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 (see explanstba below); and about 8 percent of the plants (5 PWRs and 4 BWRs) indicated that their erane is non-single-failure-proof. However, almost half the plants (49 PWRs and 7 BWRs) dd not clearty indicate the type of crans they use. NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, " Single Failure Handling System," provides the altemative of upgrading an existing crane in lieu of complying with certain recommendations of NUREG-0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," to achieve improved reliability in load-handling systems. Accordingly, several licensees have upgraded their j overhead load-handling crane to single-failure-proof status, or they have improved reliability l by increasing the factors of safety or by providing redundancy in certain active components l of the cranes. A few licensees (i.e., Oyster Creek, Dresden, Yankee Rowe) have indicated l that they are considering upgrading their cranes or installing new cranes to achieve single-failure-oroof capability. 1 Licensee information regarding the types of overhead cranes used at the plants indicates l that many plants have either single-failure-proof cranes in accordance with NUREG-0554,
" Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," or cranes upgraded in accordance with guidelines in NUREG-0612 (Section 5.1.6, and Appendix C, " Modification of Existing Cranes)." Although several plants were not clear about the type of crane they possess, none of the plants indicated that they have cranes and lifting systems that were l inadequately designed, installed, and tested.
The staff concludes that many licensees previously performed adequate evaluations of their crane design for lifting heavy loads and the evaluations were accepted by the staff. l l l l
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5 However, the staff is concemed that some facilities could have weaknesses in their load-handling operations. These weaknesses may include insufficient training of personnel involved in the lifting and rigging procedures, procedures lacking in requitarrrents for evaluating loads and ensuring that the design limitations of the hoisting system are not exceeded, insufficient inspection and preventive maintenance of cranes and lifting devices, and inadequate review of loading capacities. The staffs view is that the potential exists for any of these weaknesses to result in a single failure involving heavy loads being dropped and causing adverse consequences. As a result, future staff reviews will be focused on licensees' evaluations of their cranes and lifting devices, and related methods and procedures used for complying with the requirements of NUREG-0612. (3) Evaluation of Licensina Basis for Handlina Heavy Loads I Review of the responses to the bulletin indicated that all of the licensees believe that their heavy load-handling operations are in accordance with the licensing basis of the facility. Approximately 24 percent of the plants (10 BWRs and 16 PWRs) did not address the licensing basis in their responses. The staff is concemed that some plants that believe their load-handling operation is within the plant's licensing basis may, in fact, be outside the licensing basis. For example, the staffs reviews of Oyster Creek's (OC's) load-handling operations determined that OC would have operated beyond its licensing basis. This is because OC was planning to move loads that exceeded the size of the loads previously evaluated in the FSAR. Approximately 10 percent of the licensees indicated that they will review and modify their licensing basis as needed. As indicated in the submittals, licensees' reviews of the licensing basis resulted in one or more of the following: .
. identification and analysis of new heavy loads beyond the loads previously addressed in the licensing basis,
. commitments to only move heavy loads that were previously analyzed, e determinations that heavy load-handling operations deviated from previous commitments and the licensing bases, and e determinations that cMnge the TSs are needed.
Licensees' reviews of their plans and capabilities to handle and control heavy loads have resulted in some licensees undertaking licensing actions to implement their load-handling operations. The following are examples of planned licensing actions noted in the responses to NRCB 96-02: Licensee Planned Licensina Actions Brunswick: License amendment mquest to make the FSAR consistent with actual plant operations (completed). Fitzpatricic Changes to the TSs to allow the movement of spent fuel dry storage casks at power (schedule TBD).
- Nine Mile Point
- Design change involving reracking of the spent fuel pool. (Schedule TBD).
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i '; Noth Anna: Various license amendments regarding heavy load-handling issues (schedule TBD). Oyster Creek: TS changes to remove the weight restriction for lifting the dry storage canister (DSC) shield plugs over fuelin the DSC. (completed). Watts Bar: l Design change for reracking of the spent fuel pool (curmntly under review). { The staffs review of the information submitted indicates that some licensees' load-han operations may have been implemented inconsistently with the licensing basis of the facI Some plants either have inadvertently deviated from their load-handling procedures, I implemented procedures that are inconsistent with the licensing basis, or misinterpreted the design features of their load-handling system. The sta# also believes that since the issuance of NUREG-0612, many changes have evolved in licensees' plans to handle heavy loads. As a result, severallicensees have identified changes in theirload-handling l operations that were not previously addressed in their licensing basis. Therefore, on an "as needed" basis, the sta# will continue to perform audits and inspections in order to evaluate ) licensees' movement of heavy loads. (4) Plans for Movino Spent Fuel Dry Storaoe Casks Approximately 17 percent of the piants (10 PWRs and 9 BWRs) indicated that they plan to store spent fuel dry storage casks. Most of these plants plan to move casks within 2 years from the date of the bulletin. The remainder of the licensees either did not address the issue or have not yet begun planning for the storage of spent fuel. (5) Load Droo and Consequence Analysis Performed Approximately 33 percent of the plants indicated that they have performed load drop and consequence analyses in support of their plans to move heavy loads. The remaining plants did not show that any analysis exists. In the future, the sta# will review the load drop and consequence analyses on an as-needed plant-specific basis. The sta# has found that several licensees have done load drop and consequence analyses though Generic Letter 85-11 canceled Phase 11 of NUREG-0612, and dismissed the need for licensees to perform these analyses. The results of the analyses have led some licensees to modify their load-handling operations, including upgrading the crane and associated components of the lifting system, and modifying the load paths. Conclusion The sta# finds that NRC Bulletin 96-02 achieved its objective of getting licensees to evaluate their load-handling activities to ensure that they are performed safely and in the best interest of < protecting the health and safety of the public. The bulletin was very e#ective in getting licensees to review their plans and capabilities, licensing bases, and regulatory guidelines for carrying out activities involving the movement of heavy loadr Although the licensee responses to the l bulletin contained various levels of detail regard: oad-handling operations at their plants, su#icient information was available to enable the sta# to reach the conclusions noted below.
6 ( 6 North Anna: Various license amendments regarding heavy load-handling issues (schedule TBD). l Oyster Creelt TS changes to remove the weight restriction for lifting the dry storage l canister (DSC) shield plugs over fuelin the DSC. (completed). Watts Bar: Design change for reracking of the spent fuel pool (currently under review). The staff's review of the information submitted indicates that some licensees' load-handling operations may have been implemented inconsistently with the licensing basis of the facility. Some plants either have inadvertently deviated from their load-handling procedures, l implemented procedures that are inconsistent with the licensing basis, or misinterpreted the l design features of theirload-handling system. The staff also believes that since the issuance of NUREG-0612, many changes have evolved in licensees' plans to handle heavy
- loads. As a result, several licensees have identified changes in their load-handling operations that were not previously addressed in their licensing basis. Therefore, on an "as
- needed" basis, the staff will continue to perform audits and inspections in order to evaluate licensees' movement of heavy loads.
(4) Plans for Movina Spent Fuel Dry Storaae Casks
- Approximately 17 percent of the plants (10 PWRs and 9 BWRs) indicated that they plan to store spent fuel dry storage casks. - Most of these plants plan to move casks within 2 years from the date of the bulletin. The remainder of the licensees either did not address the issue or have not yet begun planning for the storage of spent fuel.
(5) Load Droo and Consequence Analysis Performed Approximately 33 percent of the plants indicated that they have performed load drop and consequence analyses in support of their plans to move heavy loads. The remaining plants did not show that any analysis exists. In the future, the staff will review the load drop and consequence analyses on an as-needed plant specific basis. The staff has found that several licensees have done load drop and consequence analyses though Generic Letter 85-11 canceled Phase ll of NUREG-0612, and dismissed the need for licensees to perform these analyses. The results of the analyses have led some licensees to modify their load-handling operations, including upgrading the crane and associated components of the lifting system, and modifying the load paths. Conclusion The staff finds that NRC Bulletin 96-02 achieved its objective of getting licensees to evaluate , their load-handling activities to ensure that they are performed safely and in the best interest of l protecting the health and safety of the public. The bulletin was very effective in getting licensees I to review their plans and capabilities, licensing bases, and regulatory guidelines for carrying out activities involving the movement of heavy loads. Although the licensee responses to the bulletin contained various levels of detail regarding load-handling operations at their plants, sufficient information was available to enable the staff to reach the conclusions noted below. l l
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7 Although several licensees have increased the reliability of their load-handling systems, the staff will continue to review load-handling operations, on an as-needed basis, to ensure that licensees [ adequately address their ability to preclude load drop accidents. As determined through earlier NRC reviews, licensees have reliable lifting systems as required by NUREG-0612. However, licensees need to continue to address other activities surrounding the crane operation that could help to minimize weaknesses in (c.eir load-handling operations that may contribute to load drop accidents. Such weaknesses could include insufficient training of personnel involved in applying the lifting and rigging procedures, procedures lacking in requirements for evaluating loads and for ensuring that the design limitations of the load-lifting system are not exceeded, insuffmient inspection and preventive maintenance of cranes and lifting devices, and inadequate review of loading capacities. Also, the staff finds that because some licensees plan to move heavy loads at power, they may need to assess their capabilities to both mitigate and manage the adverse consequences of a heavy load drop. Licensees should consider, among other things, possible plant shutdowns during the movement of heavy loads, limiting personnel exposure from required entry into contaminated plant areas following an accident, and recovering from the adverse conditions caused by an accident. Accordingly, the staff is particularly interested in future evaluations of load drops and consequences associated with the load-handling operations of the licensees. The staff also finds that several licensees have detarmined, after reviewing their licensing basis, that their load-handling operations may be inconsistent with their licensing basis. Consequently, several licensees have undertaken actions to correct or resolve this condition, including reviewing the FSAR, TS requirements, and procedures goveming the conduct of operations involving the movement of heavy loads. The staff will pursue enforcement actions for matters involving a noncompliance with regulatory requirements as appropriate. On the basis of the preceding discussion, the staff will continue to review issues regarding the handling of heavy loads on a plant-specific basis as needed. Generic issues regarding this I subject will be addressed through an ongoing Task Action Plan (TAP) for Heavy Loads. Any additional information required for the completion of the TAP will be obtained on a plant-specific . basis. Principal Contributor: Phillip Ray l l}}