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AUG 2 51983 PRC System LB#3 Reading 6
JLee i'EMORANDU'1 FOR: Valeria !!ilson Management Analysis Branch Planning and Program Analysis Staff,?!RR FR0't:
George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
FOIA-83-4S3 REDLIEST FR0!! C. D. CALS0YAS FOR REPORTS ISSUED BY THE BROOKHAVEf! NATIONAL LABORATORY Otl THE SEIS!!IC DESIGN OF THE DIABLO CANYON fiUCLEAR PLANT The following documents have been provided by Brookhaven fiational Laboratory to the NRC on seismic design aspects of Diablo Canyon, Unit 1.
These documents are in the PDR.
1.
liUREG/CP,-2834 Bill-fiUREG-51566, " Independent Seismic Evaluation of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Containment Annulus Structure and Selected Piping Systems," Brookhaven National Laboratory, August 1982.
2.
Letter from P. Bezier (ENL) to !!. Hartzman (NRC), dated April 11, 1933, (Sumary of evaluation of 2 piping problems).
3.
Letter from fl. Reich (BNL) to P. T. Kuo (NRC) dated flay 17, 1983 (Summary of analysis of horizontal response of Diablo Canyon annulus structure to Hosgri event).
4.
Letter from M. Reich (BNL) to P. T. Kuo (MRC) dated July 25',1983 (results of analysis of buried diesel fuel oil tanks).
The Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch might have additional decurents on the subject.
OnginalSicned by:
George W.~KnigMca George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Cranch No. 3 Division of Licensing, NRR cc:
J. P. Knight
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i AUG 3 01983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert E. Jackson, Chief Geosciences Branch, DE THRU:
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Leon Reiter, Leader p
Seismology Section, GSB, DE FROM:
Robert L. Rothman, Geophysicist Seismology Section, GSB, DE
SUBJECT:
CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE OF AUGUST 29, 1983 A moderate earthquake occurred off the coast of California on August 29, 1983. The U. S. Geological Survey reports:
Origin Time 10:10:28.8 GMT Epicenter 35.72*N 121.45'W Depth 5 kilometers Magnitude m 5.4 b
The earthquake was felt along the coast of Claifornia.
No damage was reported from this event.
The earthquake location is 50 miles from Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant in the vicinity of the Hosgri fault (CDMG Map No.1). There have been previous earthquakes reported in this area. We will contact PG&E to determine if the strong motion instruments at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant triggered.
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4hV Robert L. Rothman, Geophysicist Seismology Section Geosciences Branch, DE cc:
H. Denton R. Vollmer
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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<a wasMNG TON. D. C. 20555 SEP 011983 11El10RANDUM FOR: Robert E. Jackson, Chief Geosciences Branch, DE-
' /(Leon Reiter, Leader
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Seismology Section, GSB, DE' FROM:
Robert L. Rothman, Geophysicist Seismology Section, GSB, DE g.
SUBJECT:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE CALIFORNIA EARTFfQUAKE
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OF AUGUST 29, 1983 As stated in my memorandum of August 30, 1983, the U. S. Geological Survey's location parameters for this earthquake are:
Origin Time 10:10:28.8 GMT
w-Epicenter 35.72*N 121.45*
Depth 5 kilometers Magnitude m 5.4 b
Since that memorandum we have become aware of additional information.
The University of California at Berkeley's locatio,n parameters are:
Origin Time 10:10:31.0 GMT Epicenter 35*49.8'N 121* 21.2'W Depth 8 kilometer flagnitude M( 5.4 The USGS location is off the coast in the vicinity of the Hosgri Fault and the Berkeley location is on land in the vicinity of the Nacimento Fault.
In both cases the location is approximate 50 miles fran the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power plant (DCNPP).
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Pacific Gas and Electricity (PG&E) reports that there was also a smaller "
earthquake (magnitude M at approximately 05:27 h.4.4) in the same region on Sunday, August 28, y
D.T.
Neither of these earthquakes was felt in the DCNPP but they both triggered the supplemental seismic Instruments.
These instruments trigger at a lower ground motion level than the
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standard strong motion instruments.
PG&E will send copies cf the records as soon as they are processed.
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A Berkeley reports that the earthquake of August 29 was felt along the coast from San Luis Obispo to the San Francisco area. There are no e
reports of damage.
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? ~ f-Robert L. Rothman, Geophysicist N.}
Seismology Section e
Geosciences Branch, DE y,
cci H. Denton R. Vollmer J.. Knight _
E. Sullivan L. Chandler
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5 POLICY ISSUE For:
The Commis@eGGmiSSiOn Meeting)
From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 VERIFICATI0d PROGRAM - STAFF RECOMMENDATION t
Purpose:
This paper provides the status of the Diablo Canyon Unit i verifi-cation program, a summary of the staff evaluation of that program, and the staff recommendations regarding the reinstatement of the operating license, DPR-76, for Unit 1.
Background:
On November 19, 1981, the Commission issued its Order, CLI-81-30, which suspended Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E)
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Diablo Canyon Unit 1 operating license to load fuel and conduct i
tests up to five percent of rated power.
The Order required the satisfactory completion of a number of specified actions under an independent design verification program (IDVP) prior to reinstatement of the license (Enclosure 1).
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation required PG&E to perform addi-i tional specified actions under the IDVP (letter of' November 19, h
1981) which must be satisfactorily completed prior to NRC consider-gg ation for issuance of a full-power license for Die lo Canyon Unit 1 (Enclosure 1).
On March 15, 1982 the Commission approved a program for conducting the IDVP in accordance with the staff's recommendations (see SECY 82-89).
In response to SECY 82-414, the Commission approved a proposal from the licensee for a "three-step" licensing process as shown in Enclosure 2.
Discussion:
During the course of the verification program, the program was modified.
The most significant changes to the design verification effort as originally prescribed were (1) the expansion of PG&E's own internal l
effort to perfonn a complete seismic reanalysis of all safety-related I
structures, systems, and components under a corrective action program, and (2) the performance of a construction quality assurance audit of two construction contractors and their activities.
The decision to reevaluate essentially all safety-related structures, systems, and l
components greatly expanded the program beyond the original sampling-based effort.
In addition, PG&E expanded its efforts through the participation of the Bechtel organization in the PG&E Diablo Canyon l
Proj ect.
A summary of major milestones and developments is presented in Enclosure 3.
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Contact:
1 Hans Schierling: NRR/DL j\\
(49-27100) ji f's$2ac [
. It is evident at this time that the scope and depth of the ver-ification. effort.by both the IDVP and PG&E far exceed.that which
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had been anticipated when the above actions were first approved.
Nevertheless, the objective of the effort has not changed, namely, to provida assurance that any weakness in the execution of quality c9ntrols in the design of Diablo Canyon Unit I have been identified and resolved by corrective actions.
On August 5,1983, the staff issued SER Supplement 18 which provides its evaluation of and conclusions on the verification effort based on infonnation that had been submitted by PG&E and the IDVP as of June 30, 1 983.
Additional information provided by PG&E and the IDVP since June 30,1983 and a listing of information which remains to be sub-mitted and evaluated is included in Enclosure 4. In Supplement 18, the staff has identified a number of open issues requiring resolution.
Some of these must be resolved prior to fuel loading while resolution of others can be delayed until after. fuel load.
A list of these open items is provided as Enclosure 5.
The staff will supplement its SER after receipt and evaluation of the outstanding additional information.
A copy of the staff's SER Supplement 18 is attached as Enclosure 6.
In addition to the verification program described above, the staff has recently completed a re-evaluation of selected aspects of the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS).
This review was conduc'ted in response to allegations made by a confidential infonnant.
Results of that review are documented in SER Supplement 16 (Enclosure 7) and supports our overal-1-conclusions regarding verification of the Diablo Canyon design.
==
Conclusions:==
The overall design verification program, including both the inde-pendent program (IDVP) and the internal program (ITP) of PG&E, is largely complete.
There are a number of activities that re-quire some further effort by PG&E, such as confirmatory analysis and completion of modifications, and by the IDVP, primarily the verification of these PG&E efforts and final field verification of construction modifications.
However, the staff has concluded that the program has progressed to the point that the staff can draw the following conclusions:
The overall verification program far exceeds the scope set i
forth in November 1981.
This expanded program is largaly compl ete.
The IDVP has been an effective program and has met and was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Commission Order and the NRC Letter.
PG&E complemented the IDVP through its own program which effectively responded to the IDVP findings.
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The IDVP was conducted by competent organizations under the management of Teledyne Engineering Services and was conducted independent of influence of PG&E or its contractors.
The distinctions between Phase I and II and Steps 1, 2, and 3 (SECY 82-414) have essentially been rendered moot in that the entire effort is essentially complete.
While the IDVP program plan for Phase I called for the use of a sampling technique, the major expansion of the program by PG8E lead to a verification of the seismic design aspects of essentially all safety-related structures, systems, and components.
The sanpling technique for non-seismic design activities under Phase II of the IDVP was found adequate.
The pervasiveness of deficiencies was limited to seismic design activities.
Errors in the non-seismic design were of a random nature.
There was no programmatic breakdown of quality assurance controls in the construction of Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
The basic cause for most of the design errors was the.
failure by PG&E management to recognize, at the time of the Hosgri re-evaluation in the-mid-70's, the significance of the revised seismic design. requirements and the attendant need to implement a vigorous and well controlled redesign effort in accordance with the requirements of its quality assurance program.
All significant errors and problems were identified and appropriate corrective actions have been and will be taken to resolve them to ensure that the design of the facility conforms to the licensing criteria.
The IDVP and PG&E activities, ircluding plant modifications, f
that have not been completed at this time are expected to be completed in the same acceptable manner as all previous efforts.
The open items identified in SER Supplement 18 can and will be resolved in accordance with applicable staff requirements.
4 4-Recommendations:
Accordingly, the staff recommends that the Commission lift the suspension of the operating license, DPR-76, for Diablo Canyon'-
Unit 1, ordered on November 19, 1981 subject to the following conditions:
1.
Prior to commencement of fuel loading activities, all outstanding technical issues and modifications relating to safety-related structures, systems, and components required for fuel loading, shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the staff.
2.
Prior to undertaking activities to achieve initial criticality and conduct low-power testing, all out-standing technical issues and modifications relating to structures, systems, and components required for these activities shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the staff.
Will J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
NRC Requirements of November 19, 1981 2.
Summary of Staff Proposal in SECY 82-414 For Three-Step Licensing Process 3.
Diablo Canyon Verification Effort -
Background and Status 4.
Status of ITR's 5.
Open Items - Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18 6.
SER Supplement 18 (Commissioners, OPE, OGC, SECY only) 7.
SER Supplement 16 (Commissioners, OPE, OGC, SECY only) o
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. This paper is tentatively scheduled for discussion at an Open Meeting on Tuesday, September 13, 1983 and Wednesday, September 21, 1983.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC OPE OCA OIA OPA REGIONAL OFFICES EDO ELD ACRS ASLBP ASLAP SECY 4
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NRC NOVEMBER 19, 1981 -REQUIREMENTS (previously presented as Figure 1 in SECY 82-414)
PHASE I COMMISSION ORDER (CLI-81 30) ~
e Suspended fuel loading and low power testing license.
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e Requi red:
1.
Results of an IDVP for all SSR contracts prior to 6/78.
See Note (i) below.
PHASE II
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STAFF LETTER e
Activities required prior to a decision regarding power levels above 5%
2.
IDVP for NSSR contracts prior to 6/78.
3.
IDVP for PGE internal QA, and 4
IDVP for all service related contracts post 1/78.
See Note (1) below.
NOTES:
(i)
Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 each require:
a.
A technical report of the basic cause of the errors, their significance, and their impact on facility design.
b.
PGE's conclusion on effectiveness of IDVP, and c.
A schedule for modifications; including a basis for any deferred beyond a fuel load decision.
i Both Phase I and Phase II activities must be performed by a qualified, independent organization.
Both Phase I and Pnase II required that a Program Plan be submitted for our review and approval, and Both Phase I and Phase II were necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, activities for the appropriate approvals.
NOMENCLATURE:
j IDVP = Indeoendent Design Verification Program l
SSR =
Seismic Service-Related NSSR = Non-Seismic Service-Related
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ENCLOSURE 2 Sumary of Staff Proposal in SECY 82-414 For Three Step Licensing Process STAFF PROPOSAL ACTIVITIES Prior to Prior to FP Ouring A. Phase I November 19,1981 Order FL/LP Decision Operation
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(Prior to FL and LP)
- 1. IDVP of all SSR prior to 06/78 (interpreted to be Hosgri)
- 8. Phase II November 19, 1981 Letter (Prior to exceedino St)
- 1. IDVP for NSSR prior to 06/78 bInterim
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Report
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- 3. IDVP for all SR post 01/78
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C. 9thE.
Interim
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(see note)
Interim j
- 2. Construction QA Report (see f
- 3. As-built walk-down note)
- 4. Modifications completed, as necessary
- 5. PG&E/W interface evaluation
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- 6. Determination of correct Hosgri
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spectra Interim
- 7. IDVP for all SSR (non-Hosgri)
Report
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(prior to 06/78)
(see note)
NOMENCLATURE:
d activity complete SSR:
Seismic service-related contracts NSSR:
Non-seismic service-related contracts SR:
Service-related contracts Note:
For each of these acti'vities, an Interim Recort is recuired to demonstrate that activities are sufficiently complete to ensure that no major unidentified d'eficiencies are likely to exist. The Interim Recort is also required to set forth a justification for ceferring a portion of that activity.
This enclosure was included in SECY S2-414 (October 13,1982) as Figure 3.
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a ENCLOSURE 3 DIABLO CANYON VERIFICATION EFFORT
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BACKGROUND AND STATUS Discovery of mirror image problem on Unit 1 in September 1981 and subse-quent identification of additional errors by PG&E and NRC indicate weak-ness in PG&E Quality Assurance program implementation.
Commission Order CLI 81-30 of November 19, 1981 suspends Diablo Canyon
- Unit 1 low power license (fuel had not been loaded into reactor vessel) and requires independent design verification program (IDVP) for safety-related activities performed under seismic service related contracts before June 1978 (Phase I of IDVP).
Activities must be completed prior to reinstatement of license.
NRC letter of November 19, 1981 requires independent design verification
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program (IDVP) for safety-related activities performed under seismic service related contracts after January 1978, under nonseismic service related contracts and under PG&E internal design activities (Phase II of IDVP).
Phase I and Phase II of IDVP include review of QA programs and their implementation by PG&E and its service contractors and sample calculations for design of safety-related structures, systems, and components.
IDVP is performed and directed by Teledyne Engineerir.g Services as Program Manager with specific activities performed by R. L. Cloud Associates (seismic verification), R. F. Reedy Inc. (quality assurance), and Stone
& Webster Engineering Corporation (nonseismic verification).
IDVP was expanded in September 1982 to include sample of QA for construction activities (Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation).
PG&E instituted in early 1982 its internal technical program (ITP) to respond to IDVP concerns and make plant modifications.
PG&E contracted wit'h Bechtel in March 1982 to assist in completion of analysis and design efforts for the Diablo Canyon Project (DCP).
As a result of IDVP findings, DCP decided in early 1982 to perform a complete seismic reanalysis of all safety-related structures, systems, and componants, known as corrective action program (CAP).
PG&E submitted final report on Phase I and Phase II of verification effort.
Update of both reports expected in September with respect to still ongoing activities.
1 1
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PG&E overall analysis and design effort more than 95 percent complete as of mid August.
Plant modifications are more than 90 percent complete.
IDVP has issued its final report on Phase I and Phase II combined.
Further submittals on report expected with respect to still ongoing verification activities.
NRC staff has issued on August-5, 1983, Supplement No. 18 to Diablo Canyon SER which was based,on PG&E and IDVP information submitted as of June 30, 1983.
Supplement reflects incompleteness of information and staff review.
Supplement includes a number of open issues identified by staff.
Staff will issue an additional SER supplement after receipt of all out-standing ITRs and final submittal from PG&E and IDVP on their final reports.
All ITRs are expected to be issued by the end of September.
SER Supplement 16 was issued August 25, 1983, with respect to concerns on component cooling water system.
Other major efforts and licensing activities for Diablo Canyon will be documented in SER Supplements.
2
s Status of ITR's Sunnary Prior to June 30, 1983 ITRs isued 48 Revisions issued 17 Since June 30, 1983 new ITRs issued 6
Revisions issued 8
As of September 1,1983 i
new ITRs pending 7
Revisions pending 12 Detailed Listing (post June 30,1983)
ITR Subject Rev.
Status ITR-14 Verification of Pressure /
Rev. 2 Issued Tem,perature Analysis ITR-20 Verification of CRVPS Rev. 2 Issued Mechanical / Nuclear Design ITR-27 Verification of ICS Design Rev. 2 Issued for AFWS ITR-28 Verification of ICS Design Rev. 2 Issued for CRVPS ITR-31 HVAC Components Rev. 1 Issued ITR-48 Additional Verification of Rev. O Issued Jet Impingement Effects ITR-50 Containment Annulus Structure Rev. O Issued 4
Vertical Seismic Evaluation ITR-51 Containment Annulus -
Rev. O Pending Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending
g ITR Subject Rev.
Status ITR-52 Combined with ITR 68 ITR-53 Combined with ITR 68 ITR-54 Containment Structure Rev. O Pending Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-55 Auxiliary Building Rev. O Pending Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-56 Turbine Building Rev. O Pending Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-57 Fuel Handling Building Rev. O Issued Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-58 Intake Structure Rev. O Issued Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-59 Large Bore Piping Supports Rev. O Issued Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-60 Large Bore Piping Supports Rev. O Issued Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-61 Small Bore Piping Rev. O Pending Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-62 Combined with ITR-60 ITR-63 HVAC Ducts and Supports, Rev. O Issued Raceways, Instrument Tubing Rev. 1 Pending and Supports ITR-64 Combined with ITR-63 ITR-65 Rupture Restraints Rev. O Pending Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-66 Combined with ITR-63 ITR-67 Equipment Rev. O Issued Corrective Action Rev. 1 Pending ITR-68 Soils Review Rev. O Pending
4 ENCLOSURE 5 OPEN ITEMS DIABLO CANYON SER SUPPLEMENT 18 1.
Free-hand averaging of spectra for containment annulus.
structure should be in accordance with staff approved technique.
(C.3-9) 2.
Cutoff frequency of 20 Hz for generation of floor response spectra in containment annulus structure should be justified.
(C.3-9) 3.
Use of AISC Code for design of containment penetrations should be justified.
(C.3-17) 4.
Local yielding of steel plates around opening in containment should be justified.
(C.3-17) 5.
Assumptions in model for auxiliary building floor slab quali-fication regarding rigidity / flexibility should be clarified and justified, including documentation of parametric studies.
(C.3-22) 6.
Use of different versions of ACI code in FSAR and in design verification effort of auxiliary building should be justified.
(C.3-22) 7.
Discrepancy between IDVP and DCP sensitivity of soil spring influence on seismic response of auxiliary building should be reconciled, including resolution of soil properties and documentation of parametric studies.
(C.3-22) 8.
Use of translational and torsional response of auxiliary building as input to base of fuel handling building should be documented, including. parametric studies.
(C.3-26) 9.
Selection of set of degrees of freedom in dynamic model for fuel handling building should be justified..(C.3-26) 10.
Load combinations in analysis of turbine building should be clarified.
(C.3-36) 11.
Modeling of roof trusses in turbine building should be clarified and justified.
(C.3-36) 12.
Effect of one continuous exterior wall in analysis of turbine building should be evaluated.
(C.3-37) 1
y 13.
Differences in turbine building modeling of steel frame and roof truss for two vertical models should be clarified.
(C.3-37) 14.
The use of alternative procedures for model combinations by SRSS method should be explained and clarified.
(C.3-37) 15.
Use of increased allowable stresses in accordance with AISC Code 8th Edition should be justified with respect to criteria delineated,in FSAR.
(C.3-37) 16.
Results of analysis of large bore piping supports should be verified.
(C.3-48) 17.
Buckling criteria for linear supports, specifically the Euler buckling equation for calculating critical buckling loads for all slenderness ratios, should be evaluated and justified.
4 (C 3-48) 18.
Calculations for selected piping systems analyzed previously in ITR 12 and ITR 17 should be repeated with revised support configurations and current loadings to verify that piping and supports satisfy corresponding design criteria.
Results of piping system reevaluation with high thermal load should be verified.
(C.3-48) 19.
The scope of the DCP small bore piping review should be clarified.
(C.3-57) 20.
All equipment listed in Table 2.3.1-1 of DCP Phase I Final Report should be seismically qualified for nozzle loads and component configurations should be verified.
(C.3-59; C.3-70) 21.
Stresses in extreme fibers at interface between valve nozzle and pipe should be evaluated and results be documented.
(C.3-66) 22.
Stresses in pump flanges should be verified to be within allowable limits.
(C.3-69) 23.
Qualification of cable trays and interaction of trays with supports should be addressed.
(C.3-80) 24.
Allowable limits for welds based on field samples should be used in qualification of trays supported by superstrut.
(C.3-80) 25.
Total lateral forces, total resistance to sliding and factor of safety against sliding of intake structure should be fully evaluated.
(C.3-86) 2
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26.
Additional analyses of buried diesel fuel oil tanks should be performed (analyses with refined mesh and without deconvolution, partially filTed tank, exmamination of properties).
(C.3-99) 2).
Control circuits for isolation valves in steam supply line for turbine driven auxil,iary feedwater pump should be classified as safety-related.
(C.4-11) 28.
Auxiliary relay for automatic closure of redundant steam generator blowdown isolation valves should meet Westinghouse requirements.
(C.' 4-12) 29.
Consideration of jet impingement loads in design and qualifi-l cation of all safety-related piping and equipment should be clearly demonstrated.
(C.4-29) 30.
It should be clearly indicated that rupture restraints inside and outside containment have been properly designed and installed.
(C.4-31) l t
3
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BR'IEFING ON DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 D. G. EISENHUT X27672 SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 i
I SLIDE 1 L!
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1
., I
'u NOVEMBER 19, 1981 NRC REQUIREMENTS
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PHASE I:
COMMISSION ORDER o
SUSPENDED FUEL LOADING AND LOW POWER TESTING LICENSE o
REQUIRED 1.
RESULTS OF AN IDVP* FOR ALL SEISMIC SERVICE-RELATED CONTRACTS PRIOR TO JUNE 1978 PHASE II:
STAFF LETTER o
ACTIVITIES REQUIRED PRIOR TO DECISION REGARDING POWER
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LEVELS ABOVE 5%
2.
IDVP FOR NON-SEISMIC SERVICE RELATED CONTRACTS PRIOR TO JUNE 1978 3.
IDVP FOR PGaE INTERNAL QA 4
IDVP FOR ALL SERVICE RELATED CONTRACTS POST JANUARY 1978
- IDVP = INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIEICATION PROGRAM l<
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09/13/83 lI SLIDE 2 l
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- __._4..
'a O CENSING PROCESS 4S IN SECY 82-414.
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EL/LP.
FP DURING DECISION DECISION QPERATION STATUS
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A.
PHASE'i (COMMISSION ORDER) l','
IDVP OF ALL SSR PRIOR TO 6/78 (HOSGRI)
B.
PHASE II'(NRR' LETTER)'
2.
IDVP FOR NSSR PRIOR TO 6/78 IR C
3.
IDVP FOR PG&E INTERNAL QA IR C
I4.
IDVP FOR ALL SR POST 1/78 IR C
C.
OTH R 5.'
C 6.
CONSTRUCTION QA IR X
C 6
7.
AS-BUILT WALK-DOWN IR X
8.
MODS. AS NECESSARY X
X X
9.
PG&E/W INTERFACE EVAL.
X X
X C
10.
VERIFY HOSGRI SPECTRA X
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C 11.
IDVP FOR ALL SRR (NON-IR X
C HOSGRI, PRIOR TO 6/78)
NOMENCLATURE:
- O AS ORIGINALLY REQUIRE, NOVEMBER 19', 1981 X:
ACTIVITY TO BE COMPLETED SSR:
SEISMIC SERVICE-RELATED CONTRACTS NSSR:
NON-SEISMIC SERVICE RELATED CONTRACTS
'SSR:
SERVICE-RELATED CONTRACTS IR:
INTERIM REPORT,' DEMONSTRATING EFFORT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE C:
ACTIVITY COMPLETED
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STATUS PG&E:
o ANALYSIS AND DESIGN MORE THAN 95 PERCENT COMPLETE PIMAINING WORK PRIMARILY CONFIRMATORY ANALYSES ANALYSES AND DESIGN TO BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER 30,1983 o
OVERALL MODIFICATIONS FOR SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS (COMPLETION STATUS):
l'.'
FUEL LOAD 95%
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2.
CRITICALITY AND 5% POWER 90%
3.
FULL POWER 90%
o PG&E SCHEDULE FOR COMPilTION 1.
FUEL LOAD SEPTEMBER 30', 1983 2.
CRITICALITY AND 5% POWER NOVEMBER 15,1983
~
3.
FULL POWER NOVEMBER 15, L983 HyP:
o IDVP FINAL REPORT ISSUED LAST SUBMITTAL TO IDVP FINAL REo0RT SCHEDULED FOR EARLY OCTOBER ON RESULTS OF FUTURE ITRS 6
ITRs ISSUED AS OF SEPTEMBER 2 5I4 REVISIONS ISSUED AS OF SEPTEMBER 2 25 o
ADDITIONAL ITRs TO BE ISSUED 6
REVISIONS TO BE ISSUED 12 LAST REVISION SEPTEMBER 30 o
ALL ITRs/ REVISIONS TO BE ISSUED ADDRESS IDVP VERIFICATION EFFORTS OF PG&E CORRECTIVE ACTION ACTIVITIES 09/13/83 SLIDE 4A
STATUS CONTINUED STAFF:
o SER SUPPLEMENT 18 ISSUED ON AUGUST 5, 1983 (STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 1983) o 30 OPEN ITEMS IDENTIFIED o
PG&E RESPONDED TO MOST OPEN ITEMS, STAFF REVIEW IN PROGRESS o
STAFF EVALUATION OF ITRs/ REVISIONS TO BE COMPLETED THREE WEEKS AFTER RECEIPT l
09/13/83 SLIDE 4B
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STAFF-CONCLUSIONS o
OVERALL DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT NEARLY COMPLETE le
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o SCOPE OF IDVP AND ITP WENT WELL BEYOND ORIGINAL NRC REQUIREMENTS o
IDVP ORGANIZATIONS ARE INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT o
IDVP SAMPLING IN PHASE I WAS APPLIED TO CORRECTIVE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND IN PHASE I? FOR ORIGINAL SAMPLE o
DEFICIENCIES IN NON-SEISMIC DESIGN WERE RANDOM
/
o NO PROGRAMMATIC BREAKDOWN IN CONSTRUCTION QA o
BASIC CAUSE FOR SEISMIC DESIGN DEFICIENCIES WAS PG8E UNAWARENESS OF MAGNITUDE OF HOSGRI REDESIGN EFFORT AND NEED FOR TIGHT QUALITY CONTROL o
ALL SIGNIFICANT ERRORS AND PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED o
SER SUPPLEMENT 18 OPEN ITEMS ARE BEING RESOLVED 4
m 4
l 09/13/83 SLIDE 5
I NON OFFICIAL SLIDES DIABLO CANYON BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 13, 1983
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A.-
OPEN ITEMS IN SSER 18 B.
MANPOWER C.
STATISTICS D.
MAJOR MODIFICATIONS (EXAMPLES) l.
t
DPEN ITEMS IN SER SUPPIFMENT 18
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SERSUPPLEMENT15(AUGUST 5,1983)CONTAINS30 o
OPEN ITEMS BASED ON INFORMATION AS OF JUNE 30, 1983 o
PG&E PROVIDED 3 RESPONSES IN LATE AUGUST AND EARLY SEPTEMBER o
RESPONSES UNDER ACTIVE STAFF REVIEW o
NO FINAL NRC RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME h
a SLiu'i. n n--
,n
--_n,,
n-,
n
MANPOWER (OCTOBER 1981 - AUGUST 1983)
NRC:
19 PROFESSIONAL YEARS BNLi 7 PROFESSIONAL YEARS IDVP:
125 PROFESSIONAL. YEARS DCP:
1100 PROFESSIONAL YEARS (ANALYSIS & DESIGN) 2200 CONSTRUCTION YEARS (OCTOBER 82 TO JULY 83) 6 i
i SLIDE B
STATISTICS o
MORE THAN 30 MEFTINGS BY NRC WHICH WERE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC, INCLUDING MEETINGS WITH COMMISSION, IDVP, PG8E AND OTHER PARTIES o
MANY MEETINGS BETWFFN IDVP AND PGRE ATTENDED BY NRC STAFF o
MORE THAN 100 BOARD NOTIFICATIONS TO COMMISSION 1
i i
i r
SLIDE C I.
+.
MAJOR MODIFICATIONS (EXAMPLES)
O CONTAINMENT ANNULUS STEEL STRUCTURE :
- EXTENSIVE DIAGONAL HORIZONTAL CROSS BRACING
- ABour 25 VERTICAL COLUMNS 0
CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE:
- 35 TONS OF STEEL ADDED TO BOX FRAME (1 INCH STEEL PLATE, 2 FEET BY 50 FEET) l i
l 0
TURBINE BUILDING l
- EAST SIDE:
30 TONS.0F STEEL (2 INCH PLATE) l
- WEST SIDE:
30 TONS OF CROSS BRACING l
(PRIMARY PURPOSE TO CONTROL RESPONSE SPECTRA IN SWITCH GEAR AREA, SECONDARY PURPOSE TO ADD STRUCTURAL STRENGTH) l SLIDE D SEPT. 33', 1983 l
WTEHNNE
/
ENQNERNGSOMCES l
MAJOR IDVP PARTICIPANTS l
/
j i
4 TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES (TES)
PROGRAM MANAGER
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R.F. REEDY, INC. (RFR)
DESIGN QA: AUDITS AND REVIEWS l
ROBERT L. CLOUD ASSOCIATES, INC. (RLCA)
SEISMIC, STRUCTURAL, AND ECHANICAL STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION (SWEC)
)
SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AND SAFETY-RELATED ANALYSES i
i HANSON, HOLLEY AND BIGGS (HHaB) i CIVIL / STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING j
SLIDEI
~
maame ENGSEERNGSSMCES.
IMPORTANT ELEENTS OF THE IDVP EFFORTS 1.
AUDIT AND REVIEW 0F PRE-NOVEMBER 1981 ESIGN QA PROGRAMS 1
2.
VERIFICATION OF INITIAL SAMPLE OF THE ESIGN PROCESS l
3.
ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION OF SPECIFIC CONCERNS 11.
EXPANSION.T0 INCLUE ADDITIONAL SAMPLES, ADDITIONAL VERIFI-CATION OF GENERIC
- CONCERNS, AND VERIFICATION OF DCP ACTIVITIES 5.
AUDIT OF DCP ESIGN QA PROGRAM AND "ESIGN OFFICE VERIFICA-TION" 6.
VERIFICATION OF TE DCP ESIGN PROCESS INCLUDING FIELD VERIFICATION OF MODIFICATIONS SLIDE 2
- TaEMNE ENGNEERNGSERVICES i
1 l
CHARACTERISTICS IMPORTANT TO IDVP SUCCESS j
r j
t 1.
VERIFICATION SAMPLES WERE. CAREFULLY CHOSEN 2.
VERIFICATION EXPANDED TO RESOLVE GENERIC CONCERNSji 3
3.
POTENTIAL CONCERNS
- RECORDED, TRACKED 'AND RESOLVED IN A
)
SYSTEMATIC MANNER USING THE " ERROR OR OPEN ITEM" REPORTS j
i 4.
USE OF INTERIM TECHNICAL REPORTS J
[
)
5.
PEER REVIEW BY DIFFERENT IDVP ORGANIZATIONS i
6.
IDVP FINAL REPORT SUMMARIZES ITRs AND STATES IDVP EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS f
1 SLIDE 3
.e ee, a w
en,-* me
WTEIDGE ENGREERNGSSMCES
'I CONCLUSION 1 i
"THE IDVP HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN A TECHNICALLY COMPETENT, INEPENENT, AND TIELY MANNER AND HAS EFFECTIVELY IENTIFIED UNCERTAINTIES IN THE C0rLIANCE OF THE ESIGN WITH LICENSE AP-PLICATION CRITERIA."
SLIDE 4
WTELED(E ENGMEERNG SGMCES A
i CONCLUSION 2
)
" DESIGN ERRORS REQUIRING MODIFICATION OR RE-ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN llAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED.
THE BASIC CAUSE FOR THESE ERRORS IS THE I
AMALGAMATION OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS" 1
a 4
4 SLIDE 5
-%.ccae
.*c>e c;> m owep6 p e a
r
-*i
--T*
W TELE [NNE ENGNEERING SOMCES t
BASIC CAUSE OF ALL DESIGN ERRORS
?
THE TWO BASIC, OR ROOT, CAUSES IDENTIFIED BY THE IDVP, IN ADDI-TION TO RANDOM CAUSES, WERE:
1.
CONTROL OF DESIGN INTERFACES, AND i
2.
DOCUENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF DESIGN e
l l
SLIDE 6 s.
i WTELENNE j
ENGNERNGSSMCES '
1 FACTORS UNDERLYING THE BASIC CAUSES w'
l l
1.
SEISMICALLY ESIGNED TWICE, TO DIFFERENT CRITERIA, WITH A e
j SUBSTANTIAL TIE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE ESIGN EFFORTS i
2.
SUBSTANTIAL ESIGN IN RESPONSE 10 isE BULLETINS AND THI-
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3.
ESIGN PERFORED DVER 15 YEAR PERIOD I
4.
SEISMIC ESIGN ETHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA HAVE EVOLVED l
5.
ESIGN INTERFACES IN ESPECIALLY LARGE NUMBERS l
6.
INITIAL ESIGN CONTROL PRACTICES NOT CONSISTENT WITH EVENTUAL DURATION AND COMPLEXITY OF REITERATIVE ESIGN PROCESS FACTORS 1 AND 3 ARE UNIQUE TO DCNPP-1.
EFFECT OF ALL MAY HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED BY Tile FACT THAT PGANDE WAS ESIGNING ITS FIRST NUCLEAR PLANT.
SL IDE 7
4TaswNE ENGNEERNGSOMCES
\\p i
\\
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CONCLUSION 3 "THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM BEING CONDUCTED BY PGANDE, AND. BEING VERIFIED BY THE IDVP, IS i
A PLANNED AND CONTROLLED PROGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE AND IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE."
s i
I j
SLIDE 8
4-1
- (
f EFGNEERNGSGMCES in i
t l
4 CONCLUSION 4 "THE PGANDE AND IDVP
- EFFORTS, WHEN TAKEN
- TOGETHER, PROVIE REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE DESIGN OF. DCNPP-1 CONFORMS OR WILL CON-j FORM TO THE CRITERIA 0F THE LICENSE" i
i l
i i
SLIDE 9,
SPTF1FTWNE ENGNERNG SERVICES-i
~
i TABLE 1 IIR COMPLETION SCllEDULE g'
SCHEDULED ISSUE DATE
. f i
IIE SUBJECT REV 0 REV 1 i
51 CONTAINHENT ANNULUS 0916 Sfi CONTAINHENT STRUCTURE 0930 55 AUXILIARY BUILDING 0930 56 TURBINE BUILDING 0915 0923 j
58 INTAKE STRUCTURE.
0915 59 LARGE-BORE PIPE 0916 60 PIPE SUPPORTS 0916 61 SMALL-BORE PIPE 0916 63 MISCELLANEOUS 0916 (HVAC DUCTS Ak) SUPPORTS,.
j RACEWAYS, INSTRUMENT TUBING, l
AND SUPPORTS) 65 RUPTURE RESTRAINTS 0916 0930 l
(0UTSIDE CONTAINMENT) 68 S0ILS 091 7 0926 l
1 SLIDE 10 4-r-