ML20236D342

Insp Repts 50-295/87-16 & 50-304/87-16 on 870602-0701. Violation Noted.Major Areas inspected:870610 Earthquake at Lawrenceville,Il,Brief Loss of Containment Integrity, Operational Safety Verification,Lers & Training

ML20236D342
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	07/16/1987
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236D304	List: ML20236D301 ML20236D323 ML20236D342
References
50-295-87-16, 50-304-87-16, NUDOCS 8707300415
Download: ML20236D342 (13)

See also: IR 05000295/1987016

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MISSION I

REGION III

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Reports No. 50-295/87016(DRP); 50-304/87016(DRP) 1

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Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 757

' Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2 l

Inspection At: Zion, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: June 2 through July 1, 1987

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Inspectors: Mark M.-Holzmer *

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Patricia L. Eng

Norman R. Williamsen l

d A Av. lex n>e

J. M. Hinds, Chief

Approved By:

Reactor Projects Section IA

7 //6 /87 i

Date

Inspection Summary '

Inspection on June 2 through July 1,1987 (Reports No. 50-295/87016(DRP):

No. 50-304/87016(DRP)) J

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action  :

on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; June 10, 1987 '

earthquake at 'Lawrenceville, Illinois; brief loss of containment integrity;

Federal Full Field Exercise; operational safety verification and engineered i

safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; surveillance observation; maintenance i

observation; licensee event reports (LERs); training; followup of Region III

requests; and site visit by Regional Administrator.

Results: ~ Of the 12 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

identified in 11 areas, and one violation was identified in the remaining

area (Failure to Properly Fill Out and Review Work Request-Paragraph 2). This

violation led to the May 21, 1987, flooding of the 2A and 2B fuel oil storage

tank rooms.

t/07300415 870722

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DETAILS I

- 1.' Persons Contacted

• G. Plim1, Station Manager

E. Fuerst,- Superintendent, Production ]>

• T.'.Rieck, Superintendent, Services.

"W. Kurth, Assistant Station _ Superintendent, Operations

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• R. Johnson,-Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance

-J..Gilmore, Assistant Station Superintendent, Planning

R. Budowle, Assistant Station Superintendent, Technical Services ,

L. Pruett, Senior Operating Engineer 1

'M. Carnahan, Unit 1 Operating Engineer i

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N. Valos,-Unit'2 Operating Engineer

• R. Cascarano, Technical Staff Supervisor  ;

.A. Ockert, Training Supervisor- d

C. , Schultz,. Regulatory Assurance' Administrator l

V. Williams, Station Health Physicist

J. Ballard, Quality Control Supervisor .

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• W. Stone, Quality Assurance Supervisor j

• T. Broccolo, Assistant Operating Engineer 1

-*J. LaFontaine,. Engineer, Maintenance Staff f

• M.' Madigan, ISI Coordinator, Technical Staff j

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• Indicates persons present at exit interview. )

2. ~ Licensee' Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 93702)

(Closed) Unresolved Item (304/87011-01(DRP)) Licensee investigation of

cause for flooding of' diesel . generator fuel oil storage tank rooms. ' This

item remained open pending' completion of the licensee's investigation of 1

the causes for the flooding of the diesel generator fuel oil storage I

tanks rooms as documented'in inspection report 295/87009; 304/87011. The j

inspector reviewed the' licensee's investigation results and this item is

closed. Findings from review of the investigation report are discussed

below.

l Licensee investigation of the causes for the inadvertent spillage of over

350,000 gallons of water into the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank a

rooms revealed that none of'the three work requests written for inspection '

of check valves 25 WOO 10 and 25W0011 correctly identified the location of

the subject valves. Work request 256525 for inspecting the 25 WOO 10 valve,

written February 3, 1987, identified the valve location as the 2A diesel

generator room, although the valve is located in the 2A diesel generator i

fuel oil storage. tank room. Similarly, work request 259405, written l

' April 22,1987, specified the location of the 25W0011 valve as the 2B l

diesel generator room, while the valve is physically located in the 2B i

diesel generator fuel oil storage tank room. Work request 250054,

written May 12, 1987, identified the location of the 25W0010 valve as

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'the 2B storage room. 'All three work requests had been reviewed and-

signed off at.the_ time of the event. Review of_the licensee's.

investigation report and interviews with personnel. involved revealed that;

the three work requests for' check valves 25 WOO 10 and 25 WOO 11 illustrate

how frequently originators incorrectly designata component' locations.

.The incorrect valve' location on the third work request directly resulted-

in. flooding the storage tank rooms. - Other contributing factors were the

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fact.that the subject valves were not labelled or' tagged and the' fact

that'the written turnover information was not sufficiently detailed to.-

alert the day shift crew that the valve bonnet on the wrong. valve

(25W0011) had been' removed by a previous' shift crew.

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Zion administrative procedure-(ZAP) 3-51-1 states that the originator is -)

responsible for filling out the_ equipment and equipment location portions  !

of the work request form. Step A.1 of ZAP 3-51-1 directs the work-  !

request originator to-fill out an equipment tag and hang it as close as

possible to the problem area on the piece of equipment needing a work

request. A note.immediately following the step states that.this tag 1

is used to identify the equipment of interest in order to reduce search.

time; however, the shift supervisor is responsible. for determining

whether an equipment tag is-not required. Step A.2 of ZAP 3-51-1 states

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that the originator of the work request shall designate the equipment l

name, unit number, location, equipment piece number, system, name of l

originator and date, and full description of work to be done, and staple 1

=a copy of the equipment. tag to the white copy'of the work request. i

Step A.10 requires.the operating shift supervisor to review all entered l

information for completeness and accuracy. ' Step A.53 states that the -l

. maintenance' foreman shall review the job, job site.and work package. j

Failure to correctly _ identify component location and subsequent failure

to identify the incorrect location of said component as ' designated on a ,

work request in accordance with ZAP 3-51-1 is considered to be'a j

violation'of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V-(304/87016-01(DRP)). j

L' Despite the-requirements.of ZAP 3-51-1, discussion with members of both  !

the licensee's maintenance staff and the technical staff revealed that'it

is not clear to them who is' responsible for verifying the correct location .

L of equipment in the plant. Technical staff personnel who initiated the

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subject work requests stated that unless a particular component problem 4

is identified by a member of.the technical staff, maintenance personnel i

are responsible for specifying equipment locations on work requests; l

however, maintenance staff personnel stated that they understood that it l

was the. originator's responsibility to identify equipment location. 1

Determination by the licensee whether designation of a party responsible

( for verifying equipment locations for production work requests is necessary

is considered to be an open item (295/87016-01(DRP); 304/87016-02(DRP)).

The inspector inquired as to viable means of verifying correct locations

of equipment in the plant. Members of the licensee's staff stated that,

aside from personal memory, equipment locations could be determined ,

through the piping and instrument drawings (P&lDs) and in some cases the i

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appendices for the pertinent system operating 1. instructions (501s)'. <

The inspector reviewed the P& ids and noted that~the drawings did not

contain sufficient detail to p'nysically locate the subject valves.

Review of the appropriate 501 for the diesel generators revealed that:

'the valve locations for check valves.were not identified in the 501.

table. The inspector informed the licensee that other plants have

equipment locator lists by which plant personnel can determine the

physical locations of components.

(Closed) Open Item (295/86005-01(DRP);.304/86005-01(DRP)) Station .'

Management High Turnover Rate._ Due to a company-wide reorganization

of plant staffs in March 1985,-fo11 owed by promotion of the Zion Station - 1

Manager in September 1985, several (approximately 24) upper and middle

level management personnel were in new positions. (12 months or less in

position). Since that time, the stability of.the plant staff has.

increased significantly. Of the same group of persons,-less than five

have been in their. positions'for less than 12 months. This item is

considered closed. 1

(Closed) Open Item (304/85038-03(DRP)) Inadvertent Trip of Unit 2 Purge

in Cold Shutdown. This item was open pending completion of an

investigation of the circuit defect that' caused the purge trip. The

investigation was reported in supplemental LER 304/85019-01 (see

Paragraph 10). The investigation covered several possibilities but -  !

concluded that the trip was spurious. 'This item is considered closed. .

(Closed) Bulletin (295/86001-BB; 304/86001-8B) Inspection and-

Enforcement Bulletin No. 86-01, " Minimum Flow logic Problems that Could

Disable RHR Pumps," was reviewed and found not applicable to the Zion 1

Nuclear Power Plant. This Bulletin is considered closed. l

One violation and no deviations were identified. One open item was

identified. j

3. Summary of Operations -l

Unit 1 l

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l- The unit operated for the entire inspection period in Mode 1 at power

levels up to 93% power. Power levels were limited due to excessive

generator frame vibrations.  !

Unit 2

The unit remained in the cold shutdown mode for the entire inspection

period.  ;

No violations or deviations were identified. .

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4. ' June 10, 1987 Earthquake at Lawrenceville. Illinois

At 6:49 P.M. (CDT) on June 18, 1987, a magnitude 5 (Richter Scale)-

earthquake occurred near'Lawrenceville in southeastern Illinois. .The

effects.of the-quake at the Zion Station were not strong enough to cause i

the. strong motion or_ earthquake alarms to go off, nor did anyone in the

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control room feel the quake. The earthquake was felt, however, in the

service building.by the supervisor on shift (505) who telephoned the

control room and was advised that no alarms or any other evidence of an

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earthquake had been received.

Control room personnel subsequently responded to a number of' inquiries by ,

telephone, including the CECO load dispatcher, who was the first off-site  !

person to confirm the earthquake event. Other calls included the Senior j

Resident Inspector; the National Warning System (NAWAS) communicator, who

phened about 7:28 P.M.; and the NRC Operations Center.

The analytical and precautionary actions by Zion Station personnel were

timely and proper. (1) Some personnel were assigned to do walk-downs and

they reported back by 8:00 P.M. the same evening that there was no

visible damage. (2) A Technical Staff engineer was called to the Station

.and verified that the active' seismic monitoring system, including the

alarm annunciator on the CR board, was operable but had not received a

threshold signal. (3) Other personnel reviewed the passive seismic

monitoring system and reported that the system was operable and that

there was no evidence of a measurable quake.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's analyses and concluded that the

licensee's response to the earthquake was adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. June 21, 1987, Momentary Breach of Containment Integrity Due to Broken

Personnel Hatch

On June 21, 1987 at about 12:45 A.M. CDT, Unit I containment integrity

was momentarily breached when two station personnel opened and passed

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through the containment personnel hatch (CPH) inner door while the outer

door was not latched. The licensee did not classify this event as

reportable until about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> later, at which time the NRC Operations i

Center was notified via the emergency notification system.

Each shif t, an equipment attendant (EA) performs a tour and inspection of

an operating unit's containment. To enter the containment, the CPH outer

door is opened, personnel pass into an air lock chamber, and the outer

door is closed and latched. Then the inner door is opened and personnel

can enter the containment, after which the inner door is closed and

latched. Interlocks between the two CPH doors prcvent them from being

simultaneously open. The interlocks also ensure that the vent valve for

each door closes 'in proper sequence with the door.

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On June 23,'1987, at about' midnight, the E0 entered the CPH outer door

with a. radiation protection (RP) technician.' When the E0 attempted to 3

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close the door, the operating mechanism malfunctioned. As a result, the

CPH outer door would not latch, and it would not open more than about ,

six inches. The E0 called the control room (CR) to request assistance. J

Attempts to open the outer door from the outside were unsuccessful. The _

shift attempted to get mechanics onsite for about 45 minutes. These j

-attempts were also unsuccessful. At about 12:45 A.M. the shift foremen 1

directed-the E0 and RP technician to attempt to pass through the inner )

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door and exit containment via the containment emergency hatch (CEH).

Because the interlocks were damaged when the outer door malfunctioned,

the inner door opened. After entering containment, the E0 verified that

the CPH inner door and vent valve properly latched and closed. The CEH ]

operated properly when the E0 and RP technician exited the containment.

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The CPH outer door was repaired, tested, and returned to service by

1:00 p.m. on June 21, 1987. The CEH was satisfactorily tested in {

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accordance with Technical Specifications on June 22, 1987, using

Procedure TSS 15.6.10c, " Type B Leak Rate Test For The Personnel And

Escape Locks."

Additional NRC inspection will be performed during the review of the LER

for this event. Evaluation of compliance with reporting requirements

will be considered at that time. This is considered an Unresolved Item

pending completion of the NRC's review (295/87016-02).

No violations or deviations were identified. One Unresolved Item was

disclosed during this inspection.

6. June 23 through 25, 1987 Full Field Exercise 2

On June 23 through 25, 1987, the Full Field Exercise 2 (FFE-2) was

conducted at the Zion Station to exercise and test emergency preparedness

capabilities of Commonwealth Edison and local, state, county and federal

agencies. The exercise involved approximately 1000 participants both off

and onsite and 14 federal agencies. The FFE-2 simulated a severe reactor

accident and provided an opportunity for the various agencies to interact

in an incident response mode. The resident staff participated in the

FFE-2 in the control room and technical support center during day 1 of

the exercise and in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) on days 2 and

3. The inspectors observed that shift personnel participating in the

exercise performed their duties in accordance with appropriate procedures

and continuously monitored the status of the critical safety functions

during the exercise. The resident inspectors also attended the public

critique meeting held in Waukegan, Illinois the day following conclusion

of FFE-2.

The exercise was helpful in that it improved the resident inspectors'

knowledge and experience with regard to interfacing with the licensee and

offsite NRC personnel.

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No violations or deviations were identified.  !

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7. ' Operational Safety Verification and Engineered' Safety Features System

Walkdown (71707-& 71710)

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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

Land conducted discussions with control room operators from June 2 through

July 2, 1987. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors

ascertained that the operators were alert, fully cognizant of plant

conditions', attentive to changes in those conditions,' and took prompt

action when appropriate. .The inspectors ver/fied the operability of

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selected emergency systems, reviewed tegout1 records and verified proper

return to' service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and-

turbine buildings were conducted to' observe plant equipment conditions,- '

including potential fire ~ hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations

and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment

in need of maintenance.

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The, inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that selected

physical security activities were being implemented in accordance with

the station security plan. C

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and

verified implementation of radiation protectior, controls.

From June 2.,1987, to July 1, 1987, the inspectors walked down the

accessible portions.of the 1A diesel generator system and control board

to verify operability.

These reviews'and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in' c~onformance with the requirements established under

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Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

The inspectors verified that the' licensee properly implemented procedbre

changes to comply with Amendment Nos. 92 and 102 to the Unit I and Unit 2

Technical Specifications (TS). The March 19, 1987 amendments resolved a

discrepancy between the FSAR safety analysis and'the TS. The

inconsistency-involved the number of reactor coolant' pumps'(RCP) assumed

to be operating in stode 3 (hot standby) during a postulated control rod

bank withdrawal accident. The inspector verified that PT-0, Appendix F,

" Operating Surveillance Checksheet," dated May 18, 1987, was revised to

reflect the new wording in the TS.

l The inspectors observed that the number of Unit 1 annunciators which are  :

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alarming (approximately 10) is higher than normal for an operating unit

Lat Zion Station-(usually less than five). In addition, the inspector  ;

noted that weekly report.s of annunciator status (ZAP 3-51-7) routinely do

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not include clear statements of the cause.of the alarm, work request

numbers, or comments. The licensee informed the inspector that as a

result of their review performed earlier this year, procedure revisions

^ were in progress to make the form more useful and easier to fill out.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61720 & 61726)

The inspectors observed. surveillance testing on the containment spray

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system required by Technical Specifications'and perfomance of a

10 CFR 50, Appendix J, type.C local leak rate test (LLRT). The inspectors

verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate prodedures,

thetitest. instrumentation was calibrated,Lthat limiting conditions fo'r .

operation, were; met, that_ removal. and restoration of the affected

, components were accomplished,.that test results' conformed with tec&hidal

specifications and procedure requirements ar.d were reviewed by' personnel

other than the' individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies

identified during the. testing were properly reviewed.and resolved by.

appropriate management personnel.

The inspectors witnessed portions of-the following test activities':

TSS 15.6.10e Type C Leak Rate Tests

.PT-6- ' Containment Spray System Tests:and Checks

With regard to the performance of TSS.15.6.10e, the inspector 4 observed

the LLRT for instrument air containment isolation valves 2FCVIA018 2nd-

"2FCVIA01A. During the initial attempt to test the' subject. valves.a leak '

in the upstream test connection inside containment was identified.

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Following adjustment of,the fitting, which did not compromise the as-found.

leak test results, a'second attempt to test the valves was successful in

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that an acceptable as-found leak rate was measured. With regard to test' o

conduct,.the inspectors made the following comments-

a. Leak' rate stabilization time was specified in the test procedure as j

approximately 30 minutes. 'This required test personnel to remain in

a radiation field for the designated stabilization time.- The .

. inspector noted that the reading on ther flowmeter used to determine ,

-the. leak rate stabilized within 5 minutes. The test engineer stated .l

that'an evaluation and determination of an appropriate' stabilization 1

time for LLRT tests using the flowmeter method will be performed

after conclusion of the current Unit 2 outage,

b. Stabilization time was tracked by the test engineer uging a personal

-wrist watch which was worn underneath her anticontamination clothing

(anti C's). _ The inspector noted that such practicas increased the -

potential for personal contamination.

c. The inspector.noted that leak test results for individual val'ves are

not formally trended; however, previous test data were available

regarding valve leak test history.

No violations or deviations were identified. ,

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9. yonthlyMaintenanceObservation(62703] _

k Station maintenance activitfAs on safety related systems and components

Afsted below were observed or reviewed to 6scutain whether they were

m, t#ndvged in $ccordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and

indus'try' coda or standards and in conformance with Technical -

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jpecifilcations.

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.- * Relocation of 0 diesei'ge'nerator (DG) fuel filters . "

,% Temperaturelmonitoring of ODG number 6 connecting rod bearing

N following replacement

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fv11cwing completion of mair.tenance on the O DG, the idpector verified

that these systems had been repurned to service properly.

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The following items were consioered during the reviews of the above

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activjties: g the limiting conditions for operation were met while

l components or systems wre removed frem service; approvals were obtained

prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved

procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or

calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to

service; quality control records were maintained; activities were

accomplished by qualiffed pe'sonnel; r parts and materials used were

y%. p p perly certified; radio M W F controls were implemented; and fire

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f prevention controls were implemented.

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Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs

and to assure that priority was assigned to safety related equipment

<' , saintenanceuhJchmayaffectsystemperformance.

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l No violations or' deviations were identified.

10. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the followfdg event reports were reviewed to determine

that deportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective

action war accomplished, and thau corrective action to prevent recurrence

had been accomplished in accoraance with Technical Specifications. The-

LERs jisted below are considered closed:

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, LER No. Ul ~( DESCRIPTION

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85043 Service Water; Pump Auto-Start After ESF Bus Outage

87002 10 Steart Gene'[ tor Inspection Reveals Greater

4 Than 1% of Tuies Defective

87006 Unit Shutdo n for Two Diesel Generators

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LER No. DESCRIPTION

85019-01 Inadvertent Trip of Unit 2 Purge in Cold Shutdown

With regard to'.LER 295/87006, " Unit Shutdown for-Two Diesel Generators  !

(DG) Inoperable As Required By TS," a' violation was issued for this event

in Reports No. 295/87003 and No. 304/87003 for.failing to immediately

~' demonstrate operability of the 1A and 0 DGs when the 1B DG tripped. The-

planned corrective' actions' included (1) equipment repair and testing,

.(2) personnel instruction, and (3) procedure changes. Actions (1).and

(2) have been completed. Revisions to PT-11. " Diesel Generator Loading

Test," and to P/DG-001/3-2R, " Diesel Generator Major Overhaul Inspection

Checklist," will be considered an Open Item pending a review of the  !

revised procedures (295/87016-03).

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Training :(41400)

During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed abnormal events and

unusual occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from training

deficiencies. Selected events were evaluated to determine whether the

classroom, simulator, or on-the-job training received before the event

was sufficient either to have prevented the occurrence or to have

mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator action.

Personne1' qualifications were also evaluated, In addition, the

inspectors determined whether lessons learned fror the events were

incorporated into the training program.

During review of the licensee's investigation of the causes for the

flooding of the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank rooms, the

inspector inquired as to the extent of training received by technical

staff personnel regarding completion of work requests. The technical

staff training coordinator stated that the pertinent training consisted

of a review of ZAP 3-51-1. No lesson plans or other training aids

related to work requests were identified.

Events reviewed included the events discussed in this report. In

addition, LERs were routinely evaluated for training impact.

No training sessions were attended by the resident inspectors, although

the resident inspectors did attend one Generating Stations Emergency Plan

(GSEP) practice and observed some licensee activities during the FFE.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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12. Followup of Region III Requests (92701)

Dn-June 15, 1987, the resident inspectors were requested to. determine

whether valves manufactured by the C & in Valve Co..of Westmont, Illinois,

were used~ in safety related applications at the Zion Station. The

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inspectors determined that C & $ Valve Co. is on the licensee's approved

bidders list (ABL), and that one valve was on order. The licensee did

not- identify any. C. & S . valves currently. in use at the station. The

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flegion III request'was prompted by allegations of quality assurance 'j

problems with C & S Valves. j

No violations or deviations were identified.

- 13. June 19, 1987 Site Tour by Regional Administrator (30702)

On June 19, 1987 the resident inspectors conducted a site tour for .)

members of Region III and NRC headquarters management staffs (see {

attachment.1).. The site-tour included the control room, auxiliary .l

building,'turbira building and cribhouse. The tour.also included the

on-line vent sampling facility operated by the Illinois-Department of

Nuclear Safety (IDNS). The tour focused on the material condition of the ] i

plant and, included areas of significant improvement, as well as areas

where additional- housekeeping effort was needed.

A management meeting followed the plant tour, at which Mr. Plim1

discussed recent event history for the. station and presented trends

for several performance indicators. Mr. Plimi also discussed station i

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priorities and programs which are in place to improve station

performance. The discussions included plcnt material condition,  !

personnel error reduction, reactor trips, LERs and other subjects. 4

Mr. Davis noted that the levels of housekeeping had noticeably improved.  ;

Mr. Forney stated that the NRC was concerned that the number of significant i

plant events since the first of the year has not been reduced in spite of

the licensee's actions to improve performance. The licensee pointed to

several improving trends and stated that the number of opportunities for  ;

error since January had been relatively high due to the frequent unit

, shutdowns and startups. Mr. Forney stated that the NRC would continue to

closely monitor station performance to evaluate the management programs I

discussed. I

No violations or deviations were identified.

L 14. Open Items

Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some actior. ]

on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two Open Items disclosed j

during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 10. '

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15. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items.are matters about which more information is required

-in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of

noncompliance or deviations. One Unresolved Item disclosed during

this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.

16. Exit Interview (30703)

The' inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

.throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection

conducted from June 2 through July 1,1987 to summarize the scope and

findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the

inspectors' comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely

informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents

or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The-

licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.

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ATTACHMENT 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

JUNE 19. 1987 MANAGEMENT MEETIN3

. Commonwealth Edison Company

• C. Reed,' Senior Vice. President

• T. Maiman,-Vice-President, PWR Operations

D. L..Farrar, Manager, Technical. Services

L. - F. Gerner, Regulatory Assurance Superintendent'

L. D. Butterfield, Director, Nuclear Licensing-

P. C. LeBlond, Licensing Administrator, Zion Station

F. G. Lentine, Zion Project Engineer, Station Nuclear Engineering

.

Department-

R. W. Stobart, Director, Quality Assurance Operations

S. L..Trubatch, Staff Attorney

• G. P11m1, Plant Manager, Zion Station.

E. J. Fuerst, Superintendent of Production, Zion Station *

W. R. Kurth, Assistant Superintendent, Operations

T. A. Printz, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

C. J. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance- Supervisor

W. Stone, Superintendent, Quality Assurance, Zion Station

NRC Region III

• A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator-

• H. J. Miller, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III.

• B. - K. Grimes, Deouty Director, Division of Reactor Inspection &

Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Research, (NRR)

• W. L. Forney, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1

• J. H. Hinds, Chief, Section 1A, Division of Reactor Projects

1 *M. M. Holzmer, Senior Resident Inspector, Zion Station

• P. L. Eng, Resident Inspector, Zion Station

• N. R. Williamsen, Inspector, Region III, Zion Resident's Office

, B. W. Stapleton, Enforcement Specialist, Region III

. *H. T. Sam, Summer Intern, Region III

• G. R. Pristas, Summer Intern, Region III

• Indicates those who attended the resident inspectors' site tour on

June 19, 1987.

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