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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M3371999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Notice of Docketing of License SNM-2506 Amend Application.Notice Has Been Forwarded to Ofc of Fr for Publication ML20217M1111999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-14 & 50-306/99-14 on 990920- 22.One Violation Noted & Being Treated as Ncv.Insp Focused on Testing & Maint of Heat Exchangers in High Risk Sys ML20217F4331999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to Security Plan.Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20217C2351999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-12 & 50-306/99-12 on 990823-0917.No Violations Noted.Insp Consisted of Selected Exam of Procedures & Representative Records,Observation of Activities & Interviews with Personnel ML20212J8811999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Preliminary Accident Sequence Precurson Analysis of Operational Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 1 on 990105, for Review & Comment.Comment Requested within 30 Days of Receipt of Ltr IR 05000272/19990071999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-272/99-07 & 50-306/99-07 on 990721- 0831.One Potentially Safety Significant Issue Identified Dealing with Control Room Special Ventilation System.Four Addl Issues of Low Safety Significance Identified ML20212G7171999-09-24024 September 1999 Submits Semiannual Status Update on Project Plans for USAR Review Project & Conversion to Its.Conversion Package Submittal Continues to Be Targeted for Aug of 2000 ML20212G9801999-09-23023 September 1999 Refers to Resolution of Unresolved Items Identified Re Security Alarm Station Operations at Both Monitcello & Prairie Island ML20212F5121999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC , Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML20212D8401999-09-16016 September 1999 Discusses 990902 Telcon Between D Wesphal & R Bailey Re Administeration of Retake Exam at Prairie Island During Wk of 991206.NRC May Make Exam Validation Visit to Facility During Wk of 991116 ML20217H2331999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Security Insp Repts 50-282/99-10 & 50-306/99-10 on 990809-12.Two Findings,Each of Low Risk Significance Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20217H5661999-09-0909 September 1999 Discusses 990907 Pilot Plan Mgt Meeting Re Results to-date of Pilot Implementation of NRC Revised Reactor Oversight Process at Prairie Island & Quad Cities.Agenda & Handouts Provided by Utils Encl ML20212A9241999-09-0909 September 1999 Discusses Plans Made During 990902 Telephone Conversation to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Prairie Island During Weeks of 991101 & 991108.Requests That Written Exams & Operating Tests Be Submitted by 991022 ML20212B0511999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-11 & 50-306/99-11 on 990816-20.One Issue of Low Safety Significance Was Identified & Being Treated as Ncb ML20211Q7641999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That NRC Tentatively Scheduled Initial Licensing Exam for Plant Operator License Applicants During Wk of 000515,in Response to D Westphal ML20211N8631999-09-0707 September 1999 Withdraws 970814 Request for Exemption from 10CFR50,App R, Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities ML20211K5911999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That Util Reviewed Rvid Data Base,As Requested in NRC .Summary of Proposed Changes & Observed Differences Are Included in Encl Tables ML20211L0211999-09-0101 September 1999 Provides Notification That License Amends 141 & 132 & Associated License Conditions 6 & 7 Have Been Fully Implemented ML20211K5931999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards License Amend Request for License SNM-2506, Proposing Change to License Conditions 6,7 & 8 & TSs App a of License by Permitting Inclusion of Bpras & Thimble Plug Devices in Sf Assemblies Stored in TN-40 Casks ML20211Q6041999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to USAR for Pingp,Per 10CFR50.71(e).Rev Brings USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info Is More Recent.Attachment 1 Contains Descriptions & Summaries of SE for Changes,Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59 ML20211K2591999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards NSP Co Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Six Month Period Ending 990630 ML20211D3541999-08-24024 August 1999 Discusses GL 95-07 Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of safety-related Power Operated Gate Valves.Forwards SE Re Response to GL 95-07 ML20211C7601999-08-19019 August 1999 Confirms NRC Intent to Meet with NSP & Ceco on 990807 in Lisle,Il to Discuss with Region III Pilot Plants,Any Observations,Feedback,Lessons Learned & Recommendations Relative to Implementation of Pilot Program ML20211B8311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Request for Relief 8 Re Limited Exams Associated with Unit 1 Third ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program. Licensee Requests Relief Due to Impractibility of Obtaining 100% Exam Coverage for Affected Items ML20211B5711999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Second 90-day Rept for Implementation of Voltage Based Repair Criteria at Prairie Island Unit 1.Rept Fulfills Requirements of Section 6.b of Attachment 1 to GL 95-05 ML20211C2311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept,Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-0526,Cycle 19 971212-990526. Rept Identifies Components Examined,Exam Methods Used,Exam Number & Summarizes Results ML20211B0561999-08-18018 August 1999 Provides Addl Info on Proposed Rev to Main Steam Line Break Methodology ,in Response to NRC Staff Request Made in 990416 Telcon.Nuclear Svcs Corp Rept PIO-01-06, Analysis Rept Structural Analyses of Main Steam Check... Encl ML20211B2621999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-09 & 50-306/99-09 on 990719-22.No Violations Noted.Insp Included Review & Evaluation of Current Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators ML20211C7371999-08-17017 August 1999 Discusses Closure of Staff Review Re Generic Implication of Part Length Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing Leak on 980123.Enclosed NRC 980811 & 1223 Ltrs Responded to WOG Positions Re Corrective Actions ML20210T5661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards RAI Re & Suppl ,which Requested Exemptions from TSs of Section III.G.2 of 10CFR50 App R,To Extent That Specifies Separation of Certain Redundant Safe Shutdown Circuits with fire-related Barriers ML20210R7021999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-06 & 50-306/99-06 on 990601- 0720.One NCV Occurred,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20210P5191999-08-11011 August 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,Rev 1,Supp 1, Rv Integrity, Issued by NRC on 950519 & NSP Responses for PINGP & 951117. Staff Reviewed Info in Rvid & Released Info as Rvid Version 2.Requests Submittal of Comments Re Revised Rvid by 990901 ML20210G5061999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates 05000282/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20210J4991999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Rev 18 to USAR for Pingp,Bringing USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info More Recent.Safety Evaluation Summaries Also Encl ML20209J0941999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards SER Finding Rev 7 to Topical Rept NSPNAD-8102, Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units, Acceptable for Ref in Plant Licensing Actions ML20209H8051999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Summary of non-modification Safety Evaluation Number 515 Re Storage of Fuel Inserts,Per Insp Rept 72-0010/99-201 ML20209D4181999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That Util Has Changed Listed TS Bases Pages Attached for NRC Use.Util Made No New Commitments in Ltr ML20209H8361999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Operator Licensing Exam Repts 50-282/99-301(OL) & 50-306/99-301(OL) for Tests Administered During Week of 990517-21.Two Applicants Passed All Sections of Exam & Issued Reactor Operator Licenses to Operate Pings ML20196J9681999-07-0101 July 1999 Informs That in Sept 1998,Region III Received Rev 20 to Portions of Util Emergency Plan Under 10CFR50.54(q).Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Licensee Emergency Plan,No NRC Approval Required ML20209C3951999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209B7541999-07-0101 July 1999 Final Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1 Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys.Sys Remediated as Required for Plant Operation. Contingency Plans Developed to Mitigate Impact of Y2K-induced Events at Key Rollover Dates ML20196J8941999-06-30030 June 1999 Transmits Util Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1074, Steam Generator Tube Integrity. Licensee Recommends That NRC Focus on Several Important Listed Areas Considered Principal Concerns & Contentions ML20209F0391999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-04 & 50-306/99-04 on 990407-0531.Violation Noted.Notice of Violation or Civil Penalty Will Not Be Issued,Based on NRC Listed Decision to Exercise Discretion ML20209C3011999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Corrections to NSP ECCS Evaluation Models,Iaw 10CFR50.46.Since All Analyses Remain in Compliance,No Reanalysis Is Required or Planned ML20209B5751999-06-24024 June 1999 Submits Revised Relief Request for Limited Examinations Associated with Third 10-yr ISI Examination Plan.Attached Is Unit 1 Relief Request 7,rev 1 Which Addresses Limited Examinations ML20196F3871999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 of Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units, Per Discussions with Nrc.Approved Version of Rept Will Be Issued 05000282/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20196D5501999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Individual Exam Results for Licensee Applicants Who Took May 1999 Initial License Exam.In Accordance with 10CFR2.790,info Considered, Proprietary. Without Encls ML20196A6741999-06-17017 June 1999 Refers to 990517-20 Meeting with Util in Welch,Minnesota Re Licensee Initiatives in Risk Area & to Establish Dialog Between SRAs & Licensee PRA Staff 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217F4331999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to Security Plan.Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20212G7171999-09-24024 September 1999 Submits Semiannual Status Update on Project Plans for USAR Review Project & Conversion to Its.Conversion Package Submittal Continues to Be Targeted for Aug of 2000 ML20212F5121999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC , Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML20211N8631999-09-0707 September 1999 Withdraws 970814 Request for Exemption from 10CFR50,App R, Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities ML20211K5911999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That Util Reviewed Rvid Data Base,As Requested in NRC .Summary of Proposed Changes & Observed Differences Are Included in Encl Tables ML20211L0211999-09-0101 September 1999 Provides Notification That License Amends 141 & 132 & Associated License Conditions 6 & 7 Have Been Fully Implemented ML20211Q6041999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to USAR for Pingp,Per 10CFR50.71(e).Rev Brings USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info Is More Recent.Attachment 1 Contains Descriptions & Summaries of SE for Changes,Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59 ML20211K5931999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards License Amend Request for License SNM-2506, Proposing Change to License Conditions 6,7 & 8 & TSs App a of License by Permitting Inclusion of Bpras & Thimble Plug Devices in Sf Assemblies Stored in TN-40 Casks ML20211K2591999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards NSP Co Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Six Month Period Ending 990630 ML20211C2311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept,Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-0526,Cycle 19 971212-990526. Rept Identifies Components Examined,Exam Methods Used,Exam Number & Summarizes Results ML20211B8311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Request for Relief 8 Re Limited Exams Associated with Unit 1 Third ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program. Licensee Requests Relief Due to Impractibility of Obtaining 100% Exam Coverage for Affected Items ML20211B5711999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Second 90-day Rept for Implementation of Voltage Based Repair Criteria at Prairie Island Unit 1.Rept Fulfills Requirements of Section 6.b of Attachment 1 to GL 95-05 ML20211B0561999-08-18018 August 1999 Provides Addl Info on Proposed Rev to Main Steam Line Break Methodology ,in Response to NRC Staff Request Made in 990416 Telcon.Nuclear Svcs Corp Rept PIO-01-06, Analysis Rept Structural Analyses of Main Steam Check... Encl ML20210G5061999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates 05000282/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20210J4991999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Rev 18 to USAR for Pingp,Bringing USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info More Recent.Safety Evaluation Summaries Also Encl ML20209H8051999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Summary of non-modification Safety Evaluation Number 515 Re Storage of Fuel Inserts,Per Insp Rept 72-0010/99-201 ML20209D4181999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That Util Has Changed Listed TS Bases Pages Attached for NRC Use.Util Made No New Commitments in Ltr ML20209C3951999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209B7541999-07-0101 July 1999 Final Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1 Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys.Sys Remediated as Required for Plant Operation. Contingency Plans Developed to Mitigate Impact of Y2K-induced Events at Key Rollover Dates ML20196J8941999-06-30030 June 1999 Transmits Util Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1074, Steam Generator Tube Integrity. Licensee Recommends That NRC Focus on Several Important Listed Areas Considered Principal Concerns & Contentions ML20209C3011999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Corrections to NSP ECCS Evaluation Models,Iaw 10CFR50.46.Since All Analyses Remain in Compliance,No Reanalysis Is Required or Planned ML20209B5751999-06-24024 June 1999 Submits Revised Relief Request for Limited Examinations Associated with Third 10-yr ISI Examination Plan.Attached Is Unit 1 Relief Request 7,rev 1 Which Addresses Limited Examinations ML20196F3871999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 of Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units, Per Discussions with Nrc.Approved Version of Rept Will Be Issued 05000282/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20195G4281999-06-0909 June 1999 Notifies That Amsac/Dss Mods Completed & TS 138/129 Has Been Fully Implemented 05000282/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00 Re Containment Inservice Purge Sys Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Event Has Indicated That Level of Performance Expected by Mgt Has Not Yet Been Achieved1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00 Re Containment Inservice Purge Sys Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Event Has Indicated That Level of Performance Expected by Mgt Has Not Yet Been Achieved ML20207F4301999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards 1999 Unit 1 SG Insp Results,Per TS 4.12.E.1. Following Insp 84 Tubes Were Plugged for First Time ML20196L2461999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for Pingp,Unit 1 Cycle 20, IAW TS Section 6.7.A.6 ML20195C6861999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to USAR for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.Attachment 1 Contains Descriptions & Summaries of SEs for Changes,Tests & Experiments Made Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59 During Period Since Last Update ML20206U6781999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Revised Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 15 to F3-3,rev 15 to F3-16,rev 14 to F3-22 & Table of Contents ML20206U7131999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Revised EOF Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Including Table of Contents & Rev 2 to F8-10, Record Keeping in Eof. with Updating Instructions ML20206T2461999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Off-Site Radiation Dose Assessment for Jan-Dec 1998, Rev 0 to Annual Radiactive Effluent Rept for 980105- 990103 & Effluent & Waste Disposal Annual Rept Solid Waste & Irradiated Fuel Shipments,Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206R0401999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Removing Plant Organization Requirement,Imposed in Amend 141/132 That Plant Manager,Who Has Responsibility for Overall Safe Operation of Plant,Report to Corporate Officer ML20206Q0871999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Result of Evaluation Re Ultrasonic Exams of SG Number 22 Performed in Accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section Xi.Procedure Used for Evaluation Contained in WCAP-14166,submitted for Review ML20206F9381999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990304 RAI Re GL 96-05 Program at Pingp.Licensee Commitments Are Identified in Encl as Statements in Italics ML20206J3851999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Rept 05000282/LER-1999-004, Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Inadequate Sp That Demonstrates Operability of SFP Special Ventilation Sys.Two New NRC Commitments Are Contained in Corrective Action Section of Rept in Bold Italics1999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Inadequate Sp That Demonstrates Operability of SFP Special Ventilation Sys.Two New NRC Commitments Are Contained in Corrective Action Section of Rept in Bold Italics ML20206E1761999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages for Amends 144 & 135 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively,to Update Controlled Manual or File ML20205S3221999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Changing Implementation Date for Relocation from TS to UFSAR of Requirements in TS 3.1.E & Flooding Shutdown Requirements of TS 5.1 ML20205P9891999-04-12012 April 1999 Requests Approval for Proposed Alternatives to Liquid Penetrant Requirements of N-518.4 of 1968 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code.Results of Analysis & Summary of Tests Performed & Tests Results Are Encl ML20205Q0191999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-42 & DPR-60, Relocating Shutdown Margin Requirements from TS to COLR 05000282/LER-1998-010, Forwards LER 98-010-01 Re Discovery That 32 App R Related MOVs Are Susceptible to Physical Damage by Fire Induced Hot Shorts.Rept Provides Addl Details on Current Plans for Completing C/As Committed to in Original LER1999-04-0808 April 1999 Forwards LER 98-010-01 Re Discovery That 32 App R Related MOVs Are Susceptible to Physical Damage by Fire Induced Hot Shorts.Rept Provides Addl Details on Current Plans for Completing C/As Committed to in Original LER ML20205P9221999-04-0101 April 1999 Submits Relief Request 8,rev 0 Which Addresses Limited Exams Associated with Unit 2 Third ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program.Util Requests Relief Per 10CFR50.55a(q)(5)(iii) Due to Impracticality of Obtaining 100% Exam Coverage ML20205E8371999-03-31031 March 1999 Submits Four Copies of Rev 38 to Prairie Island Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196K7831999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Decommissioning Funding Status Rept for Monticello & Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plants,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20205Q5051999-03-30030 March 1999 Forwards Inservice Insp Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 1 & 2 Refueling Outage Dates 981109-1229 Cycle 19,970327- 981229. Rept Identifies Components Examined,Exam Methods Used,Exam Number & Summarized Results ML20205H5731999-03-29029 March 1999 Submits Required 1998 Actual & 1999 Projected Cash Flow Statements for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant & PINGP, Units 1 & 2.Encl Contains Proprietary Info.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(1) ML20205C6561999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Semiannual Update on Project Plans for USAR Review Project & Conversion to ITS ML20204H3371999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Removing Dates of Two NRC SERs & Correcting Date of One SER Listed in Section 2.C.4, Fire Protection 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20065D5821990-09-19019 September 1990 Forwards Rev 25 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20059L3431990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Revising Tech Spec Section 6.7.A.6.b ML20064A6411990-09-0606 September 1990 Amends 900724 Certification for Financial Assurance for Decommissioning Plant,Per Reg Guide 1.159.Util Intends to Seek Rate Relief by Pursuing Rehearing & Appeal of Rate Order by Initiating New Rate Proceeding ML20059E8671990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20028G8401990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for Jan- June 1990 & Revised Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for Second Half of 1989,which Includes Previously Omitted Fourth Quarter Analyses Results of Sr-89 & Sr-90 ML20058Q4021990-08-0202 August 1990 Informs NRC of Potentially Generic Problem Experienced W/Westinghouse DB-50 Reactor Trip Breaker.Info Being Provided Due to Potential Generic Implications of Deficiencies in Westinghouse Torquing Procedues ML20056A3371990-07-31031 July 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to, ASME Code Section XI Inservice Insp & Testing Program,Second 10-Yr Insp Interval of Operation ML20055J4441990-07-26026 July 1990 Submits Supplemental Info to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-26 & 50-306/89-26.Training of Supervisory Personnel Not Completed Until 900719 Due to Time Constraints Encountered During Feb 1990 Unit 1 Refueling Outage ML20055G3981990-06-28028 June 1990 Forwards Annual Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for 1989 & Rev 8 to Updated SAR for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20043F7341990-06-11011 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900420 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/90-04 & 50-306/90-04.Corrective Actions:Operations Procedure D61 Will Be Revised to More Clearly Identify Requirements for Logging Openings ML20043D5681990-06-0505 June 1990 Rev 23 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043C7731990-05-25025 May 1990 Informs That on 900425,yard Fire Hydrant Hose House 7 Declared out-of-svc Due to Const in Area,Per Tech Spec 3.14.F.2.Const in Area Will Prevent Return to Svc of Hydrant Hose House 7 Until Approx 900630 ML20043A4451990-05-0909 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-29 & 50-306/89-29.Corrective Actions:Changes Will Be Made to Review & Approval Process for Work Packages ML20043A4531990-05-0202 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-29 & 50-306/89-29.Corrective Actions:Incoming Workers Will Be Specifically Trained in Fire Prevention Practices & Permanent Workers Will Be Reminded at Meetings ML20042F8681990-04-30030 April 1990 Submits Supplemental Info on Response Time Testing of Instrumentation,In Response to Concerns Raised in Insp Repts 50-282/88-12 & 50-306/88-12.No Addl Changes to Current Response Time Testing Program Necessary ML20042E8081990-04-27027 April 1990 Forwards Radiation Environ Monitoring Program Rept 1989. ML20012E4261990-03-28028 March 1990 Forwards Inservice Insp-Exam Summary 900103-0219 Refueling Outage 13,Insp Period 2,Second Interval. Exam Plan Focused on Pressure Retaining Components & Supports of RCS & Associated Sys,Fsar Augmented Exams & Eddy Current Exam ML20012D9131990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept Unit 1 - Cycle 14 & Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept Unit 2 - Cycle 13. ML20012E0091990-03-21021 March 1990 Forwards Completed Questionnaire in Response to Generic Ltr 90-01, Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey. ML20006G1931990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards Rev 22 to Security Plan & Advises That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plant Security Plan & May Be Implemented W/O Prior NRC Review & Approval.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20012A3131990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to Effluent Semiannual Rept,Jul-Dec 1989, Supplemental Info, Amend to Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for First Half of 1989 & Rev 11 to Odcm. Analyses for Sr-89 & Sr-90 Will Be Included in Next Rept ML20006F8631990-02-22022 February 1990 Provides Steam Generator Tube Plugging & Sleeving Info,Per Tech Spec 4.12.E.1.Following Recent Inservice insp,15 Tubes Plugged for First Time & 37 Tubes W/New Indications Sleeved ML20042E1871990-02-19019 February 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900118 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-30 & 50-306/89-30.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73) ML20006E8031990-02-16016 February 1990 Forwards Request for Relief from Schedule Requirements of NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor/Darling Valves. ML20011E4991990-02-0606 February 1990 Discusses Liability & Funding Requirements Re NRC Decommissioning Funding Rules & Verifies Understanding of Rules.Ltr from NRC Explaining Liability & Requirements of Rule Requested ML20006B9291990-01-29029 January 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Procedure Will Be Developed to Periodically Inspect Emergency Intake Crib Located in River ML20006B9041990-01-29029 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Refueling Boron Concentration Will Be Calculated W/Provisions for One Shuffle Alteration ML20006B9951990-01-0303 January 1990 Suppls Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-14 & 50-306/89-15 Re Containment Airlock Local Leak Rate Testing.Corrective Actions:Changes to Local Leak Rate Testing Procedures Approved on 891229 ML20005E4881989-12-28028 December 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-10 Re motor-operated Valve Testing & Surveillance.Listed Actions Will Be Performed in Order to Meet Recommendations of Generic Ltr ML20011D6941989-12-15015 December 1989 Forwards Addendum 1 to Sacm Diesel Generator Qualification Rept & Diesel Generator Set Qualification Rept. ML19351A5281989-12-13013 December 1989 Forwards Supplemental Response to NRC Bulletin 88-009, Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors. Thimble Tube Insp Program Will Be Formalized by 901231 ML20005G4861989-12-11011 December 1989 Updates Response to Insp Repts 50-282/86-07 & 50-306/86-07 Provided by 860819 Ltr.Listed Actions Taken as Result of Task Force Evaluation,Inlcluding Implementation of Work Control Process for Substation Maint ML19332F3621989-12-0101 December 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-21 Re Implementation Status of USI Requirements at Facilities.Pra to Address USI A-17, Sys Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants Will Be Completed in Feb 1993 ML19332E9371989-12-0101 December 1989 Forwards Executed Amend 9 to Indemnity Agreement B-60, Reflecting Changes to 10CFR140 ML20006E3301989-11-20020 November 1989 Forwards Fee in Amount of $25,000,in Response to 891019 Notice of Violation & Civil Penalty Re Commercial Grade Procurement,Per Insp Repts 50-282/88-201 & 50-306/88-201. Responses to Violations Also Encl ML19332D1761989-11-17017 November 1989 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Deleting cycle-specific Core Operating Limits from Tech Specs & Creating New Core Operating Limits Rept,Per Generic Ltr 88-16 ML19332C8341989-11-13013 November 1989 Responds to NRC 891012 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-23 & 50-306/89-23.Corrective Actions:Procedure Changes Implemented to Require Placement of Yellow Tags on Fire Detection Panel Bypass Switches in Bypass Position ML19324C4031989-11-0606 November 1989 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-010,Suppl 1, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers. Supply Breaker to Unit 2 Feedwater Isolation Valve Replaced W/Qualified & Traceable Replacement Circuit Breaker ML19332B6131989-11-0606 November 1989 Forwards Rev 4 to Safeguards Contingency Plan & Implementing Procedures,Per Generic Ltr 89-07.Rev Withheld ML19324B3321989-10-13013 October 1989 Submits Supplemental Info in Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/88-16 & 50-306/88-16.Corrective Actions: Air Test Connections Will Be Added to Allow Pressurization of Containment Spray Piping Between Stated Motor Valves ML20246L5061989-08-31031 August 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-12, Operator Licensing Exams ML20246K2361989-08-28028 August 1989 Forwards, Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for Jan-June 1989, Revised Repts for 1988,1987 & 1985 & Revised Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ML20246L3771989-08-23023 August 1989 Forwards Supplemental Response to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/88-16 & 50-306/88-16. in Future,Outboard Check Valves Will Be Tested W/Upstream Vent & Motor Valves MV-32103 & 32105 Repositioned ML20245L1911989-08-14014 August 1989 Submits Supplemental Info Re NRC Audit of Westinghouse Median Signal Select Signal Validation.Operability of Median Signal Select Function Will Be Demonstrated by Verifying That Failed Channel Not Selected for Use in Level Control ML19332C8431989-08-11011 August 1989 Responds to NRC 890713 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-18 & 50-306/89-18.Corrective Actions:All Personnel Involved in Event Counseled on Importance of Following Procedures & Work Requests as Written ML20246F4341989-08-11011 August 1989 Forwards Comments on SALP 8 Repts 50-282/89-01 & 50-306/89-01 Per 890629 Request.Addl Room Adjacent to Emergency Offsite Facility Ctr Classroom to Be Designated ML20247Q8181989-07-31031 July 1989 Provides Supplemental Info in Response to 890612 Request Re NRC Bulletin 79-14, Consideration of Torsional Moments (Tms) Piping Mods. Future Mods Will Reflect Tms Where Calculations of Stresses Due to Occasional Loads Performed ML20247H9111989-07-24024 July 1989 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion- Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Administrative Procedure, Defining Erosion/Corrosion Monitoring Activities,Issued on 890220 & NUMARC Recommendations Adopted ML19332F3501989-07-20020 July 1989 Responds to NRC 890620 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-17 & 50-306/89-17.Corrective Actions:New Monthly Sampling Procedures Prepared Which Will Require Monthly Independent Samples Be Taken from Fuel Oil Storage Tank ML20247D1851989-07-12012 July 1989 Provides Addl Info Re Molded Case Circuit Breaker Replacement,Per Insp Repts 50-282/88-201 & 50-306/88-201. Util Has Concluded That Replacement Breakers from Bud Ferguson Co Suitable for safety-related Purposes 1990-09-06
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Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapohs. Minnesota 55401 Telephone (612) 330 5500 February 21, 1986 Mr J G Keppler Regional Administrator-Region III US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 PRAlRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NOS. 50-282 LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 Information Related to IE Information Notice 86-03, Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring The purpose of this letter is to supplement our letter of February 11, 1986 and provide assurance to your office that we have placed a high priority on resolution of this issue and that plant operation may safely continue until all environmental qualification concerns with Limitorque valves are resolved.
On February 6 s.nd 7, 1986 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region III inspectors performed an on-site audit and inspection af the qualifica-tion status of internal wiring installed in Limitorque motor operated valve actuators at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP).
The audit resulted from recent industry knowledge concerning potential uncertainties on the part of the equipment vendor, Limitorque, as to the specific wiring installed during the equipment manufacturing process.
In addition, some nuclear utilities were uncertain about the type of field wiring used during installation and subsequent maintenance activities.
We have actively and aggressively pursued the environnental qualification of Limitorque motor operated valve actuators, including internal wiring, since the issuance of NRC IE Bulletin 79-01B. Considerable effort has been expended over the years in correspondence with Limitorque concerning all aspects of their environmental qualification program and in evaluation of Limitorque qualification test reports. We have responded to each industry issue raised concerning Limitorque environmental qualifica-tion status promptly and in good faith.
8607290276 860221 PDR ADOCK 05000282 G PDR , j;
- I FEB 2 41986 /'
c Page 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This document supplements our February 11,.1986 letter to the NRC and f- summarizes the status of Limitorque internal' wiring qualification at the PlNGP, discusses the operability requirements of safety-related motor operated valve actuators on the PINGP 10CFR50.49 environmental qualifica-tion masterlist, and provides a plan for all corrective actions that have been defined. The discussion provided in this document combined with the support documentation available at the PINGP provides adequate assurance
, that the safety of the general public will not be compromised until all corrective actions have been completed.
The PINGP Operations Committee has formally reviewed this document'and concurs with the conclusions contained herein.
, 2.0 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION BASIS FOR LIMITORQUE INTERNAL WIRING 2.1 Overview
. -Prior to November 30, 1985,- all available documentation provided by Limitorque showed that the internal wiring was one of the following:
- 1. Rockbestos Firewall III
- 2. Raychem Flamtrol
! 3. Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) 1 Correspondance with Limitorque provided assurance that these wires were qualified as part of the environmental qualification test programs described in Limitorque-test reports 600376A,'600456, B0009 B0003, and 600198.'Thus, environmental qualification evalua-tions for the PINGP r? cognized the existence of Limitorque supplied internal w1 ring and judged qualification to be demonstrated based on Limitorque testing..
4 In addition to Limitorque provided internal wiring, there is frequently a need to perform wiring additions or modifications during the
, installation process. These modifications were often performed on an as-needed basis using standard electrical construction practices.
At the PINGP, the standard practice'for field wiring of Limitorque i
motor operated valve actuators was to use either Rockbestos SIS
? (Firewall III) wiring or conductors stripped from multi-conductor control wiring. Qualification of this field wiring was evaluated 4 and documented with the set of electrical cables used throughout the plant.
1 i
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Page 3 In early October 1985, Commonwealth Edison issued a 10CFR21 report relating to internal wiring of Limitorque motor operated valve actuators for the Zion Generating Plant. Word of this issue spread through the environmental qualification industry and the PINGP took actions to review the existing qualification basis for the internal wiring.
This included review of walkdown sheets obtained during normal valve maintenance over the past year. NRC IE Information Notice NO. 86-03 '
was issued on January 14, 1986 and formally notified the PINGP of the status of potential Limitorque internal wiring qualification deficiencies.
IE Information Notice No. 86-03 was coupled with information obtained from other nuclear utilities and industry environmental qualification groups to form a data base from which the PINGP could reevaluate the qualification basis for Limitorque internal wiring. This is discussed in detail below.
2.2 Wiring Installed in Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuators at the PINGP The following wires are installed as internal wiring in Limitorque motor operated valvo actuators at the PINGP:
2.2.1 Rockbestos Type SIS 600V UL 2.2.2 Rockbestos Type SIS Nuclear 2.2.3 Raychem Flamtrol 2.2.4 GE Vulkene SIS UL INS 2.2.5 GE XHHW SI 58053 2.2.6 Kynar Insulated Wire 2.2.7 600V TFF 2.2.8 600V TW o Items 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are both of the chemically crosslinked Firewall III formelation. Qualification of this cable has been a generic open item throughout the utility indastry. Rockbestos has recently completed qualification testing and results are under review by the NRC and NRC contractors.
Testing has been performed by other utilities and utility groups that is available to document environmental qualification. This testing documented the successful completion of post-LOCA performance tests after being subjected to thermal aging to simulate 40 years life, radiation exposure to 2.86 E08 rads gamma, and LOCA condition of 360*F and 50 psig. This testing envelopes the postulated accident conditions at the PINGP. No anomalies affecting qualification to the PINGP environments was reported.
._ _2._n.-, - _ _ _ , _ - , - _ . _ - - . _ - _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _
Page 4 The qualification documentation of Rockbestos cables was stated in the audit exit meeting to be an unresolved item pending resolution
/ of NRC IE Information Notice 84-44. The PINGP believes that adequate evidence exists in the testing noted above to support continued operation of the plant without compromising the safety of the general public until this issue is resolved.
1 o Item 2.2.3 has been tested and documentation was reviewed on-site that supports the environmental qualification. There were no unresolved or open items during the audit relating to the qualifica-tion of this cable.
o Items 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 are both manufactured with General Electric (GE) Vulkene insulation. Vulkene is a GE name for chemically cross-linked polyethylene. This wire was originally believed to only be associated with the motor (used as a motor lead) and environmen-tally qualified with the motor. As a pr'ecaution, a separate qualification documentation package was prepared that demonstrated full qualification for the Prairie Island environments. There were ne unresolved or open items during the audit relating to the quali-fication of this cable.
o item 2.2.6 is a Kynar insulated wire. Kynar is produced by the Penwalt Corporation and is the commercial name for polyvinylidene fluoride. Kynar insulated cable has been tested as reported in Conax Corporation's Test Report No. IPS-585, " Coaxial Feedthrough Subassemblies". This cable was subjected to thermal aging at 305* F for 102 hours0.00118 days <br />0.0283 hours <br />1.686508e-4 weeks <br />3.8811e-5 months <br /> with no visible degradation. The cable was then exposed to a total lutegrated dose of 1.1 E08 rads gamma. Again there was no visible degradation of the insulation. The cable was then placed inside a steam chamber to simulate the effects of a design basis accident. Peak temperatures exceeding 400* F. pressure in excess of 70 psig, and 100% relative humidity were achieved simultaneously. The duration of the test was 312 hours0.00361 days <br />0.0867 hours <br />5.15873e-4 weeks <br />1.18716e-4 months <br /> at temperatures above 300* F. The cable functioned throughout the test and was found to be in acceptable condition as determined by dielectric and insulation tests in post DBA functional testing. It should be pointed out that this DBA simulation envelopes the PINGP containment LOCA accident thermalhydraulic conditions. In addition, the duration of the postulated accident is also enveloped by the test. The maximum postulated radiation dose for inside contain-ment is 4.81 E07 rads gamma (one year TID). This requirement is enveloped by this test which irradiated the wire 1.1 E08 rads gamma as described above. The qualified life of Kynar has been determined to be in excess of 40 years using the Arrhenius equation. Therefore, since all the postulated accident conditions for inside containment .
are enveloped by this test, the Kynar insulated wire is qualified for use in Limitorque motor operated valve actuators.
Page 5 o Items 2.2.7 and 2.2.8 are both Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) wires.
These wires had qualification documentation prepared utilizing type testing and materials testing information that was available in i
~
various industry publications. There was an unresolved. item in the audit concerning applicability.of. qualification documentation. The
, PINGP has committed to inspecting and replacing ell PVC insulated ,
I- wires in Limitorque motor operated valve. actuators (see NSP letter
_ dated February 11, 1986). In Unit 1, this inspection and replacement will take place during the 1986 refueling outage now' scheduled to begin on March 5, 1986. In Unit 2, the inspection and replacement will be completed during the next scheduled cold shutdown lasting 10 days or more. The latest.this work will be completed will be during the 1986 refueling outage now scheduled to begin on October 22, 1986.
The primary concern raised in the audit was the similarity of the installed PVC wiring to the tested wiring. Specifically,,the concern was that the formulations of the PVC in the tested and installed specimens were not identical and, therefore, the qualification documentation may be inadequate. We believe that this level of-detailed examination is beyond the requirements of the. DOR Guidelines and is not consistent with direction given by the NRC in previous years for DOR Guideline qualifications, nor with general industry
- practice.
The objective of the D0R Guideline was to give licensees guidance and direction in evaluating the environmental qualification of equipment to provide reasonable assurance of qualification. Appendix
. C of the DOR Guidelines provides a partial list of materials commonly used in nuclear power plant applications. A review of this listing shows materials specified in terms of their base compound, e.g., nylon, Buna-N, Silicone Rubber, etc. It is our opinion that this provides a reflection as to the level of detail of materials identification and evaluation required to satisfy the requirements of-the D0R Guidelines. There has never been a requirement stated to perform qualification to the D0R Guidelines to the level of detail l where specific compound formulatic.ns of cable insulation, gaskets, 0-rings, etc. are evaluated for similarity to the tested compounds.
The focus of qualification questions on the PVC centered around the
! radiation qualification of the wire and potential for degradation.
- The basis for concern is that potential degradation of the PVC wiring could occur when wires were exposed to the one-year Total Integrated Dose (TlD) of 4.81 E07 Rads gamma at the containment 1
t
Page 6 centerline. Table 1 has been developed since the audit and provides further clarification of the expected TID based on equipment operating time and location. This review has categorized the valves into the following groups:
- 1. Radiation exposure is not a requirement for valves not required to be repositioned. This includes ten (10) valves per unit.
- 2. Radiation exposure is less than IE04 Rads for valves required to realign for recirculation mode and valves that operate on a safety injection signal and are located in the Auxiliary Building. This includes twenty-one (21) valves per unit.
- 3. Radiation exposure of 3 x 10 Rads for valves located in the Reactor Building and required to operate on a safety injection signal. This includes five (5) valves per unit.
5
- 4. Radiation exposure of 8 x 10 Rads for valves opened to provide additional safety injection flow to the reactor vessel. This includes two (2) valves per unit.
- 5. Radiation exposures greater than 8 x 10 Rads for valves required for longer term operation. All valve operators in this category were recently re-placed (1984 and 1985) and do not contain PVC wiring.
This includes seven (7) valves per unit.
The PINGP qualification review to the D0R Guidelines has documented qualification levels to TID's as high as 5E07 Rads gamma. However, there are several generally accepted industry references available to show qualification well above the 8E05 Rad level. Some are itemized below:
EPRI NP-2129 " Radiation Effects In Organic Materials in Nuclear Power Plants," Nov. 1981 o 80% retention of elongation @ IE07 Rads o 80% retention of elongation @ 7E07 Rads EPRI NP-1558 "A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Technology," Sept. 1980 o Incipient to Mild damage @ IE07 Rads o Mild to Moderate damage @ 8E07 Rads s e, ,_ . - . _ ~ , _ , . _ . _ _ ., -
Page 7 CERN 79-04 (European Organization for Nuclear Research)
" Compilation of Radiation Damage and Test Data, Part 1: Cable Insulating Materials,"
June 1979 o Not recommended for use as cable insula-tion at greater than IE08 Rads CERN 70-5 (European Organization for Nuclear Research)
" Effects of Radiation on Materials and Components" Feb. 1970 o Incipient to Mild damage @ IE07 Rads o Mild to Moderate damage @ 8E07 Rads REIC Report (Radiation Effects Information Center)
No. 46 "The Effects of Radiation on Electrical Insulating Materials" June 1969 o Incipient to Mild damage @ 1E07 Rads o Mild to Moderate damage 8E07 Rads It is also important to understand the failure mode of cable insula-tion in a high radiation environment. Most test data available suggests that embrittlement (reduction of elasticity) is the principal effect of high radiation exposure. Once embrittled, the insulation may crack under stress that could expose the metal conductor leading to a short if touched to other wire or metal, or if exposed to a high degree of moisture. Some mechanical stress must be present to induce insulation cracking once it has become embrittled. The installation of wiring internal to Limitorque motor operated valve actuators is installed in a relatively stress free condition. There is no mechanical operation or function of the internal wiring during valve actuation. Once installed, the internal wiring is not moved.
Experience of other nuclear plants shows that embrittled cables still perform their required function if installed in a mechanical stress free environment. It's not until the cable is pulled during the replacement process that the insulation actually cracks or falls off the cable. The logical conclusion of this discussion is that even if the internal wiring does become embrittled, it will likely perform its function because there is no induction of mechanical stress to actually cause insulation cracking.
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Page 8 3.0 LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS Table 1 provides a summary of the Limitorque motor operated valve actuators on the PINGP environmental qualification masterlist. The summary provides the following information:
o Valve ID
-o Function o Installed Location o Operating Requirements including required radiation dose at valve operating time The purpose of developing this summary is to review the potential for failure of an operator due to PVC wiring failure and, assumirg failure occurs, the impact of that failure on plant safety.
From a review of Table 1, it can be seen that with the exception of two (2) valves per unit, all motor operated valve actuators fall into one or more of the following categories:
i o Valves are already in their safeguards position and do not require operation, o Valve location and operating requirements are such that the TID is less than 3E04 Rads, o Valve operators-were recently-replaced with new operators that do not contain PVC wiring, o Valves have redundant valves in non-harsh environments.
s Therefore, the only concern from an operability standpoint assuming internal wiring failure is the Safety Injection to the Reactor Vessel valves (32067, 32069, 32170, 32172). The TID at the valve operating time
! is 8E05 Rads. Assuming wiring failure leading to valve operator failure, the valves can be operated from the motor control center which is located in a non-harsh environment. The Operational Support Center (OSC) is manned by personnel familiar with this method of valve operation and the personnel are available for this activity.
This valve operability summary provides the conclusion that the ability to shut down the plant and the safety of the general public will not be compromised in the unlikely event of valve failure due to PVC wiring failure.
4.0 CONCLUSION
This discussion has provided an overview of the present status of wiring installed in Limitorque motor operated valve actuators at the PINGP.
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Page 9 +
The use of PVC wiring has been the focus of the NRC audit and has, therefore, been highlighted in the discussion provided herein. The.
- PINCP corrective action plan-has committed to replacing all PVC wiring g installed in Limitorque valve actuators during the next extended outage (March 1986 for Unit 1 and noc later than October 1986 for Unit 2). We ,
-believe the operation of the plant until the next outage to replace this.
wiring poses no threat to the ability of the plant to safely shutdown following a postulated accident, and to the safety of the general'public
- for the following reasons
a
- 1. Adequate documentation exists to provide reasonable assuranceLof environmental qualification of the PVC i . wiring when evaluated against the requirements of the DOR Guidelines.
- 2. There is a very small probability that failure of the
- PVC wiring will lead to failure of.the valve actuator
- .at the conditions expected during a postulated accident, should they occur.
- 3. In the unlikely event of wiring failure. leading to failure of the valve actuator, there is sufficient
! redundancy in system design, or available and existing methods to operate the non-redundanc valves from Motor Control Centers-located in non-harsh environ-
{ ments.
Please contact us if you have any questions related to the supplemental informa-tion we have provided.
l O d M* n= ~-
) C E Larson Vice President NLulear Generation c: Director of NRC (Attn: G E Lear)
- .NPR Project Manager, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC G Charnoff 1
i a
4 iI t 2
, . . - . . _.- - - .. - . -. - . . .-- - . . ~. . . . - r .
t .
e TABLE 1 OPERATING REQUIREMENT FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION UNIT 1 2 ID ID FUNCTION LOCATION OPERATING REQUIREMENT 32016 32019 Main Steam to Stm Driven Aux These are new operators purchased in 1984 32017 32020 AFW Pump Aux and qualified to Limitorque Report No.
600376A. Internal wire is not PVC.
32023 32028 FW to Stm Gen Isolation Aux Valves closa automatically on SI actuation 32024 32029 Aux and will complete their safety functions prior to significant exposure to harsh environment. The valves are not required to operate thereafter and subsequent failure will not mislead plant operators or adversely affect safety related equipment.
Radiation exgosure including background is less than 10 Rads. Redundant function is provided by FW Reg valve closure, FW pmp trip and FW pap discharge valve closure.
32040 32046 .Stm Gen Blowdown Rx Valves close automatically on SI actuation 32043 32049 Isolation Rx and will complete their safety functions 32044 32051 Aux ' prior to significant exposure to harsh 32058 32059 Aux environment. The valves are not required to operate thereafter and subsequent 32166 32194 Cntant Isolation Excess Aux failure will not mislead plant operators or 32199 32210 Letdown Line Rx adversely. affect safety related equipment.
Redundant train valves are not exposed to harsh environment. Radiation exposuge including background is less than 10 Rads for motor operators located in the Aux 4
Building and 3 x 10 Rads for operators located in the Rx Building.
L .
s
- UNIT 1 1 2 l ID ID FUNCTION LOCATION OPERATING REQUIREMENT 1
1 32064 32167 RHR to Rx Val Rx Valves open automatically on SI actuation 32065 32168 Rx and will complete their safety functions j prior to significant exposure to harsh j environment. The valves are not required j to operate thereafter and. subsequent failure 4
will not mislead plant operators or adversely affect safety related equipment. Radiagion i exposure including background is 3 x 10 Rads.
i
- 32067 32170 SI to the RX Vs1 Rx These valves are opened following a LOCA to
} 32069 32172 Rx provide additional SI flow to the vessel to j prevent boron precipitation. Radiatignex-posure including background is 8 x 10 Rads.
In the event the valves cannot be operated due to wire failure, sufficient time is available to operate them from the motor
! control center by Onsite Emergency
, Operational Support Personnel.
i
- 32071 32174 Accumulator to Cold Rx These valves are normally open. In the 32072 32175 Leg Isol Rx event of a small break LOCA in which
! primary system pressure remains in the i neighborhood of 1000 psia it is desir-
. -able to close these valves and isolate l the accumulator to achieve cold shutdown.
Radiation exgosure including background is
. less than 10 Rads. . Subsequent failure
- will not mislead plant operators or affect
{ safety related equipment.
i 1
i I
UNIT 1 2 ID ID FUNCTION LOCATION OPERATING REQUIREMENT 32073 32176 SI to Cold Leg Ann Valves are in safeguards position and not required to change position during an accident. Failure will not mislead plant operators or affect safety related equipment.
32074 32177 SI to Ex Vsl Ann Valves are in safeguards position and not required to change position during an Req accident. Failure will not mislead plant operators or affect safety related equipment.
32132 32147 Fan Coil Unit Cooling Rx Valves are in safeguards position and not 32135 32150 Water Return Rx required to change position during an 32138 32153 accident. Failure will not mislead plant 32141 32156 operators or affect safety related equipment.
32195 32197 Przr Pwr Op Isolation Rx These are new operators purchased in 32196 32198 Vlv Rx 1984 and qualified to Limitorque Report No. 600456. Internal wire is not PVC.
32271 32290 Post-LOCA Hydrogen Rx These valves are in their required position 32273 32292 Control Vent Isol Rx and are not required to operate thereafter.
32274 32293 Ann The primary method of hydrogen removal is 32276 32295 Ann internal electric recombiners (two trains).
These valves could also be used for supple-mental sampling during post LOCA operation.
In that event radiation levels to the con 5 tainment operators will not exceed 8 x 10 Rads, and they may be operated from the motor control center in the event of wire failure.
Failure will not mislead plant operators or adversely affect safety related equipment.
i e' ,
i UNIT
) 1 2 ID ID FUNCTION LOCATION OPERATING REQUIREMENT 32075 32178 Reactor Sump B to RHR Rx The only harsh environment at these motor 32076 32179 Pmp Suction Rx operators is radiation which does not exist 32077 32180 Aux until the operators have been positioned for 32078 32181 Aux ECCS recirculation. Total radiation exposure, i including background and shine from contain-4 32084 32187 RWST to RHR Pmp Aux ment is less than 10 Rads. Following 32085 32188 Aux alignment for ECCS recirculation mode these valves are not required to operate. Subse-
- 32096 32108 Cntant Spray Pmp Suct Aux quent failure will not mislead plant operators 32097 32109 From RHR Hx Aux or adversely affect safety related equipment.
32103 32114 Cntmt Spray Pmp Disch Aux 32105 32116 Isol Aux 32162 32190 SI Pmp Suct Isol Aux 32163 32191 Aux 32206 32208 RHR to SI Pmp Aux 32207 32209 Aux i 32400 32406 Pressurizer Liquid, Rx These are new operators purchased in 32402 32408 Steam Space and RC Hot Rx 1985 and qualified to Limitorque
! 32404 32410 Leg Sample Rx Report No. 600456. Internal wire is i not PVC.
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