ML20212D805

Trip Rept of 861203-04 Site Visit W/Util & Lll Re SPDS Audit.List of Attendees & Lll Meeting Summary Encl

ML20212D805
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/24/1986
From:	Mark Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8701050036
Download: ML20212D805 (17)

Text

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L L Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 gEc 24 #

APPLICANT: Georgia Power Company FACILITY: Vogtle Units 1 and 2

SUMMARY

OF SAFETY PARA!!ETER DISPLAY SYSTEM SITE VISIT FOR V0GTLE Cn December 3-4, 1986, the staff and its censultants met with the applicant to discuss the safety parameter display system (SPDS). Participants are listed in Enclosure 1.

The staff's consultants, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), have provided a meeting surmary included as Enclosurc ?.

Melanie A. iiiller, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate f4 Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosures:

As stated cc: See next page

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Georgia Fower Company Vogtle Electric Certretino Plant cc:

Mr. L. T. Gucwc Pesident inspector Chief fluclear Engineer Nuclear Pect:latory Cor.mssion Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 577 P.O. Box 4545 Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 l'.r. P.uble A. Thomas Depoish Kirkland, III, Counsel Vice President - Licensing Office of the Consuners' Utility Vogtle Project Council Georgia Power Correny/ Suite 225 Southern Cortpany Services, Inc. 32 Peachtree Street, N.F.

P.O. Box 2625 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Birmingham, Alabaraa -35P02 Jarres E. Joiner Fr. Donald C. Foster Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman, Vice President & Project General lianager & Ashmore Georgia Power (cmpany Candler Building Post Office Box 299A, Route 2 127 Peachtree Street, t!.F.

Waynesboro, Georgia 20030 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Danny Feig Mr. J. A. Bailey 1130 Alte tvenue Project Licensing Manager Atlanta, Georgia 30?07 Southern Company Services, Inc.

P.G. Box 2625 Carol Stangler Biriningham, Alabarce 352C2 Georgians Against Nuclear Frrrgy 425 Euclid Terrtre Ernest L. Blake, Jr. Atlanta, Georgia 30307 Bruce W. Churchill, Esc;.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridae 2500 h Street, N.W.

Washirgtcr., D. C. 20037 Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.

Vogtle Flant b nager Georgia Power Corear.y Route 2, Box 299-/

Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W. , Suite 2900 Atlanta, Gecrgia 30323 Mr. R. E. Conway Senior Vice President and Project Director Georgia Power Cor.:p6ny Rt. 2, P. O. Box 209A Waynesboro, Georgia 3CE30

n ENCLOSURE 1 fARTICIPANTS NRC GEORGIA POWER COMPANY S. Saba E. Kozinsky D. Hudson C. Belflower C. Yeyer D. Crouch LLNL R. Floyd J. Ealick E. Schultz D. Moddour G. Johnson' P. Hermann W. Grabbard SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES R. Bellany T. Greene K. Kopecky S. Hairston O

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YOGTLE SPDS AUDIT MEETING MINUTES On December 3-4, 1986, an on-site safety parameter display system (SPDS) Audit was conducted at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) of Georgia Power Co-mpany (GPC). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Audit Team consisted of an NRC member and two personnel from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory acting as consultants to the NRC.

The boundary of the SPDS with respect to the Vogtle plant computer was discussed.

GPC personnel stated that the Emergency Response Facilities Computer System (ERFCS) i drives SPDS terminals in the Control Room. The ERFCS integrates data from several systems, and a small subset of these data are used in producing SPDS displays. SPDS data are input to the ERF Computer from the Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS),

the Plant Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS), and directly from plant instrumentation via a digital-to-analog converter and multiplier. The system configuration is illustrated in Fig. 1.

GPC explained that SPDS parameters are principally supplied by PSMS and PERMS.

PSMS and PERMS transform data input to engineering units and perform initial validity checks. The PERMS checks the validity of each radiation monitoring data channel and passes parameter values and status flags to the ERFCS. One flag denotes channel status (test, inactive, or trouble). The other flag is for alarm statas, i.e., when a signal has exceeded an alarm set point. PSMS checks inputs for operability and against the possible input range and sends parameter value and status information to the ERFCS. The ERFCS interprets any data which are not flagged as " good" as " bad" data.

GPC described the general SPDS display and interaction technique characteristics.

The status of six Westinghouse Owners' Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG) Critical Safety Functions (CSFs) as well as the Radiation CSF status is continu-ously displayed on the leftmost of two side-by-side display terminals in the Control Room. This status is depicted in the form of color coded status boxes. The CSFS repre-sented by these boxes are: 1) Reactivity, 2) Core Cooling. 3) Heat Sink, 4) RCS Integrity, .

5) Containment, 6) RCS Ir.ventory, and 7) Radiation Overvsew. The following color coding is used to indicate the status of each of the above functions: red = extreme challenge to CSF, orange = severe challenge to CSF, yellow = alert condition, and green = satisfac-tory.

The status boxes are part of all first and second level SPDS displays. The first level displays provide an overview of SPDS parameters. Operators may chose from two different display formats for this overview: a tabular presentation of parameter values, or a deviation bar chart.

The second-level displays show individual Critical Safety Function Status Trees (CSFSTs) for all but the radiation overview CSF. These trees illustrate whether a CSF is

, satisfactory or is challenged, and the logic used by the SPDS in determining the degree of challenge. For the radiation monitor overview, five groups of tabular radiation data, broken down by number and location, are shown.

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Only first and second level displays may be accessed at the left terminal. The right most terminal may be used to access first, second, or third level SPDS displays, or other ERFCS displays. Third level SPDS displays are time history plots of SPDS parameters, and parameter vs. parameter plots. The third level SPDS displays and the ERFCS dis-

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plays do not contain the CSF status boxes.

User interaction with the SPDS is accomplished primarily via a vertically-mounted ,

keypad (Fig. 2) located to the right side of the SPDS terminals. All SPDS functions can be accessed via this keypad witn single button call-up. Keys to access top-level fune-tions are configured in the top row of the keypad. Keys to call up second-level displays are located in the leftmost vertical row. Keys for second and third-level functionality are horizontally arranged according to the status hierarchy. Thus, each horizontal row (except for rows associated with radiation) corresponds to a CSF, with the leftmost key for the second-level function. The remaining keys in each row call-up of the third-level displays related to that CSF, In the case of the radiation overview status, keypad but-4 tons for are arranged such that the first horizontal row below the key labeled " Radiation" consists of keys for functionally grouped numerical displays. Immediately below this row are two rows of keys for access to trend plots of selected radiation parameters. The keypad is arranged according to priority, left to right, top to bottom. GPC also stated that if the ERF Computer detects failure on one console, there is a software lock, such that only first and second level functions are accessible.

3 The NRC Audit Team inquired how the touchpad works (i.e., electro-mechanically,

- electro-optically, etc.). GPC personnel present at the Audit were not aware of the ,

answer.

GPC described the human factors design of SPDS. GPC stated that there has been considerable human factors input into SPDS, especially with respect to the information hierarchy and development of redundant formats and redundant methods to access infor-mation. The lead human factors engineer and the Control Room Design Review (CRDR)

Team provided this input.

GPC indicated that the vertical order of keypad keys is in accordance with the relative priority of the Critical Safety Functions as defined by the Vogtle EOP Func-l tional Recovery Guidelines. Also, GPC pointed out that color coding (which is in accord-

ance with Control Room conventions) is used to indicate the degree to which a CSF is challenged. In addition to CSF status color codes, bad or questionable data and status information for CSFS that cannot be evaluated are displayed in magenta. Bad or ques-tionable data are never used to make any decision regarding CSF status. According to GPC, the CSFST display is geared towards showing the operator the logic used to deter-mine CSF status. Tertiary displays then show the specific data used in the evaluation.

GPC maintained that the layout of the vertical keypad reflects the way operators will want to use the keypad. The first functions on this keypad are overview functions,

enabling operators to determine the status of all SPDS parameters. 'Ihere are detailed

status tree pages, followed by trend plots. Trend plots have a default update rate value of two and one-half seconds, except for plots for radiation data, which have an update

rate up to one minute. GPC mentioned that the update rate acceptance criterion for radiation monitoring is 10 seconds and they are pursuing modifications to improve the update rate for radiation parameters to at least this level. GPC pointed out that design l

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features such as the displaying of alarm limits on plots, the user-selectable time scale,

! user-modifiable trend chart width, single button functionality access, an on-line index, menu driven input, and provision of alternative input methods are designed for maximum '

ease of operation by users. GPC also stated that SPDS nomenclature. is consistent with

. the rest of the Control Room.

! NUREG-0700 surveys (particularly the computer survey) were used to evaluate the i ERF Computer. The SPDS was also evaluated during EOP validation in the plant simula-tor. Twenty-three ERF Computer-related HEDs resulted from the survey and validation efforts. These HEDs are shown in Appendix 1.

When a CSF changes status an audible alarm sounds and the appropriate CSF status box flashes. The user must press an acknowledge key on the keyboard to terminate the audible alarm; the flash continues for 30-seconds. GPC stated that alarm setpoints were

reviewed, and a high-low limits will be selected for each parameter so that SPDS alarms

! are consistent with those on the Control Room annunciator.

Display characteristics were once again discussed. Redundant coding is used for piping and instrument drawings, for example a valve open state is depicted in red, outline j form, and the closed state is depicted by a green solid figure. P&ID displays are feature l of the ERF Computer but are not considered part of the SPDS. Trend plots are auto scaled on the parameter value axis to the highest resolution practically available. Time resolution of trend plots is 1/60 of the selected trending interval. The default intervalis 2.5 minutes. Alternative intervals up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> may be selected by the operator.

The topic of how the user knows the SPDS is functional was initiated. GPC re-sponded that there is a watchdog timer in ERF Computer, if screens are not refreshed within the criterion rate, an alarm is initiated, and the display screen is cleared.

There are three SPDS terminals in the Control Room, five SPDS terminals in the technical support center (TSC), and four terminals in the Emergency Operations Facility

' (EOF). PSMS provides seven data links to ERFCS, including redundant links from Train A and Train B. In addition, there are two data links from PERMS to ERFCS. GPC has not i determined system availability but committed to the performance of a 1,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> avail-l . ability test. GPC could not state whether the system will be available during preventa- "

i tive maintenance. The Audit Team inquired whether spare parts were available on site.

GPC's answer was that a limited supply of spare parts are maintained in the warehouse, 3

and that parts may also be scavenged from similar computers that have less critical j functions, such as the Simulator's SPDS computer. The NRC Audit Team pointed out j that SPDS availability is dependent upon operation of the PSMS, PERMS, and system ~

i power sources. Therefore, the final determination of SPDS availability should account for these factors, as well as items such as downtime for preventative maintenance, time i

to obtain spare parts, and availability of qualified technicians.

I About 50 plant process parameters and about 60 PERMS parameters are used to i

determine the status of CSFs. In addition to input validity checks performed by the j PSMS and PERMS, the ERF Computer checks each input to verify that it is within the

! range of the measurement device. GPC indicated that input range checking criteria i

' reflect the limits of instrument capabilities rather than realistic operating ranges.

However, case-by-case exceptions have been made.

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Interchannel comparison is performed for all parameters that have more than one input, if no good inputs are available for a parameter, it is flagged as bad. If allinputs are good, and if they all are within a delta of the average of allinputs then the average value is displayed and flagged as valid. Otherwise, the average value of all inputs that are within delta of the average is displayed, and the value is flagged questionable. Delta is currently set at two percent of the input instrument range for each parameter. The NRC Audit Team suggested that under certain conditions this value does not represent reasonable acceptance criteria. For example, in adverse environment conditions instru-ment accuracy will degrade such that valid readings may deviate by a greater amount.

Therefore, delta should not be chosen arbitrarily, in fact, two sets of deltas, one for normal operating conditions, and one for adverse environment conditions, may be neces-sary.

The Audit Team noted that Vogtle's data validation methodology requires that data be nearly perfect to be called good. Since all questionable data is displayed in magenta and since questionable data is not used to evaluate status trees, parameter status and CSF status information is lost even in cases where the parameter values displayed by be judged to be highly reliable, but not nearly perfect. The NRC audit team suggested that GPC consider coding questionable data in some way other than color so that parameter and CSF status information may continue to be displayed using " questionable" data.

According to GPC, EOPs and CSFSTs are integrated, in that the six CSFSTs used during post-trip conditions are identical to those contained in the EOP Functional Re-sponse Guides, and CSFSTs direct the user to the appropriate EOPs to be used to return

- the CSF to a normal status. Furthermore, SPDS training is integrated with EOPs.

GPC has identified the Shift Technical Advisors (STAS) as the primary SPDS user.

STAS are an integral part of the operating staff, and their normal duty station is in the Control Room. Plant operators and the health physics staff will also receive training in the use of the SPDS. The NRC Audit Team inquired what plant staff will be told about the credibility of displayed information. GPC replied that the plant staff will be told that SPDS is credible, but that the qualified instruments are the ultimate basis of data.

GPC indicated that system security is accomplished primarily through controlling 4

access to terminal keyboard function cards that allow data and software changes. Plant personnel can look at any terminal, but cannot, change system information. The cards which allow input of mode changes (which affect set points for alarms) are locked in the shift supervisor's desk. A programmer's card is necessary to modify system software.

This card is stored in a vital area. Key access to this area is required first, then access to the programmer's card is needed, then system operations changes must be entered in a different terminal, and, finally, passwords are required to make changes. Even then, only 15 minutes system access is allowed by the system.

GPC has established three types of SPDS maintenance procedures: 1) calibration,

2) preventative maintenance, and 3) corrective maintenance. Verification of the values displayed by the SPDS is conducted as part of instrument channel calibration. The Audit Team asked how plant personnel would know that aspects other than instrument accuracy are functional. GPC replied the testing of these other aspects is performed as part of preventative maintenance. Furthermore, according to GPC, the software is designed to compensate for problems such as disc failure. In additior., periodic verification of soft-ware accuracy is required by the plant software control procedure.

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The NRC Audit Team examined GPC's Functional Requirements Document that specified ERFCS capabilities and the independent review of system requirements per-formed by Energy Incorporated (EI). Sample SPDS design criteria from Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, and NUREG-0800 were traced to the functional requirements document using the System Requirements Review Report.

The NRC Audit Team also audited the design verification review effort. The Audit

, Team confirmed that sample functional requirements were addressed by the design review, and were traceable to the hardware specification and the software design files.

In addition, the Audit Team confirmed that the Control Human Factors Room Survey Checklists applicable to the SPDS were appropriately completed, and that the resulting HEDs were appropriate. The procedure for modifying ERFCS software in the future was

examined by the Audit Team, which confirmed that provisions requiring design review i and verification testing of changes are included in this procedure.

Documentation of GPC's validation process was examined by the NRC Audit Team.

The validation process included man-in-the-loop simulation testing conducted as part of the EOP validation exercises. In these exercises each EOP operator task was tested, including tasks from the Functional Response Guidelines. The NRC Audit Team exam-ined the Debriefing Questionnaires and Validation Comment Sheets used to document post-exercise debriefing for two EOP Validation Scenarios. The Audit Team determined j that neither the comment sheets nor the questionnaires specifically prompted partici-pants for comments on the SPDS. Nevertheless, comments on the SPDS were provided by the primary user. System response time testing was also included in GPC's validstion process. This testing showed that system response times for all system functions except radiation monitoring were consistently less than three seconds. GPC is attempting to reduce the system response time for radiation monitoring parameters to less than ten seconds.

Samples of the ERFC3 software were examined by the NRC Audit Team. This included examination of algorithms for engineering units conversion, and data validation of the Pressurizer pressure inputs. GPC demonstrated that the software algorithm which yields Pressurizer pressure values function as specified. Engineering units conversion is, in the case of Pressurizer pressure, accomplished through use of linear conversion of

{ voltage inputs. The NRC Audit Team verified that this conversion is appropriate. Final-ly, GPC showed that software algorithm to produce data validation outputs conform to j functional descriptions provided by GPC.

GPC stated that in the software test procedure, modes and inputs were randomly selected. Then every possible combination of a redundant input matrix was tested for each flow chart path for Trains A and B to ensure conformance of data input status (good, bad, questionable) to that specified by data validation algorithm function descrip-tions.

Use of the SPDS was observed by the Audit Team during a simulated transient response performed in the plant simulator. The NRC Audit Team observed that the SPDS user was able to gain access to and utilize desired information rapidly. The NRC Audit i Team noted several possible improvements in display conventions and interaction tech-i niques that GPC should consider. These improvements include: 1) expanded use of prompts to indicate required user responses, especially in the case of selection of numer-i Vogtle:12/23/86  !

ical values via vector keys and numerical input via keyboard, 2) improved colar contrast between indicated set points and data plots (e.g., for the validated RCS wide rande pressure the alarm set point is in red, and the lower portion of the time plot curve is also in red, making differentiation difficult),3) consistent indication of acceptable operating levels (e.g., containment water level), 4) indication of default values (y'es/no or numerical values),5) the uce of a block cursor, rather than an underline cursor, which is sometimes too small to be readily perceptible (e.g., in saturation curve displays), 6) indication of which numerical values can be user selected to obtain additional data screens, and of the actual screen selection area, 7) a change in the cursor home location from the extreme upper-left corner of the screen to the area where the first input / selection response can be made, 8) labeling of forward and backward scroll keys (for trend display control), and

9) indication of current parameter values on status tree displays. In addition, the Audit Team expressed concern that the non-QWERTY key arrangement of the keyboard might cause difficulty to users. GPC stated that these keys will be used infrequently, and that no major problems with the key arrangement are anticipated.

The Vogtle SPDS uses CSF Status Trees that are mode dependent. The tress used for post-trip operation, designated as mode 9, are the trees from the plant Functional Response Guides and were validated as part of the EOP validation process. The trees used for normal operating modes were developed by GPC operations independent of the EOP development process. The NRC Audit Team asked how these CSFSTs were vali-dated. GPC replied that the trees for modes 1 through 6 were validated through reviews by the operations department. In general, the logic is equivalent to the mode 9 trees but more conservative setpoints are used. When asked if the trees are part of what operators actually do, GPC replied that the V & V activity has confirmed that the trees reflect actual operating procedures. GPC also explained that the rationale for SPDS develop-ment is based on a consistent mental model used to develop consistent logic and display parameters. Changes to CSF status tree logic and setpoints for the various modes were generally based upon Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation and consideration of how each particular safety function is addressed in each mode.

The Audit Team questioned whether parameter values should be displayed within status trees. GPC replied that display of parameter values was omitted in order to present status trees that are identical or nearly identical to those included in the EOPs.

When asked if the consistency of abbreviations / mnemonics was verified, GPC replied affirmatively. The lead human factors engineer and an operations consultant performed this verification.

The NRC Audit Team suggested that GPC obtain additional operator feedback regarding areas not explicitly covered by the man-in-the-loop validation testing. These areas included validity and usability of the normal mode CSFSTs, desirability of providing alternate coding of questionable data so that parameter and CSF status indication can be maintained, and ease of use including the nine potentialimprovements suggested by the NRC Audit Team.

PSMS and PERMS Verification and Validation was discussed via a telephone call with Westinghouse. The PSMS is the subject of a generic V&V Program. This program is being separately reviewed by the NRC. Differences between the generle PSMS and the Vogtle-specific PSMS will be the subject of a supplemental V&V effort. 'Ihe PERMS was subjected to Verification and Validation testing by the PERMS supplier. Signal reference Vogtle:12/23/86 _6_

inputs were tested for both parameter values and status words output. The test report is not included in VEGP documentation, but is available for review at the vendor.

The Audit Team operated the SPDS in the plant Control Room.. The Audit Team observed that the system response time is low, and that it is easy to enter functions and change from one display to another. Adequate feedback concerning the effect of the user's response was provided. Screen and axis labels were understandable, and were consistently provided. The use of consistent color coding was also noted.

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1Ili n ERF RCP STATUS REED TO INVESil6 ATE M e " "*eira Te""5'CO M Liam 0F ARRAN6ING A PROTEUS O! SPLAY.

GROUP ON THE SPOS WICH NILL ALLON A QUICK IEAlis 0F EVALUATilIG RCP CON 0!TIGIS.

ERF TRD OS - C00L00m TR90 O!FFICULT TO 63 ADO 100*F/HRSLOPETORCSTEF 1160 TA 23A TEST E50.2 ERF RCS C00L00101 USE. ADO 100'F/NR SLOPE ON PLOT ON SPOS.

STEP 6 TEMP TREND.

ERF ERF COMPUTER THE ERF COMPUTER ODES IlOT 4A NO ACTimi 1237 CONTROL 200N COMPUTER SURYD N.R. PROVIDEASEQUSTIALMISTORY FILE OF OPERATOR STRIES, 6700 8.7.1.3.

AVAILABLEUPONREQUEST.

ERF CoirVTER THE ERF COIFUTS DOES NOT 4A NO ACTION 1230 CoirVTER SURVEY N.R. ERF 8700 6.T.1.4. CollF01BI TO THE STM0ARD

'QNERTY' KEVIDARO ARRA1100 LENT.

COMPUTER KEY COMPUTER KEY 10AA05 USE 03 RDIOVE EXTRMEOUS KEYS MD 1239 COMPUTER SURVEY N.R. ERF EXTRMEOUS KEYS MD SYNIOLS. BLMK OVER HOLES.

0700 6.7.1.4. BOARDS i  !=* "m 1 %g PROTEUS SYIIGOLS) ( Q AF (VIDE oNxo 0 COPY) td,7b N**##

PROTEUS THE PROTEM wmffan n e etta 1240 U-dTER SURVEY N.R. PRO

~

0700 6.7.1.1. w ruitx PROCEWRE 13504-1 REY.0 DOES 110T DESCRIBE THE OVERALL COMPUTER SYSTS, M0 THE l

COMPUTER SYSTER CORPONDTS l

t NITH WICH THE OPERATOR CAN INTERFACE.

l ERF COMPUTER PAGE DESIGNATOR, ERF COMPUTER 03 REVISE ERF MEAT $1NK PAGES TO 1242 COMPUTER SURVEY N.R. ERF 0700 6.7.2.5.H 00ES 110T O!$ PLAY THE PAGE '1/2 0F 2'. THE INPUT GROUPING IIUN8ER 20 THE TOTAL llVNBER OF FUNCTION NAY DEVELOP PAGES ED DATA IS CONTAINED IRILTI-PAGE LISTS SUT OPERATOR ON IIULTIPLE PAGES (HEAT SINK). PRONPTS LEAD TNE OPERATOR TO PAGE FORWARD OR BACK.

I l

l

12/02/86

. . CONTa0L IDW OESl] REVIEW Anpendix 1 ERF CIIBUTER RELATED NED's

___ __ =...--... ...

NED ORI6!N PAllEL CORPONDT DOCRIPTION CATE00RY PROPOSED RDOLUTION u n u uss u un uzzu ss: :::aun unsausuurs umzussanusu:===::::=su =unu usunua......--- uu.. .

1247 COMPUTER SUWEY N.R. ERF ERF COMPUTER THE KINK RATE OF A SYWOOL OR 4A NO ACTION 0700 6.7.2.7.E IESSAGE IS StoutR THAN THE RECOMENDED Gu!MLINES OF ~2-3 OLillES PER SECOND WITH A NINilRM 50 RSEC 'ON' TINE SETIES BLANKS.

1240 CCWUTER SUWEY N.R. ERF ERF & PROTEUS INVERSE VIDEO IS USED FOR 4A NO ACTION 0700 6.7.2.7.F COMPUTERS APPLICATIONS OUT SIDE THE W10ELING PRESENTED IN 8700.

THE WIKLINES STATE INVERSE VIDEO 310ULO BE USED FOR MlWLIGITING IN DENSE DATA FIELO6, SUCH AS WORDS IN A PARAGRAPH 1107 STIRE CRT SECTIONS: P90TEUS-ALAM ,

ERF CSFST 1249 COMPUTER SUWEY N.R. ERF ERF & PROTEUS USE OF COLOR, COLORS USED ON 4A 110 ACTION 0700 6.7.2.7.K COMPUTERS S0TH THE PROTEUS All0 THE ERF CRTS TO CONVEY INFORRATION ARE NOT CEIIS!$T9T IN USE 20 IEMING WITH OTNER COLOR C006

( RED & GRE S ) IN THE CONTROL n00N.

1250 COWUTER SUWEY N.R. ERF ERF & PROTEUS IRlLTIPLE PAGE CONSIDERATIONS, 4A NO ACTION 8700 6.7.2.0.0 COMPUTER W EN PAGES ARE ORGANIZED IN A MIERAACHICAL FASHION, CONTAINING DIFFERDT PATHS THROUE A SERIES, A VISUAL AUDli TRAIL 0F THE CHOICES IIADE ARE NOT AVAILAOLE UPON OPERATOR REQUEST.

_1255 MTHROPONETRIC QNC8 PROVISION IS 110T NADE S0 THAT 03 THEDESleNPROVIDESADEQUATE 3URVEY N.R. 0T00 PROCDURES MD REFERENCE as wwt tw nam.twne ~

6.1.2.6 IIATERIALS CAN DE CollSULTED LAYOUT llIIE0!ATELY DENIND THE EASILY luuttW !!?"5 0PERATOR. HONEVER, llE WILL ARE PERF0 M ED AT THE CONSOLES. TED TRAY MD A IRISIC STAllo F ll00N USE MD EVALUATE OPERATOR ACCEPTAllCE A110 USE.

12)82/96

- - CONTROL A00N DE51 3 REvler

~~---- - . Anpendix 1 ERF C05 UTER RELATED NED's CORPONOT 00CRIPfl0N CATEGORY PROPOSED RESOLUTION MED ORI4lu PMEL 3333 33333333333333333333 3333333333 333333333333333 333333333333333333333333333333 ******** 333333 .. ____

ERF & PHOTEUS THE KEY 30AR05 ON 00TH THE ERF 4A NO ACTION 1253 COMPUTER SURVEY N.R. ERF 0700 6.T.1.4.g COMPUTER AND THE PROTEUS NAVE SLOPES LESS THAN THE 88t m 8m0E0 15 DEGREES NIN14N ERF COMPUTER ITERS C(NITAINED IN A IRNGERED 4A NOACTIGI 126T COWUTER 3URVEY N.R. ERF 07006.T.2.5.J LIST All0 DOCRIED IN

' CONTINUE PARES

• ITBE ARE ROT SEQUBITIALLY usareFD RELATIVE TO THE FIRST PARE.

ERF COMPUTER THERE 15110 ERF COMPUTER 84 REPLACE THE PRENS PRINTER NITH 1311 CONPUTER SURVEY PRINTER IN TAE CONTROL 200R All ERF SY5TEli PRINTEA $1NCE IR/ REG 0700 ALL PERR5 RADIATION DATA IS 6.T.3.1.a.(1)

OUPLICATED ON THE ERF COWUTER.

l

• ,e .

MEETING

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION YNIF1Wg~) NRC Participants NRC . PDR '~"^~' 5. Saba L PDR NSIC PRC System PWRf4 Reading File Project Manager M. Miller M. Duncan 0GC J. Partlow E. v'ordan B. Grimes ACRS (10) 01HERS bec: Licensee & Service List