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[g }, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,m wassiscros. o. c. 2osss v a FE u MEMORANDUM FOR: George E. Lear, Chief g Structural & Geotechnical Er.gineering Branch, DE i desmanshismummeldum, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3, DL FROM: Harold Polk, Structural Engineer l Structural & Geotechnical Engineering Branch, DE Hans Schierling, Project Manager A Licensing Branch No. 3, DL - ~
SUBJECT:
MEETING NOTES OF PG&E/IDVP M LD CANYON: UNIT 1 STRUCTURAL ANALYSES, ~ ,6 ~ SAN FRANCISCO. f On February 4,1983 the PG&E Diablo Canyon Project (DCP) briefed and described to the IDVP (Teledyne. Engineering Services) and its consultants (M. J. Holly and J. M. Biggs) the status of the PG&E analyses for the containment annulus steel structure and the auxiliary building floor and wall loadings. H. Polk and H. Schierling of the NRC staff and A. J. Phill';.pacopoulos of BNL attended the meeting. The technical consultant to Joint Intervenors was represented. A list of attendees is attached. Containment Annulus Structure The Project reanalyzed the annulus steel structure for seismic loads using a " frame" concept for each radial beam. The mass of the tangential steel beams and supported equipment was incorporated into the adjacent radial beams in the frame. Floor response spectra were generated for various nodal points on the individual radial beam frames and compared with the original URS/Blume spectra. The new spectra generally exceed the URS/Blume spectra at most frequencies of interest. The DCP proposed to modify the structure so that the new spectra would be comparable to the current Hosgri spectra. The new spectra are generally controlled by the columns at the containment wall. The modifications proposed are additional columns under the tangential beams at about 20 locations and some stiffening of the radial beams. The piping would be reanalysed incorporat-ing the tangential beams which were not evaluated in the seismic analysis. The new response spectra will be used for the piping evaluation and equipment qualification. Two detailed" piping problems were presented but results were not yet available. PG&E proposed to use a sensitivity study of supported piping mass to structure mass to justify the adequacy of the existing structure at certain locations. Based on the status of the analysis it is doubtful that the structural modifica-tions could be designed and installed in accordance with the currently projected fuel load date. The IDVP and the staff need to review the modifications prior to the fuel load decision. As of this date the Project has not provided formal l documentation on the analysis or the modifications. ~ Qd ' ~ ~ - - 3pp-
.~ ~. ~.i G. E. Lear-G. W. Knighton ' s Auxiliary Buildino The seismic analysis has been completed and is currently being used in evaluating the structure adequacy. PG&E has retained a consultant (Jack Benjamin) to evaluate the acceptance criteria and to assist in i evaluating the structure. The measured material properties will be used in the structural evaluation in accordance with the provisions of the ACI ^ code. The implicit assumption of the floor slabs acting as rigid diaphrams in generating the seismic model was discussed. DCP proposed to use a three-stick model for determing the torsional loads and load distribution due to the floor diaphram flexibility. Future Action The IDVP requested that the inf'ormation provided at the meeting be documented in sufficient detail for evaluation. PG&E will present the analyses for the annulus steel structure and the auxiliary building floor loading in the next supplement (February 15,1983) to the PG&E Phase I Final Report. PG&E suggested a meeting with the IDVP for the week of February 21, 1983 in San Francisco to provide the IOVP with further information. {' Harold Polk, Structural Engineer Structural & Geotechnical Engineering Branch j ~ Division of En ineering f i J J gy Hans Schierling, Project ' anager - Licensing Branch No. 3 j Division of Licensing i
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,c FEB 3 31983 r.,. '... FO?. : Chair c.a Pallccino Co aissioner Gilinsky Cc c.issioner Ahearne Cox.issicner P.oberts Co=issicncr Asselstine F.:0 :
- 'illinn J. Dirchs Executive Director for Operations SU': JECT:
STATUS OF DIABLO CA': YON DESIGH VERIFICATION PROGRA'! Por ysur request, attached is a status sutrary of the evaluatien efforts in progress for Diabic Canyon by PG".E, the IDVP cnd the staff. The critical cle ent in completing the activities required for a Comission d.cisica regcrcing fuc1 load authorization (Step 1 of the 3-stcp appr,voc licerint ;:rocess is the design verification of the contain:ent annulus stasl ::c.ct'.wu r.ad t'.2 neccssary i:odifications to the structure. PC;E is ccatiruin; she ca: lysis and discussicn with the IOVP is required re- - c r:. n.. W cdequccy of propcsed rodifications. The results cf the
- r. : nsly co.plased horizontal analysis of the cnnulus structure by E.':L vere rr:.::.sW to F:0E cnd the IDVP in a rectino on February 15, 107.3. The f t:.cl resolucien will ret,uire the interaction of PC".E the IDVP and the er:ff li csnjunction..ith SUL).
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F Diablo Canyon Design Ven'fication Program Status Report - February 18. 1983 I. Overview Diablo Canyon review has been proceeding along the approach disussed with the Commission in December. Our recent letter, dated February 17, 19S3, to Rep. Udall addresses several. pertinent features of that approach (see Enclosure 1). The schedule has also been proceeding generally along that set forth in the PG&E December 2 submittal (copy attached to Enclosure 1) although PGLE/IDVP efforts appear slightly behind schedule. PGLE and IDVP evaluation efforts are approximately 2/3 complete for Phase I and 1/3 complete for Phase II activities. The staff review is proceeding and its efforts, including BNL review, are following and supporting the PGE/IDVP schedules. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p fl
F II. PGSE Efforts PG&E Semi-Monthly Report 31 (February 11,1983) prcvides summary information on the IDVP and on the PG&E Internal Technical Program (ITP). The ITP has identified to date 35 Open Items (0I), two of which occurred in the last reporting period (0I 35 - Deficiencies in STRUDL II Computer Program; OI 36 - Discrepancies in Heat Loads for HVAC Design). These open items are comparable to the E0Is of the IDVP. Open Item 34, identified by PG&E in December 1982, identified the potential that the component cooling water system under certain assumed failure modes, may not meet the licensing criteria. (This issue is also discussed below under staff activities). The ITP is continuing its confimatory analysis of the annulus steel structure. The status of the effort was discussed with the IDVP at a meeting on February 4, 1983. PG&E is evaluating the results of the analysis in light of the IDVP ccmments made dtring the meeting with respect to potential modifications to the steel structure. Another meeting on the subject is scheduled for late February. These structural modifications would result in floor response spectra (accelerations as function of frequency) which are within the FSAR envelope dasign spectra. PG&E will address their annulus steel structure analysis results in the next amendment to the Phase I Final Report (Eight additions / arendments to this report have been made to date). PG&E estimated at the end of January that the analysis and engineering design effort for Phase I and Phase II has been about 2/3 completed and the modifica-tiens for both Phases are about 1/3 completed.
'. ~. * . L III. Indeoendent Design Verification Program ~(IDVP) The IDVP semi-monthly report for January 1983 (January 28. 1983) provides the following information regarding 1: sues that have been identified as E0Is (error or open item)~and for which a file has been opene'd: Phase I Phase II Construction QA To al 194 70 29 Errors 17 22 Non-Errors ,177 48 Resolution Resolved by IDVP 164' 3 18 Evaluation Continuing 30 67 11 As of February 17, 1983, 32 Interim Technical Reports (ITR) have been issued by the IDVP, of which 17 pertain to Phase I activities and 15 to Phase II activities. A listing of all ITRs issued is provided in. Many of the Phase II ITRs require a revision as a result-of meetings between the IDVP and the PGtJ Diablo Canyon Project at schich the Project provided further clarification and information on issues identified in these ITRs. These meetings also provided clarification regarding potential Phase II additional verification and additional sampling that had been identified in Draft ITR-224 of December 23, 1983. At this time, the IDVP has preliminarily identified the need for the l following additional verification work for Phase II:
'. ~. 4 1. Evaluation of redundancy of equipment for shared systems between Unit 1 and Unit 2,
- 2. ' Evaluating the design temperature and pressure for two additional safety-related systems (component cooling water and main steam system),
3. Analysis cf jet impingement effects inside containment, 4. Evaluation of environmental consequences of postulated pipe ruptures outside containment. The IOVP review of the Brookhaven Report on the vertical seismic analysis of the annulus steel structure, as requested by NRR, is in progress. Additional information provided by BNL -on'this subject is being reviewed by the IOVP and an ITR on the subject is expected. e e ..n,.-,.
r. 5- ' + - I V. URC Effort The staff met sith PG&E on January 13, 1983 to discuss the overall status of the design verification effort. At that meeting PG&E informed the staff that the schedules outlined in their letter of December 2 remains current and achievable. (NRC fuel load decision required by March 31). A transcript of that caeting, open to the public, was provided to all parties. The staff has been' informally notified by PG&E that, while efforts are a few weeks behind schedule, they are attempting to hold the December 2 schedule. On January 25, 1983 BNL briefed the staff on the status of their studies and on February 15, 1983 the same information was discussed in a meeting which was also attended by the IDVP and PG&E. The additional BNL studies on a buried tank and on two additional piping problems are in progress and are expected to be completed in about one month. The BNL horizontal seismic analysis of the annulus steel structure has been completed. The analysis shows that torsional effects in the horizontal plane exist and some localized motions can significantly contribute to the overall response.. The staff is evaluating these findings. The BNL analysis was based on information provided by PG&E up through early January and may not necessarily account for recent modifications to the structure. As a result of the review by the IDVP of the pressure and temperature environment for safety-related equipment outside containment, as presented in ITR 14, the staff initiated a review of this subject. PG&E was requested and provided the necessary detailed information for a calculation with the staff computer code currently in use.
In a related matter, in early January, allegations were made to the staff' regarding the design adequacy and performance of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 component cooling water (CCW) system and several other related concerns. The alleger has requested to remain anonymous and the staff is attempting to honor that request. 'The allegations were the subject of Board "ot.ifications. NRR subsequently informed the IDVP of those allegations. The staff met with PG&E.on January 28, 1983 to discuss these concerns. The meeting was open to the Public. PG&E provided clarification on the design bases and functional performance of the CCW system. The staff currently is re-evaluating the issue in light of the additional infor-mation and our review efforts are targeted for completion by early April.
- See Enclosure 3).
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.P M % .p P k. - d "e UNITED STATES EtlCLOSURE 1 ~ ,,(,{: :!dh),. 7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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.i: .. l "ttr E ' ~ CH AIRf.* An February 17, 1983 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Ccmmittee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chaiman:
I am responding to your letter of January 11, 1983 in which you refer to concerns of individuals living in the area near the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station. Your letter raises five specific concerns regarding the requirements which must be satisfied prior to authorization to load fuel. Each of these concerns is addressed in the enclosure. Let me assure you that under no condition will we authorize the Diablo Canyon facility to begin operation until we have. reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is adequately protected. More specif-ically we will require a high level of confidence that no significant design er construction deficiencies affecting safety at any authorized level of operation exist at the facility before reaching a decision to auth,rize that level of operation. I hope this letter and its enclosure provide information responsive to your concerns. Sincerely, m 4W CY'
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HunzioL.$a'lladino
Enclosure:
As stated cc: Mar. vel Lujan /" 9 xm
O Enclosure Resoonse to Five Concerns l The first concern is that "the Coxaission has approved a licensing schedule that would permit fuel loading prior to completion by PG&E of its review of the plant's seismic design and prior to implementation of all necessary corrective measures.that might result from this review." On March 4, 1982 the Commission approved a program plan for Phase I of the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP). The Phase I activities (described 'below in our response to the third concern) must be completed prior to reinstatement of the low power license. On December 8, 1982, the Commission approved a plan according to which a decision regarding the low power license reinstatement will take place in two steps. A third step will be the decision regarding issuance of the full power license. Before any decision to permit PG&E to load fuel, all activities prescribed in Step 1 must be completed, and before any decision to permit low power operation (less than 5".), all activities prescribed in Step 2 must be completed. Steps 1, 2, and 3 are listed in the Enclosure of the PG&E submittal of December 2, 1982 (copy attached). While PG&E has proposed specific dates for both steps (March 31, 1983 and May 15, 1983, respectively), we do not consider these cates controlling and will reach decisions only after all necessary review and evaluation has been completed. All modifications to safety-related - structures, syst-ems, and components required for any particular mode of operation of the facility must be completed prior to a decision regarding that mode. The second concern is that "no provision.has been made for considering analyses of the seismic design now being prepared by Brookhaven National Laboratory" (BNL). The results of the seismic design analyses that have been oncoing at BNL since late 1981 will be fully taken into consideration in the NRC evaluation and determination regarding the seismic design adequacy of Diablo Canyon Unit 1. The first BNL effort involved the containment annulus structure and selected associated piping systems and was documented in a report. We have requested the IDVP to review this report, consider the results in its own design verification efforts, and provide us with its conclusions. The NRC staff is evaluating the BNL report in parallel and will have the additional benefit of the independent view provided by the IDVP. In mid 1932 the NRC requested continued participation by BNL to undertake a heri: ental seismic analysis of the containment annulus structure, seismic and s:.ess analyses of a buried tank, and additional analyses of piping systers. The purpose of the BNL analyses is to provide the NRC with additional insip.: as to the' character of results obtainable by use of current state-of-the-art analytical techniques without regard to methods or procedures previcusly approved in the licensing process for Diablo Canyon. These analyses are therefore not intended as a substitute for the design and evaluation efforts now underway nor are they a substitute for the analytical effort being performed by the IDVP. Our experience has been, however, that such analyses,often provide insights to assist in our review. The SNL analyses will be sufficiently completed and taken into consideration prior to any decision regarding restoration of the license. D e e,r ,,,n- ,n,,-.. ,-.-,,,,,,,.-p y
2-The third concern is that " fuel loading will be allowed before completion of an adequate review of non-seismic safety-related plant elements." The Commission Order of November 19, 1981 (copy attached), which' suspended the low power license, sets forth the requirements that must be completed prior to reinstatement of the license. These requirements relate to seismic analyses ~and design activities performed prior to June 1978 by PG8E and its contractors (1.e., service-related activities) and to the implementation of the quality assurance program for those efforts. The activities associated with the Commission Order have become known as Phase I of the' independent design verification effort and, as discussed above, will be completed in two steps. In addition, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation required PG&E in a letter, also dated November 19, 1981, to initiate an independent design verification effort of safety-related structures, systems and components with respect to seismic analyses and design activities performed after 1978 and with respect to non-seismic analyses and design efforts performed by PG&E and its contractors. These efforts have become known as Phase II of the design verification program. By the Commission's approval of the program plan on December 8, 1982, the utility is required to submit a status report on all Phase II activities prior to any decision regarding restoration of the license. Such work must be sufficiently complete to ensure that all major deficiencies were detected. The design verification efforts for Phase I and Phase II are well underway. The activities that we require now to be completed prior to a fuel load decision exceed those originally specified in our Order. We have expanded the program to include the following additional IDVP activities: (1) audit of the imolementation of the Diablo Canyon Project quality assurance program (2) audit of a sample of quality assurance program implementation of construction activities, (3) review of the PG&E/ Westinghouse design interface, and (4) verification of the appropriate Hosgri and non-Hosgri spectra., As explaine'd above, at the time of authorization for fuel loading all efforts required for reinstatement of the license will be completed except for modifications to those structures, systems and components that are not requirec for Step 1, in order to protect the public health and safety. In addition, the Phase II activities (i.e., non-seismic, safety-related analysis and design) of PG8E and the IDVP will have proceeded to an extent that will allow us to reach a conclusion with respect to any additional design verification that might be required. At this time the IDVP has comple ec its review of those structures, systems and components tnat co crise the initial sample to be verified under Phase II. Prior to fuel loading, PG&E and the IDVP will both submit to the NRC a report on the status cf their respective Phase II a:tivities. Again, we will require a high degree of assurance, at the time of a decision regarding fuel loading, that any further design verification efforts in the seismic and non-seismic area will not reveal any major deficiency in Diablo Canyon Unit 1. Q.,--- .,g.
.3-The fourth concern is that " fuel. loading will be permitted before results are received from th_e ongoing audit of the quality assurance program and the implementation of corrective actions, if any, which might be called for as a result of this program." As stated above in response to the first and third concern, an audit of the quality assurance (QA) programs and their implementation by PG&E and its contractors is required as part of the Phase I and Phase II activities. These audits have been completed by the IDVP; interim' technical reports have been issued and are currently undergoing NRC review. In addition, the design verification effort has been expanded to include an audit of QA activities regarding the construction of Diablo Canyon Unit 1. This activity is ongoing and a status report will be provided to.ttue NRC as part of the Step 1 requirements. Other audits of QA programs and their implementation include an IDVP QA audit of ongoing PG&E activities, a PG&E internal QA audit of its contractors, and a PG&E QA audit of its own ongoing activities. In addition, the NRC Region V Office has routinely inspected ongoing design verification activities, including the implementation of appropriate QA programs. Most of the above QA audits will, be completed prior to fuel loading and reports will be provided to the NRC. We will require that _all necessary corrective actions be implemented before fuel load authorization. The fifth concern is that " fuel loading will be permitted prior to an adequate NRC review of the various seismic and non-seismic safety-related audits, analyses and corrective actions undertaken since late 1981." The NRC Order of November 19, 1981, clearly sets forth the requirements that must ta met and procedures that are to be followed for the authorization of fuel loading. In Secti.on 5 of Attachment'1, the Order states: " Prior to auth6rization to proceed with fuel loading the NRC shall be satisfied with the results of the seismic design verification program referred to in paragraph 1, and with any plant modification resulting from that program that may be necessary prior to fuel ~ loading. The NRC may impose additional requirements prior to fuel loading necessary to protect health and safety based upon its review of the program or any of the information provided by PG&E pursuant to paragr.ach 4. This may include some or all of the requirements specified in the letter to PG&E, dated November 19, 1981." Our approval of the two-step process for a decision regarding reinstatement of the license dces not permit any deviation from these recuirements. As stated earlier, the approval is limited to the concept of two steps fer decisiens regarding reinstatement of the license, but is in no way restricted to the target schedule preposed by PG&E. At this time, PG&E and the IDVP are providing us with much information in the form of semi-monthly rep rts, interim <echnical reports, and sections of their final reports e 9 I o e - - - -... - - --,,----- _. -..,,,+,, n,_.--- ,y- -,. , - - - ~. - - - - - -, - -m---.-
4-en the various facets of-the design verification efforts in Phase I and Phase II. Although we intend to give substantial weight in our decision to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of Teledyne Engineering Sevices as the manager of the IDVP, under no condition will we consider the IDVP to take the place of the necessary and adequate NRC review. We will not be restricted in our own review efforts by the specific schedule proposed but will take the time necessary to assure ourselves and the public that there are no deficiencies that would prevent safety.-related structures, systems and components from performing their intended safety functions. 9 e I O e n
FOR FUEL LCMIN3, Lol PC#ER TESTIN3, Mc FIT L P0iER 08ERATION e' 12/02/82 .~ SOHECULED C W LETICH ACTIVITY DATE P.EW.W.S Stno l 1. Project Reports submitted: Escuircee.ts for A. Final Report fo.- Phase I C2/15/83 Raster: tion of the b. Status Repo.-t for Phase il C2/15/83 Lov F ver License C. Supplement fo-As-builts' 03/15/83 2. IDVP reports submitted: (See N:te 1) A. Status Report for Phase ! 03/0!/83 B. Status Report for Phase il 03/01/23 (See Note 2) C. Status Report for ITP QA Program 03/0l/83 D. Status Report.for Construction QA 03/01/83 E. States Report for Hon Hos;;rl spectra 03/0!/83 F. Final Report for PG4E/W Interface 03/0!/83 G. Final Report for MasgrIspect'ra 03/0!/83 ~ H. Supplement for As-built 03/15/83 For fuel load items verification (Modes 5 & 6) (See Note 3) 3. NRC Decision for Restoration of 03/31/83 the Low Power License ~ Stas 11 1. Project Reports submitted: Ra:;alrer.ents for Initial A. Final Phase l Repo.-t su'pplement 04/01/83 Celticality and Low Power B. Supplement for As-builts 04/30/83 TsstIn3 2. IDY? reports submitted: A. Final Report for Phase ! 04/15/83 B. Status Report for Phase 11 04/15/83 C. Supplement for As-built 04/30/83 For low power items verification (Modes 2,3,4,5 & 6) (See Note 4) 3. NRC DecIslon for initial 05/15/83 Criticality and Los Power Testing Sic: lil 1. Proje:t Repo.-ts submitted s:uire.er.ts fer I:cu:n=e A. Ph:se !! Report 05/15/83 of a Full Pe.er License B. Supple.nat for As-built 06/15/83 2. 10VP reports subcitted: A. Final Report for Phase 11 CS/01/83 B. Final Repo.-t for ITP QA 05/OI/83 C. Finel Report for construction QA, 05/01/83 D. Final Report for Kon-Hos' gel spe:tra 06/0!/83 E. Supplement for As-built 05/15/83 For full power Itees Verification (Rodes I-6) 3. hRO Do:Islon for issuance of 05/30/83 a Full Pever L!ce..se
s 9 NOTES NOTE I !DYP reports may be started approximately mid December, 1962, with further project input in eld January and February, it is anticipated that the reports can be completed within two weeks of receipt of the lest project input. The IDYP is in continual contact vlth the project throughout this period. NOTE 2 - Phase !! status report will address that Phase il activities'are sufficiently complete to provide reasonable assurance that no mejor deficiencies remain undetected. NOTE 3 - Items to be completed after' fuel loading: o Civ!! structural final' confirmatory load review (supported loads). Primarily Annulus and Class I platforms. o Fuel handling building modifications (Unit I only). o Turbine building modification design and constructi'n. ~ o ltems to be completed after RCs heatup and low power testing: NOTE 4 Turbine building modification design and construction. o Note This attachment was enclosed in the PG&E submittal of December 2,1982. It lists the activities of Phase I, Phase II and other efforts that must be completed at the two steps for reinstatement of the low power license and at the issuance of a full power license. e 9 9 e O ---e a w, ---,---,----,m,*-
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??.K?TUi ':Ghp'r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '81 N0Y 19 P6:06 COMMISSIONERS:
- ' ' SECF.ETAp.y Nun =io J. Palladino, Chairman
" * ""' INhC. Victor Gilinsky ~ Peter A. 3radford 8231ED gpY2 9 John F. Ahearne / Thomas M. Roberts ~C. ) In the Matter of ) ) PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-275 OL ~ ) (Diablo Canyon Nuclear ) Power Plant, Unit 1) ) ) ORDER SUSPENDING LICENSE CLI 2 0 1.- On September 21, 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission (" Commission" or "NRC") authorized the NRC staff to issue a license to Pacific Gas and Electric Ccmpany ("PG&E") for fuel loading and the conduct _of tests at up to 5% of rated power at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1,'CLI-81-22, 14 NRC On September 22, 1981, the NRC staff issued such a license. License No. DPR-76. In taking these actions the Ccmmission found that it was in the public interest to allcw effectiveness, and the NRC staff found that the applicant was in compliance with NRC regulations and construction permit recuirements relevant to the licensed activity. a,pe'rr VA
E 2. In 11.00 Suptumoer 1981, in the course of responding to a special NRC. request for information, an c:ror in tho seismic design of equipment and piping in the containment annulus of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 was def.ected by PG&E and reported to the NRC. PG&E committed to postpone loading of fuel until the matter was resolved satisfactorily and initiated a reanalysis of portions of the seismic design of the facility. As a result, a number of different additional errors were found. Based upon informatien supplied by PG&E, and recent NRC staff inspections conducted at the offices of PG&E and URS/ John A. Blume and Associates ( " Blume" ) in San Francisco, Report Nos. 59-275/81-29 and 50-323/81-18, the NRC staf f identified serious weaknesses in PG&E's quality assurance program. More specifically: the PG&E chuality assurance program did not appear a. to effectively exercise control over the review and approva_3 c:_ cesign inro= nation passed to and received from Blume, b. the PG&E quality assurance progran did not acc. ear to adequately control the distribution of design a s infor ation frem 31une within' affected internal PG&E design grcups, and uhe PG&E c.uality assurance crec. ram did not ac. cear c. to c.erane anc =o,ement adecuate cua_,1tv assurance procedures and controls over other service-related contracts.- m a
state = ants made in PG&E's operating licenso application,' certain structures, systems, and components important to safety at the plant may not be properly designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes, and further indicates that violations of NRC's regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B have occurred. Ead this information been known to the Co= mission on or~ prior to September 22, 1981, Facility License No. DPR-76 would not have been issued until the c.uestions raised had been resolved. 4. Accordingly, the Commission suspends PG&E's license to lead fuel and conduct tests at up to 5% of rated power pending satisfactory completion of the actions specified,in attachment 1 to this Order. In furtherance of this, PG&E is h: eby ordere'd to show cause pursuant to 10 'CFR 2.202 and 50.100, why Facility License No. DPR-76 should not be , suspended pending satisfactory completion of the actions speci5ied in atta'chment 1, insofar as it authorizes fuel-loading and other operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Unit l'. - Further, the Commission ' finds pursuant to 10 4 CFR 2.202 (f) that, because it is now uncertain as to the exten which structures, systems, and components inpertant to safety cf fuel loading and testing at up to 5% of rated pcwer will in fact withstand the effects of earthquakes, and because of the seriousness of the violations, the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be 1 --v -,--,,--,-------,--r- ,,,-m.
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irr.e'iately offectivo. Within 20 days of the data of this Order, PG&E may, file a written answer to the Order under cath or adfirmation and may demand a hearing. The issues to be addressed in any answer or hearing shall be whether the matters specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 are true'and whether, as a consecuence, the license should have been suspended as provided in this paragraph. A separate statement by Commissioner Roberts is I i attached. i It is so ORDERED. &,.. 3 ~ R *>, For.the Commhssion c* .'-: s g r.., n.. t A. /* : ~ o eq ^ e') l =* y >.- .i.: n. \\.. SAMUEL F CHILK Secretary of.L_he Commission 2.3, '. ~
- i Dated at Washington, D.C.,
this l'9thday of November,1981.
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.,[. ~: -1. Provido the following information for NRC review: For All Seismic Service-Related Contracts Prior to June 1978 (a) The resultslof an independen design verification program on all safety-related activities performed prior to June 1,1978 ' ' under all seismic-related service contracts utilized in the design process for ~~ safety-related structures, systems and components. Information.concerning this program should address quality assurance procedure,s, controls and practices concerning the development, accuracy, transmittal, and use of all safety-related information both within ?G&E and within each contractor's organization, as well as the transmittal of information between PG&E and each contractor. .It should also include performance of a suitable number of sample calculations l related.to each contract to verify the adcquacy and accuracy of the design process for affected safety-related structures, ~ ' i systems and components. The information to be provided concerning this design 9 ..w.-n.-n,-.---.,.-, n- .mn,.
verificatica program should ba based on.a.d include the following program elements.- (1). A review of all quality assurance procedures and controls used by each ~ pre-June 1978 seismic service related service contractor and by PG&E with regard to that contract; a comparison of these procedures and controls with the related criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50; and an identification of any deficiencies or weaknesses in the quality assurance procedures and in controls of the contractor and PG&E. (2). Development of a network for the design chain for all safety-related structures, ~ systems, and components involved. This should include all interfaces where design infommation was transmitted between PG&E int.ernal design groups and each centractor.. (3). A review of the implementation of quality assurance procedures and centrols used by and for: S m
PG&E internal design groups, each contractor interna.1 design group (s), transmittal of information between i PG&E and each contractor, ~ transmittalohcontractordevelooed information within PG&E; and identification of any deficiencies or weaknesses in the implementation of quality assurance procedures and controls by each contracto'r ind by'PG&I. (4). Development of criteria-for the conduct of this design verification program should consider the relevant guidelines ~ contained in ANSI N45.2.ll, Section 6.3.1. (5). Development of criteria for selection of a suitable number and type of sample ~ calculations related to the design of safety-related structures, systems and components involved. The purpose of i these sample calculitions should be to e e ..-r-- .-..-_._,n,-,.n,,~n---..n.----
in the arcas of any identified contractor or PG&E quality assurance weaknesses or deficiencies as dete==ined from the procedure and i'plementation m reviews discussed in steps 1 through 3 - above. Criteria' for expanding' the sample size when problems in verification are encountered should also be developed. -(b) A technical report that fully assesses the basic cause of all design errors identified by this program, the significance of design errors found, and their impact on facility design. (c) PG&E's conclusions on the effectiveness of this design verification program in assuring the adequacy of facility design. (d) A schedule for completing any' modifications to the facility that are recuired as a result of this program. For modifications that you propose not completing. prior to fuel lead, the bases for proceeding should be provided. 9 --,nn,---* ,,-,, --~ --r--
2. Tha following infor=ation shall ba provid6d 'for NRC ~ review and. approval. NRC will make its decision on these proposed companies after providing the Governor of California and Joint Intervenors in the pending operating license proceeding 15 days for comment. Qualifications of Ccmpanies Proposed To Conduct Indecendent Reviews- ~* A description.and discussion of the corporate qualifications of the company or companies that PG&E would propose to carry out the independent design verification program discussed in 1 above, including information that demonstrates,the i independence of these companies. 3. As soon as practicable following NRC approval of the company.or companies to conduct the indepandent design ' verification program, the following information shall be provided for NRC review and approval. NRC will make its decision on the acceptability of the program plan after.providing the Governor of California and Joint Intervenors in the pending operating license proceeding 15 days for comment. Procram Plan For The Desian Verification Procrams A detailed program plan for conducting the design verification programs discussed in 1 above.- The ~ I e
information providad should include tha basoc for tha critaria proposed to be used for selection of a suitable number and type of sample calculations to be performed under these programs and the bases for the criteria proposed to be used for expanding the sample size based upon the results of the initial samples. 4. Status Reoorts ~ Starting on Friday, November 27, 1981, and continuing-while the suspension is in effect, a semi-monthly status report on the second and' fourth Friday of each mcnth, on all of the engoing reanalyses efforts and design verification programs being conducted by_and for PG&E, including but not limited to the program referred to in paragraph 1, should be sdhmitted to the Regional Administrator, Region V and the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. ~ 5. Nic Review Prior to authorization to proceed with fuel loading, the NRC shall be satisfied with the results of the seismic design verification program referred to in paragraph 1, and with any plant modification resulting from that program that may be necessary prior to fuel loading. The NRC may impose additional recuirements prior to fuel loading necessary to protect health and safety based upon its review of the program or any of 4 n
the informatien provided by PGSE pursuant to paragraph 4. Thic ::y include soma or all of the requirements specified in the letter to'PG&E, dated November 19, 1981. 9 g 4 e G e e e O = e 4 9 e O g e e 9 6 O a 9 e 9 9 t S S O i e e e _m ,~.__,,_,_,-,,_.m_ .~-..... -,,. ~
' t, l November 19, 1981 1 i i I SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER ROBERTS ~ I agree with the reverification program imposed on PG&E in this Order. I disagree, however, with two aspects of the action taken by the majority of the Comission today. First, I believe that ~ suspension of the Diablo Canyon fuel load and low power license, without the oppor-tunity for a prior hearing and the opportunity to cure provided by the i Atomic Energy Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Comis - sion's regulations, is unwarranted in light of the minimal threat to the public health and safety that exists at this time and in light of the Ccmmission's duty to exercise its emergency remedial powers responsibly. Second, I believe that the procedures outlined in this. Order calling for i the coments of adversary parties to the operating license proceeding on I (1) the companies proposed by PG&E to' undertake the reverification program and (2) the scope a~nd acceptability of the proposed reverifi-- cation program evidence an abnegation of the Comission's responsibility j. to use its technical expertise to assess independently and impartially ^ any errors that may have occurred at the facility. While there is no question that the Comissien may suspend a license for false statements in the license application or for a vio-lation of the Commission's regulations, the Comission has, in the past, held itself to a standard of exercising its emergency powers carefully i and with due regard for taking action comensurate with the magnitude of the risk posed to the public health and safety. This is so because emergency actions "can radically and sumarily affect the rights and interests of others, including licensees and those who depend on their activities." Licensees Authorized to Possess or Transoort Stratecic i Ouantities of soecial Nuclear Material, CL1-77-3, 5 HRC 16, 20 (1977). inus, in tne past, "the Comission has said that if risks to the public are i.dentified, the Comission must determine their magnitude and take i anarceriate remedial action." Petition for EmercenCv and Remedial Action, CL1-78-6, 7 HRC 400, 405 (1978) (empnasis acceo). V1olation of a reculation does not, by itself, result in a requirement that a license be suspended, ld. A wide range of remedial actions are available to the Comission. In this case, the Comission could have continued to rely on PG&E's written comitment not to take actions authorized by its license until PG&E had completed to the Staff's satisfaction the program required by
.th'2 Staff.E Alternatix technical specificatiorkply, the Comission could have inserted a or a license condition into the license to prevent fuel load. Finally, the Conraission could have.provided PGEE an cpportunity for a prior hearing and an opportunity to cure before de-ciding whether to suspend the license. In order to illustrate the severe and precipitous nature of tha Ccmission's decision to suspend, it is important to note some of the facts befcre the Comnission but omitted from the majority opinion. An underpinning of the Comnission's September 21 Order authorizing issuance of the fuel load and low power license is the low risk that would be entailed by activities under this license. At present, fuel has not yet been loaded into the Diablo Canyon Unit I core and PG&E has comnitted in writino not to commehce fuel load until it has received the concurrence of the'Connission's Staff. Additionally, the Comnission has two resi-dent inspectors assigned t'o the site to monitor PGLE's activities. As the fuel intended for Unit I has not been loaded into the core and as assurance exists that it will.not be loaded until satisfactory resolu-i tion of the present issues, minimal risk to the public exists at the present time. 1/ It'is not the Comission's experience that licensees have' taken action contrary to a written comitment such as that involved here. This is due, in part, to the Comission's extensive power to take su=ary action if a licensee rescinds its ccmmitment. To illustrate this,'I note that the Comission recently filed a motion opposing a recuest for an injunction of the Diablo Canyon low-power license in Jaffer v. Brown, No. 81-5878 (9th Cir., filed November 4,1981) which "ine oiscovery of a series of errors in portions of the en-statec: gineering analysis has forced deferral of the implementation of the low-power license by Pacific Gas and Electric. No action under the license.will be undertaken until problems at th'e facility are resolved to the NRC's satisfaction." Thus, as a practical matter, the Cocais-sion's reliance on PGLE's written commitment is not unreasonable and the Cc=nission has so stated in court as recently as November 10. I 2/ To the extent that the Comission needs to take any legal action, it Ts important to note that under the present technical specifications and license, the risk to the public is minimal because PGLE can load fuel but cannot change the plant status to above a cold shutdown condition t j (Mode 5). This is because of Section 1.19 of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 ) Technical Specificatiens which provides the following definition of 0?ERABLE-0FERA31LITY: A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be 1 OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing .~ its specified function (s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electric power, cooling and seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required { for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform l its function (s) are also capable of performing their related i supportfunction(s). (footnote continued)
i With regard to my second point of disagreement, the Commission has decided to request the comments of adversary parties to the operating license proceeding en (1) the companies proposed by PGLE to implement the reverification program and (2) the scope and acceptability of the reverification program. The Commission is under a duty as an indepen-dent regulatory agency to identify any errors which may have been made, to assess what risk, if any, to the public health and safety exists, and to determine what measures need to be taken so that the Commission ha's reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is protected. Incorporation of adversary parties into this reverification process is an abnegation of the Commission's responsibility to fulfill its duties independently and impartially. ~ 2/ (continued) Tn view of the above definition and references to it throughout the Limiting Conditions For. Operation in the Unit 1 Diablo Canyon Technical Specifications, the licensee is legally precluded frca entering into cperational modes above cold shutdown (Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) because systems technically affected by the seismic design error would not meet the definition for OPERABLE-0PERASILITY. For example, the supports for the c:ntainment fan coolers which may be affected by the mirror image error are addressed in section 3.6.2.3 " Containment Cooling System." This saction reads as follows: At least two independent groups of containment fan coolant units shall be OPERABLE with a minimum of two units to one I group and one unit to the other group. Since, in view of the known potential design errors, the Contain-ment Ceoling System might not be capable of performing its specified function. Therefore, the licensee would be legally obliged to remain in a cold shutdown condition. m
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c,. The Honorable Nunzio Palladino Chairman. 1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In recent weeks I have received a number of letters from persons residing in the vicinity of the Diablo Canyon reactors. These letters express concern that the NRC will. allow fuel loading prior without an adequate overall ( assessment of the plant's safety. This mail leads me to believe that there is widespreaddoub't $ - that the Diablo station complies with the Commission's requirements. In view of the need to establish public 4 confidence in whatever decision the Commission makes witli regard to this matter, I think it important that the Commission state its response to concerns of the kind that have been brought to my attention. A. kong these concerns are that the Commission has approved a licensing schedule that would permit fuel loading prior to completion by PG&E of its review of the plant's seimsic design and prior to implementation of all necesary corrective measures that might result from this review. A second concern is that no provision has been made for considering analyses of the seismic design now being prepared by Brookhaven National Laboratory. A third concern is that fuel loading will be allowed before completion of an adequate review of nonseismic safety-related plant elements. Fourth, there is concern that fuel loading will be permitted before results are received from the ongoing audit of the quality assurance program and the implemetantion of corrective actions, if any, which might be called for as a result of this program. ~ ' Finally, the intervenors are concerned that fuel loading will be permitted prior to an adequate NRC review of the various seismic and nonseismic safety-related audits, analyses and corrective actions undertaken since late 1981. Thank you for your assistance. D Mf6 Sincerely, M. / -7e,
ENCLOSURE 2 I!4TERDt TECH:ICAL REPORTS (ITR) ITR - 1 Additional Verification and Additional Sampling, - Rev. O, RLCA, June 6, 1982 Additional ~ Verification and Additional Sampling, Rev. 1, RLCA, October 22, 1982 ITR - 2 Evaluation of Quality Assurance Program and Implementation Review, Rev. O. TES, June 23, 1982 ITR - 3 Tanks Rev. O, RLCA, July 16; 1982 ITR - 4 Shake Table Testing Rev. O, RLCA, July 23, 1982 ITR - 5 Design Chain Rev. O, RLCA, August 19, 1982 ITR - 6 Auxiliary Building Pav. O RLCA, September 10, 1982 ITR - 7 Electrical Raceway Supports Rev. O. RLCA, September 17, 1982 ITR - 8 Verification Program for PG&E Corrective Action Rev. O RLCA, October 5, 1982 ITR - 9 Development of the Service Related Contractor List For f;on-Seismic Design Work Performed for DC:PP-1 Prior to June 1978 - Phase II Rev. O, R. F. Reedy, October 15, 1982 ITR - 10 Verification of Design Analysis Hosgri Spectra Rev. O, RLCA, October 29, 1982 ITR - 11 :acific Gas & Electric / 'destinghouse Seismic
- nterface Review Rev. O, TES,::ovember 2, 1982 ITR - 12 ofping Rev. O, RLCA,t!ovember 5, 1982
~ ITR - 13 Soils - Intake Structure Rev. O. RLCA, November 5, 1982 s-. -.- n.
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,. ? ITR --14 Verification of the Temperature, Pressure, Humidity and Submergence Environments Used for Safety Rel,ated Equipment Specification Outside Containment for ' Auxiliaty Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressuirzation System Rev. O. SWEC, December 6, 1982 ITR - 15 HVAC Duct and Supports Report-Rev. O. RLCA, December 10, 1982 ITR - 16 ' Soils - Outdoor Water Storage Tanks Rev. O, RLCA, December 8, 1982 ITR - 17 Piping - Additional. Samples Rev. O, RLCA, December 14, 1982 ITR - 18 Verification of the Fire Protection' Provided for Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System, Safety-Related Portion of the 4160 V Electric System Rev. O, SWEC, December 13, 1982 ITR - 19 Verification of the Post-LOCA Portion of the Radiation Environments Used For Safety Related Equipment Specification Outside Containment for Auxiliary Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System Rev. O, SWEC, December 16, 1982 ITR - 20 Verification of the Mechanical / Nuclear Design of the Control Room Ventilation' and Pressurization System Rev. O, SWEC, December 16, 1982 ITR - 21. Verification of the Effects of High Energy Line Cracks and Moderate Energy Line Breaks for Auxiliary Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System Rev. O, SWEC, December 15, 1982 ITR - 22 Verification of Mechanical / Nuclear Portion of.the Auxiliary Feedwater System Rev. O, SWEC, Decerber 17, 1982 ITR - 23 Verification of Hi9h Energy Line Break and Internally Generated Missile Review - Outside Containment for Auxiliary Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System Rev. 0, SWEC, December 20, 1982 O
3-ITR - 24,Verifiestion of the 4160 V Safety Related -f Electrical Distribution System Rev. O, SWEC, Decer.ber 21, 1982 ITR - 25 Verification of the' Auxiliary Feedwater System Electrical Disicn 7 Rev. O, SWEC, December 21, 1982 ITR'- 26 Verification of the Centrol Room ~ Ventilation and Pressurization System ~ Electrical Design e Rev. O, $WEC, December 21, 1982 ITR 27 Verification of the Instrument and Control - Des'ign of the Auxiliary'Feedwater System Rav. 0, SWEC, December 23, 1982 ITR - 28 Verification of the Instrument and Control' Design of',the Control Room Ventilation and, s Pressurization System,, Rev. O. SWEC, December,23,'1982 ITR - 29 Design Chain - Initial, Sample Rev,0, SWEC, January 17, 1983-n. ITR - 30 SmallLBore Piping Repori '/ Rev.,0, RLCA, Jsnuarye12,.1983 ITR - 31 HVAC Components s Rev. 0 'RLCA, January 14, 1983 3 ~ / ' ITR 734 Verification of 'Diablo Canyon Project Efforts ^' ' ' ' ~. '/ T / by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporati.on s h.. c/ Rev. O, S'qEC, February 4,1983 b y a f y -o /,. 4 k f + 9 'w ..m,,,-.,,-.
p. .,, p ' c g'c, _ a 4 [. UNITED STATES f* s g(} NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , M.4'd u t ...g WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 ~ V83[/ C FEB 181983 s, % \\. / MDDRANDUM TOR: Roger Mattson, Director Division of; Systems Integration FROM: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON - REVIEW OF CCWS Over the past couple of months a number of ' questions have been raised concerning the adequacy of the design of the Diablo Canyon Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). While it is recognized that the questions raised on the CCWS may have implications for other systems, the focus for our review has been the CCWS since such a review will determine the, validity of questions that have been raised. The concerns were the subject of a Board Notification (see Enclosure 1). The allegations referenced therein, will be evaluated by Region V and IE in accordance with norral practice. In addition, the transcript of an NRC neeting with an individual who raised a' number of questions has been sent to the IDVP contractor (Teledyne) requesting that it be factored into Phase II of that program. ~(See for transmittal letter.) In addition, the staff met with PG8E representatives on January 28, 1983, to discuss the design basis for the CCWS. A copy of thd transcript of that meeting with PG8E is attached as Enclosure 3. PG&E has informed me that additional information, including responses to staff questions at the January 28, 1983, meeting, will be supplied to the NRC at the end.of February. In ordei to provide confidence in the design review approach for Diablo Canyon, we have determined that the staff should undertake a new review of the CCWS. Such a review should be sufficiently detailed to provide the following deter-minations, which should be addressed in your SER: 1. The extent to which the CCWS design satisfies the FSAR carciitments. 2. The extent to which the CCWS satisfies all NRC regulations applicable to Diablo Canyon. 3. The extent to which the CCWS caets the applicable criteria in the l ( latest edition of the Standard Review Plan, and 4. The generic implications, if any, from the aforementioned determinations regarding the adequacv cf the Diablo Canyon design approach and philosophy. ---6 % E p.) 07(Dg
Roger.Mattson Your review should be completed, with SER inputs provided to DL by March 31, 1983. If your are unable to support this schedule, please notify me promptly. DL will arrange site visits, meetings, etc. as needed, to support your efforts which, we recognize, may include walkdowns of the CCWS as necessary to review the final as-built design. We anticipate that you will integrate the overall review of the CCWS, soliciting inputs from other NRR Division as appropriate. a r s nnu or Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: H. R. Denton, w/o encl. E. G. Case, w/o encl. R. Vollmer, w/o encl. T. M. Novak, w/o encl. G. W. Knighton, w/o encl. H. Schierling, w/o encl. B. Buckley, w/o encl. H. Thompson, w/o encl. R. Engelken, w/o encl. J. Martin, w/o encl. O M e + .O 0 e W \\
PP', GREEN TICKET #12155 DISTRIBUTION Document Control (50-275/323)* NRC PDR* L PDR* PRC System
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BBuckley DEisenhut/RPurple JLee* JLJordan, DEQA:IE JMTaylor, IE Attorney, OELD (LChandler) TMNovak/MStine MBridgers, EDP (EDO#12155) Correspondence Clerk, NRR (ED0#12155) SECY (3) HRDenton WJDircks Rehm Stello DeYoung Engelken, Region V Cunningham, ELD PPAS TSpeis RMattson RVollmer HThompson Grace Snyder JKnight LRubenstein OParr GLEar PKuo
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50-275 M23 E MEMORANDUM FOR: George E. Lear, Chief Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch N Division of Engineering THRU: P. T. Kuo, Section B Leader Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering FROM: Harold E. Polk Divisi. ural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Struct on of Engineering
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT FOR R. L. CLOUD MEETING FEBRUARY 23, 1983 AND PG&E/IDVP TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE MEETING FEBRUARY 24 AND 25, 1983 FOR DIABLO CANYON On February 22, 1983 two members of the NRC staff, P. T. Kuo and Harold Polk of SGEB, and Charles Miller of Brookhaven National Laboratory met with R. L. Cloud and Associates (RCLA) to discuss the progress in their review work in the areas of the Auxi'liary Building, equipment, raceways, instrumentation and the Intake Structure. B RCLA estimated that the completion percent of the work on the following items to-be: ITEM % COMPLETE Auxiliary Building 30 Large Bore Piping 80 Large Bore Piping Supports 10 Small Bore Piping Supports 10 Equipment 0 Intake Structure 30 Raceways - Supports Only 60 Instruments 10 RCLA is using a check list on each package to ensure uniformity i1 the review. This checklist also serves as a record of any non-conformities or open items tnat would be closed at a later date by some action of the DCP. The review is accomplished in a procedure comprising two major steps. They are: 1. Review work package A. Fomard any questions to PG&E B. Receive and review answers from PG&E C. Send package to Holly /Biggs for review h /t CONTACT: HAROLD POLK .l d . X 2896 R ~ ~ %$Tetr$6A w .--e-
~ ~ George Lear - .m 2. Issure ITR on work package RCLA estimates that they will publish 3 more ITRs which will essentially complete their review work in support of fuel loading. - These ITRs address: 1. Heat Exchangers 2. Valves 3. Shake Table Testing of Mountings e These reports should be available in the very near future. RCLA indicated that they had good cooperation from the Diablo Canyon Project (DCP) in supplying information for their review. RCLA indicated that they were not performing many verification calculations and their work mode was essentially a review of the material submitted by DCP. The results of the RCLA Auxiliary Building review and analysis to date are as follows. The DCP found 12 floor slabs to be flexible -in the vertical direction. The approach used is to accept the vertical response from the global model (which assumes all slabs to be rigid). This response is then input to the boundaries of the flexible slab models and the resulting motion of the slab is determined. Response spectra are then generated at selected locations on the flexible slabs. It is suggested that the spectra nearest to the location of interest is used for the purposes of design and analysis. All stiffness and mass properties for the global seismic model have been l recalculated. The seismic model now accounts for openings in the slabs 1 around the spent fuel pool. RCLA has not found large differences from j the DCP previous seismic model results. l l RCLA observed that DCP did some averaging of the vertical response spectra, but not for the horizontal response spectra. In all cases where averaging was used, it was for frequencies lower than the structural frequencies, i The review performe'd by RCLA has focused on the detailed calculation process. Holley/Biggs will review the calculations to evaluate the acequacy of the basic models used in the analysis. This appears to be the mode of operation to be followed by the IDVP in all future reviews of structural calculations. RLCA had the following comments on the work l to date: The DCP calculations are complete and well organized. L
a George Lear - i P There are questions regarding the soil springs used to model the effect of the 100 foot elevation soil / structure interaction. There are several differences between RCLA and DCP results. First, the DCP suggests that it has performed parametric studies which indicate the insensitivity of the results to the values of the soil springs used. RCLA has performed parametric studies on the seismic model through the generation of frequencies, mode shapes and participation factors and found the response to be sensitive to i i ' changes in the soil spring values. Secondly, there are large uncertainties regarding the soil properties used to determine the spring constants. MacNeal~is under contract to IDVP to evaluate the. soil properties so that there should be more soil data available soon. Thirdly., there is a difference between DCP and RLCA regarding the foundation / soil contact area used to evaloate the sensitivity of the model to soil spring changes. The DCP retains only vertical degrees of freedom in the global vertical response mode.- RLCA is considering whether some rotational degrees of freedom should also be included. l The prior review'of ITR-6 had raised questions in the area of the soil springs, flexural stiffness bf walls and the rigidity of floor slabs relative to.the walls. The first two issues are being addressed by RLCA. At staff consultant's (BNL) request, RLCA agreed to perfrom some calculations to investigate whether.the floor slabs are indeed rigid relative to the walls. i The DCP calculations and the RCLA calculation sheets reviewing the DCP submittals were examined. The RLCA work seems to be well done and is well documented. Their review cou' pled with the Holly /Biggs review of the basic models used by DCP should produce an acceptable i verification of the DCP work. P. T. Kuo and Harold Polk of the NRC staff attended the technical interchange meeting between PG&E and the IDVP on February 24. Attendance lists are attached. The areas covered were the DCP progress in the analysis of the Ir.take Structure, the Auxiliary Building and the containment annulus steel structure. INTAKE STRUCTURE The DCP considers the intake structure analysis complete. The work by the DCP in reverifying the Intake Structure consisted of the following broad categories. a 1. Check drawings against as built structure i i J a- ~ ~ + - ,m,-.a,--, ..~n_, .__.,_,,,--,-w-,..wn-,---,-.,w_m,,_-,,.m...,-ne, n,
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George Lear - 2. Design modifications to reflect design conditions dictated by change in the breakwater level 3. Recompute seismic responses a 4 Evaluate structure for loads The structure is classified as Class II but houses some Class I equipment (auxiliary salt water pumps). Therefore, it must be shown .that failure of the Non-Class I structure will not affect the Class I equipment. The acceptance criteria used to ensure that the structure will not fail are: 1. Stresses evaluated against ACI 318-71 and SE0AC 1974 2. Some structural' ductility is allowed 3. No collapse is allowed 4 Elastic response spectra use.d' Only one area was found to exceed the material yield strength and the use of a ductility factor of 1.5 would show the structure acceptable. The area of overstress was in the reinforcing steel in the piers under the front curtain wall. The piers are used as water flow straightners and the ductility of 1.5 was required in qualifying the reinforcing steel at only one corner. Auxiliary Building The DCP presented the status of their work on the soil properties and the soil structure interaction springs for the elevation 100 feet portion of the building foundation. The soil properties for.the seismic evaluation were based on the uphole tests made on two boreholes, one under the auxiliary building and one under the containment. These properties were supplemented by the values from two other holes located nearby but outside the footprint of the two buildings. Refraction data that was available was not considered as salid as the uphole data and therefore not used. Taking into consideration the rock layering, the values between the two holes compared favorably. The soil spring's variations were found to be within 20% and the effect on the Auxiliary Building mode shapes and participation factors were small. The findings of R. L. Cloud, in an independent analysis do not support these DCP findings. 1
T,, i ' George 1. ear I < When a stick model with lumped masses is used to represent a building for seismic analysis, there is an implicit assumption that the floor slabs are rigid in their own plane. The floor slabs in the Auxiliary Building contains holes for the two spent fuel pools (one for each unit) which makes the slabs flexible for inplane motion. Two seismic stick models were evaluated for this lack of inplane rigidity. both models consisted of three sticks with lumped masses. One stick represented the area between the two spent fuel pools, with one stick for each of the areas outside the spent fuel pool area. The stidks were rigidly connected together at 'the 100 foot elevation. Model one used a torsional stiffness appropriate with the section represented by the sticks and no conriections between the sticks. Model two was the same as Model one but the sticks were connected together at elevations 115 feet and 140 feet. The properties of the connecting members were base'd on the slab properties at the spent fuel pool. The models incorporated an accidental torsion of 5% of the total building length. The resulting floor response spectra at elevation 160 feet within the bound of the original Hosgri broadened translation of spectra; although some shift of the peak frequency occurred. Containment Annulus Structure Considerable discussion ensued on the philosophy of detailed analysis of the annulus steel over the original 5 frame model. the DCP position was l that the reanalysis of the annulus steel would not produce a be,tter structure, only a different one and that the structure was being tuned for benefit of the piping analysis. ~ The results of the DCP horizontal and vertical analysis to date were presented. The analysis makes use of the frame concept but now uses all of the frames instead of collapsing them into 5 frames as in the original analysis. The individual members of the frames are being modified where necessary to produce a local fundamental frequency at 20 HZ of greater. The philosophy would result in 20-30 modifications in addition to the column additions for the vertical analysis. The modifications are to>accomodate the piping system in keeping the piping input response spectra nearly the same as the original Hosgri analysis. The Brookhaven analysis has shown that there was some motion of the non-3 continuous portions of the annulus steel that was not accounted for. DCP proposed to install additional members that would make these dis-continuous floor levels continuous and add diagonal stiffness that would l help to prevent torsional response to lateral horizontal loads. There would be approximately 60 members involved. The DCP is proceeding with the modification program and is procuring the material necessary to fabricate and install the members. _ ',, _,.,,.. _,___,,,..__,_,.._.-.-~_,,_,,,,..m,--_,,_.-~-.,_,,,,,._,-. ..m,,.., _,. _, -,,.__m.--_..mm,_.
George Lear 6-The DCP indicated they would issue the package of slides used in the presentation for their proposed modifications to the annulus structure. The DCP would continue to look into the soil spring problem. The Turbine Building will be addressed at a mid-March meeting. Harold E. Polk Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering
Enclosure:
As stated cc: R. Vollmer D. Eisenhut J. Knight P. Kuo M. Reich, BNL Q Miller, BNL .~ 941. Schierling B. Bucktey H. Polk t G l I i s
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