ML20198J429
| ML20198J429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1986 |
| From: | Chaudhary S, Harris R, Jerrica Johnson, Murphy K, Paolino R, Winters R, Woodard C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198J413 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-86-14, NUDOCS 8606030111 | |
| Download: ML20198J429 (62) | |
See also: IR 05000443/1986014
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
s REGION I
Report No. 50-443/86-14
Docket No. 50-443
License No. CPPR-135
Licensee: Public Service Company of New Hampshire
P.O. Box 330
Manchester, N. H. 03105
Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1
Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspection Conducted: March 10-21, 1986
Inspectors: Ed // 9
K. Mu p , Iechnt / Assistant 7 dage
'
Harris, NUE
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hnician
.w/rd
d' ate
Nd h W ik
S. CFiaudhary, Lead Reactor' Engineer
Ell 1 Y l VI.
date
M e. Ne 6
C. WWidard, ReMtor Engine er &
vinia
date
r\m 8 - ,\ Jb W , h 4l7'fl$C
R. WTnters, Rea6 tor Engineer ~ date
k et mr*
R. R4o11no, Lead' Reactor Engineer
'/ D V- 3 d.
date
Approved by: ( *
( -
Y l"I N-
J. Johnson, Chie'f, Operational Programs date
Section
Ins Special Announced As-Built Team Inspection on March 10-
fl.pection Summary:19867eport No. BO-4TJ7BFlI)
Areas Inspected: As-built inspection in the areas of Piping and Pipe Supports,
Instrumentation and Controls, Components (valves, pumps, motors, heat
exchangers), and Electrical Power Supplies and Distribution systems.
Results: The 'B' train of service water, component cooling water, and associated
el ectrical power supplies and distribution systems were found to be constructed
in substantial conformance to the FSAR. Two apparent violations were identi-
fied (traceability was not maintained for service water valve identification,
paragraph 2.3, and diesel generator ventilation fan motors, paragraph 4.3.2;
B606030111 060000
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and two instances were noted where procedures were not completely followed:
work was expanded beyond the authorized scope of a work request, paragraph 3.3,
and, a fire penetration in the diesel generator room was not sealed properly,
paragraph 4.2.6.5).
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Table of Contents
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1.0 InspectionPurpose,Scopo(UseofPRA),and
Summary of Findings ................ ...................... 4
2.0 Sta ti on Se rvi ce Water Sy stem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.0 Primary Component Cool ing Water Systen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.0 Electrical Power Supplies and Di stribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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5.0 Management Controls ........................................ 32
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6.0 Independent Verification .......... ...................... . 37
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7.0 'J n re s o l v ed I t e m s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
8.0 Ma n a g eiie n t Me e t i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Attachments
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A. . Persons Contacted
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B. Documents F:eviewed
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C. Instrumentation Reviewed
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D. Items Selected for 'I.1 dependent Measurements
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1.0 Inspection Purpose, Scope, and Summary of Results
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this team inspection was to determine whether the sys-
tems, structures, and components selected for review were constructed
substantially in accordance with the descriptions provided in the
' Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in NRC's Safety Evaluation
Report (SER). The inspection also included a comparison of the phys-
ical installation with engineering design documents (including piping
and instrumentation drawings (P& ids)) and the applicant's plans for
controlling plant configuration and operations during the startup and
operational phases. System walkdowns were performed during which
independent dimensional measurements were made.
1.2 Scope - Selection of Systems: Use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis
The "Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment," (SSPSA)
PLG-0300 by Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. was reviewed to obtain
the potential accident sequences that were significant contributors
to core melt frequency and offsite risk. This information was used
to select the systems and components for inspection.
Table 1 was taken from the SSPSA, the table summarizes and ranks the
accident sequences most important to core melt and risk. The initi-
ating events and subsequent system failures were also reviewed for
system selection; Table 2 was constructed to help focus attention on
systems that appeared most logical for the as-built inspection. The
on-site power, service water, and component cooling systems were se-
lected. Due to the extent and depth necessary for an as-built in-
spection, further definition of the components within these systems
was required. The final selection included Emergency Diesel 18,
Emergency Diesel IB Room Ventilation, Service Water Train B, and Pri-
mary Component Cooling Water Train B.
Limiting the inspection to the "B" train of the selected systems al-
lowed the inspection to cover a greater depth.
'
In addition to the systems selected based upon risk importance, sev-
eral other subsystems related to service water and component cooling
water were inspected. These systems were the cooling tower system
and the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier cooling system.
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TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCES WITH SIGNIFICANT RISK AND CORE MELT FREQUENCY CONTRIBUTIONS
Sheet 1 of 2
Sequence Ranklag
Initiating Additional System Failures /
Event tiuman Actions
Resulting Dependent Failures r u ncy Latent Early
(per reactor yearl Health Health
Afsk Risk
Loss of Offsite Onsite AC Power, No Recovery of AC Power Component cooling, high pressure makeup 3.3-5 1 1
Power Before Core Damage (ECCS), reactor coolant pump seal LOCA.
containment filtration and heat removal.
Loss of Offsite Service Water, No Recovery of Offsite Onsite AC power. component cooling, high 9.2-6 2 2 *
Power Power and low pressure makeup (ECCS) reactor
coolant pump seal LOCA, containment
flitration and heat removal.
Small LOCA Residual Heat Removal None. 8.9-6 3 * *
Control Room None Component cooling, high and low pressure 8.7 o 4 3 *
Fire makeup (ECCS). reactor coolant pump seal
LOCA, containment filtration and heat
removal,
un
Loss of Main Solid State Protectfon System Reactor trip, emergency feedwater high 8.3-6 5 a *
Feedwater and low pressure makeup (ECCS), contain-
ment flitration and heet removal.
Steam Line Operator Failure to Estabitsh Long Term 5.6-6 6 * *
Break Inside Heat Removal
Containment
Reactor trip Component Cooling High and low pressure makeup (ECCS), 4.6-6 7 5 *
reactor coolant pump seal LOCA, contain-
ment filtration and heat removal.
Loss of Offstte Traf n A Onsite Power. Train B Service Train B onsite power, component cooling. 4.4-6 8 6 *
Power Water. No Recovery of AC Power Before high and low pressure makeup (ECCS),
Core Damage reactor coolant pump seal LOCA, contain-
ment flitration and heat removal.
Loss of Offstte Train B Onsite Power. Train A Service Train A onsite power, component cooling, 4.4-6 9 7 *
Power Water No Recovery of AC Power Before high and low pressure makeup (ECCS),
Core Damage reactor coolant pump seal LOCA, contain-
ment filtration and heat removal.
PCC Area Fire None Component cooling, high and low pressure 4.1-6 10 8 *
makeup (ECCS), reactor coolant pump seal
LOCA, containment flitration, and heat
removal.
(Neg1tgible contribution to risk.
NOTE: Emponentf al notation is indf cated in abbreviated fom; f.e., 3,3-5 = 3.3 x 10'5
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TABLE 1 (centinued)
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Sheet 2 ef 2
Initiating Additional System Failures / Sequence Ranking
E vent Human Actions Resulting Dependent Failures equ ncy Latent Early
(per reactor year) Health Health
Risk Risk
P rtial Loss of Component Cooling
High and low pressure makeup (ECCS), reactor
Main Feedsater 3.8-6 11 9 *
coolant pump seal LOCA, containment filtra-
tfon, and heat removal.
Cable Spreading None
Room Fire Component cooling, high and low pressure 3.5-6 12 *
10
makeup (ECCS), reactor coolant pump seal
LOCA, containment (titration, and heat
removal.
Less of One DC Emergency feedwater, No Recovery of
Bus Eriergency or Startup Feedwater
Bleed and feed cooling, Train A 3.2-6 13 * *
containment filtration and heat removal.
R uctor Trip Operator Failure to Estabitsh Long Terin None. 3.0-6 *
Heat Removal. 14 *
Turbine Trip Component Cooling High and low pressure makeup (ECCS), 2.8-6 15 *
11
reactor coolant pump seal LOCA, contain-
ment filtration, and heat removal.
Less of Service None
Component cooling, high and low pressure
tuter 2.3-6 16 12 *
makeup, reactor coolant pump seal LOCA,
containment filtration, and heat removal. m
Partial Loss of Operator Failure to Estabitsh Long Term None.
Fu dwater Heat Removal 2.3-6 17 * *
Igrbine Building Onsite AC Power, No Recovery of AC Power
Fire Offsite power, component cooling, high 2.3-6 18 13 *
Before Core Damage and low pressure makeup (ECCS), reactor
coolant pump seal LOCA, containment flitra-
tion, and heat removal.
Sna11 LOCA Train B Safety Features Actuation. Trafn A high and low pressure makeup and 2.2-6 19 * *
Train A Residual Heat Removal residual heat removal; train B containment
flitration and heat removal.
Small LOCA Train A Safety Features Actuation. Train 8 high and low pressure makeup and 2.2-6 20 *
Train B Residual Heat Removal residual heat removal; train B containment
filtration and heat removal.
Terbine Trip Reactor Trip, Failure to Manually Scram Functional inability to provide adequate 1.9-6 25 * *
Reactor and to Effect Emergency Boration high pressure makeup.
IEttrfacing None
low pressure makeup, residual heat
Systems LOCA 1.8-6 27 14
removal, containment isolation and 1
flitration.
% gligible contribution to risk.
N01E.
Laponential notation is indicated in abbreviated form; i.e., 3.8-6 = 3.8 x 10-6,
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TABLE 2 , .
S ELECTIO N OF SYSTEMS FOR AS-BUILT INSPECTION
Significant Sequence Ranking Of Selected Reason for
Cho rocterization Core Melt For Elimination
Sequences inspection Frorn inspection
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Failure of
On-Site Power 1,8,9 X
Failure of
Service Water 2,8,9,16 X
Failure of
Residual Heat Removal 3,19,20 Negligible contritaution to risk
Fires 4.10,12,18 Fires considered outside inspection scope y
ATWS 5 Inspection time constroints
Operator Error 6,14.17,25 Human error outside inspection scope
Failure of
Component Cooling 7,11.15 X
Foilure of
Emergency Feedwater 13 Negligible contribution to risk
Failure of
Sofety Features Actuation 19,20 Negligible contribution to risk
Interfacing LOCA 27 To be covered under Event V inspections
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1.3 Summary of Inspection Results
The "B" train of the station service water system (including the
cooling tower system), the primary component cooling water system
(including the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier subsystem), and
the associated electrical power supplies and distribution systems
were constructed and functioned in substantial agreement with the
FSAR description and the project design documents.
In several instances, the applicant was processing FSAR revisions to
clarify and correct the latest submittal (Amendment 56). Where these
changes affected systems selected for inspection it is noted below in
the report detail sections.
Two apparent violations were identified: 1) Traceability was not
maintained properly for a service water valve identification label
and diesel generator room ventilation fan motors, and 2) work was
expanded beyond the original scope of replacing a gasket (to include
disassembly of a seismic support) without following the proper proce-
dural controls, and a fire penetration from the fuel oil day tank
room into the engine room was not sealed in accordance with installa-
tion instructions.
One unresolved item was identified. The acceptability of cable in-
stallation (where it enters the cable tray) in the diesel generator
building remains open pending the erection of staging and licensee
inspection.
The inspection report detail sections provide additional scope, ac-
ceptance criteria, and findings. Persons contacted during the in-
spection are listed in Attachment A. Reference material (drawings,
specifications, calculations, and procedures) reviewed during the
inspection are provided in Attachment B, instrumentation inspected is
listed in Attachment C, and items selected for independent measure-
ments are listed in Attachment D.
2.0 Station Service Water System
2.1 Piping and Pipe Supports
2.1.1 Scope
The scope of this inspection was to compare the completed
piping and pipe support configuration and physical instal-
1ation of train "B" of the Service Water system (SW) to the
approved design, and the licensee's commitments documented
in the. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The inspection
was performed by physically tracing the piping layout from
the service water pump house to the heat exchanger for
train B. Both intake and return lines were examined.
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In addition to the above, piping and pipe supports associ-
ated with the cooling tower system were also examined.
This system is considered a subsystem of Service Water sys-
tem; it is the ultimate heat sink for the plant, and is a
standby, safety-related system.
2.1.2 Inspection Criteria
The inspector visually examined the installed piping and
structural supports. The visual examination consisted of
physical verification of piping run, location, orientation,
and protective maintenance of supports, hangers, valves,
taps and fittings, and the adequacy of the workmanship of
the installation.
The fluid-system logic was compared with the FSAR (Section
9.1) descriptions and Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
(P& ids) included in the FSAR and changes in progress but
not yet formally incorporated in the FSAR. Acceptance cri-
teria.for materials and components were derived from the
applicable specification, code of record (e.g., ASME), in-
dustry standards, and regulatory guides. The inspector
performed dimensional checks and physical measurements of
piping and pipe supports (see paragraph 6.0) on a selected
basis. These measurements were compared to the detailed
isometric drawings of the piping system and approved pipe
support design. The isometric drawings used for the in-
spection were the same "as-constructed" drawings as used by
the licensee for stress reconciliation and the seismic
re-analysis effort.
2.1.3 Findings
Based on the above inspection, review of documentation, and
discussions with cognizant personnel, the inspector deter-
mined that the piping and pipe support installation
("as-constructed") conformed to the requirements of design
bases and analyses. The system layout was in accordance
with system description and P& ids included in the safety
analysis report. The workmanship of installation, and mea-
sures to prevent inadvertent damage to item during con-
struction were acceptable.
No violations were identified.
2.2 Instrumentation and Controls
2.2.1 Scope
Selected safety related instrumentation and control systems
associated with the Station Service Water System "B" Loop
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were inspected for conformance with applicable regulatory
requirements and FSAR commitments.
Visual observations of the installed instrument systems
(Attachment C) were made to confirm that they were designed
and installed in accordance with licensee design criteria
and construction documents.
2.2.2 Inspection Criteria
2.2.2;l Instruments and Impulse Lines
The inspector visually examined the installed
instruments and impulse lines using "as con-
structed drawings", and licensee inspection cri-
teria. The visual inspection consisted of checks
for tubing and instrument identification, minimum }
slope and bend radius, separation of redundant
systems, tubing defects and damage, instrument
location, routing, mounting restraints / anchors,
direction of flow, high point vents / drain and
source connection.
2.2.2.2 Cable, Cable Terminations
Visual inspection during the walkdown of instru-
mentation systems included connecting cable and
cable termination of instruments to the control
console and the actuated equipment / component.
The inspection included checks for conductor ter-
mination, separation, routing, identification and
cable splices.
2.2.2.3 Controls
The control and logic diagrams of the
"as-constructed systems were reviewed and checked
for redundancy, functional requirements, control
and display instrumentation, level indication,
instrumentation trip settings, and control and
position indication in the control room.
2.2.2.4 Documentation
System Components and documents relating to the
inspection of the Service Water Systems Instru-
mentation and Control are listed in Attachment
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2.2.3 Findings
The inspector found that the state of workmanship in the
area inspected was generally good and that the instrumenta-
tion and control systems inspected conform with the
, "as-constructed" drawings for inspection criteria of para-
graph 2.2.2. The tubing and instrument identification was
as specified. The minimum slope, bend radius and separa-
tion requirements were maintained. Tubing defects and dam-
age were within the allowable levels. Instrument location,
routing and mounting was per specification. Tubing re-
straints (guides) and anchors were located in accordance
with drawing dimensions. Valves were correctly installed
for flow direction. All associated high point vents and
impulse line pocket requirements have been met. Source
connections for the installed instruments were in accor-
dance with the p&ID and design documents.
Conductor terminations for instrument / component cables were
made in accordance with applicable wiring diagrams and
electrical schematics. Cables were routed and installed in
, their respective raceway or conduit in accordance with the
approved cable schedules. Cables, conduit and raceways
were properly identified. Cable splicing used conformed to
manufacturers requirements.
Redundant components were properly identified. Test re-
sults indicate functional requirements for controls have
been achieved. Control and display instrumentation is pro-
vided to permit operation and control from the control
room. Level instrumentation monitors water level in the
service water pump house and is indicated at the main con-
trol board in the control room. Main control room indica-
tion associated with the "B" service water flow train
includes pump discharge header pressure, primary component
cooling water heat exchanger temperature and total flow in
each primary cooling water safety related flow train. Con-
trol and position indication is provided on the main con-
trol board for motor operated valves.
2.3 Mechanical Equipment and Heat Exchanger
2.3.1 Scope
The scope of the inspection covered review and inspection
of mechanical equipment in general, and valves, pumps, mo-
tors and heat exchangers (HT) in particular. The above
equipment were inspected for proper installation,
functionality, and suitability for use, e.g. rating, flow
characteristics, mechanical properties, and traceability
and identification. The inspection was performed by
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physically examining the item for location, orientation,
and name tag data. The above information was compared to
the flow / logic diagrams, p& ids, system descriptions in
FSAR, and equipment specification or procurement
information.
2.3.2 Inspection Criteria
The inspection criteria and attributes were derived from
the FSAR, project specifications, codes, industry stan-
dards, ard regulatory guides. Visual examination of the
equipment consisted of physical verification of the equip-
ment location, orientation, i.e. flow direction, evidences
of preventive maintenance, manufacturers name plate data,
ASME code stamp, and general workmanship of the
installation.
Document review encompassed verification of manufacturers
data and operability characteristics of the equipment with
design requirements as described in safety analysis report
and project specifications. The code data package (N-5
packages) for selected items were also reviewed for com-
pleteness and acceptability.
2.3.3 Findings
Based on the above inspections, review of documents and
discussions with licensee and A/E personnel, the inspector
determined that valves, pumps, motors, heat exchangers, and
l other miscellaneous mechanical items in service water sys-
l tem were generally acceptable. The inspector, however,
identified an instance of erroneous tagging of one valve as
discussed below.
Valve Identification
A 24" valve (1-SW-139) in cooling tower basin deicing line
was identified by the attached manufacturers code data tag
as serial number - BF227203, but the code data package
(N-5) for the valve indicated this valve to be serial num-
ber - BF247029. On further examination of the valve body
casting mark (part number), and the code data package, the
inspector determined that the valve in question was in fact
BF247029. The valve, therefore, was mistagged with an er-
roneous code data tag. The inspector further determined
that this was possibly due to several retagging operations
on valves used in the SW system. The retagging of valves
from Unit 2 was initiated for their use in Unit 1 system.
The inspector observed that many valves were retagged sev-
eral times with different valve numbers. There was a great
deal of confusion in this operation between July 1985 and
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February 1986. The extent of this confusion was such that
the licensee had to initiate a program of reverification of
valve identification and associated documentation to assure
traceability. This valve tagging and traceability problem
was evident from a review of licensee initiated Nonconfor-
mance Report (NCR) number 74-3467-A. However, in spite of
the extensive reverification of valve identification and
associated documentation, the licensee's failure to proper-
ly identify the valve in question (1-SW-139), and maintain
the traceability of this item in a safety-related use is a
violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII.
(86-14-01)
Service Water (SW) Strainers
Each SW train is provided with a basket type strainer up-
stream of the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) heat
exchanger to ensure that the heat exchanger tubes remain
unclogged. The piping, valves, strainers, and related work
area were-inspected for as-built conformance. No discrep-
ancies were found between the P&ID's, isometrics, and pipe
support details, and the as-built plant. The inspector
observed that a lighting fixture above the strainers was in
the way of basket removal, however, startup test engineers
stated that the strainers have been opened for inspection
several times without major difficulty. The inspector had
no further questions.
2.4 Corrosion, Errosion Prevention
The Seabrook Service Water System uses concrete lined piping to com-
bat salt water corrosion in most of the system. Special rubber-like,
thick liners of "EDPM" were used in valve bodies while pipe sections
(downstream of throttling valves subject to erosion and cavitation)
were coated with polyurethane lining. A 50.55(e) rcport in 1985 de-
scribed problems with the rubber-like coating in the valve bodies;
coatings were dislodging preventing full closure of the valves and
breaking off, presenting a potential blockage of the heat exchanger
and cooling tower spray nozzle. In addition, the polyurethane lin-
ings of the spools were coming loose. The inspector reviewed the
current effort to correct these problems. A selected number of
valves have been reworked and coated with Belzona Co., "D" and "A"
material with the spool linings recoated with Belzona Co., "EC Barri-
er". These actions were recommended by a special licensee task
force. Individuals on this task force were interviewed and salt wa-
ter corrosion concerns discussed. No problems have been identified
with the concrete lined piping nor with the heat exchangers. The
inspector judged that sufficient management attention is being paid
to these corrosion concerns. No additional deficiencies were
identified.
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3.0 Primary Component Cooling Water System (PCCW)
3.1 Piping and Pipe Supports
3.1.1 Scope
The scope of the inspection included the installed piping
and pipe supports in train-B of the PCCW system, and por-
tions of the Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier (RCPTB)
subsystem located inside primary containment. The objec-
tive of the inspection was to assess the adequacy of de-
sign, construction / fabrication and installation of piping
and supports to assure safety and reliability of the system
during plant operations. Inspectors also performed dimen-
sional checks and physical measurements of piping and pipe
supports on a sampling basis. These measurements were com-
pared with detailed isometric drawings, support design, and
the design and system descriptions in the FSAR.
3.1.2 Inspection Criteria
Inspection criteria were derived from the FSAR, project
specification, codes and standards and regulatory guides.
Piping and support materials were also verified by visual
examination. Verification of the above attributes was per-
formed by using detailed isometric drawings of the piping
system for location and orientation of main system and
branch connection piping, field welds; and location and
types of supports.
The flow logic and system characteristics were examined
using Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) and FSAR
system descriptions. Material acceptability was estab-
lished by verifying the traceability of material to appli-
cable codes and specifications. The isometric drawings
used for this inspection were the same "as-constructed"
drawings as those used by the licensee for stress reconcil-
iation and seismic reanalysis of the system. The general
workmanship of the installation was also examined.
3.1.3 Findings
Based on the above inspection, review of documentation of
design bases, and discussions with licensee and A/E engi-
neers, the inspector determined that the PCCW piping and
pipe support installation ("as-constructed") conformed to
the requirements of design bases and analyses. The system
layout conformed to the description and P& ids shown in the
FSAR. The workmanship and administrative controls exer-
cised to prevent inadvertent damage to completed items were
acceptable.
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No violations were identified.
3.2 Instrumentation and Controls
3.2.1 Scope
Selected safety related instrumentation and control systems
associated with the Primary Component Cooling Water System
were inspected for conformance with applicable regulatory
requirements and FSAR commitments. Visual observations of
the installed instrument systems (Attachment C) were made
to confirm that they were designed and installed in accor-
dance with licensee design criteria and construction
documents.
3.2.2 Inspection Criteria
3.2.2.1 Instrument and Impulse Lines
(same as 2.2.2.1)
3.2.2.2 Cable, Cable Termination
(same as 2.2.2.2)
3.2.2.3 Controls
The control and logic diagrams of the
"as-constructed systems were reviewed and checked
for redundancy, functional requirements, control
and display instrumentation, level indication,
instrumentation trip settings, and control and
position indication in the control room.
3.2.2.4 Documentation
System Components and documents relating to the
inspection of the Primary Component Cooling Water
System and Thermal Barrier instrumentation are
listed in Attachment C.
3.2.3 Findings
The inspector found that the state of workmanship in the
area inspected was generally good and that the instrumenta-
tion and control systems conform to the "as-constructed"
drawings for inspection criteria of paragraph 3.2.2 with
the exception of the Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier
Pumps.
The tubing and instrument identification was as specified.
The minimum slope, bend radius and separation requirements
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were maintained. Tubing defects and damage were within
allowable levels. Instrument location, routing and mount-
ing was per specification. Tubing restraints (guides) and
anchors were located in accordance with drawing dimensions.
Valves were correctly installed for flow direction. All
associated high point vents / drains and impulse line pocket
requirements have been met. Source connection for the in-
stalled instruments were in accordance with the P&ID and
design document. Conductor terminations for
instrument / component cables were made in accordance with
applicable wiring diagrams and electrical schematics.
Cables were routed and installed in their respective race-
way or conduit in accordance with the approved cable sched-
ule. Cables, conduit and raceways were properly
identified. Cable splicing conforms to manufacturers re-
quirements. Redundant components were properly identified.
Test results indicate that functional requirements for con-
trols have been achieved. The electrical interlocks are
energized when control switch for preferred pump in a given
loop is placed in " start" position. Control and display
instrumentation is provided to permit operation of the PCCW
system from the main control room.
Licensee non-conformance report no. 82-5728 indicates that
the normal operating pressure of the Thermal Barrier pumps
(1-CC-P-322 A&B) is 161 and 165 psig, respectively, at the
normal system flow rate of 160 gpm. This operating pres-
sure exceeds the design pressure rating of 150 psi for the
heat exchangers (nos. 1-CC-E-153 A&B) and pumps (nos.
1-CC-P-322 A&B). Licensee resolution is documented in the
Engineering Change Authorization No. ECA 08/107178A, dated
June 24, 1985. To preclude operation of the system at a
higher pressure than the design pressure, the thermal bar-
rier cooling system is planned to be operated with valves
V110, V114, V230 and V236 fully open to increase flow and
decrease pressure. New setpoints have been established for
component cooling flow indicator switch nos.
1-CC-FISHL-2147, 2148, 2247 and 2248 resulting in a high
setpoint of 63 gpm which was beyond the range of the in-
struments. Modifications to provide an instrument range of
0-75 gpm were completed by July 13, 1985. FSAR changes
have not yet been made to reflect the current operating
mode of the thermal barrier pumps.
The licensee has issued an FSAR deviation (no. 590) dated
March 13, 1986 to revise FSAR section 9.2 to include chang-
es identified in ECA 08/107178A. The inspector had no fur-
ther questions.
- .
_..
'
17
.
3.3 Mechanical Equipment and Heat Exchangers
3.3.1 Scope
The scope of the inspection included mechanical equipment
in general, and valves, pumps, motors and heat exchangers
in particular. This equipment was inspected for proper
installation, functionality, and suitability for use, e.g.
pressure and temperature rating, flow characteristics, me-
chanical properties, and traceability and identification.
The inspection was performed by physically examining the
item for location, orientation, and name tag data and com-
paring this information to the flow / logic diagrams, P& ids
and system descriptions in FSAR.
3.3.2 Inspection Criteria
Inspection criteria and attributes were derived from the
FSAR, project specifications, codes, industry standards,
and regulatory guides. Visual examination of the equipment
consisted of physical verification of the equipment loca-
tion; orientation, i.e. flaw direction; evidence of preven-
tive maintenance; manufacturers name plate data; ASME code
stamp; and general workmanship of the installation.
Document review included verification of manufacturer's
data and operability characteristics of the equipment with
design requirements as described in safety analysis report
and project specifications. The code data package (N-5
package) for the items were also reviewed for completeness
and acceptability.
3.3.3 Findings
Mechanical equipment such as valves, valve motor operators
(electric or air), pumps, heat exchangers, and other mis-
cellaneous equipment conformed to design bases and system
descriptions. Their ratings, flow and operability charac-
teristics were as described in the safety analyses.
Traceability of items was maintained by proper identifica-
tion and tagging. The shock suppressors were well pro-
tected by wrappings to prevent any damage due to adjacent
work (debris and dirt).
The inspector identified four unused attachments on heat
exchangers number 1-CC-E-153, A&B, that were not shown on
the design drawings. The attachments were on the shell
side inlet and outlet nozzles. It, was determined, howev-
er, that the attachments were authorized by the A/E (UE&C)
at Southwestern Engineering Company's shop to facilitate
.
- - . -
.
.
18
. -
protection of the interior of the equipment with inert gas
during shipment and_ storage. The attachments were properly
made, and were acceptable.
The inspectors identified a support (1-CC-A-31) which ap-
peared to impinge on the insulation of another piping line
(CC-817-3-152-6"). The inspector verified that the licensee's
interference evaluation program, implemented on site by Mark
Technologies Co. had evaluated this problem. The evaluation
by Mark Technologies indicated that the clearance between
this pipe and the support was adequate for postulated earth-
quakes, and.the slight impingement of insulation was of no
concern with respect to operability or functionality of
either item.
During the walk through inspection of component cooling
water system, the inspector noted that four support chan-
nels above the heat exchanger RII-E-9B in the Residual Heat
Removal (RHR) system were disassembled. On further exami-
nation, the inspector found that the heat exchanger was
undergoing gasket replacement, and there was a Work Request
authorizing this work on the gasket. However, the scope of
the applicable work request did not include disassembly of
ASME support. The licensee's procedures require prior au-
thorization by a work request to disassemble any ASME com-
ponent or support. The disassembly of support channels
without a proper Work Request was unauthorized work and
considered to be violation of startup procedure TPI-11,
sections 3.2 and 5.1 (50-443/86-14-02).
Manual Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier (RCPTB) Rupture
Isolation
The design of the RCPTB system has undergone a number of
fundamental changes; the inspector reviewed licensee design
memoranda regarding the current operation of the system
because of a delay in updating the FSAR.
The inspector discussed the current design with design and
operations engineers to fully understand and to ensure that
no unanalyzed safety concerns existed; none were found.
However, the licensee was in the process of improving the
FSAR description by separating the RCPTB system description
from the PCCW description and more fully describing the
current RCPTB design. The licensee plans to provide the
improved material in Amendment 57 of the FSAR. The inspec-
tor had no further questions.
-. _
.
19
.
Motor Operated Butterfly Valve Position Indication
i
While inspecting the Primary Component Cooling Water Heat
Exchanger discharge valves (CC-V15 and CC-V17),
discrepancies in valve position indications were noted.
The position gage (reading 0 to 100%) geared to the motor
operator of both valves was observed to read differently
than the disk angle indicator (reading 0 to 90 degrees)
connected to the valve stem. The licensee indicated that
similar problems had been identified in the past. A Work
Request #SW-1797 was initiated for inspection of all such
valves, and the necessary adjustments of the valve position
indicator. The inspector noted that this did not appear to
be a widespread problem (approximately 20 valves of this
type were reviewed) and had no further questions in this
area.
PCCW Isolation Valves
Eight isolation valves on the supply and discharge lines
that provide PCCW cooling water to the non-essential heat
loads inside containment were inspected. These valves have
both an containment isolation function as well as a diver-
sion function. During ESF activation, non-essential PCCW
heat loads are isolated allowing adequate PCCW flow to
safety related equipment. Both the functionality and the
leak tightness of these valves were inspected.
The valves were Posi-Seal butterfly valves with air opera-
tors (air to open, spring to close). Visual inspection of
the valves and operators revealed loose electrical and air
fittings. This was brought to the attention of the
licensee. The inspector observed that the valve bodies
were oriented to normal system flow. It was verified that
the valves had a preferred flow direction based on effec-
tive disk sealing against pressure applied in one direc-
tion. Sealing in the reverse direction, however, was also
acceptable according to the manufacturer. The valves in
the supply piping were not in the preferred direction as
related to its containment isolation function. However,
after a review of valve leakage measurements conducted in
February and March 1986, the inspector determined that the
preferred valve orientation had little influence on the
measured leak tightness.
All valves in question had measured leak rates within the
1
acceptable limits. The measurements were performed with
,
containment design pressure on the containment side of the
'
valve, and atmospheric pressure on the other side.
The closure function of the valves was inspected. The
valves would close upon operation of an exhaust solenoid
,
, -
.
20
.
which vented the piston air, allowing the valve to close by
a compressed spring. The possibility of unexpected exces- l
sive closure torque requirements (because of valve / operator
orientation or hydraulic flow patterns) was reviewed; no
potential problem was identified. The valve activation
tests conducted in January - February 1986 were also re-
viewed. These tests showed no unusually high closure
times.
As indicated, in Paragraph 5.0, Management Controls, these
valves have jacking wheels to open the valves upon loss of
air. .The wheels could be inadvertently operated without
control room operator's knowledge. If the wheels were op-
erated, the valves would not automatically close as re-
,
quired. Locking the handwheels or other similar management
controls are being considered by the licensee. No unac-
ceptable conditions were identified.
4.0 Electrical Power Supplies and Distribution
4.1 Scope and Acceptance Criterion
4.1.1 Scope
The objective of this phase of the inspection was to exam-
ine the installation of selected portions of the Class 1E
power systems and to verify that the as-built conditions
agree with FSAR and SER descriptions and project specifi-
cations and drawing requirements. The components selected
for inspection were those associated with the "B Train"
Emergency Diesel Generator, Primary Component Cooling Water
System and the Service Water System.
4.1.2 Inspection Criteria
The Class 1E electrical power supply equipment and distri-
bution were inspected to the criteria established by the
licensee in Chapter 8 of the FSAR, licensee endorsement of
Regulatory Guides and Industrial specifications and stan-
dards, and licensee specifications and standards included
in Attachment B to this report.
4.2 Electrical Power Distribution
4.2.1 4160 Volt AC Power Distribution
The inspector conducted a field walkdown of the power feeds
from the "B Train" emergency diesel generator, DG-18, to
the 4160 volt switchgear cubicle bus E6. The switchgear in
this cubicle was inspected for the diesel generator feed to
the bus and for the power feeds to the Primary Component
Cooling Water Pump CC-P-11B, Cooling Tower Pump SW-P-110B,
-
--.
.
21
.
and Service Water Pump SW-P-418. The inspector observed
workmanship and the as-built conditions of the electrical
power equipment, cubicles, switchgear, cable, conduit, ca-
ble trays and bus duct noting in particular the following
attributes:
- cable, cable trays and conduit identification and col-
or coding
- electrical separation between redundant trains and
Class 1E and non Class 1E cables.
a cable tray, conduit, and bus duct hardware
- cable support and tie downs
a cable, bus and wire terminations including
identification
- cable, bus duct, conduit and tray routing
- cable mechanical and environmental protection
The governing licensee specifications for inspection and
acceptance in these areas are FEP-502, FEP-504, and FEP-505
4.2. 1.1 General Findings
The inspector determined that the identification of
cables, cable trays and conduits are as required by
the specifications. . The color of the cable (white)
corresponded to the Loop B electrical channel designa-
tion. The inspector noted two instances where the
cable tray identification did not correspond to the
tray identification on the cable pull tickets. Inves-
tigation revealed that the cable trays in question
were improperly identified initially during the cable
pull. Licensee inspection discovered the error and
appropriately prepared NCRs which corrected the iden-
tification on the trays and provided the input to the
licensee's record Cable Schedule Program (CASP). The
computer CASP print-out for these selected cable runs
was reviewed and found to be correct and corresponded
to the as-built cable tray installation and
identification.
Primary Component Cooling Water Pump (CC-P-118) cable
A78-M06/1 was observed to be only partially supported
by the cable tray edge protector where it enters cable
tray 142JB from switchgear cubicle EDE-SWG-6. The
licensee took action to move the edge protector such
. _
)
'..
22
.
that the cable was centered on it to provide proper
support. There was no evidence of damage to the ca-
ble. The inspector noted that the switchgear cabi-
nets, equipment cable trays and conduits were properly
grounded throughout the runs with bare copper conduc-
tor properly bonded and connected for continuity and
then appropriately bonded to plant grounds.
The 4160 volt metal enclosed bus duct routings (from
switchgear cubicle EDE-SWG-6 to the B Diesel Generator
and cable routing to Component Cooling Water Pump
CC-P-11B, Cooling Tower' Pump SW-P-1108 and Service
Water Pump SW-P-418) were verified to be in accordance
with the drawings and the CASP cable schedule. All
cables were of the proper size and type and were qual-
ified in accordance with licensee Specification
9763-006-113-1.
Allowable cable pull tension calculations were veri-
fied and actual pull tensions measured during the ca-
ble pulls were compared to these allowable tensions.
Cable tensions were limited by cable sidewall pres-
sure, due to bends _in the pulls to 1500 pounds and not
by the the straight pull allowable tension of 5000
pounds. All cables (except cable AU6-NGS to cooling
tower pump SW-P-1108) were less than 1500 punds. Ca-
ble AU6-NG5 pulling tension exceeded this value (1700
pounds for the last 5 feet of the pull). Nanconfor-
mance Report No. FBM-111 reported the details of the
pull and provided inspection and tests criteria which
lead to the acceptance of the cable. The points of
attachment of the pulling " mares tail" were inspected
by the licensee for physical damage and the cable was
hi potted at 35,000 volts (NEMA WC 3) for 15 minutes
to detect any damage.
The inspector reviewed the licensee calculations,
physically inspected the " mares tail" cable pulling
points for damage and concurred in the licensee's
acceptance.
Electrical cable and cable tray separation between
redundant trains and between Class 1E and non Class 1E
met FSAR commitments.
The circuit breakers, motors, pumps and the diesel
generator inspected were of the type, size and rating
as described by the FSAR, licensee drawings and speci-
fications. The primary component cooling water pump
motor nameplate placed an operating restriction on the
pump that would require waiting an hour to attempt
_
.
23
.
restart of the motor if there were three previous un-
successful attempts to start. The inspector deter-
mined that the licensee had imposed a restriction on
starting all large motors such that after one unsuc-
cessful attempt the operator must wait 30 minutes be-
fore attempting another start. The inspector found
this acceptable.
4.2.1.2 Findings Regarding Adequacy of Voltage at Terminals
The inspector reviewed the licensee's calculations of
the available voltage at the service water, component
cooling, and cooling tower pump motor terminals to
determine if the installed power systems and cable
size are adequate to provide a minimum of 90 percent
(of design) steady state running voltage and 80 per-
cent starting voltage dip to these motors during worst
case plant degraded grid voltage and grid loading
conditions.
The calculations were also reviewed to determine
whether during worst case light electrical loading,
the voltage at the motor terminals will not exceed 110
percent of rated motor voltage. The licensee calcula-
tions and voltage regulation study indicate that the
installed power systems and distribution are adequate
to maintain the voltages at the motor terminals within
the 10 percent steady state band and not less than
80 percent during motor starting in accordance with
FSAR section 8.
The licensee had further expanded the study to include
non-safety related loads. Except for a momentary
starting voltage drop to approximately 78 percent of
nameplate rating, for containment fans EAH-FN 4A and
48, all voltages remained within the 10% steady
state band with voltage not less than 80% for motor
starting. Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) let-
ter SBN-950 of February 24, 1986 provided information
from the fan vendor which indicates that these fans
will start satisfactorily down to 75% voltage.
The inspector also noted that the licensee had con-
ducted tests to verify the computer model used for the
voltage regulation study. These tests were reported in
PSNH letter SBN-931 of January 23, 1986, and confirmed
the conservatism and adequacy of the computer model.
No inadequacies were identified.
Using handbook cable impedance, the inspector per-
formed an independent calculation of voltage for one
__ _ . _ _ __ __ ._ _ _
.
24
o
of the longest 4160 volt power run and to one of the
largest of the pumps inspected (the service water pump
SW-P-41B). Cable impedances, motor starting and run-
ning currents and the calculated voltage drop were
found to be consistent with the voltage profile calcu-
lations made by the licensee. No discrepancies were
identified.
4.2.1.3 Additional Findings Regarding Power, Control and
Instrumentation Terminations
Inspections made at switchgear cubicle E-61, the Main
Control Board, and at the Remote Shutdown Panels con-
firmed that the as-built power, control, and instru-
mentation circuits (including their terminations,
identifications, control and indicating devices) were
in accordance with the as-built drawings. Inspections
were for Component Cooling Water Pump CC-P-11B, Cool-
ing Tower Pump SW-P-1108, and Service Water Pump
SW-P-418.
4.2.2 480 Volt A-C Power Distribution
The inspector conducted a field walkdown of the 480 volt
power feed from switchgear cubicle bus E61 to motor control
center EDE-MCC-6121 in the "B Train" emergency diesel gen-
erator building. From MCC-611 the inspector walked-down
the 480 volt power feeders to the diesel generator auxilia-
ry lube oil pump DG-P-11B, the diesel generator auxiliary
coolant pump DG-P-1228, and to the diesel generator air
compressor DG-C-28.
The inspector observed workmanship and the as-built condi-
tions of the electrical power equipment, cubicles,
switchgear, cable, conduit and cable trays noting in par-
ticular the following attributes.
- Equipment type, size, rating and qualifications
- Identification and color coding
- Electrical separation
Cable and tray and conduit routing
- Cable tray and conduit hardware
Cable and wire termination
.. . . . _ _ _ _ _ _
..
25
.
Mechanical and environmental protection
,
The governing licensee specifications for inspection and
acceptance in these areas are FEP-502, FEP-504 and FEP-505.
4.2.2.1 Findings
'
The inspector determined that the cable, cable
tray, and conduit identification, routing, color
coding, and separation are as required by the
specifications and drawings. Cable, bus, and
wire terminations were checked against the
drawings and no deviations were noted.
Cable tray 36CIRB in the B diesel generator room
.
has a substantial number of cables entering the
tray from vertical conduits beneath the tray.
The cables exit the conduits and enter the cable
tray over the side edge of the tray. Due to the
weight of the cables on the tray edge, damage to
the cable sheath may occur. The licensee agreed
to perform an inspection of these cables for
damage and to determine the adequacy of support.
Pending a review of the results of this inspection
this item is unresolved (50-443/86-14-03). The
inspector had no further findings regarding the
480 volt distribution inspected.
4.2.3 125 Volt D-C Power Distribution
The inspector conducted a field walkdown of the 125 volt
d-c power distribution to primary component cooling water
system "8 Train" containment isolation valves V176, V256,
V175, V257 and to thermal barrier isolation valves V395,
V428, V438, and V439.
.
The Class IE 125 volt d-c power distribution was inspected
'
to the criteria established by the licensee in Chapter 8 of
the FSAR, licensee endorsements of regulatory guides, in-
dustrial specifications and standards, and licensee speci-
fications and drawings referenced in Attachment B to this
report.
4.2.3.1 Findings - Primary Component Cooling Water
i
Isolation Valve
The inspector walked down the power, control and
instrumentation cable runs and terminations from
- - _ _ . . . - - - - _ - - - . . _ . . _
_ - . - - . . . _ - - -
.
O
26
0
the 125 volt d-c power supply panel EDE-PP-1138
to valves V176 and V256. These are pneumatic
operated valves which are controlled by 125 volt
d-c solenoid operator valves.
The inspector found no discrepancies except that
the 125 volt d-c power cables adjacent to the
valves exceeded the 4 foot unsupported length
criteria established by the licensee in cable
installation and inspection specification
FEP-504. The maximum span observed was 6 feet.
Licensee calculation ECA 03/8040438 shows that
this span is adequately supported to meet appro-
priate seismic criteria by the flexible conduit
and fittings. The inspector had no further ques-
tions in this area.
4.2.3.2 Findings Regarding Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal
Barrier (RCPTB) Isolation Valves
The inspector walked down the power control and
instrumentation cable runs and termination for
RCPTB isolation valves V395, V428, V438 and V439.
No discrepancies were observed in cable, conduit,
and cable tray routing, identification, termina-
tions and color coding.
These are motor operated valves which are con-
trolled electrically from the Main Control Board
by placing the control switch in the "0 PEN,
"CLOSE" or " AUTOMATIC" positions.
As discussed in section 3.3.3 above, the inspec-
tor found that the licensee had elected not to
utilize the automatic circuitry for closure and
isolation. FSAR section 9.2.2.5, states that
"the RCPTB isolation valves will be opened from
the MCB. For normal plant operation, power to
the isolation valves is removed after full open-
ing...". The effluent flow of each of the ther-
mal barriers is monitored by the operators for
high flow which would be indicative of thermal
barrier rupture. The inspector questioned the
defeat of the automatic isolation. The licensee
provided justification for the change which was
mainly to prevent spurious isolation and loss of
cooling to a reactor coolant pump seal. The in-
spectors reviewed a draft FSAR change which was
already in progress to clarify the design de-
scription. The inspector had no further
questions.
_
.
27
.
4.2.4 Hot Pipe Criteria
The inspector conducted an f r. dependent inspection to deter-
mine whether the Class 1E cable routing within the plant
has been made factoring in the effect of proximity to hot
pipes and any effects on cable degradation and derating.
The inspector determined that UE&C has followed cable hot
pipe separation criteria established by procedure TP-8 dur-
ing construction. Installations made (in which it was not
practical to maintain the TP-8 spacing) were evaluated on a
case by base basis to verify that the temperature criteria
were not exceeded during worst case conditions. The in-
spector reviewed seven such cases and identified no dis-
crepancies in the licensee's evaluation.
4.2.5 Cable Tray Fill Above Cable Tray Siderails
The inspector reviewed a previous inspection item
(113-03-01) relative to instances where cable tray fill had
led to a concern regarding the 40% fill criteria and cable
raceway separation criteria given in FSAR Chapter 8, and in
FSAR Appendix 8 Section 5.1.1.3(c).
The licensee has prepared a request for an amendment to the
FSAR to describe fill above 40% under specified conditions
and is preparing a design change for cable tray filling and
separation in accordance with the revised FSAR criteria.
The inspector reviewed the engineering design of cable
siderail extensions and cable tray covers to provide the
required additional cable support and proper electrical'
separation in accordance with FSAR section 8.3.1.4. No
inadequacies were identified.
4.2.6 Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Systems
4.2.6.1 Scope
The objective of this phase of the inspection was
to examine the installation of the Emergency Die-
sel Generator Power System and including the in-
sta11ation of select auxiliary support systems.
4.2.6.2 Inspection Criteria
The emergency diesel generator and its support
systems were inspected for licensee compliance
with commitments made in FSAR Chapter 8, with
licensee endorsements of Regulatory Guide and
Industrial Specifications and Standards and
,
. I
28 l
.
licensee specifications and drawings included in
Attachment B to this report.
4.2.6.3 Engine and Generator
The inspector walked down the basic diesel engine
and generator including the engine air intake and
exhaust, crankcase venting and the generator
brush rigging, generator air baffle, the electri-
cal power routing and terminations, and the elec-
trical switchgear cubicles.
4.2.6.3.1 Findings
SER paragraph 8.3.1.7.8, requires that the emer-
gency diesel engines' combustion air intakes be
equipped with electric heaters to assure that
inlet air temperature remains +50 F or above for
ambient air intake temperatures which range down
to -30 F.
The inspector determined that the diesel engines
are not equipped with electric air preheaters.
The licensee has revised the FSAR to delete re-
quirements for electrical preheaters and is
~
awaiting NRR SER approval to their October 23,
1983 submittal.
During inspection of the B diesel generator elec-
trical switchgear panel 10G CP-76A, the inspector
noted a box on the floor inside this panel which
contained diesel generator brush holder studs
that were replaced following a brush folder fail-
ure at another site with similar equipment.
-Licensee radiography had revealed that the vendor
supplied equipment studs were marginal and there-
fore elected to replace the studs. This was done
on January 26, 1986 and the removed studs were
boxed, tagged with a red QC Hold Tag and placed
in the cabinet pending disposition instructions.
During this inspection the licensee provided dis-
position instructions and removed the studs from
the area.
The inspector found that the licensee's actions
taken to replace these studs and actions taken to
dispose of them to be satisfactory. At no time
was there a possibility of using non-conforming
material in the equipment, since the studs were
-
,
29
.
considered to meet vendor requirements, and were
properly identified by a Hold Tag.
Jacket Water Cooling
The inspector walked down the jacket water cool-
ing piping from the auxiliary building to the
diesel generator to examine the as-built configu-
ration of the system. The inspection included a
visual examination of piping layout, location and
functions of supports, proper sizing and orienta-
tion of valves and other appurtanences.
The inspector found no discrepancies between the
design and construction criteria and the
"as-built" system and equipment.
,
Diesel Generator Air Starting System
The inspector performed a walkdown of the com-
pressed air starting system for the "B" emergency
diesel generator. A comparison of the as-built
system was made with the latest revision of the
design P&ID.
The inspector determined that the installed sys-
tem was in conformance with the design P&ID and
that the general workmanship was acceptable.
Several valves that were not in the normal posi-
tion (as specified by the P&ID) were authorized
by startup testing in progress during this in-
spection. The inspector verified that the re-
sponsible startup test engineer was knowlegeable
of current valve positions.
A non-safety related relief valve (V72B) on the
air compressor skid was noted to be set at 630
psig (nameplate) but the P&ID showed the setting
to be 650 psig. The licensee was aware of this
discrepancy and had initiated actions to have the
valve reset. The inspector had no further
questions.
4.2.6.4 Fuel Oil System
The fuel oil delivery, storage, and engine supply
piping and components were inspected. No major
FSAR or P&ID discrepancies were identified. The
following findings were discussed with the
licensee:
.
30
,
1. Two conduit penetrations in the B-Diesel Day
Tank Room were found not to be sealed in
accordance with plant conduit seal specifi-
cations. These seals are at floor level and
posed a potential fire hazard if fuel oil
was released from the tank and ran into the
diesel generator room below. The failure to
properly seal a fire penetration in accor-
dance with installation requirements is con-
sidered another example of violation
50-443/86-14-02 which is described in para-
graph 3.3. The licensee committed to in-
spect both the A and B Day Tank Rooms and to
correct any inadequately sealed
2. The diesel fuel oil delivery station was
discovered to be outside the proposed Unit 1
protected area. This was brought to the
attention of the licensee. A commitment was
made to provide adequate security. The
equipment and procedures for adequate secu-
rity are planned to be described in an
amendment to the station's security plan
prior to core load.
3. As noted in paragraph 5.0, a number of fuel
oil system valves are noted to be locked on
the p&ID's. No locks were observed to be in
place. The licensee has committed as part
of its Locked Valve Program to assure that
all identified valves required to be locked
will be so locked before fuel load. Cur-
rently the Diesel Building is provided with
24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> security and the inspector noted
frequent security patrols which would limit
the possibility of unattended manipulation
of fuel valves until the locked valve pro-
gram is implemented. This was found to be
acceptable.
4.2.6.5 Fillet Weld Inspection of 480 volt Motor Control
Centers in the Diesel Generator Building
The inspectors conducted a field inspection of
motor control centers to verify anchoring de-
tails. This was a reverification of a previous
inspection of finding that indicated fillet weld
requirements for welding plates h inch or less
should be the same size as the plate thickness,
and for plates greater than k inch, the fillet
_ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ --
fi gg
_
a -
~ '
I
-
fTYN ..
?n
i3 31
- E ,
.
A it
y .:
y should be 1/16' inch plus the plate thickness.
] t During this inspection it was observed that fil-
V .
'
's x-
let weld sizes were in x 4 inches at panel cen-
b '"
.- ters,and inch x 2h inches on corners. Listed as
0 , tbllows are specific motor control centers in-
-} *
, ,
spected using site dwg. F-300209.
Length (inches)
{ MCC No. Fillet size MCC Location Comments
621 h 4k Control & Dies. 2 or more
- Gen. El. 21-6
631 " "
4h
615 " "
% 4h
"
622 k 4\ "
612 " "
k 4k
'
512 4h Control & Dies. 2 or more
_ .
Gen. El. 21-6
W *515 4 ~4k
" "
531- " "
4 4k
521 ~ " "
4h
- 522 " "
h 4h
grout hole locations dwg. F-300208.
Single MCC welds were in, fillets 2h to 3 in long. The inspectors
have no other concerns. This item is considered resolved and acceptable.
'
4.2.7 Loose Parts Monitoring System
The inspector reviewed licensee commitments of FSAR Section
1.8-51-and 4.4.6.4 for a Loose-Parts Detection Program and
'
5 c
^
Monitoring System for the detection of loose metallic parts
in the primary system during preoperational testing,
startup and power operation modes.
.
'
L The inspector reviewed licensee Loose Parts System Descrip-
W tion SD:-93C-1, Rev. 4 and SD-930-1, Rev. 4 for the in-
..
, stalled system. No inadequacies were identified.
4.2.8 s Containment Electrical Penetration
y 4.2.8.1 Scope
2 .,
Containment electrical penetrations H-36 and H-39
were inspected for confornance with applicable
regulatory requirements a'nd FSAR commitments.
. Visual observations of the installed penetra-
'tions, cable and cable terminations were made to
confirm that they were designed and installed in
.
f-- - - --
--
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
m
.
32
..
accordance with licensee design criteria and ,
construction documents. '
4.2.8.2.1 Cable and Cable Termination
The visual inspection of the containment
electrical penetration included checks for
the following technical requirements:
--
type, size and identification of cable;
--
cable bend radius, support and separa-
tion requirements were maintained;
--
proper use and. installation of cable
splices.
4.2.8.3 Findings
The inspector found that the materials and
workmanship in the areas inspected was in
accordance with the criteria of paragraph
4.2.8.2.1.
4.3 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System
The temperature within the diesel room is controlled by a high capac-
ity air ventilation system designed to limit room temperature to a
maximum of 125 F. Adequate performance of this system is considered
important for proper diesel operation. An as-built inspection of the
HVAC equipment was conducted to assure conformance with the design
configuration and required air flow rates.
4.3.1 Heat Load and Fan Capacity
The UE&C heat load calculations were reviewed to determine
the design basis for the sizing and configuration of the
system. A supply fan capacity of 65,639 cfm was calculated
based on Colt. Industries engine heat load data, associated
auxiliary loads, a thirty five degree temperature rise (90
to 125 F), and insulated exhaust pipes. This flow rate
contains an 18% margin over required capacity. The inspec-
tor independently verified the design flow rate calcula-
tions. In addition the hot exhaust piping was verified to
be insulated with only the piping flanges exposed.
The flow velocity measurements of both the supply and ex-
haust fans were reviewed as well as the flow calculations.
The supply fan, DAH-FN-258, was measured to provide 70,308
cfm (design 65,639 cfm) while the exhaust fan, DAH-FN-268,
measured 63,095 cfm (design 64,000 cfm). The low exhaust
.
33
.
fan flow was within the 110% acceptance range. In opera-
tion,= the supply air outlets were judged to provide _ accept-
able air flow across the engine.
4.3.2 Visual Inspection
The supply and exhaust fan equipment was visually inspect-
ed. No major discrepancies were identified and the condi-
tion of the equipment and housekeeping were acceptable.
The following items identified during the inspection were
investigated:
1. A loose conduit was found on air cperated damper
-DAH-Dp-15B in the supply ducting and a broken com-
pressed air regulator gage found on DAH-DP-168 in the
exhaust inlet.
2. Hold Tag 82-1028 was found on the. supply fan fire
damper DAH-DP-164. The tag referred to an NCR-re-
questing replacement of the existing fire dampers be-
cause of a concern with effective damper actuation and
closure under flow conditions. The inspector reviewed
the new damper design and determined that it would not
adversely affect the reliability of the supply fan.
3. The inspector found Renumber Tag 788 on fan motor
DAH-FN-259 and reviewed the motor's documentation
package. It was found that fan motor 25A and 25B were
interchanged in an attempt to resolve a fan / motor
alignment problem. The documentation was in order.
However, it was found that the serial numbers stamped
on the two motors were identical.
Following questioning by the inspector, the applicant
initiated actions to correct the improper serial num-
ber identification. This is considered a second exam-
ple of failure to properly maintain equipment
identification (violation 86-14-01, paragraph 2.3).
5.0 Management Controls
5.1 "As-Constructed" Program
The inspector reviewed documentation and held discussions with cogni-
zant licensee and A/E personnel to determine the adequacy of the
licensee's plans / program for revising and up grading the drawings and
other engineering and licensing documents to reflect the
"as-constructed" (as-built /as-installed) condition of plant piping,
supports, instrumentation and mechanical equipment. The inspector
carried out this program review in conjunction with the physical in-
spection of the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) and Service
.- -
34 ,
.
Water (SW) systems. The effectiveness of the licensee's
"as-constructed" program was-assessed by comparing the final
"as-constructed" drawings with the installed configuration of the
system. Responsibilities for the licensee's "as-constructed" program
were ascertained from procedures and discussions with staff members.
The inspector noted that the A/E Project Engineering Manager was re-
sponsible for the implementation of this program. Responsible disci-
pline engineers provided the technical requirements, and the A/E's
engineering personnel and the ASME piping contractor verified the
piping and equipment installation. ,
Based on the above review and comparison of drawings and other design
documents with the actual layout of the piping and equipment in the
plant, the inspector determined that the licensee's "as-constructed"
program was adequate to effectively identify, document, and reconcile
any variation in the system layout from the original design.
No violations were identified.
5.2 Design-Change and Nonconformance Control
The inspector reviewed a random sample of Engineering Change Author-
izations (ECA) and Nonconformance Reports (NCR) associated with the
PCCW and SW system design and installation. This review was per-
formed to determine: the technical adequacy of the design change and
nonconformance disposition; conformance to procedural controls for
review and approval and adequacy and completeness of information for
proper implementation of the change.
The inspector determined that ECA and NCR dispositions were techni-
cally valid, complied with procedural controls, and were sufficiently
detailed to support proper implementation of the change or disposi-
tion. These documents were properly controlled and distributed by
the site document control to assure currency and validity of design
drawings and specifications.
The inspector, noted however, that many items exhibited multiple
" HOLD" tags, " RELEASE" tags, and " Limited Work Authorization (LWA)"
tags simultaneously. On further inquiry, the inspector determined
that under the current tagging program, each NCR required a HOLD tag
to be placed on the item even if the nonconformance might have been
on only a portion or minor part of the item or its documentation.
The LWA tag was used to authorize any work or repair on the equipment
so tagged, and the RELEASE tag indicated that the equipment was re-
leased from the warehouse. The inspector also identified several
HOLD tags on equipment which should have been removed because the
nonconformances had been resolved or the NCRs were closed. The li-
censee acknowledged this problem, and informed the inspector that
they had also recognized this problem several months ago and had im-
plemented a corrective action program to minimize such instances.
The inspector was informed that the cause of this problem was a lack
.
._ - -, - - , - - - - - , - . , ---- ---
.
35
.
of access to equipment during the test phase and also some oversight
on the part of the licensee's startup group. The licensee has
strengthened the interface control between the startup group and oth-
er organizations at the site. A specific QA procedure had been is-
sued and implemented by startup group to control and minimize this
problem. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
5.3 Locked Valve Program
During the inspection of the Service Water, Primary Component Cooling
Water, and Diesel Generator Systems, those valves requiring manage-
ment controls to assure reliable system function were identified by
review of the current P& ids as well as inspector judgement. The fol-
lowing findings were made:
1. Very few valves indicated on the P& ids as normally locked were
locked because of authorized startup testing in progress.
2. A locked valve verification procedure (0S1490.01) has been
drafted which includes valves identified by the P& ids as locked
as well as other valves judged by the procedure's author (an
operator) to require locking. This procedure was subject to
additional operations department and committee review prior to
core load.
3. The following air operated butterfly valves in the Service Water
and Primary Component Cooling Water System have jacking wheels
that are provided to manually override the valve operator spring
in the event of supply air failure:
SW-V16 CC-V122
SW-V18 CC-V175
CC-V57 CC-V176
CC-V168 CC-V256
'CC-V121 CC-V257
The inspector determined that the jacking wheels, if inadver-
tently closed, would prevent the valve operation as required
during an ESF actuation. The management control of these wheels
was discussed with the licensee. The licensee indicated that
appropriate control of the position of the wheels would be eval-
uated, and the placement of the valves on the locked valve list
will be considered.
4. Other valves, e.g. plug valves in the air start system of the
diesel, appeared to the inspector as requiring management con-
trol over their position.
The licensee indicated that all system valves would be reviewed
as part of verifying the completeness of the locked valve list.
The inspector determined that it was too early to pursue
.
36
.
concerns involving the completeness of the locked valve list,
because, the list had not been reviewed.
No violations were identified. This area will be reviewed dur-
ing future routine inspections of the facility.
5.4 Configuration Management and New Hampshire Yankee P& ids
The inspector reviewed the licensee's configuration management pro-
gram to ascertain the adequacy of controls established to prevent
unreviewed changes in plant and equipment arrangements from the
"as-analyzed" and "as-constructed" configuration. This potential
problem generally results from plant betterment evolutions, modifica-
tions due to changed operability consideration, and changes or
up grading of equipment and systems. The review also included an .
assessment of the degree of accuracy with which the plant design and
configuration was reflected in FSAR.
Based on the above review, comparison of FSAR descriptions and fig-
ures with "as-constructed" plant arrangements, and discussions with
licensee representatives the inspector determined that the licensee
was developing a program of configuration control to assure reliabil-
ity and safety in plant operations.
The licensee's program in this area will be essentially, a graded
one. The program will establish a " Design Base Line Documents List".
The documents included in the list will be the basis of plant design,
modifications and operations.
The documents that will be included in the Design Base Line Document
List will be further categorized in four categories. These catego-
ries are:
Category I - Used for plant operations
Category II - Provides indirect support to plant operation
Category III - Contains design basis, but does not affect plant
operations.
Category IV - Contains design basis information of historical
nature, and does not affect plant operations.
The updating of the above documents has been prioritized to support
safe operation of the plant. Category I has the highest priority.
The documents placed in this category will be revised and updated
prior to resuming plant uperations. Category IV documents have the
lowest priority and are not required to be revised or updated at any
predetermined frequency.
Furthermore, the licensee has initiated a program of creating a new
set of computer aided design P& ids that would be simpler, faster to
update and operations oriented. These drawings would consolidate
complete system information on one diagram, and also eliminate some
information which is not necessary for the safe operation of the
.
.
37
.
plant. The current design P& ids issued by the A/E have complete de-
sign information on them that is needed to construct the plant and
perform engineering analysis, but is not necessarily germane to plant
operations. Additionally, due to design and analysis, equipment in
one system may be divided into portions, and be depicted on different
diagrams. This system of P& ids serves the design and construction
well, but may become quite cumbersome to use in plant operations.
It appears that the licensee's program of consolidating a system on
one diagram, and purging unnecessary information would enhance the
usability of these P& ids. A simpler, uncluttered, and consolidated
P&ID would contribute significantly towards plant safety. The sim-
plified P&ID identification numbers will be prefixed with a symbol
"B" to distinguish them from the design version. The design version
diagrams will be prefixed with symbol "D" Both versions of the dia-
grams will be reviewed, concurred, and certified by the A/E (UE&C) to
indicate their technical adequacy and conformance to the original
design logic. The "B" version diagrams will be issued to the plant
operations staff, and will be used for plant operations. The "D"
versions will be controlled by plant and licensee engineering staff
for use in engineering analysis and modifications. The current P& ids
will be retained in the licensee's records as historical
information.
During the review of this program, the inspectors noted that opera-
tions P& ids did not indicate the point of class breaks between the
seismic and nonseismic categories of piping system. NRC's Regulatory
Guide No. 1.29, to which the licensee is committed, recommends that a
piping system be designed and constructed to seismic requirements
beyond the seismic boundary up to the first restraint or a set of
restraints that restrict movement in all three directions. The
licensee's operational P& ids, h? wever, show only the point of inter-
face between ASME pipe classes from one another, and the seismic and
nonseismic piping. The inspector asked the licensee as to what assur-
ances and controls the licensee has instituted to prevent any inad-
vertent removal, modification, and/or substitution of restraints that
are part of seismic support system but are beyond the seismic inter-
face. Because this information (regarding seismic restraints in
nonseismic portions of piping) is not readily available from the
P& ids used in the plant, confusion may result regarding the classifi-
cation of any particular restraint during maintenance and modifica-
tion operations.
In response to the inspector's above concern the licensee agreed to
put a note on all P& ids indicating the status of seismic restraints
beyond the interface.
The licensee further committed that the A/E's current P& ids included
in the FSAR will be updated by June 1, 1986 to show the latest "as-
constructed" configuration, and that the new operations P&lDs (com-
-
_
'
..
38
.
puter aided design version) will be included in FSAR thirty (30) days
prior to the commission. briefing for full power Operating License.
5.5 Housekeeping
The inspectors reviewed the licensee program for cleanliness control
and housekeeping for operational readiness. The physical verifica-
tion of cleanliness and housekeeping was carried out in conjunction
with the "as-constructed" walk-through inspections. The licensee's
housekeeping program and procedures were reviewed for adequacy of
organization, manpower, and acceptance criteria. The current clean-
liness and status of housekeeping was verified by visual inspection
of plant area and equipment turned over to the licensee.
Based on the above review and observation the inspector determined
that the current state of plant cleanlines's is adequate in the turned
over areas. The inspector also determined that the housekeeping and
cleanliness as instituted by the licensee was sufficiently detailed
- with sufficient manpower assigned to it, and had an adequately
staffed organization to be effective in preparing plant readiness for
operation.
6.0 Independent Measurements
To assess the reliability of the "as-constructed" data obtained in the
licensee's walk-down inspections, the inspectors independently verified
selected data recorded on the final isometric drawings used for stress
reconciliation work. The attributes selected for independent measurement
and verification included: welding; dimensions of pipes and support num-
bers; pipe wall thickness; valve and equipment connections; and length of
drilled-in concrete expansion anchors, supporting pipes and equipment.
The dimensional checks and verification were performed with commercially
available standard tape measure; the acceptability of welded connections
were verified by visual examinations; the pipe wall thickness and depth of
expansion anchors were measured by ultrasonic (UT) examination technique
using NRC's own equipment and technicians. The inspector also indepen-
dently verified the design of a welded connection by an alternate and sim-
plified design calculation. Items selected for independent measurement
and the results are identified in Attachment D.
Additional independent measurements and calculations regarding MCC fillet
weld sizes and ventilation flow rates are described in paragraphs 4.3.1
and 4.2.6.6. I
No violations were identified.
....
39
e
--7. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
~
' ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
An unresolved item is discussed in Paragraph 4.2.2.
8.0 Management Meetings
Discrepancies were discussed with licensee management as they were identi-
fied during the course of the inspection. The inspectors also met with
licensee management representatives at an interim exit meeting on March
14, 1986. A final exit meeting was held on March 21, 1986 at which time,
the licensee management was apprised of the inspection scope, findings and
observations.
At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the
licensee by the inspectors.
i
$
t
.
'
4
.
- - - + + - ~., i,_..r cr-m.,, - - - , . _ . - _.-.--...v--,.-- em-. _
--.-..-_._--,_,,-.,--c,_r--,-2,w,-_-ey,. -n-...,w- , , ~ ~ .
- _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ __ - -
,
.
.
. ATTACHMENT A
l
Persons Contacted
A. -Public Service of New Hampshire, N.H. Yankee, Yankee Atomic Electric Co. '
<
G. Austin, Licensing
W. Cloutier, Project Engineer
l J. DeVincentis, Director of Engineering
'T. Glowacky, Lead Electrical Engineer
.R. Jamison, Electrical Engineer
M. Lemieux, Quality Assurance Engineer
D. Maidrand, Assistant Project Manager
i G. Mcdonald, Construction Quality Assurance Manager
l D. McLain, Startup Manager
W; Sanchez, Licensing Engineer
G. Souders, Lead Electrical Engineer
J. Stacey, Project Engineer
B. -United Engineers and Constructors
C. Balasubramauian, I&C Field Engineer
R._Cox, Senior Field Engineer, Electrical
A. Dufalt, Supervisor Electrical Support Group
B. Huselton,' Project Engineering Manager
M. McKenna, Project Engineering Manager
D. Mehta,. Coordinator of Seismic Design
C. Mark Technologists Inc.
R. Durand, Supervising Engineer
S. Harris, Principal Engineer
D. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. Barclay, Resident Inspector
L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch
A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
-D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector
_ _ _ _ _ _
.
4
ATTACHMENT B
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Description / Title Rev.
UE&C Drawings 9763-D-800798-589.66 Isometric Piping 0
CC System Line No. 798
9763-0-800821-1-589.74 Isometric Piping CC System 0
Line No. 821
9763-D-800817-1-589.72 Isometric Piping CC System 0
Line No. 817
9763-D-800827-581.30 Isometric Piping CC System 0
line No. 827
9763-D-800828-583.50 Isometric Piping SS System 0
Line No. 828
9763-D-800797-580.02 Isometric Piping CC System 0
Line No. 797
9763-D-800829-583.50 Isometric Piping CC System 0
Line No. 829
9763-D-800794-584.40 Isometric Piping CC System 0
,
,
Line No. 794
9763-D-800761-583.80 Isometric Piping CC System 0
Line No. 761
9763-D-801802-570.40 Isometric Piping SW System 0
Line No. 1812
9763-D-801806-570.40 Isometric Piping SW System 0
Line No. 1806
9763-D-801820-571.208 Isometric Piping SW System 0
Line No. 1820
,
.-
,
-.
Attachment B~ 2
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Description / Title Rev. Date
UE&C Orawings - Pipe Support Detail 9763-M-80077 S 28A 10/21/85
- Support M/S-777-RG-05
9763-M-800798S Support M/S 798-RG-35 278 01/02/85
9763-M-800817S Support M/S~817-SG-07 3B 06/26/84
9763-M-800817S Support M/S 817-SG-04 88 06/26/84
9763-M-800817S Support M/S 817-SG-06 1B 06/26/84
- 9763-M-800821S Support M/S 821-RG-07 3B 06/26/84
9763-M-800821S Support M/S 821-RG-05 3A 05/20/85
9763-M-800817S Support 817-RG-08 98 06/25/84
9763-M-800817S Support 817-SG-09 78 06/25/84
9763-M-800827S Support 827-SG-01 318 06/26/84
9763-M-800827S Support 827-SG-10 22A 09/26/83
9763-M-800797S Support M/S 797-SG-05 238 11/12/84
9763-M-800797S Support M/S 797-SG-11 22A 06/18/84
9763-M-800827S Support 827-SM-15 35A 06/26/84
9763-M-800828S Support 828-RG-01 168 06/26/84
9763-M-800828S Support 828-RG-05 19A 06/08/84
9763-M-800828S Support 828-RG-10 120 11/05/84
9763-M-8007975 Support 797-SG-04 128 07/24/84
9763-M-8007975 Support 797-RG-16 24A 06/07/84
9763-M-800797S Support 797-SG-02 21B 06/22/84
,
9763-M-8007975 Support 797-SH-01 160 10/08/84
9763-M-800797S Support 797-SH-08 168 06/22/84
9
b
..
Attachment B' 3
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Description / Title Rev. Date
9763-M-800797S Support 797-SG-07 178 06/22/84
9763-M-800829S Support 829-RG-05 20 09/10/84
9763-M-800829S Support 829-SV-01 6B 06/26/84
9763-M-800829S Support 829-RG-02 5B 06/26/84
9763-M-800838S Support M/S 838-SG-07 24A 06/11/84
9763-M-800794S Support 794-SG-16 128 06/21/84
9763-M-800794S Support 794-SG-13 12C 06/21/84
9763-M-800838S Support M/S 838-SG-05 27A 12/12/84
9763-M-800838S Support M/S 838-SG-03 21A 11/16/84
9763-M-800838S Support M/S 838-SG-04 27A 12/04/84
9763-M-800838S Support M/S 838-SG-02. 26A 12/12/84
9763-M-800761S Support 761-SG-04 27A 12/04/84
9763-M-800838S Support M/S 838-SG-02 26A 12/12/84
9763-M-800761S Support 761-SG-14 IB 06/13/84
9763-M-8007615 Support 761-SG-7A A 05/13/85
9763-M-8008385 Support M/S 838-SG-01 ISC 06/08/84
9763-M-801801S Support M/S 1801-RG-10 ISB 01/05/84
9763-M-801802S Support 1802-SG-04 218 07/04/84
9763-M-801802S Support 1802-RG-07 20B 07/09/84
9763-M-801802S Support 1802-SG-08 198 02/24/84
9763-M-801802S Support 1802-SV-10 IB 07/11/84
9763-M-801802S Support 1802-SG-12 ISB 07/11/84
9763-M-801812S Support 1812-RG-28 32A 05/30/85
-
.
.
Attachment B 4
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Descrip_ tion / Title Rev. Date
9763-M-801812S Support 1812-RG-13 26B 07/13/84
9763-M-8018125 Support 1-1812-SG-14 30A 05/30/85
9763-M-8018125 Support 1-1812-SV-12 21B 07/12/84
9763-M-801812S Support M/S 1812-SG-08 30A 09/18/84
9763-M-801812S Support 1812-SG-09 31B 05/11/85
9763-M-801812S Support 1812-SG-10 27A 05/14/85
9763-M-801812S Support 1812-SG-16 32A 09/17/84
9763-M-801806S Support 1806-SG-02 11B 07/10/84
9763-M-801806S Support 1806-RG-05 13B 07/11/84
9763-M-801820S Support 1820-SG-01 21B 05/11/85
9763-M-801820S Support 1820-SG-17 18B 09/10/84
9763-M-8018205 Support M/S 1820-SG-04 120 03/29/85
9763-M-801818S Support M/S 1818-SG-05 20A 09/17/84
Drawing Post Seal International Inc.
Dwg. No. 11473. "12"-Class 150
Valve Assembly & Matryx
- 26072 SR-60 E 4/11/84
Report NCR #82-1028, Replacement of 12/11/85
fire dampers in Diesel 81 ven-
tillation unit DAH-FN-25B
Drawings F-604096, " Diesel Generator
Related Building Air Flow Diagram" 7 2/07/86
to Diesel
B1
F-310010 " Diesel Generators
DG-1A and DG-1B One Line
Diagram" 5 12/30/82
F-202103, " Diesel Generator
Cooling Water P&I Diagram" 14 1/14/86
F.
.
.
Attachment B 5
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Description / Title Rev. Date
F-202102, " Diesel Generator
Fuel and Lube Oil P&I Diagram" 14 1/14/86
F-310525, " Diesel Generator -
Elev. 51'-6" Exposed Condult-
Plan 14 5/08/85
F-202101, " Diesel Generator Air
Systems P&I Diagram" 11 2/05/86
Iso No. DG-4358-01, Exhaust
Line From DG 9 10/02/83
Iso No. GG-4363-01, Exhaust
Line From Silencer 8 12/23/83
Colt Industries, Dwg. No. 11
908 201, " Joint, Exhaust Ex-
pansion 26" 2 6/16/77
Colt Industries, Dwg. No.
11908202, " Joint, Exhaust
Expansion 40" 2 6/16/77
Colt Industries, Dwg. No.
11909211, " Exhaust Silencer" 3 1/12/79
Colt Industries, Dwg. No.
11908678, " Crankcase Vacuum Fan" 3 11/10/77
Specification No. 9763-006-249-7,
walls and floor penetration Sealant 5 7/24/85
. . . . . . . - . .- - - . .. - _.. - - _- .-
.
Attachment B
'
.
,
6
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Title Rev. Date
Procedure GT-I-145, "EQ Review" 4 2/28/86
i Instructions Posi-International, Inc.,
Installation and maintenance
L instructions for Post-Sealed
Trunmion Valve - -
Manual
Matryx Activator Manual,
Description and parts list of
- Spring Return Model No. 26062-
L. SR-60 - -
L
l Test Reports GT-M-05-F01 Rev. 11, Valve
- activation test data for
following valves with date
'
of test:
i
1-CC-V-122 -
1/23/86
168 1/23/86
175 2/20/86
176 2/20/86
256 2/20/86
257 2/20/86
Manual Zurn Industries, Inc. #20RN 0.N.
!
77-N-1789, " Instruction Manual
- For Model 514 Simlex Strainer,"
related to Strainer 1-SW-S-11 - -
l- Memo " Safety Evaluation of Service -
3/12/86
! Water System Valve Liner / Seats,
Spool Linings, and Piping Inserts" - 3/12/86
From H.C. Shaffer, File T.F. G4.3.2,
i SBE-86-214
Memo " Thermal Barrier Criteria", From
I.R. Reed, UE&C to Pete Anderson,
YAEC -
12/06/82
Letter "RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling," from
John DeVincentis PSNH to David H.
Rhoads, UE&C -
12/28/82
Letter "RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling," from
G. P. Semientro and John DeVincentis
PSNH to John R. Slotterback, UE&C -
12/28/82
l
.
-,--..r..- ,. ... .,___. .-., ._ _ ,,,.,,-3, . , _ , . . , _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ , . .,._.,__,,,,_,,__,___..,_,m..,,,-.._,~_,.,... -
-_
,_
.
.
Attachment B 7
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Title Rev. Date
Report' NCR No.82-729, Rework 1-FAH-DP-13A
and 13B limit switches -
8/22/85 ,
Calculation UE4C, Calc. Set No. 6.01.47.01,
"DGB Ventilation Lock" 3 6/10/83
Procedure 0S1490.01, " Periodic Locked Valve
Verification" Draft -
Test Report Test Pkg. No. DAH-9.0 for Supply
and Exhaust Fans DAH-FN-258 and
,- 268, flow measurements and CFM 6/26/85
calculations 7/21/85
Test Reports 1-PT(I)-37.2, Rev.1, Primary
Component Cooling Water valve
leakage measurements for the
following valves:
- V57, V168 3/01/86
V256, V257 2/15/86
V121, V122 3/01/86
V175, V176 2/17/86
~
Report Seabrook FSAR, Draft Amendment 57 - -
Report ECA-99113673-A, Inadequate Service
Water Flow Indications During
Normal Operation -
3/14/86
Report Documentation Packages for
1-DAH-FN-25A and B, diesel gener-
ator supply air fan motor
certification docuements -
6/09/80
Form Retag #788, involving diesel
generator supply air fan motor -
2/14/83
>
- y, ,- - - - - , . .,, ,9---.r, , - w-,-t-~w.e-- - - - . - _w-~.,,-,m---,.-__--~-,m-,,-,._,--- cm,_,,,,,w , , , , , --,,.,.-,w,,+,---r~, -+-,,,wv,--_
r --
'
! .-
~
! Attachment B 10 l
i
l
t DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Description / Title Rev Date
l
Drawing 480 Volt Unit Substation Buses 9 10/28/82 l
1-E61 and 1-E62 one Line
Diagram UE&C Drawing 9763-F-310014
Drawing Control Building, 460 Volt Motor 11 11/15/85
Control Center 1-E621 one Line
Diagram. UE&C Drawing 9763-F-
310035
Procedure Station Operating Procedure for 2 12/17/85
Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Sampling.
Yankee Atomic Procedure Number
CX0924.04
Calculation Adequacy of Support for Conduit 0 3/18/86
Conduit ECA 03/804043B
Engineers calculation for
CC-V-57/121/176/256
Bulletin Engineering Data for Copper and
Aluminum Conductor Electrical Cables,
Okonite Company Bulletin EHB-78
Handbook Wire and Cable Selection and
Technical Data. General Electric
Handbook Section 8A, 88, 8C
Drawing UE&C CC System Loop B CNTMNf 3 1/10/86
Structure Valves V256,
V176 Cable Schematic and Table
9763-M-310895 Sheet E20/4D,
4E, 4F
Drawing UE&C CC System Loop B CNTMNT 1 8/25/83
Structure iso valves V-256, V-176
schematic diagram 9763-M-310895
sheet E20/4a448
Drawing UE&C CC System Loop B CNTMNT
structure isol valves V-175 &
V-257 cable schematic and
cabletable 9763-M-310895 sheet
E2T/6D&6E
.
.
h.
p -
.
h
.
Attachment 8 11
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
,
Document Tyge Description / Title Rev Date
Drawing UE&C CC system Loop B CNTMNT
structure iso valves V-175 & V-257
Schematic Diagram 9763-M-310895
Sheet E-2T/6&68
Drawing UE&C Station Main Electrical 11 12/27/85
One Line Diagram 9763-F-310008
Drawing UE&C Unit Electrical Distribution 15 2/27/85
One Line Diagram 9763-F-31002
Drawing UE&C Diesel Generator Building 9 12/13/85
460V Motor Control Center
1-E611 One Line Diagram 9763-F-
310029
Drawing UE&C Control Building 460V 11 11/15/85
Motor Control Center 1-E631
One Line Diagram 9763-F-310032
Drawing UE&C 480 V Unit Substation 9 12/27/85
Buses 1-E64 and 2-E69 One
Line Diagram 9763-F-30/704
Drawing UE&C 125 UDC and 120 UAC 5 2/14/83
Instrument Buses Key One
Line Diagram 9763-F-310041
Drawing UE&C Control Building 4600 12 11/15/85
Motor Control Center 1-E612
One Line Diagram 9763-F-310030
Report Final Safety Analysis Report 56 11/85
(FSAR) (Section 9.2)
Report FSAR Deviation Form No. 542 2/6/86
Certificate Certificate of Compliance,
Nashua Corp No 398 Green Tape 2/3/86
Letter Seabrook Station ECI Impact 11/4/85
No. E068, Updating of ANSI
B31.1 Piping in Line List, with
NHY Tast Approval.
l
1
- - _.
. -.
r
..
.
Attachment B 8
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Description / Title Rev Date
Procedure Installation and Inspection 1 2/20/86
of exposed condit #FEP-502
Procedure Installation and Inspection of 1 11/07/85
Cable #FEP 504
Procedure Installation and Inspection of 1 12/09/85
Cable Terminations #FEP-505
Calculation Voltage Regulation Calculations 2 7/15/85
for 13.8 KV, 4.16KV and 480 volt
Electrical Distribution Calculation
9763-3-ED-00-02-F
Procedure Electrical Testing Requirements 1 8/18/85
- FEP-602
Calculation Electrical Distribution (ED&EDE) 2 11/3/83
Medium Voltage Protective Relay
Coordination and Miscellaneous
Relay Setting Class IE and non-
class 1E
Procedure Administrative Procedure No. 39 7 6/3/85
as Constructed Engineering
Document Program (As Built)
Procedure Technical Procedure No. 11 (TP-11) 0 4/29/83
Minimum As-Built Record Drawing
Listing
Installation of Safety and Non
'
h * b A W Proc dufe~"' 1 11/05/85
Safety Related Electrical
Equipment
Specification SKV Cable Specification 3 1/11/80
9763-006-113-1
Standard ICEA S-81, NEMA WC3
Regulatory Guide Physical Independence of Electric
Systems Regulatory Guide 1.75
.
.
, Attachment B 9
<
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
l
'
Document Type Description / Title Rev Date
Standard Standard Criteria for 0 1981
Class 1E Equipment and Circuits
l Drawing UE&C 4160 V Switchgear 8 3/31/81
Bus 1-E6 One Line Otagram
Drawing UE&C Service Water Pump 1-P-41B 5 12/14/82
Cable Schematic 9763-M-301107
Sheet AR3H
'
Drawing UE&C Service Water Pump 1-P-41B 3 12/14/82
,
Three Line Diagram 9763-M-301107
! Sheet AR3A
L Drawing UE&C Cooling Tower Pump 1-P-110B 7 7/1/85
l
Cable Schematic 9763-M-301107
Sheet AV6H
Drawing UE&C Cooling Tower Pump 1-P-110B 3 2/14/80
Three Line Otagram 9763-M-301107
Sheet AV6A
Drawing UE&C PCCW Loop B Pump 1-P-110 5 2/21/84
i
Cable Schematic 9763-M-310895
l Sheet A 79H
l- Orawing UE&C PCCW Loop B Pump 4 4/13/83
,
1-P-11-D Three Line Diagram
'
9763-M-310895 Sheet A79A
Procedure Non conformances VE&C 3 8/31/85
Procedure ASP-3
Procedure Nonconforming material parts or
Components UE&C Procedure QA-15
Drawing Olesel Generator Building SKV 11 6/8/83
Bus Ducts-Plan UE&C drawing
9763-F-310545
! Drawing Diesel Generator Building, 460 9 12/13/85
!
Volt Motor Control Center 1-E611
One Line Diagram UE&C Drawing
l 9763-F-310029
Drawing Typical Floor mounting of 6 12/20/85
Electrical Equipment UE&C
Drawing 9763-F-30029
-
.
.
Attachment B 10
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Description / Title
_
Rev Date
Drawing 480 Volt Unit Substation Buses 9 10/28/82
1-E61 and 1-E62 one Line
Diagram UE&C Drawing 9763-F-310014
Drawing Control Building, 460 Volt Motor 11 11/15/85
Control Center 1-E621 one Line
Diagram. UE&C Drawing 9763-F-
310035
Procedure Station Operating Procedure for 2 12/17/85
Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Sampling.
Yankee Atomic Procedure Number
CX0924.04
Calculation Adequacy of Support for Conduit 0 3/18/86
Conduit ECA 03/8040438
Engineers calculation for
CC-V-57/121/176/256
Bulletin Engineering Data for Copper and
Aluminum Conductor Electrical Cables,
Okonite Company Bulletin EH8-78
Handbook Wire and Cable Selection and
Technical Data. General Electric
Handbook Section 8A, 8B, 8C
Drawing UE&C CC System Loop B CNTMNT 3 1/10/86
Structure Valves V256,
V176 Cable Schematic and Table
9763-M-310895 Sheet E2V/40,
4E, 4F
Drawing UE&C CC System Loop B CNTMNT 1 8/25/83
Structure iso valves V-256, V-176
schematic diagram 9763-M-310895
sheet E20/4a448
Drawing UE&C CC System Loop B CNTMNT
structure isol valves V-175 &
V-257 cable schematic and
cabletable 9763-M-310895 sheet
E2T/6D&6E
.
.
Attachment B 11
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Description / Title Rev Date
Drawing UE&C CC system Loop B CNTMNT
structure iso valves V-175 & V-257
Schematic Diagram 9763-M-310895
Sheet E-2T/6&68
Drawing UE&C Station Main Electrical 11 12/27/85
One Line Diagram 9763-F-310008
Drawing UE&C Unit Electrical Distribution 15 2/27/85
One Line Diagram 9763-F-31002
Drawing UE&C Diesel Generator Building 9 12/13/85
460V Motor Control Center
1-E611 One Line Diagram 9763-F-
310029
Drawing UE&C Control Building 460V 11 11/15/85
Motor Control Center 1-E631
One Line Diagram 9763-F-310032
Drawing UE&C 480 V Unit Substation 9 12/27/85
Buses 1-E64 and 2-E69 One
Line Diagram 9763-F-30/704
Drawing UE&C 125 UDC and 120 UAC 5 2/14/83
Instrument Buses Key One
Line Diagram 9763-F-310041
Drawing UE&C Control Building 4600 12 11/15/85
Motor Control Center 1-E612
One Line Diagram 9763-F-310030
Report Final Safety Analysis Report 56 11/85
(FSAR) (Section 9.2)
Report FSAR Deviation Form No. 542 2/6/86
Certificate Certificate of Compliance,
Nashua Corp No 398 Green Tape 2/3/86
Letter Seabrook Station ECI Impact 11/4/85
No. E068, Updating cf ANSI
B31.1 Piping in Line List, with
NiiY Tast Approval.
c
.
> +
l Attachment 8 12
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document Type Description / Title Rev Date
Procedure UE&C Technical Bulletin #6, Design 12/6/77
Analyses of Piping Supports at
Seismic /non-Seismic Bounderies
'
Specification UE&C Pipe support details work 12/29/82
request for line No. 708
Work Request Work Request RC-1975, Inspect / Rework 2/12/86
1-RC-FV 2833 to maintain EQ
Report Configuration Management Proposed Design 2/7/86
Bareline Document List, Weekly Report
No. 12
Chart Papscott Organization Change 10/11/85
j Report FSAR Consistency Review Report Summary Undated
Chart New Hampshire Yankee Organization Chart 1/1/86
List Startup Test Department System Incomplete 3/14/86
Items List
Specification Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) D 5/1/85
19104849 (Vacuum Breakers)
Specification ECA 99806108 (Install flushing A 11/4/85
spool pieces)
Drawing UE&C P&ID Diesel Air System 11 2/5/86
9763-F-202101
Drawing UE&C P&ID Diesel Fuel & Lube 14 1/14/86
011 9763-F-202102
. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
F
l
L
i .
Attachment 8 13
l Documents Reviewed
l
Component Cooling Instrument
l
l Installation Work Packages
l
1. Flow Transmitter 1-CC-FT-2291-1&2, containment el.0'0' Loop 3
DrawinC No. 1-CC-I-6-001 lead sheet, Tubing - Tray / Hanger Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 4.7, General Notes, Tube Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 4.8, General Notes, Tube Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 4.9, General Notes, Flex Hose Data, Rev. O
Drawing No.1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 4.10, General Notes, Flex Hose Data,
l Table I Rev. O
- Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 4.11, Tubing Installation, General Notes, and
!
Flex Hose Data, Rev. O
Drawing No.1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 2.10, General Notes, Tray Hangers, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 2.11, General Notes, Tray Hangers, Rev. 0
l Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-001 sheet 2.12, General Notes, Tray Hangers, Rev. O
! Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-T-001 sheet 4.3, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-T-001 sheet 4.4, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-TH-001 sheet 2.3, Tray / Hanger Installation, Rev. 4
Drawir.g No. 1-CC-I-6-TH-001 sheet 2.4, Tray / Hanger Installation, Rev. 4
, Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-TH-001 sheet 2.5, Tray / Hanger Installation, Rev. 4
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.2, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.3, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No.1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.4, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No.1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.5, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No.1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.6, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No.1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.7, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.10, Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 4
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-HF-001 sheet 3.11, Hanger Fabrication, Rev 4
2. Flow Transmitter 1-CC-FT-2175 A & B, Containment, el. 26'-0" Loop 4
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001 lead sheet, Tubing-Tray / Hanger Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001 sheet 2.13, General Notes, Flex Hose Data, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001 sheet 2.14, General Notes, Tray Hangers, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001 sheet 2.15, General Notes, Tray Hangers, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001 sheet 4.8, General Notes, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001 sheet 4.9, General Notes, Tubine Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-J-001 sheet 4.3, Tray, Hanger & Tubing Installation,
Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-T-001 sheet 4.4E, F C & B, Tubing ISO, Rev. 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-T-001 sheet 4.5, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-TH-001 sheet 2.4, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Detail 1
Drawing No.1-CC-I-8-TH-001 sheet 2.6, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Detail 3
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-TH-001 sheet 2.67, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Detail 6
l
1
- _ , , _ _ . _ . - . . _ ___ __ _ _ _-__~_ _ _.-._-_. -__,._,_,_,_--__..-,_---,..
r
.
.
' Attachment B 14
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-TH-001 sheet 2.68, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Detail 7
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-TH-001 sheet 2.69, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Detail 8
3. . Level Transmitter 1-CC-LT-2126, Containment el. 25'-0 Loop 4
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-006, lead sheet, Tubing-Tray / Hanger Installation, Rev. 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-006, sheet 4.8, General Notes - Tube Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-006, sheet 4.9, General Notes - Tube Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-006, sheet 2.13, General Notes - Tray Hanger, Rev. 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-006, sheet 2.14, General Notes - Tray Hanger, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-T-006, sheet 4.4, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-T-006, sheet 4.5, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No.1-CC-I-8-TH-006, sheet 2.4, Tray-Hanger Instrument Support Tubing
Installation Rev. A
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-TH-006, sheet 2.5, Hanger Fabrication, Detail 3, Rev. O
Drawing No.1-CC-I-8-TH-006, sheet 2.6, Hanger Fabrication, Detail 4&5, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-TH-006, sheet 2.7, Hanger Fabrication, Detail 6&7, Rev. 0
4. Flow Transmitter 1-CC-FT-2091-1 & 2 Containment el O'-0" Loop 1
' Drawing No. 1-CC-I-5-T-001, sheet 4.4, Tubing Installation, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-5-T-001, sheet 4.5, Tubing Installation, Rev. 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-5-TH-001, sheet 2.4, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Rev. O
Drawing No.1-CC-I-5-TH-001, sheet 2.5, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Rev. O
Drawing No.1-CC-I-5-TH-001, sheet 2.6, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-5-TH-001, sheet 2.7, Tray / Hanger Fabrication, Rev. 0
5. Field Wold Sheets / Bill of Materials
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-5-001, Revision 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-004, Revision 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-6-003, Revision 0
Drawing No. 1-CC-I-8-001, Revision 0
6. Engineering _ Change Authorizations (ECA)
ECA-031-101961
ECA-031-112963
ECA-031-112928
ECA-031-112908
ECA-031-112885
ECA-031-112907
ECA-031-112884
ECA-031-112773
ECA-031-112463
r
o
e
Attachment B 15
-7. Specifications / Procedures
UE&C No. 9763-M-300230 sheet 53 Wiring Systems Notes & Details
UE&C No. 9763.006-46-1 Rev. 10 Instrument Installation
UE&C No. 9763.006-171-1 Balance of Plant & Reactor Auxiliary Instrument Rack
UE&C No. 9763-QAS-1 Quality Assurance Administrative / Systems Requirements
Field Procedures FIP-34 Rev. 4 General Installations of Instrument Systems
Service Water Instrument Installation Work Packages:
Drawing No. 1-SW-I-1-CI-001 lead sheet, Tubing-Tray / Hanger Control Sheet,
, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-SW-I-1-CI-001, sheet 5.2, Level Measuring Device &
Pulley Assembly Support, Rev. O
Drawing No. 1-SW-1810-04, Service Water (1-SW-1812-03) Weld Map
Drawing No. 1-SW-1812-07, Service Water (1-SW-1812-03) Weld Map
Drawing No.1-SW-1810-07A, Service Water (1-SW-1812-03) Weld Map
J
r
o
o
3
ATTACHMENT C
Instrumentation Reviewed
I Service Water Instrumentation Systems
A. Service Water Pump House, Cooling Water Train "B", P&ID diagram
No. F-6U~5033;
1. Service Water Pump nos. 1-SW-41B & 1-SW-410;
2. Pressure Transmitter nos. PT-8282 & PT-8284;
3. Pressure Indicator no. PI-8283;
4. Level Transmitter no. LT-8260;
5. Control loop diagram no. M-506839.
B. Service Water - Primary __ Auxiliary Buf1 ding Cooling Water Train "B",
P&lD diagram no. F-805019, sheet 1.
1. Pressure Differential Indicator Switch nos. PDIS-8258 & PDIS-8259;
2. Flow Transmitter no FT-6191;
3. Pressure Indicator no. PI-8283;
4. Level Transmitter no. LT-8260;
5. Control loop diagram no. M-506839.
C. Service Water Cooling Tower Pump no. 1-SW-P1108, P&ID diagram no.
F-805019, sheet 2.
1. Instrument Rack No. IR-42;
2. Pressure Transmitter no. PT-6193;
3. Temperature Element no. TE-6194;
4. Temperature Indicator no. TI-6194;
5. Control loop diagram no. M-606834.
D. Service Water Cooling _To_wer Fan nos. 1-SW-FN-51A & 1-SW-FN-51-B,
P&I0 diagram no. F-805019, sheet _2.
1. Flow Transmitter nos. FT-6163 & FT-6173;
2. Flow Element nos. FE-6163 & FE-6173
3. Control loop diagram no. M-506835
o
w _ _ _ ____ _ ._____._._____ __ _ _________.__.__..____ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .
__. --_ --_______________--- _ - -
(. , . . ..
,
!
.g
.
[O
m
o
o "
'
"
. Attachment C ,
2
a
II Primary Component Cooling' Water Systems (PCCW)
l- ,
-
A. Component Cooling Water Pump nos. 1-CC-P11B & 1-CC-P110,
,
.P&IO diagram no. F-805016 sheet 1 & 2.
3 '
1. Ir.strument Fick no. IR-208
i ,. 2. Pressure Transmitter no. PT-2200
,
3. Pressure Indicator nos. PI-2200 & PI-2265
4. Temperature El.ement nos. TE-2141 TE-2262-1, TE-2262-2,
TE-2241, TE-2263-1 & TE-2263-2
5.' Pressure Switch no. PSL-2201
,
6/ Control loop diagram no. M-506190
!
B. Component Cooling Water - PCCW Head Tank TK-198,
~
_ P&IO diagram no. 805016 sheet 1.
"
1. Level Transmitter nos. LT-2272-1, LT-2272-2, LT-2272-3, t
LT-2292-1, LT-2292-2 & LT-2292-3. '
2. Level Indicator nos. LI-2272-1, LI-2292-1, LI-2292-2 &
LI-2292-3.
3. Control loop diagram no. M-506191
C. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1-CC-E-178, P&ID
diagram no. 805016 shee,t 1.
-
' '
1. ControlPanelJ-bP-J088
'
2. Temperature Element nos. TE-2271 & TE-2297
3. Temperature Indicator no'.'TI-2297
4. Control loop diagran no. M-506198
D. Component Cooling-Reactor' Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Coolant
Loop System, P&ID diagram no. F-804976.
.
l
1. Thermal Barrier Circulating Water Pump nos. 1-Cc-P-322A &
,
1-Cc-P-322B;
.
2. Flow Transmitter no. FT-2175A & FT-2175R;
'
3 '. Flow Element no. FE-2175;
'
'
4. PressureIndicator, nog.PI-2120,PI-2121&PI-2131
5. Control loop diagram no. M-506202
o
r
s' t I
I
s
.(
_ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _
_ _ . _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i
a
o
Attachment C 3
E. Component Cooling - Rea.ctor Coolant Pump thermal Barrier,
P&lD diagram no. F-804976.
1. Thermal Barrier nos. RC-P-10 and RC-D-1C (inside primary shield)
2. Flow Element nos. FE-2148 & FE-2248
3. Flow Switch nos. FISHL-2148 & FISHL-2248
4. Control loop diagram no. M-506203
F. Co_mponent Cooling Reactor Coolant Pump Coolers outlet Flow Loops A&B,
P&lD diagram no. F-804976.
1. Flow Transmitter nos. FT-2291-1 & FT-2291-2
2. Control loop diagram no. M-506204
. _ _ _ _ _ -
r
a-
4
6
ATTACHMENT 0
Items Selected for Independent Measurements
During this inspection a walkdown was performed on the Component Cooling system
piping run, pipe components and supports. Two specific lines were inspected,
in the walkdown inspection: line 821-3-152-6" from weldolet at 821-4-152-8"-
12"x8" to penetration X48 and 798-16-152-20" to heat exchanger HX-E-178.
Isometric piping drawings used during this inspection were F-800798-580.60
Rev.0 and F-800821-581.30 Rev. O. Attributes looked for during this inspection
were welding, broken members, loose members, component orientation and dimen-
sions as shown on the as-constructed isometric piping drawings.
In addition to the walkdown inspection a sampling of specific supports were
inspected using detailed support drawings and Engineering Change
Authorizations (ECA's). Attributes looked for during this inspection were
welding, broken or loose members any undue movement orientation and overall
dimensions.
Listed as follows are specific supports inspected and comments.
150 Support Dwg./ECA
0-800798-589.66 Rev. 0 798-SG-13
798-SG-15
798-SG-16
798-SG-14
798-RG-17
F-800817-583.50 Rev. 0 817-RG-12/25010092-C
817-RG-15
817-SV-11
817-RM-13
817-RM-14/25110363-C
F-800817-583.50 Rev. O M/S 817-SH-16/25101352-A
M-800821-581.30 Rev. 0 821-RG-1
821-RG-8
821-RG-10
821-SV-11
F-800798-583.50 Rev. 0 798-SG-08
[M/S-752 -06/798-RG-09]
798-RM-06
M/S-798-RG-04
M/S-798-SG-03
798-SG-02
798-SG-33
r
a
5'
y
Attachment D 2
Hilti Bolt Inspection
Fifty-one hilti concrete anchor bolts were examined using a Sonic Mark I
. ultrasonic unit to determine length only. In addition to the examination for
length, anchors were examined for minimum embedment and code stamp as outlined
in site procedure FGCP, Rev. 3. All work was performed in accordance with NRC
procedure NDE-18 and site procedure FGCP,_Rev. 3.
Listed as follows are specific areas inspected.
Concrete Anchor Bolts
Code Dia. Length Min. Embed Support Total Comment
S_! Lamp .
R 3/4 in. 10 in. 6 in. 817-RG-12 4 Sat.
I. -h in. 5.5 in. 2 3/4 in. M/S-817-SH-16 4 Sat.
I. in. 5.5 in. 2 3/4 in. 821-RM-10 4 Sat.
R 3/4 in. 10 in. 6 in. M/S-752-RG-6 12 Sat.
T 1 in. '12 in. 6 in. M/S-752-RG-6 4 Sat.
W- 1 in. 15 in. 10h in. 798-RG-35 11 Sat.
Z 1h in. 18 in. 13 1/8 in. M/S752-RG-6 12 Sat.
t