ML20155C063
| ML20155C063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1987 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155C044 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810070225 | |
| Download: ML20155C063 (86) | |
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. e QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 ilYDROGEN WATER CllEMISTRY INSTALLATION COMPLIANCE WIT}i T!!E ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCll INSTITUTE GUIDELINES FOR PERMANENT BWR HYDROGEN WATER Cl!EMISTRY INSTALLATIONS
, SEPTEMBER 1987 REVISION i
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l Prepared for Commonwealth Edison Company by Sargent & Lundy l
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l esloo7ones PDR 090920 P ADOCK 05000254 PNU
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O Guidelines for Parmanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.0 Comply with intent:
Design guidance provided in this section does not include any requirements.
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Guidelines for Permanent 3WR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemicry Installation for Nonconformance 2.0 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.0 Comply with intent:
Figure 2-1 shows the hydrogen addition Design guidance provided in this section system in simplified form. For this does not include any requirements, report, the system is divided into hydrogen supply, oxygen supply, hydrogen injection, and oxygen injection systems.
Options for hydrogen supply are discussed briefly below, and detailed descriptions of the main options are provided in Section 3.
Oxygen supply is also described in Section
- 3. The gas injection systems are described in this chapter. Also described in this chapter are instruments and controls applicable to the entire system.
2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 Comply with intent:
The hydrogen water chemistry system is See Section 2.0.
not safety-related. Equipment and com-ponents need not be redundant (except where required to meet good engineering practice), seismic category 1, electrical class IE, or environmentally qualified.
Nevertheless, proximity to safety-related equipment or other plant systems requires special consideration in the design, fabri-cation, installation, operation and maintenance of hydrogen addition system components. Section 9 of this document delineates the quality assurance and quelity control requirements to assure a safe and re!!able hydrogen addition system. In some cases these requirements are over and above those which are normally required for nonsafety-related installations.
The hydrogen addition system should sup-mess the dissolved oxygen concentration
,n the recirculation water to a point where IGSCC immunity is maintained at all reactor power levels at which the hydro-gen addition system is operating.
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification l' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance _
t 2.2 HYDROGEN SUPPLY OPTIONS 2.2 Comply with intents ;
Hydrogen can be supplied from three See Section 2.0.
sources: (1) a commercial hydrogen suppliers (2) onsite production from raw materials; or (3) recovery and recycle of '
i hydrogen from the off-gas system. Any
- combination of these three methods may, !
in principle, be appropriate at .s given
- facility.
- 2.2.1 Commercial Supplierj 2.2.1 Comply
Hydrogen can be obtained commercially Hydrogen will be initially supplied by a !
from two types of sources: (1) merchant merchant producer.
producers (i.e., companies that make !
hydrogen for the purpose of selling it to l i others) and (2) byproduct producers (i.e.,
companies that produce hydrogen only as a (
! byproduct of their main business). j l
Hydrogen obtained in this ruanner is sup-plied as a high pressure gas or as a (
4 cryogenic liquid. The selection of gaseous i or liquid supply options depends on sy3 tem j requirements such as flow rates cnd in-l jection pressures and onsite considerations t such as available separation distances and ;
building strengths. In general, gaseous :
storage is preferred for low flow rates and small separation distances. Detailed con-1 k j siderations for gaseous and liquid hydrogen l supply facilities are descriied in Sections t
3.1 and 3.2 of this report, respectively. l l Safety considerations are discussed in '
l Sections 4.1 and 4.2. ;
2.2.2 Onsite Production 2.2.2 Not Applicable:
Industrial processes for hydrogen pro- Onsite production will not be used for the I a
duction can be divided into two groups initial design. l etcctrolysis of water and thermochemical !
l decomposition of a feedstock that con- l tains hydrogen.
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] Detailed considerations for onsite pro- .
1 duction of hydrogen by electrolysis are !
] degribed in Section 3.3 of this report. l f I l !
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e 1 Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance _
All other processes for producing high i purity hydrogen involve thermochemical decomposition of hydrogen-containing i feedstocks folicwed by a series of chem- ,
Ical and/or phyalcal operations that con- i centrate and purify the hydrogen. While i these processes are feasible, in principle, ;
they are not currently envisioned for im- ;
plementathn. Therefore, these processes ;
i are not addressed in this report.
l 2.2.3 Recovery 2.2.3 Not Applicable Many processes are commercially avail- A recovery method will not be used for [
able for separating, concentrating, and the initial design. l purifying hydrogen from refinery or by- l product streams or for upgrading the !
purity of manufactured hydrogen. [
Processes are also being developed for the i recovery and storage of hydrogen by the i formation of rechargeable metal hydrides.
! Although recovery of hydrogen is a viable [
option, near-term implementation of this l l option is not envisioned. Therefore, this i j option is not addressed in this report. r f 2.3 GAS INJECTION SYSTEMS l 2.3.1 Hydrogen injection System 2.3.1 Comply:
a i The hydrogen injection system includes all i flow control and flow measuring equip-j ment and all necessary instrumentation i i and controls to ensure safe, reliable j operation.
I l l 2.3.1.1 Injection Point Considerations 2.3.1.1 Comply:
i i l Hydrogen shall be injected at a location Hydrogen is injected at the condensate l
, that provides adequate dissolvir.g and pump discharge through gas saver . lance j mixing and avoids gas pockets at high assemblies.
points. Experience has shown that e a
in}ection into the suction of feedwater or
- condensate booster pumps is feasible. :
, In}ection into feedwater pumps will :
l require hydrogen at high pressures (e.g., i i 150 600 psig). This may require either a j j compressed gas supply, compressors or a i
cryogenic hydrogen pump, depending on
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation _
for Nonconformance the supply option chosen. In the case of a liquid hydrogen storage system, this can also affect the sizing of the liquid hydrogen tank.
There may be pressure fluctuations in feedwater systems, depending on reactor power level and purnp performance. The hydrogen addition system shall % designed to accommodate the full range of such fluctuations.
2.3.1.2 Codes and Standards 2.3.1.2 (Paragrapbs I through 5) Comply with intent:
This system shall be designed and Installed Codes and standards used for the hydrogen in accordance with OSHA standards in injection system are equivalent to or more 29 CFR 1910.103, strigent than those identified in this
, secticn.
l Piping and related equipment shall be :
designed and fabricated to the appropriate edition of ANSI B31.1 or B31.3 for pressu e-retaining components. Storage containers, if used, shall be designed.
constructed, and tested in accordance ,
with appropriate requirements of ASME l B&PV Section VIII or API Standard 620.
All components shall meet all the mandatory requirements and material ,
specifications with regard to manufactere, examination, repair, testiag, identification and certification.
All welding shall be performed using ;
- procedures meeting requirements in AWS i DI.1, ANSI B31.1 or B31.3, or ASME B&PV,Section IX, as appropriate.
Inspection and testing shall be in acenrdance with requirements in ANSI B31.1, ANSI B31.3, or API 620, as appropriate.
System design shall also conform with pertinent portions of NUREG-0800, 10 CFR 50.48, Branch Technical position BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and appropriate standards I and regulations referenced in this document. Appendix A provides a list of i codes, standards, refulations, and l I
published good engineering practices applicable to permanent hydrogen water 2-4
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance chemistry installations. Each utility is responsible for identifying additional plant-specific codes and standards that may apply, such as State-imposed require-ments, Uniform Building Code ACI or A!SC standards.
Piping and equipment shall be marked or 2.3.1.2 (Paragraph 6) Do not comply:
identified in accordance with ANSI 233.1.
See Section 10.1 of the Hydrogen Water Ch<>mistry license package for justifi-cation for noncompliance.
2.3.1.3 System Design Considerations. 2.3.1.3 Comply:
Hydrogen piping from the supply system to the plant may be above or below ground.
Piping below ground shall be designed for cathodic protection (or be coated and wrapped), the appropriate soll conditions such as frost depth or liquefaction, and expected vehicle loads. Guard piping around hydrogen lines is not required; however, consideration shall be given to its use for such pu po:es as protection frcm heavy traffic loads, leak detection and monitoring, or isolation of the potential hazard from nearby equipment, etc. All hydrogen piping should be grounded and have electrical continuity.
Excess flow valves should be installed in the hydrogen line at appropriate locations to restrict flow out of a broken line.
Excess flow protection shall be designed to ensure that a line break will not result in an unacceptable hazard to personnet or equipment (BTP CMEB 9.5-1). The design features for mitigating the consequences of a leak or line break must perform their intended design function with or without
- normal ventilation.
Individual pump 'njection lines shall contain a check valve to prevent feed-water from entering the hydrogen line and to protect upstream hydrogen gas compo-nents. Automatic isolation valves should be provided in each injection line to prevent hydrogen injection into an inactive pump.
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance ,
Purge connections shall be provided to 2.3.1.3 (Continued) Comply:
allow the hydrogen piping to be com-pletely purged of air before hydrogen is introduced into the line. N!trogen or another inert gas shall be used as the purge gas. Gases shall be purged to safe locatior.s, either directly or through intervening flow paths, such that per-sonnel or explos ,ve hazards are not encountered and undesirable quantitles of gas are not injected into the reactor.
Area hydrogen concentration monitors are an acceptable way to ensure that hydrogen concentration is maintained below the flammable limit. If used, such monitors should be located at high points where hydrogen might collect and/or above use points that constitute pott:ntial leaks.
Good engineering practice for locating hydrogen detector heads is to take into consideration the positive buoyancy of gaseous hydrogen. Detector heads shall be located so that the monitors shall be capable of detecting hydrogen leaks with or without normal ventilation. Each utility shall evaluate its particular system design and identify specific points where hydrogen concentration monitors should be installed. Examples of such points includa flanged in-line devices (such as calibrat ion spool pieces associated with mass f'ow-meters), outlets of purge / vent paths, or the items disct ssed in the fo' lowing paragraph. Sleeves or guard pipes can be used as an alternative method to mitigate the consequences of a line break.
A hydrogen addition system will inc ease the hydrogen concentration in the feed-water, reactor, steamlines ar.d main condenser. Each of these systems shall he reviewed for possible detrimental effects.
A discussion of possible coacerns is presented below.
. Main Condenser. The main con- I denser presently handles combustible gases. The hydrogen addition system does not significantly change the 2-6
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Guidelines for Perm:nent BWR Impl:m:ntation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance concentration or volume of noncon- 2.3.1.3 (Continued) Comply:
densables. Therefore, it is not anticipated that hydrogen addition will affect operation of the main condenser.
Off-cas System. Oxygen shall be added into the off-gas system to recombine with the hydrogen flow thus limiting the extent of the system handling hydrogen rich mix-tures and reducing volumetric flow rates. The net effect will probably be a revised heat input into the re-combined off-gas. The capability of the off-gas system to handle this revised heat load must be evaluated to ensure that temperature limits are not exceeded. Considerations in '
the design of the off-gas oxygen injection system should include loss of oxygen and runaway oxygen injectlon.
Steam Piping and Torus. Hydrogen water chemistry may slightly increase the rate of hydrogen leak-age into the torus via the safety relief valves. However, the rate of oxygen leakage will be decreased.
i Thus, the possibility c forming a combustible mixture is not signifi-cantly increased when compared to ,
non-HWC operation.
l Sumps. There are three water systems that may be affected by l HWC: main condenser condensate, feedwater and reactor water. For sumps, which receive water from any of these three sources, the average hydrogen concentration in the water may increase slightly.
The maximum expected concentra-3 tion of hydrogen in the sump atmosphere should be determined to ensure that the hydrogen concentra- '
tion remains below the lower com-bustible limit of hydrogen in air.
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Guldslines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 2.3.2 Oxygen injection System 2.3.2 Comply:
The oxygen injection system injects oxygen into the off-gas system to ensure that all excess hydrogen in the off-gas stream is recombined, it includes all necessary flow control and flow measure-ment equipment.
2.3.2.1 In}ection Point Consideration 2.3.2.1 Comply:
I Oxygen should be injected into a portion Oxygen is injected upstream of the first of the off-gas system that is already stage steam jet air ejector diluted such that the addition of oxygen t
does not create a combustible mixture. If this is not possible, other system design considerations shall be provided in plant-specific cases to reduce the chances for off-gas fires.
2.3.2.2 Codes and Standards 2.3.2.2 (Paragraphs 1, 2,3, and 5) Comply with intent:
The system shall be designed and installed i
in accordance with OSHA standards in 29 Codes and standards used for the oxygen '
CFR 1910.104, and CGA G4.4, Industrial injection system are equivalent to or more Practices for Gaseous Oxygen Trans- stringent than those identified in this mission and Distribution Piping Systems. section.
1 i Piping and related equipment shall be designed, fabricated, tested and installed in accordance with the appropriate edition of ANSI B31.1 or ANSI B31.3. Additional guidance on materlats of construction for oxygen piping and valves is given in Section 3.4 of this report, and in ANSI /
ASTM C63, "Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen Service."
l Welding shall be per fo. rr.ed using procedures meating requirements of AWS Dl.1 or ASME B&PV,Section IX, as appropriate.
Piping shall be marked or identified in 2.3.2.2 (Paragraph 4) Do not comply:
compliance with ANSI 233.1.
See Section 10.1 of the HWC licensing
$.ckage for justification for noncom-
, siance.
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
- System design shall also conform with l appropriate NFPA, CGA, and other stan-1 dards and regulations referenced else- r j where in this document. Each utility is !
- responsible for identifying plant-specific
] codes and stardards that may apply, such ,
! as State-impesed requirements, Uniform i
, Building Code, ACI or AISC standards.
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2.3.2.3 Cleaning 2.3.2.3 Comply with intent:
All portions of the system that may The oxygen piping was cleaned using contact oxygen shall be cleaned as procedures that met the requirements of described in Section 3.4 of this report, and CG A G-4.1 and G-4.4.
In accordance with CGA G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service. I 1
J 2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 2.4 Do not comply l l This subsection discusses the instrumen- See Section 10.2 of the HWC licensing i j tation, controls, and monitoring associated package for justification of the following i with the hydrogen addition system. system trips which were not provided in !
I the design of the HWC system. l The instrumentation and controls include a. High Residual Oxygen in Off-Gas '
all sensing elements, equipment and valve Trip, j operating hand switches, equipment and b. Low Oxygen Injection System Supply 1 valve status lights, process information Pressure or Flow Trip, and ;
instruments, and all automatic control c. Off-Gas Train or Recombiner Train -
) equipment necessary to ensure safe and Trip 1 reliable operation. Table 2-1 lists the ,
i recommended trips of the hydrogen addi-l tion system. The instrumentation shall
! provide indication and/or recording of l q parameters necessary to monitor and con- [
1 trol the system and its equipment. The l j instrumentation shall also indicate and/or i alarm abnormal or undesirable conditions. l Table 2-2 lists the recommended instru- I I mentation and functions. This table also !
! includes instrumentation for hydrogen and :
1 oxygen supply options. Additional infor- !
! mation on instrumentation and controls is !
I provided in Section 3.
! System instrumentation and controls shall i be centralized where feasible to facilitate ease of control and observation of the system. As a minim.m. there shall be a system trouble alarm and/or annunciator provided in the main control room.
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 2.4.1 Hydrogen Injection Flow Control 2.4.1 Comply:
Parallel flow control valves should be i
provided in the hydrogen injection line for system reliability and maintainability. If flow control is automatic, hydrogen flow rate should be controlled as a function of plant process parameters such as steam or feedwater flow.
The capability should be provided to adju:t flow rate to each pump manually, if this is found to be necessary to achieve adequate hydrogen distribution.
Manual isolation valves shall be provided in each pump injection line to accommo-date pump out-of-service conditions.
Individual pump injection lines should contain automatic isolation valves inter-locked to the corresponding pump, so that i hydrogen is not injected into a pump that
! is not running.
'l Provisions for shutoff of hydrogen injection shall be provided in the control room.
2.4.2 Oxygen !njection Flow Control 2.4.2 (Paragraph 1) Comply with intent:
Parallel flow control valves should be Only a single pure oxygen train is provided provided in the oxygen injection line for for each unit. The second train is from an system reliability and maintainability, air intake in the building. Each train has a
. single flow control valve.
j Oxygen flow rate shall be controlled to
! provide residual oxygen downstream of the 2.4.2 (Paragraph 2) Comply:
! recombiners. System controls shall be designed to ensure that oxygen injection continues af ter hydrogen flow stops, so that all free hydrogen is safely recombined.
2.4.3 Monitoring 2.4.3 Comply:
1 Provision shall be made to monitor con-I tinuously the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the recirculation water. In j obtaining samples of recirculation water i for this purpose, appropriate containment j isolation shall be provided in accordance I
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, Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation Implementation or Justification for Nonconformance t
with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General '
Design Criteria 3, 54, 55, 56, or 57.
Provision should be made to monitor
! continuously the concentration of oxygen
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and hydrogen in the off-gas flow down- l stream of the recombiners. Hydrogen and :
1 oxygen monitoring in the off-gas recom- l biner system should meet the acceptance i criteria of Standard Review Plan 11.3 with l 1
the exception that automatic control i functions are not required.
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. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification !
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance __
3.0 SUPPLY FACILITIES ,
3.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN 3.1.1 System Overview 3.1.1 Comply with intent:
Hydrogen gas can be supplied from either A hydrogen supplier has not been chosen permanent high-pressure vessels or from at this time, When chosen, the hydrogen ,
transportable tube trailers. For the supplier will meet the intent of the crl-4 permanent storage system, gaseous hydro- teria in this section.
gen is stored in seamless ASME code vessels at pressures up to 2,400 psig and I ambient temperatures. Transportable i l vessels are designed to DOT standards and l store hydrogen at pressures up to 2,650 '
psig at ambient temperatures. With either storage design, the gas is routed through a i
, pressure control station which maintains a ;
) constant hydrogen supply pressure. In any '
event, the gaseous hydrogen system shall l
- be provida.4 by a supplier who has exten- l l sive experience in the design, operation i and maintenance of associated storage and l 4
supply systems. Gaseous hydrogen shall be l provided per CGA G-3 and G-5.3. !
i 3.1.2 Specific Equipment Description i
[ c 3.1.2.1 Hydrogen Storage Vessels 3.1.2.t Not Applicable:
)
i The hydrogen storage bank shall be com- The interim hydrogen stipply system will ,
! posed of ASME Code gas storage vessels. utilize transportable tube trailers and the '
Each tube shall be constructed as a seam- long-term hydrogen sup ply system will uti-i] tess vessel with swagged ends. Specific tube design shall be based on ASME Un-lize a cryogenic liquic hydrogen s'orage i
, tank. ;
e fired Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill, l Division 1, including Appendix XIV-70.
The tube bank shall be supported to l prevent movement in the event of line f I
failure and each tube shall be equipped l
- with a close-coupled shutoff valve. As an ;
alternative, one safety valve per bank of
! tubes can be used, provided the safety l l valve is sized to handle the maximum r i relief from all tubes tied into the valve. ,
i Each bank shall be equipped with a ther-j mometer and a prcessure gauge, as is .
i necessary for proper filling. l P
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation for Nonconformance 3.1.2.2 Transportable Hydrogen Storage 3.1.2.2 Comply with intent:
Vessel See Section 3.1.1 Transportable hydrogen vessels shall be ,
constructed, tested, and retested (every 5 !
a years), in accordance with DOT spec- '
ifications 3A, 3AA, 3AX, or 3AAX. A!! l valving and instrumentation shall be ;
identical to Section 3.1.2.1.
f 3.1.2.3 Pressure Reducing Station 3.1.2.3 Comply with intent:
The pressure control station shall be of a See Section 3.1.1 !
manifold design. The manifold shall have 4
! two (2) full-flow parallel pressure redus-ing regulators. The discharge pressure range i of these regulators shall be adjustable to
- l satisfy plant hydrogen injection require- '
l ments. Pressure gauge shall be provided :
- upstream and downstream of the regu-l lators. Sufficient hand valves shall be provided to ensure complete operational
! flexibility.
' i An excess flow check valve shall be l installed in the manifold immediately [
downstream of the regulators to limit the i flow rate in the event of a line break. The i
! stop-flow setpoint shall be determined by i
! each plant and should be set between the L
! maximum plant flow requirements and the i full C of the flow control valves. l l AdditioEul guidance on excess flow l j protection is provided in Section 2.3.1.3. I 3.1.2.4 Tube Trailer Discharge Stanchion 3.1.2.4 Comply with intent !
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A tube trailer discharge stanchion shall be See Section 3.1.1 y provHed for gaseous product unloading.
The stanchion shall consist of a flexible i pigtall, shutoff valve, check valve, bleed l valve, and nnessary piping. Filling !
j apparatus shall be separated from other l
- equipment for safety and convenience, and I pr tected with walls or barriers to prevent !
vehicular collision. I A tube trailer ground assembly shall be ,
provided for each discharge stanchion to i i ground the tube trailer before the -
! discharge of hydrogen begins.
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification ,
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 3.1.2.5 Interconnecting Pipeline 3.1.2.5 Comply with intent:
All equipment and interconnecting piping See Section 3.1.1 supplied with this system shall be installed ,
in compliance with the following i standards:
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American National Standards Insti-tute (ANSI) B31.1 Power Piping,
! B31.3, Chemical Plant and Petro ~
leum Refinery Piping.
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- National Fire Protection Association l (NFPA) 70, National Electrical
- Code. ;
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NFPA-50A, Bulk Hydrogen Systems.
l All applicable local and national codes.
There are severa! suitable field instal-lation techniques whici are based on i industrial experience. The following are j guidelines which may be used for field ,
l connections:
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Copper-to-Copper, Brass-to-Brass, l and Copper-to-Brass Socket Braze 1 Jsints, i
t J -- Silver Alloy 45% Ag,13% Cu,15% Zn, 24% 1
- Cd., ASTM B260-69T and AWS ;
j A3.8-69T, bag-1 Melting Range-
! Solidus-607.2'C Liquidus-618.3'C
.I 4 - Flux j Working Range 593.3'C to j
1 871.!'C i
j
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Copper, Brass, Carbon Steel, and 4 Stainless Steel N.P.T. Threaded d
Joints.
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- . Guidelines for Permanent BWR loplementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
- TEFLON' Tape *
- 3.1.2.3 (Continued) Comply with intent:
SCOTCH"' Number 45 Tape" See Section 3.1.1 or equal. -195.5'C to +204.4'C. O to 3,000 psig. Wrapped in direction of threads.
Flange Joints (On all Materials).
- Ring Gasket Material Low Pressure (720 psig maximum)
Precut T.F.E. impregnated asbestos, 1/6 inch thickness.
Garlock 900 or equal. -1955'C to
+168.3*C, ) to 900 psig.
-- Ring Gasket Material,, High Pressure FLEXITALLIC' '
- Type. Mate-rial to be 0.175 inch thick 304 stainless steel with TEFLON filler and 0.125 inch carbon steel guido ring.
' TEFLON is a trademark of E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington, DE 19898.
" If tape is used, electrical continulty/ grounding of each piping section should be confirmed.
- SCOTCH is a trademark of 3M Company, St. Paul, MN 55101.
""FLEXITALLIC is a trademark of Flexitallic Gasket Co., Bellmawr, NJ 03031.
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
- Antiseize Compound 3.1.2.3 (Continued) Comply with intent:
For flange f ace, nut, and bolt See Section 3.1.1 lubrication. Halocarbon 25-55 grease or equal. -195.5'C to 1 +176.6*C, O to 3,000 psig. DO NOT USE ON ALUMINUM, MAG-NESIUM, OR THEIR ALLOYS UNDER CONDITIONS OF HIGH
- Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum Alloys Socket and Butt Welds.
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- Welding Procedure Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW),
) Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
, (GTAW), Shielded Metal Arc 1
Welding ((SMAW),
Welding PAW); or Plasma Arc with appropriate filler material and shleiding
, gas. Proper surface and joint I preparation (in regard to cleaning j and clearances) should be exercised.
. 3.1.2.6 Component Cleaning 3.1.2.6 Comply with intent ,
All components that contact hydrogen See Section 3.1.1 must be free of moisture, loose rust, ,
scale, slag, and weld spatters they must be ;
! essentially free of organic matter, such as >
] oil, grease, crayon, paint, etc. To meet !
! these objectives, system components shall
- be cleaned in accordance with standard ;
industrial practices, as recommended by i the gas supplier, prior to and following i system fabrication.
1 3.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN )
l 3.2.1 System Overview a
3.2.1 Comply with intent:
I j Liquid hydrogen is stored in a vacuum- A liquid hydrogen supplier has not been
! jacketed vessel at pressures up to 150 psig chosen at this t'me. When chosen, the -
{;
and temperatures up to -403'F (satu- hydrogen supplier will meet the intent of rated). Based on data relating hydrogen the criteria in this section.
injection pressures to BWR plant power levels, hydrogen supply from a liquid 3-5 1
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance source can be provided directly from a tank or pumped into supplementr.1 gaseous storage. Gaseous storage requirements are identified in Section 3.1 The required supply pressure shall be based on pressure requirements at the point of hydrogen injection and line losses from the hydrogen supply system to the injection point.
Feedwater pressure requirements and line losses must not exceed 120 psig if hydro-gen is to be supplied directly from a liquid tank.
In any event, the liquid hydrogen system shall be provided by a supplier who has extensive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of associated storage cnd supply systems, such as cryogenic pumping. Liquid hydrogen shall be provided in accordance with CGA G-5 and G-5.3.
3.2.2 Specific Equipment Description 3.2.2.1 Cryogenic Tank. 3.2.2.1 Comply with intent:
Tanks for liquid hydrogen service are See Section 3.2.1 available with capacities between 1,500 gallons and 20,000 gallons. An "inner !'
vessel" or "liquid container" is supported
- w. thin an "outer vessel" or "vacuum jacket," with the space between filled j with insulation and evacuated. Necessary piping connects from inside of the inner vessel to outside of the vacuum jacket.
Gauges and valves to indicate the control of hydrogen in the vessel are mounted outside of the vacuum jacket. Legs or '
saddles to support the whole assembly are welded to the outside of the vacuum jacket.
Inner vessels are designed, fabricated, tested, and stamped in accordance with Section VI!!, Division 1, of the ASME Code '
for Unfired Pressure Vessels. Materials suitable for liquid hydrogen service must l have good ductility properties at tem- l peratures of -422'F per CGA G-5. The '
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance cryogenic operating temperatures of these vessels preclude material degrading mechanisms such as corrosion or hydrogen embrittlement. The constant operating vessel pressures assure that flaw growth due to cyclic stress loading wi!! not occur. The inner vessel is subject to a required pressure test which ensures that no flaws exist that could cause a failure at or below the set pressure of the vessel's redundant relief devices. In addition to ASME Code inspection requirements, 100% radiography of the inner vessel longitudinal welds shall be completed.
The tank outer vessel shall be constructed of carbon steel and snalt not require ASME certification.
Insulation between inner and outer vessels shall be either perlite, aluminized mylar, or suitable equal. Fibrous or blanket insulation, such as bonded glass fibers or rock wool, shall not be used because of the potential ia liquid-saturated missiles which wvuld occur only as a result of vi.ssel failure. The annular space should be evacuated to a high vacuum of 50 microns or less.
Tank control piping and valving should be installed in accordance with ANS! B31.1 or B31.3. All piping shall be either wrought copper or stainless steel. The following tank piping subsystems shall be provided:
Fill circuit, constructed with top and bottom lines so that the vessel can be filled without af fecting continu-ous hydrogen supply.
Pressure-build circuit, to keep tank pressures at operational levels.
- Vacuum-jacketed liquid fill and ,
pump circuits, where applicable. ;
3.2.2.2 Overpressure Protection System 3.2.2.2 Comply with intent:
Safety considerations for the tank shall be See Section 3.2.1 satisfied by dual full-flow safety valves and emergency backup rupture discs. The 3-7
Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance primary relief system shall consist of two 3.2.2 (Continued) Comply with intents sets of a minimum of one (1) rupture disk and safety valve piped into separate See Section 3.2.1 "legs." Relief devices shall be connected in parallel with other relief devices. The system shall be coupled by a 3-way divert-er valve or tie bar interlock so that one leg is opened when the other is closed.
With this arrangement, a minimum of one safety valve and one rupture disk will be available at all times. The dual primary relief systcms with 100% standby redun-dancy allows maintenance and testing to be performed without sacrificing the level of protection from overpressure.
The primary relief system shall comply with the provisions of the American l
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) Standards.
The tank shall also be supplied wiih a secondary relief system not required by the ASME Codes. This system shall be totally separate from the primary relief system. It shall consin of a locked open valve, a rupture disk, uw a secondary vent stack. This rupture disk shall be designed to burst at 1.33 times maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP).
Supply system piping that may contain li-quid and can be isolatable from the tank j relief valves shall be protected with ther-4 mal relief valves. All outlet connections from the safety relief valves, rupture de-vices, bleed valves, and the fill line purge connections shall be piped to an overhead vent stack, per CGA G-5, Section 7.3.7.
Two relief devices shall be installed in the tank's outer vessel to relieve any exces-sive pressure buildup in the annular space.
Hydrogen tanks and delivery vehicles shall ;
be grounded per CGA P-12. Sections 5.4,5
- and 5.7.1.2. The storage system shall be :
protected from the ef fects of lightning per NFPA 73, Chapter 6.
3-S !
Guidelines for Permaneni BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance Excess flow protection shall be added to the tank's liquid piping wherever a line break would release a sufficient amount of hydrogen to threaten safety-related structure >. An acceptable methodology is identified in Section 4.2.2, "Pipe Breaks."
3.2.2.3 Instrumentation 3.2.2.3 Comply with intent:
The tank shall be supplied with a pressure See Section 3.2.1 gauge, a liquid level gauge, and a vacuum readout connection. These gauges are sufficient for normal monitoring of the tank condition. Instrumentation for remote monitoring, such as high/ low-pressure switches, pressure and level transmitters, may be added. A listing of supply system instrumentation and control is identified in Section 2.4.
3.2.2.4 Liquid Hydrogen Pump and 3.2.2.4 Comply with intent:
Controls See Section 3.2.1 l The liquid hydrogen pump shall be of proven design to provide continuous hydrogen supply in unattended, automatic operation. The following items comprise ,
the more important system controls. '
l 3.2.2.4.1 Positive Isolation Valve 3.2.2.4.1 Comply with intent:
A positive isolation valve shall be used to See Section 3.2.1 control the liquid feed into the pumping system per NFPA 308. The valve shall be a failed-closed, pneumatically operated valve. The valve shall only be open during pump operation, shall close in any fault ,
l mode, and shall be able to be remotely '
overridden in case of em,ergency.
3.2.2.4.2 System Overpressure Shutdown 3.2.2.4.2 Comply with intent:
Although the system is protected by See Section 3.2.1 safety relief valves and rupture discs, system overpressure shall be avoided by shutting down the pumps at high pressure.
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. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance .
- t-t 3.2.2.4.3 Temperature Indicating Switch 3.2.2.4.3 Comply with intent l A temperature switch shall continuously See Section 3.2.1 l l monitor the downstream gas line for low :
temperature and shall trip the liquid pump to protect downstream equipment from ,
low temperatures. ,
l 3.2.2.4.4 Pump operation 3.2.2.4.4 Comply with intent
) Pump operation shall be continuously See Section 3.2.1 and automatically monitored. Operation .
which results in pump cavitation, high l 7
temperature at the pump discharge, or low
- temprature downstream of the vaporizer <
shal; cause the pump to be shut down by the remote control panel. ?he fault shall be truficated on the remote osntrol panel by an audible alarm and light indication. ,
3.2.2.4.5 Purging of Controls 3.2.2.4.5 Comply with intent li j
. All electrical components in hydrogen See Section 3.2.1 i'
serv,lce should be designed in accordance i with NFPA 70. Only nitrogen or another !
inert gas shall be used for purging pump i motors, control panels and valves. I t
3.2.2.5 Interface with Gaseous System 3.2.2.3 Comply with intent l
. Liquid hydrogen pump systems typically See Section 3.2.1 i 1 require a gaseous storage system as a i l surge or backup to plant hydrogen supply.
- These storage systems shall be designed in accordance with Section 3.1, Gaseous l l i Hydrogen. Whenever a gaseous backup is ,
j used in conjunction with a liquid hydrogen l 4 system, switchover controls shall be :
J provided, j l 3.2.2.6 Vaporization 3.2.2.6 Comply with intent )
} Vaporization of the liquid hydrogen shall See Section 3.2.!
be achieved by the use of ambient air vapor!ters. Vaporizer design, installation and operation shall take guidance from ,
NFPA MA and SOB.
l 3-10 l
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Guidelines for P;rminent BWR Impl:m:ntation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance The vaporizer should feature a star fin design and aluminum alloy construction.
For a combined liquid and gaseous storage system, the vaporizers used should have a design pressure consistent with plant in-jection pressure requirements. The units may be piped in parallel such that each unit can operate independently. Parallel vaporizer assemblies shall be sized for the peak hydrogen flow required for each plant and shall provide for periodic intervals for defrosting, as appropriate.
Other atmospheric vaporization systems may be utilized if their capacity is demonstrated to be adequate for the plant flow and ambient conditions.
For a pumped liquid only storage system, the vaporizer must withstand maximum pressures generates : rom the cryogenic pump. These vaporizers shall be equipped with stainless steel lining - 'gned to 3500 psig.
3.3. ELECTROLYTIC 3.3.1 System Overview 3.3.1 Not Applicable:
The disassociation of water by electrolysis The electrolytic method of producing is an acceptable method of obtaining the hydrogen is not being considered at this gases needed for hydrogen water chem- time.
istry. This can be done on site and the gases can conveniently be generated at the rate used. The electrolytic gas generator should be proven equipment, the same as used in other industrial appli-cations. Depending on the generator operating pressure, either hydrogen com-pressors or pressure breakdown (control) is utilized to match plant hydrogen injection pressure requirements. The electrolytic system shall be provided by a supplier 9,ho has extensive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of these systems.
3-11
. _ _ _ _ .. - - . - -_ -. = - .
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. t Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance l 3.4 LIQUID OXYGEN ,
3.4.1 System Overview 3.4.1 Comply: f i Liquid oxygen is stored in a vacuum- The HWC system contains an !!,000 gallon i
jacketed vessel at pressures up to 250 psig liquid oxygen tank. j i and temperatures up to -251*F (satu-
'I rated). Oxygen taken from the vessel ;
shall be vaporized through ambient air j vaporizers and routed through a pressure
- i j control station which maintains gas pressures within the desired range. The 1 liquid oxygen system shall be provided by i a supplier who has extensive experience in i the design, operation and maintenance of l associated storage and supply systems. :
- Liquid oxygen shall be provided per CGA j G-4 and G-4.3. ;
i 3.4.2 Specific Equipment Description '
{ 3.4.2.1 Cryogenic Tank. Tanks for liquid 3.4.2.1 Comply: i oxygen service, with capacities between
) 3,000 gallons and 11,000 galicns are simi- !
j lar in principle. An "inner vessel" or ;
"liquid container" is supported within an l 1 "outer vessel" or "vacuum Jacket," with !
insulation provided in the space between !
1 the tanks. Necessary piping connects I
< from inside of the inner vessel to outside i of the vacuum Jacket. Gauges and valves
] to indicate the control of product in the 4 vest.el are mounted outside of the vacuum '
- jacket. Legs or saddles to support
- .he i'
whole assembly are welded to the outside of the vacuum jacket. I i
l Inner vessels shall be designed, fabricated, a tested and stamped in accordance with Section Vill, Division I, of the ASME Code
- i for Unfired Pressure Vessels., Materials j suitable for liquid oxygen service must J
have good ductility properties at I
cryogenic temperatures of -300'F per CG A G-4. The outer vessel should be constructed of carbon steel and does not
- require ASME certification.
4 l
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! 3-12 1
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance insulation between inner and outer vessels shall be either perlite, aluminized mylar or suitable equal. The annular space should be evacuated to a high vacuum of 50 microns or less.
Tank control piping and valving should be installed in accordanca with ANSI B31.1 of B 31.3. All piping shall be either wrought copper or stainless steel. The following tank piping subsystems shall be provided:
- Fill circuit constructed with top and bottom lines so that the vessel can be filled without affecting system operation.
Pressure-build circuit, to keep tank pressures at operational levels.
- Economizer ci cuit, to preferentially .
feed oxygen gas from vessel vapor space to process.
3.4.2.2 Overpressure Protection System. 3.4.2.2 Comply:
Safety considerations for the tank shall be satisfied by dual full-flow safety valves and emergency backup rupture discs. The primary relief system shall consist of two sets of one (1) safety valve and one (1)
- rupture disc piped into separate legs, l coupled by a three way valve. This dual i primary relief system with 100% standby redundancy allows maintenance and test-ing to be performed without sacrificin the level of protection from overpressure.g The prirr.ary relief system shall comply with the provisions of the ASME Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) Standards.
Annular space safety heads shall be provided to relieve any excess positive pressure buildup which might result from e leak in an inner ves.s!. Supply system piping that mey contain liquid can be isolatable from the tank relief valves shall be piotected with thermal relief valves.
]
3-13
Guidelines for Parmanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance _
The tank shall be supplied with a pressure gauge, a liquid level gauge, and a vacuum readout connection. These gauges are suf-ficient for normal monitoring of the tank condition. Instrumentation for remote monitoring, such as high/ low-pressure switches, pressure and level transmitters may be added. A listing of supply system instrumentation and control is identified in Section 2.4.
3.4.2.3 Vaporization. The vaporization of 3.4.2.3 (Paragraph 1) Comply:
the liquid oxygen shall be achieved by the ,
use of ambient air vaporizers.
The vaporizer should feature a star fin 3.4.2.3 (Paragraph 2) Comply with intents .
design and extruded aluminum alloy con-struction. The vaporizers shall have a The vaporizers to be used feature a hex
, minimum design pressure of at least 300 fin design.
l psig. The units shall be piped in parallel such that each unit can operate indepen-dently. Parallel vaporizer assemblies shall be sized to handle peak plant flow require- <
ments and shall provide for periodic inter-vals for defrosting, as appropriate. Other atmospheric vaporization systems may be i utilized if their capacity is demonstrated to be adequate for the plant flow and ambient conditions.
3.4.2.4 Pressure Control Station. The 3.4.2.4 Comply:
pressure control station shall be of a ,
manifold design. The manifold shall have two (2) full-flow parallel pressure reducing regulators. The discharge pressure range ;
of these regulators shall be adjustable to {
satisfy plant oxygen injection require- [
ments. Pressure gauges shall be provided r upstream and downstream of the regula- !
4 tors and sufficient hand valves shall be !
! provided to ensure complete operational !
flexibility, i
. Protection of downstream equipment from iow-oxygen temperatures shall be included l in the system design. ;
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justificco.lon :
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance I l
3.4.3 Materials of Construction for Oxy- 3.4.3 Comply:
Een Piping and Valves l
The design and installation of oxygen piping and related equipment shall be in L I
accordance with ANSI B31.1 or B31.3 and 3
the following guidelines for material l selection for oxygen systems. J Observations of past oxygen fires indicate {
that ignition can occur in carbon steel and i j stainless steel piping systems operating at, or near, sonic velocity. Friction from high i velocity particles is considered to be the
! source of ignition. Copper, brass, and
- nickel alloys have the characteristic of
. melting at temperatures below their i
respective ignition temperatures. This
, makes these materlats extremely resistant
, to ignition sources, and once ignited, they
! exhibit a much slower rate of burning than 1
carbon or stainless steels.
As a result of these observations, the i following materials, in order of prefer- i
! ence, are acceptable for oxygen service.
1 In the case of carbon steel or stainless i
steel, the maximum velocity of gaseous oxygen shall be within guidelines estab-
- lished by the Compressed Gas Association
CGA Pamphlet CGA-4.4, "Industrial Prac-4 tices for Gaseous Oxygen. Transmisslor 2
and nistribution Piping Systems." >
- Copper l
Brass l
l .
Monel I t J .
Stainless Steel j
Carbon Steel i ;
If steel pipe is to be used for the system and some local flow conditions could cause l the velocity to exceed that established in i
! CGA G-4.4, then that portion of the sys.
l tem must be converted to a copper-based j alloy and extend a minimum of 10 diame-J ters downstream of the point of return to J
j 1 3-15
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Guldelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
, the allowable velocity. These local flow 3.4.3 (Continued) Comply:
conditions may occur at control valves, orifices, branch line takeoff points, and in i the discharge piping of safety telle!
devices, j Valves that open rapidly are not suitable i for oxygen service, since rapid filling of
- an oxygen line will result in a temperature
! increase due to adiabatic compression. As
- a result of this phenomenon, ball valves 3 and automatic valves may only be used .
with the following restrictions:
- Valve bodies shall be made of c j copper alloy. Balls shall be monel or 1
brass. Valve seats and seals should be teflon, nonplasticized Ke!-F, j Kalrez, or Viton.
Ball valves may not be used as process control valves in throttling or re;;;lating service. Ball valves may be used as isolation valves, l
emergency shutoff valves, or vent or bleed valves where they are either fully open or fully closed.
l Pneumatic or electric ball valves used for on-off services shall have an actuation time from fully closed to fully open of 4 seconds or greater for pressures Jp to 250 psig. No restriction is placed on actuation time from fully open to fully closed.
Piping immediately downstream must be a straight run of copper-bearin3 material for a minimum of 10 diameters.
- Pneumatic or electric ball valves used for emergency service may be fully open or fully closed to the amergency position, with no restric-tions on actuation time.
Sultable valve packing, seats, and gasket materials are listed below in order of preference from the oxygen compatibilit y basis only.
3-16
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i . Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification j j* Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance i l
1 1
]
- Teflon ,
I a Glass filled Teflon !
i 4
- Nonplasticized Kel-F !
r i j
- Garlock 900 f
!
- Viton or Viton A :
3.4.4 Oxygen Cleanina 3.4.4 Comply with intents l'
j All piping, fittings, valves, and other The oxygen supply system was cleaned a material may contact oxygen shall be using procedures that met the require-
] cleaned to remove internal organic, ments of CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4.
] inorganic, and particulate matter in l j accordance with CGA 4.1, Observation !
i has shown that ignition can occur in '
j properly designed piping systems when I
- foreign matter is introduced. Th refore, l removal of contaminants such as grease, !'
l
, ells, thread lubricants, dirt, water, filings, j scale, weld spatter, paints, or other j foreign material is essential. Cleaning i
- should be accomplished by precleaning all ;
) parts of the system, maintaining cleantl- !
i ness during construction, and by com- [
i pletely cleaning the system after !
l construction. :
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. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance l
4.0 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 4.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN j 4.1.1 Site Characteristics of Gaseous and ,
Liquid Hydrogen ;
4.1.1.1 Overview. Review of the 4.1.1.1 Comply: ,
following site characteristics shall be conducted by each BWR facility in locating the gaseous and/or liquid hydrogen supply systems: ,
- Location of supply system in proximity to exposures as addressed ,
in NFPA SOA and SOB. !
t
. Route of hydrogen delivery on site.
- Location of supply system in ;
proximity to safety-related ,
equipment. i 4.1.1.2 Specific Considerations. !
r 4.1.1.2.1 Fire Protection. The area 4.1.1.2.1 (Paragraph 1) Comply with selected for hydrogen system siting shall intents i meet or exceed all requirements for protection of personnel and equipment as Paragraph 3-1.2 of NFPA 30A-1984 :
addressed in NFPA SOA and SOB, gaseous requires that gaseous hydrogen systems !
and liquified hydrogen systems, respec. shall be located above ground. The [
tively. Each standard identifies the gaseous supply vessel is located above t maximum quantity of hydrogen storage ground but the piping from the supply !
mmitted and the minimum distance from facility to the turbine building is below (
lydrogen systems to a number of ground. This is considered acceptable as [
exposures, the piping is routed above ground prior to l entering the turbine building.
The need for additional fire protection for other than the hydrogen facility shall be 4.1.1.2.1 (Paragraph 2) Comply: '
determined by analysis of local conditions of hazards onsite, exposure to other prop- [
erties, water supplies, and the probable elfectiveness of plant fire brigades in i accordance with NFPA SOA and 308. l 4.1.1.2.2 Security. All hydrogen storage 4.1.1.2.2 Comply: l sy:. tem installations shall be enm,n!;iety l fenced, even when located within the l owner-controlled area. Lighting shall be l installed to facilitate night surveillance, j l
t 4-1
Cuidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 4.1.1.2.3 Route of ifydrogen Delivery on 4.1.1.2.3 Comply:
- Site. Each plant shou;d determine the i route to be taken by hydrogen delivery trucks through onsite and of ts te areas, in l
order to protect the hydrogen storage area !
f from any vehicular acc' dents, truck i j barriers shall be installed around the i perimeter of the system installation.
Within the plant security area, all deliveries shall be controlled per the ,
requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. ;
4.1.1.7.4 Location of Storage System to 4.1.1.2.4 Comply:
Safety-Related 5tructures. Each )lant i shall determine that the location of the The hydrogen storage area is 1500 feet !
i hydrogen storage system is acceptable south of the nearest safety-related l J . elative to safety-related structures and structure, which is the Unit I and 2 '
equipment considering the hazards control room.
- described in Sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.1, ,
l and 4.2.2.
] 4.1.2 Caseous Storage Vessel Failure 4.1.2 Comply:
Gaseous storage vessels in the scope of !
this report are the commercially avail- r i able, seamless, swagged-ended vessels ,
l' that are commonly referred to as "hydril !
tubes." This sectie addresses the non-
- mechanistic rumure failure of single !
l Vessels and *he . separation distances j i required to avoid damage to safety- ;
- related equipment. Simultaneous failure l
- of multiple vessels is not addressed !
j because the inherent strength of the !
vessel makes them unsusceptible to ! allure i from outside forces. These vessels shall
, be capable of withstanding tornado i
- missiles (NUREG-0800) and site specific seismic loading due to horizontal and
', vertical accelerations acting simultaneously.
These features eliminate common etase
- vessel failures so that the maximum
! postulated instantaneous release is the i
fully pressurized contents of the largest 1 single vessel. The potential consequences of such a release, a fireball or an j explosion, are addressed in order, i
4-2 I
1
Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Ch(mistry Installation for Nonconformance 4.1.2.1 Fireball. The thermal flux versus 4.1.2.1 Comply:
distance from the fireball center are shown on Figure 4-1 for the two most common vessel sizes. These fluxes and durations will not adversely af fect safety-related structures. However, each utility shall review any unique site characterls-ties to assure all safety-related equipment 1 will function in the event of a fireball.
i 4.1.2.2 Explosion. When a gaseous stor- 4.1.2.2 Comply:
age vessels ruptures, the expansion of the j high-pressure gas results in rapid turbultat mixing with the surrounding air. In the '
case of gaseous hydrogen, the release will I go through the detonation limits of 18.3 -
39% before the wind can translate the mixture. Consequently, any explosion blastwaves will originate at the vessel I rupture site. For this report, it is i
conservatively assumed that 100% of the a vessel contents will contribute to the j blastwave and that tha TNT-hydrogen equivalence is 20% on an energy basis (320% on a mass basis). This translates to 27.1 lbs of TNT per 1000 standard cubic feet (SCF) of gaseous hydrogen. Using i this conversion factor and U.S. Army Technical Manual TM5-1300, blast over-pressures and impulses can be calculated as functions of distance from the vessel location. These blast parameters could then be compared to the dynamic strength of safety-related structures.
) An evaluation entitled "Separation Distances Recommended for Hydrogen i
] Storage to Prevent Damage to Nuclear >
j
, Power Plant Structures From Hydrogen i I
Explosion" was performed for EPRI by R. P. Kennedy. This evaluation, which is I
included as Appendix B of these guide-lines, recommends separation distances
, based on quantitles of stored hydrogen and l building design factors. The recommenda.
J tions are provided in the form of step-by-
- step procedures, with subsequent steps
i requiring additional work but resulting in l
i !
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o Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation for Nonconformance !
reduced distances from the previous step. The procedure to determine accept-able separation distances is outlined 1 below.
- Step 1. For any reinforced concrete or masonry walls at least 3 inches
- thick, the upper curve on Figure 4-2 provides conservative separation distances as a function of vessel
- size. If this is acceptable, then no further work is needed. Otherwise, proceed to step 2.
- Step 2. For reinforced concrete walls at least 18 inches thick, with known static strength and percent tensile rebar Eq. 7 in Appendix B can be used to determine required separation distances. The two lower curves on Figure 4-2 are representa-tive examples of design parameters l for walls of nuclear power plants.
- Walls with different parameters 4
should be analyzed using the i j methods in Appendix B, pages 10 through 13. If this is acceptable, then no forther work is needed.
Otherwise, proceed to step 3.
- Step 1. For separation distances i closer than allowed by the above ! '
and 2, perform a dynamic blast
] capacity analysis in accordance with (
) NUREG/CR-2462 Q).
I For all storage locations, the vessel (s) and I the foundation (s) shall be designed to remain in place for both design-basis tornado characteristics and site-specific
- flood conditions.
l 4.1.3 Caseous Pipe Breaks 4.1.3 Comply:
I l This section addresses the requirements l for hydrogen piping systems attached to i gaseous storage vessels up to the point l where excess flow protection is provided.
l The criterla for acceptable sitmg for the l j event of a pipe break are: I 4e
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. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
- Dilution of resultant release below 4.1.3 (Continued) Comply:
4 the lower flammability limit of 4%
before reaching air pathways into safety-related structures.
- Minimum separate distances for the blast damage criteria outlined in Section 4.1.2.
It is conservatively assumed that all releases occur while the storage vessel is at 2.450 psig. This is the maximum l allowable working pressure of the majority of commercially available vessels.
l Caseous releases at elevated pressures result in supersonic jet velocities and a ,
dispersion prMess that is momentum-dominated. Under these conditions, the Gaussian dispersion model unrealistically overestimates the amount of hydrogen in
- the explosive region and the distance to i the lower flammable region. Therefore, j these properties of gaseous releases were calculated using a jet dispersion model i
)
described in Reference Q).
The results of this modeling are shown in l Figure 4 3 as minimum separation dis- '
l tances versus inside diameter of the l
pipe. The upper curve is the maximum l distance to the lower flammability limit of 4% hydrogen. Each utility shall determine that the location of air pathways into safety related structures exceeds this minimum separation distance or show that other criteria should be ;
applied to a specific case. An example of i such an exception would be if the air intakes have automatic shutters con-trolled by hydrogen analyzers thus i preventing the ingestion of a flammable I mixture.
l The lower curve on Figure 4-3 is the mini-j mum required distance to safety-related :
j structures with greater than or equal to an ;
! 8 inch thick reinforced masonry or con- l l crete wall. This distance includes the
! drif t distance of an unignited, f ully deve-
) loped gaseous jet plus the blast distance i 4-3 1 l
( )
l i=
j' Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance foundation design at each installa- 4.2.1 (Continued) Comply: l tion shall meet these requirements.
l Design basis tornado-generated mis-siles are capable of breaching all j known commercially available liquid j hydrogen storage vessels. There-t fore, tornado missiles are a potential
- cause of "storage vessel failure."
. Aircraft i A large aircraf t crashing directly 2 into the storage area is capable of j breaching all known commercially available liquid I.yd ogen storage ,
vessels. Therefore, aircrdt crash is '
a potential cause of "storage vesse!
. failure." .
l l
1 4
- Fire ,
I The overpressure protection system i shall be sized to accommodate the worst-case vaporization rate caused ,
j by a hydrocarbon fire engulfing the outer shell with loss of vacuum and hydrogen in the annulus of the
- double-wall storage tank (as per L
- Compressed Gas Association 5.3 and ASME Section Vill requirements).
- Flood 1
i
) The following flood conditions could l result in vessel failures ;
I l
{ -- High water reaches the top of !
i the vent stack for the overpres- t sure protection system. *
-- High flood velocities dislodge the tank. ;
I Under either condition, water could !
enter the vent system and defeat the '
overpressure protection system.
Therefore, the tank shall be located l I
such that masimum flood heights l Cannot esceed the vent stack (
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance elevation and such that potential 4.2.1 (Continuod) Comply:
flood velocities cannot damage the vent stack or dislodge the tank.
- Vehicle impact !
The :torage vessel shall be protected l from the impact of the largest i vehicle 9 sed onsite by a barricade i capable of stopping such a vehicle.
I e Vessel Structural Failure l The storage vessel shall be designed,
! constructed, inspected and operated i J to assure an extremely low l
) likelihood of tank structural failure l during its tenure on site. A vessel '
! designed in accordance with this ,
i document complies with this low- !
probability requirement. i 4.2.l.1 Fireball 4.2.1.1 Comply -
i For the two potential causes of "storage !
- vessel failure," tornado missiles and
! aircraft impact, a fireball at the tank .
l location is the expected result. The major
] reasons for this is the high ignitability of
- hydrogen and the density of ignition ,
q sources in the af termath of these casual i
, events. An aircraf t impact or a design '
i basis tornado and the associated missiles 1 will also provide numerous sources of r i
ignition from downed power lines. l 3 damaged transformers, and switchgears, ;
! etc. Detalls of these considerations are '
en in the report for the Dresden plant l
~
1 The thermal flux versus distance from the fireball center (tank location) is shown on ,
i Fl;vre t,-4 for the range of commercially ,
available tank sizes. The durations of the various fireball sizes are also given. ,
- These fluxes and durations will not
- adversely affect equipment or personnel
! enclosed in concrete / steel safety-related l l structures. However, each utility shall '
1
) !
i 4-3 I
I !
i
i _____.______________
I i.
!- l
{ Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification :
j*
'4ydrogen Water Chemistry Installation , , _
for Nonconformance
} [
- for the me.ximum amount of hydrogen in !
i the detonable region. It conservatively i assumes that the pipe break is oriented
~
[
directly toward the safety-related struc- [
tures. Each utility shall determine '
compliance with this minimum separation distance or demonstrate that other ,
criteria should be applied.
! 4.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN 4.2 Comply
! 4.2.1 Storage Vessel Failure 4.2.1 Comply j i
i For this report, storage vessel failure is l j defined as a large breach resulting in the ;
rapid emptying of the entire contents of
^
i
! liquid hydrogen, it is assumed that the i tank is full at the time of failure and that j the entire spill vaporizes instantane- i 1 ously. The following enumerates potential l causes of vessel fa lere and the required j design features that mitigate or alleviate '
j these potentials. j
+ Seismic The tank and its foundation shall be e i designed to meet the seismic !
j criterion for critical structures and !
j equipment at the plant site (i.e., j j design basis earthquake), it is j j preferable to seismically support all
) liquid hydrogen piping. If this is not ;
possible, the liquid hydrogen piping !
j shall be seismically supported up to and including excess flow protection devices. The specific liquid hydrogen tank and poing design at ;
each installation sha t'. meet these requirements.
]
Tornado and Tornado Missiles l t
- The tank and its foundation shall be !
designed to withstand the "design basis tornado characteristics" as ,
outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.76.
- As a minimum, the tank shall remain i in alace so that any liquid spillage !
wil ,
originate from the tank i location. The specific tank and I s
4-6 l
l
- I i ,
0 Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implenientation or Justification ljy,drogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance :
review any unique site characteristics to assure all safety-related equipment will function in the event of a fireball.
- 0.2.1.2 Explosion at Tank Site 4.2.1.2 Comply:
Although an explosion is not expected,
, safety related structures and equipinent shall be verified to be capable of with- 1 i
standing a detonation occurring at the site of the tank installation. For the instantaneous release of the entire tank contents, the following wae used to L
] determine blast parametero for an explo-l sion at the tank sites
- 1. Gaussian F weather stability
[
i
- 2. Detonation limits of hydrogen. '
18.3-39 %
- 3. TNT - hydrogen equivalent of i 20% on an energy basis (320% on I a mass basis) -
i NUREG/CR-2726 reports that detonations L 4
have been observed for hydrogen concen-trations as low as 13.8% when ignited in a l long, large-diameter tube. The explosive l yield or TNT equivalence of such threshold concentration reactions is extremely low ;
because most of the combustion energy is ['
expended in the transition to detonation.
) This is essentially the reason w hy it i represents the lower detonation limits any ,
less concentration will give a zero l detonation yield. This also points out that 1 both hydrogen concentration and explosive :
) yield affect the total equivalent mass of l 1
TNT for a given release. !
i l j Regulatory Guide 1.91 models the blast I 2
ef fects from transportation accidents by i assuming 100% of the cargo detonates at a !
TNT mass equivalence of 240% (one pound
! of cargo equals 2.4 pounds of TN1). The analysis described in this report modeled
- large spills of hydrogen by calculating the amount of release that is between 13.3 and 39% (-46% of the sessel contents) and assuming that it detonates at a TNT mass i t. 9 l
l
i.
j Guidelines for Permanent BOR Implementation or Justification ,
Hydrogen Water Chem!stry Installation for Nonconformance :
! l j equivalence of $20% The resulting TNT !
i equivalence for this method is one pound ,
1 of vessel contents equals 2.4 pounds of i l TNT, an identical result to that obtained i 4
with the NRC method. ;
The above results in an equivalence of 1.37 lbs of TNT per gallon of tank size. l Using this conversion factor end U.S. :
Army Technical Manual TM)-1300 and the :
1 damage criteria outlined in Appendix B, ;
., required separation distances have been ;
) determined as a function of tank size. l 1 The results are shown on Figure 4 5 for j
!' the design parameters of the three i building types described in Section j l 4.1.2.2. For buildings with other design j
- prameters, the methods in Appendix B or l I .n NUREG/CR-2462 (1) may be used to r i determine separation ~ distances. Each !
1 utility shall use these methods for
) determining the minimum required separa- ,
j tion distances from the storage tank to ;
1 safety related structures or equipment for ;
the event of an explosion at the tank site. ;
4.2.2 Pipe Breaks 4.2.2 Comply:
)
f
! This section addresses the requirements i j for gaseous and liquid hydrogen pipir'g '
systems attached to the storage vessel up !
} to the poini where excess flow protection i is provided. The criteria for acceptable j siting for the esent of a pipe break are the j same as outlined in Section 4.1.3. It is ,
s conservatively essurped that all releases I
] occur while the storage vessel is at 130 !
psig (the maximum allowable working l pressure of the majority of commercially ;
I available tanks), j l !
j 4.2.2.1 Caseous Piping 4.2.2.1 Comply: l The same dispersion medel for momen- f 1 tum-dominated jets discussed in Section !
, 4.1.3 applies to gaseous releases from i liquid storage tank piping with the ' '
appropriate release conditions for 1 saturated vapors. The results of this l 1 modeling are shown in Figure 4 6 as j 4 10 I
a Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation ,
for Nonconformance minimum separation distances versus hole size or inside diameter of piping not protected with excess _ flow devices. .The upper curve is the maximum drif t distance to the lower flammability limit and is the
- minimum required separation distance to
. air pathways into safety-related struc-tures. The three lower curves are required separation distances for the representative types of safety-related structures. These distances are the sum of both the drif t and blast distances. .
Structures with other parameters can be analyzed using the methods in Appendix B or in NUREG/CR-2462 (1). Each utility shall determine that the storage vessel piping and location meet these minimum requirements or show that less stringent criteria should be applied to a specific case. An example of such a suitable exception would be if the air intakes are provided with automatic shutters controlled by hydrogen analyzers to prevent the ingestion of a flammable mixture.
4.2.2.2 1.iquid Piping 4.2.2.2 Comply:
The vapor cloud formed by the flashing and rapid vaporization of a liquid release is nearly neutrally buoyant and has little momentum associated with its forma-tion. For these conditions, a Gaussian dispersion model is employed using the following conservative assumptions: i l
- 1. Instantaneous vaporization of re-lease
- 2. F weather stability
- 3. I m/s wind speed
- 4. Wind direction towards safety-related area No credit is to be taken for site-specific j wind direction or speed characteristics ;
since it is assumed that pipe breaks can 1 i occur during the worst-case weather and )
wind conditions. j 4-11 1
I i
- . - - - - - _ . - .-,-c.--- ,
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance The minimum required separation dis-tances for liquid hydrogen pipe breaks, using the above assumptions, are given on Figure 4-7 as a function of discharge rate and hole size. The upper curve is the drif t distance to the lower flammability limit for a fully developed could with F stability and I m/s windspeed. This defines the minimum required separction distance to air pathways into safety-related struc-tures. The three lower curves define the minimum required separation distances to the representative safety-related struc-tures. These curves include the drif t distance to the center of the detonable cloud and the b!ast distance for the amount of hydrogen in the detonabic re-gion. For nther structure types, Appendix B or NUREG/CR-2462 (1) may be used to determine blast distances. These dis-tances shall be applied to all liquid piping, including those from any pump discharges, that are not seismically supported or protected by excess flow devices.
4.3 ELECTROLYTIC 4.3 Not applicable Electrolytic hydrogen production is not being used at this time.
4.4 LIQUID OXYGEN 4.4.1 Site Characteristics of Liquid Oxygen 4.4.1.1 Overview. Review of the 4.4.1.1 Comply following site characteristics shall be completed by each BWR facility as part of their efforts to locate the liquid oxygen storage system.
Location of supply in proximity to exposure as addressed in NFPA 50.
Route of liquid oxygen delivery on
, site.
1 l
l l
t 4-12
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
. Location of supply system in proxi-mity to safety-related equipment.
- Location of hydrogen storage.
4.4.1.2 Specific Considerations.
4.4.1.2.1 Fire Protection. The area 4.4.1.2.1 Comply:
selected for liquid oxygen system siting shall meet or exceed all requirements for protection of personnel and equipment as addressed in NFPA 50, Bulk Oxygen Sys-tems. The standard identifies the types of exposures under consideration. The num-ber of exposures warrants a plant-specific review for proper code compliance. As much separation distance as practical should be provided between the hydrogen and oxygen systems.
l 4.4.1.2.2 Security. All liquid oxygen 4.4.1.2.2 Comply:
supply system installatisns shall be com-pletely fenced, even when located within the security area. Lighting shall be installed to facilitate night surveillance.
4.4.1.2.3 Route of Liquid Oxygen Delivery 4.4.1.2.3 Comply ori Site. Each plant should determine the route to be taken by liquid oxygen delivery trucks through on- and offsite areas. In order to protect the oxygen storage area from any vehicular accidents, truck bar-riers shall be installed around the perime-ter of this system installation.
I Within the plant security area all deliveries shall be controlled by plant security personnel, per the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.
4.4.1.2.4 Location of Storage System to 4.4.1.2.4 Comply:
Sakty-Related Equipment. Each plant Eall determine that the location of the The oxygen storage area le located 1000 ilquid oxygen supply system is acceptable feet south of the nearest ufety-related considering the hazard described in structure, which is the . Unit I and 2 Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. control room.
l l
4-13
, Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconferrnance 4.4.2 Liquid Oxygen Storage Vessel 4.4.2 Comply:
Failure Liquid oxygen storage vessels are vulner-able to the same potential causes of fail-ure as the liquid hydrogen vessels but the potential consequences of failure are much less severe. The potential threat '
from a liquid oxygen spill is the contact of oxygen-enriched alt with combustible materials or the ingestion of oxygen-enriched air into safety-related air intakes. Additional information on the effects of oxygen-enriched atmospheres is given in NFPA 53M and in ASTM G63-83a and G88-84. For the purpose of this reports it is conservatively assumed that total oxygen concentrations above 30 vol%
(21% O2 in air + 9% enriched O ) will increase the effective combusti ility of ignitible materials in the area.
4.4.3 Liquid Oxygen Vapor Cloud Dis- 4.4.3 Comply persion The vapor cloud instantaneously formed by a large liquid oxygen spill will have a density of 3.59 relative to air. Such a cloud will experience considerable gravity-driven slumping as it disperses and translates with the wind. This process has been described by the DEGADIS model developed by Prof. J. A. Havens of the University of Arkansas (3). His model has been found to agree well with published ;
data on large releases of dense gases con- .
ducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, !
U.S. Coast Guard and others.
, The DEGADIS model has been used to determine the height of the vapor cloud as a function of distance for various sizes of commercially available liquid onygen stor-age tanks. It was conservatively assumed that any vessel failure would result in the instantaneous vaporization of the entire tank contents. The curves on Figure 4-8, which define "acceptable location of safety-related air intake," were generated :
by using the DEC ADIS model under the l worst-case weather conditions of F i 4-14 j
Guldelinss for Ptrmanznt BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance stability and 10 m/s wind speed for total oxygen concentrations of 30 vole For dense gas dispersion, lower wind speeds result in more radial spreading with a lower cloud height and shorter maximum drif t distance. Higher wind speeds will translate even the largest release past safety-related intakes in less than 10 sec, 2 giving little time for ingestion of enriched air.
Therefore, liquid oxygen storage vessels shall be located such that safety-related air intakes are within the acceptable region defined by Figure 4-8 or alternative analyses shall be performed to justify the location. Since this figure assumes the origin of release is from the storage loca-tion, the tank and its foundation shall be designed to remain in place for both design basis tornadoes ar.d siteapecific flood conditions.
4.5 REFEREf!CES .
4.5 Not applicable:
- 1. R. P. Kennedy, T. E. Blejwas, and D. <
l E. Bennett. "Cepacity of Nuclear ,
Power Plant Structures to Resist Blast Loadings." NUREG/CR-2462. l Sandia National Laborator!es for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion.
- 2. "Air Products Liquid Hydrogen Storage System Hazardous Conse-quence Analysis." Revision 1,
, Oc*ober 1,1985.
- 3. 3. A. Havens. "The Atmospheric Dispersion of Heavy Gases: An i Update." IChemE Symposium Series No.93,1985.
1 b
l 3
4-15 l
l
Guidelines for Ptrm:nent BWR Implementation or Justification
.lydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance ;
5.0 VERIFICATION 5.0 Comply:
The various methods of verifying the A Hydrogen Water Chemistry Verification effectiveness of HWC (i.e., electrochemi- System (HWCVS) has been chosen to verify cal potential, constant extension rate the effectiveness of the HWC system.
tests, etc.) are not within the scope of this document. Appropriate methods of verifi-cation should be selected and implemented on a plant-specific basis.
i j
5-1
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 6.0 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND 6.0 Comply with intent:
TRAINING Design guidance provided in this section This section give recommendations to the does not include any requirements.
operating utility for operation, mainte-nance, and training in order to meet the design intent of the hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) system.
The operation of a HWC system will require operator and chemistry personnel attention. Becau.e of the radiation increases that result from employing this system, an awareness of ALARA princi-pies is required by all plant personnel.
This system could also have an effect on the off-gas system and the plant fire protection program.
6.1 OPERAllNG PROCEDURES 6.1 Comply with intent:
Written procedures describing proper All necessary procedures for safe valving alignrnent and sequence for any operation and maintenance of the HWC anticipated operation should be provided system will be provided, and will be for each major component and system incorporated into existing plant process. Check-off lists should be procedures if possible, developed and used for complex or infre-quent modes of operation. Operating procedures should be considered for the following operations:
Hydrogen addition system startup, norrnal operation, shutdown and i alarm response.
Material (gas or liquid) handling (ftlling of storage tanks) operations that are consistent with the sup-plier's recommendations.
Purging of hydrogen and oxygen lines.
~
Operation of onsite gas generation system (if appropriate).
- Fire protection or safety measures '
i for hydrogen- or oxygen-enhanced
, fires and hydrogen or oxygen spills.
i i I l 6-1 ,
I l
1
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justificati>>n Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance Calibration and maintenance procedures as recommended by equipment or gas suppliers.
Routine inspection of HWC system equipment. ,
i
. Adjustment of the main steamline , !
radiation monitor setpoints (if !
appropriate).
6,1.1 Integration into Existing Plant 6.1.1 Comply:
1 Cperation Procedures Where appropriate, operation of the HWC system shall be incorporated into normal plant procedures such as plant startop and shutdown.
6.1.2 Pjant-Specific Procedures 6.1.2 Comply:
Appropriate procedures shall be developed to orovide guidance for plant operators when operation of the HWC system neces-sitates operation of an existing system in a different mode or raises new concerns.
Areas which should be considered are:
- Operation of the off-gas system Possible off-gas fires i 1
6.1.3 Radiation Protection Program 6.1.3 Comply:
Operation of an HWC system results in an l
increase in radiation levels wherever nuclear steam is present. The radiation protection program shall be reviewed and l appropriate changes made to compensate for these increased radiation levels.
l The following guidelines are establishec to ensure that radiolor,ical exposures to both i plant personnel and the general public and I consistent with ALARA requirements.
! Compliance with these requirements mini-rnizes radio!ogically significant hazards '
associated with HWC implementation.
The operation of a hydrogen addition
, system may cause a slight reduction in the
- off-gas delay time due to the increase in i
i l 6-2
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification '
Hydrogen Water Chemistry insallation for Nonconformance the flow rate of noncondensables resulting from the excess oxygen added. This may slightly increase plant effluents and should l be reviewed on a plant-specific basis.
6.1.3.1 Al. ARA Commitment. Permanent 6.1.3.1 Comply:
hydrogen water chemistry systems and programs will be oesigned, installed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the provisions of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 to assure that occupational radiation exposures and doses to the general public will be "as low as reason-ably achievable."
4 6.1.3.2 Initial Radiological Survey. A 6.1.3.2 Comply:
1 comprehensive radiological survey should l i
be performed with hydrogen injection to l quantify the impact of hydrogen water
, chemistry on the environs' dose rates, both within and outside the plant. This survey should be used to determine if significant radiation changes occur within the plant and at the site boundary. Based upon the magnitude of the change, it should be determined if new radiation areas or high >
radiation areas reed to be created.
Appropriate posting, access, and moni-toring requirements should be imple- 7 mented for the affected areas. Plant operating and surveillance procedures i should be revised, as required, to minimize the time and number of personnel required ;
, in radiation areas for operations, mainte- :
, nance, in-service inspection, etc.
6.1.3.3 Plant Shielding. The radiological 6.1.3.3 Comply: f
, survey of Subsection 6.1.3.2 should be used l
l to determine the adequacy of existing ;
plant shielding. In addition, the radiation
- levels from sample lines, sample coolers ;
and monitoring equipment may increase i l due to HWC and should be checked for ;
adequate shielding. If required, measures l j for selective upgrading of plant shielding ,
- should be implemented to reduce both work area and site boundary dose rates.
4 4
6-3 1
l
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 6.1.3.4 Maintenance Activities. Hydrogen 6.1.3.4 Comply:
water chemistry will have minimum impact on occupational exposures result-ing from maintenance activities. Plant procedures should incorporate appropriate ,
requirements for access to and monitoring i of areas where increased dose rates exist with HWC to satisfy ALARA require-ments. For extended maintenance, plant procedures should include provisions to terminate the hydrogen in}ection. Due to the short half-life of N-16, radiation levels will return to pre-HWC conditions within minutes of hydrogen shutoff.
6.1.3.5 Radiological Surveillance Pro- 6.1.3.5 Comply: [
g_ rams. Dose rate surveys should be '
conducted and radiation levels should be monitored periodically to ensure com-pliance with the radiological limits imposed by 40 CFR Part 190,10 CFR Part 100, and 10 CFR Part 20. Additional surveys may be required to comply with ALARA requirements. Hydrogen water chemistry, in association with improved water quantity operational practices, could affect the crud buildup within the i recirculation piping and the shutdown dose rates. A radiological surveillance program should be established to monitor i shutdown dose rates and crud buildup over a number of fuel cycles to evaluate pos-sible changes.
6.1.3.6 Measurement of N-16 Radiation. 6.1.3.6 Comply:
The radiological surveillance program should include provisions for the new distribution of N-16 in the main steam.
Selection of appropriate health physics instrumentation and application of correc-tion factors are required to provide accu-rate dose measurements. (This correction is required due to the effect of the ener-getic N-16 gamma on instrumentation
.4 calibrated with less energetic gamma
, sources.) All plant survey meters should , ,
4 be reviewed and appropriate calibration
, and correction methods accounted for in plant procedures.
]
6-4
t Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance A review of the plant personnel dosimetry program shall be conducted to ensure that [
the appropriate calibration or correction ;
factors are used. ;
6.1.3.7 Value/ Impact Considerstions. 'he 6.1.3.7 Not applicable following discussion reviews the total dose impact on a plant which implements HWC. No design guidance is stated in this section.
A radiological assessment at Dresden ,
indicates that the total dose increase with '
HWC is approximately 0.59b on an annual ;
basis (from 1935 to 1945 man-rem / year) [
(1). While this increase is site dependent [
(ue to plant layout and shielding configu-rations, significant variances from the Dresden assessment are not anticipated.
Thus, over the life of a plant (assuming a 25-year remaining life), the projected total dose increase with HWC is ~ 250-300 i man-rems.
With HWC implementation, the potential exists to relax current augmented in-service inspection requirements imposed by NRC Generic Letter 84-11 (2) and '
elimination of extended plant outages for l pipe replacement and/or repair. The ,
value/ impact assessment presented in i Appendix E to Reference 3 projects a 1161 man-rem (best estimate) savings over the life of the plant as a conunuence of reduced inspections and repairs with HWC. Typical pipe replacement projects I resuit in a total dose of 1400 to 2000 man-rems. Thus, HWC implementation could result in a significant savings in total dose over the life of the plant.
6.1.4 Water Chemistry Control 6.1.4 Comply:
Procedures should be developed to main-tain the high reactor water quality neces-sary to obtain the maximum benefit from the HWC system. Intergranular stress corrosion cracking can be mitigated by controlling the ionic impurity content of the primary coolant and by reducing the dissolved oxygen level in the primary coolant by use of HWC. The EPRI-BWR 65 ,
Guidelines for Ptrminant BWR implemtntation or Justification 1
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance Owners Group has developed "BWR Hydro-gen Water Chemistry Guidelines" (4),
which must be met ir. order to obtain tTie full benefits of HWC. These water chem-istry guidelines should be used as a basis for developing a plant-specific water chemistry control program.
Hydrogen water chemistry can reduce the !
dissolved oxygen level in the condensate and feedwater. It has been shown that at ;
very low levels of dissolved oxygen, corro-sion and metal transport to :he primary I system would be increased. If, when '
operating on HWC, the dissolved oxygen concentration drops below 20 ppb, an evaluation should be made to determine if there is increased corrosion or metals '
transport, or if other factors relating to such a reduced oxygen concentration need to be considered. If this evaluation determines that oxygen injection is neces-sary, a system should be designed using the guidance provided in Sections 2.3.2 and 3.4 of this report.
l 6.1.5 Fuel Surveillance Program 6.1.5 Comply:
No significant effect of hydrogen injection i on fuel performance has been observed, nor is expected. However, since in- <
reactor experience with hydrogen water chemistry is limited, utilities should consider the fuel surveillance programs ;
j recommended by their fuel suppliers.
l 6.2 MAINTENANCE 6.2 Comply:
l
! A preventative maintenance program l 2
should be developed and instituted to ensure proper equipment performance to i reduce unscheduled repairs. A!! mainte-a nance activities should be carefully '
- planned to reduce interference with sta- l 1 tion operation, assure industrial safety, j and minimize maintenance personnel exposure. Written procedures should be ;
developed and followed in the perfor- I mance of maintenance work. They should l t
be written with the objective of protect-l ing plant personnel from physical harm i 66 1 l
Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance and radiation exposure, and o' reducing hydrogen addition system downtime.
Radiation exposure should be reduced by shortening the time required in a high radiation field and by reducing its :
intensity by turning off the HWC system :
1 or other means during the maintenance !
period.
1 ,
All excess flow check valves used for i
hydrogen line break protection shall be periodically tested to assure they will function properly. t
)
4 6.3 TRAINING 6.3 Comply j i in order for the HWC system to maintain i
its system integrity and to provide the i expected benefits from its use, the system :
must be operated correctly. The most l effective means of reducing the potential of operator error is through proper j training. (
) Training should be provided to: !
l
- Instruct operators on the function, ;
theory and operating characteristics t of the system and all its major i system components.
1
- Advise operators of the conse-
- quences of component malfunctions and misoperation and provide !
- instruction as to appropriate corrective actions to be taken.
1 Advise operations and maintenance l personnel of the potential hazards of i gases in the system, and provide ,
I instruction as to appropriate proce- i J dures for their handling. i l
- Instruct emergency response person-i net on appropriate procedures for :
handling fires or personnel injuries '
i involving spills or releases of H2 f 0 2liquid and gases.
i
( 6-7 i i
)
l
4 Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
]' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance Instruct plant personnel on the expected radiation changes due to
, the operation of the HWC system and the appropriate ALARA prac-tices to be taken to minimize dose.
Instruct appropriate personnel on the ,
benefits of HWC.
Advise maintenance at ' construc- i tion personnel of the routing of
, hydrogen lines and of the appro-
] priate protective actions to be taken when working near these lines.
I Periodic training should be provided to ,
reinforce information described above and to communicate information regarding any modifications, procedural changes, or incidents.
6.4 IDENTIFICATION 6.4 Do not comply:
j in order to aid plant personnel in See Section 10.1 of the HWC licensing l identifying hydrogen and oxygen lines, package for justification for noncom-these lines should be color coded as pliance.
, required by ANSI A13.1.
6.5 REFERENCES
6.5 Not applicable: 1
- 1. "Environmental Impact of Hydrogen Water Chemistry." EPRI Hydrogen Water Chemistry Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia, December 1984.
4
- 2. "Inspection of BWR Stainless Steel Piping." NRC Generic 1.etter 84-11, April 19,1984.
I
- 3. "Report of the United States
) Nuclear Regulatory Cummission j Piping Review Committee."
NUREG-1061, Volume 1, August
- 1954
. 4. BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry
] Guidelines: 1987 Revision. NP-j 4947-5R-LD. Palo Alto, Calif.:
- Electric Power Research Institute, j to be published.
4
! 6-8 i
l _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ , . , - . _ ---._,.- _ . - - - - - - - - - - - , , - -
, Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 7.0 SURYSILLANCE AND TESTING 7.1 SYSTEM INTEGRITY TESTING 7.1 Do not comply:
In addition to the testing required by the See Section 10.3 of the HWC licensing applicable design codes, completed package for justification for noncon-process systems which will contain hydro- formance.
gen shall be leak tested with helium or a soap solution as appropriate prior to initial ope.ation of the system. All components and joints shall be so tested in the fabri-cation shop or af ter installation, as appro-priate. Appropriate helium leak tests shall be performed on portions of the sys-tem following any modifications or main-tenance activity which could affect the pressure boundary of the system.
7.2 PREOPERATIONAL AND PERIODIC 7.2 Comply:
TESTING Completed systems should be tested to the extent practicable to verify the oper- !
ability and functional performance of the system. Proper functioning of the foi-lowing items should be verifiedt Trip and alarm functions per Table 2-2.
Gas purity, if generated on site.
- Safety features.
System controls and monitors per i Table 2-2.
A program should be developed for peri- '
l odic retesting to verify the operability and the functional performance of the system.
l .
t 7-1 l
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justific.uion Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformr .e 8.0 RADIATION MONITORING
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1 Comply with intent:
This section reviews the radiological Design guidance provided in this section does not include any requirements.
conseq)uence (HWC and presents of hydrogen the basis water chemistry for increas-ing the main steamline radi: tion monitor setpoint to accommodate HWC. It is con-cluded that implementation of HWC does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the technical specification setpoint.
During normal operation of a BWR, nitro-gen-16 is formed from an oxygen-16 (N-P) reaction. N-16 decays with a half-life of 7.1 sec. and emits a high-energy gamma photon (6.1 MeV). Normally, most of the N-16 combines rapidly with oxygen to form water-soluble, nonvolatile nitrates and nitrites. However, becaJse of the lower oxidizing potential present in a hydrogen water chemistry environment, a higher percentage of the N-16 is con-verted to more volatile species. As a consequence, the steam activity during hydrogen addition can increase up to a factor of approximately five. The dose rates in the tu:bine building, plant environs, and off site also increase; however, the magnitude of the increase at any given location depends upon the con-tribution of the steam activity to the total dose rate at that location. The specific concerns includet The dose to members of the general public (40 CFR 190),
a The dose to personnel in unrestricted areas (10 CFR 20), and The maintenance of personnel expo-sure "as low as reasonably achiev-able"(ALARA).
3-l
O
, Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 8.2 MAIN STEAMLINE RADIATION 8.2 Do not comply:
MONITL 21NG See Section 8.2 and 10.4 of the HWC As noted in the previous section, main licensing package for justification for steamline radiation levels can increase up nonconformance.
to approximately fivefold with hydrogen water chemistry. The majority of BWRs have a technical specification requirement for the main steamline radiation monitor '
(MSLRM) setpoint that is less than or i equal to three (3) times the normal rated I i full-power background. For these plants an adjustment in the MSLRM setpoint may be required to allow operation with hydro- I gen injection. For earlier BWRs with J
MSLRM setpoints of seven (7) to ten (10) times normal full-power background, a setpoint change may not be required.
8.2.1 Dual MSLRM Setpoint Recom- 8.2.1 Do not comply:
, mendation i
See Section 8.2.
. For plants at which credit is taken for an i MSLRM-initiated isolation in the control rod drop accident 'CRDA), a dual setpoint approach may N. utilized. At most plants, t the MSLRM =etpoint is specified in the l
plant Technical Specifications (Tech Specs) as some factor times rated full-i power radiation background. With hydro-
- gen addition, the full-power background could increase up to 3 times that without hydrogen addition. Below 20% rated power or the power level required by FSAR or Tech Specs (see Table 2-1), the existing setpoint is maintained at the Tech Spec factor above normal full-power background, and hydrogen should not be 3
injected. About 20% rated power, the MSLRM setpoint should be readjusted to the same Tech Spec factor above the rated full-power background with hydro-gen addition. This adjustment would be
. made by the plant personnel during star- l
! tups and shutdowns. Plant power would
} remain con = tant during this adjustment l process. Thus, the Tech Spec factor which 4 the MSLRM setpoint is adjusted remains 1 the same with and without hydrogen addi-i tion, but the background radiation level
, increases with hydrogen addition. If an 8-2 l
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justificttion Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance unanticipated power reduction event occurs such that the reactor power is l below this power level without the required setpoint change, control rod motion should be suspended until the !
necessary setpoint adjustment is made.
At newer plants, credit is not taken for an !
MSLRM-initiated isolation af ter a CRDA, and a dual setpoint is not needed at these plants.
Plants that need a dual setpoint should consider changing their Technical Specifi-cations to increase the factor used to determine the MSLRM setpoint, if their CRDA analysis will permit this increase.
A suggested approach would be to use the !
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit j 1, Amendment No. SS Technical Specifica-tion change as a model. Under this approach, the MSLRM setpoint was raised ;
based on a satisfactory evaluation of the I
offsite consequences.
8.2.2 MSLRM Safety Design Basis 8.2.2 Do not comply:
The only design basis event for which See Section 8.2. l some plants may take credit for main I stea , isolation valve (MSIV) closure on '
main steamline high radiation is the design ,
basis control rod drop accident (CRDA). l As documented in Reference (1), the i j CRDA is only of concern below 10% of rated power. Above this power level the ;
1 rod worths and resultant CRDA peak fuel enthalples are not limiting due to core volds and faster Doppler feedback. Since the current MSLRM setpoint will not be changed below 20 % rated power, the MSLRM sensitivity to fuel fatlure is not impacted and the FSAR analysis for the CRDA remains valid.
l The licensing basis for the CRDA states
, that the maximum control rod worth is established by assuming the worst single inadvertent operator error (2). From j
References (2) and (3), the~ maximum control rod worth above 20% rated power, assuming a single operator error, is <0.3%
- aK/K. Parametric studies utilizing the 8-3 1
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance conservative GE excursion model (1) indi- <
cate that the maximum peak fuel enthalpy for a dropped control rod worth of 0.8%
aK/K is less than 120 calories per gram (3). Consequently, the conservatively calculated peak fuel enthalpy for a CRDA above 20% rated power will have signifi-cant margin to the fuel cladding failure '
threshold of 170 calories per gram.
An increase in the MSLRM setpoint will
. not impact any other FSAR design basis
! accident or transient analysis since no credit is tc. ken for this isolation signal.
4 Consequently, a technical specification change which adopts the recommended
, dual setpoint approach will not reduce overall plant safety margins.
]
8.2.3 MSLRM Sensitivity 8.2.3 Do not comply [
Conceptually, the sensitivity of the See Section 8.2.
- MSLRM to fission products is effectively reduced by the increase in the setpoint above 20% power. However, it is still functional and capable of initiating a ,
i reactor scram. The main function of the '
instrument is to help maintain offsite releases to within the applicable regula-tory limits. The MSLRM it supplemented by the off-gas radiation monitoring system :
which monitors the gaseous effiuent prior to its discharge to the environs. The of'-
gas radiation monitor setpoint is estab-
. lished to help ensure that the equivalent stack release limit is not exceeded, i
8.2.4 Conclusions 8.2.4 Do not comply: l 1 '
4 From the above discussion, it can be See Section 3.2.
concluded that an increase in the MSLRM i setpoint above 20% rated power will not reduce the safety margins as defined by Technical Specifications or increase the offsite radiological effects as a conse-quence of design base accidents. Further- , ,
more, since this change to the MSLRM can be justified independent of HWC, this change does not constitute an unreviewed j safety concern, i
l h*ld
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 8.3 EQUIPMENT QUALif1 CATION 8.3 Comply:
Outside primary containment the increase in dose rates with HWC is small relative to the integrated dose assumed for equip-ment qualification (EQ) tests. Further-more, dose rates inside the drywell near '
the recirculation piping will decrease .
. because of the '1 creased carryover of N-16 in the stea n. Each utility should review the resultant dose increases to ensure that the doses assumed in the EQ 1 tests required for electrical equipment per 1
10 CFR Part 30.49 remain bounding. ,
1
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S 8.4 Comply: :
Implementation of an HWC system is
- unlikely to significantly increase the amounts or significantly change the types i of effluents that may be released off
! site. Although an increase in individual or j cumulative occupational radiation expo- i sure may occur, the guidelines prov;ded in i Section 6.1.3 of this document will erisure that radiologica! exposures to both plant personnel and the general public are con-sistent with ALARA requirements. Since :
the design objectives and limiting condi- l tions for operation as defined 10 CFR Part 30, Appendix 1, are not impacted, no '
i Appendix ! revision is required.
- Each plant should examine the environ- i t
mental effects of an HWC system. How- l ever, it is unlikely that environmental '
impact statements or environmental ;
assessments will be required for HWC l systems.
\ l i
l j l i
9 3-3 l
4
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR implemtntation or Justification
~
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
8.5 REFERENCES
8.5 Not applicable
! 1. R. C. St!rn, et al., "Rod Drop Analysis for Large Boiling Water Reactors." NEDO-10527. General Electric Company, March 1972.
- 2. R. C. Stirn, et al., "Rod Drop !
Accident Analysis for Large Boiling l
- Water Reactors Addendum No. 2 i j Exposed Cores." NEDO-10527, !
Supplement 2. General Electric Company, January 1973. !
- 3. R. C. Stirn, et al., "Rod Drop d
Accident Analysis for Large Boiling 1 Water Reactors Addendum No. 1 j Multiple Enrichment Cores with ;
i Axial Gadolinium." NEDO-10527, l Supplement 1. General Electric ;
Company, July 1972. L I
i f
I k
4 8-6 l
i i
, . - . . - _ - , . ~ . . - - - - - - . . _ _ _ _ , - - - . - .
e
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 9.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 9.0 Comply with intent:
Although the HWC system is non-nuclear Design guidance provided in this section i safety-related, the design, procurement, does not include any requirements.
fabrication and construction activities shall conform to the quality assurance provisions of the codes and standards specified herein. In addition, or where not covered by the referenced codes and stan- .
dards, the following quality assurance features shall be established. ;
9.1 SYSTEM DESIGNER AND PRO- 9.1 Comply: '
CURER
- Design and Procurement Document '
Control. Design and procurement documents shall be independently verified for conformance to the !
requirements of this document by !
individual (s) within the design !
organization who are not the origi- !
nators of the design and procure- :
- ment documents. Changes to design t i
and procurement documents shall be j verified or controlled to maintain l conformance to this document. l
- Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services. Measures shall be established to ensure that 4
suppliers of material, equipment and ,
construction services are capable of l supplying these items to the quality l sp-ified in the procurement docu-ments. This may be done by in evaluation or a survey of the sup-pliers' products and facilities.
t
- llandling, Storage, and Shipping, j Instructions shall be provided in pro-curement documents to control the handling, storage, shipping and pre-servation of material and equipment to prevent damage, deterioration, and reduction of cleanliness. ,
i l 9-1
O g
- Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Irstallation for Nonconformance 9.2 CONTROL OF HYDROGEN STOR- Comply with intent:
AGE AND/OR GENERATION EQUIP-MENT SUPPLIERS A hydrogen supplier has not been chosen at this time. When chosen, the criteria in l In addition to the requirements in Section this section will be met. ,
9.1, the system designer should audit the ;
design and manufacturing documents of the equipment supplier to assure confor-mance to the procurement documents.
The system designer shall specify specific factory tests to be performed which will assure operability of the supplier's equip-ment. The system designer or his repre-sentative should be present for the factory tests, r
9.3 SYSTEM CONSTRUCTOR 9.3 Comply: l
- Inspection. In addition to code >
requirements, a program for inspec-tion of activities affecting quality shall be established and executed by, or for, the organization performMg the activity to veriff conformance with the documented instructions, proceoores, and drawings for accom-plishing the dctivity. This shall include the visual inspection of components prior to installation for conformance with procurement documents and visual inspection of ,
items and systems following installa-tion, cleaning, and passivation (where applied). ,
Inspection, Test and Operating i Status. Measures shall be estab-lished to provide for the identi-fication of items which have satisfactorily passed required inspections and tests.
- Identification and Corrective Action i for items for Nonconformance.
Measures shall be established to identify items of nonconformarice
- with regard to the requirements of the procurement documents or appli-cable codes and standards and to identify the remedial action taken to correct such items.
9-2
)
ATTACIMDrLC DRAELCOPY OF PROEOSID_CilAllGES_IQ UEDATED_f.SAR_AS_A_RESULLOT_IMC ADDITLQtLALQUAD_.CITIE S_STATIOtl 5051K i
- Enclosure 1 o f f- g.w v.,ni to rir.:; r. Ab s/:t tr :, peducitt en cut;.:t / c ! : g e c yc.; t ib ) c vi t h the u..u al r e d .atiou i r./ c) ci the ster a tic > durinC Wint 0?entionq.
Cu t pu t. ci.ncia f frui t'.m r.o n!. t o t s a r e a p pl ed t o t h t ; cceca co pu tar and
- hnu $ vlector r.vltea2s to a two-;2n r, trip-che.rt re order in the control i c :u . h ettlector W1'.chen ecl ect Lc :ve en r.o n:. t o ru A a nd 5 f e r J r.; u t te the red pn of the tecorder, ced batnen t.nnitors C and D for input to the black pen of the recorder.
80 Each log rad r.onitor has a downceale ala::s trip , saible circu .
f, r t.:a a cal u '
n) and an upccale trip that la preset togvalueAever times the nor:r.1 ackground radiation. (Another upscale rip preset at a ue n.it n ., . J ..e *
,4hr1D r t notsel background radiation annunciat -
emnline ith di ion a on control roos panci 90X-3. Bis ala rn is activated by a itsh on eithm two pen recorder.) The log rad monitor upscale trip
+3?eu gy (pre et stj t_.gro v ti:n normal background) is connected to the reactor prot tist system (P ) . Wich has two safety channals bo th of Wich aus t l be act ,
1ste a protccive action. Cirtuits are arranged sach that an gscale trip frca conitor A or C activates PJS channel A, and sn h specale t:ip fras conitor B or 0 activates RP3 channel 1. Act iva ting eithat suis ty channel annunciates a channel A or 3 2ain steasline high radiation alarm on control roca panel 90s5. 34tivating tbth channals results 11 a channel A and channel 3 main steunline high radiation alat .s I I
and initiatos the f ollowing protective act'on:
- a. All Group I pri':ary conttiinment isolation valves, includin', the usin storsline isolation valvec are closed (see subsection 7.'t.2).
- b. The of f-sas isolation valves are closed.
- c. De eachanical vacuus pu:sp is tripped. ,
1 l
- d. ne reactor is actmed frcu clorare of the MSIV's.
1
% l 1
6 QUAD-c1 Tits stcitos 7 FACE $3 l
l
Enclosure 2 10.17 HYDROGEN NATER CHEMISTRY SYSTEH The purpose of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) System is to in-ject hydrogen gas into the reactor coolant, via the condensate sys-tem, to suppress the dissolved oxygen concentration. This suppres-sion of the dissolved oxygen coupled with a high purity reactor coolant will reduce the susceptibility of reactor piping and ma'e.
rials to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).
t 10.17.1 Design Basis j
The following BWR hydrogen water chemistry points shall be main-tained, during HWC system operation, to mitigate the potential for IGSCC in the reactor coolant system .
A. Dissolved oxygen concentration in the reactor oolant between 4 and 16 ppb.
B. Reactor coolant conductivity 8 less than 0.2 uS/cm. ,
10.17.2 Description i
10.17.2.1 Hydrogen Injection System i
The hydrogen supply site is located 1500 feet from the nearest !
, s*'ety.rt,'ated structure, which is the Unit 1 and 2 control room, j at 6n elevation of 633 feet. It is surrounded by a lighted secur-i ity fence, and truck barrier posts are installed at the fence peri-meter to protect it from mobile equipment. The hydrogen is stored as a high pressure gas in transportable tube trailers and as a l liquid in a cryogenic storage tank.
The licuid hydrogen is supplied from a 20,000-gallon cryogenic storage tank. The liquid hydrogen is pumped from this storage tank to a hydrogen vaporization station. This station consists of a parallel array of ambient air vaporizers, with either of the two vaporizer leos being capable of supplying the maximum required hydrogen supply of 140 scfm for the station. After the vaporiza-tion station, the hydrogen line is connected to an isolation valve which is connected to an excess flow check valve and a nitrogen
- purge connection. The hydrogen pipe is then routed underground to e point within several feet of the outside of the west wall for the i Unit 1 turbine building.
The gaseous hydrogen tube trailers will serve as an interim hydro- !
gen supply system until the liquid hydrogen supply system is opera-tional. The tube trailers will then be used as a reserve supply of hydrogen gas. The hydrogen gas flows from the tube trailer through
! a close-coupled shutoff valve and a parallel array of pressure re-ducing regulators. The trailer is connected, via a flexible pig-tail, to a discharge stanchion. The discharge stanchion consists of a shutof f valve, check valve, bleed valve, and a grounding strap. After the discharge stanchion, the hydrogen line is con-nected to an isolation valve which is then connected to the hydro-gen gas line from the liquid hydrogen supply system, upstream of the excess flow check valve.
J A branch line proceeds to the Unit 1 and 2 generator hydrogen con-trol cabiret while the rain line is connected to an additicnal ex-cess flow check valve, a nitrogen purge connection, and a manual
\
isolation valve. This line then branches to the Unit 1 or Unit 2 '
I l side of the Turbine Building. Inside the building, the hydrogen l I line is first connected to a solenoid operated isolation valve, '
! whicn Closes upon an area hydrogen concentration high signal.
Next, the line is connected to a parallel array of flow control stations. Each flow control station has an isolation valve and a nitrogen purge connection on each end with a flow control valve at.d l
1 1
l
pressure anc' flow instruments in between. After the ficw control station the hydrogen line is connected to a purge line flame arres-tor and then it branches into four lines leading to the condensate pumps. Each of these lines contain a manual isolation valve, a solenoid operated isolation valve which closes if the associated condensate pump is not activated or if the HWC system is tripped, a check valve, and a second manual isolation valve before it connects
' to the condensate pump discharge line, i
10.17.2.2 0xygen Irjection System The oxygen supply site is located 1000 feet from the Unit 1 and 2 control room 500 feet from the hydrogen supply site, and at an i elevation of 615 feet. It is surrounded by a 1(ghted security fence, and truck barriers are installed at thr fence perimeter to protect it from mobile equipment.
i l The oxygen is stored in an 11,000 ,_ 'on 'iquid oxygen tank. The oxygen flows from the tank into an oxyy .n vaporization station.
This station consists of two pairs of -mbient air vaporizers in-stalled in parallel. Each pair of vaporizers can be isolated with- l out affecting the maximum required oxygen airpply of 70 scfm for the f
station. After the vapori2er station, the oxygen line is connected to a parallel array of pressure .' educing regulators. Next, it is
. connected to an excess flow check valve. The oxygen pipe is then :
routed underground, alongside the hydrogen pipe, to a point within several feet of the outside of the west wall for the Unit 1 turbine I building. Af ter ledving the ground, the pipe branches to the Unit 1 or Unit 2 side of the turbine building. Inside the building, the oxygen piping is connected to a flow control station consisting of .
I a flow control valve, pressure and flow instruments, and upstream and downstream manual isolation valves. The oxygen piping is fi-nally connected to the off-gas system piping before the first stage
]
! Steam Jet Air Ejector. An additional line carrying building air is connected to an identical flow control station before being attach-ed to the off-gas system near the oxygen injection point. This line is provided to supple ent the regular oxygen supply.
I I
b 10.17.2.3 Control and Instrumentation The HWC system will supply up to 70 scfm of hydrogen to each unit's condensate system. The hydrogen addition rate can be adjusted either automatically, with the addition rate based on steam flow, or manually. The oxygen addition rate, can also be adjusted auto-matically, with the addition rate based on hydrogen addition rate, or manually. The oxygen injection rate is controlled to maintain a residual oxygen concentration downstream of the off-gas recombin-i ers. Therefore, the oxygen injection system will remain operating af ter the hydrogen injection has been terminated, so that all free
, hydrogen in the off-gas system will be recombined, i
System trips for the HWC System are given in Table 1 and the HWC System installed instrumentation and controls are given in Table 2.
10.17.3 Perfonnance Analysis j The performance of the HWC System will be evaluated by the Hydrogen ;
Water Chemistry Verification System (HWCVS). This system consists I j of an autoclave subsystem, an orbisphere subsystem, and a monitor- l ing panel .
1 The autoclave subsystem contains three autoclaves. Each autoclave receives 2 to 4 gallons / min of water from the Reactor Building Pro-j cess Sample Panel sample line at up to 1250 psig and 5750F. The first autoclave contains a crack growth monitoring system, which is capable of detecting changes in sample crack length as small as 0.0002 inch. The second autoclave is a modular unit which contains a constant extension rate tensile (CERT) test system. When in-stalled, this system will perform a one week long CERT test on both cracked and uncracked samples. Af ter the test has been performed ,
l the sample will be removed and examined to identify if intergranu- l l lar fracture had occurred. The last autoclave contains an electro- l l chemical potential monitoring system, which measures the corrosion potential in the water. Each of these autoclaves will provide f 1
l i
1 continuous data collection. After flowing through the final auto-clave, the sample water will be cooled to 1500F before being dis-charged to the Reactor Water Clean Up System.
The orbisphere subsystem contains a single water conductivity ana-lyzer and two dissolved oxygen analyzers, the orbisphere subsystem receives water from the Reactor Building Process Sample Panel at 150 psig and 1200F. After passing through the orbisphere subsystem the sample water is discharged to the Reactor Process Sample Panel Drain Header for the Reactor Building Equipment Drain Tank.
1 The sample lines for the autoclave and orbisphere subsystems are '
connected to the existing Reactor Process Sample Panel Sample Line. This line passes through a pair of safety-related isolation valves before being connected to reactor recirculation loop B for Unit 1 or loop A for Unit 2.
1 The monitoring panel contains a computerized Data Acquisition System (OAS), which continuously monitors and records data every 20 minutes for the HWCVS in addition to plant power level, autoalave temperature and flow, and hydrogen injection rate. This system shall be used to develop correlations between crack growth and plant water chemistry parameters.
- 10.17.4 Inspection and Testing l
4 The functional operability of the HWC system was tested at the time
! of system installation.
A pr?vcntative maintenance schedule has beer incorporated into the ,
i plant maintenance program to provide surveillance inspections of the HWC System. Periodic retesting requirements for the system i shall be based upon manuf acturer's recomendations and in consi- ,
deration of extended HWC System shutdown periods or other f adtors not consistent with normal system operation. Also, a retest of the hydrogen system integrity shall be performed following any modifi- j l
cations on the hydrogen piping which may affect the pressure bound- l ary of the system.
l l
l l
l
- Enclosure 3 f,s The nomal dose rate at the main stor.line radiation (MSLR) monitors during nornal full power operation is 100 r.R/hr. The noble gas activity 0
c ont ained in each fuel rod is approxima tely 3.6 x 10 euries. Due to the decontamination effects of the primary coolant for the non-noble gas act ivity, the noble gas activity will be the pr iva ry dose cont ributor to the steaaline radiation tonitors in the event of fuel f ailure. The release of 100% of the noble gas activity in one red would result in a detector dose rate of 1.4 R/hr to 13.9 R/hr deperding on the degree of mixing in, the reactor vessel . If 100* nixing is cssumed, the lower dose rate of 1.4 R/h'r is applicab uve.,The
. set 'nts c n the MSLR .o'n'It o rs ir e ed e.e e ryo ad@stid to provide -
it N5b ti=c r ^
orm4L hachroun ( mR/hr) v fif%.s L& -
2 ,
and a scram signal at c':n iccs normal backgroen (CID mR/HL .- --
/ is m
_t The release of that activity contained in the volu=e of one fuci rod, d
assuming 100% mixing in the reactor vessel, is therefore suf ficient to result in isolation of the reactor vessel. If fuel rod damage is restricted to only the release of the plenum activity (1% of total rod
/"*. activity) and conservatively assuming 100% mixing in reactor vessel vapor volume, it would require cladding f ailure of 89 fuel rods to isolate the reactor vessel. Under normal steam flow, fuel' f ailure would be detected in 8.8 seconds and isolation valve closure would begin 0.5 second later with isolation valve closure being acccmplished sithin the next 10 seconds: Therefore, the total time frcn fuel f ailure to isolation valve closure is 19.3 seconds. It should, however, be emphasi:ed that only 10.5 seconds worth of a.tivity will leave the reactor vessel.
l l
)
QUAD-CITIES SECTIT 14 FACE 13 l
Enclosure 4 i l 1 i i APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT l OF !
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-29 & DPR-30 I;
Introduction:
l a
Commonwealth Edison Company, Licensee under Facility Operating Licenses OPR-29 a and DPR-30 for the Quad-Cities M,ation Unit No.1 and Unit No. 2, respective- j ly, hereby requests that the Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A l I
3 of the Operating Licenses be amended by revising the sections as indicated by l
a vertical bar in the margin of the attached pages 3.1/4.1-3, 3.1/4.1-8, t I 3.1/4.1-9, 2.1/4.1-10, 3.2/4.2-6 and 3.2/4.2-11 for Units 1 and 2. The re- !
quested change involves increasing the isolation and scram set point for the f l
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors from 7 times normal full power background [
j (NFPB) to 15 times NFPB (without Hydrogen Water Chemistry). This change is j being requested to support a planned Hydrogen Water Chemistry program, t Discussion:
i Commonwealth Edison Company is developing a Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) program to improve reactor water chemistry at Quad Cities Units 1 and 2. The !
) purpoS:, of the program is to reduce the ef fects of Intergranular Stress Corro-
- sion Cracking (!GSCC). ;
! l j Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of austenttic stainless steel piping j
] in BWRs has resulted in costly plant outages to accommodate inspections and j repairs to primary coolant system piping and components. Hydrogen Water Chem-
]
l 1stry, which consists of the combination of good water chemistry and the addi- l tion of hydrogen to the feedwater, has been shown to be effective in arresting
{ l pipe cracking and pipe crack growth. Addition of hydrogen decreases the oxi- j dizing power of the reactor water and reduces its aggressiveness toward cool-l
- ant system materials.
l
- \
j l 1
l
I' A by-product of the oxygen suppression by hydrogen addition is an increase in ,
nitrogen carry-over in the main steam and an increase in radiation from the main steam lines caused by Nitrogen-16 (N-16). The increase in N-16 is pro-mted by the chemical change that occurs in the reactor core with hydrogen ad-dition. The N-16 isotope is formed by a neutron-proton reaction with the Oxy-gen-16 (G-16) in the reactor water. Under normal chemistry conditioas the ma-
)
jority of the N-16 forms nitrate, which is ncnvolatile. With the more reduc- '
ing core chemistry conditions of Hydrogen Water Chemistry, a greater fractica J of the N-16 forms volatile compounds (amonia, nitrous oxide) which are swept into the steam phase.
The revised trip setpoint will permit Hydrogen Water Chemistry implementation, while rnaintaining the capability to automatically isolate and scram the reac-1 tor in the event of significant fuel failures. The change will not af fect the ability to detect fuel failures because the off-gas system pre-treatment radi- .
ation monitor (which is more sensitive to fuel failures than the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor and which is not affected by this change) will retain the capability to detect fuel failures and alert the plant staf f.
The proposed set point increase to 15 times NFPB (without HWC) is intended to provided operational flexibility while avoiding unnecessary scrams and the i I
concomitant unnecessary challenges to safety systems. The facter of 15 was determined to be necessary in order to provide a margin for the increased ra-diation levels due to Hydrogen Water % mistry and the design of the radiation
, mon.cors. An increase in main steam line radiation levels of as much as 5 1 tines is possibla due to Hydrogen Water Chemistry. The current setpoint of 7 )
provides a margin for normal meter indication fluctuation. Tne factor of .'5 f times NFPB (without HWC) was obtained by multiplying the factor of 5 by a set j point margin of 3 times NFPB.
The attached Technical Specification page 3.1/4.1-3, 3.1/4.1-8, 3.1/4.1-9, 3.1/4.1-10, 3.2/4.2-6 and 3.2/4.2-11 for Units 1 and 2, indicates the prope, sed I change 11volving the increase of the isolation and scram det point of the main steam line radiation mnitors from 7 times NFPB to 15 times NFPB (without HWC).
2-l
Safety Assessment:
The safety function of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors is to detect the radiation increase in the event of a Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) and to close the Main Steam Isolation Yalves (MSIVs) and shutdown the reactor on high radiation levels. The closure of the MSIVs reduces the release of radioactive fission products to the environment. For the CRDA, the calculated dose rate at the monitors is 8 R/hr. Because the calculated dose rate of 8 R/hr is ap-proximately five times the proposed setpoint of 1.5 R/hr, the monitors will
! maintain the capability to close the MSIVs and scram the reactor on high radi-ation caused by the design basis Control Rod Drop Accident.
l The dif ference Detween the time required for the MSLRM to reach the current trip set point (0.7 R/hr) and the new trip set point (1.5 R/hr) is approxi- 1 mately 1/4 second, and the time required to reach the new trip set point re-mains less than 1/2 second. The time period permitted for completing closure i of the main steam isolation valves is 5 seconds (Quad Citie.: Technical Speci-fication 3.7/4.7 0.1). The increase in time-to-closure (due to the new trip set point) is only 57, of the current time-to-closure. This will have a small effect on the total release and concomitant dose to the public. Since the calculated dose from the CRDA is only 12 mrem, the increase will be very small and, therefore, does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The capability to monitor for fuel f ailures is not af fected by this change.
Tne Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor's operating detection range is not l changed. The Steam Jet Air Ejector Discharge Radiation Monitor, which is more sensitive to fuel f ailures than the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, is not f
i af fected by this change and will be capable of alerting the plant staf f to the t I existence of minor fuel f ailures which could be present below the proposed 1
trip setpeint.
I l
Significant Hazards Consideration:
j The pranosed amendment involving the increase of the trip set point of the
) Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors does not represent a significant hazards consideration because operation of Quad Cities NPS with this change does not:
l 3
l
9
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The consequences cf the desian basis Con-trol Rod Drop Accident, which takes credit for the operation of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, are not significantly affected by this change as discussed. No other previously analyzed accidents or malfunc-tions, as addressed in the UFSAR, are involved, i
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. This modification only adjusts tre trip set point ,
on the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors (MSLRM); no of.her station in-struments or equipment are involved. The only design basis accident which takes credit for the MSLRM is the CRDA, and as discussed above, the in- .
creased set point does not af fect the ability of the MSLRi to perform its intended safety function, it has also been shown that the increar.ed set point has no affect on the capability of the station to detect noble gas releases from the reactor core.
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The Control Rod Drop Accident is the only accident which takes credit for the operation of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors. The change in the trip setpoint for the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors does not reduce the margin be- i tween the calculated dose rate from the accident and the tri; setpoint.
The change does not significantly af fect the consequences of the control rod drop accident as discussed above. The change of fers significant bene-fits that enhance the margin of safety for operation with HWC by reducing the potential for inadvertent scrams and by supporting a water chemistry program which substantially mitigates !GSCC of safety-related piping.
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- est 1*:.t. ;
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- ::t.t*! iM 14:::'; sa'ety 1. u t 't:= :e.m; es:te:e: ;' tnas
- r.rs, a res: :t 5:ta :::.rt * !.ra; e 5t:0 valve :loswre. fne t.r:. e sit: v6;.e :1's.te s:ta= '.*::1:
i De :;4::. ; sa'et. 1 *11 't:* tel-9 4;;*e is a:e:. ate :: :rt. eat
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{ e *me 5:ecenter ;:..va:.w' s: ram is a 04:.we te t*e ste: valve :::s.re 1 s:rs aa:
res..u m; :4.ses teses;emt a s: tam :ef;te t*e ste: va;ves are :;:les. t*.s t*e t j
st:: .alve :;ss.re ::is:wts les ats severe.
23 an tesStra- ; vn:ww*.:::wtsanc at :y; 21 te:mes
- vaew.*,
ass :lo;swre as I
- a*
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' *1;m ra:14:1:9 ;evels 19 the =aan stenutes tunnel aseve te v- !
.we *o tre a
e:r's; f.el, n1*.:;em am: esygem rac1:s:tivity are an insicaticm lea =1m i 11*es Pot-a; a 5:ta*24:w;r:w 1s nnitattes m 1. emerever sv:n ra 14 tion level sceecs M"g' 4 !
d st. rte Of rme pure: e cf tmas scram is ta .ecwce t?e i tscm ra:tatten to the estent necessary to prev t escessais j J ter:L*e c:etaal*atten. 01stner;e o' escessive a* cunts of i t*e site enstr:ms is prevente: ty taie air e:ector off.;as a ' acactivity t e r na . "to }
{! cawse an 1sciatj: 9 i
's*f.'Tflec in Specification 3.8 1s escovcen.of t,me main con =enser of f.ges-line provtses Tne 134: l l
TPe Pain valves 1solattom stenaline isolation are ICs close: valve closwre scram is set to scram ePen t*e 1
tre s:ra*Nn; ress.te an: ft:m 'w11 cren. inis scrae anti:1:stes
- i By at f;wa transteat ent:5 aculo occur enen the valves close.
taas setting, tme reswitant transient is insigntfacent, l 4
a teatter voce sett:n is provices emac% actuates or tycasses tme varicus
- tas l
(referenct functiens a:trepriate to the cattlewlar plant operating statws !
Sae Sec tion 7.7.1.2) . >
tme es fwel or Startup/ Hat Stanecy cosition,emeneverreactor t** s'ose switch is in f' the turoint concenter l q
Ice. var.wwi by3sss 0. scram ano main steatline isolation valve closure scram are ;
i an: Imas Dy345s nas ove*6 prov1 e3 for fle 10111ty owring startup j 4 tysass to alle=
is in recants effect, to te mace to tne twrtine concenter. sh11e tnis l 8
- Increases my protection is trovices against pressure or f1wa :
the mism.cressure scram anc asaw lit scras, respectively, .
(
.nlen are effective in tnis moce. i, if tre reactor were Browgnt to a not starcty concittom for recairs to the ;
l twr:1*e s.: cunctater, tne main steamlice isolation valves ocule te close1.
j a,::tnes tres single f a11wre or sin;1e costster at:1:n in this m: e of
- eration can reswlt 16 an unrewte.ec ra:tolo;1 cal release, ;
tme maawal s: ram fw aanval means of ra;1: action is atti.e in all *oses, thus crovietng f or a !
a reactor c:eratten. 4y inserting ccatt:1 roes cwrtag all ecces #
l L
j fee law syste* crevices protection a;almst eatessive pt.or levels ama i saart reacter zerlocs in the startw: i (referem:e sat S e c t io n s T .4. 6.2 a nc 1. 6. 4.3 ) .ans intersectate to er ran;es '
a source ran;e montt:r 3
- (San) syste' is also stovicea to sw;
- 1, i:31tional newte:m level j informatica Se:tt:m L rt*; startwo twt tas eo :ta, fwn:ttons (referemce las T.6.3.2).
j 5 tan: y tnus the 14w as reewarea in the 4efwel ans Startwetact ,
asaw 11%meses in ac31 tion. Drotection is trov1:ec in tmas range ey tme 1 j screa as :sscwstes in tne :ases f:r Spectftcation 0.1. In t*e i
{ ::.or tsm;e. t?e a m syste* tr:va:es re:vtreo protection (reference 134 !
1 Se;ttom 1.s.$.1.2.
J tme asew's cover omt, Thus, tne Unw systt*
the intermentate a*:1sco.et not retware: In t*e Awn scre. l
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1 43etwate covera;e an tme startwo eac 19termestate range. ;
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start.:/act 5 tam::y31s: matte io w*e n;;m lesel screes are ret.;tet fcr the ans een moces s' o!aat coeration. **ey are tnett'tre re:w;te: to ;v ::eraticaa;'f:r tmese *oces f reactor :: erat: m.. '
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\ oomi hbc. .nc pmiJed in the main steamlines as a means of tnessuring steam f.ow and aho limhing o r mao intentcry from the eel during a steamline hieat tecident. In .iddhion to monitoring steam doe.
ienumentatinn i priniJsd which v..utes a trip ,of Group I helation vahes. The primar) fonscion of the jintn.nn.maden is to deter, a breal D. tne ruain ueamline, thus only Origup ! ulves are tfoird.For the
- oru.taic serident. m.in uc.mtire breit avtside the dryw til. ihb i,ip seuin) of 14Cs of r.ord ueam Osw. In tonjondion virh the fl:m limiten and main steandine uhe stosure. limbs the mau imeninty leu such that fuel h not untmered, fuel temper.ums remain Icn ibn !!00' F and releur of radioacthity to the environs n we 10 CPR 100 piJelines (re'eierte SAR Sectiens 14.2.3.9 and 14.2.3.10).
I Temperaiure.m:nhoring inurumen'ation is provideil in the rnein utanfine tunnel to detect !ca i
Trips are presided on s'is inurumentation and when oceeded cause c!cture of Group I h sening of 200* Pb low cerugh to /ciett frA5 of the or/er of 5 to 10 gpm; thus it is capable o speuri.m cf birds. for large breals,it is a baclop to high > team flow instrumentation dheu suall Neals vith the remhingimall release'of radioacthity, gives isolation before the guideline > of 1 are enteded. l main utamline tunnel hne been povid:d to detect grois fuel failure. This
- thgh radiatica rn- ors in t e instrugernade .. ies csvre o Group i uhes, the only v hes required to c!me for this ateident. Wlth the estaMithed se ,ng of imo r. rmal battground and main steamline isolation vahe sloivre, riuion product
}
j release is liry. icd so th 10 C R 100 guidelines are not eacceded for thh auident
- 12. 2. l .7 ).
i t
Preuvre inutumenistion is provided which trips when main steamlin prewure Jrops below 825 p i
^;
thh inurumentation resahs in slosure of Group I isolation vahet in the Keruel and Starinp/llo lStar.Jby m (j inh "ip functisn is hypaoed Thh function is provided prima rily to provide proie6 tion againu .: pre i
matronelion which would cause the enntrol and/or byrm uhe to opn With the trip set at s25 psig,incrun lou is lintiied to that fuelis not uncos cred and peat claddin; temperatureute much leu than 1500' F,
- Q are no fmion products anilable for release other than those in the reactor water (reference SA 11.2.3 ).
The RCIC and the llPCI high flo'.. and temperature inurumentation are provided to detect a break i respeeth e piping Tiipping of this iniitwmentation resuht in actuation of the oil RCIC or ofIlPCI sensors are
- Tripping la;is for this fwnuion is ths >.une as ilui for she main steamline isolation vahes. Fthus and
< required to te cpetable or in a trippeJ sonJition in nwet the sin;le. failure uitaia lhe inip witings of
- .%0" of design Cow and uhe elmure time are sush that tore untosety is pioented and (mion prvJn r
. it within limits.
i The instruinentation v hith initi.ites ECCS attion b areanged in a one.out of.t* o laten twice logic circult the reactor scram circuits, bos ever, there is one trip syniem anoeigted with each funnien rather th 1
' systems in the reacint protection system.The single. failure criteria are rnet by virtue orch osihng fanniorn are presided. e 3., spays and automatic blowdown and high preuvre contan ;
' l specifiestion requires that if a trip 5) stem becomes inoperabic, the qstem
- hish it suiv L for c ample,if the trip system for 5 ore spray A becomes inopesab!c. sure spiay A is dest
.iut ofactrice specificalitms of Specification 3.5 govern.This speiheation preierses the etresthe l witt. re. pet to the single faihire criinia c>en during periods when rnaintenance or testing i
The control rod block funriions are prmideJ to r revent eaccuive tenitol rod withJr.iwat %
so that MCP. d go bolcu the MCPR ruel Claddipo' Integrity Safety Lirait.
4 j
The trip togic fer this fundienis one out of n; e 3, any trip on one of the sis ApAM's.eigh rour SRM's will result in a rod block. The minimum inutument channel requirements a%rc su Eient imtrumentation to anure that the single. failure criteri. are met.The minimum imitument channel rquirements l
for the RC\t may he seduted by oni for a short period of time to allu* for maintensner,icuing. or calibratio J
J Q%sr Thb time priod h ont>~.3'. of the operating time in a month and does not significantly inere.se th; 1
- presenting an inadiertent tontrol rod withdrawat.
l
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. Amendment No. 66 '
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QU AD.ClTlF.S
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4 Kt*t fliats mari a rt/ elf tatti p:str 8 tita .'N ttrif 0 h- v.id .
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53 % % 31 latti litam t w 0 4 WP kw HP.! ltti .rd ,
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I tu b bl essee namet h est is ns3 tt4 intes t% sirerele aveen fated betre W8 k Latas. .
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1 % estses*Latas sh,e nesteg the empleel essa nettstes toten.
t h ggwi ehe as e s.4iuti M ce a=%.al em=* P==* M* tt fee Wtse **en.
1 tnetwee a itse 4 ier et w esu seconde. l v top of active tval ne detimed as 360' ateve vessel aero f or all water levels 4 sed
&n the L,".<A analysts (see leses 3.21.
3.2/4.2-11 A end ent No, M 93 ..... ..
QU AD-C 1ii t S Co% 30 Loss of condensate secwe occurs when the condenser can no longer handle heat input. Loss of condenser vecw e initiates a closw ee of the twebine stop velves and turbine bypets valves, which ellminates the heat Irpwt to the condenser. Closwre of the turbine stcp and bypass volves cowses a pressure transient, newtron flwa rise, and en increase in swrface heet flua. To prevent the cladding safety limit frcre being e=ceeded if this occurs, a reactor seem occwes on turbine stop valve closure. The turbiete stop velve closce scrare function eloce Il edeqwate to prevent the cladding safety limit f rom telng onceeded in W event of a twrbine trip transient with bypass closure.
The condenser lom-vocvwe scree is a beckup to the stop velve closure scre and cowses a scram before the stop valves are closed, thws the resulting transient is less severe. Scese occurs at Il Inches Hg vecwwe, stop valve closure occwes at 20 Inches Hg vecowe, and bypass closure at 7 inches Hg vecwwe.
MlgirE i the main stowellne tunnel above that due to the normal nitrogen and ouygen radioegt g are en Iri)lcationoflookingfuel. A scree is -tnitleted whenever such redletion level eteeed y times nel background. The purpose of this scram 1s to reduce N source of such radiation to the ert t necessary to prevent emeessive turbine contmeinetion. Discharge of oncesvive
- wwwnts c' r m vity to the site environs is prevented by the air ejector off-ges monitors, which
. We 6cn of the main condenser of f-ges line provided W limit speelflod in specification 3.8 Is encoeded.
The main steenline Isolation valve closure scree is set to scree when W isolation valves are 105 closed from full cpen. This serme enticipates the pressure and flum transleet which would occur when the valves l close. By scrs==ing at this setting W resultant transient is insignificant, i
l A reactor modo switch is provided which actuates or bypasses W verlous scree functions apprcpriate to I
the parti'wler plant cperating status (reference SAR Section 7.7.I.2). Whenever W reactor sede switch i s in tte Re f ue l f Startup%t Stoney gesition, the turbine condenser low-veevue scrue end main steamilne isolatice valvo closure scese are bypassed. This bypass has been provided for fisulbility during startup and to altos repairs to te made to W turbine condenser. While this bypass is in effect, protection is provided egelnst pressure or flwu increases by the high-pressure scree end AN94 l'il scree, respectively, which are ottoctive in this ande.
If tt.e reactor were brought to a hot stoney condition for repairs to W turblre condenser, N main !
, stesellne isolation velves would be closed, k hypotheslied single f ailure or single operator action in "
this made of cperation can result in an unreviewed radiological release.
j .
The menwel scene function is active in all modes, thws providing for a menwel means of rapidly laserting
] ccetrol rods during all modes of reactor ctoration. l I
The im system provides protection against escessive pceer levels and short reactor periods in W startup j and Intermediate gewer ranges (reference SM Section 7.4.4.2 end 7.4.4.1). A source range annitor (5f90
- system is also provided to supply eMitional rewtron level information kring startup but has no terme f unctices (reference SM Section 7.4.3.2). Thus W Im is required in the Re?wel and $tertupWt Stoney l sase s , in eMition, protection is provided in this range by the AP94 l'.4 scran as discussed in tte bases for Specification 2.l. In the power range N AM94 system provides rewired protection (reference SAR
, Section 7.4.5.2). Thus, the im systen is not required in the Rwn mode, the AP9t's cover only the I
intermediate and gemer range, the im's provide adequate coverage in W startup and Int,ermediate range, j The high-reactor presswre, high-drpell pressure, reactor low water level, and scree discharge volwee high i
level screes are required for the Startup%t $taney and Rwn modes of plant operation. They are therefore regwired to te <terational for these modes of rewtor coeretion.
%/
The twrbine condenser low wecuwe scree is required cely ckring gawer c9eratice and onest be bypassed to start up the unit.
l Aren#ent No,M 86 5.v4.1-3 0154H l l
1
d QU AD-Ci f i ts OF%50 TA8tt 3.1 1 RE ACTOR PRottCilCh $YSTEM ($CRM) th5TRUM(NTAllCh RIQUIR(MCNTS REFU(L MXX Mint e W.rter
< of Operable or Tripped instr a nt Chemmeln per Telp $ystw=III IRID Fwaction IRID level I4ttled ActInn( I I bee $ witch in shute m A
' * ~ ' '
1 Memwel Scree A l 15 3 High flwi $ 120/125 of full scale A '
3 I m retive 1 g(3) 2 High flwa (ISS scese) $$ecification 2.1.A.2 A 2 Inceerative A
't
! 2 (per bank) High water level in scram 1 40 gallons per beek A i l s discharge vol mHI i
2 High-reactor pressure $ 1060 psig A I
l j High-drywell pressureIII '
2 g 2 psig A 2 Reactor Ic= water level g 8 inches III A ,
1 2 Turbine condenser low 121 inches l4g vacuus A !
vacu e(II -
l 1 7 I Main stomallne high I normal full power 2
{[I
$ A
) . todistionIIII kgrowed
! {%
- 4 Meln stemeline isolation < 105 volve closure A velve closvreIII ,
J 1
4 l
w A"e n #en t No , pf. 86
- i. 3.l/4.1 4 l
l i
Ol54H I
t 1
QU A04l T its
- CCR-30 7 1
I TABLL 3.1-2 l R(ACTOR PSCTLCTION $YSTEM ($CRM) IN51RUMENT Af t0N RIQUIRim(NTS STMTUP/ HOT STMC6f M)DC L
i Min 6 pia kWer i
i of Operable or Tripped instrument i Chemmels per Telp Systesn(l) Trip Fv a ction Trip level Settina ActionIII pbde $. itch in shwtdonm A I
a . ,,
A I Manuel scre i L IF94 A
5 High fiwa i120/125 of full scale
! A
] ) Inoperative l
m(3) 2 High flum (l$1 scem) Speelfication 2.l.A.2 A l l A 2 Inoperative 2 High-reector pressure 1 1060 psig A l 2
High-4rywell pressure (S) $ 2 psig A g
2 hector Ic= water level ! 8 inches (8) .
l l 1 (per beek) High water level in scret i 40 gellons por berA A { I discharge volwie I4I l
1 26 inches Hg vecwun A 2 Turbine condenser low vacuim(II y If ,
Main steamline high A 2 $ Q normel full power ,
nd !
r edi en oeo ri b.c.g,
)1
^ ;
1 Meln stessaline isolation $ 105 volve closure A l l 4 1 volve closwe eIII (
) I i
l l .
l l
1 __
l v' i
eendNntNo.g.86 3,if4,i.g otS4M
QUAD-Ci f t t $
OPR-10 TABLt 3.1-3 Rt ACTOR PROTECTICW $v5 TEM ($CRM) INSTRUMENTAfl0N REQUIREMENTS RUN m ;
r
?
Minl e NJter of Operable or Tripped instr w nt Channels ser Trio System (II Trio Function Trio Lovel Settina Action (II 1 bde $ witch in shut &wn A i
.e , ,
i Manwel see m A at3) i Specification 2.1 A.I 2 High flum (flow blesod) A or B 2 Inoperative A or B l 2 Downscele(III g 3/12S of full scole A or B l 2 High-reactor pressure $ 1060 psig A t
2 High.drywell pressure $ 2 psig A IO) l 2 Reactor tem estee level 3 8 inches A l
2 (ger g 4) Highwater level in seem $ 40 gallons per benk A discharge vol m 2 Turbine condenser los g 21 leches Hg vacuan A or C' vecwwa f of 2 Main ste eline high $ $ normal full power A or C ;
l background redistion(12)
_A 4 mein ste e llne Isolation <105velveCIosure A or C velve closure (6) 2 Twebine control volve fast t 40E turbine / retor Ao'C closurel ') loed mismatch 10) 2 Twebine ste ,selve $ 10E velve closvro A or C j closwroIII l l
2 Tvrbine (HC control fluid g 900 psig A or C l los presswre(') .
A*endN nt NO. . 86 3.1/4.1-10 015M
' a qu A n.Cillf.S OPR-30
()
ii hf
\in wri i.tv. are prmiJed in the r tain ueamlines as a rneans of tr.enuring ues n 3m now f aw,end aho o' mau insent;ry fmm the so.cl durin; a steamline breat :ccident., In addition to moni:oring ictramemetinn i psaiiAd which t..o ee a irip pf Oscup i isolation l vahes.
d Fet theThe worsiweprimesy f iirt umemads n h to detee, a breat k ine main uvamline.thu ont;Gtvup I safws are c ose t j .i aciideni, main sicamline bre il auniJe the drp e l. ;hh trip senine of it s rf raicd siesm Ov with the dam limiters and main steamline vahe (103ure limi:s the man imentnry len such that fu un ciered, fueliernperatuies remain len than 1500' F. and release of radioxihity to th 10 Crh 100 guidelines (rc'ese. se SAR Sections 14.2.3.9 end 14 2.3.10).
7tmpreture.moniinring instrumentation h prov;Je.1 la the main steamfine Trips are proiidd e.n thh inutumentation and when eseecJed caust efesu scidng of N0 F h Icw ercugh to dciett frah of the order of 3 to 10d;,pm; for th spotsum of breeh. For large breals,it is a baclop to hi;.h are caueded.
a . - c7 if Thh
,oniiors in the rnd i ucamline tunnel base been provid:d to detect gron fuel fa urt.
Ingh.sadiatic Ins tr u.ne n t' a causes epute of Chup 1 vahes, the only vehcs requitec to close for thi
,l , bulground and rnain steamline helation vehe tlosure. (mion product
., estab!kteQ setting ofQTimes noten 100 guidelion ase nn; eaccedcJ for this auident (reference SAR Set sclease h 1. ned 50 that 10 Cl'
] ,
12.2.l.71 ,
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Pressure inutumentatis is prosided whhh trips when rnain sicamlineJF)pituure m n.tes Jrop ,
! thh inutumentado; telulls in closure of Group I isolation vahn in the Refuel and Siariup/lloi ,
('j inh trip functivais bypaaed This function h provided pri t ll lou is timited so that fuel b net uncostred and peat claddin; temperatures ere muth
- l l
i are ne f.nion produen av.ritable for rel:ase other than ihose in the reactor syaier >
t 11.2.3) o l The RCIC anJ ihe IWCI high Cow and ternperature instrumentation are provide '
respecibe piping. Tripping of ihh inutumentation results in actuation of the lR I
Tripping lo;ie for tha rumtion is ibs same as that for the main steamtineF hatation and required to ce optable or m a irippJ tonJnion to meet the sin;te.fahre tritena. Ih
.br0% of Jesign f.ow and vah e (foture time are sush shal sure untosety b psoenie h within hmits. !
The inittumentation s hish initietes ECC.t action b attanged in a one.out of.ts i o iahn(
the renter scram circuits, how eser, there h one trip syuem anocleted with each functioj sptems in the scacint protection synem.The single.failare criteria injation.are De inct!
siebng funatum are trovided, e g., sprap and automatic blowdown and high. pressu' spritication seeivires that if a trip sptem becomes inoperabic. the synem y
For czarnple.if the trip spt:m for core spray A becomes inoperable, cure sp ,
.soi.of. service specifications of Specification 3.5 govern.This speiheanon i f d pst>j witt. re. pet to the sirgie.fadore trneria esen durin; periods when rnaintenance l
'The conitol red block functions are osmided tn picscni caccuhe twitol toJ withJiai '
go beltnr the MCPR ruel Claddipo Ititegrity Safety Limit.The:l four SRM's will result in a #N Wott. The eninimum inutument channel eripdrementsl IrLittumentation to anure that ihr single. failure criteria are mes. The minimum imtrem l for the RBM may be redused by one for a short period ofilme to allva for maintenf (g Thh time period is only-M of the operating time in a rnonth and does not !
I presenting an inadsettent tontrol reJ withdrawal Amendment No. 60 . ,
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kend. ent No. ff , 83 .
12/42 11 m