IR 05000341/1987001
| ML20215J769 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215J760 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-87-01, 50-341-87-1, NUDOCS 8705080238 | |
| Download: ML20215J769 (9) | |
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SALP 7 Attachment Report of Fenni 2 SALP Related Activities for July 1,1985 through March 31, 1986 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Detroit Edison Company Name of Licensee Fermi 2 Name of Facility July 1, 1985 through March 31, 1986 Report Period 8705080238 870505 PDR ADOCK 05000341 Q PDR
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' INTRODUCTION This SALP 7 report has been prepared to document-significant activities, events, and inspections that were associated with the Femi 2 facility during the period July 1, 1985, through March 31, 1986. Significant events that occurred following completion of the Fermi SALP 6 assessment and described in this report, resulted in an extended outage, and numerous equipment and operational problems. In response to these events a number of NRC-licensee management meetings were conducted; the licensee developed an extensive corrective action program to resolve management, personnel, and equipment weaknesses. Due to poor licensee performance during this SALP 7 report period which has received significant NRC and licensee attention, and the lack of operating performance, the NRC has elected not to assess the licensee performance.or assign any evaluation ratings.Section II of this report, "Significant Activities, Events, and Inspections," provides a-brief description of significant activities,.
events, and inspections that occurred during the report period.Section III, " Supporting Data and Sumaries," is a compilation of SALP related information, such as enforcement and LER data for the report period that is normally found in Section V of a usual SALP report. This report is not an assessment of licensee performance. It is a description of activities, events, inspections, and SALP related data that are related to the Fermi 2 facility during the SALP 7 report perio II. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES, EVENTS, AND INSPECTION Just prior to the beginning of this nine month SALP period, the -
licensee received its Low Power License (on March 20,1985) and was performing fueling and startup testing activities in preparation for receiving its Full Power License and eventual commercial operatio ~
On July 10, 1985, an NRC Comission Briefing was conducted in support of the issuance of the Full Power License. On July 15, 1985, the Fermi 2 Full Power License was-issued to Detroit Edison Compan On July 1, 1985, an Out-of-Sequence Rod Pull Event occurred at Fermi that resulted in the reactor becoming critical prematurel As a result of the Rod Pull Event, a Confirmation Action Letter (CAL), dated July 19, 1985, was issued to the licensee. This CAL, among other things, required the licensee to obtain concurrence from the NRC Region III Regional Administrator prior to exceeding 5% powe In addition to the Rod Pull Event, between July 1 and October 15, 1985, numerous Technical Specifications and procedural violations occurred. Inspection Report 50-341/85040(DRP) identified 26 violations, for which enforcement action was pending when the inspection report was issued to the licensee on January 7, 198 A civil penalty enforcement action was proposed on July 29, 1986, for these violations. On August 1, 1986, the licensee paid the .
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civil penalt ,
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On September 19, 1985, a management meeting was conducted at the Region III office to discuss the results of inspection report 50-341/85040(DRP). During the meeting the licensee described the corrective actions which it had implemented. The licensee developed a Reactor Operations Improvement Plan (ROIP), which was documented in a letter dated October 10, 1985. This plan provided a systematic approach to resolving the root causes of the identified poor performanc A special operational readiness assessment team inspection was conducted at Fermi during August 18-20 and September 16-20, 198 This assessment focused on conduct of operations.and corrective actions associated with recent plant events, including the actions required in the July 19, 1985, Confirmatory Action Letter as a result of the July 1,1985, premature criticality event. Both strengths and weaknesses were identified during the inspectio Weaknesses included poor communications between management and shift personnel, problems with the team effort of the control room operating staff, and lack of integration of the Shift Operations Advisor and Reactor Engineering role with shift operating personne Although the licensee had completed the actions required by the CAL, Region III concurrence to exceed 5% power (required by the CAL) was withheld pending licensee resolution of the identified weaknesse D. On September 17, 1985, with the plant operating at 4.1% power, the licensee discovered cracks in the east and west 30-inch steam bypass lines and in associated hanger retainers and lug welds. Inspection report 50-341/85045(DRS) reported that the cracks were apparently caused by high frequency acoustic vibrations induced by the steam bypass valves. Contributing to the problem were the relatively thin pipe walls of the large diameter bypass lines. During the inspection, conducted October 8 and 9, 1985, the licensee discovered a new crack which had developed since the last cracks had been repaired. The NRC inspectors concluded that continued operation represented a personnel safety risk. In an NRC management meeting with licensee corporate officers, the licensee agreed to shut the unit down and to initiate replacement of the damaged pipin During December 3-5, 1985, and January 9, 1986, an NRC regional specialist reviewed the applicable licensee's engineering design j package and inspected the newly installed piping. The installed i modified piping design included larger, thicker pipe, orifice plates
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(in an effort to reduce acoustic vibration), and other corrective l changes.
l E. The NRC observed an exercise of the licensee's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness (RERP) program conducted at the site
- on October 2, 1985. During the exercise, a weakness was identified in which licensee personnel failed to incorporate current and forecasted meteorology conditions (primarily wind direction) into l- the protective action decisionmaking process. As a result, the l licensee conveyed marginally acceptable protective action l recommendations to the State of Michigan. The licensee subsequently l took action to resolve this weakness.
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F.- On November 13, 1985, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 13 experienced an upper _ crankshaft connecting rod bearing failure and other related damage. The licensee had experienced similar problems in January 1985, with EDG's Nos 11 and 12, and thought it had corrected the problem. During the NRC's and licensee's reviews of the EDG No. 13 failure, problems were also found in EDG's Nos. 14 and 1 After extensive investigations, testing, and modifications, it was concluded that failures of the EDG's probably resulted from dry starts and bearing cap misalignments. The licensee modified and repaired the EDG's and subsequently declared them operationa The licensee committed to the NRC to implement a program to monitor future bearing performance. The NRC also imposed license requirements concerning a Fermi EDG lube oil surveillance progra A security team inspection was conducted at the site from November 12 through December 27, 1985 (inspection report 50-341/85047(DRSS)), to review the licensee's poor performance in the Safeguards area. As a result of the inspection findings, 13 violations were identified by the team, and 1 violation was identified by.the licensee. A civil penalty enforcement action was proposed on May 20, 1986 (subsequent to this report period).
The licensee took extensive corrective actions to improve perform-ance in this area, which included increased audit commitments; trend analysis commitments pertaining to access control violations, maintenance support, and security related reportable events; an increased security surveillance program; a detailed 100% audit of all authorized access records; accelerated activity on Engineering Design Projects pertaining to security systems; and proposed long term corrective actions to. address adverse trends, organizational responsibilities, and review and revision of security plan On November 17, 1985, between 17,000 and 35,000 gallons of slightly radioactive water was released from a ruptured seam in the condensate storage tank (CST). The water soaked into the ground surrounding the tank. The rupture occurred as a result of work related to the installation of the plant's remote shutdown pane The tank was subsequently repaire During December 4-6, 1985, a limited inspection of Environmental Qualification (EQ) requirements was conducted. The inspection included a review of Engineering Design Packages and Purchase Requisitions. No violations or deviations were identified. A more detailed EQ inspection is schedule On December 5, 1985, the licensee notified the NRC that pipe hanger loads in the reactor-auxiliary building had potentially overstressed approximately 45 embedded plates. This condition was discovered during a design verification of calculations on hangers attached to concrete structures. As a result, the licensee declared the Containment Atmosphere, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water,
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Residual Heat Removal, Emergency Equipment Service Water, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water, Core Spray, and miscellaneous turbine
' systems inoperable. The embedded plate concern was resolved by a combination of refinement of the hanger loads, the as-built attachment locations, and the embedded plate analyses. All systems were again declared operable on January 7,1986. During an NRC review of the reanalyses, an inspector determined that some pipe stress load reduction calculations were not verified or approved prior to declaring the applicable system operable. This finding was later closed due to lack of safety significance based on the results of the licensee's reanalyse Because of the nature and diversity of Fermi 2 problems, a 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter was issued on December 24, 1985, identifying ,
the NRC's concerns and requesting that the licensee evaluate and '
address management weaknesses, develop a comprehensive plan to ensure the readiness of the facility to restart, and identify the actions necessary to improve regulatory and operational performanc The licensee responded to the 50.54(f) letter on January 29, 198 Actions taken by the licensee to improve performance included the development of a Nuclear Operations Improvement Plan which incorporated ROIP issues, a Security Improvement Plan, changes in management personnel and structure, and the formation of an Independent Overview Committee.~ The NRC reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and projected corrective actions and found them to be acceptabl III. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES Licensee Activities Fermi 2 began this SALP report period in an ongoing extended outage, and had numerous shutdowns thereafte The outages / shutdowns and major events which occurred are briefly summarized belo . July 1, 1985: Premature criticality inciden . July 9, 1985: Forced outages at 5% power due to Reactor low water leve . July 23, 1985: Shutdown to correct a feedwater pump problem which occurred during a demonstration test on July 22, 198 . October 11, 1985: Shutdown for maintenance and installation of NRC-required equipment (i.e., remote shutdown panel and repair of the main steam bypass lines).
The plant did not operate above 5% power. Nine scrams (all at less than 5% power) were reported during the period. Four of these scrams were due to procedural inadequacies or personnel error. None were due to mechanical / equipment problems or were the result of inadequate desig n
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. Inspection Activities There were twenty-six inspections conducted during this report period of July 1,1985 through March 31, 1986. Major or significant inspection activities are listed in Paragraph 2 of this section, Special Inspection Summar . Inspection Data Facility Name: Fermi 2 Docket No.: 50-341 Inspection Reports Nos.: 85006, 85025, 85027, 85029-85045, 85048, 85050, 85051, 86002, 86003, and 8600 Table 1 Number of Violations in Each Severity Level Functional Areas I II III IV V Plant Operations 1 Radiological Controls Maintenance 2 Surveillance 1 Fire Protection Emergency Preparedness 1 Security 1 Outages Quality Programs and 1 Adminis. Controls Affecting Quality Licensing Activities Training & Qualification Effectiveness TOTALS 0 0 0 7 0 Note: Several violations identified during the report period are not included in Table 1 above. These violations were being
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considered for escalated enforcement action, at the end of this perio . Special Inspection Summary A special safety inspection was conducted during the period of July 1 through October 15, 1985, concerning activities surrounding the premature criticality events and other LC0 violations (85040). A special Operation Readiness Team Inspection was conducted on August 18-20 and September 16-20, 1985 (85043).
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.; A reactive safeguards inspection was conducted between November 12 and December 27, 1985. This inspection was conducted to review the licensee's poor safeguards-
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performance as indicated b and adverse trends (85047)y several reportable events
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,. Investigations or Allegations Review ;
l Fifteen allegations relating to Fermi 2 consisting of 58 concerns
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the 15 allegations and 11 of the 58 concerns remained open at the end of the perio .
D.- Escalated Enforcement Actions
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Civil Penalties
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' A Civil Penalty involving security violations in the amount of
$50,000 was paid on June 19, 1986. The package consisted of
, '13 examples of violations, which collectively made 2 Severity-Level III violations (85047). An Escalated Enforcement case' involving the premature criticality incident of July 1,1985, was sent to the licensee on July 3, 1986. The licensee paid $300,000 in Civil Penalties on August 1,1986,($100,000 was paid for each Severity Level III
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violation (85040)).
3.- OnJulyl29,1986, the licensee was assessed $75,000 because
'_ of three violations involving Fermi 2 technical specifications
, and the facility's operating license. The licensee paid the
!. $75,000 Civil Penalty on August 1,1986,($25,000 for each'
! of the three Severity Level III violation-(85040)).
E.- Licensee Conferences Held During Report Period 1.- July 2, 1985.- Region III Office; management meeting to discuss the mid-term Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
, Report (SALP 6).for Fermi .; September 10, 1985 - Region III Office; management meeting with representatives of Detroit Edison Company and members of the Region III staff to discuss Fermi's premature criticality.
' September 19, 1985 - Region III Office; enforcement conference to discuss Femi's premature criticality.
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> October 10, 1985 - Region III Office; management meeting with
, the Licensee's Chairman of the Board and the Vice President of Nuclear Operations, to discuss the licensee's performance
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regarding the initial operations of Fermi . December 4.1985 - Region III Office; an enforcement conference
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to review problems at. Femi 2 and the actions to be taken prior to the plant being returned to operation from the maintenance /
t modification outage that it was i .
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4 January 6.1986 - Region III Office; the Regional Administrator met with the Chairman of the Board, Detroit Edison Company to discuss the Licensee's plans for dealing with the December 24, 1985,50.54(f) lette . January 9,1986 - Fermi Site; management meeting with the Regional Administrator and members of his staff, and repre-sentatives of Management Analysis Company (MAC) at their request, to provide background information regarding the Fermi sit . January 17, 1986 - Region III Office; an enforcement conference with NRC management and Fermi representatives to discuss security concern and other problems concerning management breakdown . January 24, 1986 - Region III Office; management meeting with the Deputy Regional Administrator, representatives from headquarters and Franklin Research (NRC Consultant), and Detroit Edison Company to discuss the licensee's action plan to repair and test their emergency diesel generator . February 14, 1986 - Region III Office; a management meeting with the licensee to discuss the Diesel Generator issue . February 21, 1986 - Region III Office; management meeting with representatives of the Fermi site security organization, to discuss their developing performance improvement program . March 5,1986 - 0' Hare Airport, Chicago; a management meeting with the Regional Administrator and the CEO, Detroit Edison Company, to discuss matters related to Fermi F. Confirmatory Action Letters (CALs)
CAL-RIII-85-10 was issued during the report period. The CAL was in regard to the premature criticality events of July 1,1985, and the correction actions the licensee planned to take (i.e.,
proper training, procedure implementation, and communication with personnel).
l G. A Review of Licensee Event Reports _ Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
Fermi 2 l os 0 85083, and 86001, 86002, and 86004 l
Fifty-seven LER's were issued during the report period. Twenty-seven
! were the result of personnel errors; 8 were the result of procedure inadequacies; 3 were related to design problems; and 14 fell in the
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"other" cause code. Personnel errors represented a significant percentage of the total LER's at 47%.
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'Cause Cor's Areas LERs
- Personnel' Error 27
- Design Deficiency 3 External Caus O Procedure Inadequacy 8 Component / Equipment 1 Other 14
- Unknown 4
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57 CFR 21 Reports No 10 CFR Part 21 Reports were submitted by the licensee during
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this report period for Fermi,
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