ML20211F257
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- ME!10RANDUM FOR:
Thomas it. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing
- FR0!i:
L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systens, Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
SilPPLEMENTAL' SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT INPUT, FINAL IDVP RESOLUTION - DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, UNITS 1 AfiD 2 i
Enclosed is the-input to the Diablo Canyon Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) regarding final resolution of the followup actions resulting from the IDVP. This input consists of Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB), Power Systems Branch (PSB), and Equipment Qualifications Branch (EQB) resolution of the 15 followup items identified in Table C.8.3 of Diablo Canyon SER, ilUREG-0675, Supplement No. 19.
Responsibility for the SSER input on these items is as follows: ASB, Iten Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11,13 and 15; PSB, Item No. 3; E')B, Iten Nos'. 4, 5,12, and 14.
The licensee has provided satisfactory responses to all the above items in their December 6,1983 letter and in sub-sequent subnittals.
However, Item No. 5 requires additional staff (EQB) review prior to Step 3 (full power operation).
He therefore consider our effort regarding the IDVP to be compiete except as noted.
It should also be noted that other additional action is required to confirm completion of certain of the above items.
Items 1, 2 and 9 require some field verification by Region V to complete. This has been discusse<f and agreed upon as documented in Darrell Eisenhut's memorandum to John B. tiartin, Region V dated December 6, 1983.
In addition, the licensee's December 13, 1983 letter in response to Item 11 indicates that completion of one modification (installation of redundant Class 1 isolation controls and instrumentatiFn~for the CVCS letdown line and auxiliary steam line) required as a result of the reanalysis of tenperature/ pressure environments resulting from postulated pipe breaks outside containment will be accomplished prior to Mode 4, or justification for operation in " ode 4 will be provided.
We consider this to be acceptable.
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L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Directne for Core end Plant Systems Division of Systens Integration
Enclosure:
,As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
Contact:
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