ML20245E797
| ML20245E797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1989 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E449 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906270452 | |
| Download: ML20245E797 (93) | |
Text
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Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation Report for Amendment to Facility Operating License March.3, 1989 Revision 1 i
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Prepared for Commonwealth Edison Company by Sargent & Lundy 8906270452 890501
't PDR ADOCK 05000254 p
PDR c
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Revision 1 March 1989 QUAD CITIES TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 2.0 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPflON 2-1 2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 2-1 2.2 HYDROGEN SUPPLY OPTIONS 2-1 2.3 GAS INJECTION SYSTEMS 2-2 2.3.1 Hydrogen 2-2 2.3.1.1 Injection Point Considerations 2-2 2.3.1.2 Codes and Standards 2-2 2.3.1.3 System Design Considerations 2-3 2.3.1.3.1 Main Condenser 2-5 2.3.1.3.2 Off-Gas System 2-5 2.3.1,3.3 Steam Piping and Torus 2-5 2.3.1.3.4 Sumps 2-6 2.3.2 Oxygen Injection System 2-6 2.3.2.1 Injection Point Considerations 2-6 2.3.2.2 Codes and Standards 2-6 2.3.2.3 Cleaning 2-7 2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 2-7 2.4.1 Hydrogen Injection Flow Control 2-8 2.4.2 Oxygen Injection Flow Control 2-8 2.4.3 Monitoring 2-9 3.0 SUPPLY FACILITIES 3-1 3.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN 3-1 3.1.1 System Overview 3-1 3.1.2 Hydrogen Storage Vessels 3-1 3.1.3 Pressure Reducing Station 3-2 3.1.4 Tube Trailer Discharge Station 3-2 3.1.5 Interconnecting Pipe 3-2 l
3.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN 3-3 3.2.1 System Overview 3-3 3.2.2 Cryogenic Tank 3-3 3.2.3 Overpressure Protection System 3-4 3.2.4 Instrumentation 3-5 3.2.5 Liquid Hydrogen Pump and Controls 3-5 3.2.6 Interface with Gaseous System 3-6 3.2.7 Vaporization 3-7 3.3 LIQUID OXYGEN 3-7 3.3.1 System Overview 3-7 3.3.2 Cryogenic Storage Tank 3-7 3.3.3 Overpressure Protection System 3-8 3.3.4 Oxygen Vaporization System 3-9 3.3.5 Pressure Control Station 3-10 3.3.6 Interconnecting Piping 3-10 4.0 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 4-1 l
4.1 GASEOUS AND LIQUID HYDROGEN 4-1 4.1.1 Site Characteristics of the Gaseous and Liquid Hydrogen System 4-1 i
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QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
Title Page 4.1.1.1 Overview 4-1 4.1.1.2 Specific Hydrogen Conditions 4-1 4.1.1.2.1 Fire Protection 4-1 4.1.1.2.2 Security 4-2 l
4.1.1.2.3 Route of Hydrogen Delivery on Site 4-2 l
4.1.1.2.4 Location of Hydrogen Storage Facility to Safety-Related Structures 4-2 4.1.2 Gaseous or Liquid Storage Vessel Failure 4-2 4.1.2.1 Fireball 4-3 4.1.2.2 Explosion 4-4 4.1.3 Gaseous or Liquid Pipe Breaks 4-5 4.2 LIQUID OXYGEN 4-6 4.2.1 Site Characteristics of the Liquid Oxygen System 4-6 4.2.1.1 Overview 4-6 4.2.1.2 Specific Oxygen Conditions 4-6 4.2.1.2.1 Fire Protection 4-6 q
4.2.1.2.2 Security 4-7 4.2.1.2.3 Route of Liquid Oxygen Delivery on Site 4-7 4.2.1.2.4 Location of Storage System to Safety-Related Equipment 4-7 4.2.2 Liquid Oxygen Storage vessel Failure, Vapor Cloud Dispersion 4-7 5.0 VERIFICATION 5-1 5.1 HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY VERIF.TNATION SYSTEM 5-1 5.1.1 Autoclave Subsystem 5-1 5.1.2 Orbisphere Subsystem 5-1 5.1.3 Monitoring Panel 5-2 5.2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 5-2 6.0 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND TRAINING 6-1 6.1 OPERATING PROCEDURES 6-1 6.1.1 Integration Into Existing Plant Operation Procedures 6-1 6.1.2 Plant Specific Procedures 6-1 6.1.3 Radiation Protection Program 6-1 l
6.1.3.1 ALARA Commitment 6-2 6.1.3.2 Initial Radiological Survey 6-2 6..l.3.3 Plant Shielding 6-3 6.1.3.4 Maintenance Activities 6-3 6.1.3.5 Radiological Surveillance Programs 6-3 6.1.3.6 Measurement of N-16 Radiation 6-4 6.1.3.7 Value/ Impact Considerations 6-4 6.1.4 Water Chemistry Control 6-5 6.1.5 Fuel Surveillance Program 6-5 6.2 MAINTENANCE 6-5 6.3 TRAINING 6-6 i
6.4 IDENTIFICATION 6-6 7.0 SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING 7-1 7.1 SYSTEM INTEGRITY TESTING 7-1 7.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL AND PERIODIC TESTING 7-1 8.0 RADIATION MONITORING 8-1 ii
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QUAD-CITIES' Revision 1 March 1989 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
Title Page
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8-1 8.2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING
'8-1 8.2.1 Dual MSLRM Set Point Recommendation 8-2 8.2.2 MSLRM Safety Design Basis 8-2 8.2.3 MSLRM Sensitivity 8-4 8.2.4 Conclusion 8-4 8.3 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION 8-5
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S 8-5 9.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 9-1 9.1 SYSTEM DESIGNER AND PROCURER 9-1 9.1.1 Design and Procurement Document Control 9-1 9.1.2 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services 9-1 9.1.3 Handling, Storage and Shipping 9-1 9.2 CONTROL OF HYDROGEN STORAGE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS 9-1 9.3 SYSTEM CONSTRUCTOR 9-2 10.0 DEVIATIONS / EXEMPTIONS FROM THE BWR GUIDELINES 10-1 10.1 DEVIATIONS FROM GUIDANCE ON PIPE IDENTIFICATION 10-1 10.2 EXEMPTIONS FROM GUIDANCE ON HWC SYSTEM TRIPS 10-2 10.3 DEVIATION FROM GUIDANCE ON SYSTEM INTEGRITY TESTING 10-3 10.4 DEVIATION FROM GUIDANCE ON MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING 10-3 l
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QUAD-CITIES n
. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Title 1
HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY' SYSTEM 2
HYDROGEN SUPPLY PIPING SYSTEM 3
HYDROGEN INJECTION POINTS 4
OXYGEN SUPPLY PIPING SYSTEM 5
OXYGEN INJECTION POINTS 6
OFF-GAS OXYGEN ANALYZERS 7
HYDROGEN & LIQUID OXYGEN STORAGE FACILITY SITE LOCATION q
8 HYDROGEN STORAGE FACILITY SITE LOCATION 9
ROUTE OF HYDROGEN & OXYGEN SUPPLY DELIVERY 10 THERMAL FLUX VS. DISTANCE FROM FIREBALL CENTER FOR GASEOUS HYDROGEN STORAGE SYSTEM 11 THERMAL FLUX VS. DISTANCE'FROM FIREBALL CENTER FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN STORAGE SYSTEM 12 MINIMUM REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCE TO SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES VS. VESSEL SIZE FOR GASEOUS HYDROGEN STORAGE SYSTEM-j j
13 MINIMUM REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCE VS. ID OF PIPE FOR RELEASES FROM 2450 PSIG GASEOUS HYDROGEN STORAGE SYSTEMS 14A MINIMUM REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCE VS HOLE SIZE AND ID OF PIPE FOR GASEOUS RELEASES FROM 150 PSIG LIQUID
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HYDROGEN STORAGE TANK j
l 14B MINIMUM REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCE VS HOLE SIZE AND
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DISCHARGE RATE FROM 150 PSIG LIQUID HYDROGEN STORAGE i
TANK (F WEATHER STABILITY, 1 M/S WIND VELOCITY)
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15 LIQUID OXYGEN STORAGE FACILITY SITE LOCATION 16 ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS OF SAFETY-RELATED AIR INTAKES FOR VARIOUS SIZES OF LIQUID OXYGEN STCRAGE TANKS j
17 HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY VERIFICATION SYSTEM i
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LIST OF TABLES Table:
-Title.
'1-TRIPS.FOR THE HYDROGEN WATER' CHEMISTRY SYSTEM I
1 2
HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND~
CONTROLS e
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QUAD-CITIES j
1.0 INTRODUCTION
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This report describes the Hydrogen Water Chemistry System f
installed at the Quad-Cities Station.
The purpose of the I
hydrogs water chemistry installation is to inject hydrogen into the reactor coolant, via the condensate system, to suppress the i
dissolved oxygen conce,* ration.
This suppression of the
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dissolved oxygen concentration coupled with a high purity reactor j
coolant will reduce the susceptibility of reactor piping and materials to intergranular stress corrosion cracking-(IGSCC).
l This process is referred to as hydrogen water chemistry (HWC).
The guidance for the Quad-Cities HWC System came!from the Electrical Power Research Institute (E/RI) report entitled
" Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations," dated May 1985.
However, all of the deviations and exemptions discussed in this submittal are based upon the September 1987 revision of this EPRI report (EPRI NP-5283-SR-A),
which has been accepted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3
(NRC) and will be referred to throughout this report as the "HWC Guidelines."
All deviations and exemptions to the EWC Guidelines are discussed in section 10.
This document will describe the hydrogen and oxygen storage and supply systems and the injection systems for hydrogen and oxygen.
This description will include the hydrogen water chemistry system requirements for operation, maintenance, surveillance, safety precautions, and testing to provide for safe system and plant operation.
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QUAD-CITIES 2.0 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Figure 1 shows a simplified drawing of the Quad Cities Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) system.
This system will be divided into four subsystems for an in-depth description.
These are hydrogen supply, oxygen supply, hydrogen injection, and oxygen injection.
2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA The hydrogen water chemistry system is not safety related.
Equipment and components are not redundant, seismic class I, electrical class lE, or environmentally qualified, except where required to meet good engineering practice.
However, the proximity of safety-related equipment or other plant systems requires special consideration in the design, fabrication, installation, operation, and maintenance of hydrogen addition components.
Respective of this, quality assurance and quality control provisions were implemented, as discussed in section 9, tc assure a safe and reliable hydrogen addition system.
During operation, the hydrogen addition system will maintain the dissolved oxygen concentration in the recirculation water at a level which will mitigate the consequences of IGSCC while ensuring that the hydrogen will be safely recombined in the off-gas system.
2.2 HYDROGEN SUPPLY OPTIONS For HWC systems in general, the hydrogen can be supplied from any combination of the following three sources:
a.
a commercial hydrogen supplier, b.
on-site production from raw materials, or recovery and recycle of hydrogen from the off-gas c.
system.
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F March 1999 Gaseous and liquid hydrogen will be initially' supplied by Liquid Air Corporation, which is a commercial supplier.
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2.3 GAS INJECTION SYSTEMS 2.3.1 Hydrogen Injection System The hydrogen injection system, which is depicted in Figure 2, includes all flow control and flow measuring equipment and all necessary instrumentation and controls to ensure safe, reliable y
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operation.
This system is capable of providing up to 70 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm) of hydrogen, with a normal pressure range of 125 to 170 psig, to each Unit's condensate system.
2.3.1.1 Injection Point Considerations I
The hydrogen is injected into the condensate pump discharge line, through gas saver lance assemblies.
This location provides adequate dissolving and mixing and avoids gas pockets at high points.
The location of the hydrogen injection points for Unit 2 l
is depicted in Figure 3 at coordinates D-3, D-5, D-7, and D-9.
2.3.1.2 Codes and Standards The hydrogen injection system has been designed and installed in accordance with OSHA standards in 29 CFR 1910.103.
Piping and related equipment was designed, fabricated, inspected, and tested in accordance with ANSI B31.1 for pressure-retaining components.
All components meet all the mandatory requirements and material specifications with regard to manufacture, examination, repair, testing, identification, and certification.
All welding was performed using procedures that met the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Section IX.
The piping was uniquely identified through the display of an appropriate color field and legend markings.
All underground piping had identification tape laid 6 inches above the pipe, before the trench was filled.
Warning markers were also placed over the trench.
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QUAD-CITIES System design also conforms with pertinent portions of NUREG-0800, 10 CFR 50.48, Branch Technical Position BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and appropriate state and local building codes and standards.
i 2.3.1.3 System Design Considerations The hydrogen piping is run underground from the hydrogen supply j
system to a point within ceveral feet of the outside of the west wall for the Unit 1 turbine building.
i A. branch line tees off of the buried HWC system hydrogen supply line directly across from the generator hydrogen control cabinet, which is west of the Unit 1 turbine building.
This branch line proceeds underground to the generator hydrogen control cabinet.
It then splits into two lines above the ground at the control cabinet.
Each line has a pressure regulator, a check valve, and upstream and downstream isolation globe valves.
Each line then terminates at a tee into the existing Unit 1 and Unit 2 generator hydrogen supply lines just downstream of the control cabinet.
All underground piping has a factory-installed protective coating, and all joints have been covered with two (2) layers of a protective wrap to provide protection against corrosion.
The routing and installed depth of the hydrogen piping took into account local soil conditions, such as frost depth and expected vehicle loading.
The use of guard piping was considered in the design, but it was determined to be unnecessary.
The hydrogen piping is electrically continuous from the hydrogen supply system to the condensate pumps, and is grounded on each end.
The grounded connection at the condensate pumps is accomplished by providing electrical continuity between the hydrogen piping and the condensate piping, the condensate pump motor ground, the cable tray ground, and finally the ground grid.
The hydrogen supply system is also grounded, in addition to the hydrogen piping being grounded near its connection to the hydrogen supply l
system.
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QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 An excess flow check valve is installed at the hydrogen supply site, before the hydrogen pipe enters the ground, and an I
additional excess flow check valve is installed within several feet of the hydrogen pipe's exit from the ground, near the Unit,1 j
turbine building.
The individual hydrogen injection lines are equipped with check valves and solencid isolation valves, which are interlocked with the condensate pumps.
The individual s
solenoid isolation valves provide hydrogen supply system isolation if its associated condensate pump motor is not running j
and for all hydrogen injection system trips.
A nitrogen purge connection is provided downstream of each excess flow check valve, which are located at the hydrogen supply site and at the exit point of the hydrogen piping from the ground near the turbine building, and on each end of the four (4) hydrogen addition control stations.
A hydrogen purge vent line with flame arrestor has also been connected to the hydrogen pipe following each units' hydrogen addition flow control station.
Area hydrogen concentration monitors have been installed to ensure that the hydrogen concentration around the hydrogen piping remains below the flammable limit.
These monitors have been installed at high points where hy'drogen might collect and above use points that constitute potential leaks (see Table 3 for approximate locations).
These monitors are connected to solenoid isolation valves, which are installed in each units' hydrogen feed line at its entrance to the turbine building, to provide hydrogen supply isolation if a high hydrogen concentration level is present.
The hydrogen addition system will increase the hydrogen concentration in the feedwater, reactor, steam lines, and main condenser.
The following four (4) systems were reviewed for possible detrimental effects:
a.
Main Condenser, b.
Off-Gas System, 2-4 m____.__.___
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QUAD-CITIES c.
Steam Piping and Torus, and d.
2.3.1.3.1 Main Condenser The main condenser presently handles combustible gases at nonflammable levels, and the hydrogen addition system will not significantly change the concentration or volume of these gases.
Therefore, it is not anticipated that hydrogen addition will affect the operation of the main condenser.
2.3.1.3.2 Off-Gas System Oxygen or air is added into the off-gas system to recombine with the hydrogen flow.
This limits the extent of the system which handles hydrogen-rich mixtures and reduces the volumetric flow-rate.
The net effect from operating the HWC system is a revised heat input into the recombiner off-gas.
However, this increased heat input has been analyzed by their manufacturer to be insignificant and will not affect operation of the off gas system.
2.3.1.3.3 Steam Piping and Torus The torus contains hydrogen monitors which will allow operators to identify any hydrogen concentration increase due to HWC system operation.
2.3.1.3.4 Sumps The three (3) water systems that are affected by HWC are:
a.
Main condenser condensate, b.
Feedwater, and c.
Reactor water.
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QUAD-CITIES gevision 1 March 1189 J
For. sumps which receive water from any of these three sources, the average hydrogen concentration may slightly increase.
However, the maximum expected concentration levels'of hydrogen in the' sump atmospheres were determined to be less than the lower combustible limit of hydrogen in air.
Therefore, the hydrogen addition' system is not expected to affect the combustibility of the sump atmospheres.
2.3.2 Oxygen Injection System The oxygen' injection system, which is depicted in Figure 4, injects oxygen into the off gas system to ensure.that the excess hydrogen in the off gas stream is recombined.
It includes all necessary flow control and flow measurement equipment.
This system is capable of providing up to'35 scfm of oxygen, a combined air / oxygen flow or a total of'135 scfm of air flow into each Unit's off gas system.
A timer system vill continue oxygen flow after the hydrogen injection system is tripped for 15 minutes before' slowly decreasing the oxygen injection to zero, within an additional 5 minutes.
2.3.2.1 Injection Point Considerations The injection point of oxygen is in a diluted portion of the off-gas system before the first stage of the Steam Jet Air Ejectors.
The oxygen injection points for Unit 2 are depicted in-Figure 5 at coordinates D-3 and D-4.
2.3.2.2 Codes and Standards The oxygen injection system has bc w. d < ;ned and installed in
- accordance with OSHA standards in 29 CFR 1910.104 and CGA G-4.4, Industrial Practices for Gaseous Oxygen Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems.
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QUAD-CITIES Piping and related equipment was designed, fabricated, tested and
' installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1.
Additional guidance for materials of construction for oxygen piping and valves was given in Section 3.4.
Welding was performed using procedures that met the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Section IX.
Piping was uniquely identified through the display of an i
appropriate color field and legend markings.
All underground piping had identification tape laid 6 inches above the pipe before the trench was filled, and markers were placed over the filled trench.
All applicable state and local codes were also followed.
2.3.2.3 Cleaning All portions of the system that may contact oxygen were cleaned as described in Section 3.4 of this report and in accordance with CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4.
2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL The instrumentation and controls include all sensing elements, equipment and valve operating hand switches, equipment and valve status lights, process information instruments, and all automatic control equipment necessary to ensure safe and reliable operation.
Table 1 lists the trips of the HWC system.
The instrumentation provides indication and/or recording of parameters necessary to monitor and control the system and its equipment.
The instrumentation also indicates and/or alarms abnormal or undesirable conditions.
Table 2 lists the installed instrumentation and functions.
This table also includes instrumentation for hydrogen and oxygen supply options.
Additional information on instrumentation and controls are provided in Section 3.
All control room instrumentation and controls for the HWC system I
are located on a new seismically installed nonsafety-related control panel.
This panel also contains annunciators for local panel trouble alarms.
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QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989
- 2.4.1 Hydrogen Injection Flow Control The hydrogen injection flow control is through a parallel set of flow control valves.
This parallel arrangement provides better system' reliability and maintainability.
The flow control can be adjusted'either automatically, with the hydrogen addition rate based on the steam flow, or manually.
The flow control valves will close to provide hydrogen isolation for all HWC system trips, and will fail closed upon loss of power or air.
Each injection line coc ains upstream and downstream manual isolation globe valves, uhich allows individual pump maintenance, and a solenoid operated isolation valve, which prohibits hydrogen injection into a non-operating pump.
The solenoid isolation valves will isolate the HWC system during any H'3C system trips and will fall closed upon loss of power.
2.4.2 Oxygen Injection Flow Control Parallel flow control valves are provided in the oxygen injection line, for system reliability and maintainability.
However, only one of the two trains carries pure oxygen from the liquid oxygen storage facility.
The second train carries building air to supplement the regular oxygen supply, on operator demand.
The oxygen flow rate will be controlled to provide residual I
oxygen downstream of the recombiners.
System controls are l
designed to provide that oxygen injection continues for 15 l
minutes after the hydrogen addition is terminated, so that all free hydrogen will be safely recombined to within the tolerances of the off-gas system.
2.4.3 Monitoring The recirculation water oxygen concentration is continuously monitored by two dissolved oxygen analyzers, which are part of the orbisphere subsystem of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry 2-8
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QUAD-CITIES Verification system.
The sample flow for-these analyzers is-
'obtained via the Reactor Building-Process Sample Panel sample.
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line, which can be isolated from the reactor recirculation lo~p o
by two inline-(inboard and. outboard) containment isolation valves,. classified as Group I valves.
See section 5.1.2 and 5.2-for additional ~information on this subsystem.
Redundant oxygen analyzers have been added in parallel'to the-existing hydrogen analyzers, which are located downstream of the off gas recombiners.
These monitors have been'provided to allow monitoring of the residual hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the off gas stream.
Figure 6 depicts the oxygen and hydrogen I
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-j monitoring of the off gas stream for Units 1 and'2.
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3.0 SUPPLY FACILITIES 3.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN l
3.1.1 System Overview The hydrogen gas supply system will be provided by Liquid Air Corporation, which has extensive experience in the design, operation, and maintenance of gaseous storage and supply systems.
The initial hydrogen storage and supply system shall consist of the following subsystems:
a.
Hydrogen Storage Vessels, b.
Pressure Reducing Station, c.
Tube Trailer Discharge Stanchion, and d.
Interconnecting Piping.
3.1.2 Hydrogen Storage Vessels A bank of six (6) high pressure s'torage vessels are provided to serve as a gaseous surge volume for the liquid hydrogen tank.
Each of these vessels contains 8,300 scf of hydrogen for a total capacity of 50,000 scf.
When liquid hydrogen is not available, one (1) cr two (2) jumbo tube trailer (s) will be brought on site as a backup hydrogen supply.
Each trailer will contain a bank of horizontal hydrogen gas vessels with a total capacity of 120,000 scf.
These transportable vessels will be provided, tested, and maintained by the hydrogen supplier, i
The tube bank will be supported to prevent movement in the event of a line failure, and each tube shall be equipped with a close-l coupled shut-off valve.
As an alternative, a single safety valve per bank of tubes could be used, provided the safety valve is sited to handle the relief from all of the tubes tied into it.
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QUAD-CITIES 4
0 Revision 1 March 1989 Each bank of tubes shall also be equipped with any instruments required for proper filling.
3.1.3 Pressure k' educing Station
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The pressure control station shall be of a manifold design with two (2) full-flow parallel pressure reducing regulators.
The discharge pressure range of these regulators shall be fully adjustable to satisfy plant hydrogen injection requirements.
i Pressure gauges shall be provided upstream and downstream of the regulators, and a sufficient number of hand-operated valves shall be provided to ensure complete operational flexibility.
An excess flow check valve is installed downstream of both the l
interim tube trailer connection and the long-term hydrogen source (see Figure 5).
This valve will limit the hydrogen release in l
1 the event of a line break.
An additional excess flow check valve i
is installed in the hydrogen gas supply line near the west wall of the Unit 1 turbine building.
The stop-flow setpoint for each of these flow control check valves is 200 scfm.
3.1.4 Tube Trailer Discharge Stanchion A tube trailer discharge stanchion shall be provided for each trailer for gaseous product unloading.
The stanchion shall consist of all necessary piping and valves to safely unload the gaseous hydrogen.
It shall be separated from the filling apparatus for safety and convenience and be protected against vehicular collision.
A tube trailer ground assembly shall also be provided on each discharge stanchion to ground the tube trailer before the discharge of hydrogen begins.
3.1.5 Interconnecting Piping j
The equipment and interconnecting piping to be supplied with the hydrogen storage and supply system shall be installed in l
compliance with ANSI B31.1 or B31.3.
All components that may l
contact the hydrogen shall be cleaned in accordance with standard i
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-QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 industrial practices as recommended by the supplier prior to and following system fabrication'to ensure that the surface is free-from. moisture, loose rust, scale, slag, and. weld spatter and l
essentially free of organic matter, such as oil, grease, crayon, paint,1etc.
3.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN 3.2.1 System overview
- The liquid hydrogen storage system will be provided by Liquid Air
. Corporation, which has ext'ansive experience in the design, cperation,_and maintenance of liquid gas storage systems.
The liquid hydrogen storage and. supply system shall~ consist of the following subsystems:
i a.
Cryogenic storage tank, b.
Overpressure' protection system, c.
-Instrumentation j
d.
Liquid hydrogen pump and controls, 1x
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e.
Interface with gaseous system, and l
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Hydrogen vaporization system.
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The liquid hydrogen shall be provided in accordance with CGA G-5 and G-5.3.
3.2.2 Cryogenic Storage Tank The liquid hydrogen storage system snall consist of one 20,000 gallon " inner vessel," constructed in accordance with Section VIII, Division 1 of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels.
"he inner vessel will be subjected to a pressure test to ensure 3-3
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1 that no flaws exist that could cause a failure at or below the l
set pressure of the vessel's redundant relief devices.
A 100%
radiographic inspection of the inner vessel's longitudinal welds shall also be performed in addition to the ASME Code inspection requirements.
This inner vessel is enclosed by a noncertified carbon steel " outer vessel" or " vacuum jacket."
The annular i
space between the inner and outer vessels shall contain perlite, aluminized mylar, or a suitable equal for insulation, and this space shall be kept at a high vacuum of 50 microns or less.
All tank control piping and valving should be installed in accordance with ANSI B31.3,, and all tank piping shall be constructed of stainless steel.
The following tank piping subsystems shall be provided, a.
A fill circuit with top and bottom lines, which allow the tank to be filled without affecting continuous hydrogen supply.
b.
A pressure build-up circuit to keep the tank pressure at operational levels.
c.
Vacuum-jacketed lige'd fill and pump circuits, where applicable.
3.2.3 Overpressure Protection System Safety consideration for the tank are satisfied by both primary and secondary relief systems.
The primary relief system shall consist of a pair of pipe legs coupled by a three-way valve.
Each 7f these legs shall contain one safety valve and one rupture disk.
This dual primary relief system will provide 100% standby redundancy, which will allow maintenance and testing to be performed without sacrificing the level of protection from overpressure.
This primary relief system shall comply with the provisions of the ASME Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) Standard 2 The secondary relief system, 3-4 w._._--_--_-._--__-___
QUAD-CITIES which is not required by the ASME Codes, shall be totally separate from the primary relief system.
This secondary system shall consist of a locked open valve, a rupture disk designed to burst at 1.33 times the maximum allowable working pressure, and a secondary vent stack.
Two annular space relief devices shall be installed in the outer vessel to relieve any excess positive pressure which might result from a leak in the inner vessel.
Also, all system piping which may contain liquid and can be isolated from the tank relief devices shall be protected with thermal relief devices.
All outlet connections from the safety relief valves, rupture devices, bleed valves, and the fill line purge connections shall be piped to an overhead vent stack, per CGA G-5, Section 7.3.7.
The hydrogen tank and delivery vehicle, when loading or unloading, shall be groundei per CGA P-12, Sections 5.4.5 and 5.7.1.2.
The cryogenic tank shall also be protected from the effects of lightning per NFPA 78, Chapter 6.
Excess flow protection shall be added to the tank's liquid piping wherever a line break would release a sufficient amount of hydrogen to threaten safety-related structures (see also Section 4.2.2).
3.2.4 Instrumentation The tank shall be supplied with a pressure gauge, a liquid level j
gauge, and a vacuum readout connection.
Additional information i
on supply system instrumentation can be found in Section 2.4 and Tables 1 and 2.
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3.2.5 Liquid Hydrogen Pump and Controls The liquid hydrogen pump shall be of proven design to provide continuous hydrogen supply in unattended, automatic operation.
This liquid hydrogen pump shall have the following subsystems and controls.
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A positive isolation valve shall'be provided to
.a.
control the liquid feed into the pumping' system per NFPA'50B.
This valve shall be a pneumatically..
' operated valve, which shall only open during pump operation, shall fail'close in any fault mode, and shall be able to be remotely overtidden in' case-of emergency.
b.
The hydrogen pumps sh'all be shut down.at high q
pressures to prevent system overpressurization.
c.
A temperature switch downstream of the vaporizers to' trip the hydrogen pump if a low temperature-condition exists in the hydrogen gas line.
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d.
Pump operation shall be continuously.and f
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automatically monitored.
Operation which results in pump-cavitation, high temperatur.e at the 7 ump discha'rge, or low temperature downstream of the vaporizer shall trip the pump and indicate-the fault on the remote control. panel by an audible alarm and light indication.
e.
Nitrogen shall be used to purge pump motors, control panels, and valves.
All electrical components shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 70.
l 3.2.6 Interface with Gaseous System l
Switchover controls shall be provided to allow operation of the liquid or gaseous hydrogen supply systems.
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3.2.7 Vaporization Vaporization of the liquid hydrogen shall be achieved by the use I
of ambient air vaporizers.
The vaporizers shall be designed, 3-6 I-l
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i installed and operated under guidance from NFPA 50A and 50B.
The
)
vaporizers shall be piped in parallel to allow periodic intervals for defrosting without interfering with the plant's hydrogen flow J
requirements of 140 scfm.
The vaporizer = shall have a design-pressure consistent with plant injection requirements and be able to withstand the maximum pressures generated from the cryogenic
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Pump.
3.3 LIQUID OXYGEN 1
l 3.3.1 System Overview The liquid oxygen storage system will be provided by the Liquid j
Air Company because of their extensive experience in the design, operation, and maintenance of associated storage and supply
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systems.
The liquid oxygen storage and supply system will j
consist of the following subsystems:
a.
Cryogenic storage tank, b.
Overpressure protection system, c.
Oxygen vaporization station, d.
Pressure control station, and e.
Interconnecting piping.
The liquid oxygen will be provided per CGA G-4 and G-4.3.
3.3.2 Cryogenic Storage Tank The liquid oxygen storage system consists of one 11,000-gallon
" inner vessel," constructed in accordance with Section VIII, l
Division 1 of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels.
This inner vessel is enclosed by a noncertified carbon steel " outer vessel" or " vacuum jacket."
The annular space between the inner 3-7 l
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and outer vessels contains perlite and is kept at a high vacuum of 50 microns or less.
All tank control piping and valving has been installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 and all tank piping is constructed of wrought copper and stainless steel.
The following tank piping subsystems have been provided.
I a.
A fill circuit with top and bottom lines, which allow the tank to be filled without affecting system operation.
The filling of the tank will be performed by the liquid oxygen supplier with station personnel supervision.
b.
A pressure build-up circuit to keep the tank pressure at operational levels.
This pressure build-up circuit contains a shut-off valve and a check valve which allows removal and maintenance of the pressure regulator without service interruptions.
c.
An economizer circuit to preferentially feed oxygen gas from the vessel vapor space into the oxygen discharge line.
3.3.3 Overpressure Protection System l
l Safety considerations for the tank are satisfied by dual full-I flow safety valves and emergency backup rupture discs.
The primary relief system consists of a pair of pipe legs coupled by a three-way valve.
Each of these legs contain one safety valve
)
and one rupture disk.
This dual primary relief system provides 100% standby redundancy, which allows maintenance and testing to be performed without sacrificing the level of protection from
)
overpressure.
This primary relief system complies with the provisions of the ASME Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) Standards.
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QUAD-CITIES in Two annular space safety heads.are provided to relieve any excess positive-pressure which might result from a leak in the inner vessel.
Safety valves have also.been installed.in the following locations to protect piping and equipment which may contain
-liquid and can be isolated from the tank' relief valves.
.a.
On the-upper portion of the pressure build-up. coil to provide additional protection to the inner vessel, b.
On the lower portion of the pressure build-up coil to protect the coil in case liquid is trapped in it when the shut-off valve is closed.
c.
On the filling manifold to protect this equipment in case liquid is trapped between the valve in the bulk transport and the top and bottom fill control valves.
d.
On each vaporizer branch to protect the pair of vaporizers in case the block valve ahead of the vaporizer pair is shut-off by mistake.
e.
On the oxygen gas discharge line to protect equipment downstream of the pressure control station.
A check valve on this line protects the oxygen storage and supply system from contamination and sudden increases in pressure from the oxygen injection system.
The tank has local indication of tank pressure, liquid oxygen level, liquid oxygen temperature, and vaporized-oxygen supply l
pressure.
These indicators are sufficient for normal monitoring of the tank condition.
I 3.3.4 Oxygen Vaporization System ll l
The vaporization of the liquid oxygen is achieved by the use of ambient air vaporizers.
Each vaporizer features a hex fin design, a 200-scfm flow capacity, and a design pressure of 500 3-9
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psig.
Two pairs of vaporizers are installed in parallel, which allows each pairito'be independent of the other.
This arrangement allows for periodic defrosting of one pair of vaporizers while not interfering with the plant's oxygen flow requirements of 70.scfm.
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3.3.5 Pressure-Control Station H
1 The pressure control station is a manifold design.
The manifold-has two (2) full-flow parallel pressure-reducing regulators.
The 3
3 discharge pressure range of these regulators is adjustable to satisfy plant oxygen injection requirements.
Pressure gauges are provided upstream and downstream of the regulators, and a sufficient. number of hand operated valves are provided to ensure complete operational flexibility.
A low temperature shut-off valve is installed downstream from the vaporizer to protect system piping and equipment from liquid oxygen.
3.3.6 Interconnecting Piping The design and installation of the oxygen piping valves and related-equipment was in conformance with ANSI B31.1 and CGA G-4.4.
All oxygen piping and equipment was cleaned in accordance with CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4 to remove all organic, inorganic, and particulate catter from surfaces to be exposed to the oxygen.
The initial cleaning was accomplished by precleaning all parts of j
the system at the factory, maintaining cleanliness during shipping and construction, and completely purging the system after construction was completed.
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4.0 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS l
4.1-GASEOUS AND LIQUID HYDROGEN 4.1.1 Site Characteristics of the Gaseous and Liquid Hydrogen Systems 4.1.1.1 Overview A review of the following site characteristics was conducted for' the location of the gaseous and liquid hydrogen storage site.
a.
The location of the storage site in proximity to exposures as addressed in NFPA 50A and 50B, b.
The route of hydrogen deliver!, vehicles on-site, and c.
The location of the hydrogen storage site in proximity to safety-related equipment.
1 4.1.1.2-Specific Hydrogen Conditions 4.1.1.2.l' Fire Protection The hydrogen storage site is located 1500 feet from the nearest safety-related structure.
The site is also located such that it will be at least 75 feet from any future and present buildings.
The location is shown in Figures 7 and 8.
This site location meets or exceeds all requirements for protection of personnel and equipment as addressed in NFPA 50A, " Gaseous Hydrogen Systems,"
and NFPA SOB, " Liquefied Hydrogen Systems."
There is no need for additional fire protection systems based on an analysis of local conditions on-site, exposure to properties, water supplies, and the probable effectiveness of the plant fire brigade in accordance with NFPA 50A and 50B.
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.4.1.1.2.2 Security-The' hydrogen storage site is completely fenced and is located' inside'the owner controlled area.
Lighting is to be' installed to facilitate night surveillance.
4.1.1.2.3 Route of Hydrogen Delivery on Site The. route to be taken by hydrogen delivery trucks on Commonwealth Edison property is shown on Figure 9.
Truck barrier, posts are located approximately at the fence perimeter to protect the gaseous and liquid storage vessels from mobile equipment.'
4.1.1.2.4 Location of Hydrogen Storage Facility to Safety-Related Structures
.The site' location as shown in Figure 7 has been shown to be acceptable relative'to safety-related structures and equipment l
considering the following hazards:
a.-
Gaseous' or liquid storage vessel failure, and b.
Gaseous or' liquid pipe' breaks.
4.1.2 Gaseous or Liquid Storage Vessel failure The gaseous storage facility will consist of two tractor trailer discharge stations, which may be.used for hydrogen gas supply when liquid hydrogen is not available, and a 50,000 scf "6 pack" tube bank for permanent gas supply with the liquid system.
These vessels shall be capable of withstanding tornado missiles (NUREG-0800) and site-specific se.ismic loading due to horizontal and
]
-vertical accelerations acting simultaneously.
A simultaneous failure of multiple vessels will not be discussed because of the i
inherent strength of the vessels which makes them unsusceptible
]
to failures from outside forces.
For this reason, the maximum postulatea release of hydrogen fron the gaseous storage facility in accordance with the HWC Guidelines is the instantaneous i
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Revisien 1-March 1989
. release of the fully pressurized contents of the largest single vessel.
The gaseous hydrogen storage tube bank will be anchored l
to remain in place forfthe design bas!.s tornado and the storage facility is 38 feet higher than the plant elevation of'595 feet, to eliminate any flooding concerns.
L The liquid storage facility will consist of a single 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen storage vessel.
This vessel, its foundation,.and all liquid hydrogen piping up to and including excess flow protection devices shall be designed to withstand the design basis earthquake for the plant site.
The tank and its foundation shall also be designed to remain in place during the design basis tornado, and the storage facility is 38 feet higher than the plant elevation of 595 feet, to eliminate any flooding concerns.
The potential consequences of a gaseous or liquid storage vessel failure are a fireball or an explosion.
4.1.2.1-Fireball The therm 31 flux versus distance from a fireball center for two common gaseous commercial vessel sizes from the HWC Guidelines are shown in Figure 10.
The individual tube trailer mounted l
storage vessels being considered for the facility contain 12,000 scf per vessel; hence, the required separation distance could not be calculated from Figure 10.
As a conservative estimate, it was approximated that the thermti flux for a fireball from the 12,000-scf gaseous hydrogen storage vessel equaled that of the 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen storage vessel.
Using conversion factors in the EWC Guidelines, the equivalent TNT for both storage facilities can be calculated.
The 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen storage facility is equivalent to 27,400 lbs of TNT, and one pressurized 12,000-sef gaseous hydrogen storage vessel equals 325 lbs of TNT.
The significantly higher equivalent explosive content of the liquid hydrogen tank validates this assumption.
The thermal flux versus distance from 4-3
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the: fireball' center-for a liquid' hydrogen storage system is shown in Figure 11~.-
From this; figure,~1t can be-seen that for a.
-20,000-gallon liquid hydrogen tank with a1 fireball duration of 8.18 seconds, charring:of1 wood surfaces occurs ~at 520 feet.
Since'the nearest' safety-related structure is 1500 f'eet from.the postulated fireball center, the effects.of a fireball are
. insignificant.
4.1.2;2!. Explosion Figure 12 shows the minimum required separation distance,for
. gaseous' hydrogen storage systems to safety-related structures recommended'by the HWC Guidelines.
Using 12;000 scf.of hydrogen gas per vessel, the minimum required separation ~ distance-to safety-related, structures is.approximately 140 feet.
Since the actual' distance is'much. greater than~140 feet,:the effects of an explosion for the gaseous hydrogen storage option are considered insignificant.
An analysis.was.also performed for the minimum separation
- distance required for the 20,000-gallon liquid hydrogen storage tank.
As shown in.Section 4.1.2.1 the explosive content of the liquid hydrogen tank is significantly higher than.that for the gaseous hydrogen storage vessels.
Therefore, the bounding i
minimum separation distance should be based upon this more conservative analysis.
A calculation was performed using the recon cendations in the evaluation entitled " Separation Distances. Recommended for Hydrogen Storage to Prevent Damage to Nuclear Power Plant Structures from Hydrogen Explosion," which is included as Appendix B of the EWC Guidelines.
This calculation yielded a result of 962 feet for the required separation distance.
Since this is well below the actual distance of 1500 feet to the nearest safety-related structure, the effects of an explosion for the liquid hydrogen storage option are also considered insignificant.
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QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 4.1.3 Gaseous or Liquid Pipe Breaks The criteria for acceptable siting of gaseous pipe breaks up to the point where excess flow protection is provided from the HWC Guidelines are; a.
Dilution of resultant release below the lower flammability limit of 4% before reaching air pathways into safety-related structures, and b.
Minimum separation distances for the blast damage criteria.
The hydrogen supply system piping diagram is shown in Figure 3.
Excess flow protection for the system is provided as close as possible to the gaseous storage unit.
This arrangement provides piping outside of the fenced area with excess flow check valve protection.
Figures 13 and 14A from the HWC Guidelines shows the minimum separation distance between safety-related air intakes vercus supply pipe diameter for gaseous releases from a 2450 psig gaseous hydrogen storage system and a 150 psig liquid hydrogen storage tank, respectively.
The required separation distance of 375 feet for the gaseous hydrogen storage system and 500 feet for the liquid hydrogen storage system are significantly less than the actual 1500 feet distance to the nearest safety-related air pathway.
Therefore, the effects of gaseous pipe breaks on safety-related air intakes is insignificant.
The criteria for acceptable siting of liquid pipe breaks up to the point where excess flow protection is provided is identical to that for gaseous pipe breaks.
Figure 14B shows the minimum separation distance to air pathways into safety-related structures versus supply pipe diameter for liquid releases from a 150 psig liquid hydrogen storage tank.
The maximum liquid hydrogen pipe diameter upstream of the first excess flow device is less than one half of an inch.
This diameter corresponds to a separation distance of approximately 1400 feet.
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QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 All liquid piping and the first excess flow check valve for the gaseous hydrogen piping are inside the fenced area of the hydrogen storage site.
Therefore, the maximum overpressure produced by a pipe break would be enveloped by those produced by the explosion of the liquid hydrogen storage tank, which are below the HWC Guidelines blast criteria.
4.2 LIQUID OXYGEN 4.2.1 Site Characteristics of the Liquid Oxygen System 4.2.1.1 Overview A review of the following characteristics was conducted for the location of the liquid oxygen storage system.
a.
The location of the supply system in proximity to exposures as addressed in NFPA 50 and the hydrogen storage facility, b.
The route of liquid oxygen delivery on site, and c.
The location of the supply system in proximity to l
safety-related equipment.
4.2.1.2 Specific Oxygen Conditions i
4.2.1.2.1 Fire Protection i
The liquid oxygen supply facility is located 1000 feet from the j
nearest safety-related structure.
The site location is shown in Figures 7 and 15.
This site location meets or exceeds all requirements for protection of personnel and equipment as addressed in NFPA 50, " Bulk Oxygen Systems."
A distance of 500 feet is provided between the oxygen and hydrogen supply sites.
This provides as much separation distance as practical between the two sites.
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i QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March :989 l
4.2.1.2.2 Security The oxygen supply facility is completely fenced and is located inside the owner controlled area.
Lighting is to be installed to facilitate night surveillance.
4.2.1.2.3 Route of Liquid Oxygen Delivery on Site The route to be taken by liquid oxygen supply vehicles on Commonwealth Edison property is shown on Figure 9.
Truck barrier posts are located approximately at the fence perimeter to protect the facility from mobile equipment.
4.2.1.2.4 Location of Storage System to Safety-Related Equipment The liquid oxygen supply system location has been shown to be acceptable considering the following hazards, a.
Liquid Oxygen Storage Vessel Failure, and b.
Liquid Oxygen Vapor Cloud Dispersion.
4.2.2 Liquid Oxygen Storage Vessel Failure, Vapor Cloud Dispersion The vapor cloud instantaneously formed by a large liquid oxygen spill or tank failure could conceivably be injected into safety-related air intakes.
The HWC Guidelines address this problem and l
provide acceptable locations to safety-related air intakes for various sizes of liquid cxygen atorage tanks.
The storage tank for the liquid oxygen storage facility is an 11,000-gallon tank.
Using this tank size and Figure 16 taken from the HWC l
Guidelines, the acceptable location can be found.
The nearest safety-related air intakes are the control room outside air ventilation intakes.
These intakes are 28 feet above ground level and are located inside the plant security fence, which is located 850 feet from the oxygen supply facility.
This location meets the acceptable location criteria of Figure 16.
Since this 4-7
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' figure assumes the origin.'of release'is from the storage location,Lthe' tank and its foundation have been: designed to
. remain in place for -the design basis tornado, and the oxygen /',-
storage site is'20 feet higher.than the plant elevation of 595 feet, to eliminate any flooding concerns.
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-5.0 VERIFICATION-5.1 HYDh0 GEN WATER CHEMISTRY-VERIFICATION SYSTEM iv
?
The: performance of the' HWC System will' be evaluated by a Hydrogen Water Chemistry' Verification System (EWCVS) which is depicted in Figure 17, sheets 1 and,'2.
Tnis system consists of an l
autoclave subsystem, an orbisphere subsystem, and a monitoring panel.
5.1.1 Autoclave Subsystem The autoclave subsystem contains three autoclaves piped in parallel, which receive a total of 2 to 4 gallons / min of water-
)
from the Reactor Process Sample Panel line at up to 1250 psig and 0
575 F.
The'first autoclave contains a crack growth. monitoring system, which is capable of detecting changes in sample crack
- length as small as 0.0002 inch.
The second autoclave is a modular unit'containing a constant extension rate tensile'(CERT) test systen..
This. autoclave will perform a one week long CERT
.l test on-both cracked and uncracked samples when'it is
. installed.
After the test has been performed the sample will be examined to identify if intergranular fracture had occurred.
The
~
last autoclave contains an electrochemical."i potential monitoring system, which measures'the corrosion potential in the water.
. After flowing through an autoclave,-the sample water will be j
0 cooled to below 150 F before being discharged to the auction header of the Reactor Water Clean-Up System Recirculation Pumps.
- 5.1.2 Orbisphere Subsystem The orbisphere subsystem contains a single water conductivity analyzer and two dissolved oxygen analyzers.
The orbisphere subsystem receives water from the Reactor Process Sample Panel at 0
approximately 50 psig and 68 F.
After passing through the orbisphere subsystem the sample water is discharged to the Reactor Building Process Sample Panel Drain Header, which discharges to the Reactor Building Equipment Drain Tank.
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-QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 J
March 1989.
V L
~5'l.3 Monitoring Panel ~
The monitoring panelLcontains a computerized Data Acquisition
' System-(DAS),'which monitors and records data for the HWCVS (as covered in Sections 5.l'.1 and 5.1.2) in' addition to plant power level, autoclave temperature and flow, and hydrogen injection
. rate.
This system will.be used to develop correlations between-crack growth and plant water chemistry parameters.
5.2 SAFETY COMOIDERATIONS The new sample. lines for the HWCVS were added to the existing recirculation loop sample line for each Unit's Reactor Process I
Sample Panel.- These new sample lines are for the autoclave sud orbisphere subsystems of the HWCVS.
The existing sample line for the Reactor. Process Sample Panel System is' separated from the i
reactor recirculation Loop B for Unit 1 or Loop.A for Unit 2 by dual Group I containment isolation valves.
On June 19, 1987, the NRC transmitted a revision to BTP MEB 3-1,.
of SRP 3.6.2 in NUREG-0800 entitled, " Postulated Rupture Locations in Fluid System Piping Inside and Outside Containment."
It stated that for the following pipes, breaks do not'need to be postulated:
a.
Longitudinal breaks for high energy piping with a diametor less than 4 inches (Section B.3.b.(1)).
b.
Leakage cracks for moderate and high energy piping with a diameter less than 1 inch (Section B.3.c.(1)).
It is also stated that piping used as instrument lines with a l
diameter less than 1 inch should conform with the provisions in Reg. Guide 1.11 to guard against circumferential line breaks (section B.3.a(10).
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Both of.the new. lines have a diameter less-than'1' inch and the
. high energyLline.to'the Autoclave l subsystem conforms with
' l
. Regulatory Guide 1.11 (section c.2.b).
Therefore, no new~ failure modes need'to.be. analyzed..
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6.0' OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND TRAINING The operation of an HWC system.will-require operator-and chemistry personnel attention.
Because of the radiation i
increases'that will result from using this system, an awareness L
of ALARA principles is required by all personnel.
This system will also have an effect on the off-gas system and the plant fire
_ protection program.
6.1 OPERATING PROCEDURES a
Operating procedures design guidance will be implemented through provision of appropriate written operating instructions for all applicable site operations.
Procedures will be provided for pre-operational testing and startup including system leak testing, system purging and system fill and vent (see Section 7.1); normal system operation including requirements for system alarm and trip functions, system restart and shutdown; system maintenance including preventative maintenance items and periodic retesting requirements:(see Sections 6.1.3.4 and 6.2); and material handling including fire protection measures.
6.1.1 Integration Into Existing Plant Operation Procedures Where appropriate, HWC. system operation will be referenced in normal plant procedures and referred to appropriate system operating instructions.
6.1.2 Plant-Specific Procedures Current off gas system procedures will be modified to recognize requirLd changes due to operation of the HWC system.
6.1.3 Radiation Protection Program The operation of the hydrogen additiot. system will cause a slight reduction in the off-gas delay time due to the increase in the flow rate of noncondensibles resulting from the excess oxygen 6-1 L
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added.
The maximum potential increase in the dose to the public whi'h could result from operating with the hydrogen addition c
l system has been conservatively estimated by assuming that the off-gas system was operated with 125 scfm of injected air in addition to an assumed 40-sefm condenser air in leakage.
It was further assumed that this rode of operation was maintained for the full year, even though this is considered to be a backup or supplemental mode only.
Based on ge.seous release data from the past six years, the maximum off-site dose under these circumstances is less than 3 mrem / year, which is well below any regulatory limit or level of concern.
Therefore, the impact on the health and safety of the
)
public due to this aspect of the hydrogen addition system is negligible.
Additional information relating to radiological effects due to the operation of the HWC system can be found in l
l Section 8.
6.1.3.1 ALARA Commitment Commonwealth Edison management is committed to designing, installing, operating, and maintaining the hydrogen addition system in accordance with Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 to assure that occupational radiation exposuret and doses to the general public will be "as low as reasonably achievable."
6.1.3.2 Initial Radiological Survey A preliminary radiological survey has been completed to identify potential radiological effects on the Quad Cities Station.
Areas of the station which may experience increased dose rates have been identified.
The results of this survey will be confirmed and additional measures introduced, if required, when hydrogen injection is implemented.
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QUAD-CITIES 6.1.3.3 Plant. Shielding Based'on the survey completed in accordance with Section 6.1;3.2, and the experience at the Dresden Station, the shielding in the Quad Cities Station appears to be sufficient to attenuate the contributions from additional,N-16 contained'in the steam lines.
These results will be confirmed and additional' shielding.
will be provided, if required, when the hydrogen addition is implemented.
6.1.3.4 Maintenance Activities Appropriate system' design guidance will be incorporated into existing plant-procedures.to establish access control of radiation areas that are significantly affected by hydrogen addition.
Also, guidelines.will be established for.any additional controls. required for area posting and monitoring, that are necessary as a result of hydrogen injection.
6.1.3.5 Radiological Surveillance Programs The existing radiological surveillance program as described in Section B.4 of the Off-site Dose Calculation Manual is adequate for assuring compliance with regulatory requirements for off-site doses to the public.
This is an ongoing program and has therefore yielded a data base of measured doses which arise from normal operation.
The doses which are measured-during operation with hydrogen addition will be compared with the existing data base to ensure that the impact on the public due to hydrogen addition is ALARA.
The existing on-site radiological survey program is adequate for determining the impact of hydrogen addition on station operation and ensuring that station operation will be ALARA.
As experience is gained with the hydrogen addition system, the program will be modified if additional measures are required.
i 6-3
. QUAD-CITIES 6.1.3.6' Measurement of N-16~ Radiation The survey meter which will be relied upon for N-16 measurements is the Eberline Model'RO-3 ion chamber.
The construction and energy dependence of-this monitor is essentially the same as
~
those of the Eberline'Model RO-2 ion chamber.
Vendor' supplied data indicate that this series of ion chambers has a small over-response at 6 MeV (about 10%).
Therefore, the accuracy of these meters is adequate for measurements of radiation fields due to N-16.
A review of plant personnel dosimetry will be conducted to ensure that appropriate calibration or correction factors.are used.
6.1.3.7 Value/ Impact Considerations A radiological assessment at Dresden indicated that the total dose increase with HWC was approximately 0.5% of an annual basis (from 1935'to 1945 man-rem / year).
While this ins:rease is site dependent' due to plant layout and shielding configurations, significant variances from the Dresden assessment are not anticipated.
Thus, over the life of a plant (assuming a 25-year remaining life), the project total dose increase with HWC is 250-300 man-rems.
With HWC implementation, the potential exists to relax current-augmented in-service inspection requirement imposed by NRC Generic Letter 84-11 and elimination of extended plant outages for pipe replacement and/or repair.
The value/ impact assessment presented in Appendix E to NUREG-1061 (Volume 1, August 1984) projects a 1161 man-rem (best estimate) savings over the life of the plant as a consequence of reduced inspections and repairs with HWC.
Typical. pipe replacement projects result in a total j
dose of 1400 to 2000 man-rem.
Thus, HWC implementation could result in a significant savings in total dose over the life of L
the plant.
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March 1989 6.1.4 Water Chemistry' Control Commonwealth Edison. Nuclear Operatic 7s Directive NOD-CY.2, "BWR l
Water Chemistry Control ~ Program"'has seen issued to establish the object'ive, management policy, and method of control for assuring the high. reactor water quality necessary to obtain the maximum benefit from the hydrogen addition system, including the maintenance of the feedwater' dissolved oxygen concentration above 20 ppb.
The specific numerical water chemistry control requirements were primarily taken from the EPRI-BWR Owners Group report entitled "BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Guidelines,"
existing General Electric chemistry guidelines, and known or suspected contaminant concerns at the company's BWRs.
The Quad Cities station has incorporated the requirements of these l
guidelines into their procedures.
6.1.5 Fuel Surveillance Program The' station will consider the fuel surveillance program recommended by the fuel supplier, and in consideration of the HWC operating experience will request further guidance from the fuel supplier.to implement or modify the initial recommended fuel surveillance program.
6.2 MAINTENANCE System maintenance requirements and design guidance are to be met through incorporation of an appropriate preventative maintenance schedule and procedures into the station maintenance program.
The preventative maintenance program will be based on manufacturer's recommendations, and will include surveillance inspections as well as hydrogen and oxygen subsystem excess flow check valve periodic retesting requirements.
See Sections 6.1.3.4 and 7.2 for additional information.
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QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 6.3 TRAINING The station training personnel will incorporate the design guidance into the station training program.
HWC system training will provide instruction to personnel on_related procedures and will include periodic training to update personnel on current system operating considerations.
A student text has been developed to address the design and operation of the HWC System.
6.4 IDENTIFICATION All hydrogen and oxygen piping was uniquely identified through the display of an appropriate color field and legend markings.
Underground piping had identification tape laid 6 in above the pipe, before the trench was filled, and markers placed over the filled trench.
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' 7,0 SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING 7.1 SYSTEM INTEGRITY TESTING l
L Pre-operational leak test requirements for the hydrogen piping will be met through the performance of a soap bubble leak test meeting the requirements of the 1986 edition of ANSI B31.1.
This test uses nitrogen to pressurize the hydrogen piping to 150 psig of s,istem design pressure for at least 15 minutes.
Then the pressure is reduced to 100 psig to perform a soap bubble leak test on all of the pipe joints.
A retest will be performed following any modifications to the hydrogen piping that may affect the pressure boundary of the system.
This retest will-use nitrogen to pressurize the affected section of piping to 110% of system design pressure for at least 15 minutes.
Then the pressure is reduced to 100 psig to perform a soap bubble leak test on the affected pipe joints.
.7.2 PRE-OPERATI:)NAL AND PERIODIC TESTING The fellowing items are addressed in the Quad-Cities BWR Water Chemistry Installation Pre-operational and Startup Test Procedure:
a.
.All trip and alarm functions, b.
Safety features,
-c.
Excess flow check valves, and d.
System controls and monitors.
. Periodic retesting requirements shall be met through implementation of an appropriate retesting schedule and procedures, based on manufacturer's recommendations and in consideration of extended Hydrogen Water Chemistry system shutdown periods or other factors not consistent with normal system operation.
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l QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 8.0 RADIATION MONITORING
.)
8.1 INTRODUCTION
]
During normal operation of'a BWR, nitrogen-16 is formed from an
. oxygen-16 (N-P) reaction.
N-16 decays with a half-life of 7.1 secords and emits a high-energy gamma photon (6.1 Mev).
Normally, most of the N-16 combines rapidly with oxygen to form water-soluble, nonvolatile. nitrates and nitrites.
- However,
. because of the lower oxidizing potential present in a hydrogen water chemistry environment, a higher percentage of the N-16 is converted to more volatile species.
As a consequence, the steam activity during hydrogen addition can increase up to a factor of j
approximately five.
The dose rates in the turbine building, l
}
plant environs, and off-site also increase; however, the l
magnitude of the increase at any given location dept:nds upon the contribution of the steam activity to the tota? dose rate at that location.
The specific concerns are:
a.
The dose to members of the general public (40 CFR i
190),
b.
The dose to personnel in unrestricted areas (10 CFR 20), and c.
The maintenance of personnel exposure "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA).
8.2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING The current Quad Cities Technical Specifications require a Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM) set point of seven (7) times the normal rated full power background for Main Steam line Isolation and Reactor SCRAM.
As part of the changes to the technical specifications Quad-Cities will utilize a single set j
point of fifteen (15) times the full power rated background l
8-1 x
m__u___._
[:
3,-
QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 I' '
without hydrogen addition.
This exception to the gui6elines ic l
fully justified in the discussion below:
8.2.1 Dual MSLRM Set Point Recommendation Commonwealth Ed.ison takes exception to this recommendation.
Calculations.have been performed which indicate that the MSLRM will continue to perform its safety function with a single set point.. The advantage gained from a single set point is that it eliminates the procedural actions which would be required to change between the dual set points during power ascension and descension.
Minimization of required procedural actions during this phase of operations enhances overall operational safety by eliminating unnecessary operator diverrions.
l The proposed set point li. crease is to fifteen (15) times the current nominal full power background (NFPB).
The factor of fifteen provides an adequate safety margin to assure that the MSLRM will perform its intended safety function while eliminating spurious challenges to the safety systems.
It is based on
. allowing for a factor of five (5) increase in the current nominal full power background due to increased N-16 carry-over in the main steam, and a factor of three (3) in the monitor response variation (which is consistent with current generic BWR technical specifications).
Note that the current technical specification set point is a factor of seven (7) times the current NFPB, so that the new value represents a net increase of a factor of approximately 2.5 rather than 5.
As discussed in Section 8.2.2, sufficient margin exists at the new set point to assure that the MSLRM will perform its intended safety function following the I
design basis control rod drop accident.
8.2.2 MSLRM Safety Design Basis The only design basis event in which the Quad-Cities Station takes credit for the MSLRM is the control rod drop accident (CRDA).
For this accident the conservatively calculated dose rate at the MSLRM is 8 R/hr.
The new setpoint is 1.5 R/hr, which 8-2 f
e'
't QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 Ng March 1989 is fif teen _(15) times the. current nominal full power operation background dose rate, as stated-in the UFSAR.
Since the l
calculated 1 dose rate from the_CRDA'is approximately five times q
the proposed set point, the MSLRM will retain the capability to.
W L~~
initiate the required safety actions on the high radiation signal l
caused by the.CRDA.
1 Raising the MSLRM trip. set point from 0.7 R/hr to 1.5 R/hr will i
not significantly increase the radiological release from a L
CRDA.
The difference between the time required to reach the i
current trip set point and the new trip set point is approximately-1/4 second, and the time required to reach the new trip set point remains less than 1/2 second.
The time period permitted for completing closure of the main steam isolation valve is 5 seconds (Quad Citiee Technical Specification 3.7/4.7-l D.1).
The increase in time-to-closure (due to the new trip set
-point) is only 5% of the' current time-to-closure.
This will have a small effect on the total release and concomitant dose to the public.
Since the calculated doce from the CROA is only 12 mrem, the increase will be very small and, therefore, does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident u
previously evaluated.
l Because the CRDA is the only accident which requires MSLRM initiated actions, the new set point does not create the possib'ility of a.new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
No other previously analyzed accidents or malfunctions, as addressed in the UFSAR, are involved.
The MSLRM is provided only to mitigate the radiological
)
consequences of a CRDA once fuel damage has occurred.
Other means are provided to minimize fuel damage from a CRDA.
Therefore the new set point does not involve an increase in the probability of a CRDA or any other accident.
The.new set point does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
It has been conservatively calculated that the margin required to assure that the monitor will trip and perform 8-3 I
QUAD-CITIES its intended function is 0.7 R/hr.
When this value is added to the new set point value of 1.5 R/Hr, the total dose rate required to assure that the monitor will trip is 2.2 R/Hr.
As discussed above, the calculated dose from the CRDA is 8 R/hr.
Therefore, the margin of safety between the trip set point and the calculated dose rate from the CRDA is more than enovgh to assure that the monitor will perform its intended function.
8.2.3 MSLRM Sensitivity Conceptually, the sensitivity of the MSLRM to fission products is effectively reduced by the increase in the setpoint.
However, it is still functional and capable of initiating a reactor scram.
The main functicn of the instrument is to help maintain off-site releases to within the applicable regulatory limits.
The M3LRM is supplemented by the off gas radiation monitoring system which monitors the gaseous effluent prior to its discharge to the environs.
The off gas radiation monitor setpoint is established to help ensure that the equivalent stack release limit is not exceeded.
8.2.4 Conclusion The only 3ccident which requires the MSLRM is the CRDA.
It bas been shown that, for this scenario, the increased set point does not affect the ability of the MSLRM to perform its intended safety function, and has minimal impact on the health and-safety of the public.
It has also been shown that the increased set point has no affect on the capability of the station to detect noble gas releases from the reactor core.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that an increase in the MSLRM set point will not reduce the safety margins as defined by technical specifications, and therefore this changes does not constitute an unreviewed safety concern.
1 8-4 e
c
T" QUAD-CITIES l'
8.3 > EQUIPMENT-QUALIFICATION Commonwealth Edison has estimated the expected radiation values 1
i for the' Quad-Cities Station.due to'hydrocen addition.
All i
L a
environmental qualification of electrical equipment per 10 CFR
)
50.49 will remain bounding based upon these estimated dose increases.
After the HWC system is operational, additional radiation surveys will be performed to determine the actual dose increase to equipment.
~
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S The' radiological environmental effects of hydrogen addition have been evaluated for the Quad-Cities Station.
It has been determined that-the calculated annual average off-site dose, including the effects of hydrogen water chemistry, will be within the guidelines of.40CFR190.
This evaluation was performed using-the environmental dose models and techniques in the Commonwealth j
Edison Off-site Dose Calculation Manual (Rev. 11, March 1985) as modified to take into account current recreational river usage.
Thp dose evaluation accounted for the "skyshine" due to the increased N-16 in the turbine and main steam piping, the " worst
' case" effects of hydrogen addition on the plume-shine dose, and currently existing on-site gamma radiation sources.
Assuming i
that the N-16 in the main steam increases by a factor of 5, it l
has been' conservatively estimated that the dose to the maximally exposed individual will be less than 20 mrem / year.
8-5 I
I'.U
.b.,
7_
QUAD-CITIES a
t Revision 1 f
March 1989 l
l 9.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE Although the EWC system is non-nuclear safety related, the design, procurement, fabrication and construction activities shall conform to the quality assurance provisions of the codes and standards specified in this document.
The following QA provisions were also followed to supplement the QA provisions of the codes and standards.
9.1 SYSTEM DESIGNER AND PROCURER 9.1.1 Design and Procurement Document Control System design and procurement guidance is reflected in Sargent &
Lundy specifications, instrument data sheets, and design drawings.
The specifications were developed by Sargent & Lundy Engineers and then reviewed by Commonwealth Edison Company.
9.1.2 Control of Purcnased Material, Equipment and Services Measures have been developed to ensure that suppliers of material. equipment and construction services are capable of supplying these items to the quality specified in the procurement documents.
This was accomplished by evaluations and surveys of the suppliers products and facilities.
9.1.3 Handling, Storage and Shipping Instructions were provided in the procurement documents to control the handling, storage, shipping and preservation of material and equipment to prevent damage, deterioration, or reduction of cleanliness.
9.2 CONTROL OF HYDROGEN STORAGE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS i
The applicable design and manufacturing documents for the hydrogen storage equipment will be reviewed to assure conformance to the procurement documents.
Factory tests of the system shall 9-1
l QUAD-CITIES a
also be specified which will assure operability of the supplier's e,quipment.
These tests will be supervised by Sargent & Lundy personnel or their representatives.
9.3 SYSTEM CONSTRUCTOR Quad-Cities Station Quality Control Department shall provide necessary inspection activities and identification of conforming and nonconforming items with regard to the requirements of the procurement documents or applicable codes and standards.
They shall also identify the remedial actions to be taken to correct any nonconformances.
L l
l 9-2 u-----.___-____._.
_u___
QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 10.0 DEVIATIONS / EXEMPTIONS FROM THE HWC GUIDELINES 7
This section contains all deviations and exemptions from the
- design guidance stated in the HWC Guidelines.
l 10.1 DEVIATIONS FROM GUIDANCE ON PIPE IDENTIFICATION These deviations are from Sections 2.3.1.2 and 2.1.2.2 Codes and Standards.
Deviation The HWC Guidelines recommend all hydrogen and l
oxygen piping and equipment to be identified in accordance with ANSI Z35.1.
However, the installed piping is not marked in accordance with this standard.
i Justification The intent of this standard is to ensure that all hydrogen and oxygen piping is readily identified from other plant piping.
This intent has been met by uniquely identifying all hydrogen and oxygen piping through the display of color fields and legend markings.
This deviation is from Section 6.4 Identification:
The HWC Guidelines recommend color coding all l
Deviation hydrogen and oxygen lines in accordance with ANSI A13.1 to aid plant personnel.
Justification The intent of this standard is to ensure that l
all oxygen and hydrogen lines are readily identified from other plant piping.
This intent has been met by uniquely identifying all hydrogen and oxygen lines through the display of color fields and legend markings.
I 10-I i____._---.
QUAD-CITIES 10.2 EXEMPTIONS FROM GUIDANCE ON HWC SYSTEM TRIPS These exemptions are from Table 1, Suggested Trips for Hydrogen Water Chemistry System, which is referenced in Section 2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL Exemption High Residual Oxygen In Off-Gas Trip Justification A high residual oxygen concentration in the off gas system implies that more oxygen is being injected into the off gas stream than is necessary to recombine with the hydrogen in the off-gas.
Therefore, there will not be an increase in the explosive concentration of j
hydrogen plus oxygen in the off-gas stream due I
to the low hydrogen level.
The residual oxygen concentration in the off-gas system is monitored in the control room and can be manually adjusted.
Exemption Low Oxygen Injection System Supply Pressure or Flow Trip Justification The intent of this trip has been met by augmenting the oxygen supply with building air.
This allows part of the oxygen requirements to be met through building air.
Therefore, in the event of a loss of oxygen supply, the building air will provide the necessary oxygen to prevent an excess hydrogen condition in the off-gas system.
Exemption Off-Gas Train or Recombiner Train Trip i
l 10-2 1
L__._,_______
' QUAD-CITIES Revision 1 March 1989 A procedure will be implemented to isolate the Justification
' hydrogen'and oxygen. injection systems uponL receiving an off gas train or recombiner' train trip.
This procedure will request a manual trip of-the hydrogen injection system and a manual adjustment of the oxygen flow controlT..er to rero.
110.3 DEVIATION FROM GUIDANCE ON SYSTEM IhTEGRITY TESTING This deviation is from Section-7.1 System Integrity Testing..
Deviation The EWC Guidelines recommend performing a Helium leak test on any portions of the hydrogen piping that is affected by modifications or maintenance.
Helium leak testing is not justified, as its Justification performance would cause additional cost and unnecessary delay, as well as unwarranted-and undesirable complications.
The proposed nitrogen leak testing conforms with the 1986 edition of ANSI B31.1 and adequately proves system joint integrity,. consistent with the initial system installation considerations.
10.4 DEVIATION FROM GUIDANCE ON MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING This deviation is from Section 8.2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING.
The HWC Guidelines recommend a dual set point l
Deviation for the MSLRM if credit is taken for a MSLRM-initiated isolation in the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA).
This would require changing the MSLRM set point at a power level of 20%,
to 3 times the normal rated full power 10-3 m_.-_.-
._i__.. ___ _ _ _
?
QUAD-CITIES background *with hydrogenLaddition.
Below 20%
rated power the MSLRM setipoint'would remain at its non-HWC setting and the HWC system
'would not'be allowed to' operator.
- However, I
r the Quad-Cities Station HWC system'will utilize a single MSLRM set point with a setting of 3 times the normal rated full power background with hydrogen addition, even though credit is taken for a MSLRM-initiated isolation for the CRDA.
Justification
-This. exemption is justified in Section 8.2.
k 4
i 10-4
...e
.-p.
. c,
' QUAD-CITIES Revision.I' 4
March 1989 i
x TABLE 1 i
,.f..,
. TRIPS FOR-THE HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SYSTEM l
o Low Power Level o
Reactor SCRAM o ' Operator Request (Manual) o Low Residual Oxygen In Off-Gas o
High Area Hydrogen Concentration o
High Hydrogen. Flow.
o Low' Hydrogen Flow o
Hydrogen: Storage Area Trouble Note:
1.
The operator can set the minimum steam flow point (0 to 100%)
'at which the hydrogen addition system will operate.
The current.setpoint is 20%.
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. +.
E
., Unit 1 Area Hydrogen' Sensor Locations-O, gy y
Sensor EPN F1. ~ El.
Locations
~
.1 2741-19 572'-6"
' Above IC/ID Condensate Pump-
,1-2741~- 21 572'-6" Above IA/1B Condensate Pump o
L.
s 1-2741-29..
,547'-0"-
Near Hydrogen Flow Control Station y,
1 1-2741-30.
547'-0"-
Above Hydrogen Local Control Panel 2201-B3
' l-2741-27.'
547'-0" Near Pipe Chase 1-2741-261 611'-6".
Above Pipe Chase -
1-2741-28~
595'-0" Near Hydrogen Supply Isolation Valve 1-2799-15C 1-2741 5 9 5 ' - 0 '
On Entrance Side to Manlift
.it Unit ?' Area Hydrogen Sensor Locations Sensor EPN F1. El.
Location 2-2741-21 572'-6" Above 2C/2D Condensate Pump l2-2741-30 547'-0" Above Hydrogen Local Control Panel 2202-83' 2-2741-27 611'-6"
.Above Pipe Chase
- 2-2741 595'-0"-
.Inside Oil Storage Room Near Door 2-2741-28 595'-0" Near Hydrogen Supply Isolation Valve 2-2799-15C
'2-2741-29 547'-0"
'Near Hydrogen Flow Control Station 2-2741-20
.595'-0" Between Manlift and Oil Storage Room Door 2-2741-19 572'-0" Above 2A/2B Condensate Pump a
t I
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4 e
QUAD CITIES 1& 2 HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY INSTALLATION COMPLIANCE WITH THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE GUIDELINES FOR PERMANENT BWR HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY INSTALLATIONS SEPTEMBER 1987 REVISION 4
Prepared for Commonwealth Edison Company 1
j by J
Sargent & Lundy l
I l
1 mn e$
n
{V I #
s
Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hvdrogen Water Chemistry Installation,n for Nonconformance L
. l.0 INTRODUCTION 1.0 Comply with intent:
L Design guidance provided in this section does not include any requirements.
1-1
- . ; o s
+
. Guidelines for Permanent B%R implementation or Justificat;on.
. Hvdrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 2.0. GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.0 Comply with intent:
- Figure. 2-lL.shows ' the hydrogen addition.
Design guidance provided in. this section systemL in ' simplified form.
For this does not include any requirements.
- report, the system is divided into hydrogen i supply, oxygen supply, hydregen injection, and oxygen injection systems.
Options for hydrogen supply are discussed briefly below, and detailed descriptions of the main options are provided in Section 3.
Oxygen supply is also described in Section
- 3. ' he gas injection systems are described T
in' this chapter.
Also described in this
. chapter are instruments ' and controls applicable to'the entire system.
2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 Comply with intent:
. The hydrogen water chemistry system is See Section 2.0.
not safety-related.- Equipment and com-ponents need not 'be redundant- (except
~
where required to meet good engineering
. practice), seismic category I, electrical class IE, or environment!!y qualified.
Nevertheless, proximity to safety-related equipment or other plant systems requires.
- special consideration in the design, fabri-cation,.
installation, operation and maintenance of hydrogen addition system
. components. Section 9 of this' document delineates - the quality assurance and L
quality control requirements to assure a safe. and reliable hydrogen addition system, in some cases these requirements are over and above those, which are normally required for nonsafety-related j'
mstallations.
l.
The hydrogen addition system should sup-press the dissolved oxygen concentration in the recirculation water to a point where IGSCC immunity is maintained at all reactor power levels at which the hydro-gen addition system is operating.
2-1 l
J
Revision 1 March'1989
' Guidelines for Permanent B4'R 1 implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance I
q 2.2 HYDROGEN SUPPLY OPTIONS 2.2 Comply with intent:
Hydrogen can be supplied from three See Section 2.0.
sources:
(1) a commercial hydrogen supplier; (2) onsite production from raw y
materials; or (3) recovery and recycle of hydrogen from the off-gas system. Any combination of these three methods may, in principle, be appropriate at a giver.
facility.
2.2.1 Commercial Supplie_rs
2.2.1 Comply
r Hydrogen can be obtained commercially Hydrogen will be initially supplied by from two types of sources: (1) merchant Liquid Air Corporation, which is a producers (i.e.,
companies that make Merchant producer.
hydrogen for the purpose of selling it to others) and (2) byproduct producers (i.e.,
companies that produce hydrogen only as a byproduct of their main business).
Hydrogen obtained in this manner is sup-plied as a high pressure gas or as a cryogenic liquid. The selecticn of gaseous or liquid supply options depends on system requirements such as flow rates and in-jection pressures and onsite considerations such as available separation distances and building strengths.
In general, gaseous storage is preferred for low flow rates and small separation distances. Detailed con-siderations for gaseous and liquid hydrogen supply facilities are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this report, respectively.
Safety considerations are discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
2.2.2 Onsite Production 2.2.2 Not Applicable:
Industrial processes for hydrogen pro-Onsite production will not be used for the duction can be divided into two groups:
initial design.
electrolysis of water and thermochemical decomposition of a feedstock that con-tains hydrogen.
Detailed considerations for onsite pro-duction of hydrogen by electrolysis are described in Section 3.3 of this report.
2-2
________.m__.__
.____m_
Revision 1 March 1989 Gbidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistrv Installation All other processes for producing high purity hydrogen involve thermochemical decomposition of hydrogen-containing feedstocks followed by a series of chem-ical and/or physical operations that con-centrate and purify the hydrogen. While these processes are feasible, in principle, they are not currently envisioned for im-plementation. Therefore, these processes are not addressed in this report.
2.2.3 Not Applicable:
2.2.3 Recovery Many processes are commercially avail-A recovery method will not be used for able for separating, concentrating, and the initial design, purifying hydrogen from refinery or by-product streams or for upgrading the purity of manufactured hydrogen.
Processes are also being developed for the recovery and storage of hydrogen by the formation of rechargeable metal hydrides.
Although recovery of hydrogen is a viable option, near-term implementation of this option is not envisioned. Therefore, this option is not addressed in this report.
2.3 GAS INJECTION SYSTEMS 2.3.1 Hydrogen Injection System
2.3.1 Comply
The hydrogen injection system includes all flow control and flow measuring eculp-ment and all necessary instrumentation and controls to ensure safe, reliable operation.
2.3.1.1 Injection Point Considerations 2.3.1.1 Comply:
Hydrogen is injected into the condensate Hydrogen shall be injected at a location pump discharge line, upstream of the con-that provides adequate dissolving and mixing and avoids gas pockets at high densate booster pump, through gas saver points.
Experience has shown that lance assemblies, injectior, into the suction of feedwater or condensate booster pumps is feasible.
Injection into feedwater pumps will require hydrogen at high pressures (e.g.,
150-600 psig). This may require either a compressed gas supply, compressors or a cryogenic hyorogen pump, depending on 2-3 I
.s.
c,.,
JCuldelines for Permanent 5% R:
-!mp.ementation or Astificat;cn LHydrogen Water Chemistry InstalianonT for Nonconformance
)
- the ' supply option chosen. In tne case of.a tiiquid hydrogen storage system, tNs can t a!so af fect the sizing ; of - the.lic.:.c 5
hydrogen tank.
.{
l Therei may be pressure f!uctuations in feedwater systems, depending on reactor power, level and pump performance. 7e hydrogen addition system snail be destgrac to-accommodate the full range of.sucn fluctuations.
2.3.1.2 Codes and Standards 2.3.1.2 ~ (Paragraphs 1 through $) Comply with intent:
This system shall be designed and instal;ed Codes and standards used for the hydrogen in ' accordance with OSHA standards in mjection system are equivalent to or _more -
29 CFR 1910.103.
stringent than those identified in this section.
Piping and related equipment-shall bc>
designed and fabricated to the appropriate edition of ANSI B31.1 or B31.3. for
. pressure-retaining components.
5torage -
containers, if' used, shall be designed -
constructed, and' tested in ' accordance with appropriate requirements of ASME B&PV Section Vill or-API ' Standard 620.
All components shall meet all the mandatory requirements and material specifications with regard to manuf act'.re, examination, repair, testing, identification and certification.
- All welding shall be performed using procedures meeting requirements in AWS DI.1,. ANSI B31.1 or B31.3, or ASME B&PV,Section IX, as appropriate.
inspection and testing shall be
.m I
accordance.with requirements in ANSI B31.1, ANSI B31.3, or API 620, as appropriate.
l System design shall also conform with pertinent portions of NUREG-0800,.10 CFR 50.43, Branch Technical position BTP CMEB 9.3-1, and appropriate standarcs and: regulations referenced in this document. Appendix A prov:ces a list of
- codes, standards, t egu:ations, arc L
published good engireer:ng prac t.ces applicable to permarent h>cregen water l
24
s -
a Guidelines for Permanent BWR Impleme tation or Justification Hscrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance chemistry installations.
Each utility is responsible for identifying additional plant-specific codes and standards that may apply, such as State-imposed require-ments, Uniform Building Code, ACI or AISC standards.
Piping and equipment shall be marked or 2.3.1.2 (Paragraph 6) Do not comply:
identified in accordance with ANSI 235.1.
See Section 10.1 of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry license package for justifi-cation for noncompliance.
2.3.1.3 System Design Considerations.
2.3.1.3 Comply:
Hydrogen piping frcm the supply system to the plant may be above or below ground.
Piping below ground shall be designed for cathodic protection (or be coated and wrapped), the appropriate soil conditions such as frost depth or liquefaction, and expected vehicle loads.
Guard piping around hydrogen lines is not required; however, consideration shall be given to its use for such purposes as protection from heavy traf fic loads, leak detection and monitoring, or isolation of the potential hazard from nearby equipment, etc.
All hydrogen piping should be grounded and have electrical continuity.
Excess flow valves should be installed in the hydrogen line at appropriate locations to restrict flow out of a broken line.
Excess flow protection shall be designed to ensure that a line break will not result in an unacceptable hazard to personnel or equipment (BTP CMEB 9.5-1). The design features for mitigating the consequences of a leak or line break must perform their intended design function with or without normal ventilation.
Individual pump injection lines shall contain a check valve to prevent feed-water from entering the hydrogen line and to protect upstream hydrogen gas compo-nents. Automatic isolation valves should be provided in each injection line to prevent hydrogen injection into an inactive pump.
M I
. Guidelines for Pormanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
- Purge connections 'shall be provided to.
_2.3.1.3 (Continued) Comply:
allow thel hydrogen piring to be com-
. pletely purged of air before hydrogen is
'introdu'ced.into. the : line.
Nitrogen or another-inert : gas shall oe used as the
' purge gas; Gases shall be purged to safe locations,' either directly. or through-intervening ; flow paths, such that per-sonnel or explosive. hazards are not encountered and undesirable quantities of gas are not injected into the reactor.
Area hydrogen concentration monitors are -
an acceptable way to ensure that hydrogen concentration is maintained below the flammable limit. If used, such monitors should be located at high points where hydrogen might collect and/or above use points that constitute potential leaks.
Good ' engineering practice for locating hydrogen detector heads is to take into consideration thei positive buoyancy of gaseous hydrogen. Detector heads shall be located so that the monitors shall be capable of detecting _5ydrogen leaks with or without normal ventilation.
Each utility shall evaluate its particular system design and identify. specific points.where hydrogen concentration monitors should be installed. Examples of such points include flanged in-line devices (such as calibration spool pieces associated with mass flow-meters), outlets of purge / vent paths, or the Litems discussed in the following paragraph. Sleeves'or guard pipes can be used as an alternative method to mitigate the consequences of a line break.
A hydrogen addition system will increase the hydrogen cortentration in the feed-water, ~ reactor, steamlines. and main condenser. Each of these systems shall be reviewed for possible detrimental effects.
A discussion of possible concerns is presented below.
The main con-
~
denser presently handles combustible gases. The hydrogen addition system does not significantly change the 2-6 l
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V,f L
' Guidelines for Permanent BWR ~
implementation or' Justification '
I Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
' for Nonconformance -
'I concentration ~ or volume 'of.noncon-2.3.1.3 (Continued) Comply:
densables.
Therefore, it is not anticipated that hydrogen addition will! affect operation "of. the main condenser.
' Of f-Gas System.
Oxygen shall be added into the off-gas system to recombine with the hydrogen flow i
thus limiting the extent.of. the a
syste nandling hydrogen rich mix-tures and reducing volumetric flow l.
l:
rates. The net effect will probably l-be a revised heat input into the re-I combined off-gas. The capability of the off-gas system - to handle this revised heat load must be evaluated to ensure that temperature limits are not exceeded. Considerations in the design of the off-gas oxygen injection system should include loss of oxygen and runaway oxygen injection.
Steam Piping and Torus. Hydrogen water chemistry may slightly c
increase the rate of hydrogen leak-age into' the torus via the safety relief valves.. However, the rate of oxygen leakage will be decreased.
Thus, the possibility-of forming a combustible mixture is not signifi-cantly increased when compared to non-HWC operation.
Sumps. - There are three water systems that may be affected by HWC: main condenser condensate, feedwater and reactor water. For sumps, which receive water from any of these three sources, the average hydrogen concentration in the water may increase slightly.
The maximum expected concentra-tion of hydrogen in the sump atmosphere should be determined to ensure that the hydrogen concentra-
{
tion iemains below the lower com-bustible limit of hydrogen in air.
i l
2-7
Guidelines for Pbrmanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Noncenformance 2.3.2. Oxygen Injection System
2.3.2 Comply
- The-oxygen injection system injects oxygen into the off-gas system to ensure that all excess hydrogen in the off-gas stream is recombined. It includes all necessary flow control and flow measure-ment equipment.
~
2.3.2.1 injection Point Consideration 2.3.2.1 Comply:
Oxygen should be injected into'a portion Oxygen is injected upstream of the-first of the off-gas system that is already stage steam jet air ejector, diluted such that the addition of oxygen does not create a combustible mixture. If this is. not possible, other system design considerations shall be provided in plant-specific cases to reduce the chances for off-gas fires.
2.3.2.2 Codes and Standards 2.3 2.2 (Paragraphs 1, 2,3, and 5) Comply with intent:
The system shall be designed and installed in accordance with OSHA standards in.29 Codes and standards used for the oxygen CFR - 1910.104, and CGA.G4.4, industrial injection system are equivalent to or more Practices for Gaseous Oxygen Trans-stringent than ' those identified in this
. mission and Distribution Piping Systems.
section.
Piping and related equipment shall be
- designed, ' fabricated,' tested and installed in accordance with the appropriate edition of ANSI B31.1 or-ANSI B31.3. Additional guidance on materials of construction for oxygen piping and valves -'is given in Section 3.4 of this report, and in ANSI /
- G63,
" Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen Service."
Welding shall - be performed - using procedures meeting requirements of AWS Dl.1 or ASME B&PV,Section IX, as appropriate.
l Piping shall oe marked or identified in 2.3.2.2 (Paragraph 4) Do not comply:
compliance with ANSI Z35.1.
See Section 10.1 of the HWC licensing package for justification for noncom-pliance.
2-8 l
V Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 5ystem ; design shalt also conform with
' appropriate NFPA, CGA, and other stan-dards and regulations referenced else-g where in this document. Each utility is responsible for identifying plant-specific codes and standards that may apply, such as State-imposed requirements, Uniform Buildir'g Code, ACI or AISC standards.
2.3.2.3 Cleaning 2.3.2.3 Comply with intent:
All portions of the system that may The oxygen piping was cleaned using shall be cleaned as procedures that met the requirements of contact oxygen.
CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4.
described in Section 3.4 of this report, and in accordance with CGA G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service.
2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 2.4 Do not comply:
This subsection discusses the instrumen-See Section 10.2 of the HWC licensing tation, controls, and monitoring associated package for justification of the following with the hydrogen addition system.
system trips which were not provided in the design of the HWC system.
High Residual Oxygen in Off-Gas The instrumentation and controls include a.
all sensing elements, equipment and valve '
- Trip, operating fiand switches, equipment and b.
Low Oxygen injection System Supply valve status lights, process information Pressure or Flow Trip, and instruments, and all automatic control c.
Off-Gas Train or Recombiner Train equipment necessary to ensure safe and Trip reliable operation.
Table 2-1 lists the recommended trips of the hydrogen addi-tien system.
The instrumentation shall provide indication and/or recording of parameters necessary to monitor and con-
. trol the system and its equipment. The instrumentation shall also indicate and/or alarm abnormal or undesirable conditions.
Table 2-2 lists the recommended instru-mentation and functions. This table also includes instrumentation for hydrogen and oxygen supply options. Additional infor-mation on instrumentation and controls is provided in Section 3.
System instrumentation and controls shall be centralized where feasible to facilitate ease of control and observation of the system. As a minimum, there shall be a system trouble alarm and/or annunciator provided in the main control room.
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L Guid311nes for Permanant BWR Impismantation or Justification '
Hydrogen' Water Chemistry installation.
' for Nonconformance 1
i i
i 2.4.'l' Hydrogen Injection Flow Control
2.4.1 Comply
o Parallel flow' co_ntrol valves-should be provided in the hydrogen injection line for system reliability and maintainability.. If L
flow control is automatic, hydrogen flow
- rate should be controlled as a function of plant process parameters such as steam or feedwater flow.
q 1
The capability should be provided to adjust i
E
!E flow rate to each pump manually, if this is found to be necessary to achieve adequate l
hydrogen distribution.
. Manual isolation valves shall be provided in each pump injection line to accommo-n date pump ' out-of-service conditions.
Individual pump injection lines should contain automatic isolation valves inter-locked to the corresponding pump, so that
~ hydrogen is not injected into a pump that is not running.
Provisions for shutoff of hydrogen injection shall be provided in the control room.
2.4.2 Oxygen injection Flow Control 2.4.2 (Paragraph 1) Comply with intent:
Parallel flow' control valves should be Only a single pure oxygen train is provided for each unit. The second train is from an provided in the oxygen injection line for air intake in the building. Each train has a system reliability and maintainability.
single flow control valve.
Oxygen flow rate shall De controlled to 2.4.2 (Paragraph 2) Comply:
provide residual oxygen downstream of the
' recombiners.
System controls shall be Oxygen flow is based upon the hydrogen flow designed to ensure that oxygen injection rate to provide residual oxygen downstream continues after hydrogen flow stops, so of the recombiners.
that all free hyorogen
,is safely Oxygen flow continues for 20 minutes after l
recombined.
hydrogen injection is terminated.
2.4.3 Monitoring
2.4.3 Comply
Provision shall be made to monitor con-tinuously the concentration of dissolved in oxygen in the. circulation water, r
obtaining samples of recirculation water for this purpose, appropriate containment isolation shall be provided in accordance 2-10
l
' Uuid: lines for Perman:nt BWR.
Implementation or Justification Hvdrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 3, 54, 55, 56, or 57.
I Provision thould be made to monitor 1
continuously the concentration of oxygen f
- and hydrogen in the off-gas flow down-stream of the recombiners. Hydrogen and
{
i oxygen monitoring in the off-gas recom-l biner system should meet the acceptance i
criteria of Standard Review Plan 11.3 with
' the exception that automatic control functions are not required.
l 2-11 4
L
Revision 1 March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent'BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistrv Installation for Nonconformance 3.0 '5UPPLY FACILITIES 3.1 ~ GASEOUS HYDROGEN 3.1.1 System Overview 3.1.1 Comply :
Liquid Air Corporation will provide the Hydrogen gas can be supplied from either hydr gen. gas supply system, which includes permanent high-pressure _ vessels or from a liquid hydrogen tank, permanent hydrogen transportable tube trailers.
For- - the st rage tubes, and two discharge stantions permanent storage system, gaseous hydro-f r temp rary hydrogen supply from tube gen is stored. in ' seamless ASME ~ code trailers.
vessels at pressures up to 2,400 psig and ambient temperatures.
Transportable vessels are designed to DOT standards and store hydrogen at pressures up to 2,650 psig at ambient temperatures. With either storage design, the gas is routed through a pressure control station which maintains a constant hydrogen supply pressure. In any event, the gaseous hydrogen system shall be provided by a supplier who has exten-sive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of associated storage and supply systems. Gaseous hydrogen shall be provided per CGA G-3 and G-5.3.
3.1.2 Specific Equipment Description 3.1.2.1 Hydrogen Storage Vessels 3.l.2.1 Comply:
The hydrogen storage bank shall be com-The long-term hydrogen supply system vill posed of ASME Code gas storage vessels, utilize a cryogenic liquid hydrogen storage Each tube shall be constructed as a seam-tank with ASME gaseous tubes as a hydrogen less vessel with swagged ends. Specific surge supply.
tube design shall be based on ASME Un-fired Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vi!I, Division 1, including Appendix XIV-70.
The tube bank shall be supported to prevent movement in the event of line failure and each tube shall be equipped with a close-coupled shutoff valve. As an alternative, one safety valve per bank of tubes can be used, provided the safety valve is sized to handle the maximum relief from all tubes tied into the valve.
Each bank shall be equipped with a ther-mometer and a pressure gauge, as is necessary for proper fillmg.
3-1
Revision 1 March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation for Nonconformance 3.1.2.2
. Transportable Hydrogen Storage 3.1.2.2 Comply :
Vessel Transportable. hydrogen vessels shall be The transportable tube trailers are constructed, tested, and retested (every 5 provided, tested, and maintained by
' years), in accordance with DOT spec-the hydrogen supplier.
ifications 3A, 3AA, 3AX, or 3AAX. All valving and instrumentation shall be j
identical to Section 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3 Pressure Reducing Station 3.1.2.3 Comply:
l The pressure control station shall be of a manifold design. The manifold shall have two (2) full-flow parallel pressure reducing regulators. The discharge pressure range of these regulators shall be adjustable to satisfy plant hydrogen injection require-ments.-Pressure gauges shall be provided upstream and downstream of the regu-lators.
Sufficient hand valves shall be provided to ensure complete operational flexibility.
An excess flow check valve shall be installed in the manifold immediately downstream of the regulators to limit the flow rate in the event of a line break. The stop-flow setpoint shall be determined by each plant and should be set between the maximum plant flow requirements and the full C of the flow control valves.
y Additional guidance on excess flow protection is provided in Section 2.3.1.3.
3.1.2.4 Tube Trailer Discharge Stanchion 3.1.2.4 Comply :
A tube trailer discharge stanchion shall be provided' for gaseous product unloading.
The stanchion shall consist of a flexible pigtail, shutoff valve, check valve, bleed valve, and necessary piping.
Filling apparatus shall be separated from other equipment for safety and convenience, and i
protected with walls or barriers to prevent vehicular collision.
A tube trailer ground assembly shall be provided for each discharge stanchion to I
ground the tube trailer before the I
discharge of hydrogtn begins.
3-2
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F.l' Revision 1 March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent B4 R Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 3.1.2.5 Interconnecting Pipeline 3.1.2.5 Comply :
All equipment and interconnecting piping l
supplied with this system shall be installed in compliance with the following standards:
American National Standards Insti-tute (ANSI) B31.1, Power Piping, B31.3, Chemical Plant and Petro-leum Refinery Piping.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70, National _ Electrical Code.
NFPA-50A, Bulk Hydrogen Systems.
All applicable local and national codes.
There are several suitable field instal-lation techniques which are based on industrial expecience. The following are guidelines which may be used for field connections:
Copper-to-Copper, Brass-to-Brass, and Copper-to-Brass Socket Braze Joints.
-- Silver Alloy 45% Ag,15% Cu,15% Zn, 24%
Cd., ASTM B260-69T and AWS AS.8-69T, bag-1 Melting Range-Solidus-607.2'C Liquidus-618.3*C
- Flux Working Range 593.3*C to 871.I'C Copper, Brass, Carbon Steel, and Stainless Steel N.P.T.
Threaded Joints.
1 3-3
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. Revision 1-March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent BWR.-
implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
-- TEFLON
- Tape"
- 2 3.1.2.3 (Continued) Comply :
SCOTCH * *
- Number 48 Tape *
- L l '-
..or equal. -195.5*C to +204.4*C, 0 to 3,000 psig.. Wrapped in direction of threads, a.
Flange Joints (On 'all Materials).
Ring
' Gasket Material Low.
Pressure (720 psig maximum).'
Precut.
T.F.E.
impregnated -
- asbestos, 1/6 inch thickness.
Garlock.900 or equal. -1955'C to
+168.3*C, ) to 900 psig.
- Ring Gasket. Material,, High Pressure FLEXITALLIC+ * *
- Type.' Mate-rial to be 0.175 inch thick 304 stainless ~ steel with TEFLON filler and 0.125 inch carbon steel gu.ide ring.
' TEFLON is a trademark of E. I. duPont de Nemours '&
Co., - Wilmington, DE 19898.
- *1f tape is.
- used, electrical continuity / grounding of: each piping section should be confirmed.
' * *
- SCOTCH is a trademark of 3M Company, St. Paul, MN $5101.
I
' * * *
- FLEXITALLIC is a trademark of Flexitallic-Gasket Co.,
Bellmawr, NJ 0803l.
3-4
h =
a:
Revision 1 March 1989 f
l b
l Guidelines for Permin:nt BWR Implementation or Just.fication l
Hydrogen Wate-Chemistry installation for Nonconformance 3
1
- Antiseize Compound 3.1.2.3 (Continued) Comply :
l For _ flange face, nut, and bolt lubrication.
Halocarbon 25-55 grease or equal.
-195.5*C To
+176.6*C, O to 3,000 psig.. DO NOT USE ON ALUMINUM, MAG-NESIUM, OR THEIR ALLOYS UNDER CONDITIONS OF HIGH TORQUE OR SHEAR.
Carbca Steel, Stainless Steel, and
. Aluminum Alloys Socket and Butt Welds.
- Welding Procedure Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW),
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW), Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW), or Plasma Arc Vielding (PAW); with appropriate filler material' and shielding gas.
Proper surface and joint preparation (in regard to cleaning and clearances) should be exercised.
3.1.2.6 Component Cleaning 3.1.2.6 Comply :
l All components that contact hydrogen l'
must be free of moisture, loose rust, scale, slag, and weld spatter; they must be essentially free of organic matter, such as oil, grease, crayon, paint, etc. To meet these objecti.es, system components shall j
be cleaned in accordance with standard industrial practices, as recommended by the gas supplier, prior to and following
- system fabrication.
3.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN 3.2.1 System Overview 3.2.1 Comply :
Liquid Air corporation will provide Liquid hydrogen is stored in a vacuum-a 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen tank jacketed vessel at pressures up to 150 psig fr8 Permanent supply source.
and temperatures up to -403*F (satu-rated). Based on data relating hydrogen j
injection pressures to BWR plant power levels, hydrogen supply from a liquid t
l
)
3-5 l
i
-L-.__
.n-~_
Rev'irton 1
{' ~
-March 11989 Guidelines for Permanent BWP..
-Implementation'or Justification for Nonconformance
- Hydrogen Water Chemb&y Ins'tallatinn a
source can;be provided directly.from.a
~
tank or pumped into supplemental gaseous.
storage.. Caseous ' storage requirements are identified.in Section 3.1 The required l
supply pressure shall be based on pressure requirements ~ at' the.' point of hydrogen
- injection and line losses from the hydrogen supply system.to the injection point.
Feedwater pressure requirements and line losses must not exceed 120 psig if hydro-
~
gen is to be supplied directly from a liquid tank.
In any event, the liquid hydrogen system shall' be provided by a supplier who has extensive experience in the design, operation' and maintenance of associated -
storage and supply systems, such as cryogenic pumping. Liquid hydrogen shall be provided in accordance with CGA G-5
. and G-5.3.
3.2.2 Specific Equipment Description 3.2.2.1 Cryogenic Tank.
3.2.2.1 Comply :
l Tanks 1 for liquid hydrogen service are available.with capacities between 1,500 gallons and 20,000 gallons.
An " inner vessel" or " liquid' container" is supported
- within. an " outer vessei" or. " vacuum jacket," with the space between-filled with insulation and evacuated. Necessary
. piping connects.from. inside of the inner vessel to outside of the vacuum jacket.
Gauges and valves to indicate the control of hydrogen 'in the vessel are mounted outside of the vacuum jacket. Legs or saddles to' support the whole assembly are welded' to'.the outside of the vacuum
. jacket.
Inner. vessels are designed, fabricated, tested, and stamped in ac ' rdance with Section Vill,~ Division 1, of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. Materials suitable for liquid hydrogen service must have good ductility properties at tem-peratures of -422*F per CGA G-5. The
.t 6 m___.__
m Revision l' m
4
.! arch 1989 Guid21ints for Permanent BTR-Impismentation or Justification.
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
' cryogenic operating temperatures of these
- vessels preclude-material degrading -
mechanisms such as corrosion or hydrogen embrittlement. _ The. constant operating '
vessel pressures assure that flaw growth-due.to cyclic stress loading-will not occur. The inner vessel is subject to a required pressure test which ensures that no flaws exist that could cause a failure at
. or below the set pressure of the vessel's
- redundant relief ' devices.
In addition to ASME Code ' inspection. requirements,
'100 % radiography of the inner ~ vessel longitudinal welds shall be. completed.
The tank outer vessel shall be constructed of carbon steel and shall not require ASME certification.
' Insulation between inner and outer vessels shall be either perlite, aluminized mylar, or. suitable equal.
Fibrous ' or. blanket insulation, such as bonded glass fibers or rock wool, shall not be used because of the potential for liquid-saturated missiles which would occur only as a result of
' vessel failure. The annulv space should be evacuated to a high vacuum of 50 microns or less.
' Tank. control. piping and valving should be
~
' installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 or B31.3; All piping shall be either wrought copper or stainless steel. The following
' tank. piping subsystems shall be provided:
Fill circuit, constructed with top and bottom lines so that the vessel can be filled without af fecting continu-ous hydrogen supply. -
Pressure-build ' circuit, to keep tank pressures at operational levels.
Vacuum-jacketed liquid fill and pump circuits, where applicable.
3.2.2.2 Overpressure Protection System 3.2.2.2 Comply :
l Safety considerations for the tank shall be satisfied by dual full-flow safety valves and emergency backup rupture discs. The 3-7
a.1 c,2 Revision 1' March 1989.
~Guidilinas for Permanent SWR-Implementation or Justification
. Hydrog:n Water Ch mistry Installation'
~
for Nonconformance primary relief' system shall consist of two-3.2.2 (Continued) Comply: ;
sets of a minimum of one (1) rupture disk
.[
?I and safety. valve' piped s into. separate
" legs."' Relief. devices shall be connected in parallel with other relief devices. The m
Lsystem shall be coupled by a 3-way divert-er valve' or: tie bar interlock so that one.
. leg is opened whenL the other is closed.
' With this arrangement, a minimum of one safety valve and one rupture disk.will be available at all times. The dual primary
. relief systems with 100% standby redun--
dancy-allows maintenance and testing to -
,be performed without sacrificing the level
. of protection from overpressure..
The primary relief ' system shall. comply
' with. the provisions :of the Ameri(.n Society.of Mechanical' Engineers (ASME)
Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed
' Gas Association (CGA) Standards.
l-The tank shallialso' be, supplied.with a secondary rellei; system not required by the ASME. Codes.- This system shall be
- totally. separate from the primary relief
- system. It shall consist of a locked open valve, a rupture disk,~and a secondary vent stack.'.This rupture disk shall be designed
- to burst at 1.33 times maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP).
Supply system piping that may contain li-quid and can be isolatable from the tank relief valves shall be protected.with ther-mal relief valves. All outlet connections from the safety relief valves, rupture de-vices, bleed valves, and the fill line purge connections shall be piped to an overhead L
vent stack, per CGA G-3, Section 7.3.7.
' Two relief devices shall be installed in the tank's outer vessel to relieve any exces-
'sive pressure buildup in the annular space.
. Hydrogen tanks and delivery vehicles shall,
be grounded per CGA P-12, Sections 5.4.5 a:.J 5.7.1.2.
The storage system shall be protected from the effects of lightning per NFPA 73, Chapter 6.
3-3
6-
,P.evision 1
.. : # p.
March 1989 Gu!'delines for Permanant BWR '
Imp'ementaticn or Justification
' Hydrogen Water Ch2mistry installation for Nonconformance n;
Excess.f!o'w protection shall. be'added to
' the tank's liquid piping 1wherever a line break would release a sufficient amount of l hydrogen to-threaten safety-related
,E structures. An acceptable methodology is identified in Section 4.2.2, " Pipe Breaks."
3.2.2.3 : Instrumentation 3.2.2.3 Comply:
The tank shall be supplied with a pressure l'
gauge, a liquid level gauge, and a vacuum readout connection. _. These gauges are sufficient for normal monitoring of the tank condition.
Instrumentation for remote monitoring, such.. as. high/ low-pressure switches,. pressure and level transmitters, may be added.. A listing of supply system instrumentation and control is identified in Section 2.4.
3.2.2.4.
Liquid Hydrogen Pump and 3.2.2.4 Comply:
' Controls l
The liquid hydrogen' pump shall be of
-proven design to ' provide continuous hydrogen supply in unattended, automatic operation. The following items comprise the more important system controls.
3.2.2.4.1 Positive Isolation Valve-3.2.2.4.1 Comply:
A positive isolation valve shall be used to l
control the liquid feed into.the pumping system per NFPA SOB. - The valve shall be a failed-closed, pneumatically operated valve. The valve shall only be open during pump operation, shall close in any fault mode, and shall be able 'to be remotely lg overridden in case of emergency.
3.2.2.4.2, System Overpressure Shutdown 3.2.2.4.2 Comply:
b Although the system is protected by l
safety relief valves and rupture discs, system overpressure shall be avoided by shutting down the pumps at high pressure.
3-9 L
Revision 1 '
y
' March'1989 Guidelines for Pcrmen:nt BWR
,lmplementa: ion or Justification N
= : Hpdrogen Water Chemistry Installation; for Nonconformance L3.2.2.4.3 Temperature Indicating Switch 3.2.2.4.3 ' Comply :
( A temperature switch'shall continuously monitor the downstream gas line for low temperature and shall trip the ' liquid pump to. protect downstream ' equipment from L
low temperatures. -
3.2.2.4.4' Pump operation.
3.2.2.4.4 Comply:
l Pump operation shall 'be continuously and automatically. monitored. - Operation -
which results _ in. pump cavitation, high temperature at the pump discharge, or low temperature. downstream of the vaporizer shall cause the pump to be shut down by the remote control puel. The fault shall
' be indicated on the remote control panel by an audible' alarm and light indication.
- 3.2.2.4.5 Purging of Controis 3.2.2.4.5 Complyi L All electrical components in hydrogen l'
serv, ice should be designed in accordance with NFPA,70. Only nitrogen or another inert gas shall be used for purging pump motors, control panels and valves.
3.2.2.) Interface with Gaseous System 3.2.2.5 Comply :
1.iquid-hydrogen pump systems typically A rack containing six ASME Code require, a gaseous storage system as a gaseous hydrogen tubes vita a
-surge or backup to plant hydrogen supply.
total capacity of 50,000 sef will These storage systems shall be designed in be used in conjunction with the
. accordance. with. Section 3.1, Caseous liquid hydrogen tank.
Hydrogen. Whenever a gaseous backup is used in conjunction with a liquid hydrogen system,. switchover controls shall' be provided.
3.2.2.6 Vaporization 3.2.2.6 Comply with intent:
Vaporization of the liquid hydrogen shat!
The vaporizers to be used feature be achieved by the use of ambient air a hex fin design.
vaporizers. Vaporizer design, installation and operation shall take guidance from SFPA SOA and 50B.
3-10
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s
- n, n
.C
>q'
-GuidGlines for Permanent BTR -
Implementation or Justification.
'. Hydrogen Water Chem'istry Installation:
- for Nonconformance l;
' The vaporizer. should feature. a star fin design and aluminum alloy ' construction.
. For a combined liquid and gaseous storage
-_ system, the vaporizers used should have a -
- design pressure consistent with plant in-jection pressure requirements. The units may be piped;in parallel such that each unit can operate independently. Parallel
-vaporizer assemblies shall be sized for the peak - hydrogen flow required.for - each -
plant and shall provide for periodic I;
intervals for defrosting,' es appropriate.
Other atmospheric vaporization systems may. be-utilized if their. capacity is L
demonstrated to be adequate for the plant flow and ambient conditions.
For a pumped liquid' only storage system, the vaporizer must withstand maximum pressures generated from the cryogenic pump. These vaporizers shall be equipped with stainless steellining de>i 0ed to 3500 6
psig.
3.3. ELECTROLYTIC 3.3.1 System Ov'erview 3.3.1 Not Applicable:
The disassociation of water by electrolysis The electrolytic method of producing is an acceptable method of obtaining the hydrogen is not being considered at this gases needed.for. hydrogen ' water chem-
- time, istry. This can be done on site and the gases can conveniently be generated at the. rate ' used.
The electrolytic gas
- generator should be proven equipment, the same as used in other industrial appli-
' cations.
Depending. on t% generator i
operating pressure, either hydrogen com-pressors or pressure breakdown (control) is utilized to match plant hydrogen injection pressure requirements. The electrolytic system shall be provided by a supplier who
' has extensive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of these systems.
4 y
i 3-11 l
l,
---_-__.--_____-_-_-____-_-_l_.
i Guid2]in:s for Perm:nent BWR implementation or Justification for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry In.stallation 3.4 LIQUID OXYGEN 3.4.I' System Overview
3.4.1 Comply
The HWC system contains an 11,000 gallon Liquid oxygen is stored in e vacuum-jacketed vessel at pressures up to 250 psig liquid oxygen tank.
and temperatures up to -251*F (satu-rated).
Oxygen taken from the vessel shall be vaporized through ambient air vaporizers and routed through a pressure
. Control station which maintains gas pressures within the desired range. The liquid oxygen system shall be provided by a supplier who has extensive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of associated storage and supply systems.
Liquid oxygen shall be provided per CGA G-4 and G-4.3.
3.4.2 Specific Equipment Description 3.4.2.1 Cryogenic Tank. Tanks for liquid 3.4.2.1 Comply:
oxygen service, with capacities between 3,000 gallons and 11,000 gallons are simi-lar in principle.
An " inner vessel" or
" liquid container" is supported within an
" outer vessel" or " vacuum jacket," with insulation previded in the space between the tanks.
Necessary piping connects from inside of the inner vessel to outside of the vacuum jacket. Gauges and valves to indicate the control of product in the vessel are mounted outside of the vacuum jacket.
Legs or saddles to support the whole assembly are welded to the outside of the vacuum jacket.
inner vessels shall be designed, f abricated, tested and stamped in accordance with Section VIII, Division 1, of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. Materials suitable for liquid oxygen service must have good ductility properties at j
cryogenic temperatures of -300*F per
)
CGA G.4.
The outer vessel should be constructed of carbon steel and does not require ASME certification.
3-12 l
l
_______________________________1
1 Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydroeen Water Chemistry installation for Nonconformance Insulation between inner and outer vessels shall be either perlite, aluminized mylar or suitable equal.
The annular space should be evacuated to a high vacuum of 50 microns or less.
Tank control piping and valving should be installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 of B31.3. All piping shall be either wrought copper or stainless steel. The following tank piping subsystems shall be provided:
Fill circuit constructed with top and bottom lines so that the vessel can be filled without affecting system operation.
Pressure-build circuit, to keep tank pressures at operational levels.
Economizer circuit, to preferentially feed oxygen gas from vessel vapor space to process.
3.4.2.2 Overpressure Protection System.
3.4.2.2 Comply:
Safety considerations for the tank shall be satisfied by dual full-flow safety valves and emergency backup rupture discs. The primary relief system shall consist of two sets of one (1) safety valve and one (1) rupture disc piped into separate legs, coupled by a three-way valve. This dual primary relief system with 100% standby redundancy allows maintenance and test-ing to be performed without sacrificing the level of protection from overpressure.
The primary relief system shall comply with the provisions of the ASME Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed Gas l
Association (CGA) Standards.
Annular space safety heads shall be provided to relieve any excess positive pressure buildup wnich might result from a leak in an inner vessel. Supply system piping that may contain liquid can be isolatable from the tank relief valves shall he protected with thermal relief vahes.
3-13 l
e Guidelines for Perman:nt BWR.
Implementation or Justification L
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
(
l The tank shall be supplied with a pressure gauge, a liquid level gauge, and a vacuum readout connection. These gauges are suf-ficient for normal monitoring of the tank condition.
Instrumentation for remote monitoring, such as high/ low-pressure switches, pressure and level transmitters may be added. A listing of supply system instrumentation and control is identified i
in Section 2.4.
3.4.2.3 Vaporization. The vaporization of 3.4.2.3 (Paragraph 1) Comply:
the liquid oxygen shall be achieved by the use of ambient air vaporizers.
The vaporizer should feature a star fin 3.4.2.3 (Paragraph 2) Comply with intent:
design and extruded aluminum alloy con-struction.
The vaporizers shall have a The vaporizers to be used feature a hex minimum design pressure of at least 300 fin design.
psig. The units shall be piped in parallel such that each unit can operate indepen-dently. Parallel vaporizer assemblies shall be sized to handle peak plant flow require-ments and shall provide for periodic inter-vals for defrosting, as appropriate. Other atmospheric vaporization systems may be utilized if their capacity is demonstrated to be adequate for the plant flow and ambient conditions.
3.4.2.4 Pressure Control Station.
The 3.4.2.4 Comply:
pressure control station shall be of a manifold design.. The manifold shall have two (2) full-flow parallel pressure reducing regulators. The discharge pressure range of these regulators shall be adjustable to satisfy plant oxygen injection require-ments. Pressure gauges shall be provided upstream and downstream of the regula-tors and sufficient hand valves shall be provided to ensure complete operational flexibility.
Protection of downstream equipment from low-oxygen temperatures shall be included in the system design.
3-14
I'..
l-
' 'Guidelin?.s for Permanent BWR-Implementation or Jus;ification -
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 3.4.3 Materials of Construction for Oxy-
3.4.3 Comply
gen Piping and Valves The design and installation of oxygen piping and related equipment shall be in
.accordance with ANSI B31.1 or B31.3 and the following guidelines for ' material selection for oxygen systems.
Observations of past oxygen fires indicate that ignition can occur in carbon steel and stainless steel piping systems operating at, or near, sonic velocity. Friction from high velocity particles is considered tu be the
- source of ignition.
Coppr, brass, and nickel alloys have the characteristic of melting at temperatures below their respective ignition temperatures.
This makes these materials extremely resistant
.to ignition sources, and once ignited, they exhibit a much slower rate of burning than carbon or stainless steels. -
As a result of these observations, the following materials, in order.of p*efer-ence, are acceptable for oxygen service.
In the case of carbon' steel or stainless steel, the maximum velocity of gaseous oxygen shalll be.within guidelines estab-
.lished by the Compressed Gas Association CGA Pamphlet.CGA-4.4, " Industrial Prac-tices for' Gaseous Oxygen, Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems."
Copper Brass Monel Stainless Stee!
Carbon Steel if steel pipe is to be used for the system and some local flow conditions could cause the velocity to exceed that established in CC A G-4.4, then that portion of the sys-t. must be converted to a copper-bused alloy and extend a minimum of 10 diame-ters downstream of the point of return to 3-15
Guidelines for Permanent BWR -
Implementation or Justification i Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for 'Nonconformance the' allowable; velocity. These' local flow '
3.4.3 (Continued) Comply:
conditions ' may occur a_t control. valves,.
.. orifices, branch line takeoff points, and in' the ' discharge piping ~ of: safety ' relief-
- devices.
. Valves /that open rapidly are not suitable for oxygen service, since rapid filling of an oxygen line will resuIt in a tem'perature increase due to adiabatic compression. As a result of ti;is phenomenon, ball valves and automatic valves may only be used with the following restrictions:
Valve. bodies shall be made of a copper alloy. Balls shall be monel or brass. Valve seats and seals should be,. teflon, nonplasticized Kel-F, Katrez, or Viton.
Ball. valves may not be used as-process control valves in throttling or regulating service.
Ball valves
' may be used as isolation valves, emergcncy shutof f valves, or vent or -
bleed valves where they are either fully open or fully closed.
Pneumatic or electric ball valves used for on-off services shall have an actuation time from fully closed-to fully open of 4 seconds or greater for pressures up to 250 psig.
No restriction is placed on actuation time from fully open'to fully closed.
' Piping - immediately downstream must be a straight run of copper-bearing material for a minimum of 10 diameters.
Pneumatic or electric ball valves used for emergency service may be l
fully open or fully closed to the l-emergency position, with no restric-J tions on actuation time.
l Suitable valve packing, seats, and gasket l
materials are listed below in order of l
preference from the oxygen compatibility l
basis only.
l 3 16 l
l I
m
~
~ ~
~~
~
1 Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
.g for Nonconformance l'
Teflon Glass-filled Teflon
~
Nonplasticized Kel-F ~
Carlock 900 Viton or Viton A
. 3.4.4 Oxygen Cleaning 3.4.4 Comply with intent:
All piping, fittings, valves, and other The oxygen supply system was cleaned material may contact oxygen shall be using procedures that met the require-cleaned. to remove internal organic, ments of CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4.
inorganic, and particulate matter. in accordance with CGA 4.1.
Observation has shown that ignition can occur :in properly designed piping systems when foreign matter is introduced. Therefore, removal of contarninants such as grease, oils, thread lubricants, dirt, water, filings, scale, weld spatter, paints, or other foreign material is essential.
Cleaning should be accomplished by precleaning all parts of the system, maintaining cleanti-ness during construction, and_ by com-pletely cleaning the system after construction.
3-17
Guiddlines for Perm:nent BWR 1 implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
(
l 4.0 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 1
l 4.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN 1
i 4.1.1 Site Characteristics of Gaseous and Liquid Hydrogen 4.1.1.1 Overview.
Review of the 4.1.1.1 Comply:
following site characteristics shall be conducted by each BWR facility in locating the gaseous and/or liquid i
hydrogen supply systems:
' Location of supply system in
+
proximity to exposures as addressed in NFPA 50A and 50B.
Route of hydrogen delivery on site.
+
Location of supply system in
+
proximity to safety-related equipment.
4.1.1.2 Specific Considerations.
4.1.1.2.1 Fire Protection.
The area 4.1.1.2.1 (Paragraph 1) Comply with selected for hydrogen system siting shall intent:
meet or exceed all requirements for protection of personnel and equipment as Paragraph 3-1.2 of NFPA 50A-1984 addressed in NFPA SOA and 50B, gaseous requires that gaseous hydrogen systems and liquified hydrogen systems, respec-shall be located above ground.
The tively.
Each standard identifies the gaseous supply vessel is located above maximum quantity of hydrogen storage ground but the piping from the supply permitted and the mir'imum distance from facility to the turbine building is below hydrogen systems to a number of ground. This is considered acceptable as the piping is routed above ground prior to exposures.
entering the turbine building.
The need for additional fire protection for other than the hydrogen facility shall be 4.1.1.2.1 (Paragraph 2) Comply:
determined by analysis of local conditions of hazards onsite, exposure to other prop-erties, water supplies, and the probable effectiveness of plant fire brigades in accordance with NFPA SOA and 50B.
4.1.1.2.2 Security. All hydrogen storage 4.1.1.2.2 Comply:
system installations shall be completely fenced, even when located within the owner-controlled area. Lighting shall be installed to f acilitate night surveillance.
4-1
-h g.
t U.
J
~.i
' implementation or J.ustificatioi nGu'delinos for Permanent BTR i
i EHydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance L4.1.1.2.3 Route of Hydrogen Delivery on ~
4.1.1.2.3 ' Comply:
Site.. -Each plant, should - determine the routel to be. taken by hydrogen' delivery trucks through onsite and offsite areas. In order to' protect the hydrogen storage area.
7
. from ~ any,. vehicular. ' accidents, truck.
barriers '.shall be ' installed around the V
perimeter of the system installation.
Withinl ' the plant security area, all deliveries shall be controlled per the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.
' 4.1.'t.2.4 ' Location of Storage System to 4.1.1.2.4 Comply:
Safety-Related Structures.
Each plant.
shall determine that. the. location of the The hydrogen storage area is 1500 feet -
hydrogen 1 storage : system is ' acceptable south of.the nearest safety-related relative ' to ' safety-related structures and structure, which 'is the Unit. I and '2 -
equipment considering the hazards control room.
described ' in ' Sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.1, and 4.2.2.
4.1.2 Gaseous Storage Vessel Failure 4.1.2 Comply:-
Gaseous storage vessels in the scope of this. report ' are the commercially avail-
.able, seamless, ' swagged-ended. vessels that are commonly referred to as "hydril tubes." ' This section addresses the non-mechanistic ' rupture failure of single vessels and the separation distances required to avoid damage to safety-related ~ equipment. Simultaneous failure of multiple vessels is not addressed because the inherent strength of the vessel makes them unsusceptible to failure from outside forces. These vessels shall be capable of withstanding tornado missiles (NUREG-0800) and site specific seismic loading. due to horizontal and vertical accelerations acting
. simultaneously.
'These features eliminate common cause vessel failures so that the maximum postulated instantaneous release is the fully pressurized contents of the largest single vessel. The potential consequences l
of such a release, a fireball or an l
explosion, are addressed in order.
4-2
P.,
r Guidelings for Permanent BWR
~ Implementation or Justification :
' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation -
'for Nonconformance L
' 4.l.2.1 Fireball. The thermal flux versus.
4.l.2.1 Comply:
~ distance from the fireball center are shown = on Figure 4-1. for ' the ' two most -
common vessel sizes. These fluxes and durations will not adversely affect safety-i' related structures. However, each utility shall review any unique' site characteris-tics to assure all safety-related equipment will function in the event of a fireball.
4.1.2.2 Exploskon. When a gaseous stor-
'4.1.2.2 Comply: -
- age vessels ruptures, the expansion' of the high-pressure gas results in rapid turbulent mixing with the surrounding air. In the case of gaseous hydrogen, the release will go through the detonation limits of 18.3.-
59% before the wind can translate the mixture.
Consequently, any explosion.
blastwaves will originate at the vessel rupture site.
For this report,.it is conservatively assumed that 100% of the vessel contents will contribute to the blastwave and that the. TNT-hydrogen equivalence is 20% on an energy basis (320% on'a mass basis). This translates to 27.1 lbs of-TNT per 1000 standard cubic feet (SCF) of ~ gaseous' hydrogen.
Using this conversion factor and U.S. Army Technical Manual TM5-1300, blast over-pressures anrj impulses can be calculated as functions of distance.from the vessel location.
These blast parameters could then be compared to the dynamic strength of safety-related structures.
An evaluation '
entitled
" Separation Distances Recommended for Hydrogen Storage to Prevent Damage to Nuclear Power Plant Structures From Hydrogen Explosion" was performed for EPRI.by R. P. Kennedy. This evaluation, which is
' included as Appendix B of these guide-lines, recommends separation distances based on quantities of stored hydrogen and building design factors. The recommenda-tions are provided in the form of step-by-
. step procedures, with subsequent steps requiring additional work but resulting in 4-3 mA-
i $ '-'
(
n
" Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification
-l z
Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation for Nonconformance y.
reduced distances from the ' previous
)
step._- The procedure to determine accept-l able separation distances 'is outlined r
below.
Step 1. For any reinforced concrete
- +
or masonry walls at least 8 inches j
thick, the upper curve on Figure 4-2 k
provides conservative separation distances as a. function of vessel 3
j size. if this is acceptable, then no
- further work is needed. - Otherwise,
{
proceed to step 2.
Step 2.
For reinforced concrete walls at least 18 inches thick, with known static ' strength and percent tensile rebar, Eq. 7 in Appendix B i
can be used to determine required separation distances. The two lower curves on Figure 4-2 are representa-tive examples of design parameters for walls of nuclear power plants.
Walls with different paramsters should.be analyzed using the methods in Appendix B, pages 10 through 13.
If this is acceptable, then no further work is needed.
Otherwise, proceed to step 3.
Step 3.
For separation distances closer than allowed by the above 1 and 2,- perform a dynamic blast capacity analysis in accordance with NUREG/CR-2462 Q).
For all storage locations, the venel(s) and the ' foundation (s) shall be designed to remain in place for both design-basis tornado characteristics and site-specific flood conditions.
4.1.3 Gaseous Pipe Breaks
4.1.3 Comply
This section addresses the requirements for hydrogen piping systems attached to gaseous storage vessels up to the point where excess flow protection is provided.
T; criteria for acceptable siting for the event of a pipe break are:
4-4 a
C
M s
B Implementation or Justification R
.. Guid21ines for Perrn nent BWR.
J Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance p
i
' Dilution of resultant release below-4.1.3 ' (Continued) Comply:
"the lower flammability limit of 4%
before reaching air pathways into safety-related structures.
Minimum separate distances for t'he
' blast damage: criteria outlined in Section 4.1.2.
It is conservatively. assumed that all releases occur while the storege vessel is at. 2,450 psig.
This is the maximum
, allowable working pressure of the majority of commercially available vessels.
Gaseous r_eleases' at elevated pressures result in supersonic jet velocities and a dispersion process that is momentum-dominated.
Under ' these. conditions, the Gaussian dispersion model unrealistically -
overestimates.the amount of hydrogen in the. explosive region and the distance to the lower flammable region.~ Therefore,
- these properties of gaseous releases were calculated using a jet dispersion model described ih Reference (2).
The results of this modeling are shown in Figure. 4-3 as minimum separation dis-tances. versus inside diameter of the pipe. The upper curve is the maximum distance to the lower flammability limit of 4% hydrogen.
Each utility shal!
determine that the location of - air pathways into safety-related structures exceeds this minimum separation distance or show that other criteria should be applied to a specific case. An example of such an exception would be if the air intakes have automatic' shutters-con-trolled by hydrogen analyzers thus preventing the ingestion of a flammable mixture.
The lower curve on Figure 4-3 is the mini-mum required distance to safety-related structures with greater than or equal to an 8-inch-thick reinforced masonry or con-crete wall.
This distance includes the drift distance of an unignited, fully deve-loped gaseous jet plus the blast distance 4-5 s
.=
_. _. =. _ _ _ = _. _.. _ __
___m_..m_ _ _ _ _.__
.__.___.___m_____
h.
.-I' a
' Guidellnes for Permanerit BWR Implementation or Justification 1 Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 4
for the maximum amount.of hydrogen in the detonable region.. It conservatively assumes that the pipe break Lis oriented
~
directly toward.the safety-related struc-tures..
Each utility. ; shall.. determine -
compliance with this minimum separation distance ~ or demonstrate that-other criteria should be applied.
L 4.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN
4.2 Comply
4.2.1 Storage Vessel Failure.
4.2.1 Comply:.
. For 'this report, storage vessel failure is defined as a large breach resulting in the rapid emptying of the entire contents of-liquid. hydrogen.. It is assumed that the
' tank is full at the time of failure and that the. entire spill: vaporizes. instantane-cusly. The following enumerates potential' causes of vessel failure and the required design features that mitigate or' alleviate these potentials.-
E Seismic
+-
The tank and its foundation shall be
' designed 'to meet the seismic criterion for critical structures and equipment at the plant site (i.e.,
It is preferable to seismically support all l
liquid hydrogen. piping. If this is not l
possible, the liquid hydrogen piping shall be seismically supported up to and including excess flow protection devices.
The specific liquid hydrogen tank and piping design at each installation shall meet these requirements.
Tornado and Tornado Missiles The tank i.nd its foundation shall be designed to withstand the " design basis tornado characteristics" as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.76.
As a minimum, the tank shall remain in place so that any liquid spillage will originate from the tank location. The specific tank and j
1 4-6 l
j
o.
[ 1.
o L
> Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification L
Hydrogen Water' Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance foundation design at each installa-4.2.1 (Continued) Comply:
tion shall meet these requirements.
Design basis tornado-generated mis-siles 'are. capable c,1 breaching all known commercially available liquid hydrogen storage vessels.
There-fore, tornado missiles are a potential
. cause of " storage vessel f ailure."
Aircraft A large aircraft crashing directly i
'into the storage area is capable of breaching all kr.own commercially available liquid hydrogen storage vessels. Therefore, aircraf t crash is a potential cause of " storage vessel iailure."
Fire The overpressure protection system
- shall be sized to accommodate the worst-case vaporization rate caused by a hydrocarbon fire engulfing the outer shell with loss of vacuum and-hydrogen in the annulus of the
' double-wall storage tank (as per Compressed Gas Association 5.3 and ASME Section Vill requirements).
Flood
)
The following flood conditions could
]
result in vessel f ailure:
)
-- High water reaches the top of the vent stack for the overpres-sure protection system.
-- High flood velocities dislodge the tank.
Under either condition, water could enter the vent system and defeat the overpressure protection system.
J Therefore, the tank shall be located such that maximum flood heights cannot exceed the vent stack 4-7
f Q..ci.- e 4 c-Perm areri S 4 R Npiemen a::en er ist.:lca: ton
.: cre-1 ater C er.nr. innal'.at:c fer Nercenfernnce e e'.atm. anc >uch trat petertia2
. 2.1 (Continued) Comply:
- . cec ' e:ectues cannot camage tre
.ent stack or cisloege the tani.
Vehic!e impact
+
The storage vessel shall be protected from the impact of the largest vehicle used onsite by a. carricade capable of stopping such a vehicle.
Vessel Structural Failure The storage vessel shall be designed, constructed, inspected and operated to assure an extremely low likelihood of tank structural f ailure during its' tenure on site. A vessel designed in accordance with this document complies with this low-probability requirement.
4.2.1.1 Fireball 4.2.1.1 Comp 1v:
For the two potential causes of " storage vessel f ailure," tornado missiles and aircraft impact, a fireball at the tank l
location is the expected result. The major 1
reasons for this is the high ignitability of hydrogen and the density of ignition sources in the af termath of these casual events. An aircraf t impact or a design basis tornado and the associated missiles will also provide numerous sources of ignition from downed power
- lines, damaged transformers, and switchgears, etc. Details of these considerations are given in the repert for the Dresden plant (2).
The thermal flux versus distance from the fireball center (tank location) is shown on Figure 4-4 for the range of commercially available tank sizes. The durations of the various fireball sizes are also given.
These fluxes and durations w ill not adversely affect equipment or personnel enclosed in concrete / steel safetprelatec nructures. Howeser, each utility snall
- .3
\\
l n1
..z h
Guidelines for Perman:nt.BWR 1 implementation or Just fication
[
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconfor'mance -
o review any unique' site characteristics to assure all safety-related equipment will
~
function in the event of a fireball.'
4.2.1.2 Explosion at Tank Site.
4.2.1.2 Comply:
Although an' explosion. is not expected, safety-related structures and equipment shall'be verified to be capable of with-
- standing a detonation occurring at the site t-of the tank installation.
For the
. instantaneous. release of the entire tank contents, 'the following were used to
. determine blast parameters for. an explo-sion at the tank site:
- l. Gaussian F weather stability I
- 2. Detonation limits of hydrogens 18.3-59 %
- 3. TNT: - hydrogen ' equivalent of
!20% on an energy basis (520% on a mass basis)
NUREG/CR-2 '26 reports that detonations have been' observed for hydrogen concen-trations as low as 13 8%'when ignited in a l'
long, large-diam *ter tube. The explosive.
yield or TNT equivalence of such threshold.
concentration reactions is e> tremely low because most of the combustion energy is expended in the transition to detonation.
This is essentially the reason why it represents the lower detonation limit; any less concentration will give
- a. zero detonation yield. This also points out that both hydrogen concentration and explosive yield affect the total equivalent mass of TNT for a given release.
Regulatory Guide 1,91 models the blast effects from transportation accidents by assuming 100% of the cargo detonates at a
. TNT mass equivalence of 240% (one pound of. cargo equals 2.4 pounds of TNT). The analysis described 'in this report modeled 4
large spills of hydrogen by calculating the amount of release.that is between 18.3 and 59% (-46% of the vessel contents) and assuming that it detonates at a TNT mass h-9
Cu'idelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Noncenformance equivalence of 520% The resulting TNT equivalence for this method is'o'ne pound of vessel contents equals. 2.4 pounds of TNT, an identical result to that obtained with the NRC method.
- The above results in an equivalence of 1.37 lbs of TNT per gallon of tank size.
Using this.. conversion factor and U.S.
u Army Technical Manual TM5-1300 and the damage criteria outlined in Appendix B, required separation, distances have been determined as a function of tank size.
The results are shown on Figure 4-5 for the design parameters of the 'three building -types described in. Section
- 4.1.2.2.
For buildings with other' design parameters, the methods in Appendix B or in NUREC/CR-2462 Q) may be used to determine separation distances..
Each utility shall use these methods for determining the minimum required separc-tion distances from the storage tank to' safety-related structures or equipment for.
the event of an explosion at the tank site.
. 4.2.2 Pipe Breaks
4.2.2 Comply
This ssection addresses the requirements for gaseous and liquid hydrogen piping systems attached to the storage vessel up to the point where excess flow protection is provided. The criteria for acceptable siting for the event of a pipe break are the same as outlined in Section 4.1.3.
It is conservatively assumed that all releases i
i occur while the storage vessel is at 150 psig_ (the maximum allowable working pressure of the majority of commercially available tanks).
4.2.2.1 Gaseous Piping 4.2.2.1 Comply:
The same dispersion model for momen-tum-dominated jets discussed in Section 4.1.3 applies to gaseous releases from liquid storage tank piping with the apn opriate release conditions for si cated vapors.
The results of this i
modeling are shown in Figure 4-6 as j
4-10
__-______._________.______m.___
v Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance minimum separation distances versus hole size or inside diameter of piping not protected with excess flow devices. The upper curve is the maximum drif t distance to the lower flammability limit and is the minimum required separation distance to air pathways into safety-related struc-tures.
The three lower curves are required separation distances for the representative types of safety-related structures. These distances are the sum of both the drif t and blast distances.
Structures with other parameters can be analyzed using the methods in Appendix B or in NUREG/CR-2462 fl_). Each utility shall determine that the storage vessel piping and location meet these minimum requirements or show that less stringent criteria should be applied to a specific case.
An example of such a suitable exception would be if the air intakes are provided with automatic shutters controlled by hydrogen analyzers to prevent the ingestion of a flammable mixture.
l 4.2.2.2 Liquid Piping 4.2.2.2 Comply:
The vapor cicud formed by the flashing and rapid vaporization of a liquid release is nearly neutrally buoyant and has little momentum associated with its forma-tion.
For these conditions, a Gaussian dispersion model is employed using the following conservative anurt ptions:
- 1. Instantaneous vaporization of re-lease
- 2. F weather stability
- 3. I m/s wind speed
- 4. Wind direction towards safety-related area No credit is to be taken for site-specific wind direction or speed characteristics since it is assumed that pipe breaks can occur durmg the worst-case weather and wind conditions.
4-11
g > e, ;-
i t
fGbid: lines for Perman:nt BWR:
Implementation or Justification IHydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance -
4
'4 s.
. The [ minimum L required ' separation dis-tances "for. liquid hydrogen. pipe ' break's, 7..using the above assumptions, are given on Figure 4-7 as a function of discharge rate and hole size. The upper curve is the drif t.
distance'.to the. lower flammability limit
. for a fully developed could with F stability
- and. I m/s windspeed. This defines ' the
' minimum required separation distance. to air pathways into safety-related struc-i tures. The three lower curves define the '
minimum required separation distances to the representative ' safety-related 'struc-
.tures.. These curves: include the drif t
- distance to the center of the detonable
? cloud. and.the blast distance. ' f or the
- amount of ~ hydrogen in the detonable re-gion. For other structure types, Appendix
- .B or NUREG/CR-2462 (1) may be used to determine. blast ' distances.
These dis-
' tances shall be applied to all liquid piping,
' including those from any pump discharges, that. are.' not ' seismically. supported or protected by'. excess flow devices.
4.3 ELECTROLYTIC '
4.3 Not applicable:
Electrolytic hydrogen production is not being used at this time.
4.4 LIQUID OXYGEN 4.4.1 Site-Characteristics of Liquid
' Oxygen 4.4.1.1 Overview.
Review of the 4.4.1.1 Comply:
following site characteristics shall be
. storage system.
Location of supply. in proximity to
. exposure as addressed in NFPA 30.
j l
Route of liquid oxygen delivery on site.
4-12
(
l
_..__..m______.__m.___
m_
.I
[. -
s v'
Revision 1 d
i March 1989 k
Guidhlines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification j
. Hydrogen ' Water Chemistry Installation.
~ for Nonconformance j
t 1
Location of supply l system in proxi-
.l mity to' safety-related equipment.
i.L Location of hydrogen storage.
4.4.1.2 Specific Considerations.
4.4.1.2.1
~ Fire. Protection.
The area 4.4.1.2.1 Comply:
selected. for. liquid oxygen system siting shall meet or exceed all requirements for
- protection of personnel and equipment as addressed in NFPA 50, Bulk Oxygen Sys-tems. The standard identifies the types of
. exposure's under consideration. The num-ber of exposures warrants a plant-specific review for proper code compliance. As much : separation distance as practical should be provided between the hydrogen and oxygen systems.
4.4.1.2.2 Security.
All liquid oxygen 4.4.1.2.2 Comply:
supply system installations shall be com-pletely fenced, even when located within the security area.
Lighting shall be installed to facilitate night surveillance.
4.4.1.2.3 Route of Liquid Oxygen Delivery 4.4.1.2.3 Comply:
on Site. Each plant should determine the route to be taken by liquid oxygen delivery trucks _ through on-and offsite areas. In order to protect the oxygen storage area from any vehicular accidents, truck bar-
[
riers shall be installed around the perime-ter of the system installation.
. Within the plant security area all deliveries shall be controlled by plant security personnel, per the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.
4.4.1.2.4 Lwation of Storage System to 4.4.1.2.4 Comply:
Safety-Related Equipment.
Each plant shall determine that the location of the The oxygen storage area is located 1000 feet south of the nearest safety-related liquid oxygen supply system is acceptable considering the hazard described in structure, which is the. Unit I and 2 Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.
control room, and 500 feet north of the hydrogen storage area.
4-13 n-_-..-
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Guidelines for. Pcrmanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
.'4.4.2 Liquid Oxygen Storage _ Vessel
4.4.2 Comply
Failure.
Liquid oxygen storage vessels are vulner-N able 'to the same potential causes of fail-ure as the liquid hydrogen vessels but the i.
potential consequences of failure are much less severe. The potential threat from al liquid oxygen spill is the contact of g
oxygen-enriched - air with combustible
~
materials or the ingestion of oxygen-
~
' enriched air into. safety-related air intakes.
Additional information on the ef fects of oxygen-enriched atmospheres is given in NFPA 53M and in ASTM C63-83a and GS8-84..
For the purpose of this report, it is conservatively assumed that total oxygen concentrations above 30 vo1%
(21% O in air + 9% enriched 0 ) *ill '
p 2
~ increase the ef fective combustibility of -
. ignitible materials in the area.
4.4.3 Liquid Oxygen Vapor Cloud Dis-
4.4.3 Comply
persion The vapor cloud instantaneously formed by a large liquid oxygen spill will have a density of 3.59 relative to air. Such a cloud '.will
_ experience considerable gravity-driven slumping as it disperses and translates with the wind. This process has been described by the DEGADIS model developed by Prof. J. A. Havens of the University of Arkansas Q). His model has been found to agree well with published r
data on large releases of dense gases con-ducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Coast Guard and others.
The DEGADIS model has been used to determine the height of the vapor cloud as a function of distance for various sizes of commercially available liquid oxygen stor-
. age tanks. It was conservatively assumed that any vessel failure would result in the instantaneous vaporization of the entire j
tank contents. The curves on Figure 4-S, which. define " acceptable location of i
safety-related air intake," were generated by using the DEGADIS model under the worst-case weather conditions or F 4-14
i Guid: lines for Permanent BWR' Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance stability and 10 m/s wind speed for total oxygen concentrations of 30 volo6.
For dense gas dispersion, lower wind speeds result in more radial spreading with a lower cloud height and shorter maximum drif t distance.
Higher wind speeds will translate even the largest release past safety-related intakes in less than 10 sec, giving little time for ingestion of enriched air.
Therefore, liquid oxygen storage vessels shall' be located such that safety-related air l'itakes are within the acceptable regica defined by Figure 4-8 or alternative anz'yses shall be perMrmed to justify the location.
Since this Jigure assumes the origin of release is from the storage loca-tion, the tank and its foundation shall be designed to remain in place for both design basis tornadoes and site-specific flood conditions.
4.5 REFERENCES
4.5 Not applicable:
1.
R. P. Kennedy, T. E. Blejwas, and D.
E. Bennett.
" Capacity of Nuclear Power Plant Structures to Resist Biast Loadings." NUREG/CR-2462.
Sandia National Laboratories for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion.
2.
" Air Products Liquid Hydrogen Storage System Hazardous Conse-quence Analysis."
Revision 1,
October 1,1985.
3.
J. A. Havens.
"The Atmospheric Dispersion of Heavy Gases:
An Update." IChemE Symposium Series No.93,1985.
4-15
Guidelines for Perman:nt BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation -
for Nonconformance i
5.0 VERIFICATION
5.0 Comply
The various methods of verifying the A Hydrogen Water Chemistry Verification ef festiveness of HWC (i.e., electrochemi-System (HWCVS) has been chosen to verify cal potential, constant extension rate the effectiveness of the HWC system.
j tests, etc.) are not within the scope of this
[
document. Appropriate methods of verifi-cation should be selected and implemented on a plant-specific basis.-
4 l
=
1 j
5-1 l
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9
- Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance-r 6.0 = -OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND
'6.0 Comply with intent: '
F' TRAINING
~
Design guidance provided in this section
-This section give. recommendations to the does not include any' requirements. -
operating utility for operation, mainte-nance, and training in order to meet the design. intent of the hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) system.
The operation 'of ' a HWC system will require operator and chemistry personnel attention.
Because 'of the radiation increases that result from employing this
. system, an. awareness of ALARA princi-pies 'is required by. all plant personnel.
This system could also have an effect on the off-gas system' and the plant fire -
protection program.
' 6.1-OPERATING PROCEDURES 6.1 Comply with intent:
Written procedures - describing proper All. necessary procedures for.
safe valving alignment and. sequence for any:
operation and maintenance of the HWC anticipated. operation should be provided system ' will be provided,' and ' will be for each. major component and system incorporated into existing plant process.
Check-off lists yhould.be procedures if possible.
developed and used for complex or infre- -
quent modes of operation.
Operating procedures should be considered for the following operations:
Hydrogen addition system startup, normal operation, shutdown and alarm response.
Material (gas or liquid) handling (filling of.- storage tanks) operations that are consistent with the sup-plier's recommendations.
Purging of hydrogen and oxygen lines.
Operation of onsite gas generation system (if appropriate).
Fire protection or safety measures for hydrogen-or oxygen-enhanced fires and hydrogen or oxygen spills.
6-!
1 l
.1 Guidelines for Permanent BWR-Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
' Calibration and maintenance procedures as-recommended by equipment or gas suppliers.
~
Routine inspection of HWC system equipment.
{
Adjustment of the main steamline radiation.. monitor setpoints - '(if appropriate). -
f 6.1.1 Integration Into Existing - Plant
6.1.1 Comply
Operation Procedures Where appropriate, operation of the HWC system shall be incorporated into normal
. plant procedures such as plant startup and shutdown.
'6.I'.2 Plant-Specific Procedures
6.1.2 Comply
Appropriate procedures shall be developed to provide guidance' for plant operators when operation of the HWC system neces-sitates operation. of an existing system in a different mode or. raises new concerns.
Areas which should be considered are:
Operation of the off-gas systern
. Possible off-gas fires 6.1.3 Radiation Protection Program
6.1.3 Comply
Operation of an HWC system results in an increase in radiation levels wherever nuclear steam is present. The radiation protection program shall be reviewed and appropriate changes made to compensate for these increased radiation levels.
The following guidelines are established to ensure that radiological exposures to both plant personnel and the general public and consistent with ALARA requirements.
Compliance with these requirements mini-mizes radiologically significant hazards associated with HWC implementation.
The operation of a hydrogen addition system may cause a slight reduction in the of f-gas delay time due to the increase in 6-2
l.
H Cuidelines for Perman:nt BWR
- Implementation or Justification Hvdrogen Water Chemistry Installation ~
for Nonconformance the flow rcte of noncondensables resulting-1:
from the excess oxygen added.. This may slightly increase plant ef fluents and should be reviewed on a plant-specific basis.
P 6.1.3.1. ALARA Commitment. Permanent 6.1.3.1 Comply:.
hydrogen water chemistry systems and programs will ~ be designed, installec,
. operated, and, maintained in accordance
+
with the provisions of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 to assure that. occupational-radiation exposures and doses to the
. general public will be "as low as reason-ably achievable."
6.1.3.2 initial Radiological' Survey.. A 6.1.3.2 Comply:
comprehensive radiological survey should be performed with' hydrogen injection to quantify - the impact of hydrogen water chemistry on the environs' dose rates, both within and outside the plant. This survey -
should be used to. determine if significant radiation changes occur within the plant and at the site boundary. Based upon the-magnitude of. the change, it should be determined if new radiation areas or high radiation ' areas, need to: be created.
Appropriate - posting, access, and ' moni-
.toring requirements should be imple-mented for the affected areas.
Plant operating and surveillance procedures should be revised, as required, to minimize the time and numb',r of personnel required in' radiation areas for operations, mainte-nance, in-service inspection, etc.
6.1.3.3 Plant Shielding. The radiological 6.1.3.3 Comply:
survey of Subsection 6.1.3.2 should be used to determine the adequacy of existing plant shielding. In addition, the radiation levels from sample lines, sample coolers-and monitoring equipment may increase due to HWC and should be checked for adequate shielding. !! required, measures for selective upgrading of plant shielding should be implemented to reduce both work area and site boundary dose rates.
6-3 l
Guidelines for Permanent BWR implem:ntatic'i or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 6.1.3.4 Maintenance Activities. Hydrogen 6.1.3.4 Comply:
wa ter - chemistry will have minimum impact on occupational exposures result-ing from maintenance activities.
Plant procedures should incorporate appropriate requirements for access to and monitoring of areas where increased dose rates exist with HWC to satisfy ALARA require-ments. For extended maintenance, plant procedures should include provisions to terminate the hydrogen injection. Due to the short half-life of N-16, radiation levels will return to pre-HWC conditions within minutes of hydrogen shutoff.
6.1.3.5 Radiological Surveillance Pro-6.1.3.5 Comply:
grams.
Dose rate surveys should be conducted and radiation levels should be monitored periodically to ensure com-pliance with the radiological limits imposed by 40 CFR Part 190,10 CFR Part 100, and 10 CFR Part 20.
Additional surveys may be required to comply with ALARA requirements.
Hydrogen water chemistry, in association with improved water quantity operational practices, could affect the crud buildup within the recirculation piping and the shutdown dose rates.
A radiological surveillance program should be established to monitor shutdown dose rates and crud buildup over a number of fuel cycles to evaluate pos-sible changes.
6.1.3.6 Measurement of N-16 Radiation.
6.1.3.6 Con oly:
The radiological surveillance program should include provisions for the new distribution of N-16 in the main steam.
Selection of appropriate health physics j
instrumentation and application of correc-tion factors are required to provide accu-rate dose measurements. (This correction is required due to the effect of the ener-getic N-16 gamma on instrumentation I
calibrated with less energetic gamma sources.) All plant survey meters should i
be reviewed and appropriate calibration
{
and correction methods accounted for in plant procedures.
I 6-4 l
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1 l l
l:
/
r l'
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification L-
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance A review of the plant personnel dosimetry program shall be conducted to ensure that the appropriate calibration er correction factors are used.
6.1.3.7 Valui./ Impact Considerations. The 6.1.3.7 Not applicable:
following discussion reviews the total dose impact on a plant which implements HWC.
No design guidance is stated in this section.
A radiological assessment at Dresden l
indicates that the total dose increase with
'HWC is approximately 0.5% on an annual basis (from 1935 to 1945 man-rem / year)
(1). While this increase is site dependent due to plant layout and shielding configu-
~
rations, significant variances from the Dresden assessment are not anticipated.
.Thus, over the life of a plant (assuming a 25-year remaining life), the projected total dose increase with HWC is ~ 250-300 l
man-rems.
With HWC implementation, the potential exists to relax current augmented in-service inspection requirements imposed by NRC Generic Letter 84-11 (2) and elimination of extended plant outages for pipe replacement and/or repair.
The value/ impact assessment presented in Appendix E to Reference 3 projects a 1161 man-rem (best estimate) savings over the life of the plant as a consequence of reduced inspections and repairs with HWC. Typical pipe replacement projects result in a total dose of 1400 to 2000 man-rems. Thus, HWC implementation could result in a significant savings in total dose over the life of the plant.
6.1.4 Water Chemistry Control
6.1.4 Comply
Procedures should be developed to main-tain the high reactor water quality neces-sary to obtain the maximum benefit from the HWC system.
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking can be mitigated by controlling the ionic impurity content of the primary coolant and by reducing the dissolved oxygen level in the primary coolant by use of HWC. The EPRI-BWR 6-5
Revision 1 j
March 1989
.]
0
-'?
Guidelines for Permanent BTR '
Implementation, or Justification L
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance i
I a
l Owners Group has developed "BWR Hydro-gen ' Water Chemistry Guidelines" Q),
which must be met in order to obtain the full benefits of HWC. These water chem-istry guidelines should be used as a basis i
for developing a plant-specific. water j
chemistry control program.
l Hydrogen water chemistry can reduce the The feedwater dissolved oxygen con-dissolved oxygen level in the condensate centration will be monitored through-I and feedwater. It has been shown that at out the initial startup test of the very low levels of dissolved oxygen, corro-HWC system to determine if-feedwater sion and metal transport to the primary-oxygen control is necessary.
system would be increased.
if, when operating on HWC, the dissolved oxygen concentration drops. below 20 ppb, an evaluation should be made to determine if there is increased corrosion or metals transport, or if other factors relating to such a reduced oxygen concentration need to be considered.
if this evaluation determines that oxygen injection is neces-l sary, a system should be designed using the ' guidance. provided in Sections 2.3.2 and 3.4 of this report.
s 6.1.5 Fuel Surveillance Program 6.1.5 Comply.
No significant effect of hydrogen injection on fuel performance has been observed, nor is expected.
However, since in-reactor experience with hydrogen water chemistry is, limited, utilities should consider the fue! surveillance programs recommended by their fuel suppliers.
6.2 MAINTENANCE
6.2 Comply
{
l A preventative maintenance program should be developed and instituted to ercare proper equipment performance to l
i reouce unscheduled repairs. All mainte-nance activities should be care!Wlv planned to reduce interference with sta-tion operation, assure industrial safety, and minimize maintenance personnel exposure.
Written procedures should be devet ed and followed in the perfor-m.
.: of maintenance work. They should be written with the objective of protect-ing plant personnel from physical harm 6-6
\\
- y p
Guidelines for Perman:nt BWR -
! implementation or Justification
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation -
for Nonconformance and radiation ' exposure and of reducing hydrogen addition - system downtime.
Radiation exposure should be reduced by
. shortening the; time required 'in a high' radiation ' field ' and. by reducing its intensity by turning off the HWC system or other means during.the maintenance period.'
All excess flow check valves ~ used ' for hydrogen line break' protection shall be periodically tested ' to assure ' they will function properly.
6.3 ' TRAINING
6.3 Comply
In' order 'for' the HWC system to maintain
. Its system integrity and to provide the expected benefits from its use, the system must be operated correctly.
The most
. effective means of reducing the potential of. operator.. error' is through proper training..
Training shpuld be provided to:
Instruct operators on the function,-
theory and operating characteristics of the! system and all its major system components.
Advise:. operators of the conse-
. quences of component malfunctions and. misoperation and ' provide instruction -
as to appropriate corrective actions to be taken.
j Advise operations and maintenance j
personnel of the potential hazards of
{
gases in the system, and provide
]
instruction as to appropriate proce-1 1
dures for their handling.
Instruct emergency response person-net on appropriate procedures for handling. fires or personnel injuries involving spills 'or releases of H2 Of O liquid and gases.
2 J
6-7
)
i J
I L-
.., ~ _ -.
3 l
Guidelines for Perminent BWR -
Implementation or Justification e Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
, ' Instruct ~ plant personnel on the expected radiation changes due to the operation of the HTC system and the appropriate ALARA prac-tices to be thken to minimize dose.
Instruct appropriate personnel on the.
benefits of HWC.-
Advise maintenance ' and construc-tion personnel of the routing of hydrogen lines and of the appro-priate protective actions to be taken when working near these lines.
' Periodic training should be provided to reinforce information described above and to communicate information regarding any modifications, procedural changes, or l
incidents.
6.4 IDENTIFICATION 6.4 Do not comply:
.i in order to. aid f plant personnel; in-See Section 10.1 of the HWC licensing identifying hydrogen and ' oxygen lines, package. for - justification for noncom-these lines - should -- be color. coded as pliance.
required by ANSI A13.1.
6.5 REFERENCES
6.5 Not applicable:
1.
" Environmental Impact of Hydrogen l
Water Chemistry." EPRI Hydrogen Water Chemistry Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia, December 1984.
2.
" Inspection of BWR Stainless Steel Piping." NRC Generic Letter 84-11, April 19,1984.
l l
- 3..
" Report of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee."
NUREG-1061, Volume 1,
August 1984.
4.
BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Guidelines:
1987 Revision.
N P-4947-5R-LD.
Palo Alto, Calif.:
Electric Power Research Institute, l
to be published.
6-8
)
a l
1 i
~4u l 9 c.
s Guidilin2s for Permantnt BWR'
. Impismentation or Justification-for Nonconformance -
[s
! Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation 7.0 : SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING p
7.1 SYSTEM INTEGRITY TESTING' 7.1 Do not comply:
'In addition to the testing required by the '
See Section 10.3 of the.HWO licensing:
- applicable design '- codes, completed -
package for justification.for noncon-
- formance, process systems which will contain hydro-gen shall be leak tested.with' helium or-a soap solution as appropriate prior to initial -
operation of the system. ' All components and joints shall be so tested in the fabri-cation shop or af ter installation, as appro-
~ Appropriate helium leak tests priate.
shall be performed on portions of the sys-tem following any modifications or main-tenance' activity which could affect the pressure boundary of the system.
7.2 PREOPERATIONAL AND PERIODIC
7.2 Comply
TESTING Completed systems should be tested to the extent practicable. to. verify the oper-ability and functional performance of the system.
Proper functioning of the fol-lowing items should be verified:
Trip and alarm functions per Table 2-2.
Gas purity, if generated on site.
Safety features.
Excess !!ow check valves.
System controls and monitors per Table 2-2.
A program should be developed for peri-odic retesting to ' verify the operability and the functional performance of the system.
7-1
,a Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
~ Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
. for Nonconformance 8.0 - RADIATION MONITORING
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1-Comply with intent:
This section reviews the. radiological Design guidance provided in this section consequence of hydrogen water chemistry does not include any requirements.
'(HWC) and presents the basis for increas--
ing the main steamline radiation monitor setpoint to accommodate HWC It is con-ciuded that implementation of HWC does not reduce the margin of safety as defined
~
in the basis of the technical specification setpoint.
During normal operation of a BWR, nitro-gen-16 is formed from an oxygen-16 (N-P) reaction. N-16 decays with a half-life of 7.1 sec. and ' emits' a' high-energy gamma photon (6.1. MeV). ' Normally, most of the N-16 combines rapidly with oxygen to form water-soluble, nonvolatile nitrates and nitrites.
However, because of the lower oxidizing potential present in a hydrogen water chemistry environment, a higher percentage of the N-16 is con-verted to more volatile species.
As a consequence, the steam activity during a
hydrogen addition can increase up to a factor of approximately five. The dose rates in the. turbine building, plant environs, and off site also increase; however, the magnitude of the increase at any given location depends upon the con-tribution of the steam activity to the total
~
dose rate at ' that location. The specific concerns include:
The dose to members of the general public (40 CFR 190),
The dose to personnel in unrestricted
. areas (10 CFR 20), and The maintenance of personnel expo-l i
suie "as low as reasonably achiev-able" (ALARA).
S-1 L.
L _
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 8.2 '
MAIN STEAMLINE RADIATION 8.2 Do not comply:
MONITORING See Section 3.2 and 10.4 of the HWC As noted in the previous section, main licensing package for ' justification for steamline radiation levels can increase up nonconformance.
to approximately fivefold with hydrogen water chemistry. The majority of BWRs
- have a technical specification requirement for the main steamline radiation monitor (MSLRM) setpoint that is less than or equal to three (3) times the normal rated full-power background. For these plants an adjustment in the MSLRM setpoint may be required to allow operation with hydro-gen injection.
For earlier BWRs with MSLRM setpoints of seven (7) to ten (10) times normal full-power background, a setpoint change may not be required.
8.2.1 Dual MSLRM Setpoint Recom-8.2.1 Do not comply:
mendation See Section 8.2.
For plants at which credit is taken for an MSLRM-initiated isolation in the control rod drop accident (CRDA), a dual setpoint approach may be utilized. At most plants, the MSLRM setpoint is specified in the plant Technical
. Specifications (Tech Specs) as some factor times rated full-power radiation background. With hydro-gen addition, the full-power background could increase up to 3 times that without hydrogen addition.
Below 20 % rated power or the power level required by FSAR or Tech Specs (see Table 2-1), the existing setpoint is maintained at the Tech Spec factor above normal full-power background, and hydrogen should not be injected.
About 20% rated power, the MSLRM setpoint should be readjusted to the same Tech Spec factor above the rated full-power background with hydro-gen addition. This adjustment would be made by the plant personnel during star-tups and shutdowns. Plant power would remain constant during this adjustment process. Thus, the Tech Spec factor which the MSLRM setpoint is adjusted remains the same with and without hyc'rogen addi-tion, but the background radiation level increases with hydrogen addition. If an 8-2
z..
Guid:linzs for Permirent BWR Implementation or Justif.cction Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance L
- unanticipated power - reduction' event occurs such tliat the reactor power is -
below this' power, level. without the required setpoint. change, control rod
- motion 'should be' suspended until. the--
necessary setpoint adjustment. is made.
At newer plants, credit is not taken for an MSLRM-initiated isolation af ter a CRDA,-
' and a dual setpoint is not needed at these plants.
Plants that need a dual setpoint should consider changing their Technical Specifi-cations to increase the factor used to determine the MSLRM setpoint, if - their-CRDA analysis will permit this increase.
' A suggested approach would be to use the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit
- 1. Amendment No. 58 Technical Specifica-tion change as a model.
Under this approach, the MSLRM setpoint was raised based on a satisfactory evaluation of the offsite consequences.
8.2.2 MSLRM Safety Design Basis 8.2.2 Do not comply:
The only design basis event for which See Section 8.2.
some plants may take credit for - main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure on main steamline high radiation is the design basis control rod drop accident (CRDA).
As documented in Reference (1), the
~
CRDA is only'of concern below f 0% of rated power. Above this power level the rod worths and resultant CRDA peak fuel enthalpies are not limiting due to core voids and faster Doppler feedback. Since the current MSLRM setpoint will not be changed below 20% rated power, ' the MSLRM sensitivity to fuel failure is not impacted and the FSAR analysis for the CRDA remains valid.
The licensing baus for the CRDA states that the maximum control rod worth is established by assuming the worst single inadvertent operator error (2).
From Rehrences (2) and (3), the-maximum
~
cd rol rod worth above 20% rated power, assuming a single operator error, is <0.8%
aK/K. Parametric studies utilizing the 8-3
---___m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _
Guidelines for P:rmanent BWR implementation or Justif. cation
.. _ Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
' conservative GE excursion mooel (1) indi-L
.cate that the' maximum peak fuel enthalpy
- for a ' dropped. control rod worth of 0.8%
aK/K 'is less-than 120 calories per gram (3)..
Consequently, the conservatively calculated peak fuel enthalpy for a CRDA above 20% rated power w'ill have signifi-cant margin to the fuel cladding failure
.. threshold of 170 calories per gram.
An increase in the MSLRM setpoint wi!!'
not impact'any other FSAR design basis' accident or transient analysis since no credit is.taken for this isolation signal.
Consequently, : a ' technical specification change which. adopts the recommended dual, setpoint approach will not reduce overall plant safety margins.
.8.2.3 MSLRM Sensitivity 8.2.3 Do not comply:
Conceptually, the sensitivity of the See Section 8.2.
MSLRM to fission products is effectively reduced by the increase in the setpoint above 20% power.
However, it is still functional 'and. capable of initiating a reactor scram. The main function of the instrument. is to help maintain offsite releases to within the applicable regula-tory limits. The MSLRM is supplemented by the off-gas radiation monitoring system which monitors the gaseous effluent prior to its discharge to the environs. The off-gas radiation monitor retpoint is estab-lished to help ensure that the equivalent stack release limit is not exceeded.
8.2.4 Conclusions 8.2.4 Do not comply:
From the. above discussion, it can be See Section 8.2.
concluded that an increase in the MSLRM setpoint above 20% rated power will not reduce the safety margins as defined by Technical Specifications or increase the offsite radiological effects as a conse-
. quence of design base accidents. Further-more, since this change to the MSLRM can be justified independent of HWC, this change does no, constitute an unreviewed safety concern.
3-4
- _ _ _ = - _ _ -
MP, ( ;
9:
_ ; Guidelines for Pzrmtn:nt BWR 1 implementation or Justification -
k-j Hydrogen Water Ch:mistry Installation,
- for Nonconformr.nce 1
.;q
~
p p
' 8.3i EQUIPMENT. QUALIFICATION
. 8.3.. Comply:
L)<
~3 Outside primary containment the increase 1
,1 R />
/in dose rates,with HWC is small relative-l i
L
.to'the integrated. dose assumed for equip-rnent. qualification. (EQ) tests. - Further-q more, dose rates inside the drywell near,
' the : recirculation piping will ' decrease
~
- because of the increased carryover. of N-16 : in' the. steam.. Each utility should 1
review' the resultant i dose. increases to -
ensure that' the doses assumed in the EQ tests required for electrical equipment per
,i 10 CFR Part 30.49 remain bounding.
- 8.4 ' ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
8.4 Comply
- Implementation = of an HWC system'. is unlikely. : to. significantly increase the amounts or significantly change the types of effluents that mayj be released off
. site. 'Although an increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation expo-sure may occur, the guidelines provided in Section 6.1.3 of this document will ensure that radiological exposures;to both plant
. personnel and the general public are con-sistent.with ALARA requirements. Since
-the design objeciives and limiting condi-
. tions for operation as defined 10 CFR Part
~ $0,. Appendix 1, are not. impacted, 'no i
. Appendix ! revision is required.
1 Each plant should examine the environ-mental effects of an HWC system. How-
~
ever,. it is unlikely that environmental impact : statements or environmental
-{
assessments will be required for HWC systems.
)
4 3-5 i
=
L. - -_ __:-_. _ _, _ _ _.
' Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementat. ion or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nc,nconformance
8.5 REFERENCES
8.5 Not applicable:
1.
R. C. -Stirn, et al.,
" Rod ' Drop '
' Analysis for Large Boiling Water Reactors." NEDO-10527. General Electric Company, March 1972.
2.
- R. ' C. Stirn, ' et ' al.,
" Rod Drop
' Accident A.nalysis for Large Boiling Water. Reactors Addendum No. 2 Exposed Cores."
NEDO-10527, Supplement 2.
Company, January 1973.
3.
R. C. Stirn, ' et al.,
" Rod Drop Accident-Analysis for Large. Boiling Water Reactors Addendum No.1 Multiple Enrichment Cores with Axial Gadolinium."
NEDO-10527, Supplement 1.
- Company, July 1972, i
8-6 b
Guidelin s for Parmanent BWR Implement: tion or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
for Nonconformance 9.0 QUALITY. ASSURANCE 9.0 Comply with intent:
Alth_ough the HWC system. is non-nuclear -
Design guidance provided in this 'section F
safety-related, the. design, procurement, does not include any requirements.
E fabrication 'and construction activities c
shall conform to the quality assurance provisions of the codes and. standards specified herein. In addition, or where not
~
covered by the referenced codes and stan-dards,' the followi ; quality assurance'
. features shall be estaotished.
9.1 SYSTEM. DESIGNER AND PRO-
9.1 Comply
CURER Design and Procurement Document Control.
Design and procurement documents shall be independently
. verified for' conformance to the requirements of this document by individual (s) within the design organization who are not the origi-nators of the design and procure-ment documents. Changes to design and procurement documents shall be verified 'or controlled to maintain conformance to this document.
Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services. Measures shall be established to ensure that suppliers of material, equipment and construction services are capable of supplying these items to the quality specified in the procurement docu-ments.
This may be done by an evaluation or a survey of the sup-pliers' products and facilities.
Handhng, Storage, and Shipping.
Instructions shall be provided in pro-curement documents to control the handling, storage, shipping and pre-servation of material and equipment to prevent damage, deterioration, and reduction of cleanliness.
9-1 9
.m_____.m
.-_m--
>1-March 1939-j.
Guidhlines for Perrranent BWR :
Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installat:en for Nonconformance t
9.2 CONTROL OF HYDROGEN STOR-Comply :
AGE. AND/OR GENERATION EQUIP-MENT SUPPLIERS Liquid Air corporation is using contractors with Commonwealth Edison Company approved W l.-
L
.In addition to the requirements in Secuon program'to install the system. All Code 9.1, the system designer snould audit the and EPRI recot. mended tests ::n the tank will
' design and manuf acturing documents of be performed:by Liquid Air Corporation or the equipment supplier to assure confor-its subcontractors,.
> mance to the procurement documents.
The system designer shall specify specific
' factory tests to be performed which wili-assure operability of the supplier's equip-ment. The system designer or his repre-sentative should be present for the factory tests.
9.3 SYSTEM CONSTRUCTOR
9.3 Comply
Inspection.
In addition to code requirements, a program for inspec-
' tion of. activities af fecting quality shall be established and executed by, or for, the organization performing _
the activity to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accom-plishing the activity.
This shall include the visual inspection of components prior to installation for conformance with procurement documents and visual inspection of items and systems following installa-
- tion, cleaning, and passivation (where applied).
Inspection, Test and Operating Status.
Measures shall be estab-lished to provide for the identi-fication of items which have satisfactorily passed required inspections and tests.
Identification and Corrective Action for items for ' Nonconformance.
Measures shall be established to identify items of nonconformance with regard to the requirements of the procurement documents or applt-cable codes and standards and' to identify the remedial action taken to correct such items.
9-2 I
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7 ATLACMENJ_C SMETY EVALUATION REPORT CottiERTE I
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.112 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPj AND AMENDMENT NO.108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY j
1 AND i
1 IOWA-ILLIN0IS CAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET N05. 50-254/265
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated September 16 and November 18, 1988, the licensee requested to amend Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30 to change the setpoint of the main steam line radiation monitors (MSLRMs), to.
correct typographical errors and to make changes in the Technical Specifications.
The requested change involves increasing the setpoint of MSLRMs frora seven times Normal Full Power Background (NFPB) to fifteen times NFPB+to allow for wdhoul e
implementation of Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) which is expected to mitigate [Jf;3d the effects of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC). The MSLRM setpoint change is necessary since the injection of hydrogen into the feedwater lowers the oxidizing potential in the reactor coolant which in turn converts more N-16 to a volatile species and results in an increase in steam line radiation level. As a consequence, the steam activity during hydrogen addition can increase up to a factor of approximately five.
By letter dated September 28, 1988 the 1.censee provided additional information to support the implementation of HWC. The additional information included:
(1) Report titled, "HWC Installation Report for Amendment to the facility Operating License" dated May 16, 1988.
(2) Report titled "HWC Installation Compliance with Electric Power Research Institute (ERPI) Guidelines for Permanent 8WR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations - 1987 Revision."
(3) Draf t Copy of Proposed Changes to Updated FSAR as a Result of HWC Addition at Quad Cities Station.
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The changes will be included in the June 30, 1989 update to the FSAR.
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2.0 EVALUATION The MSLRMs provide reactor scram and main steam line isolation signals when high-activity levels are detected in the main stream lines.
these monitors serve to limit radioactivity releases in the event of fuelAdditionally, failures.
Technical Specification (TS) changes are needed to accommodate the expected main steam line radiation levels (from increased N-16 activity levels-in the steam phase) as a result of hydrogen injection into the reactor coolant sy st em.
The licensee has requested TS changes involving raising the MSLRM set points from the current seven times NFPB to fifteen times NFPBf witheaf a single set point for the MSLRMs which is an exception to the EPRI "GuidelinesThe m
for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation - 1987 Revision" (hereafter referred to as the Guidelines). The Guidelines recomend a dual
(
MSLRM set point:
(1) For reactor power less than 20% of rated ' when hydrogen should not be injected, the setpoint is maintained at the current TS factor above NFPB, and (2) For reactor power greater than 20% of rated, the setpoint is readjusted to the same TS factor above NFPB with hydrogen addition.
The only design basis event in which the Quad Cities Station takes credit for the MSLRM is the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA).
In the event of a CRDA, the MSLRMs detect high radiation levels in the main steam lines and provide signals for reactor scram and Main Steam Line Isolation Yalve (MSIV) closure to reduce the release of fission products to the environment. For the proposed MSLRM set point of fifteen times NFPBf the calculated dose rate at the HSLRM is 1.5
Yd'#f" rate from the CRDA is over five times the proposed increased MSLRM set point, a m on the high radiation signal caused by the CRDA will still scram the reactor and isolate the MSIVs.
Raising the MSLRM trip set point from the current 0.7 R/hr to 1.5 R/hr will not result in a significant increase in the radiological consequences of a CRDA.
The time to reach the proposed MSLRM trip set point following a CRDA will be by increased the less than 1/4 second. The Quad Cities TS permits five seconds for MSIV closure. The increase in time-to-closure due to the proposed MSLRM set point is only 5% of the current time-to-closure. Since the calculated dose from the CRDA is only 12 mrem, the minor increase in MS1V isolation will have an insignificant effect on the total activity release and the resulting dose to the general public.
In the event of an incident causing minor fuel damage such that radiation "Nh "#
levels will not exceed the proposed MSLRN set point of fifteen times NFPB W$f,4 he downstream steam jet air ejectors radiation detectors would be alarmed.
These detectors have a greater sensitivity than the MSLRMs for noble gases cecause of the holdup period (delay between HSLRM and steam jet air ejector radiation detectors) which allows for significant decay of N.16 (7.1 second half-life).
Since steam jet air ejector radiation detectors are in the Quad Cities Unit 1 and 2 TS, the proposed MSLRM set point change will not result in offsite doses in excess of established release limits.
Therefore, the proposed TS changes are acceptable.
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. 2.2 RAH ATION PROTECTION The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal regarding the radiological implications due to the increased dose rate associated with increased N-16 activity levels during hydrogen injections into the reactor system. The licensee is comitted to designing, installing, operating, and maintaining the HWC System in accordance with Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 to assure that occupational radiation exposures and doses to the general public will be As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). A preliminary radiological se#vey-hr been
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completed at the Quad Cities Station to identify areas of the station hich may j
experience increased dose rates due to HWC. When HWC is implemented, the duq l
results of the preliminary sur"cy will be confirmed and_ acoitional measurements a
will be made, if required. Based on the preliminary :frvey and experience from the Dresden Unit 2 (implemented HWC in March 1983), additional shielding appears to be unnecessary. Again, when HWC is implemented, these results will be confirmed and additional shielding will be provided, if required.
Plant procedures will address access control of radiation areas that are affected by HWC. Guidelines will be established for any additional controls needed for area posting and monitoring due to HWC. The existing radiological surveillance program (Section 8.4 of Offsite Dose Calculational Manual) assures compliance with regulatory requirements for offsite doses to the public.
Radiation protection practices implemented for HWC will ir.:ure ALARA in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.8 and is, therefore, acceptable.
2.3 HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN STORAGE FACILITIES l
The licensce will utilize :n interi ter-age-faci 11ty for gaseous hydrngen m,9 unt&e Icag-tern liquid hydrogcr. storage facility is completed. After the yuac3,d i
liquid hydrogen f:cility 1: installed, the geseous hydengan facility will bo u;cd a: : backep cupply. The gesecus hydrogen supply will enneiet nf twn trettcr treilers cach containing : ban' Of ecmpretted hydrogen gas tubes (+etal l
1 eapacity 50,000 - 70,000 scf, c;ch tubc c;pacity 0300 sef r-ee*4 mum pres urc J
1400 psig)- The pressure control station has two parallel full flow pressure reducing regulators. An excess flow check valve is installed downstream of the interim tube trailer and long-term liquid hydrogen storage facility. An additional excess flow check valve is installed in the hydrogen gas supply line near the west wall of the Unit I turbine building. Each excess flow check valve has a stop-flow-setpoint of 200 scfm (plant's hydrogen flow requirements are 140 scfm).
1onk is The beg-teve-liquid hydrogen etcrage faci'ity wi centist of a 20,000 ge!!cm tent constructed in accordance with Section VIII, Division 1 of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. The hydrogen storage facility (compressed gas and liquid) is located 1500 feet from the nearest safety-related structure.
This distance meets the Guidelines which requires 140 and 962 feet separation i
distance in the event of an explosion of a gaseous hydrogen storage tube and liquid hydrogen tank respectively.
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INSERT FOR. PARAGRAPH'2.3 The hydrogen storage' facility contains a liquid hydrogenL
- tank, gaseous storage tubes, and two gaseous tube trailer discharge stations.
The licensee will utilize a 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen tank as a long term hydrogen source.
Gaseous hydrogen storage tubes (total capacity 50,000-75,000 scf, each tube capacity 8,300 scf, maximum pressure 2,400-
~psig) are provided to serve as a gaseous surge volume for the j_
liquid hydrogen tank.
If the' liquid hydrogen system is not completed, the licensee will utilize two. gaseous hydrogen
' tube trailers.for initial startup and operation.
Gaseous tube trailers will also be brought on. site to provide backup hydrogen supply when liquid hydrogen is not available.
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P u The hydrogen supply facility provides the gaseous hydrogen requirements for turbine generator cooling / purging as well as HWC for Units 1 and 2.
The liquid oxygen storage tank, with a maximum capacity meets the Guidelines.
The hydrogen and oxygen storage facilities meet the Guidelines.
a.4 M HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN INJECTION SYSTEM The hydrogen piping is run underground from the storage facility to the outer wall of the Unit 1 turbine building.
a The piping is covered with* protective coating to protect against corrosion and is electrically grounded.
a.
The hydrogen injection lines for each Unit are equipped with check valves and solenoid isolation valves, which are interlocked with the condensate pump.
individual solenoid isolation valves provide hydrogen flow isolation if the The associated condensate pump is shut down and for all hydrogen injection trips.
1 The hydrogen is injected into the condensate pump discharge to provide adequate dissolving and mixing and to avoid gas pockets at high points.
The HWC systen is tripped by the following signals:
Reactor scram, Low residual off-gas oxygen concentration, High hydrogen flow, Low hydrogen flow, Area hydrogen concentration high, Operator manual, Hydrogen storage facip trouble, and Low reactor p0;;;r lCa1.Dbm f/ouls Eat.h unie has ugM hybegen srta monifers loca+ef)
Inc ar ; h% r:gcn ;riter; crc in eight injection system componenta that may leak.::::ti n; in the vicinity of hydrogen The sensors feed to a monitor panel which trips thejsystem at 20% of the lower explosive limit.
e Otspects vs ursit 2 H&
0xygen is injected into the of t-gas system to insure that all excess hydrogen in the off-gas stream is recombined.
The hydrogen and oxygen injection system meet the Guidelines.
.t. 5
.3 # CONCLUSION On the basis of the above evaluation, we find that the proposed Technical Specification changes required for implementation of HWC at Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 are acceptable.
The proposed increased single set point, versus a dual power dependent set point, for the MSLRMs is an exception to the BWR Owners Group " Guidelines for Pemanent Hydrogen Water Chemittry Installation - 1987 Revision".
This exception is justified on the basis that the CRDA dose rate is already limiting at five times the new set point.
safety of the plant or the general public.
Thus, it will not affect the I
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments. involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility ccmponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the' amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual.or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed fir. ding.
that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there 1
has.been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)and10CFR51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environ-mental. impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff.has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) public (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: Frank Witt Dated:
January 18', 1989
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macmarta DESCRIPTION OF COMMENTE i
I Paragraphs 1.0 Jatradurainn and 2.0 Ey_a2Xati2n The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor setpoint is fifteen times the normal full power background level without hydrogen addition. The enhancement.
of "without hydrogen addition" provides a necessary distinction for calibration of.the monitor. This comment is provided for clarification.
l Paragraph 2.2 - Radiation Protection Replace the word " survey" with " study".
Actual radiological surveys were not performed but rather a study was performed to anticipate increased
- dose rates and the need for additional shielding. This comment is provided for clarification.
Paragraph 2. 3 - liy.drggan_and_Dzygen Storage Facilitigg The proposed change to the paragraph provides clarification to the gaseous and liquid hydrogen storage configuration.
Paragraph 2.3 - liydtgg.en andJzygen Iniection System (a) The HWC System trips on low reactor steam flow in lieu of low reactor.
power level.
i (b) There are eight hydrogen area monitors per unit. The Safety Evaluation' infers that there are eight hydrogen monitors for both l
units. This comment is provided for clarification.
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FIGURE 12.
MINIMUM REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCE TO SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES VS. VESSEL SIZE FOR GASEOUS HYDROGEN STORAGE SYSTEM
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