ML20237G162

Dcrdr Suppl 2 - Summary Rept

ML20237G162
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	08/31/1987
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
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1 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l QUAD CITIES STATION DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SUPPLEMENT 2 -

SUMMARY

REPORT AUGUST 1987 lh V

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PAGE: 1 COMMONWEALTH EDISON'S RESPONSE TO THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OF )

DECEMBER 1985 QUAD-CITIES DCRDR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT i

l INTRODUCTION Commonwealth Ediaca Company (CECO) submitted the Summarf Report for the Guad-Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) to the NRC in May 1985, as required by l Supplement i to NUREG-0737. That report was reviewed by Science  !

Applications Intr:cational Corporation (SAIC) personnel on I contract to the W. As a result of SAIC's review, the NRC requested that CECc supplement the Summary Repo~rt. That j supplement was transmitted to the NRC in December 1905. Review I of that supplement by SAIC is documented in their Technical 1 Evaluation (TE) Report dated August 25, 1986 The NRC agreed with the conclusion in this TE Report and included it in their Safety Evaluation (SE) Report dated 03/09/87.

I Section 3.0 of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report documents their

("s conclusions. Those conclusions are included below:

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l The Quad-Cities DCRDRs are incomplete. In the staff's Judgement, !

several activities must be completed in order to satfisfy the DCRDR requirements in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. Those activities are:

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1. Assessment of HEDs - Resolve concerns related to cancelled <

HEDs discussed in Section 21 5 above, and in Section 2.5 and I Appendix C, Section C1 of *he attached TER.

2. Selection and verification of design improvements -

l Resolve concerns identified in Sections 2.6, 2.7, 2. 8, 2. 9 l and 2.10 and of the attached TER.

3. Coordinat ion with improvements from other programs - )

l Complete the coordination process as described in the May i 1985 Summary Report, at the June 1985-Quad Cities ons$te )

audit, and at the Tune 1986 LaSalle preimplementation j audit. ]

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CECO is required to maintain an auditable record of all I activities necessary to complete che Quad-Cities DCRDRs. CECO l should also submit a second Supplemental Summary Report which: l I

1. Identifies actual staffing for each of the above i activities i

2. Confirms completion of those activities I i

3. Provides any modifications to proposed HED corrections or modified Justifications for not correcting HEDs resulting from those activities l

4. Provides any proposed changes to schedules for HED correction I

Evaluation of the Quad-Cities DCRDR will continue through completion of the at ce activities. The staff evaluation of the activities to be cos... leted will be reported in a supplement to this SE.

1 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. RESPONSE O

\-) 1 The following report is CECO's response to these conclusions. l Section 3 of the Quad-Cities SE Report conclusions lists three a activities which must be completed in order to satisfy the DCRDR requirements in Supplement i to NUREG-0737.

)j Items 1, and 2 relate to NRC concerne identified in the Technical Evaluation Report (TER) Appendices. The CECO  ;

response to each of these concerns is included in the section  !

of this report entitled "Commonwenith Edison Co. Response To The Quad-Cities Technical Evaluation Report Appendices A thru C". l; Those responses are related to the appendices by the correspond-  !

ing letter included in the page numbers. The responses are  !

arranged in the same sequence as the concerns were presented in the various appendices.

Item 3 the NRC lists "which must be completed" relates to the

" Coordination with improvements from other programs". As indicated in Section 2.8 of the TER and the SER, this activity l 1s in progress and "will not be satisfied until the activities  ;

described by CECO have been completed". i i

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PAGEt 3 Section 3 of the SE Report conclusion also lists four items which should be included in this Quad-Cities DCRDR Supp1sement 2 Report.

Item 1 of that list requested CECO to identify the " actual )

staffing of each of the above tashs". The actual staffing for j the activities consistr of many of the original DCRDR Human l Factors Engineering Team members. Present team members are )

listed below:

1 Robert V. Castro - Quad-Cities Tech Staff Stephen H. Cooley - Human Factors Engineer (ARD Corp.)

Kathleen A. Hesse - Alternate Human Factors Engineering d Coordinator / Human Factors Engineer Robert E. Howard - Human Factors Engineering Coordinator Robert L. Kershner - Lead Human Factors Engineer (ARD Corp.)

Robert D. Koenig - Station Nuclear Engineering James K. Krass - Station Electrical Engineering 4 Michael D. O' Carroll - Document and Documentation Controller j (ARD Corp.) l Karen B. Slora - Human Factors Engineer <ARD Corp.) l Thomas K. Tamlyn - Quad-Cities Assistant Superintendent of Prod j l Michael S. Tucker - Station Nuclear Engineering 1 ("%

(_) Item 2 of that list, as indicated in the SE Report and the TER, are iterative processes and are in progress.

l Items 3 and 4 of that list are also included in the section of this report entitled " Commonwealth Edison Co. Response To The Quad-Cities Techinical Evaluation Report Appendices A thru C".

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PAGE: 4 INDEX DF QUAD-CITIES IMPLEMENTATION DATE MODIFICATION HED# FSR-PG i

359 F-19 PREVICUS IMPLEMENTATION J NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED'PER HEDAT)

REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 411 222 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE 428 282 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE .

REVISED IMPLEMENTATION ]

12/31/1987 169 297 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION l ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 391 128 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION O 12/31/1987 AND 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE AS INDICATED 349 166 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUEL 1HG OUTAGE 279 173 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION IST REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987' 226 174 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION iST REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987  ;

227 176 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 O

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l INDEX OF-QUAD-CITIES IMPLEMENTATION DATE MODIFICATION j r%  !

HED# FSR-PG 281 181 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION i ACCEPT AS IS I REVISED IMPLEMENTATION l 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE I 436 26 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE j 412 19 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 1 24 78 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION l 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

, REVISED IMPLEMENTATION l COMPLETE 460 105 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

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(_)g REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 159 141 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION i 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION l 12/31/1987 187 142 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 1 REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 171 129 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 421 100 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 O

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4 PAGE: 6 INDEX OF QUAD-CITIES IMPLEMENTATION MODIFICATION O HED# FSR-PG I

172 130 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION l ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE l 264 117 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION I 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 260 118 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 57 190 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT-AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 59 193 P3EVIOUS IMr' LAMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS O REVISE.D IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 1 74 62 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUCLING OUTAGE 12 64 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 13 G5 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT'AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 18 72 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION  ;

ACCEPT AS IS REVISED IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE 32 80 PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS REVISEb IMPLEMENTATION

() 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. RESPONSE TO THE QUAD-CITIES TECHi!ICAL EVALUATION REPORT APPENDICES A THRU C 1

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t-FAGE: A-1 QUAD CITIES REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDs REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR QUAD CITIES STATION DCRDR SAFETY EVALUATION (SE)

APPENDIX A RESPONSE Some of the items in the CECO Checklist differ from those respective items listed in NUREG-0700. Appendeix A to the Quad Cities Station SE identified three of these differences which-the NRC team disagreed with. The Checklist criteria in question were 1.2.3.D.2, 1.2.3.F.2, and 3.2.1.C . -(Though cited in Appendix A, item 1.2.3.F.1 was not in dispute with the NRC but only referenced because the following item, item 1.2.3.F.2, referenced it.) At subsequent audits in 1985 concern was expressed by the NRC regarding these Checklist items. At that time CECO re-evaluated these items and agreed to make the CECO Checklist conform to NUREG-0700. That modification was made, and the items were re-evaluated at Quad Cities Station. Section 2.4 of the Quad Cities Station SER states that as a result of these modifications, committed to in CECO's December 1985 Supplemental Summary Report for the Quad Cities DCRDR, the review team concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirement to conduct a Control Room Survey as stated in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. Therefore, we' consider this aspect O of the SER/TER to be closed.

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QUAD CITIES STATION 0\ REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 225 APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY N/A FSR PAGE F-14 FINDING THUMBWHEELS WHICH HAVE DISCRETE SETTINGS DO NOT RESIST INTERMEDIATE OR UNCERTAIN SETTING.

RESPONSE

THE THUMBWHEELS DO HAVE DISCRETE SETTINGS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT CECO's justification does not address the problem. There is no question  !

that the thumbwheels have discrete settings but that these settings permit j the operator to select intermediate settings. CECO should respond to the actual discrepancy described in the HED.

ECO CLARIFICATION The HED was written on the thumbwheels for the High and Low EGC limits.

These are set by the NSO during startup as requested and required from the .

Load Dispatcher who monitors the settings. The range of operation is I limited. These controls are not time critical and the limits are verifind at least once a shift after entry into the EGC. While the'thumbwheels can be intentionally left in a nondetent, intermediate, position, the switch d action is make-to-break so that an " intermediate" setting per se is ,

not possible. The HED documented a non-operational problem and was l therefore cancelled. t IMPLEMENTATION NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT)

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O QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 251 APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY N/A FSR PAGE F-16 FINDING RESPONSES ON THE OPERATOR SURVEY INDICATE A NEED FOR ECCS PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE GAUGE IN THE MCR (E.G., RHR AND RHR SWP PUMPS). THESE GAUGES WOULD PROVIDE POSITIVE FEEDBACK ON THE STATUS OF THE ECCS SYSTEMS, THAT IS, WHETHER THE PUMPS ARE RUNNING. OTHER INDICATORS SHOW DEMAND, BUT NOT STATUS. THUS, THE PRESSURE GAUGES WOULD PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF VERIFYING THAT THE PUMPS ARE RUNNING.

RESPONSE

THERE ARE CURRENTLY WAYS OF TELLING IF THE PUMPS ARE RUNNING. READINGS ARE TAKEN LOCALLY OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NEEDED TO BE OPERATED IN THE AREA.

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT s CECO's Justification for cancelling this HED merely serves to confirm the deficiency cited in the HED. CECO should therefore provide ECCS pump discharge pressure indication in the control room in order to provide positive feedback on the status of the ECCS system.

l CECO CLARIFICATION The HED as written is misleading in that it implies that none of the ECCS pumps have discharge pressure indication in the control room. This is NOT the case. The only ECOS pumps that do not have individual putsp incication for discharge pressure are the two.RHR pumps. These pumps dischacge into a l

commor system header End the overall RHP. system does have pressure indication in the eentrol room. In a transient event both RHR pumps auto start and overall system pressure is the parameter of concern. The only time individual RHR pump dis harge preesure im monitored 13 during individual pump surveillonces in which case, and by procedure, an operator is locally dispatched.

IMPLEMENTATION NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT)

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I QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

i HED # 268 i APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY N/A l FSR PAGE F-17 l l

FINDING THE OPERATOR SURVEY INDICATED A NEED FOR OFF GAS TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE INDICATORS IN THE MCR SO THAT THE OPERATOR COULD MONITOR THEM MORE FREQUENTLY. IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, IT WOULD BE CRITICAL FOR OPERATORS TO MONITOR OFF GAS TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE FREQUENTLY WHICH IS NOT FEASIBLE WITH THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION.

RESPONSE

THE OPERATORS DO NOT NEED THIS INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The HED indicates that Off-Gas Temperature and Pressure indication is critical to have in the control room but not feasible with the current CECO's response serves to reconfirm the deficiency cited in  !

O configuration.

the HED. Therefore CECO should provide this information in the control room.

CECO CLARIFICATION The current indication is available to protect the piping. The Off-Gas l 1

system isolates on high temperature and/or pressure to prevent a release path in the event of a hydrogen explosion. There is no operator action involved. Once isolated, the system can not be reset from the control room, an operator must be dispatched to evaluate system status prior to unisolating it. It is therefore not critical to monitor Off-Gas temperature and pressure as the HED suggests. The HED documented a nonproblem and was cancelled.

IMPLEMENTATION NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT)

PAGE: C1- 4 I' ' QUAD CITIES STATION k REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE HRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 423 j APPENDIX C1 i HED CATEGORY N/A FSR PAGE F-18 FINDING IT WAS OBSERVED DURING THE VALIDATION THAT A DIESEL LOAD INDICATOR ON THE 90X-3 PANEL WOULD FACILITATE OPERATION IN A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT WHERE OPERATORS HEED TO START AND RUN VARIOUS PIECES OF EQUIPMENT WITHOUT )

OVERLOADING AND POSSIBLY TRIPPING THE DIESEL GENERATORS. j

RESPONSE

THIS WOULD BE NICE TO HAVE, BUT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS.

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT The HED indicated a need for Diesel Generator load indication on the ECCS panel. CECO's response was that that information is not required for operations. Since PRA studies have indicated that station blackout is one

(~} of the major contributors to core melt, the licencee needs to elaborate upon

( j its response to justify not adding this indication.

CECO CLARIFICATION All of the equipment on the 90X-3 panel is ECCS equipment and was designed to auto load to the emergency buses and Diesel Generator upon loss of off-site power or station blackout. The Diesel Generators in turn were design to handle the starting load of the ECCS equipment. Diesel Generator load indication is available on the Electrical Distribution panel (90X-8). There is therefore no need to have load indication on the 90X-3 panel since that equipment will have loaded to the Diesel Generators when necessary. Load information is desirable after sore time into an event when deciding whether non safety related equipment can be used, eg. instrument air compressors, cr whether some safety related equipment can be stopped. At the time that decision is nade it is not time critical, and it would be made after plant management and supervisory personnel have conferred. Those decision should be made based on the status of each Diesel Generator, and that information is properly located on the 90X-8 panels.

NOTE: In the TER attached to the SER this HED number was incorrectly identified.as 429. The correct HED index number la 423.

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NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT)

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\- REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 359 APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY N/A FSR PAGE F-19 i

FINDING RESPONSE TO THE OPERATOR SURVEY INDICATED THAT THE POSTED TABLE FOR RELEASE RATES NEEDS TO BE SIMPLIFIED OR OPERATORS SHOULD HAVE PERIODIC RETRAINING ON  ;

HOW TO READ IT, AND THE SAME t.PPLIES TO THE MEGAVARS TO MEGAWATT CHART.

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RESPONSE

THIS IS A TRAINING ISSUE; NOT PART OF THE DCRDR.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT l The HED indicates that the posted chart for release rates and the Megavars 1 to Megawatts chart need to be simplified or periodic training provided. The )

Rustication provided for the cancellation of the HED was that it is a training issue and not within the scope of the DCRDR. While perhaps not i f~% within the scope of the DCRDR's, training issues vis-a-vis human factors is

_) within the scope of the Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 requirement for l

s i coordination of the DCRDR with Training. CECO's Justification therefore )

does not rectify the human factors issue reised by the HED which should be j resolved within the scope of the DCRDR. )

CECO CLARIFICATION I In response to the NRC's comments concerning this HED and its relationship i to the global issue of Supplement i to NUREG-0737 initiative integration, the HEDAT has reevaluated this problem. Quad Cities will revise its release rates tables prior to the end of this year, 12/31/87. Since the Megavars to Megawatts chart is not time critical to use, is not safety related, and is somewhat complex because of the nature of the relationship of the compared parameters it will not be simplified but will be covered in periodic operator training.

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IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987

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QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SACETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 21 APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY N/A FSR PAGE F-27 FINDING j IN CASE OF FLASHER FAILURE OF AN ALARMED TILE, THE TILE LIGHT DOES NOT ]

ILLUMINATE AND BURN STEADILY. j RESPONSE l THIS IS BY DESIGN TO INSURE A DARK BOARD CONCEPT. FLASHER FAILURE IS ]

DETERMINED DURING ANNUNCIATOR TESTS.

J NRC/SAIC COMMENT The response that flasher failure is determined during annunciator tests and l that by design the tile lights do not burn steadily so as to ensure j adherence to the dark board concept does not address how flasher failure is l detected after testing during the balance of the shift. l l

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(") CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT has reevaluated its response to this HED based upon the NRC's comments and feels that the original Justification may have been too vague.  ;

When an alarm tile flasher card fails the tile will illuminate and burn l steadily once the operator has responded to the alarm. Prior to his pushing l the acknowledge pushbutton, the horn will sound but no tile will illuminate l or flash. This auditory only cue serves to alert the operator of the l flasher card failure. The HED therefore was incorrect and the HEDAT feels the operator has adequate indication of flasher card failure.

IMPLEMENTATION HONE (DETERt1INED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT) e N

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QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION-TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 203 APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY N/A ,

FSR PAGE F-33 FINDING LOCKS ON KEY-OPERATED CONTROLS ARE NOT ORIENTED 50 THAT THE SWITCH IS "OFF" WHEN THE KEY IS IN THE VERTICAL POSITION.

RESPONSE

THE "OFF" MODE IS AT THE 10 O' CLOCK POSITION. THIS IS CLOSE ENOUGH TO A VERTICAL POSITION TO SATISFY THE INTENT OF THE GUIDELINE.  !

NRC/SAIC COMMENT This HED cited key-operated controls that are not oriented so that the "off" position is at the 12:00 vertical position. CECO's response is that the "off" position is at the 10:00 position ~which is close enough to vertical to ,

satisfy the intent of the guideline. The Licensee should indicate the s number of modes assigned to the key-operated controls, their " clock" positione, and associated labeling.

CECO CLARIFICATION The following list denotes the various modes allocated to key-operated )

controls at Quad Cities station, their " clock" positions, and the labeling j associated with each position. l l

KEY LOCK CONTROL 10:00 2:00 o Valves CLOSE OPEN o RHR SW Start MANUAL AUTO Permissive OVERIDE j o CONMT Cool 2/3 LVL OFF MANUAL ECCS Init Bypass OVERIDE o DW Pressure Reset NORMAL RESET o SDIV High H O Bypass NORMAL BYPASS o Turning Gear Piggy OFF BYPASS Back Motor-o DG 1/2 OFF ON o Auto Blowdown Inhibit NORMAL INHIBIT O

IMPLEMENTATION NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT) l

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O QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 275 j APPENDIX C1 1 HED CATEGORY N/A l FSR PAGE F-36 l FINDING ONE RESPONSE TO THE OPERATOR SURVEY INDICATED THAT THE DRYWELL SUMP PUMP AND i VALVE CONTROLS SHOULD BE LOCATED BY THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INDICATORS ON' 90X-4.

RESPONSE i THE CONTROLS ARE CURRENTLY ON THE ADJACENT PANEL TO 90X-4 (90X-3). THIS IS I SUFFICIENT. I NRC/SAIC COMMENT .

1 This HED cites a problem in which the drywell sump pump and valve controls l should be located by the primary containment indicators on the 90X-4 panel.

("A CECO's response indicates that these controls are currently located on an

( adjacent panel (90X-3) and that this is sufficient. The licensee should indicate why the present location is sufficient and why some form of enhancement would not be beneficial.

CECO CLARIFICATION The " primary containment indicators" referred to in this HED actually consist of reditndant 1 solation valve position indications on a large mimic of the contalment. This mimic is an enhancement designed to graphically  ;

present the status of the Containment Isolation Valves, to the operator, in i one location. It appropriately is located on the 90X-3 panel with the ECCS 1 systems. Since the Drywell Sump System is not an ECCS system, its' controls )

und indications are appropriately located on the 90X-4 panel.

If;PLEMENTATION NONE (DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN HED PER HEDAT)

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REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO i IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 411 l APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY 1B -

FSR PAGE 222 FINDING - j AT PRESENT, THE ACAD/ CAM MODE SWITCHES ARE NOT PHYSICLLY LOCATED IN THE j CONTROL ROOM. l l

RESPONSE

A9 A PRODUCT OF THE LABELING PROGRAMS, THE PRESENT ACAD/ CAM POWER CONTROL 4 SWITCH WILL BE RELABELED TO CONFORM TO THE PROCEDURES. THIS SWITCH IS j ACTUALLY THE MODE SWITCH AND IS LOCATED IN THE CONTROL ROOM.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT l Given the re-classification in category and/or level of this HED, the licensee should either move the implementation date up or provide adequate r

h)Justificationforanydelayincorrectingtheproblem.

CECO CLARIFICATION Subsequent reevaluation of this HED by the HEDAT produced concurrence with the NRC's comments. As was indicated in the original response to thfu problem, the CAM /ACAD power switch is located in the control room. The switch has been labeled to read " CAM /ACAD POWER CONTROL" and is consistent with the procedures that reference it.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE v

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REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 428 APPENDIX C1 '

HED CATEGORY 1B

.FSR PAGE 282 I

FINDING A "RCIC PUMP SUCTION CHANGE OVER" ANNUNCIATOR IS NOT' CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND HAS BEEN CITED IN THE TASK ANALYSIS AS BEING REQUIRED.

RESPONSE

A "HPCI/RCIC PUMP SUCTION CHANGE OVER" ANNUNCIATOR WILL BE ADDED TO EACH UNIT ON 90X-3.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Given the re-classification in category and/or level of this HED, the licensee should either move the implementation date up or. provide adequate Justification for any delay in correcting the problem. ~

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" CECO CLARIFICATION Reevaluation by the HEDAT produced concurrence with the NRC's comments concerning implementation. Two alarms on the 90X-3 panel'will be reworded to alert the operator of-a HPCI or RCIC pump suction change over.

Alarm "HPCI COND STORAGE TANK LOW LEVEL" will be changed to read "CCST LOW.

LVL HPCI/RCIC SUCT XFR", and alarm " SUPPRESSION CHAMBER HIGH LEVEL' will be changed to read " TORUS HI LVL HPCI/RCIC SUCT XFR". The alarms and related procedures will be changed by the end of this year, 12/31/87.

I IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 4

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'U QUAD CITIES STATION i REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 169 APPENDIX C1 HED CATEGORY 1C FSR PAGE 297 j FINDING THE SCALE VALUES DO NOT INCREASE WITH THE CLOCKWISE MOVEMENT OF THE I POINTER FOR CIRCULAR METERS. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOCKWISE )

MOVEMENT AND THE CONCEPT OF " INCREASE" IS A POPULATION STEREOTYPE WHICH, IF VIOLATED, MAY CAUSE CONFUSION. THE METERS HAVE A NEGATIVE AND A POSITIVE SCALE AROUND ZERO BUT ARE NOT MARKED 50. (PHOTO LOG NO. B-12) i RESPONSE I THE CITED CIRCULAR METERS USE ZERO AS A CENTER POINT TO BALANCE THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE VALUES. THE INDICATION USED BY THE OPERATOR {

DOES NOT REQUIRE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE VALUES, BUT RELIES ON THE POINTER POSITION RELATIVE TO ZERO.

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( ,T_ .1RC/SAIC COMMENT )

The licensee's justification for not labeling the display cited in this HED is inadequate and the licensee should resolve this concern.

CECO CLARIFICATION j The cited meter is the Generator Auto Voltage Regulator Balance indicator. l The operator does not need to know whether the indicator's pointer is ]

negative or positive per se, but only where it is in relation to zero, the I absolute balance point. Nevertheless, upon reevaluation the HEDAT concurrs with the NRC's comments concerning sound Human Engineering practice. The i cited indicator will be labeled with a "+" and " " sign to denote positive and negative direction, respectively, by the end of this year, 12/31/87. j l

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IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 l

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(~' QUAD CITIES STATION

( ,g/ REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 29 232 233 234 235 236 APPENDIX C2 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 83 i

FINDING THERE ARE SOME ANNUNCIATOR TILES WITH TEMPORARY LABELS (DYNOTAPE). THERE ARE SOME ENGRAVED ANNUNCIATOR ALARM TILES IN WHICH THE LETTERING IS WEARING OFF. THERE ARE SOME ALARM TILES ON WHICH THE LETTERING DOES NOT HAVE A STROKE WIDTH-TO-HEIGHT RATIO BETWEEN 1:6 AND isa, OTHER TILES OH WHICH THE LETTER WIDTH-TO-HEIGHT RATIO IS NOT BETWEEN 1:1 AND 3:5, OTHER TILES ON WHICH CHARACTERS ARE NOT SEPARATED BY AT LEAST ONE STROKE WIDTH, WORDS ARE NOT SEPARATED BY AT LEAST ONE CHARACTER WIDTH, AND/OR LINES ARE NOT SEPARATED BY A SPACE THAT IS ONE-HALF THE CHARACTER HEIGHT.

RESPONSE

ANNUNCIATOR STANDARDS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED ADDRESSING CHARACTER DIMENSIONS.

THESS STANDAMDS WILL BE USED ON ALL NEW ANNUNCIATOR TILES. ALL TILES WITH  !

TEMPORARY LABELS WILL BE PERMANENTLY ENGRAVED.

<^'\ \

\ -NRC/SAIC COMMENT I A number of " Control Room Design Standards" were proposed by the licensee to l address a large number of discrepancies. While these " Standards" in general j were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and i annunciators. This piecemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the control room that will be more inconsistent after implementation of " Standards" than before implementation. This is not acceptable to the NRC and the licensee should Justify not applying their

" Standard" for Annunciators throughout the control room so as to insure consistency.

CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT has reevaluated these HEDs in light of the NRC's comments. The individual tiles identified in the HEDs will be reengraved in conformance to the station's Annunciator Engraving Standard. This will ensure that tiles that are difficult to read because of inadequate engraving characteristics and those that had temporary dmyotaped labels will be brought into conformance with sound Human Engineering design principles.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

PAGE: C2- 2 QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO

-IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.  !

I HED # 175 181 183 185 APPENDIX C2 g HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 122 FINDING

.THE MEANING ASSIGNED TO A PARTICULAR COLOR IS NOT CONSISTENT ACROSS ALL APPLICATIONS WITHIN THE CONTROL ROOM. THIS TYPE OF CONSISTENCY ALLOWS FOR CLEARER UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETATION OF COLORS REGARDLESS OF WHERE THEY ARE USED.

RESPONSE

A STANDARD FOR THE USE OF COLOR IN THE CONTROL ROOM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND WILL BE IMPLEMENTED ON ALL NEW MODIFICATIONS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT A number of " Control Room Design Standards" were proposed by the licensee to While these " Standards" in general Ooddressalargenumberofdiscrepancies.

were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and annunciators. This piecemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the control room that will be more inconsistent after implementation of "Standa) de" than beforc implementation. This is not acceptable to.the NRC and the licensee should justify not applying their

' Standard" for Use of Color throughout the control room so as to insure consistency.

CECO CLARIFICATION Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant in that the meaning ascribed to a particular color can denote position or status. In response to the NRC's comments a comprehensive color usage review was undertaken in the control room. The following chart presents the meanings associated with the various colors used in the control room. ]

GREEN Closed, Off, Stop, Manual, Open (for breakers only to denote the breaker is de-energized), Low Priority, Normal (status).

RED Open, On (running), Start, Auto, Closed (for breakers only to denote the breaker is energized), First Out High Priority, Emergency or exceeded setpoint (status), and, when used to color code a valve switch handle, seal-in closed / throttle open. ,

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l PAGE: C2- 3 i AMDER Tripped, Abnormal or extreme normal range of operation (status), ,

YELLOW and,.when used to color code.a valve switch handle, throttle J closed / throttle open.

BLUE SCRAM Accumulator Discharged (on the Full Core Dispicy)

WHITE Information, eg., Annunciator background color,.and Bus Alive light i background color. l BLACK Only used to color code a valve control switch handle as Seal-in open/ Seal-in closed. J CYAN Used only on th= computer CRTs to denote Out-Of-Bounds or Out-Of- ,

Service (Status).

]

The curr ent color usage as detailed above is fairly consistent with the color standard submitted in Supplement 1 to the Final. Summary Report in .

December of 1985. Therefore, implementation of the standard on all ]

additions to the control room will'not create a wide disparity between the '

standard and what exists.

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( ) IMPLEMENTATION ,

COMPLETE J

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QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 391 APPENDIX C2 HED CATEGORY 1C i FSR PAGE 128 FINDING THERE ARE TWO METERS ON EACH UNIT THAT UTILIZE ZONE MARKING. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THE NORMAL RANGE IS LOCATED (SAME FOR UNIT 2). GENERALLY, ZONE MARKING IS NOT UTILIZED. ZONE MARKING MAKES THE READING OF DISPLAYS LESS CONFUSING AND QUICKER.

RESPONSE

ZONE MARKING WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE CONTROL ROOM WHERE APPLICABLE.

THE METERS WILL BE COLORBANDED FOR A PARTICULAR OPERATING ZONE OF THE SCALE TO PROVIDE THE OPERATOR WITH THE REQUIRED STATUS INFORMATION.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT were proposed by the licensee to

(~)N A numbera of

(_ address " Control large Room number Design Standards"While of discrepancies. these " Standards" in general were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and annunciators. This piecemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the control room that wil1~be more inconsistent after implementation of " Standards" than before implementation. This is not acceptable to the NRC and the licensee should Justify not applying their

" Standard" for Use of Color throughout the control room so as to insure consistency.

CECO CLARIFICATION Zone Banding on the 2 meters referred to in this HED will be changed to  ;

conform to the Quad Cities Color Coding Standard by 12/31/87. Zone Banding l on the remaining control room displays, where appropriate, will be I implemented prior to completion of the second refueling outage. I IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 AND 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE AS INDICATED  ;

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\/ QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 349 365 APPENDIX C2 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 166

-FINDING THERE IS NO LIST OF STANDARD NAMES, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS TO REDUCE AMBIGUITY REGARDING THE MEANING OF LABELS, CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS, AND ANNUNCIATOR TILES. USE OF NAMES IS NOT CONSISTENT ACROSS LABELS, CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS, AND ANNUNCIATORS.  :

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RESPONSE

A LIST OF STANDARD ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS HAS BEEN DEVELOPE 0. ALL NEW CONTROL ROOM LABELS WILL CONFORM TO THE ABBREVIATION LIST.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT A number of " Control Room Design Standards" were proposed by the licensee to

('N address a large number of discrepancies. While these " Standards" in general were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will s

not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and annunciators. This piecemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the control room that will be more inconsistent after implementation of " Standards" than before impleme.'.etion. This is not acceptable to the NRC and the licensee should Justify not applying their

" Standard" for Abbreviations throughout the control room so as to insure consistency between labels, annunciators, procedures and training.

CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT reevaluated this HED as a result of the expressed NRC concerns. A review of the labels used in the control room was underteken vis-a-vis the Abbreviation Standard submitted in Supplement 1 to the Final Summary Report in December of 1985. Faw instances of disagreement were discerned.

Those that were will be reengraved to be consistent with the standard.

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\/ QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 279 APPENDIX C2 HED CATEGORY 3C i FSR PAGE 173 FINDING SOME LABELS DO NOT SUBTEND A VISUAL ANGLE OF 15 MINUTES OF ARC WHEN VIEWED FROM A TYPICAL VIEWING DISTANCE OF 30 INCHES.

RESPONSE

LABELING STANDARDS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND WILL BE ADDED TO A CONTROL ROOM PROCEDURE. ALL NEW LABELS WILL CONFORM WITH THE STANDARD.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT A number of " Control Room Design Standards" were proposed by the licensee to address a large number of discrepancies. While these " Standards" in general were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will

(^ not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and N annunciators. This pienemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the contPul room that will be more inconsistent after implementation of " Standards" then before implementation. This is not seceptable to the NRC and the licenses should Justify not applying their

" Standard" for Labels throughout the control room so as tc insure consistency in their subtended visuel angle of 15 minutes of arc.

CECO CLARIFICATION During the Pre-implementation Audit of-Quad Cities the NRC agreed with Station Management that control room labeling, in general, is in good shape.

The Control Room labeling is being reevaluated with respect to the SER's comments. Labels that are ambiguous or difficult to read will be i replaced by 12/31/87. l l

1 IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 O

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k/ QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO l IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. l l

HED # 226 231 230 l APPENDIX C2 '

HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 174 j FINDING ON NUMEROUS LABELS, THE CHARACTER WIDTH-TO-HEIGHT RATIOS AND STROKE WIDTH-TO-HEIGHT RATIOS OF LETTERE AND NUMERALS ARE NOT WITHIN GUIDELINES.

RESPONSE

LABELING STANDARDS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND WILL BE ADDED TO A CONTROL ROOM PROCEDURE. ALL NEW LABELS 'WILL CONFORM WITH THE STANDARD.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT A number of " Control Room Design Standards" were proposed by the licensee to address a large number of discrepancies. While these " Standards" in general were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will

(~S not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and

(,) annunciators. This piecemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the control room that will be more inconsistent after implementation of " Standards" than before implementation. This is not ecceptable to the NRC and the licensee should justify not applying their

" Standard" for Labels throughout the control room so as to insure -

consistency.

CECO CLARIFICATION During the Pre-implementation Audit of Quad Cities the NRC agreed with Station Management that control room labeling, in general, is in good shape.

The Control Room labeling is being reevaluated with respect to the SER's comments. Labels that are ambiguous or difficult to read will be replaced by 12/31/87.

IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 i

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QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 227 228 229 APPENDIX C2 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 176 i

FINDING  !

IN SOME LABELS, THERE IS NOT A SPACE OF AT LEAST ONE STROKE-WIDTH BETWEEN l LETTERS, A SPACE OF AT LEAST ONE CHARACTER-WIDTH BETWEEN WORDS, AND/OR A I SPACE OF AT LEAST ONE CHARACTER-HEIGHT BETWEEN LINES.

RESPONSE i LABELING STANDARDS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND WILL BE ADDED TO A CONTROL ROOM PROCEDURE. ALL NEW LABELS WILL CONFORM WITH THE STANDARD.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT A number of "Gontrol Room Design Standards" were proposed by the licensee to ]

address a large number of discrepancies. While these " Standards" in general J

(N were acceptable to the NRC, there is a concern over the fact that they will

( ,) not be applied to existing discrepancies but only to new labels and annunciators. This piecemeal implementation will result in an operator interface with the control room that will be more inconsistent after implementation of " Standards" than before implementation. This is not acceptable to the NRC and the licensee should Justify not applying their

" Standard" for Labels throughout the control room so as to insure consistency.

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CECO CLARIFICATION During the Pre-implementation Audit of Quad Cities the NRC agreed with l Station Management that control room labeling, in general, is in good shape. l The Control Room labeling is being reevaluated with respect to the SER's 1' comments. Labels that are ambiguous or difficult to read will be replaced by 12/31/87.

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1 IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 O

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(O s,/ QUAD. CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.- i HED # 322 APPENDIX C3 HED CATEGORY 2B FSR PAGE 81 FINDING RESPONSE TO THE OPERATOR SURVEY INDICATED THAT SOME ABBREVIATIONS ARE USED ON THE ANNUNCIATORS THAT ARE NOT WELL EXPLAINED; E.G., WINDOW-D-11 ON 90X-8 PANEL READS " RELAY STV TRIP". THE QOA, 900-8-D, SAYS " GENERATOR TRIP FROM STV RELAY". SOME OPERATORS WERE UNCLEAR AS.TO WHAT "STV" MEANT. FURTHER, TILES A-16 ON 90X-3, H-9 ON 901-3, G-20 AND H-20 ON 901-4,-AND C-8 ON THE 90X-5 PANELS WERE IDENTIFIED AS BEING AMBIGUOUS AND/OR NOT CONTAINING ENOUGH INFORMATION. I

RESPONSE

THE CITED TILES WILL BE RELABELED AS:

i ANNUNCIATOR

( DESIGNATION CURRENT LEGEND PROPOSED LEGEND 1 90X-8-D-11 RELAY STV TRIP MAIN GENERATOR OVEREXCITATION TRIP 90X-3-A-16 TIP ISOLATION OFF TIP BALL VALVE OPEN/ GROUP 2 SIGNAL NORMAL i 90X-3-H-9 SIGNAL CONVERTER TRIP HPCI SIGNAL CONVERTER OUTPUT TROUBLE 1 90X-4-G-20 ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM (LEGEND IS CLEAR TO OPERATORS)

PANEL 2201(2)-73A l TROUBLE (DIV. I) 90X-4-H-20 ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM (LEGEND IS CLEAR TO OPERATOR)

PANEL 2201(2)-73A TROUBLE (DIV. II) 90X-5-C-8 MAIN STEAM LINE (LEGEND IS CLEAR TO OPERATOR)

LEAKAGE l

1 NRC/SAIC COMMENT i The proposed corrective action only partially corrects the discrepancy ,

.1 1

CECO CLARIFICATION In response to the NRC's concerns the HEDAT reevaluated the three alarm 4 tiles in the original HED that were deemed to be adequately worded (90%-4 G20 and H20, and 90X-5 C8). The Annunciator response procedures for the tiles were reviewed and determined to be clear and concise in both their direction to the operator for action and their description to the operator

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(- .of the alarm inputs. Operators are trained on each annunciator tile'and to use the? response procedures when " responding" to an alarm. The HEDAT maintains that the cited tiles are clear and provide sufficient:information.-

to<the operator for him to take appropriate action.

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\s- QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 462 APPENDIX C3 HED CATEGORY 1C ,

FSR PAGE 109 i

FINDING SCALES ARE NOT SELECTED TO SPAN THE EXPECTED RANGE OF OPERATIONAL l PARAMETERS. DISPLAYS LISTED BELOW HAVE INAPPROPRIATE SCALE RANGES AND/OR l '

DIVISIONS:

DRYWELL PNEUMATIC SYSTEU PRESSURE (90X-4)

REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CHANNEL A (90X-5)

REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CHANNEL B (90X-5)

HOTWELL LEVEL RECORDER (90X-7) ,

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RESPONSE

THE APPROPRIATE RANGE FOR CITED SCALES IS CONTAINED IN THE EXISTING RANGE.

GREEN BANDING WILL BE ADDED TO METERS TO INSURE CRITICAL RANGES ARE HIGHLIGHTED.

f -wNRC/SAIC CONMENT

( ) The proposed corrective action only partially corrects the discrepancy CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT reevaluated the cited instrumentation as a result of the NRC's concerne regarding inappropriate divisions. The Dryvell Pneumatic System Pressure indicator has a range of 0-160 PSIG in divisions of 4 PSIG. The scale on this indicator will be modified such that the pressure.is displayed in divisions of 5 PSIG. The Reactor Vessel Level indicators cited have a range of from -60 to +60 inches in divisions of 12 inches. The displays are intended to provide the operator with a gross indicant of vessel level.

Three other sets of indication are available to the operator within a 3 foot '

area to provide a finer indicant of vessel level. Two are LED displays that provide level information in at least one inch increments. The third is an analog display with a 0-60 inch scale range in one inch divisions. In the HEDAT's opinion the reactor vessel level indication available is sufficient to permit the operator to adequately perform his duties under all operational modes and conditions. The indication will however be zone banded to enhance and facilitate its use. The Hotwell Level Recorder hes a range of 0-50 inches in divisions of one. The scale is large, easy to read, and will be zone banded to enhance its use. Finer divisions are not necessary. ,

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE  !

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r QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO  !

IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR  !

HED # 307 '

APPENDIX C3 l HED CATEGORY 1A FSR PAGE. 199 FINDING CPERATOR SURVEY RESULTS INDICATED THAT THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION-COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEMS ARE DIFFICULT TO OPERATE WHEN BEING USED TO REDUCE REACTOR PRESSURE. THESE SYSTEMS ARE HOT LAID OUT ACCORDING TO FUNCTION, SEQUENCE OF USE, FREQUENCY OF USE,JOR OTHER-OPERATOR EXPECTATIONS.

RESPONSE  !

BACKGROUND SHADING, DEMARCATION, AND SYSTEM LABELS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED I TO ENHAhCE THE HPCI AND RCIC SYSTEM (90X-3 AND 90X-4).

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The proposed corrective action only partially corrects the discrepancy.

O Moreover, acceptance of the proposed corrective action for this HED is dependent upon the licensee's resolution of the expressed NRC concerns over the following programs / standards:

o Color Coding l l

o Labeling ]

o Demarcation /Bar;kground Shading CECO CLARIFICATION Mimics are presently used to enhance the presentation of these syutems on the control panel. The controls are appropriately labeled on the panels.

The opsrators are trained to know the systems. (and their operation) and the operators are trained to follow procedures prescribing the use of each control switch.

Display and control enhancement is a technique that allows operators to sort out the immediately relevant from the irrelevant stimuli. Effective enhancement permits timely acquisition of meaningful information, facilitates correct identification of relevant control options, and allows '

the operator to maintain effective awareness over system status.

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O Effective' surface enhancement techniques include Demarcation and Mimic Lines, Color Shading, and Labeling. Color enhancement is used in nuclear power plant control rooms to help clarify component identification and J functional relationships among various components. Many problems, such as I large matrices of undifferentiated components, physically displaced controls and their associated displays, can be remedied with color shading.

Background shading also improves the efficiency of information transfer to the operator and assists his decision making process by organizing panel elements, minimizing existing visual clutter, optimizing desired a9sociations among panel elements, and standardizing information presentation. Color enhancements also facilitate learning and retention of where components and controls are located, especially for new operators.

Components having a common color also are seen as forming a group.

Because the goal of shading is to provide operator aids, the operator must I

agrse with or approve the enhancement, or it probably will not be )

successful. Operator participation is a requirement throughout the color l shading process and was integral during the selection of color enhancements at Quad Cities station that has taken place to date.

l l SAIC recommends that the number of colors used for coding shculd not exceed eleven (11) and should be kept to the minimum needed to provide sufficient information (as identified on page 6.5-11 in NUREG-0700). Quad Cities uses l

,,)onlysix (6) colors for coding purposes and has established a standard to this effect. l Moreover, because Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant, the 1 l instances of thG use of color for coding purposes is minimal. Color shading l on the other hand does not represent system status or state, but is merely a {

perceptual aid designed to facilitate system identification. There is no meaning assigned to the shading and the shading should not be interpreted as

)

j c, ding. I Another factor iA determining the utility of background shading is the area of the surface to which we are applying background shading. A control room j the size of Quad Cities' can afford to use a greater number of color enhancements than control rooms with less area, provided it has been systematically applied using sound human engineering and operating principles. Several industry documents recognize the utility of using a number of background shading colors. One EPRI document advocated and provided an example which included eight (8) colors for one sample panel.

In addition, there are precedents set throughout the industry which clearly l demonstrate the effectiveness of using over twenty (20) colors for enhancement to support system identification.

Less than twenty (20) colors have been chosen for background shading for the i main control boards at Quad Cities. Principles for color use (outlined in sections 6.5 and 6.6 of NUREG-0700) guided the selection of colors to be used on the control panels. Colors were selected from a pool of high contrast and matte finish shades used at other stations, applied against a board color. As an engineered retrofit, their application O e"Kewanee Beige" xtendo from a total-board design evaluation that followed a system-by-system approach.

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I The use of colors, particularly in con] unction with background shading at j Quad Cities has been reexamined with operating personnel (SME's). As a result the enhancement of the Quad Cities control boards will be very similar to that accomplished at Byron /Brait rood. We have had a very positive response from the operators at Byron /Braidwood and are sure we will have the same response at Quad Cities.

In general, controls and displays at Quad Cities were found to be grouped by function with few " extraneous" or " maverick" components. In these cases, ,

background shading affords a means to functionally group these extraneous l components. Both the main component group r.nd their maverick components in J a system will be colored identically, j Background shading will be applied to systems nested among others. In the few cases where this technique will be applied, a high-contrast background shade applied to the centrally positioned group will enhance the separation of ed]acent systems.

On the whole, the selection and use of background shading is designed to work in concert with other perceptual aids and the placement design of instruments. The total-board design evaluation will hold in check the potential overuse of one or more perceptual aids. Thus, where background shading will be applied, its use will be conservative, necessary, and

- meaningful for operator performance.

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In addition, lines of deinarcation will be used, where possible, to enhance system grouping. Demarcation will be used between closely-spaced but functionally distinct systems that do not have individual components placed within other system groupings. The use of demarcation instead of background shading, in these instances, will prevent the overuse of color. The proposed demarcations consist of circumscribing functional or selected groups with a contrasting line in areas where physical space or~ panel edges l do not visually set apart the related components.

]

Due to the integration and coordination necessary for the successful )

implementation of these enhancement programs throughout the control room, the HEDAT feels an implementation date of the second refueling outage to be reasonable.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE f%

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QU.AD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO I IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. ~

i HED # 151 APPENDIX C3 HED CATEGORY 1C

]

FSR PAGE 125

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j FINDING VERTICAL STRAIGHT SCALE VALUES DO NOT INCREASE WITH UPWARD MOVEMENT OF THE POINTER. SOME OF THE VERTICAL METERS HAVE A NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE SCALE AROUND ZERO BUT ARE NOT MARKED SO. (PHOTO LOG: B-10) i

RESPONSE

SCALES ON DISCREPANT VERTICAL METERS WILL BE LABELED WITH PLUS (+) AND MINUS

(-) SIGNS TO INDICATE THE TRUE VALUES ON THE SCALE.

I NRC/SAIC COMMENT The proposed corrective action only partially corrects the discrepancy l

ECO CLARIFICATION The displays cited in the original HED all entailed scales with a negative and positive range around zero. The HEDAT's initial evaluation resulted in a decision to correct this problem by adding a "+" and " " sign as and where  !

appropriate to the discrepant indicator faces. Reevaluation by the HEDAT in response to the NRC's comments resulted in the same conclusion. In the ,

HEDAT's opinion the corrective action for the problem committed to in l previous correspondence with the NRC adequatoly addresses the problem.

l IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O

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\_/ QUAD. CITIES STATION-i REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 288 APPENDIX C3 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 145 FINDING ON THE A RECIRCULATION CONTROLLER, THE MANUAL / AUTO DEVIATION METER IS NOT LABELED, THE SPEED DEMAND METER.HAS LABELS "OPEN AND CLOSED,"

WHICH ARE MEANINGLESS FOR A PUMP, AND BOTH SCALES DISPLAY NO PARAMETERS. THESE FACTORS LEAD THE OPERATOR TO USE THE WRONG METER.

RESPONSE

j THE METERS WILL BE LABELED "% SPEED DEMAND" AND THE "CLOSE" AND "OPEN" LABELS WILL BE REMOVED.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The proposed corrective action only partially corrects the discrepancy O CECO CLARIFICATION

, The scale face of the manual / auto deviation meter on the A Recirculation

! controller will be labeled DEV. The "Open" and " Clove" labels will be removed from the controller's Speed Demand meter, and replaced with the label "% SPEED DEMAND". This will be accomplished in conjunction with the Labeling, Background Shading, Mimics and Demarcation Line control board enhancement programs being implemented at t'ne station.

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CL'AD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. i l

HED # 487

' APPENDIX C3 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 169 I

FINDING . .

l LABELS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITHIN AND ACROSS PIECES OF EQUIPMENT IN THEIR' l' USE OF ABBREVIATIONS. THE LISTED ANNUNCIATOR TILE HAS "RHRS" ENGRAVED ON IT. THE CONVENTION USED IN THE CONTROL ROOM REFERS TO RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL i l AS "RHR". IT WAS STATED THAT THE ADDITIONAL "S" MAY CAUSE CONFUSION WITH-l SERVICE WATER (SW). OTHER DESCREPANT TILES INCLUDE: H7, B6, CG, D6, G7, i

A8, 88, C8. ,

RESPONSE

THE CITED ANNUNCIATOR WILL BE RELABELED "RHR".

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The proposed corrective action only partially corrects the discrepancy O

CECO CLARIFICATION Upon reevaluation by the HEDAT it was concluded that perhaps the wording of the original response was unclear. It was our intention to correct all the tiles cited in the discrepancy. Therefore, to clarify, tiles AG, B6, C6, D6, G7, H7, A8, B8, and C8 vill be reengraved so as to remove the "S" from "RHRS". .The reengraving will be done in conformance with the Annunciator l I

Engraving Standard adopted by the station.

1 IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O

PAGE: C3-10  !

1 I

) QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RFSPONSE/ CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DORDR. <

l HED # 281 APPENDIX C3 HED CATEGORY 3B j FSR PAGE 181 l FINDING OPERATOR SURVEY RESULTS INDICATED THAT PARTICULAR SWITCHES SHOULD HAVE A MIMIC OF THE ACTUAL FLOW PATH, AND THERE SHOULD BE UNIFORMITY BETWEEN SYSTEM MIDICS.

RESPONSE

MIMIC COLORS WILL BE CHANGED TO PROVIDE A CONSISTENT SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE PANEL LAYOUT.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The licensee's response did not address the HED and the licensee needs to address the requirements for a mimic of the actual flow path, b

'v CECO CLARIFICATION The station has committed to the installation of an integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive control panel enhancement program which will include background shading, lines of demarcation, and mimics. During the implementation of the program each system will be individually reviewed and analyzed to determine whether the addition of mimics would facilitate the understanding and operation of a particular system, in which case they will be added, as well as whether existing mimics meet the standards and criteria '

for mimics presented in SuppJ ement 1 to the Quad Cities DCRDR Final Summary Report. )

l l

i IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE l-

,s v

l

PAGE: C4 :1 q I

4

('] QUAD CITIES STATION

\,/ REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 436 l APPENDIX C4 j HED CATEGORY 1C FSR PAGE 76  ;

'l

.{

FINDING ]

THERE IS PRESENTLY A SINGLE VOLTAGE bISPLAY FOR BOTH THE 1 AND 1/2 DIESEL '

GENERATOR (ON 90X-6) WHICH MAY LEAD TO CONFUSION AS TO WHICH ONE IS BEING DISPLAYED.

RESPONSE

THE METER IS CONTROLLED BY A SWITCH LOCATED BELOW THE METER. THIS CONTROL WILL BE PERMANENTLY LABELED TO INDICATE WHETHER THE DISPLAY IS INDICATING t DG 1 OR DG 1/2.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation tietes should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification O should be provided for implementation as proposed.

CECO CLARIFICATION Reevaluation of this problem by the HEDAT produced concurrence with the NRC's comments. The label described in our supplemental response on page 26 has been installed. However, since the problem is only germane to Unit 1,  !

the 901-8 panel is the only panel involved in the corrective action. j IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE l

(}

i

'PAGE: C4- 2 i l

i 1

()

\/

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO l

IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.  ;

)

HED # 412 )

APPENDIX C4 {

HED CATEGORY 1B FSR PAGE 19 ,

FINDING THERE IS PRESENTLY ONE DUAL PEN RECORDER ON 90X-55 AND ONE ON 90X-56 WHICH DISPLAYS HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION WITH ONE PEN AND OXYGEN CONCENTRATION WITH  ;

THE OTHER. EACH PEN HAS A " SPANS" OF 0-5 % O-20 % ASSOCIATED WITH IT. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH SPAN THE RECORDER IS INDICATING AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

RESPONSE

AN APPLICABLE SPAN WILL BE PROVIDED ON THE RECORDER.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification should be provided for implementation as proposed.

('OCECO CLARIFICATION i

Reevaluation of this problem by the HEDAT has resulted in concurrence with the NRC's comments. The discrepant recorders for hydrogen and oxygen concentration on the 90X-55 and 90X-56 panels will be correctly labeled by 1 the end of this year, 12/31/87, so that it will be clear which span they are indicating at any given time.

IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 I

1 A

's- I

PAGE: C4- 3 4

(')

(_/

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 410 427 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 1A FSR PAGE 27 FINDING DURING THE VALIDATION IT WAG OBSERVED THAT THE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION I COOLING (RCIC) TRIP THROTTLS VALVE MAY NEED TO BE RESET. THIS WOULD HAVE TO l BE DONE LOCALLY BY AN EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT YET IT IS A TIME CRITICAL OPERATION. THE DELAY ENTAILED COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OP2 RATIONS. IN ADDITION, WHEN MANUALLY OPERATING RCIC, THE TEST VALVE HAS TO BE THROTTLED TO PREVENT THE TURBINE FROM TRIPPING OVERSPENDING. THERE IS CURRENTLY NO INDICTION OF VALVE POSITION SO THE OPERATOR MUST GO ON " FEEL", AS TO HOW LONG THE SWITCH MUST BE HELD IN THE OPEN POSITION.

i

RESPONSE

l AN ENGINEERING MODIFICATION WILL BE PERFORMED TO ELIMINATE FALSE OVERSPEED i TRIPS (CAUSED BY THE HYDRAULIC OIL SYSTEM.) TEST VALVE POSITION INDICATION I WILL NOT BE NEEDED AFTER THE MODIFICATION HAS DEEN INSTALLED.

O NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification i should be provided for implementation as proposed, l I

i CECO CLARIFICATION The modification planned to address this HED is to put a motor operator control of the Trip and Throttle valve into the control room. All electrical trips will be removed from the 1301-61 valve and incorporated into the logic for the Trip and Throttle valve. In addition, renet capability for the Trip and Throttle valve will be provided to the operator in the control room. The design, procurement and testing process for the components to be installed in a major modification like the one described takes a significant amount of time. Moreover, the modification must be integrated with other improvements being made to the control room, with the applicable procedures, and with training. To accompliah this without major plant interruption requires careful planning and coordinated integration which also takes time. An implementation of the second refueling cutage was therefore felt to be reasonable and realistic.

I'~h

(. IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

PAGE: C4- 4 1

1 QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED'# 24 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 3C l FSR PAGE 78  !

FINDING THE VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL AXES OF THE FOLLOWING ANNUNCIATOR PANELS ARE NOT LABELED:. 902-55, 902-56, 901-55 AND 912-7. THE AXES LABELING ON 901-56 IS WHITE ADHESIVE LETTERING ATTACHED TO THE METAL SURROUNDING THE ANNUNCIATOR TILES.

i l

RESPONSE .

THE AXES OF THE DISCREPANT ANNUNCIATOR PANELS WILL BE RELABELED.  !

NRC/SAIC COMMENT J Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation'by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification should be provided for implementation as proposed.

CECO CLARIFICATION )

Reevaluation of this problem by the HEDAT produced concurrence with the l NRC's comments. Axis labels have been installed on the discrepant j annunciator panels for both units. I IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE O

j

PAGE: C4- 5 l

() QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 460 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 3C l FSR PAGE 105 j FINDING SCALE UNITS ON DISPLAYS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE DEGREE OF PRECISION AND ACCURACY NEEDED BY THE OPERATOR TO PERFORM TASKS DURING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS. DISPLAYS ARE DESCREPANT IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS: UNITS ARE NOT LABELED ON THE DISPLAY, UNITS ARE INCORRECT AND/OR LABELING APPEARS ON THE DISPLAY FACE AND NOT ON THE DISPLAY ITSELF.

RESPONSE

THE CITED SCALES WILL BE RELABELED CORRECTLY.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification

/N should be provided for implementi ton as proposed.

U CECO CLARIFICATION Reevaluation of this problem by the HEDAT has produced concurrence with the NRC's comments. The "A", "B", "C", and "D" Steam Line Rad monitors will have MR/HR placed on the scale face. The RHR Inlet Pressure to Heat 1 Exchanger and the RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Pressure l indicators will have " PSI" removed from the scale faces to be replaced with l "PSIG". This will be accomplished by the end of the year, 12/31/87.

IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 l

i i

l C/

I I

PAGE: C4- 6

(~}

\/

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO 1 IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. ]

HED # 129 131 130 ]

APPENDIX C4 l HED CATEGORY 3C 3 FSR PAGE 119 FINDING SCALES DO NOT HAVE LABELS OR REQUIRED INFORMATION TO USE THE SCALES. IN l SOME INSTANCES, THE INFORMATION IS INAPPROPRIATELY LOCATED. j RESPONSE l DISCREPANT SCALES WILL BE PERMANENTLY LABELED.

i NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification should be provided for implementation as proposed.

p CECO CLARIFICATION

( ) The discrepant scales will be relabeled as part of the control room relabeling program in con] unction and coordination with the background shading and lines of demarcation programs. Because of the extensive nature of these programs their completion will not be until the end of the second refueling outage.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE i

4 l

l (V

PAGE:'C4- 7 i

QUAD CITIES STATION s REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION:(SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 159 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 141 FINDING EQUIPMENT IS NOT PROPERLY LABELED.

RESPONSE

ALL CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT WILL BE PERMANENTLY LABELED.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation detes should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further justification abould be provided for implementation as proposed.

CECO CLARIFICATION Reevaluation of this HED by the HEDAT resulted in concurrence with the NRC's I comments. Therefore, the computer point. trending recorders on the 90X-5

/ panel and the hydrogen and oxygen recorders on the ACAD/ CAM panels, the discrepant pieces of equipment cited 1n the HED, will have their. pen assignment labels corrected by the end of this year, 12/31/87.

IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987

I PAGE: C4- 8 l

i

[~

\/

) QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO j IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 187 159 i APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 3C j FSR PAGE 142 '

l l

FINDING l CONTROLS HAVE IMPROPERLY LABELED SWITCH POSITIONS, RELATED DISPLAYS AND j CONTROLS DO NOT HAVE CORRESPONDING LABELS. (PHOTO LOG NO. B-15)  !

RESPONSE I THE SWITCH POSITIONS ON TFE CITED CONTROLS WILL BE RELABELED.  !

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by I the completion of the first refueling outage, or further justification l should be provided for implementation as proposed.

f^ pECO CLARIFICATION

( ,/ Reevaluation of this HED by the HEDAT has resulted in concurrence with the NRC's comments. Therefore, the discrepant switch positions on the cited j controls will be relabeled, along with their related displays, by the end of this year, 12/31/87. l I

I I

IMPLEMENTATION l 12/31/1987 I I

'91

PAGE: C4- 9

[ QUAD CITIES STATION

'% ' REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 337 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 156 FINDING SOME PANEL ELEMENTS DO NOT HAVE LABELS, OR HAVE DYNOTAPE OR HANDWRITTEN TEMPORARY LABELS.

RESPONSE

ALL PANEL ELEMENTS WILL BE PERMANENTLY LABELED.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification should be provided for implementation as proposed.

r9ECO CLARIFICATION

'q ,) The discrepant panel elements will be permanently labeled as part of the control room relabeling program in con 3 unction and coordination with the background shading and lines of demarcation programs. Because of the extensive nature of these programs their completion will not be until the end of the second refueling outage.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

)

l l

O l

PAGE: C4-10

[ QUAD CITIES STATION' REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO j IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. J HED # 416 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 1B

'FSR PAGE 205 FINDING DURING THE VALIDATION IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS ON THE 90X-4 PANEL ARE ARRANGED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF SEQUENCE OF USE, FREQUENCY OF USE, FUNCTION, OR OTHER LOGICAL EXPECTATIONS. THIS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DELAY AND/OR ERROR IN THE USE OF THE SYSTEM CONTAINED )

ON THE PANEL.

SUMMARY

LABELING, BACKGROUND SHADING, AND LIMES OF DEMARCATION WILL BE USED TO FUNCTIONALLY DIFFERENTIATE THE SYSTEMS ON THE 90X-4 PANEL.  ;

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by 4 the completion of the first ref.ueling outage, or further Justification j s - should be provided for implementation au proposed. l CECO CLARIFICATION '

Display and control enhancement is a technique that allows operators to sort out the immediately relevant from the irrelevant stimuli. Effective enhancement permite timely acquisition of meaningful information, facilitates correct identification of relevant control options, and allows the operator to maintain effective awareness over system status.

Effective surface enhancement techniques include Demarcation and Mimic Lines, Color Shading, and Labeling. Color enhancement is used in nuclear power plant control rooms to help clarify component identification and functional relationships among various components. Many problems, such as large matrices of undifferentiated components, physically displaced controls and their associated displays, can be remedied with color shading.

1 Background shading also improves the efficiency of information transfer to l the operator and assists his decision making process by organizing panel elements, minimizing existing visual clutter, optimizing desired associations among panel elements, and standardizing information presentation. Color enhancements also facilitate learning and retention of where components and controls are located, especially for new operators.

Components having a common color also are seen as forming a group.

PAGE: C4-11

/\ Because the goal of shading is to provide operator aids, the operator must

\_) agree with or approve the enhancement, or it probably will not be i successful. Operator participation is a requirement throughout the color shading process and was integral during the selection of color enhancements  !

at Quad Cities station that has taken place to date.

SAIC recommends that the number of colors acac for coding should not exceed eleven (11) and should be kept to the minimu.- eeded to provide sufficient information (as identified on page 6.5-11 in ALdEG-0700). Quad Cities uses only six (6) colors for coding purposes and has established a standard to this effect. Moreover, because Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant, the instances of the use of color for coding purposes is minimal. Color shading on the other hand does not represent system status or state, but is merely a perceptual aid designed to facilitate system identification. There is no meaning assigned to the shading and the shading should not be interpreted as ,

coding.

Another factor in determining the utility of background shading is the area )

of the surface to which we are applying background shading. A control room the size of Quad Cities' can afford to use a greater number of color enhancements than control rooms with less area, provided it has been systematically applied using sound human engineering and operating principles. Several industry documents recognize the utility of using a  ;

nucber of background shading colors. One EPRI document advocated and provided an example which included eight (8) colors for one sample panel.

In addition, there are precedents set throughout the industry which clearly g~)

( ,;

demonstrate the effectiveness of using over twenty (20) colors for enhancement to support system identification.

Less than twenty (20) colors have been chosen for background shading for the )

main control boards at Quad Cities. Principles for color use (outlined in i sections 6.5 and 6.6 of NUREG-0700) guided the selection of colors to be used on the control panels. Colors were selected from a pool of high contrast and matte finish shades used at other stations, applied against a "Kevanee Beige" board color. As an engineered retrofit, their application extends from a total-board design evaluation that followed a system-by-system approach.

The use of colors, particularly in conjunction with background shading at Quad Cities has been reexamined with operating personnel (SME's). As a result the enhancement of the Quad Cities control boards will be very similar to that accomplished at Byron /Braidwood. We have had a very positive response from the operators at Byron /Braidwood and are sure we will have the same response at Quad Cities.

In general, controls and displays at Quad Cities were found to be grouped by function with few " extraneous" or " maverick" components. In these cases, background snading affords a means to functionally group these extraneous components. Both the main component group and their maverick components in a system will be colored identically.

O

1 PAGE: C4-12

) Background shading will be applied to systems nested among others. In the l

[/

s_ f e w cases where this technique will be applied, a high-contrast background  !

shade applied to the centrally positioned group will enhance the separation {

of adjacent systems. j On the whole, the selection and use of background shading is designed to work in concert with other perceptual aids and the placement design of instruments. The total-board design evaluation will hold in check the j potential overuse of one or more perceptual aids. Thus, where background )

shading will be applied, its use will be conservative, necessary, and meaningful for operator performance. {

1 In addition, lines of demarcation will be used, where possible, to enhance system grouping. Demarcation will be used between closely-spaced but functionally distinct systems that do not have individual components placed within other system groupings. The use of demarcation instead cf background l shading, in these instances, will prevent the overuse of color. The )

l proposed demarcations consist of circumscribing functional or selected {

l groups with a contrasting line in areas where physical spac'e or panel edges j l do not visually set apart the related components.  !

4

--IMPLEMENTATION ND REFUELING OUTAGE l 1 l

l l

f~

v L-_-_-__----------------____________------_

l PAGE: C4-13 t'

e (ml QUAD lCITIEScdTATION l

'"J REVISED RESPOUSE/ CLARIFICATION TO HEDS-REFCRRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAF ETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. l HED # 417 j APPEhDIX C4 l HED CATEGORY 1B i FSR PAGE '206 i

FINDING l DURING THE VALIDATION IT WAS OBSERVED THAT:THE CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS IN THE RFSIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) AND CORE S? RAY SYSTEMS ARE ARRANGED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF SEQUENCE OF USE, FRCGUENCY OF USE, FUNCTION, OR OTHER I LOGICAL EXPEGYATIONS. TH.!S CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DELAY AND/OR ERROR IN THE USE l OF TME SYETEMS.

1 RESPOWit -

BACCGROUND SH/ DING AND

SUMMARY

LABELS WILL BE ADDED TO 90X-3 TO CLARIFY FUNCTIONAL GROUPIUGS.

NRC/SAIC CUMMENT

,, Proposed 1:nplen.entation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by

( the complet. ton of the first refueling outage, or durther Justification

\ should be provided for implementation as proposed.

1 l

CECO CLARIFICATION l Display and control enhancement is a technique that allows operators to sort out the immediately relev%nt from the irrelevant stimuli. Effective enhancement permits timely acquisition of meaningful information, '

i facilitates correct identification of relevant control options, and allows the operator to maintain effective awareness over system status.

Effective surface enhancement techniques include Demarcation and Mimic Lines, Color Shading, and Labeling. Color enhancement is used in nuclear power plant control rooms to help clarify component identification and functional relationships among various components. Many problems, such as large matrices of undifferentiated components, physically displaced controls and their associated displays, can be remedied with color shading.

Background shading also improvos the afficiency of information transfer to the operator and assists his decision making process by organizing panel elements, minimizing existing visual clutter, optimizing desired associations among panel elements, and standardizing information presentation. Color enhancements alao facilitate learning and retention of wiare components and controls are located, especially for new operators.

Lomponento having a common color also are seen as forming a group, i

LJ l _

PAGE: C4-14 l

Because the goal of shading is to provide operator aids, the operator must agree with or approve the enhancement, or it probably will not be successful. Operator participation is a requirement throughout the color shading process and was integral during the selection of color enhancements at Quad Cities station that has taken place to date.

SAIC recommends that the number of colors used for coding should not exceed eleven (11) and should be kept to the minimum needed to provide sufficient information (as identified on page 6.5-11 in NUREG-0700). Quad Cities uses only six (6) colors for coding purposes and has established a standard to this effect. Moreover, because Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant, the instances of the use of color for coding purposes is minimal. Color shading on the other hand does not represent system status or state, but is merely a perceptual aid designed to facilitate system identification. There is no meaning assigned to the shading and the shading should not be interpreted as coding.

Another factor in determining the utility of background shading is the area of the surface to which we are applying background shading. A control room i the size of Quad Cities' can afford to use a greater number of color l enhancements than control rooms with less area, provided it has been systematically applied using sound human engineering and operating principles. Several industry documents recognize the utility of using a number of background shading colors. One EPRI document advocated and provided an example which included eight (8) colors for one sample panel.

/ In addition, there are precedents set throughout the industry which clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of using over twenty (20) colors for enhancement to support system identification. I Less than twenty (20) colors have been chosen for background shading for the main control boards at Quad Cities. Principles for color use (outlined in sections 6.5 and 6.6 of NUREG-0700) guided the selection of colors to be used on the control panels. Colors were selected from a pool of high contrast and matte finish shades used at other stations, applied against a "Kewanee Beige" board color. As an engineered retrofit, their application extends from a total-board design evaluation that followed a system-by-system approach.

The use of colors, particularly in con] unction with background shading at Quad Cities has been reexamined with operating personnel (SME's). As a result the enhancement of the Quad Cities control boards will be very similar to that accomplished at Byron /Braidwood. We have had a very positive response from the operators at Byron /Braidwood and are sure we will have the same response at Quad Cities.

In general, controls and displays at Quad Cities were found to be grouped by function with few " extraneous" or " maverick" components. In these cases, background shading affords a means to functionally group these extraneous components. Both the main component group and their maverick components in a system will be colored identically, em

l l

l PAGE: C4-15

((~

Background shading will be applied to systems nested among others. In the

)g few cases where this technique will be applied, a high-contrast background ,

ehade applied to the centrally positioned group will enhance the separation

~

of adjacent systems.

On the whole, the selection and use of background shading is designed to work in concert with other perceptual aids and the placement design of instruments. The total-board design evaluation will hold in check the potential overuse of one or more perceptual aids. Thus, where background chading will be applied, its use will be conservative, necessary, and meaningful for operator performance.

In addition, lines of demarcation will be used, where possible, to enhance cystem grouping. Demarcation will be used between closely-spaced but functionally distinct systems that do not have individual components placed within other system groupings. The use of demarcation instead of background shading, in these instances, will prevent the overuse of color. The proposed demarcations consist of circumscribing functional or selected groups with a contrasting line in areas where physical space or panel edges do not visually set apart the related components.  ;

1 I~ IMPLEMENTATION hND REFUELING OUTAGE

\- / l i

PAGE: C4-16 O

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 418 APPENDIX C4 HED CATEGORY 1B  !

FSR PAGE 207 FINDING DURING THE VALIDATION IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS ON THE 90X-8 PANELS ARE ARRANGED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF SEQUENCE OF USE, FREQUENCY OF USE, FUNCTION OR OTHER LOGICAL EXPECTATIONS. THIS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DELAY AND/OR ERROR IN THE USE OF THE SYSTEMS CONTAINED ON THE PANEL.

SUMMARY

LABELING, BACKGROUND SHADING, AND LINES OF DEMARCATION WILL BE USED TO FUNCTIONALLY HIGHLIGHT AND DIFFERENTIATE THE SYSTEMS ON 90X-8.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT t

/~ Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated for implementation by

( ,N) the completion of the first refueling outage, or further Justification chould be provided for implementation as proposed.

1 CECO CLARIFICATION  ;

Display and control enhancement is a technique that allows operators to sort out the immediately relevant from the irrelevant stimuli. l Effective  !

enhancement permits timely acquisition of meaningful information,  !

facilitates correct identification of relevant control options, and allows l the operator to maintain effective awareness over system ctatus. '

Effective surface enhancement techniques include Demarcation and Mimic Lines, Color Shading, and Labeling. Color enhancement is used in nuclear l power plant control rooms to help clarify component identification and l functional relationships among various components. Many problems, such as )

large matrices of undifferentiated components, physically displaced controls  ;

and their associated displays, can be remedied with color shading.

Background shading also improves the efficiency of information transfer to the operator and assists his decision making process by organizing panel elements, minimizing existing visual clutter, optimizing desired associations among panel elements, and standardizing information presentation. Color enhancements also facilitate learning and retention of where components and controls are located, especially for new operators.

f Components having a common color also are seen as forming a group.

L ----- - - - - - -

PAGE: C4-17 l

Because the goal of shading is to provide operator aids, the operator must agree with or approve the enhancement, or it probably will not be q successful. Operator participation is a requirement throughout the color j shading process and was integral during the selection of color enhancements at Quad Cities station that has taken place to date.

SAIC recommends that the number of colors used for coding should not exceed j eleven (11) and should be kept to the minimum needed to provide sufficient J information (as identified on page 6.5-11 in NUREG-0700). Quad Cities uses only six (6) colors for coding purposes and has established a standard to this effect. Moreover, because Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant, the instances of the use of color for coding purposes is minimal. Color shading on the other hand does not represent system status or state, but is merely a perceptual aid designed to facilitate system identification. There is no meaning assigned to the shading and the shading should not be interpreted as i coding. 1 Another factor in determining the utility of background shading is the area of the surface to which we are applying background shading. A control room the size of Quad Cities' can afford to use a greater number of color ]

enhancements than control rooms with less area, provided it has been i systeniatically applied using sound human engineering and operating principles. Several industry documents recognize the utility of using a number of background shading colors. One EPRI document advocated and g-wg provided an example which included eight (8) colors for one sample panel.

( j In addition, there are precedents set throughout the industry which clearly '

demonstrate the effectiveness of using over twenty (20) colors for enhancement to support system identification.

Less than twenty (20) colors have been chosen for background shading for the main control boards at Quad Cities. Principles for color use (outlined in sections 6.5 and 6.6 of NUREG-0700) guided the selection of colors to be used on the control panels. Colors were selected from a pool of high I contrast and matte finish shades used at other stations, applied against a "Kewanee Beige" board color. As an engineered retrofit, their application extends from a total-board denign evaluation that followed a system-by-system approach.

The use of colors, particularly in conjunction with background shading at Quad Cities has been reexamined with operating personnel (SME's). As a result the enhancement of the Quad Cities control boards will be very similar to that accomplished at Byron /Braidwood. We have had a very positive response from the operators at Byron /Braidwood and are sure we will have the same response at Quad Cities.

In general, controls and displays at Quad Cities were found to be grouped by function with few " extraneous" or " maverick" components. In these cases, background shading affords a means to functionally group these extraneous components. Both the main component group and their maverick components in I a system will be colored identically. I l

1 i

PAGE: C4-18

\

' Background shading will be applied to systems nested among others. In the few cases where this technique will be applied, a high-contrast background shade applied to the centrally positioned group will enhance the separation of ad 3 acent systems.

On the whole, the selection and use of background shading is designed to work in concert with other perceptual aids and the placement design of )

instruments. The total-board design evaluation will hold in check the l potential overuse of one or more perceptual aids. Thus, where background l shading will be applied, its use will be conservative, necessary, and meaningful for operator performance.

I In addition, lines of demarcation will be used, where possible, to enhance system grouping. Demarcation will be used between closely-spaced but functionally distinct systems that do not have individual components placed within other system groupings. The use of demarcation instead of background <

sh'ading, in these instances, will prevent the overuse of color. The {

proposed demarcations consist of circumscribing functional or selected groups with a contrasting line in areas where physical space or panel edges do not visually set apart the related components.

l CNOTE: This HED was misnumbered in the TER attached to the SER. In the TER on page C-6 it was numbered 0148.3 )

l IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE l _______ __ - -__-_ _

PAGE: C4-19 1

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO I IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 284 APPENDIX C4 i HED CATEGr.tY 1B j FSR PAGE 211 l

1 FINDING {

OPERATOR SURVEY RESPONSE INDICATED THAT HAVING THE HIGH PRESSUP.E COOLING l INJECTION (HPCI) COMPONENTS BETWEEN THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) LOOPS (A&B) CREATES INTERFERENCE. ,

I i

RESPONSE

SYSTEM LABELING AND BACKGROUND SHADING WILL BE USED TO HIGHLIGHT THE RHR LOOPS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT Proposed implementation dates should be reevaluated f9r implementation by the completion of the first refueling outage, or further justification i chould be provided for implementation as proposed. )

\

CECO CLARIFICATION Display and control enhancement is a technique that allows operators to sort out the immediately relevant from the irrelevant stimuli. Effective i enhancement permits timely acquisition of meaningful information, I facilitates correct identification of relevant control options, and allows the operator to maintain effective awareness over system status.

Effective surface enhancement techniques include Demarcation and Mimic Lines, Color Snading, and Labeling. Color enhancement is used in nuclear power plant control rooms to help clarify component identification and functional rel ationships among various components. Many problems, such as large matrices of undifferentiated components, physically displaced controls and their aesociated displays, can be remedied with color shading.

Background shading also improves the efficiency of information transfer to the operator and assists his decision making process by organizing panel elements, minimizing existing visual clutter, optimizing desired associations among panel elements, and standardizing information presentation. Color enhancements also facilitate learning and retention of where components and controls are located, especially for new operators.

Components having a common color also are seen as forming a group.

PAGE: C4-20

\~- Because the goal of shading is to provide operator sids, the operator muut l agree with or approve the enhancement, or it probably will not be successful. Operator participation is a requirement throughout the color shading process and was integral during the selection of color enhancements ,

at Quad Cities station that has taken place to date.

l SAIC recommends that the number of colors used for coding should not exceed eleven (11) and should be kept to the minimum needed to provide sufficient information (as identified on page 6.5-11 in NUREG-0700). Quad Cities uses only six (6) colors for coding purposes and has established a standard to this effect. Moreover, because Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant, the instances of the use of color for coding purposes is minimal. Color shading on the other hand does not represent system status or state, but is merely a perceptual aid designed to facilitate systen. identification. There is no l meaning assigned to the shading and the shading should not be interpreted as I l

coding.

Another factor in determining the utility of background shading is the area of the surface to which we are applying background shading. A control room the size of Quad Cities' can afford to use a greater number of color enhancements than control rooms with less area, provided it has been systematically applied using sound human engineering and operating principles. Several industry documents recognize the utility of using a number of background shading colors. One EPRI document advocated and provided an example which included eight (8) colors for one sample panel.

g In addition, there are precedents set throughout the industry which clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of using over twenty (20) colors for enhancement to support system identification.

Less than twenty (20) colors have been chosen for background shading for the main control boards at Quad Cities. Principles for color use (outlined in sections 6.5 and 6.6 of NUREG-0700) guided the selection of colors to be used on the control panels. Colors were selected from a pool of high contrast and matte finish shades used at other stations, applied against a "Kewanee Beige" board color. As an engineered retrofit, their application extends from a total-board design evaluation that followed a system-by-system approach.

The use of colors, particularly in con] unction with background shading at Quad Cities has been reexamined with operating personnel (SME's). As a result the enhancement of the Quad Cities control boards will be very similar to that accomplished at Byron /Braidwood. We have had a very positive response from the operators at Byron /Braidwood and are sure we will have the same response at Quad Cities. l In general, controls and displays at Quad Cities were found to be grouped by function with few " extraneous" or " maverick" components. In these cases, background shading affords a means to functionally group these extraneous components. Both the main component group and their maverick components in l a system will be colored identically.

PAGE: C4-21

(~N ,

(_ Background shading vill be applied to systems nested among others. In the few cases where this technique will be applied, a high-contrast background shade applied to the centrally positioned group will enhance the separation of adjacent systems.

On the whole, the selection and use of background shading is designed to work in concert with other perceptual aids and the placement design of instruments. The total-board design evaluation will hold in check the potential overuse of one or more perceptu&1 aids. Thus, where background shading will be applied, its use will be conservative, necessary, and meaningful for operator performance. l In addition, lines of demarcation will be used, where possible, to enhance system grouping. Demarcation will be used between closely-spaced but j functionally distinct systems that do not have individual components placed within other system groupings. The use of demarcation instead of background shading, in these inotances, will prevent the overuse of color. The proposed demarcations consist of circumscribing functional or selected groups with a contrasting line in areas where physical space or panel edges do not visually set apart the related components.

('~j\ MPLEMENTt2 TION i

( ,2ND REFUELING OUTAGE f^%

l l

l

PAGE: C5-1 O

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

APPENDIX C5 The following HEDs were identified and grouped as posing the  !

same general concern to the reviewers in the TER attached to the SER. The same grouping is employed here which precludes the presentation of the HEDs' Findings.

HED# HED CAT FSR PG# HED# HED CAT FSR PG#

0148,0149 1B 42 0277 1B 201 ,

0030 2C 84 0416 1B 205  ;

l 0071 2C 85 0417 1B 206 l l 0336 3C 155 0418 1B 207 I 0336,0340,0351 3C 160 0274 2B 208 0107 3B 179 0193 1C 210 0166 3C 198 0284 1B 211 i

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT )

Acceptance of the proposed corrective action for this HED is dependent upon the licensee's resolution of the expressed NRC l concerns over the following programs / standards: l 1

i o Color Coding 1

o Labeling o Demarcation / Background Shading CECO CLARIFICATION Display and control enhancement is a technique that allows operators to sort out the immediately relevant from the irrelevant stimuli. Effective enhancement permits timely acquisition of meaningful information, facilitates correct identification of relevant control options, and allows the operator to maintain effective awareness over system status.

Effective surface enhancement techniques include Demarcation and Mimic Linee, Color Shading, and Labeling. Color enhancement is used in nuclear power plant control rooms to help clarify component identification and functional relationships among various components. Many problems, such as large matrices of undifferentiated components, physically displaced controls anu O their associated displays, can be remedied with' color shading.

I l

PAGE: C5-2 l

l l

Background shading also improves the efficiency of information I transfer to the operator and assiots his decision making process by organizing panel elements, minimizing existing visual clutter, optimizing desired associations among panel elements, and standardizing information presentation. Color enhancements also J facilitate' learning and retention of where components and '

controls are located, especially for new operators. Compenents having a common color also are seen as forming a group.

Because the goal of shading is to provide operator aids, the operator must agree with or approve the enhancement, or it probably will not be successful. Operator participation is a requirement throughout the color shading process and was integral during the selection of color enhancements at Quad Cities station that has taken place to date.

SAIC recommends that the number of colors used for coding should not exceed eleven (11) and should be kept to the minimum needed l

to provide aufficient information (as identified on page 6.5-11 in NUREG-0700). Quad Cities uses only six (6) colors for coding purposes and has established a standard to this effect. Moreover, because Quad Cities is a Red / Green board plant, the instances of l the use of color for coding purposes is minimal. Color shading on the other hand does not represent system status or state, but is merely e perceptual aid designed to facilitate system

{"

s s identification. There is no meaning assigned to the shading and J

the shading should not be interpreted as coding.

l Another factor in determining the utility of background shading j is the area of the surface to which we are applying background l shading. A control room the size of Quad Cities' can afford to I use a greater number of color enhancements than control rooms with less area, provided it has been systematically applied using sound human engineering and operating principles. Soveral industry documents recognize the utility of using a number of background chading colors. One EPRI document advocated and l provided an example which included eight (8) colors for one sample panel. In addition, there are precedents set throughout the industry which clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of using over twenty (20) colors for enhancement to support system identification.

Less than twenty (20) colors have been chosen for background shading for the main control boards at Quad Cities. Principles for color use (outlined in sections S.5 and 6.6 of !!UREG-0700) guided the selection of colors to be used on the control panels.

Colors were selected from a pool of high contrast and matte finish shades used at other stations, applied against a "Kewanee Beige" board color. As an engineered retrofit, heir application

_s extends from a total-board design evaluation that followed a system-by-system approach.

\ -)

v

PAGE: C5-3 1

1 The use of colors, particularly in conjunction with background shading at Quad Cities has been reexamined with operating personnel (SME's). As a result the enhancement of the Quad Cities control boards will be very similar to that accomplished l at Byron /Braidwood. We have had a very positive response from j the operators at Byron /Braidwood and are sure we will have the '

same responce at Quad Cities.

In general, controls and displays at Quad Cities were found to be grouped by function with few " extraneous" or a maverich" components. In these cases, background shading affords a means to functionally group these extraneous components. Both the main component group and their maverick components in a system will be colored identically.

Background shading vill be applied to systeme nested among others.

In the few cases where this technique vill be applied, a high-contrast background shade applied to the centrally positioned group will enhance the separation of adjacent systems.

On the whole, the selection and use of background shading is I designed to work in concert with other perceptual aids and the I placement design of instruments. The total-board design evaluation will hold in check the potential overuse of one or l

(~h more perceptual aids. Thus, where background shading will be

(_,/ applied, its use will be conservative, necessary, and meaningful  !

for operator performance. j In addition, lines of demarcation will be used, where possible, to enhance system grouping. Demarcation will be used between closely-spaced but functionally distinct systems that do not have individual components placed within other system groupings. The use of demarcation instead of background shading, in these instances, will prevent the overuse of color. The proposed demarcations consist of circumscribing functional or selected groups with a contrasting line in areas where physical space or panel edges do not visually set apart the related components.

[ NOTE: (1) HED number 418 was misnumbered in the TER attached to the SER. In the TER on page C-6 it was numbered 148. (2) HED number 277's FSR page number was incorrectly printed in the SER/TER as 210.)

I

PAGE:'CG- 1

[ QUAD CITIES STATION

.- REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE): OF THE_DCRDR.

HED # 171 APPENDIX C6 HED CATEGORY 1C FSR PAGE 129 FINDING NO METHOD IS PROVIDED FOR DETERMINING LAMP FAILURE IN INDICATING LIGHTS, EXCEPT BY VISUAL INSPECTION.

RESPONSE

THE LEGEND LIGHTS CITED IN THIS HED ARE PART OF THE TURBINE CONTROL PANEL (90X-7). THESE LIGHTS ARE PROVIDED WITH A LAMP TEST.

-NRC/SAIC COMMENT The HED cites' lack of provision for determining failure in indicator. lights. 1' It is not clear from CECO's response whether there are any other lights in the control room that suffer from the'same difficiency aside from_those on l the turbine control panel. Additional information_concerning the scope of r~ the HED and its resolution is needed to provide assurance that the HED is

(_,g/ satisfactorily resolved.

CECO CLARIFICATION The Quad Cities HEDAT has recently become aware of a long life' indicator light bulb developed by Pennsylvania Power and Light _for their-Susquehanna plant. The bulb is supposed to have a service life of 11 years and be compatable with GE type sockets. Elements within Commonwealth Edison Company are investigating the possibility of utilizing these bulbs at our facilities. If use of the Susquehanna light bulbs is feasible CECO will attempt to implement them at the Quad Cities station-by the end of the second refueling outage. In the interim our shift turnover panel walk down surveillance program will be used to identify instances of bulb failure for ,

replacement.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O

PAGE: C7- 1 g-

\ ,/ QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 421 l APPENDIX C7 HED CATEGORY 1B FSR PAGE 100 FINDING AT PRESENT THERE IS INDICATION OF PERCENT TANK' LEVEL AND PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE FOR THE STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL BORON TANK FROM WHICH ACTUAL TANK LEVEL CAN BE DETERMINED (ON 90X-5). THERE IS HOWEVER, NO DIRECT INDICATION OF THE LEVEL OR ANNUNCIATION OF HIGH OR LOW LEVELS. IN THE TASK ANALYSIS IT I WAS REQUIRED TO KNOW WHEN 200 GALLONS WAS LEFT IN THE TANK AND THIS WAS NOT DIRECTLY ASCERTAINABLE. ALL INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE TASK ANALYSIS SHOULD BE PROVIDED I" THE CONTROL ROOM.

RESPONSE

APPROPRIATE INDICATION IS AVAILABLE. AN ANNUNCIATOR " STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK HI/ LOW LEVEL" AS WELL AS A LEVEL INDICATOR ARE AVAILABLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM.

IRC/SAIC COMMENT The basis for the Justification is not adequate for one or more of the following reasons:

l

1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy.

3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard.

CECO CLARIFICATION The original response to this HED stated that an annunciator for " Standby Liquid Control Tank Hi/ Low Level" and a level indicator are available in the control room. The low setpoint for that alarm is the 200 gallon level mentioned in the HED. It was felt that that was adequate control room information to permit the operator to perform his duties. However, the HEDAT has reevaluated this HED in light of the NRC's comments and agrees with them. Therefore, to minimize any confusion and error in the use of the Standby Liquid Control Tank Level indicator abnormal high and low ranges will be zone banded on the indicator eliminating the need for mental conversions. This will be accomplished by the end of this year, 12/31/87.

O IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987

1 PAGE: C7- 2 ,

1 l

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO I IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. ,

HED # 224 APPENDIX C7 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 94 i

l FINDING I WHEN ROTARY CONTROLS USED FOR WIDELY DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS ARE PLACED ON s THE SAME PANEL, NO SHAPE CODING IS EMPLOYED. J-HANDLES ARE USED TO CONTROL VALVES AND PUMPS ON THE SAME PANEL. KEY-OPERATED CONTROLS CONTROL VALVES AND COMPRESSORS ON THE SAME PANEL. THUMBUSTERS OPERATE ,

VALVES.

l

RESPONSE

ALL CONTROLS ARE LABELED APPROPRIATELY TO INDICATE FUNCTION. THE OPERATORS ARE TRAINED ON THE FUNCTION OF EACH CONTROL SWITCH.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT O The basis for following the Justification is not adequate for one or more of the reasons:

1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy, i l

3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard. ]

CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT has reevaluated this HED and is still convinced that the existing control switch configurations are acceptable and present no safety hazard.

The control switches presently use a variety of actuators. The controls are appropriately labeled. The operators are trained to know the fuction of each control switch, and they are trained (and obligated) to follow procedures prescribing the use of each switch.

i IMPLEMENTATION f-~pCCEPTASIS U

1 PAGE: C7- 3 i QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

i HED # 300 1 APPENDIX C7 '!

HED CATEGORY'1C

'FSR PAGE' 97 FINDING l ALL THUMBUSTER-TYPE ROTARY SELECTOR SWITCH FINGER GRASP HEIGHTS ARE BELOW- -I THE RECOMMENDED HEIGHT OF .625. (PHOTO LOG NO. C-2)

RESPONSE

THE CITED SWITCHES ARE FOR THE FEEDWATER HEATERS AND ARE USED ONLY DURING 1 STARTUP. IF THE OPERATOR INTERRUPTS ACTUATION OF THE-SWITCHES, NO ADVERSE )

CONSEQUENCES OCCUR. THE SLOTTED ALUMINUM BLOCK " TOOL" WHICH IS'AVAILABLE TO THE OPERATORS, TO AID IN ACTUATING THESE SWITCHES, IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS.

1 NRC/SAIC. COMMENT I The basis for the Justification is not adequate for one_or more of the  !

O following reasons:

1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy.

3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard.

CECO CLARIFICATION The cited control room switches are .328 inches high. The-discrepancy has no negative impact on operator performance because the operators do not wear 1 gloves when operating these controls and therefore have no problems grasping them. In addition, the controls are only manipulated during startups, their manipulation is not' time critical, and a switch extension Job Performance Aid is available for the operator to use. Interruption of the actuation of these switches has no adverse consequences. Switch replacement is therefore not warranted.

IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS

PAGE: C7- 4 p) t s_- i QUAD CITIES STATION j REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO -

IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 205 APPENDIX C7 HED CATEGORY 1C  !

FSR PAGE 98 i FINDING i THUMBUSTER ROTARY SELECTOR CONTROLS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO HOLD AGAINST THE SPRING TORQUE FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE CONTROL ACTION.

RESPONSE

OPERATORS USE AN ADAPTER SWITCH HANDLE, WITH A LARGER FINGER AREA, PROVIDED AT EACH CONTROL BOARD CONTAINING THUMBUSTERS TO OPERATE THESE CONTROLS.

THUS, DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING CONTROL POSITION AGAINST THE SPRING TORQUE IS MINIMIZED. IN ADDITION, THESE CONTROLS ARE USED ONLY DURING STARTUP AND AN INTERRUPTION IN THEIR ACTIVATION DOES NOT RESULT IN ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES.

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT l

[ The basis for the justification is not adequate for one or more of the  !

\ following reasons:

l 1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues. l

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy.

l l 3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

, 4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard.

1 CECO CLARIFICATION The cited control room switches are .328 inches high. The discrepancy has no negative impact on operator performance because the operators do not wear gloves when operating these controls and therefore have no problems grasping them. In addition, the controls are only manipulated during startups, their manipulation is not time critical, and a switch extension Job Performance Aid is available for the operator to use. Interruption of the actuation of these switches has no adverse consequences. Switch replacement is therefore not warranted.

/D Q IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS 1

l PAGE: C7- 5 l

/'T l l /

L/ QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

I HED # 182 APPENDIX C7 HED CATEGORY 2B FSR PAGE 109 FINDING THE TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE AND REACTOR PANEL DISPLAYS (ON 912-10) WERE FOUND TO HAVE INAPPROPRIATE RANGES.

l THE LOWER RANGE SHOULD BE 50 INSTEAD OF 75.

RESPONSE

THE CURRENT RANGE IS ACCEPTABLE; 50 IS OUTSIDE THE RANGE NEEDED BY THE OPERATORS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The basis for the justification is not adequate for one or more of the fg following reasons:

V 1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy.

3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard.

CECO CLARIFICATION The Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW) temperature display was identified as problematic during a walkdown of the control panels with a NSO. The lower TBCCW temperature range of 50 degrees was not identified as required via the Task Analysis, is not mandated by emergency procedure, and remains the opinion of the NSO assisting the review. Evaluation ~of that opinion by the HEDAT, which was comprised of more engineering and operating knowledge and experience than was held by the NSO offering the original comment, determined that it was incorrect. The TBCCW setpoint is above 75 degrees; the high setpoint alarm is at 150 degrees fahrenheit and clears when temperature has dropped to 120 degrees fahrenheit, the high end of the normal operating range. A lower range of 50 degrees is therefore not warrented.

t

(/

IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS

PAGE: C7- 6 i

()

w- QUAD CITIES STATIOM REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. j HED # 495 APPENDIX C7 {

HED CATEGORY 1C 1 FSR PAGE 113  !

FINDING PRESENTLY, THE " RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER FLOW" METER (ON 90X-

3) HAS A RANGE OF 0-70 X 100 AND THERE IS NO STANDARD DIVISIONS. THIS METER i IS CONFUSING TO READ OR INTERPOLATE.

i i

RESPONSE

THE METER SCALE IS A SQUARE ROOT SCALE ELIMINATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SQUARE ROOT CONVERTER. THE ACCURACY WOULD NOT BE ENHANCED BY MAKING THIS SCALE LINEAR.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The basis for the Justification is not adequate for one or more of the

~}followingreasons:  !

\/

1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy.

3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard.

I CECO CLARIFICATION  !

The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water Flow indicator on the 90X-3 panel is not used to set RHR flow during either normal or abnormal  ;

operations. Since system pressure, not flow per se, is the key parameter,  ;

system " flow" is set using other system pressure indication. The cited l instrument is typically used during in service testing surveillance, which j are not time critic ~al. The log scale used on the indicator is conducive to l these surveillance, as well as other operational requirements, because it l allows for the entire possible RHR flow range to be displayed in a format easily used by operators. A linear scale would necessitate ranging up/down to keep the display on scale. This extra task is not necessary.

\ d

'-IMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS l

PAGE: C7- 7 I

I i

t

\~ QUAD CITIES STATION g REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO j IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 172 j APPENDIX C7  ;

HED CATEGORY 1C  !'

FSR PAGE 130 FINDING BURNED OUT BULBS IN INDICATOR LIGHTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY REPLACED. THE SOCKETS ARE AGING AND THEY HAVE A TENDENCY TO FALL APART WHEN REMOVING l OR INSTALLING HEW BULBS. DUE TO THE HEAT GENERATED BY THE LAMPS, THE PLASTIC LAMP COVERS ARE MELTING TO ONE ANOTHER (TYPICAL OF LIGHTS SIDE-BY-SIDE, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REPLACE BULBS.

RESPONSE

THE LEGEND LIGHTS CITED IN THIS HED ARE PART OF THE TURBINE CONTROL PANEL (90X-7). THESE LIGHTS ARE PROVIDED WITH A LAMP TEST.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT

,s The basis for the justification is not adequate for one or more of the

following reasons

1. It does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

2. It does not sufficiently address the discrepancy.

3. It cites absence of previous operator error.

4. It cites utility, industry, or manufacturer's standard. l CECO CLARIFICATION Aging sockets is a maintenance item and is quickley addressed when brought to the station's attention. Bulbs have been replaced with lower wattage bulbs to prevent excessive heat generation and melting of the plastic covers. There are no melted covers in our control room today. Moreover, the Quad Cities HEDAT has recently become aware of a long life indicator light bulb developed by Pennsylvania Power and Light for their Susquehanna plant. The bulb is supposed to have a service life of 11 years and be compatable with GE type sockets. Elements within Commonwealth Edison Company are investigating the possibility of utilizing these bulbs at our facilities. If use of the Susquehanna light bulbs is feasible, CECO will attempt to implement them at Quad Cities station by the end of the second refueling outage. In the interim our shift turnover panel walk down surveillance program will be used to identify instances of bulb failure for replacement.

(

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

i PAGE: C8- 1 O

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 264 APPENDIX C8 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 117 FINDING THE GUIDELINE STATES THAT THE CHARACTER HEIGHT ON DISPLAYS SHOULD SUBTEND A VISUAL ANGLE OF 15 MINUTES. THIS MEANS THAT AT A VIEWING DISTANCE OF 30 INCHES (THE DEPTH OF THE BENCHBOARDS), THE CHARACTER HEIGHT MUST BE .

AT LEAST .132 INCHES. LISTED ARE EXAMPLES OF DISPLAYS THAT ARE NOT IN ACCORDANGL WITH THE GUIDELINE. THIS GUIDELINE IS STATED TO ENSURE THAT ,

LETTERING ON DISPLAYS IS LEGIBLE.

LABEL COMMENT REACTOR WATER LEVEL REQUIRED CHAR HT .132 MEASURED CHAR HT .090 i CONTAINMENT PRESSURE REQUIRED CHAR HT .132 l MEASURED CHAR HT .080 l

(~) BYPASS VALVE-1 REQUIRED CHAR HT .132 i

(_f MEASURED CHAR HT .075

RESPONSE

THE DEVIATION IN CHARACTER HEIGHT FOR THE CITED DISPLAYS PRESENTS NO PROBLEMS IN READABILITY TO THE OPERATORS. THE STH PERCENTILE OPERATORS CAN LEAN SLIGHTLY ACROSS THE BENCHBOARD. GUARDRAILS WILL BE ADDED TO THE FRONT OF EACH ECNCHBOARD TO PREVENT INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE CONTROLS.

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT The response to this HED is not consistent with the adoption of a Labeling Standard which is to ensure minimum labeling characteristics are met so that l operators can read their controls / displays from the required distance. HED resolutions need to be consistent with the control room standards proposed in Supplement 1 to Volume 1 of the DCRDR Final Summary Report.

CECO CLARIFICATION In response to the NRC's comments, the HEDAT has reevaluated this problem.

A team of station personnel will review the control room labeling for clarity, consistency with the standard adopted by the station, and readability. Labels that are ambiguous or difficult to read will be replaced by the end of the current year, 12/31/87.

IMPLEMENTATION I 12/31/1987 l

PAGE: C8- 2 10 V

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 260 257 APPENDIX C8 HED CATEGORY 3C FSR PAGE 118 FINDING THE GUIDELINE STATES THAT DISPLAY LETTER CHARACTERS ARE TO HAVE A WIDTH-TO-HEIGHT RATIO BETWEEN 1.00 AND .60, RESPECTIVELY. SEVERAL DISPLAYS ARE J

NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINE. THIS GUIDELINE IS STATED TO ENSURE THAT DISPLAYS ARE LEGIBLE AND SOMEWHAT CONSISTENT.

RESPONSE

THE DISCREPANT RATIOS RANGE FROM .33 TO .53. THIS IS AN INSIGNIFICANT DEVIATION AND RESULTS IN NO DIFFICULTY IN READABILITY FOR THE OPERATORS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The response to this HED is not consistent with the adoption of a Labeling  !

[j Standard which is to ensure minimum labeling characteristics are met so that operators can read their controls / displays from the required distance. HED resolutions need to be consistent with the control room standards proposed j in Supplement i to Volume 1 of the DCRDR Final Summary Report.

I CECO CLARIFICATION j In response to the NRC's comments, the HEDAT has reevaluated this problem. l A team of station personnel will review the control room labeling for l clarity, consistency with the standard adopted by the station, and I readability. Labels that are ambiguous or difficult to read will be replaced by the end of the current year, 12/31/87.

IMPLEMENTATION ,

12/31/1987 i o

PAGE: C8- 3 sm' I

V) QUAD CITIES STATION '

REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 55 APPENDIX C8 HED CATEGORY 2C FSR PAGE 189 FINDING COLORS AND TYPES OF LINES USED FOR PIPING AND ELECTRICAL LINES ON THE COLOR CRTs ARE NOT USED CONSISTENTLY. CONSISTENT USE OF GRAPHIC CODING ALLOWS FOR EASY RECOGNITION AND INTERPRETATION OF GRAPHIC DISPLAYS.

RESPONSE

THE COLORS AND TYPES OF LINES TO BE USED FOR PIPING AND ELECTRICAL LINES WILL BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT A CONSISTENT APPROACH.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT The response to this HED is not consistent with the adoption of a Color

]

f~s Coding Standard which is to ensure that information conveyed by colors is l I

( ) consistent thereby reducing the possibility of operator error. HED resolutions need to be consistent with the control room standards proposed in Supplement 1 to Volume 1 of the DCRDR Final Summary Report.

CECO CLARIFICATION I The HEDAT reevaluated this HED as a res. ult of the expressed NRC concerns. A ]

review of the use of color on the CRTs in the control room was undertaken I vis-a-vis the Control Room Color Convention Standard submitted in Supplement i to the Final Summary Report in December of 1985. Few instances of disagreement were discerned. Commonwealth Edison's Computer Systems Group continually enhances the station's computer system striving for improved capability and consistency. Nonetheless, those instances of disagreement will be addressed in order to enhance the system's consistency with the standard.

IMPLEMENTATION l' 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE l

I

'\ j

(~J

\_ j I

l E

PAGE: C8- 4 A

i QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 57 APPENDIX G8 HED CATEGORY 2C FSR PAGE 190 FINDING COLORS USED ON CRTs ARE NOT CONSISTENT IN MEANING WITH COLORS IN THE REST OF THE CONTROL ROOM. CONSISTENT MEANINGS FOR COLORS ALLOW FOR  ;

EASY RECOGNITION AND INTERPRETATION.

RESPONSE

THE CRT (BY NATURE OF ITS DESIGN) USES NUMEROUS GOLORS. MOST USES OF COLOR ARE FOR LINES, OUTLINING AND WORDING. THE USE OF COLORS DOES NOT NEED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTROL ROOM SINCE IT IS USED INDEPENDENTLY.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT

/~' The response to this HED is not consistent with the adoption of a Color

( Coding Standard which is to ensure that information conveyed by colors is q consistent thereby reducing the possibility of operator error. HED j resolutions need to be consistent with the control room standards proposed l in Supplement 1 to Volume 1 of the DCRDR Final Summary Report. ]

l CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT reevaluated this HED as a result of the expressed NRC concerns. A review of the use of color on the CRTs in the control room was undertaken vis-a-vis the Control Room Color Convention Standard submitted in Supplement i i to the Final Summary Report in December of 1985. Few instances of disagreement were discerned. Commonwealth Edison's Computer Systems Group I continually enhances the station's computer system striving for improved capability and consistency. Nonetheless, those instances of disagreement will be addressed in order to enhance the system's consistency with the standard.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O

v

)

PAGE: C8- 5 l

l

,-~ 1

()

QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. {

l 59 HED #

APPENDIX C8 HED CATEGORY 2C FSR PAGE 193 a

FINDING THE COLOR YELLOW IS USED ON THE COLOR CRTs FOR REGULAR LETTERING AS WELL AS TO INDICATE CAUTION OR WARNING. THE COLOR YELLOW AS DEFINED BY j THE CHECKLIST SHOULD MEAN: HAZARD POTENTIALLY UNSAFE CAUTION ATTENTION i REQUIRED MARGINAL PARAMETER VALUE EXISTS. THE USE OF YELLOW FOR THE REGULAR LETTERING MAY IMPLY UNINTENDED SIGNIFICANCE TO THE LETTERS.  ;

1 O

RESPONSE

l YELOW PROVIDES A GOOD CONTRAST ON THE CRT AND IS THEREFORE USED AS A STATUS CONDITION COLOR. THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE USE OF COLOR. j NRC/SAIC COMMENT The response to this HED is not consistent with the adoption of a Color q l7_D Coding Standard which is to ensure that information conveyed by colors is l;

'% consistent thereby reducing the possibility of operator error. HED resolutions need to be consistent with the control room standards proposed in Supplement 1 to Volume 1 of the DCRDR Final Summary Report.

CECO CLARIFICATION The HEDAT reevaluated this HED as a result of the expressed NRC concerns. A review of the use of color on the CRTs in the control room was undertaken vis-a-vis the Control Room Color Convention Standard submitted in Supplement i to the Final Summary Report in December of 1985. Few instances of disagreement were discerned. Commonwealth Edison's Computer Systems Group continually enhances the station's computer system striving for improved capability and consistency. Nonetheless, those instances of disagreement will be addressed in order to enhance the system's consistency with the standard.

IMPLEMENTATION i 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE l

1

<~

v 1

l PAGE: C9- 1

,e ,

(' '3) QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 74 27 APPENDIX C9 HED CATEGORY 1C FSR PAGE 62 FINDING THERE ARE SEVERAL ANNUNCIATORS WITH INPUTS FROM MORE THAN ONE PLANT PARAMETER. THESE INCLUDE "HIGH-LOW", "A/B", AND NON-SPECIFIC " TROUBLE" ALARMS.  ;

0 i

RESPONSE <

THE OPERATORS HAVE CONTROL PANEL OR LOCAL PANEL INSTRUMENTATION AVAILABLE TO I DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC " TROUBLE". IN ALL CASES, ANNUNCIATORS ARE REFERENCED l IN THE ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURES. THE OPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO LOOK UP MULTI- 1 INPUT ALARMS IN THE PROCEDURE BOOK WHEN NECESSARY.

l

)

NRC/SAIC COMMENT  !

This HED concerns the plant's multi-input annunciator alarms, which all told i

/

\-)) violate ten Human Engineering Criteria. Neither the exact number of these annunciators was provided nor their descriptions; though based on their l

{

assigned category and level of severity it is apparent they are important to {

plant safety. The corrective action proposed does not address the i discrepancy. The licensee should readdress this system and this problem. i

' b CECO CLARIFICATION  !

Upon further evaluation, the HEDAT concurred with the NRC's comments and <

will established a team to perform an in depth review of multi-input alarms at Quad Cities station similar to the team that was established at Dresden station. The review at Dresden identified many multi-input alarms for which I adequate control room instrumentation existed to enable the operator to determine the status of the parameter alarmed. For example, it would be  !

impossible for a level or pressure parameter to alarm HIGH and then to l subsequently alarm LOW without first being able to be reset. A reflash capability would not enhance these alarms. The same was true for dual division / channel alarms in which the operator's response was identical  ;

regardless of the division / channel to actuate the alarm. In fact, when one division / channel alarms the other division / channel should alarm as well. In addition, many local panels have " Trouble" alarms in the control room that l' activate whenever the local panel's alarms activate. The response to these alarms was to dispatch an operator to the local panel to address the alarm. l The local panels contained the necessary controls and displays to mitigate  ;

the conditions that prompted the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room.  !

() Since an operator was at the local panel to address any subsequent alarm, it ;

(,,/ was not necessary to have multiple alarm windows or computer alarms  !

available in the main control room for these local " Trouble" alarms. ,

l

1 PAGE: C9- 2 I

once these alarms have been reset at the local panel they will O() Moreover, reflash the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room. Instances were discerned, however, in which control room indication was not sufficient to  !

enable an operator to detect the actuation of a subsequent alarm input once the annunciator had actuated on a different input. In these instances the alarm was to be split out into an appropriate alarm tile or added'to the J process computer as an alarm point should an adequate tile not be available. J It is anticipated that the review to be performed at Quad Cities will result. J in findings similar to those from the Dresden review. As at Dresden, any alarms for which control room indication is insufficient to enable an ]:

operator to detect a subsequent alarm input actuation will be split out into j appropriate alarm tiles or added to the process computer as an alarm point. j s

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I

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IMPLEMENTATION '

2ND REFUELING OUTAGE i

( )) l 1

1 l

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O

PAGE: C9- 3 p

(s-) QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED 3ESPONSE/ CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 12 APPENDIX C9 HED CATEGORY 2B FSR PAGE 64 FINDING AN ALARM PRINTOUT CAPABILITY IS NOT PROVIDED FOR ALL MULTI-INPUT ANNUN-i CIATORS. PRINTING THE SPECIFIC ALARM OF ALL MULTI-INPUT ALARMS WOULD l ALLOW FOR READY CLARIFICATION OF THE NATURE OF THE ALARMS.

RESPONSE

THE OPERATORS HAVE CONTROL PANEL OF LOCAL PANEL INSTRUMENTATION AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC " TROUBLE". IN ALL CASES, ANNUNCIATORS ARE REFERENCED IN THE ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURES. THE OPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO LOOK UP MULTI-INPUT ALARMS IN THE PROCEDURE BOOK WHEN NECESSARY.

l NRC/SAIC COMMENT r~s which all told

( ) This HED violate concerns ten Human the plant'sCriteria.

Engineering multi-input annunciator Neither the alarms, exact number of these

'^#

annunciators was provided nor their descriptions; though based on their casigned category and level of severity.it is apparent they are important to plant safety. The corrective action proposed does not address the discrepancy. The licensee should readdress this system and this problem.

I CECO CLARIFICATION Upon further evaluation, the HEDAT concurred with the NRC's comments and will established a team to perform an in depth review of multi-input alarms at Quad Cities station similar tc the team that was established at Dresden ctation. The review at Dresden identified many multi-input alarms for which adequate control room instrumentation existed to enable the operator to determine the status of the parameter alarmed. For example, it would be impossible for a level or pressure parameter to alarm HIGH and then to l subsequently alarm LOW without first being able to be reset. A reflash

! capability would not enhance these alarms. The same was true for dual l division / channel alarms in which the operator's response was identical regardless of the division / channel to actuate the alarm. In fact, when one u

)

division / channel alarms the other division / channel should alarm as well. In addition, many local panels have " Trouble" alarms in the control room that activate whenever the local panel's alarms activate. The response to these clarms was to dispatch an operator to the local panel to address the alarm.

The local panels contained the necessary controls and displays to mitigate the conditions that prompted the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room.

[ ') Since an operator was at the local panel to address any subsequent alarm, it I \s # was not necessary to have multiple alarm windows or computer alarms available in the main control room for these local " Trouble" alarms.

l

PAGE: C9- 4

(~ Moreover, once there alarms have been reset at the local panel they will ret'. lash the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room. Instances were l discerned, however, in which control room indication was not sufficient to '

enable an operator to detect the actuation of a subsequent alarm input once the annunciator had actuated on a different input. In these instances the alarm was to be split out into an appropriate alarm tile or added to the ,

process computer as an alarm point should an adequate tile not be available. l It is anticipated that the review to be performed at Quad Cities will result l

in findings similar to those from the Dresdsn review. As at Dresden, any alarms for which control room indication is insufficient to enable an operator to detect a subsequent alarm input actuation will be split out into appropriate alarm tiles or added to the process coniputer as an alarm point.

l l

l IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O

O 1

(

(

1 PAGE: C9- 5

(~

( QUAD CITIES STATION l REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO ]

IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. j HED # 13 APPENDIX C9 l HED CATEGORY 28 FSR PAGE 65 1

FINDING 1 FOR ALARMS WITH INPUTS FROM MORE THAN ONE PARAMETER, A REFLASH CAPABILITY l IS NOT PROVIDED WHICH ALLOWS SUBSEQUENT ALARMS TO ACTIVATE THE AUDITORY ALERT MECHANISM AND REFLASH THE VISUAL TILE EVEN THOUGH THE FIRST ALARM HAS NOT CLEARED.

RESPONSE

THE " TROUBLE" ALARMS ARE CRITICAL TO PLANT SAFETY. THE MULTI-INPUT ALARMS THAT COULD AFFECT PLANT SAFETY HAVE OTHER CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS.

NRC/SAIC COMMENT This HED concerns the plant's multi-input annunciator alarms, which all told Neither the exact number of these

[\ violate ten Human annunciators Engineering was provided Criteria.

nor their descriptions; though based on their N-essigned category and level of severity it is apparent they are important to plant safety. The corrective action proposed does not address the discrepancy. The licensee should readdress this system and this problem.

CECO CLARIFICATION Upon further evaluation, the HEDAT concurred with the NRC's comments and will established a team to perform an in depth review of multi-input alarms et Quad Cities station similar to the tsaa. that was established at Dresden station. The review at Dresden identified many multi-input alarms for which adequate control room instrumentation existed to enable the operator to determine the status of the parameter alarmed. For example, it would be impossible for a level or pressure parameter to alarm HIGH and then to subsequently alarm LOW without first being able to be reset. A reflash l capability would not enhance >hese alarms. The same was true for dual division / channel alarms in which the operator's response was identical regardless of the division / channel to actuate the alarm. In fact, when one division / channel alarms the other division / channel should alarm as well. In addition, many local panels have " Trouble" alarms in the control room that activate whenever the local panel's alarms activate. The response to these clarms was to dispatch an operator to the local panel to address the alarm.

The local panels contained the necessary controls and displays to mitigate the conditions that prompted the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room.

Since an operator was at the local panel to address any subsequent alarm, it

(~'}wasnot necessary to have multiple alarm windows or computer alarms

(_- available in the main control room for these local " Trouble" alarms.

E________-.--________

1 PAGE: C9- 6 l l

l l

[N~' reflash Moreover, once these alarms have been reset at the local the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room.

panel they will Instances were discerned, however, in which control room indication was not sufficient to enable an operator to detect the actuation of a subsequent alarm input once the annunciator had actuated on a different input. In these instances the alarm was to be split out into an appropriate alarm tile or added to the process compu'c er as an alarm point should an adequate tile not be available. l It is anticipated that the review to be performed at Quad Cities will result )

in findings similar to those from the Dresden review. As at Dresden, any i alarms for which control room indication is insufficient to enable an ,

operator to detect a subsequent alarm input actuation will be split out into appropriate alarm tiles or added to the process computer as an alarm point.

I J

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE

("h G

1 1

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1

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PAGE: C9- 7 l QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 18 APPENDIX C9 HED CATEGORY 2B FSR PAGE 72 FINDING  !

THERE,ARE VISUAL ALARM TILES WHICH ARE NOT LOCATED'ABOVE RELATED CONTROLS l AND DISPLAYS REQUIRED FOR CORRECTIVE OR DIAGNOSTIC ACTION IN RESPONSE TO I THE ALARM. THIS MAY CAUSE A DELAY IN PERFORMING THE ACTIONS NEEDED TO. l 9ESPOND TO THE ALARM. 1

RESPONSE

THE CITED ANNUNCIATORS ARE LOCATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THEIR RELATED CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS. IN ALL CASES, ANNUNCIATORS ARE REFERENCED IN THE ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURES. THE OPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO LOOK UP MULTI-INPUT ALARMS IN THE PROCEDURE BOOK AS NECESSARY. a RC/SAIC COMMENT l

(c'"fThisHEDconcernsthefactthatalarm

(, tiles are not located above the l controls / displays necessary for' corrective or diagnostic action in response  !

to the alarm. Neither the exact number of these annunciators was provided ,

nor their descriptions. The corrective action proposed does not address the 1 discrepancy. The licensee should readdress this system and this problem. '

CECO CLARIFICATION Reevaluation of this HED by the HEDAT resulted in concurrence with the NRC's-comments. '

Annunciator tiles cited in the original HED will be evaluated .

All tiles of a time critical response nature and those that have a. safety significance will be relocated to be as close to corresponding controls / displays as possible. Given-that the first outage has' passed for Unit 2 end is in the near future for Unit 1, the. implementation of thir corrective action will be completed by the end of the second refueling outage.

IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O

1 PAGE: C9- 8 {

/"'

]

(_)T QUAD CITIES STATION l REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO i IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.

HED # 31 j APPENDIX C9 i HED CATEGORY 28 l FSR PAGE 77 l l

FINDING VISUAL ALARM TILES WITHIN AN ANNUNCIATOR MATRIX ARE NOT, FOR THE MOST PART, GROUPED BY FUNCTION, SYSTEM, SUBSYSTEM OR OTHER LOGICAL ORDER.

ARRANGING THE ALARM TILES IN LOGICAL GROUPS MAY FACILITATE LOCALIZATION  !

AND RESPONSE TO ALARMS. ALARMS LISTED ON THE ATTACHED SHEETS ARE EXAMPLES OF THOSE NOT LOGICALLY GROUPED AND ARE OF CONCERN TO THE OPERATORS.

RESPONSE i THE CITED ANNUNCIATORS ARE LOCATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THEIR RELATED CONTRCLS AND DISPLAYS. IN ALL CASES, ANNUNCIATORS ARE REFERENCED IN THE ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURES. THE OPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO LOOK UP MULTI-INPUT ALARMS IN THE PROCEDURE BOOK AS NECESSARY.

)

('~tiRC/SAICCOMMENT '

This HED concerns the fact that alarm tiles are not grouped by function, system, subsystem or other logical order. Neither the exact number of these annunciators was provided nor their descriptions. The corrective action proposed does not address the discrepancy. The licensee should readdress this system and this problem.

CECO CLARIFICATION In response to the NRC's comments this HED was reevaluated by the HEDAT.

The alarms cited in the HED vare reviewed and, while they are not necessarily grouped by function, system, or other logical order as the HED states, they are in an Annunciator box above the controls / displays used to mitigate the condition that prompted the alarm and therefore are within the operators visual field when he manipulates those controls and/or views those displays. In addition, the HEDAT felt that the reorganization to the Annunciator boxes necessary to address the concerns expressed in the HED would destroy position coding that has developed over time and enhance the potential for operator error. No further consideration or action is therefore warrented.

r\

bdMPLEMENTATION ACCEPT AS IS

. PAGE: C9- 9 QUAD CITIES STATION REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR. j HED # 32

. APPENDIX C9 HED CATEGORY 2A FSR PAGE 80 FINDING THERE ARE SOME VISUAL TILE LEGENDS WHICH ARE AMBIGUOUS AND NON-SPECIFIC.

THEY ALERT THE OPERATOR TO SYSTEM ' TROUBLE' AND FAIL TO ELABORATE ON THE SPECIFIC TROUBLE. THE OPERATORS ARE PROVIDED WITH LITTLE OR NO INDICATION AS TO WHAT THE TROUBLE IS AND HAVE NO OTHER MEANS TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEM FURTHER (OTHER THAN SENDING EAs AND EOs OUT TO IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC TROUBLE).

RESPONSE

THE OPERATORS HAVE CONTROL PANEL OR LOCAL PANEL INSTRUMENTS 7!ON AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC " TROUBLE". IN ALL CASES, ANNUNCIATORS ARE REFERENCED IN THE ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURES. THE OPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO LOOK UP MULTI-INPUT ALARMS IN THE PROCEDURE BOOK WHEN NECESSARY.

RC/SAIC COMMENT This HED concerns the plant's multi-input annunciator alarms, which all told violate ten Human Engineering Criteria. Neither the exact number of these annunciators was provided nor their descriptions; though based on their assigned category and level of severity it is apparent they are important to plant safety. The corrective action proposed does not address the  ;

discrepancy. The licensee should readdress this system and this problem.

CECO CLARIFICATION Upon further evaluation, the HEDAT concurred with the NRC's comments and will established a team to perform an in depth review of multi-input alarms at Quad Cities station similar to the team that was established at Dresden station. The review at Dresden identified many multi-input alarms for which adequate control room instrumentation existed to enable the operator to determine the status of the parameter alarmed. For example,.it would be impossible for a level or pressure parameter to alarm HIGH.and then to subsequently alarm LOW without first being able to be reset. A reflash capability would not enhance these alarms. The same was true for dual division / channel alarms in which the operator's response was identical regardless of the division / channel to actuate.the alarm. In fact, when one division / channel alarms the other division / channel should alarm as well. In addition, many local panels have " Trouble" alarms in the control room that activate whenever the local panel's alarms activate. The response to these alarms was to dispatch an operator to the local panel to address the alarm.

s The local panels contained the necessary controls and displays to mitigate the conditions that prompted the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room.

.__-_--_----_-___-_-____D

l PAGE: C9-10 at the local panel to address any subsequent alarm, it

(^)gSinceanoperatorwas

( was not necessary to have multiple alarm windows or computer alarms I

I availa'rie in the main control room for these local " Trouble" alarms.

Moreover, once these alarms have been reset at the local panel they will reflash the " Trouble" alarm in the main control room. Instances were discerned, however, in which control room indication was not sufficient to enable an operator to detect the actuation of a subsequent alarm input once the annunciator had actuated on a different input. In these instances the alarm was to be split out into an appropriate alarm tile or added to the process computer as an alarm point should an adequate tile not be available.

It is anticipated that the review to be performed at Quad Cities will result in findings similar to those from the Dresden review. As at Dresden, any alarms for which control room indication is insufficient to enable an operator to detect a subsequent alarm input actuation will be split out into appropriate alarm tiles or added to the process computer as an alarm point.

1 IMPLEMENTATION 2ND REFUELING OUTAGE O