ML20246F637
| ML20246F637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1989 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E449 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905150042 | |
| Download: ML20246F637 (60) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . i' ~ \_.s l. l Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation Report for Amendment to Facility Operating License March 3, 1989 Revision 1 o Prepared for Commonwealth Edison Company by Sargent & Lundy O 8905150042 890501 PDR ADOCK 05000254 p PDC _
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' Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance I
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
- 1.0 Comply with intent:
Design guidance provided in this section does not include any requirements. - L V('s l l r L L (mc) 1-1
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[* Guidelines for Permanent SWil Implementation or Justification
* : Hvdrogen Water Chemistry Installation . for Nonconformance q
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M( 2.0 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ~ 2.0 " Comply with intent:
. Design guidance provided in this section
~
- Figure 2-1;shows the hydrogen- addition system ini simplified. form.- For this - does not include any requirements.
. ; report, the system is divided into hydrogen supply, oxygen supply, hydrogen injection, .
and oxygen injection systems. Options for hydrogen supply are discussed briefly below, and, detailed descriptions of the main options are provided in Section 3. Oxygen supply is also described in Section E
- 3. The gas injection systems are described in Lthis chapter. _Also described in this.
chapter are ; instruments : and ' controls applicable to the entire system. 7' 2.1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 Comply with intent:
.The hydrogen. water chemistry system is See Section 2.0.
- n. not safety-related. Equipment and com-
'i ponentsf need not 7 b~ e redundant (except where required to meet g .od engineering
. practice), . seismic l category 1,- electrical
, Q ! class; IE, or environmentally . qualified.
Nevertheless, proximity to safety-related b ' equipment or other plant systems requires specia! consideration in the design, fabri-cation, . = installation, operation and
. maintenance of hydrogen addition system components. Section 9 of .this document delineates the quality assurance and quality control requirements to assur.e a safe and reliable ' hydrogen addition system. In some. cases these requirements
- are 'over ' and above those which are normallyL required 'for nonsafety-related installations.
The hydropn addition system should sup-press the dissolved oxygen concentration in the recirculation water to a point where IG5CC immunity is maintained at all reactor power. levels at which the hydro-gen addicion system is operating. J O s l l 2-1 l
f ; , Revision 1
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.g;delines for ' Permanent BWR ' ~ implementation or Justification Hydrogen. Water Chemistry Installation ; . for Nonconformance yy; if Qd 2.2: HYDROGEN SUPPLY OPTIONS 2.2 Comply with intent:
? Hydrogen Ecan o be ' supplied from three See Section 2.0.
sources: - L (1) J a; commercial hydrogen supplier;L (2) 'onsite- production from raw materials; or.(3) recovery.'and recycle of
< hydrogen- from f the .off-gas system. Any_
combination of these three methods may,.
.in principle, L be. appropriate ' at a ' given
- 3 . f acility. .
2.2.li Commercial Suppliers 2.2.1 Comply: 4 Hydrogen .'can .be ' obtained commercially Hydrogen will'be initially supplied by 7p
~
' from two types of sources: (1) merchant Liquid Air Corporation, which is a producers- (i.e.. ' companies that make ~
Merchant producer.
- hydrogen for' the purpose of selling it to
'o'
.others) and (2). byproduct producers (i.e.,-
companies that produce hydrogen only as a byproduct of their main business). . Hydrogen obtained in. this manner is,sup-plied as a -high pressure gas .or as a
. cryogenic liquid. ~ The selection of gaseous i
;A)(
i s or liquid supply
.. : requirements opt such as ons depends flow rates and in- on system
' " L ' jection pressures and onsite considerations 1 such as available separation distances and
) : building Estr'engths. In: general, gaseous
, f~ storage is preferred for low flow rates and small separation distances. Detailed con-
' _s ' iderations for gaseous and liquid hydrogen ,
, supply facilities are described in Sections 3.1 and :3.2 of ~ this report, respectively.
Safety considerations are discussed in
- Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
. - 2.2.2 Onsite Production 2.2.2 Not Applicable:
f : Industrial processes for hydrogen pro- Onsite production will not be used for the
.V ' ' duction can be divided into two groups: initial design.
electrolysis of water and thermochemical
, , decomposition 'of a feedstock that con-I
. tains hydrogen.
Detailed considerations for onsite pro-duction of hydrogen by electrolysis are described in Section 3.3 of this~ report. 1 i 2-2
i Revision 1 L March 1989 1 implementation or Justification Guidslines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance S x ,,
) All other processes for producing high ,
purity hydrogen involve thermochemical ! decomposition of ' hydrogen-containing feedstocks followed by a series of chem-ical and/or physical operations that con-centrate and purify the hydrogen. While these processes are feasible, in principle, they are not currently envisioned for im-pigmentation. Therefore, these processes are not addressed in this report. 2.2.3 Recovery 2.2.3 Not Applicable: Many processes are commercially avail-A recovery method will not be used for able for seps. ating, concentrating, and the initial design. purifying hydrogen from refinery or by-product streams or for upgrading the purity of manufactured hydrogen. Processes are alto being developed for the recovery and storage of hydrogen by the formation of rechargeable metal hydrides. Although recovery of hydrogen is a viable option, near-term implementation of this option is not envisioned. Therefore, this fS option is not addressed in this report. lO < 2.3 GAS INJECTION SYSTEMS 2.3.1 Hydrogen Injection System 2.3.1 Comply: The hydrogen injection system includes all flow control and flow measuring equip-ment and all necessary instrumentation and controls to ensure safe, reliable operation. 2.3.1.1 Injecticn Point Considerations 2.3.1.1 Comply: Hydrogen is injected into the condensate Hydrogen shall be injected at a location pump discharge line, upstream of the con-that provides adequate dissolving and densate booster pump, through gas saver mixing and avoids gas pockets at high lance assemblies, points. Experience has shown that injection into the suction of feedwater or condensate booster pumps is feasible. Injection into feedwater pumps will require hydrogen at high pressures (e.g., 150-600 psig). This may require either a compressed gas supply, compressors or a cryogenic hydrogen pump, depending on ( )
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, a m- _ Cuidelines for Pemanent BWR implementation or 3 justification
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry bstallation ~ for Nonconformance
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' gthe(supply option chosen. In the case of a yliquid hydrogen storage system, this can also af fect: the. sizing ..of' the liquid b,
- hydrogen tank.
There . may: be._ pressure fluctuations in feedwater systems, depending on reactor power level and pump performance. The hydrogen addition system shall be designed ~ to accommodate the full range of such
- fluctuations. -
12.3.1.2 Codes and Standards 2.3.l'.2 (Paragraphs 1 through' 5) Comply with intent: This system shall be designed andl installed - - Codes and standards used for the hydrogen
-in accordance with 05HA' standards in injection system are equivalent to or more 29 CFR 1910.103. stringent than those identified in this section. .
Piping and related equipment shall' be designed and fabricated to_the appropriate edition of ANS!" B31.1 or' B31.3 for pressure'-retaining components. S.torage - containers, .if used, 'shall be designed, constructed, and tested 'in accordance with appropriate requirements off.ASME B&PV Section. Vill or API Standard' 620.
. AAll components shall meet all' the Dmandatoryj requirements and material specifications with regard to manuf actLre, examination, repair, testing,' identification and certification. -
-- All : welding . shall ' be performed using procedures meeting requirements in AWS Dl.1, ANSI- B31.1 or B31.3, or ASME
' B&PV, Section IX, as appropriate.
Inspection and _ testing shdl be in accordance -with requirements in ANSI B31.1,- ANSI _ B31.3, or API 620, as appropriate. . System design shall also conform with
' pertinent portions of _ NUREG-0800, 10 CFR 50.48, Branch Technical position BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and appropriate standards land regulations referenced in this document. Appendix A provices a list of codes, standards, regu:ations, arc published good engineermg prac tices applicable to permanent hydregen water 2.;
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- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation k,@
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N;; J chemistry installations.. l Each . utility is .
- a responsible ~ forctidentifying '. additional!
j'
. plant-specific ' codes : and ' standards : that may apply, such'as State-imposed require-
- ments, Uniform. Building Code, ACI or
' AISC. standards.
- n. Piping and equipment'shall' be marked or 2.3.1.2 (Paragraph 6) Do not comply:
~
y lidentified in accordance with ANSI 235.1..
. See Section 10.1 'of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry l license package for justifi-cation for noncompliance. 3 2.3.1.3 . System Design Considerations.
~
2.3.1.3 Comply: Hydrogen piping from the . supply system to .
'the plant.may be above or below ground. . .
Piping below; ground shall be designed for.
' cathodic protection '(or be coated and-
. wrapped), the. appropriate soil conditions such _as~ frost depth'.or liquefaction; and' expected v ehicle iloads. Guard . piping -
around" hydrogen lines is' not required;
? however, consideration shall~ be given to its use for such purposes 'as' protection
[. . ,') . from~ heavy 1 traffic loads, leak detection A7 and monitoring, . or <isolationL . of the
- potential hazard from nearby equipment, etc.- J All . hydrogen. piping should be grounded and have electrical continuity.
Excess flow ; valves should be installed in
' .o the hydrogen line at appropriate locations
~to restrict ' flow- out of a broken line.
- Excess flow protection shall be designed
.to ensure that a line break w'ill not result in'an unacceptable hazard to personnel or
. equipment (BTP CMEB 9.5-1). The design 4- features.for mitigating the consequences of a leak or line break must perform their
' intended design function with or without normal ventilation.
~ Individual pump injection lines shall contain a check valve to prevent feed-
- water.from entering the hydrogen line and to protect upstream hydrogen gas compo-
<- nents. Automatic isolation valves should be. pr.ovided in each injection line to
. prevent hydrogen injection into 'an inactive pump.
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Implementation or Justification
. Guidelines for Permanent'BWR-F . Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance ' ;f%
LAi Purge Connections'shall' be provided to 2.3.1.3 (Continued) Comply: ' W allow . theshydrogen' piping to' be com-pietely; purged of air before . hydrogen 'is introduced . into the line. Nitrogen or1 % another : inert gas - shall be used as the ~ purge gas. Gases'shall be purged to safe
" locations, either directly or through: ~
p intervening . flow . paths, . such . that per-
- sonnel: or ~ explosive hazards are..not o
encountered and undesirable quantities of gas are not injected into the reactor.
~
F .' Area hydrogen concentration nenitors are an acceptable way to ensure le hydrogen i concentration is. maintain 6 'Lelow the flammable lirait.y if used, such monitors should be located at high points where
- hydrogen'~might collect.and/or above use pointsi that. constitute potential leaks.
p Good . engineering . practice . for locating
. hydrogen detector heads isito take into
! consideration the positive buoyancy of y -gaseous hydrogen. ' Detector heads shall be R located f so that the monitors shall be ifN . capable of detecting hydrogen leaks with Kf or without. normal ventilation. Each utility'shal' evaluate its particular system design and identify specific points where hydrogen concentration monitors should be -
. installed. - Examples of such points include .
flanged in-line' devices (such as calibration spool pieces ' associated with mass flow- ~ meters), . outlets of purge / vent paths, or
- the items discussed in the following paragraph. Sleeves or guard pipes can be -
used as an alternative method to raitigate
- the consequences of a line break.
A hydrogen addition system will increase the hydrogen concentration in the' feed-water, reactor, steamlines and main condenser. - Each of these systems shall be reviewed for possible detrimental effects. l A discussion of pcssible concerns is - ; 1 presented below.
. Main . Condenser. The main con-denser presently handles combustible gases. The hydrogen addition system
. does not significantly change the 2-6
r 'Guidslines for Ptrmanent BWR Implementation or Justification
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance _ .m i j concentration or volume 'of noncon- 2.3.1.3 (Continued) Comply:
densables. Therefore, it is not anticipated that hydrogen addition will affect operation of the main
. condenser.
- Off-Gas System. Oxygen shall be added into the off-gas system to recombine with the hydrogen flow thus limiting the extent of the sy3 tem handling hydrogen rich rnix-tures and reducing volumetric flow rates. The net effect will probably be a revised heat input into the re-combined off-gas. The capability of the off-gas systen - to handle this revised heat load must be evaluated to ensure that temperature limits are not exceeded. Considerations in the design of the off-gas oxygen injection system should include loss of oxygen and runaway oxygen injection.
- Steam Piping and Torus. Hydrogen (n) water chemistry may slightly increase the rate of' hydrogen leak-age into the torus via the safety relief valves. However, the rate of oxygen leakage will be decreased.
Thus, the possibility of forming a combustible mixture is .not signifi-cantly increased when compared to non-HWC operation.
- Sumps. There are three water systems that may be affected by HWC: main condenser condensate, feedwater and reactor water. For sumps, which receive water from any of these three sources, the j average hydrogen concentration in i the water may increase slightly. !
The maximum expected concentra-tion of hydrogen in the sump atmosphere should be determined to ensure that the hydrogen concentra-i tion remains below the lower com-bustible limit of hydrogen in air. V 2-7 E_a - _ ---- - __-- - - _ _ - - . - _ - _ - - - -
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o . -Guidelines for Permanent BWR - . implementation or Justification
.. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance pW
' a Af ' 2.3.2' Oxygen injection System 2.3.2 Comply: The oxygen' injeciion ( system - injects
. oxygen into the off-gas system to ensure
.that all excess hydrogen in. the off-gas stream 'is ' recombined. It. includes all ~
. necessary flow control and flow measure-ment equipment.'...
2.3.2.1 Injection Point Consideration- 2.3.2.1 Comply: Oxygen should be. injected into a portion Oxygen is injected upstream of the first a of; the off-gas system that is already stage steam jet air ejector,
,' diluted such that .the addition of oxygen does not create a combustible mixture. If this is not possible, other ' system design
. considerations shall be provided in plant-specific cases to reduce the chances for off-gas fires.
12.3.2.2 Codes and Standards 2.3.2.2 (Paragraphs 1, 2,3, and 5) Comply with intent:
.,The' system shall be designed and installed
-in accordance with OSHA standards in 29 Codes and standards used for the oxygen CFR 1910.104, and CGA G4.4, Industrial injection system are equivalent to or more 4, Practices . for; Gaim s Oxygen Trans- stringent than those identified in this mission and Distribution Piping Systems. . section.
Pipingi and related equipment shall be designed, fabricated, tested and installed
.in accordance with the appropriate edition of ANSI B31.1 or ANSI B31.3. Additional guidance on materials of construction for oxygen piping . and . valves is given in
- Section;3.4 of this report, and in ANSI /
ASTM G63, " Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen Service." Welding shall be performed using procedures meeting requirements of AWS Dl.1 or - ASME B&PV, Section IX, as appropriate. Piping shall be marked .or identified in 2.3.2.2 (Paragraph 4) Do not comply: compliance with ANSI Z35.1. See Section 10.1 of the HWC licensing package for justification for noncom-pliance. 2-8
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" Guidelines for Permanent BWR-Implementation or Justification
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
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System . design shall . also conform with appropriate NFPA,' CGA, and other'stan-dards . and l regulations ' referenced else-where in' this document. Each utility is responsible for identifying plant-specific Ecodes and standards that may apply, such
, as State-imposed requirements, Uniform Building Code, ACI or AISC standards.
2.3.2.3 Cleaning 2.3.2.3 Comply with intent: - g Alli portions of ~ the > syst'em that may The oxygen . piping was cleaned using contact oxygen shall be cleaned as procedures that met the requirements of described in Section 3.4 of this report, and CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4. in accordance with CGA G-4.1, Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service. 2.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 2.4 Do not comply: This subsection discusses the instrumen- See Section 10.2 of the HWC licensing tation, controls, and monitoring associated package for justification of the following with the hydrogen addition system. system icjps which were not provided in the design of the HWC system. The instrumentation and controls include a. High Residual Oxygen in Off-Gas O all sensing elements, equipment and valve b. Trip, Low Oxygen injection System Supply V- operating fland switches, equipment and Pressure or Flow Trip, and valve- statut lights, process information instruments, and all automatic control c. Off-Gas Train or Recombiner Train equipment necessary to ensure. safe and Trip reliable operation. Table 2-1 lists the recommended trips of the hydrogen addi-tion system. The instrumentation shall provide indication, and/or recording' of parameters necessary to monitor and con-trol the system and its equipment. The instrumentation shall also indicate and/or alarm abnormal or undesirable conditions. Table 2-2 lists the recommended instru-mentation and functions. This table also includes instrumentation for hydrogen and oxygen . supply options. Additional infor-mation on instrumentation and controls is p ovided in Section 3. System instrumentation and controls shall
. be' centralized where feasible to facilitate
- f. ease of control and observation of the system. . As a minimum, there shall be a system trouble alarm and/or annunciator provided in the main control room.
[\ . L ! 2-9 k__.__.m_m___. _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ . _ .
t ,- Revision 1 March 1989 4 implementation or Justification Guidelines for Permanent BWR for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation t' w l . 2.4.1- Hydrogen Injection Flow Control 2.4.1 Comply:
)
o Parallel flow control valves should be ! provided in the hydrogen injection line for
- system reliability and maintainability. If
~
flow control is automatic, hydrogen flow
- rate should be controlled as a function of plant process parameters such as steam or feedwater flow.
The capability should be provided to adjust flow rate to each pump manually, if this is found to be necessary to achieve adequate hydrogen distribution. l Manual isolation valves shall be provided
- - in each pump injection line to accommo-date pump out-of-service conditions. !'
Individual, pump injection lines should contain automatic isolation valves inter-locked to the corresponding pump, so that hydrogen is not injected into a pump that is not running.
,m
.T 1 Provisions for shutoff of hydrogen V injection shall be provided in the control room.
2.4.2. Oxygen Injection Flow Control 2.4.2. (Paragraph 1) Comply with intent: Only a single pure oxygen train is provided Parallel flow control valves should be for each unit. The second train is from an provided in the oxygen injection line for air intake in the building. Each train has a system reliability and maintainability. single flow control valve. Oxygen. flow rate shall be controlled to 2.4.2 (Paragraph 2) Comply: provide residual oxygen downstream of the recombiners. System controls shall be Oxygen flow is based upon the hydrogen flow rate to provide residual oxygen downstream designed to ensure that oxygen injection continues after hydrogen flow stops, so of the recombiners. that all free hydrogen is safely Oxygen flow continues for 20 minutes after l recombined. hydrogen injection is terminated. 2.4.3 Monitoring 2.4.3 Comply: Provision shall be made to monitor con-tinuously the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the recirculation water. In I obtaining samples of recirculation water for this purpose, appropriate containment isolation shall be provided in accordance l (~ l l c 1 2-10 l 1 I L_____
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,; ' ,J C'u idelines for' Permanent BWR; ~ Implementation or Justification in H9drogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance Egg u Mi with-_10 CFR 50h Appendix A, General , '
L Design Criteria 3, 54, 55, 56, or 57. - iProvision ':should:. be made to. monitor-A: -continuously; thefconcentration of- oxygen -
- and hydrogen ;in - the off-gas:' flow ' down-
' stream of the recombiners. .-Hydrogen and
'F- ' oxygen monitoring in the off-gas recom-biner system should ineet the acceptance
. criteria of Standard Review Plan 11.3 with.
, the exception . that automatic control
. functions are not re_ quired.:
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Revision'1
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March 1989. Implementation or Justification-
.' Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance D .
V - 3.0 SUPPLY FACILITIES e. 3.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN . 3.1.1. System Overview 3.1.1 Comply : 1.iquid Air Corporation will provide the Hydrogen gas can be supplied from e'ither hydr 8en gas supply system, which includes permanent high-pressure vessels or from . a liquid hydr gen tank, permanent. hydrogen transportable . tube trailers. For the St rage tubes, and two discharge stantions N permanent storage system, gaseous hydro- i r temp rary hydrogen supply from, tube gen . is , stored in seamless - ASME code trailers.
" vessels at pressures up to 2,400 psig and .
ambient temperatures. . Transportable vessels are designed to DOT standards and store hydrogen at pressures up to 2,650
- psig at ambient temperatures. With either storage design, the gas is routed through a ,
pressure control station which maintains a
' constant hydrogen supply pressure. In any event, the gaseous hydrogen system shall be provided by a supplier who has exten- i
'sive experience in the design, operation g' -
' and maintenance of associated storage and s supply systems. Gaseous hydrogen shall be provided per CGA G-5 and G-5.3.
3.1.2 Specific Equipment Description 3.1.2.1 Hvdrogen Storage Vessels 3.1.2.1 comply: The hydrogen storage bank shall be com- The long-term hydrogen supply system will posed .of ASME Code gas storage vessels. utilize a cryogenic liquid hydrogen storage tank with AS!E gaseous tubes as a hydrogen
- Each tube shall be constructed as a' seam-less vessel with swagged ends. Specific surge supply, tube design shall be based on ASME Un-fired Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, l Division 1, including Appendix XIV-70.
The tube bank shall be supported to prevent movement in the event of line failure and each tube shall be equipped ; with a close-coupled shutoff valve. As an alternative, one safety valve per bank of tubes can be used, provided the safety valve is sized to handle the maximum , relief from all tubes tied into the valve. '
. Each bank shall be equipped with a ther-mometer and a pressure gauge, as is I
necessary for proper filling. 3-1
W - - ._ Revision 1 , March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification ' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance , j
.,m 3.1.2.2 Transportable Hydrmen Storage 3.1.2.2 Comply :
Vessel Transportable hydrogen vessels shall be The transportable tube trailers are constructed, tested, and stested (every 5 provided, tested, and maintained by years), in accordance .5 DOT spec- the hydrogen supplier, ifications 3A, 3AA, 3AX, or 3AAX. All valving and instrumentation shall be identical to Section 3.1.2.1. 3.1.2.3 Pressure Reducing Station 3.1.2.3 Comply:
- I The pressure control station shall be of a manifold design. The manifold shall have
two (2) full-flow parallel pressure reducing regulators. The discharge pressure range of these regulators shall be adjustable to satisfy plant hydrogen injection require-ments. Pressure gauges shall be provided upstream and downstream of the regt-lators. Sufficient hand valves .shall be provided to ensure complete operational tiexibility.
/l An excess flow check valve shall be V installed in the manifold immediately downstream of the regulators to limit the
' flow rate in the event of a line break. The stop-flow setpoint shall be determined by each plant and should be set between the maximum plant flow requirements and the full C y of the flow control valves.
Additional guidance on excess flow protection is providea in Section 2.3.1.3. 3.1.2.4 Tube Trailer Discharge Stanchion 3.1.2.4 Comply : l A tube trailer discharge stanchion shall be provided for gaseous product unloading. The stanchion shall consist of a flexible pigtail, shutoff valve, check valve, bleed
. valve, and necessary piping. Filling apparatus shall be separated from other equipment for safety and convenience, and protected with walls or barriers to prevent vehicular collision.
A tube trailer ground assembly shall be provided for each discharge stanchion to ;
,G ground the tube trailer before the discharge of hydrogen begins.
3-2 L - _____
Revicion'1 March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent B4R Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance o m) 3.1.2.5 Interconnecting Pipeline 3.1.2.5 Comply : 1 All equipment and interconnecting piping l I supplied with this system shall be installed in compliance with - the following standards: American National Standards Insti-tute (ANSI) B31.1, Power Piping, B31.3, Chemical Plant and Petro-leum Refinery Piping.
- National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70, National Electrical Code.
- NFPA-50A,' Bulk Hydrogen Systems.
- All applicable ' local and national !
Codes. There are - several suitable field instal-lation techniques which are based on industrial experience. The following are guidelines which may be used for field i
.(~). connections:
(
- Copper-to-Copper, Brass-to-Brass, and Copper-to-Brass Socket Braze Joints.
-- Silver Alloy 45% Ag,15% Cu,15% Zn, 24%
Cd., ASTM B260-69T and AWS AS.8-69T, bag-1 Melting Range-Solidus-607.2*C Liquidus-618.3*C
-- Flux Working Range 593.3*C to 871.l
- C
- Copper, Brass, Carbon Steel, and Stainless Steel N.P.T. Threaded Joints. i s
3-3
Revision 1 March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
-- TEFLON
- Tape *
- 3.1.2.3 (Continued) Comply : .
SCOTCH * *
- Number 48 Tape *
- l or equal. -195.5"C to +204.4*C,0 to 3,000 psig. Wrapped in direction of threads.
- Flange Joints (On all Materials).
-- Ring Gasket Material Low Pressure (720 psig maximum)
Precut T.F.E. impregnated asbestos, 1/6 inch thickness. Garlock 900 or equal. -1955*C to
+168.3*C, ) to 900 psig.
-- Ring Gasket Material,, High Pressure FLEXITALLIC * * *
- Type. Mate-rial to be 0.175 inch thick 304 stainless steel with TEFLON filler and 0.125 inch carbon steel J
^] guide ring.
" TEFLON is a trademark of E.1. duPont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington, DE 19898.
*
- 1f tape is used, electrical continuity / grounding of each piping ;
section should be confirmed.
* *
- SCOTCH is a trademark of 3M Company, St. Paul, MN 55101.
* * *
- FLEXITALLIC is a trademark of i-y Flexitat!ic Gasket Co., Bellmawr, NJ 1 08031.
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Revision 1 l March 1989 Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation for Nonconformance
' s'
- Antiseize Compound 3.1.2.3 (Continued) Con oly :
For flange face, nut, and bolt l lubrication. - Halocarbon 25-55 grease or equal. -195.5'C to
+176.6*C, 0 to 3,000 psig. DO NOT USE ON ALUMINUM, MAG-NESIUM, OR THEIR ALLOYS UNDER CONDITIONS OF HIGH TORQUE OR SHEAR.
- Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum Alloys Socket and Butt Welds.
- Welding Procedure Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW),
Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW), Shielded Metal Arc Welding ((SMAW), Welding PAW); or Plasma Arc with appropriate filler material and shielding gas. Proper surface and joint preparation (in regard to cleaning (,) ('~% and clearances) should be exercised. 3.1.2.6 Component Cleaning 3.1.2.6 Comply : j All components that contact hydrogen i must be free of moisture, loose rust, scale, slag, and weld spatter; they must be essentially free of organic matter, such as oil, grease, crayon, paint, etc. To meet these objectives, system components shall be cleaned in accordance with standard industrial practices, as recommended by the gas supplier, prior to and following system fabrication. 3.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN 3.2.1 System Overview 3.2.1 Comply : Liquid Air Corporation will provide Liquid hydrogen is stored in a vacuum- a 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen tank jacketed vessel at pressures up to 150 psig fI a Permanent supply source. and temperatures up to -403'F (satu-rated). Based on data relating hydrogen cw injection pressures to BTR plant power
) levels, hydrogen supply from a liquid 3-5
Revision 1 March 1989 3~ . .. Guidelin:s for Permanent BWR - Implementation or Justification
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Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconforrr.ance M, j~SD/ source can be provided directly ' from a .
~
1 tank or pumped into supplemental gaseous storage. Gaseous , storage requirements
. are: identified in Section 3.1 The required supply pressure shall be based on pressure requirements at the point of . hydrogen
- injection and line losses from the hydrogen supply system to the injection. point. -
Feedwater pressure requirements and line
- losses must not exceed 120 psig if hydro-gen is to be supplied directly from a liquid tank.
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' In any event., the' liquid hydrogen system shall be provided by a' supplier who has extensive experience in ' the - - design, Ll operation and maintenar,ce of associated storage and supply systems, such as cryogenic ' pumping. Liquid hydrogen shall be provided in accordance with CGA G-3 and G-5.3.
3.2.2 Specif'ic Equipment Description p-3.2.2.1 Cryogenic Tank. 3.2.2.1 Comply : Tanks for' liquid hydrogen service are l available with. capacities between 1,500 gallonsLand - 20,000 gallons. An " inner vessel" or " liquid container" is supported within an " outer. vessel" or !' vacuum jacket,"- with the space between filled with' insulation and evacuated. Necessary piping connects from' inside of the inner vessel to outside of the vacuum jacket. Gauges'and valves to indicate the control of hydrogen in the vessel are mounted ' outside of the vacuum jacket. Legs or
. saddles to support the whole assembly are
, welded ~ to the outside of the vacuum jacket.
Inner vessels are designed, fabricated, tested, and stamped in accordance with , Section Vlli, Division 1, of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. Materials suitable for liquid hydrogen service must have good ductility properties at tem-peratures of -422"F per CGA G-5. The g O 3-6 i __---_:____. 1
, , . Revision 1 s March 1989 Guld: lines for Perman:nt BWR Implementation or Justification .c ' Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation.
for Nonconformance i)f cryogenic operating temperatures of these
; vessels ' , preclude - material degrading ,
" mechanisms such as. corrosion or hydrogen embrittlement. The constant operating .
vessel pressures assure that flaw growth - due. : to- cyclic ' stress loading will not occur. The inner vessel-is subject to a required'pressur'e test.which ensures that no flaws exist that could cause a failure at
. or below the set pressure of the vessel's
, - redundant relief' devices. - In addition to i
;ASME Code inspection requirements, 100%. radiography -- of the inner vessei longitudinal - welds shall be completed.
The, tank outer vessel shall be constructed of carbon steel and shall not require ASME
, certification.
Insulation between inner and outer vessels shall be either perlite, aluminized mylar, Lor : suitable ' equal. Fibrous or- blanket insulation, such as bonded glass fibers or rock wool, shall not be used because of the potential for liquid-saturated missiles
'which would occur- only as a result' of
[x'] ' vessel failure. The annular space should be evacuated -to a high vacuum of 50 microns'or less.
. Tank control piping and valving should be '
installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 or B31.3. . All piping shall be either wrought copper or stainless steel. The following tank piping subsystems shall be provided:
- Fill circuit, constructed with top and bottom lines so that the' vessel can be filled without affecting continu-ous hydrogen supply.
1
- Pressure-build circuit, to keep tank pressures at operational levels.
- Vacuum-jacketed liquid' fill and pump circuits, where applicable.
3.2.2.2 Overpressure Protection System 3.2.2.2 Comply : l Safety considerations for the tank shall be satisfied by dual full-flow safety valves . i
; and emergency backup rupture discs. The 3-7 l
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R: Vision 1 March 1989 Implem:ntation or Justification Guiitlin;s for Permanent SWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconfortnance , 7 primary relief system shall consist of two 3.2.2 (Continued) Comply : ( ,1 sets of a minimum of one (1) rupture disk and safety valve piped into separate l
" legs." Relief devices shall be connected in parallel with other relief devices. The system shall be coupled by a 3-way divert-er valve or tie bar interlock so that one leg is opened when the other is closed.
With'this arrangement, a minimum of one safety valve and one rupture disk will be available at all times. The dual primary relief systems with 100% standby redun-dancy allows maintenance and testing to be performed without sacrificing the level of protection from overpressure. The primary relief system shall comply with the provisions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compressed Gas Association (CGA) Standards. The tank shall also be supplied with a secondary relief system not required by
,q the ASME Codes. This system shall be totally separate from the primary relief
(') system. It shall consist of a locked open valve, a rupture oisk, and a secondary vent stack. This rupture disk shall be designed to burst at 1.33 times maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). Supply system piping that may contain li-quid and can be isolatable from the tank relief valves shall be protected with ther-mal relief valves. All outlet connections from the safety relief valves, rupture de-vices, bleed valves, and the fill line purge connections shall be piped to an overhead vent stack, per CGA G-3, Section 7.3.7. Two relief devices shall be installed in the tank's outer vessel to relieve any exces-sive pressure buildup in the annular space. Hydrogen tanks and delivery vehicles shall be grounded per CGA P-12, Sections 5...s and 3.7.1.2. The storage system shall be l protected from the ef fects of lightning per NFPA 78, Chapter 6.
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+ - ' /. Guidelines for Prrmantnt BWR imp!ementation or Justification
; Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance y
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Esceul!!ow protection shall be added to 3,%) th'e tint 6s liquid piping wherever a line
- break would release a sufficient amount of
~ hydrogen- to threaten : safety-related structures. . An acceptable methodology is L identified in Section 4.2.2, " Pipe Breaks."
3.2.2.3 : Instrumentation 3.2.2.3 Comply:
-The tank shall'be supplied with a pressure l gauge, a liquid level gauge, and a . vacuum
' readout connection. These gauges are
' sufficient for normal monitoring of the tank condition. Iristrumentation . for.
remote monitoring, such as high/ low-pressure switches, pressure and level . transmitters may be added. . A-listing of supply system instrumentation' and control .
. is identified in Section 2.4.
3.2.2.4 Liquid Hydrogen Pump and 3.2.2.4 Comply: Controls l The ' liquid bydrogen pump ; shall be of-f.~ proven design to ' provide - . continuous G-. i./ hydrogen supply in unattended, automatic operation. The following items comprise . the more important system controls. 3.2.2.4.1 Positive Isolation Valve . 3.2.2.4.1 Comply:
~ A positive isolation valve shall be used to l control the liquid feed into the pumping system per NFPA SOB. The valve shall be a failed-closed,- pneumatically operated
' valve. The valve shall only be open during pump operation, shall close in any fault mode, and shall be able to be remotely overridden in case of emergency.
3.2.2.4.2 System Overpressure Shutdown 3.2.2.4.2 Comply :
. Although the system is protected by l safety relief valves and rupture discs, system overpressure shall be avoided by shutting down the pumps at high pressure.
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Revision 1-March 1989
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- Guidelinks.for Pzrmenent BWR , .impismantation nr Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance o
jy _ () ,: 3.2.2.4.3. Temperature Indicating Switch 3.2.2.4.3 Comply: - A temperature switch shall continuously monitor _ the downstream gas line for low temperature and shall trip the liquia pump
- to protect _- downstream equipment from low temperatures.
i 3.2.2.4.4 Pump operation 4
'3.2.2.4.4 Comply:
Pump . operation shall ~ be continuously l and automatically monitored. ; Operation which results. in pump cavitation, high . temperature at the pump discharge, or low n l temperature downstream of the vaporizer
' shall cause" the pump to be shut down by the remote control panel. The fault shall
- be ' indicated on the remote control panel
- by an audible alarm and light indication.
3.2.2.4.5 Purging of Controls 3.2.2.4.5 Complyi All. ' electrical . components in hydrogen l
. serv. ice should be designed in accordance
'- - with NFPA 70. Only nitrogen or another
-( inert gas shall .be used for purging pump motors, control panels and valves.
3.2.2.5 Interface with Gaseous System 3.2.2.5 Comply :
. Liquid hydrogen pump systems typically A rack centaining six ASME Code require a ; gaseous storage system as a gaseous hydrogen tubes with a total-capacity of 50,000 scf will
. surge or backup to plant hydrogen supply.
be used in conjunction with the
; These storage systems shall be designed in accordance with Section 3.1, Gaseous liquid hydrogen tank.
Hydrogen. Whenever a gaseous backup is used in conjunction with a liquid hydrogen system, switchover controls shall -. be provided. 3.2.2.6 Vaporization 3.2.2.6 Comply with intent: The vaporizers to be used feature Vaporization of the liquid' hydrogen shall a hex fin design. be achieved by the use of ambient air vaporizers; Vaporizer design, installation and operation shall take guidance from NFPA 50A and 50B. 3-10 L . L
l Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 3 Th'e vaporizer should feature a star fin design and aluminum alloy construction. For a combined liquid and gaseous storage system, the vaporizers used should have a design pressure consistent with plant in-
' jection pressure requirements. The units may be piped'in parallel such that each unit can operate independently. . Parallel vaporizer assemblies shall be sized for the peak hydrogen flow required for each plant ' and shall provide for periodic intervals. for defrosting, as appropriate.
Other atmospheric vaporization systems may be utilized if their capacity is demonstrated to be adequate for the plant flow and ambient conditions. For a pumped liquid only storage system, the' vaporizer must withstand maximum pressures generated from the cryogenic pump. These vaporizers shall be equipped with stainless steel lining designed to 3500 psig. 77 3.3. ELECTROLYTIC N) 3.3.1 System Overview 3.3.1 Not Applicable: The disassociation of water by electrolysis The electrolytic method of producing is an acceptable method of obtaining the hydrogen is not being considered at this gases needed for hydrogen water chem- time. istry. This can be done on site and the gases can conveniently be generated at the rate used. The e!cctrolytic gas generator should be proven equipment, the same as used in other industrial appli-cations. Depending on the generator operating pressure, either hydrogen com-pressors or pressure breakdown (control) is utilized to match plant hydrogen injection pressure requirements. The electrolytic system shall be provided by a supplier who has extensive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of these systems. l e <) 3-11
1 implementation or Justification Guidelines for Perman:nt BWR for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
,cs 3.4 LIQUID OXYGEN .
3.4.1 System Overview 3.4.1 Comply: The HWC system contains an 11,000 gallon' Liquid oxygen is stored in a vacuum- liquid oxygen tank.
. jacketed vessel at pressures up to 250 psig and temperatures up to -251*F (satu-rated). Oxygen taken from the vessel shall be vaporized through ambient air vaporizers and routed through a pressure
- control station which maintains gas pressures within the desired range. . The ,
liquid oxygen system shall be provided by a supplier who has extensive experience in the design, operation and maintenance of associated storage and supply systems. Liquid oxygen shall be provided per CGA G-4 and G-4.3. 3.4.2 Specific Equipment Description 3.4.2.1 Cryogenic Tank. Tanks for linuid 3.4.2.1 Comply: oxygen service, with capacities between 3,000 gallons and 11,000 gallons are simi-j r lar in principle. An " inner vessel" or t V] " liquid container" is supported within an
" outer vessel" or " vacuum jacket," with l
insulation provided in the space between the tanks. Necessary piping connects from inside of the inner vessel to outside of the vacuum jacket. Gauges and valves to indicate the control of product in the vessel are mounted outside of the vacuum jacket. Legs or saddles to support the whole assembly are welded to the outside of the vacuum jacket. inner vessels shall be designed, fabricated, tested and stamped in accordance with ' Section VI!!, Division 1, of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. Materials suitable for liquid oxygen service must have good ductility properties at cryogenic temperatures of -300*F per CG A G -4. The outer vessel should be constructed of carbon steel and does not require ASME certification. i n N 3-12
1mplementaticn or Justification Guidelines for Permanent BWR for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
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' Insulation between inner and outer vessels shall be either perlite, aluminized mylar or : suitable equal. The annular space -
should be evacuated to a high vacuum of 50 microns or less. Tank control piping and valving should be installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 of B 31.3. All piping shall be either wrought copper or stainless steel. The following tank piping subsystems shall be provided:
.. Fill circuit constructed tvith top and bottom. lines so that the vessel can be filled 'without affecting system operation.
- Pressure-build circuit, to keep tank pressures at operational levels.
. Economizer circuit, to preferentially feed oxygen gas from vessel vapor space to process.
Overpressure Protection System. 3.4.2.2 Comply: [') 3.4.2.2 V Safety considerations for the tank shall be l satisfied by dual full-flow safety valves and emergency backup rupture discs. The primary relief system shall ccnsist of two sets of one (1) safety valve and one (1) , rupture disc piped into separate legs, coupled by a three-way valve. This dual primary relief system with 100% standby redundancy allows maintenance and test-ing to be performed without sacrificing the level of protection from overpressure. The primary relief system shall comply with the provisions of the ASME Pressure Vessel Codes and the Compresser'. Gas Association (CG A) Standards. Annular space safety heads shall be provided to relieve any excess positive pressure buildup which might result from a leak in an inner vessel. Supply system piping that may contain liquid can be isolatable from the tank relief valves shall be protected with thermal relief valves. 3-13
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR. Implementation or Justification l ' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance i M:i > t ..
' Q lThe tank shall be supplied with a pressure-
. gauge, a liquid level gauge, and a vacuum
' readout connection. These gauges are suf-
. ficient ior normal' monitoring of the tank condition. - Instrumentation for remote monitoring, such as. high/ low-pressure
? switches, pressure and-level transmitters may be added. A listing of supply system instrumentation and control is identified
.'in Section 2.40 3.4.2.3 Vaporization. The vaporization of 3.4.2.3 (Paragraph 1) Comply:
the liquid oxygen shall be achieved by the use of ambient air vaporizers.
,The vaporizer should feature a star fin 3.4.2.3 (Paragraph 2) Comply with intent:
design and extruded aluminum alloy con-struction. The vaporizers shalif have a' The vaporizers to be used feature a hex minimum design pressure of at least 300 fin design, psig. 'The units shall be piped in parallel such that each unit can operate indepen-.
.'dently. Parallel vaporizer assemblies shall be sized to handle peak plant flow require-ments and shall provide for periodic inter-P- vals for defrosting, as appropriate. Other
[ atmospheric vaporization systems may be utilized if their capacity is demonstrated to be adequate for the plant flow and ambient conditions. 3.4.2.4 Pressure Control' Station. The 3.4.2.4 Comply: pressure control station shall be of a manifold design. . The manifold shall have two (2) full-flow parallel pressure reducing regulators. . The discharge pressure range of these regulators shall be adjustable to satisfy plant oxygen. injection require-ments. Pressure gauges shall be provided
-upstream and downstream of the regula-tors and sufficient hand valves shall be provided to ensure complete operational flexibility.
' Protection of downstream equipment from low-oxygen temperatures shall be included in the system design.
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'.. l Guidelines for. Permansnt BWR ' for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation .
p \[ <3.4.3:Materiatiof Construction for Oxy- ' 3.4.3 Comply:
-gen Piping and Valves The - design." an' d L installation of oxygen
. piping and related equipment shall be in accordance with ANSI B31.1 or B31.3 and r the : following . guidelines for. - material
, , selecdon for oxygen systems.
Observations'of past oxygen. fires indicate that ignition can occur in carbon steel and
-: stainless steel piping systems operating at, or near, sonic velocity. Friction from high
. velocity particles is considered to be the
? source . of; ignition. - Copper, brass, and
' nickel alloys have; the' characteristic; of Lc melting at temperatures below their respective' ' ignition ~ temperatures. This makes these materials extremely resistant to ignition. sources, and once ignited, they .
exhibit a much slower rate of burning than
~
carbon or stainless steels. 4 4 As a result 'of these observations, the following materials, in . order of prefer-- [ ence, are acceptable. for oxygen service. In ahe case of carbon steel or, stainless steel,: the maximum ' velocity of gaseous
. oxygen. shall be within guidelines estab-
.lished by the Compressed Gas Association CGA Pamphlet CGA-4.4, " Industrial Prac-tices for Gaseous Oxygen, -Transmission:
and Distribution Piping Systems."
- Copper
- Brass
- Monel
- Stainless Steel -
f
- Carbon Steel
-If steel pipe is to be used for the system
. and some local flow conditions could cause the' velocity to exceed that established in CC A G-4,4, then that portion of the sys-tL , must be converted to a copper-based
. alloy and extend a minimum of 10 diarne-ters downstream of the point of return to 3-15 n.
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f . . l. , , [ # Guidelines for Permanent BWR _ Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation Implementation or Justification for Nonconformance L p.
?d the allowable velocity. These local flow 3.4.3 (Continued) Comply:
conditions may occur at control valves, orifices, branch line takeoff points, and in
.the discharge piping ' of safety ' relief -.
' devices.
Valves that.open rapidly are not suitable for oxygen service, since' rapid filling of
~
. an oxygen line will result in a temperature
. increase due to adiabatic compression. As a result of this phenomenon, ball valves and. automatic valves may only be used with the following restrictions:
Valve bodies'. shall be made . of a J copper. alloy. Balls shall be monel or brass. ! Valve seats and seals should be teflon, nonplasticized Kel-F, Kalrez, or Viton.- Ball. valves rray not be used as process contro. valves in throttling - or ' regulating . service. . Ball valves may be used ' as isolation valves, W emergency' shutoff valves, or vent or Q, . bleed valves where they. are either fully open or fully closed. Pneumatic or electric ball valves used' for on-off services shall have an actuation time from fully closed to fully open of 4 seconds or greater for pressures up to 250 psig. No restriction is placed on actuation time from fully open to fully closed. Piping immediately downstream must be a straight run of copper-bearing material for a minimum of 10 diameters. .
- Pneumatic or electric ball valves
-used for emergency service may be fully open or - fully closed to the
' emergency position, with no restric-tions on actuation time.
Suitable valve packing, seats, and gasket materials are listed below in order of preference from the oxygen compatibility basis only. 3 16
._._._._c _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _
Guidelines for Permanent BWR. Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance {3 i./ ' . Teflon-
- Glass-filled Teflon
- Nonplasticized Ke!-F -
s Garlock 900
- Viton or Viton A
'3.4.4 Oxygen Cleaning 3.4.4 Comply with intent:
All'. piping, fittings, valves, 'and other The oxygen supply system was cleaned _ material may contact oxygen shall be using procedures that met the require-
- cleaned ~ to. remove . internal . organic, ments of CGA G-4.1 and G-4.4.
inorganic,. and particulate matter in
- accordance with CGA 4.1. Observation .
has shown that ' ignition can occur in properly designed pipingE systems when foreign matter is introduced. Therefore, removal of: contaminants such as grease, oils, thread lubricants, dirt, water, filings,
- scale, weld spatter, paints, or other foreign material: is essential. Cleaning should be accomplished by precleaning all
-Q v . parts .of the system, maintaining cleanti- _
ness during construction, and by com-pletely. cleaning the - system after construction. l 4 3-17 _ _ _ = _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - . _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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. Guidelines for Permanent BWR for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
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4.0 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 4.1 GASEOUS HYDROGEN 4.1.1 Site Characteristics of Gaseous and ' Liquidllydrogen 4.1.1.1 Overview. Review of the 4.1.1.1 Comply: P following site characteristics shall be conducted by each BWR facility in locating the gaseous and/or liquid hydrogen supply systems:
- ' Location of supply system in proximity to exposures as addressed in NFPA SOA and 50B.
- Route of hydrogen delivery on site.
- Location of supply system in proximity to safety-related equipment.
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4.1.1.2 Specific Considerations. U 4.1.1.2.1 Fire Protection. selected for hydrogen system siting shall The area 4.1.1.2.1 intent: (Paragraph 1) Comply with meet or exceed all requirements for Paragraph 3-1.2 of NFPA 50A-1984 protection of personnel and equipment as addressed in NFPA 50A and 50B, gaseous requires that gaseous hydrogen sptems and liquified hydrogen systems, respec- shall be located above ground. The tively. Each standard identifies the gaseous supply vessel is located above maximum quantity of hydrogen storage ground but the piping from the supply
. permitted and the minimum distance from facility to the turbine building is below hydrogen systems to a number of ground. This is considered acceptable as exposures. the piping is routed above ground prior to entering the turbine building.
The need for additional fire protection for other than the hydrogen facility shall be 4.1.1.2.1 (Paragraph 2) Comply: determined by analysis of local conditions of hazards onsite, exposure to other prop-erties, water supplies, and the probable effectiveness of plant fire brigades in accordance with NFPA 50A and 50B. 4.1.1.2.2 Security. All hydrogen storage 4.1.1.2.2 Comply: system installations shall be completely fenced, even when located within the ! owner-controlled area. Lighting shall be
,fm ir.stalied to f acilitate night surveillance. \
o) l 4-1 _-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8
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pL i[ Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation Implementation or Justification for Nonconformance r '
. y nV ) ;"4 ?. c4.1.1.2.3 Route of Hydrogen Delivery on :
Site. ~ Each!. plant should . determine the , 4.1.1.2.3 Comply: .
- route'. to.' be . taken by hydrogen delivery - ' '
trucksinrough'onsite and of fsite areas.' In - : 3 . order to protect the hydrogen storage area , L $ .from J any . vehicular 1 accidents, - truck K barriers shall . be . installed around the perimeter of the system installation.- u Within" Ithe' plants ; security. area, all
. deliveries 'shall be : controlled ; per. the
- requirements of 10 CFR 7.3.55.
p 4.1;1.2.4 Location of Storage System to - 4.1.1.2.4 ' Comply:
' Safety-Related Structures. Each pTa5t ..
- g. 'shall determine that the location of the The hydrogen storage area is 1500 feet W . hydrogen storage . system :is. acceptable south < of. the nearest safety-related i
relative to safety-related structures and structure, which is: the Unit 1 and 2 equipment considering .the . hazards centrol room. ductibed in Sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.1,
; and 4;2.2.
^-- 4.1.2 Gaseous Storage Vessel Failure 4.1.2 Comply:
A Gaseous storage vessels in the scope of
-U this report are: the: commercially avail-U able,' seamless, swagged-ended vessels
' that are commonly referred to as "hydril' tubes."1' This section addresses the non-mechanistic rupture f ailure of : single .
^ : vessels and :the - separation distances required to avoid 1damage to safety-related equipment. Simultaneous fallure of multiple vessels . is not addressed because the inherent strength of the
. vessel makes them unsusceptible to failure from outside forces. These vessels shall
'be capable of withstanding- tornado missiles (NUREG-0800) and site specific seismic loading due' to horizontal and vertical accelerations acting simultaneously.
These. ' features eliminate common cause
' vessel failures so that the maximum postulated . instantaneous f elease is the fully pressurir.ed contents of the largest single vessel. - The potential consequences of -- such a release, a fireball or an explosion, are addressed in order.
O 4-2
f Guidelines for Permantnt BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 7y
-d l4.1.2.I' Fireball.' . The thermal flux versus 4.1.2.1 Comply:
n ~ distance - from - the fireball center 'are
- shown1 on Figure 4-1 for the two most N-common vessel sizes. These fluxes and
' . durations will not adversely affect safety-related structures. However, each utility shall review any unique site characteris-tics to assure all safety-related equipment will function in the event of a fireball.
4.1.2.2 Comply: 4.1.2.2 Explosion. - When a gaseous'stor-age vessels ruptures, the expansion of the high-pressure gas results in rapid turbulent
- mixing with the surrounding air. . In the case of gaseous hydrogen, the release will go through the detonation limits of 18.3 - '
59%. before the wind can translate the mixture. Consequently, any explosion blastwaves' will originate .at ' the vessel
- rupture site. . ;For this report, it is .
conservatively. assumed that 100% of the vessel contents - will contribute to the blastwave .and that the TNT-hydrogen equivalence is i.0% on an energy basis n (520% on a mass basis). This translates to V 27.1 lbs of TNT per 1000 standard cubic feet (SCF); of gaseous hydrogen. Using this conversion. factor and U.S. Army Technical Manual TM5-1300, blast over-pressures and impulses can be calculated as -functions of distance from the vessel' location. . These blast parameters could then be compared to the dynamic strength of safety-related structures. - entitled "ceparation
-- An evaluation Distances Recommended for Hydrogen Storage to Prevent Damage to Nuclear Power Plant Structures From' Hydrogen
- Explosion" was performed for EPRI by l - R. P. Kennedy. This evaluation, which is included as Appendix B of these guide-
. lines, recommends separation distances L based on quantities of stored hydrogen and
'. building design factors. The recommenda-tions are provided in the form of step-by-step procedures, with subsequent steps requiring additional work but resulting in l
LO 4-3 L L __ - _- _-_
3
\
y w' ' Implementation or Justification 1 Guidelines for Permanent BWR: for Nonconformance 1 : Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation , [D reduced distar*ces from the previous pc step.t The procedure to determine . accept-'
- . able separation' distances is outlined '
, . below.
7"
..: Step 1. For any reinforced concrete -
or masonry walls' at least 8 inches-e ' thick, the . upper curve _on Figure 4-2 provides: conservative - separation distances as 'a function of vessel size. 'If this is acceptable, then no further work is needed. Otherwise, proceed to step 2.
.. . Step . 2. : For. reinforced concrete walls at least 18 inches thick, with known static strength and percent tensile rebar, Eq. 7 in Appendix B-
'can be used to determine required E separation distances. ; The two lower curves on Figure 4-2 are representa-tive examples of design parameters for walls of nuclear power plants.
Walls with different parameters b V should be - analyzed using methods in Appendix B, pages 10 the
< through 13. If this is acceptable, then no further work is needed.
.Otherwise, proceed to step 3.
- Step ' 3. - For separation ' distances
' closer than allowed by the above I and 2, ' perform a dynamic blast capacity analysis in accordance with NUREG/CR'-2462 Q).
For all storage loca.. ions, the vessel (s) and the foundation (s) shall- be designed to remain in place for both design-basis tornado characteristics and site-specific flood conditions. 4.1.3 Gaseous Pipe Breaks . 4.1.3 Comply:
. This section addresses the requirements for hydrogen- piping systems attached to gaseous storage vessels up to the point where excess flow protection is provided.
T criteria for acceptable siting for the event of a pipe break are: 4-4
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Guidelines for Perm:nent BWR ' Implementation or Justification '
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' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation ' for Nonconformance l
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'* Dilutio'n' of: resultant release below 4.1.3 (Continued) Comply: -
the lower flammability limit of 4% before reaching airc pathways into safety-related structures.-- 1 1
-- Minimum separate distances for the 4
, blast i damage criteria outlined in Section 4.1.2.
' It is ' conservatively l assumed -that all releases occur while the storage vessel is at 2,450 psig. This is the maximum allowable working pressure of the majority -
of commercially available vessels.
' Gaseous releases ' at e'levate' d. pressures result lin , supersonic jet velocities and a dispersion' process lthat. .is momentum-
. dominated. Under these conditions, the Gaussian dispersion model unrealistically overestimates the amount of hydrogen in the~ explosive region and the distance to the lower flammable region., Therefore,
~ these properties of gaseous releases were j .. .
calculated Lusing a jet dispersion model described in Reference (2). The results of this modeling are shown in
' Figure. 4-3 as minimum separation dis-tances - versus inside diameter of the pipe. - The upper curve is the maximum distance to the lower flammability limit of 4% ' hydrogen. 'Each utility shall determine that the location of air pathways into safety-related structures exceeds this minimum separation distance or show that other criteria should be applied to a specific case. An example of such an exception would be if the. air
-intakes have automatic shutters con-trolled - by. hydrogen analyzers thus ,
preventing the ingestion of a flammable mixture. The lower. curve on Figure 4-3 is the mini-mum. required distance to safety-related structures with greater than or equal to an 8-inch-thick reinforced masonry or con-crete wall. This distance includes the drif t distance of an unignited, fully deve-loped gaseous jet plus the blast distance 4-5 l
t L I
.s. , . . .-
- Guidalines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation ~ for Nonconformance
. /^q -.
g if 'for the maximum ~ amount of hydrogen in
~ the ; detonable region. It conservatively.
assumes ..that the pipe break is oriented directly toward the safety-related struc-
.tures.. . Each ~ . utility shall determine compliance,with:this minimum separation
- distance or demonstrate that other i* ' criteria should be applied.~
4.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN - 4.2 Comply: 4.2.1 Storage Vessel Failure 4.2.1 Comply: For. this report,. storage vessel failure is defined as a.large breach resulting in the rapid emptying of tiie entire contents of E ligtiid: hydrogen. It is assumed that the tank is full at the time of failure and that the entire spill vaporizes instantane-ously. The following enumerates potential causes of ~ vessel failure and the required
' design features that mitigate or alleviate ,
these potentials. j 7s-Seismic j _ The tank and its foundation shall be designed to meet the seismic criterion for critical structures and equipment at' the plant site (i.e., design basis earthquake). It is preferable to seismically support all liquid hydrogen piping. If this is not possible, the liquid hydrogen piping shall be seismically supported up to and including excess flow protection devices. -The specific liquid hydrogen tank and piping design at each . installation shall meet these
- requirements.
. Tornado and Tornado Missiles The tank and its foundation shall be designed to withstand the " design l basis tornado characteristics" as L outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.76.
As a minimum, the tank shall remain L in place so that any liquid spillage will originate from _the tank location. The specific tank and _% p/ ; 1 4-6
g m
.4.,, ,
Implementation or Justification
.. l Guidelines for Permanent BWR- for Nonconformance Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
('N, '.
- foundation design at. each installa- 4.2.1 (Continued) Comply:
F_ ' tion shall'. meet these requirements. Design basis tornado-generated mis , sites are capable: of breaching all
~ known commercially available liquid .
hydrogen storage vessels. - There-fore, tornado missiles are a potential-cause of ." storage vessel failure."
- Aircraf t '
A . large aircraft . crashing directly
'into the storage area is capable of breaching- all known commercially available liquid .-hydrogen storage vessels.' Therefore, aircraf t crash is a potential cause.of " storage vessel failure."
- Fire The overpressure protection system -
shall be sized to accommodate the 7~~ ' worst-case vaporization rate caused ( by a hydrocarbon fire engulfing the outer shell.with loss of vacuum and
' hydrogen in the annulus of: the double-wall storage tank (as per
- Compressed Gas Association 5.3 and '
' ASME Section Vill requirements).
- Flood The following flood conditions could
- result in vessel f ailure:
- High water- reaches the top of the vent stack for the overpres-c sure protection system.
-- High flood velocities dislodge the tank.
Under either condition, water could enter the vent system and defeat the ' overpressure protection system. i Therefore, the tank shall be located such that. maximum flood heights y cannot exceed the vent stack s
\
I 4-7 I I
g '
' p , [ ';,@aetig (r j- Permanent e B% RL 11 implementation or Justification i crece, u ater Chenustr. Installatten for Nenconformance -p .E '
f f N -
' e:evation ano suchT that petentia( k.2.1 (Continued)- Comply:
H l' M '.' flood . velocities cannot damage the vent stack or dislodge the tank. ' r .L Vehicle Impact ~ F lThe storage vessel shall be protected '
'Irom '.the' , impact of the ; largest
. vehicle? used.ionsite by a barricade
< capable of stopping such a. vehicle.
" .. Vessel Structtral Failure
. The storage vessel shall be designed,
. constructed, inspected and operated w to' assure :an2 extremely low likelihood of 7 tank l structural failure
' during.~its tenure on site. A vessel designed . inL accordance with this -
. document J complies with this low .
probability requirem'ent. 1. 4.2.1.1 Fireball 4.2.1.1 compiv: For the two potential causes of " storage .'- ' vessel f ailure,". tornado missiles and h IDy'V aircraf t impact, ' a fireball at ' the tank
. location is the expected result.1The major reasons,for this is the'high ignitability of
. hydrogen and ' the r density of. ignition sources in thet af termath of these casual .
, events. An a'rcraf i t -impact or a design
. basis tornado and the associated missiles will also provide numerous sources of J ignition . from ,. . downed . power lines, damaged ' transformers, and switchgears,
^ etc. Details ~ of these considerations are
. given .in the; report for the Dresden plant-(2).
The thermal flux versus distance from the fireball center (tank location) is shown on Figure 4-4 for the range of commercially
. available tank sizes. The durations of the various ; fireball sizes are also given.
These fluxes and durations will ' not adversely affect equipment or personnel 1 l enclosed in concrete / steel safety-related structures. Howeser, each utility shall D d 43 /: W---__=-_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __ ____ _ _ _
w
'/ : _,n; Implementation or Justification .
, Guidelines for Perman:nt BWR -
Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance j% L d,) ~ review any. unique, site characteristics to t assure:all safety-related equipment will
^ ,
function in the event of a' fireball.
. 4.2.1.2 Explosion at Tank Si te 4.2.1.2 Comply:
- Although an explosion is not expected, l safety-relateds structures .and equipment shall be verified to be: capable of with-
~
standing a detonation occurring at the site of the 1 ' tank - installation. For the instantaneous retease of' the entire tank contents, the following were used to
' determine blast parameters for an explo-sion at the tank site:
- 1. Gaussian F weather stability
'2. Detonation limits ' of hydrogen,
~ 18.3-59% '
- 3. . TNT '- hydrogen equivalent of
-20% on an energy basis (520% on a mass basis)-
NUREG/CR-2726 reports that detonations have been observed for hydrogen concen-trations as low as 13.8% when ignited in a long, large-diameter tube. ; The explosive I yield or TNT equivalence of such threshold concentration reactions is extremely low
> because most of the combustion energy is expended in the transition to detonation.
This : is - essentially; the reason why it _ represents the lower detonation limit; any
-less concentration will give a zero detonation yield. - This also points out that both hydrogen concentration and explosive yield affect the total equivalent mass of TNT for a given release.
t Regulatory Guide 1.91 models the blast effects from transportation accidents by assuming 100% of the cargo detonates at a TNT mass equivalence of 240% (one pound of cargo equals 2.4 pounds of TNT). The analysis described in this report modeled large spills of hydrogen by calculating the amount of release that is between 18.3 and 59% (-46% of.the vessel contents) and assuming that it detonates at a TNT mass 4-9 i F w-_--_--._--_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
q;. s
, L* [ ' 3 . .
Guidelines for Permanent BWR - Implementation or Justification 4 Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation. for Nonconformance g 'fg
.1 1
^~l - -equivalence of:520% The. resulting TNT '
,j . equivalence for this method is one pound ;
3 of: vessel contents equals 2.4. pounds of l L- . TNT, an identical result' to that obtained
^
, :with the NRC method.
The, above results in an equivalence of 1.37-lbs.of TNT: per. gallon of tank size. Using this. conversion factor and U.S. Army Technical Manual TM5-1300 and.the ~ damage : criteria outlined 'in Appendix i B,1 7 ' required separation distances have been- '. ' determined as la - function of- tank ' size. The results :are shown 'on Figure 4-5 for
> Lthe design parameters. _of the three
- building l = types - described in : Section 4.1.2.2.- For buildings.with other design parameters, the methods in Appendix B or in NUREG/CR-2462 (1)-may be used to-determine , separation distances. Each utility shall use ' these methods - for
. determining the minimum required separa-
' tion distances from the storage tank to safety-related structures or equipment for A the event of an explosion at the tank site.
~Q 4.2.2 Pipe Breaks 4.2.2 Comply:
This section addresses. the requirements for gaseous and. liquid hydrogen piping systems attached to the storage vessel up to the point where excess flow protection is provided. The criteria for acceptable siting for the event of a pipe break are the same as outlined'in Section 4.1.3. .it is conservatively assumed that all releases occur while the storage vessel is at 150 psig (the maximum allowable working pressure of the majority of commercially available tanks).
; 4.2.2.1 Gaseous Piping 4.2.2.1 Comply:
The same. dispersion model for momen-tum-dominated jets discussed in Section
~ 4.1.3 ' applies to gaseous releases from liquid storage tank piping with the apo ppriate . release conditions for si aated vapors. The results of this
' modeling are shown .in Figure 4-6 as 4-10
7-P < h'N: -
, y ..
Implementation or Justification L . Guidelines for Permanent BWR L ' Hydrogen' Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
.1:/^N A
- b. . minimum separation distances versus hole .
E y' size? or inside diameter of piping' not . protected with excess flow devices. .The
~
' upper curve' is the maximum drif t distance
' to the lower' flammability limit and ~is the minimum required separation distance to
.,' air pathways',into safety-related : struc-tures.- The . three . lower: curves are required ' separation distances for the
, ' representative types of H safety-related
, structures. These distances are the sum
= of both the - drift .and blast distances.
Structures with other parameters can be analyzed using the methods in Appendix B L or'in NUREG/CR-2462 (1). Each utility i shall determine that the storage vessel
. piping and location. meet these minimum requirements or:show that less stringent .
criteria should bel applied to a specific case. . _ An example of such' a . suitable exception.would be if.the air intakes are
' provided . with automatic . shutters controlled by hydrogen analyzers. to prevent the ingestion of a flammable n : mixture. ,
V' . ' 4.2.2.2 Liquid Piping 4.2.2.2 Comply: wi'
,The vapor cloud formed by the flashing and rapid vaporization of a liquid release is nearly neutrally buoyant and has little momentum associated with its forma-tion.- For - these . conditions, a Gaussian dispersion model is employed using the # following conservative assumptions:
- 1. Instantaneous vaporization of re-lease 4
' 2. F weather stability
; 3. I m/s wind speed
- 4. Wind direction towards safety-related area No credit is to be taken for site-specific wind direction or speed characteristics !
since it is assumed that pipe breaks can
' occur during the worst-case weather and wind conditions.
4-11 _m._____-m__m__._______.____-__.__a__._ _m - _ . _ _ . _ _ _ .
P! l L Guid$lin:s for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
\ j The minimum required separation . dis-
- tances for liquid hydrogen pipe breaks,
.using the' above assumptions, are given on ,
Figure 4-7 as a function of discharge rate and hole size. The upper curve is the drif t distance to the lov'er flammability limit for a fully developed could with F stability and 1 m/s windspeed. This defines the - minimum required separation distance to
- air pathways into safety-related struc-tures. The three lower curves define the minimum required separation distances to the representative safety-related struc-tures. These ' curves include the drif t distance to the center of the detonable cloud and the blast distance for the amount of hydrogen in the detonable re-gion. For other structure types, Appendix B or NUREG/CR-2462 (1) may be uwd to determine blast distances. These dis-tances shall be applied to all liquid piping, including those from any pump discharges, that are not seismically supported or protected by excess flow devices.
g 4.3 Not applicable: () 4.3 ELECTROLYTIC Electrolytic hydrogen production is not being used at this time. 4.4 LIQUID OXYGEN 4.4.1 Site Characteristics of Liquid Oxygen 4.4.1.1 Overview. Review of the 4.4.1.1 Comply: following site characteristics shall be completed by each BWR facility as part of their efforts to locate the liquid oxygen storage system.
- Location of supply in proximity to exposure as addressed in NFPA $0.
- Route of liquid oxygen delivery on site.
I V 4-12
{g. ",' y. T -g 7 r , Revision 1 W . March-19891
- j. 7.,
Guidelines for Permanent BWR' implementation or Justification
+ L Hydrogen Water 1 Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance l p( j LocItion'o1 supply ~ system in proxi- '
mity to safety-related equipment. hah Location of hydrogen storage.1 T4 .4.'t.2' Specific Considerations.
- 4;4 1.2.11 Fire Protection. The ~ area 4.4.1.2.1 Comply:
s slected' for liquid oxygen system siting 4' " shall meet or exceed all requirements for i protection' of personnel'and equipment as addressed in NFPA 50, Bulk Oxygen Sys-4 tems. The standard identifies the types of exposure's under consideration. The num- ./ ; ber of exposures warrants a plant-specific " . review - for. proper _ code compliance. As much ~ . separation distance as' practica!
,, should be provided between the hydrogen
. and oxygen systems.
' 4.4.1.2.2 : " Security. .511 liquid oxygen 4.4.1.2.2 Ccmply:
~
supply system installations shall be com-
. pletely fenced,.even when located within n the security area. - Lighting ' shall be Tinstalled to facilitate night surveillance.
' Q/ .
'4.4.1.2.3 Route of Liquid Oxygen Delivery 4.4.1.2.3 Comply:
on Site. .Each plant should determine the . route to be taken by liquid oxygen _ delivery.
. trucks through on- and offsite areas. In order to protect the oxygen storage area from any vehicular accidents, truck bar-riers shall be installed around the perime-ter of the system installation.
Within lthe plant . security area - all deliveries shall be controlled by, plant security personnel, per the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. Lwation of Storage System to 4.4.1.2.4 Comply:
~ 4.4.1.2.4
. Safety-Related Equipment. - Each plant The oxygen storage area is located 1000 shall determine that the location of the feet south of the nearest safety-related
-liquid oxygen supply system is acceptable structure, which is the Unit I and 2 considering the . hazard described in control room, and 500 feet north of the
; 5ections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.
hydrogen storage area.
\ :
4-13 i
----n_z__._____________,___._ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ , _ _
C - .. , O & . . LGuidelines for' Permanent BWR - Implementation or Justification t Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation i for Nonconformance M i, L -Gu v 4.4.2 - Liquid Oxygen Storage Vessel 4.4.2 Comply: , Failure . H: Liquid oxygen storage vessels are vulner-
' rble;to the came potential causes of fail-ure'as the liquid hydrogen vessels but the potential ' consequences Eof failure are much less severe. The potential threat from a liquid oxygen spill is the contact of '
oxygen-enriched air with combustible materials or - the ' ingestion of oxy' gen-
! cnriched air 'into safety-relater
- intakes.' Additional information o t F-effects of-oxygen-enriched atmospher given.in NFPA $3M and in ASTM G63-c ;a and G88-84. For the purpose of this
, report,'it is conservatively assumed that total oxygen concentrations above 30 vol%
-(21% O2 in air + 9% enriched O ) will
' increase the effective combusti ility of
. ignitible materials in the area.
4.4.3 Liquid Oxygen Vapor Cloud Dis- 4.4.3 Comply: persion 1 p) ( 'The vapor cloud instantaneously formed by a large liquid oxygen spill will have 'a density of ; 3.59. relative to air. Such a cloud- ' will experience considerable gravity-driven slumping as it disperses and . translates with the wind. . This process has been- described by the DEGADIS model developed by Prof. J. A. Havens of the University of Arkansas (3). His model has been found to agree well with published data on large releases -of dense gases con-ducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Coast Guard and others. n
;The DEGADIS model has been used to determine the height of the vapor cloud as a function of distance for various sizes of
. commercially available liquid oxygen stor-age tanks. 'It was conservatively assumed that any vessel failure would result in the
,: instantaneous vaporization of the entire tank contents. The curves on Figure 4-S, which define " acceptable location of safety-related air intake," were generated byl using -the DEGADIS model unoer the worst-case weather conditions of F
( 4 14
HJf'I . 1
' t( n
, l.y , 7,
., ;;; 3. . -
gw, ' ' NGbidilines for Permanent BWR' Implementation or Justification ., W, > Hydrogen Water Chei !stry Installation for Nonconformance
.u. ,
y-~ A./ stability 'and'10 m/s wind speed. for total oxygen. concentrations of 30 EvolE For l dense' gas - dispersion, lower wirid ' speeds L ... result < in more radial ~ spreading; with a < b '
. lower cloud ~ height, and shorter maximum
~ drift distance. . Higher wind speeds will L translate evenithe. largesti release past f4 Mafety-related intakes in less than 10 sec, giving little time for ingestion of enriched l air.. -
Therefore, l'iquid.' oxygen storage' vessels
- shall be located such that safety-related
' air ' intakes , are within; the . acceptable region defined by Figure 4-8_or alternative analyses shall'be performed lto justify the '
D y location.' Since this figure . assumes' the . Lorigin of release:is from the storage loca-tion,' the tank and its . foundation shall be
, : designed.' to; remain in' place: for both design . basis tornadoes and -site-specific '
L flood conditions.
. P nned , T. E. Blejwas, and D.
E. Bennett. " Capacity: of Nuclear Power Plant Structures to ' Resist Blast Loadings." NUREG/CR-2462. Sandia - National Laboratories - for U.S._ Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
- sion.
2.: " Air : Products Liquid Hydrogen Storage System Hazardous Conse-4" quence: ' Analysis." Revision 1, October 1,1985.
- 3. 3. . A.' Havens. . The ' Atmospheric Dispersion.. of. Heavy Gases: An Update." IChemE Symposium Series No.93,1985.
{t 4-15 1 i
t Er i", ,, ..
)
b . Guidelines for Permanent BWR . Implementation or Justification pl ; Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
;jy i 5
- l5.0 VERIFICATION . 5.0 Comply:
The' various . methods of: verifying ' the A Hydrogen Water Chemistry Verification 'l
' ef festiveness of HWC.(i.e., electrochemi- System (HWCVS) has been chosen to. verify i t- cal. potential, - constant '. extension ~ rate the effectiveness of the HWC system.>
. tests, etc.) are not within the scope of this '
document. Appropriate methods of verifi - cation should be selected and implemented
-on a plant-specific basis.
c.; 2.... L i c0 . 5-1 ______________________:_. j
Guidelines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 6.0 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND 6.0 Comply with intent: TRAINING Design guidance provided in this section This section give recommendations to the does not include any requirements. operating utility for operation, mainte-nance, and training in order to meet the design intent of the hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) system. The operation of a HWC system will
- require operator and chemistry personnel attention. Because of the radiation increases that result from employing this system, an awareness of ALARA princi-pies is required by all plant personnel.
This system could also have an effect on the off-gas system and the plant fire protection program. 6.1 OPERATING PROCEDURES 6.1 Comply with intent: Written procedures describing proper All necessary procedures for safe valving alignment and sequence for any operation and maintenance of the HWC anticipated operation should be provided system will be provided, and will be for each major component and system incorporated into existing plant procedures if possible, process. Check-off lists should be developed and used for complex or infre-quent modes of operation. Operating procedures should be considered for the folicwing operations:
- Hydrogen addition system startup, normal operation, shutdown and alarm response.
- Material (gas or liquid) handling (filling of storage tanks) operations that are consistent with the sup-plier's recommendations.
- Purging of hydrogen and oxygen lines.
- Operation of onsite gas generation system (if appropriate).
- Fire protection or safety measures for hydrogen- or oxygen-enhanced fires and hydrogen or oxygen spills.
O 6 '.
],' .
# Cuidelines for Permanent BWR- Implementation or Justification
-Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
}^7 ' Calibration 'and maintenance s (/ .
; procedures ' ' as recommended - by equipment or gas suppliers. -
- ; Routine. inspection of HWC system equipment.
. Adjustment of -the main steamline radiation monitor- setpoints (if appropriate)..
6.1.I' integration 'Into ' Existing Plant 6.1.1 Comply: Operation Procedures Where appropriate, operation of the HWC . system shall be incorporated into normal plant procedures such as plant startup and shutdown. 6.1.2 Plant-Specific Procedures 6.1.2 Comply: Appropriate procedures shall be developed to provide guidance for plant operators when operation of the HWC system neces-
- sitates operation of an existing system in 7
- a different mode or raises new concerns.
Areas which should be considered are:
.. Operation of the off-gas system
- Possible off-gas fires 6.1.3 Radiation Protection Program 6.1.3 Comply:
Operation of an HWC system results in an increase in radiation' levels wherever nuclear steam is present. The radiation protection program shall be reviewed and appropriate changes made to compensate for these increased radiation levels. The following guidelines are established to ensure that radiological exposures to both
- plant personnel and the general public and consistent with ALARA requirements.
Compliance with these requirements mini-l mizes radiologically significant hazards
- . associated with HWC implementation.
l The operation of a hydrogen addition
-system may cause a slight reduction in the off-gas delay time due to the increase in 6-2 l
,7 Guidelines for Permanent BWR _ impismentation or Justification
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance 3
i r 4 E he t flow rate of noncondensables resulting from the excess oxygen added. - This may i- slightly increase plant ef fluents and should be reviewed on a plant-specific basis. 6.1.3.1 Comply: 6.1.3.1 ALARA Commitment. Permanent hydrogen water chemistry systems and programs will be designed, installed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the provisions of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 to assure that occupational radiation exposures and doses to the general public will be "as low as reason-ably achievable." initial Radiological Survey. A 6.1.3.2 Comply: 6.1.3.2 comprehensive radiological survey should be performed with hydrogen injection to quantify the impact of hydrogen water chemistry on the environs' dose rates, both within and outside the plant. This survey should be used to determine if significant radiation changes occur within the plant and at the site boundary. Based upon the magnitude of the change, it should be (Vl determined if new radiation areas or high radiation areas need to be created. Appropriate posting, access, and moni-toring requirements should be imple-mented for the af fected areas. Plant operating and surveillance procedures should be revised, as required, to minimize the time and number of personnel required in radiation areas for operations, mainte-nance, in-service inspection, etc. 6.1.3.3 Comply:
.6.1.3.3 Plant Shielding. The radiological survey of Subsection 6.1.3.2 should be used to determine the adequacy of existing plant shielding. In addition, the radiation levels from sample lines, sample coolers and monitoring equipment may increase due to HWC and should be checked for adequate shielding. If required, measures for selective upgrading of plant shielding ,
should be implemented to reduce both ' work area and site boundary dose rates. f <.s
%_s 6-3
I
~
e ' Guid: lines for Permanent BWR Implem:ntation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry installation. for Nonconformance L j 6.1.3.4 Maintenance Activities. Hydrogen 6.1.3.4 Comply: water chemistry will have minimum - impact on occupational exposures result-ing. from maintenance activities. Plant - procedures should incorporate appropriate requirements for access to and monitoring of areas where increased dose rates exist with HWC to satisfy ALARA require-ments. For extended maintenance, plant procedures should include provisions to terminate the hydrogen injection. Due to the short half-life of N-16, radiation levels will return to pre-HWC conditions within minutes of hydrogen shutoff. 6.1.3.5 Radiological Surveillance Pro- 6.1.3.5 Comply: grams. Dose rate surveys should be conducted and radiation levels should be monitored periodically to ensure com-pliance with the radiological limits imposed by 40 CFR Part 190,10 CFR Part 100, and 10 CFR Part 20. Additional surveys may be required to comply with ALARA requirements. Hydrogen water g3 chemistry, in association with improved (') water quantity operational practices, could affect the crud buildup within the recirculation piping and the shutdown dose rates. A radiological surveillance program should be established to monitor , shutdown dose rates and crud buildup over a number of fuel cycles to evaluate pos-sible changes. 6.1.3.6 Measurement of N-16 Radiation. 6.1.3.6 Comply: The radiological surveillance program should include provisions for the new distribution of N-16 in the main steam. Selection of appropriate health physics instrumentation and application of correc-tion factors are required to provide accu-rate dose measurements. (This correction is required due to the effect of the ener-getic N-16 gamma on instrumentation calibrated with less energetic gamma sources.) All plant survey meters should be reviewed and appropriate calibration and correction methods accounted for in plant procedures. 6-4
un - , 3 i v.: :.1 ; Guidelines for Permanent BWR ~ Implementation or Justification. 1
, Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance i
[V v ; J A review of the plant personnel dosimetry 1 j program shall be conducted to ensure that the.. appropriate calibration or ' correction i J factors are used. - 6.1.3.7 L Value/ impact Considerations. The 6.1.3.7 Not applicable: j
< following discussion reviews the total dose
' impact on a plant which implements HWC. No design guidance is stated in this l section. .!
Afradidlogical assessment ' at Dresden ; indicates that the total dose increase with l i
' HWC is approxima;ely 0.5% on an annual basis (from 1935 to 1945 man-rem / year) _
' ( 1). While'this increase is site dependent cfue to plant layout and shielding configu-j
- rations, significant' . Variances from the 1
' Dresden assessment are not anticipated.
Thus, over the' life of a plant (assuming a- l 25-year remaining life), 5 the projected total dose increase with HWC is ~ 250-300 l man-rems. 1 i With HWC implementation, the. potential
. exists . to relax current augmented in- ;
service t inspection requirements imposed D. Af by NRC Genetic Letter 84 (2) and , elimination of extended plant outages for : J pipe replacembt and/or repair. . The value/ impact avsessment presented in , i
' Appendix E to Reference 3 projects a 1161 man-rem (best ei.timate) savings over the l
? life of the. plar ; as a consequence of reduced inspect,ons and repairs with
'HWC. Typical pge replacement projects result in' a total cose of 1400 to 2000 man- l rems. Thus, HWC implementation could l
result in a significant savings in total dose over the life of the plant. 6.1.4 Water Chemistry Control 6.1.4 Comply: l Procedures should be developed to main-tain the' high reactor water quality neces-sary to obtain the maximum benefit from the HWC system. Intergranular stress
. corrosion cracking can be : mitigated by w '
controlling.the ionic impurity content of - the primary coolant and by reducing the
. dissolved oxygen - level in the primary coolant by use of HWC. The EPRI-BWR O )
6-3 Il .
Revision 1 Rsrch 1989 Guidelines for Permanent BWR ' Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance ( ) Y/ ~ ~ Owners Group has developed "BWR Hydro-gen Water Chemistry Guidelines" (4), which must be met in order to obtain tTie full benefits of HWC. These water chem-istry guidelines should be used as a basis for developing a plant-specific water chemistry control program. Hydrogen water chemistry can reduce the The f eedwater dissolved oxygen con-dissolved oxygen level in the condensate centration will be monitored through-and feedwater. It has been shown that at out the initial startup test of the very low levels of dissolved oxygen, corro- HWC system to detemine if f eedwater sion and metal transport to the primary oxygen control is necessary. system would be increased. If, when operating on HWC, the dissolved oxygen concentration drops below 20 ppb, an evaluation should be made to determine if there is increased corrosion or metals transport, or if other factors relating to l such a reduced oxygen concentration need to be considered. If this evaluation determines that oxygen injection is neces-sary, a system should be designed using the guidance provided in Sections 2.3.2 and 3.4 of this report. (~} 6.1.5 Fuel Surveillance Program 6.1.5 Comply: No significant effect of hydrogen injection on fuel performance has been observed, nor is expected. However, since in- , reactor experience with hydrogen water chemistry is limited, utilities should consider the fuel surveillance programs recommended by their fuel suppliers. 6.2 MAINTENANCE 6.2 Comply: A preventative maintenance program should be developed and instituted to ensure proper equipment performance to reduce unscheduled repairs. All mainte-nance activities should be carefully planned to reduce interference with sta-tion operation, assure industrial safety, ar.e minimize maintenance personnel exposure. Written procedures should be devet ed and followed in the perfor-mi .c of maintenance work. They should l3 be written with the objective of protect-l ,q ing plant _ personnel from physical harm g 6-6 L_--__--______--_______- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __
m . w x,"
- Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
, < .W and radiation exposure, and of red $cing . h . hydrogen addition system downtime.
' Radiation' exposure should be reduced by
- shortening the . time . required -in a high radiation field and' by. reducing its intensity by-turning off the HWC system or- other' means during the maintenance
- period.
All excessL flow check valves used for l' ' hydrogen line! break protection shall be 7 -periodically ' tested : to assure they will-F function properly. 6.3 TRAINING' 6.3 Comply: 4 In order for the HWC system to maintain its system integrity and to provide . the . expected benefits from its use, the system
= must be operated correctly. The most'
-effective means of reducing the potential of operator error is. through proper training.
. Training shpuld be provided to:
4 Instruct operators on the function, theory and operating characteristics
.of the system and all its major system components.
<* . Advise operators of the conse-quences of component malfunctions and misoperation and provide instruction ' as .: to appropriate
. corrective actions to be taken.
.' Advise operations and maintenance personnel of the potential hazards of gases' in the system, and provide instruction _as to' appropriate proce- ;
dures for their handling.
'- Instruct emergency response person-net on appropriate procedures for handling: fires or personnel injuries involving spills or releases of H2 '
0 2liquid and gases. 6-7 ir
------n.-.u--.-_.-__m m.-- . _ . - . _ , _ _ _
3 ..., , Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification i.x Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation : for Nonconformance J/ , . V
~
= Instruct plant personnel on' the
, . expected tradiation changes due to -
the operation 'of the HWC system and the appropriate ALARA prac-tices to be taken to minimize dose.
. Instruct appropriate personnel on the benefits of HWC.
n
- Advise maintenance and construc-tion personnel of the routing of hydrogen : lines . and of the , appro-priate protective actions to be taken when working near these lines.
Periodic training should be provided to reinforce information described above and
.to communicate information regarding any modifications, procedural changes, or incidents.
6.4 IDENTIFICATION 6.4 Do not comply: In : order to aid plant personnel in See Section 10.1 of the HWC licensing identifying hydrogen and oxygen lines, package for justification for noncom-1.rN) these lines should be color coded as pliance. required by ANSI A13.1.
6.5 REFERENCES
6.5 Not applicable:
- 1. " Environmental Impact of Hydrogen Water Chemistry." EPRI Hydrogen Water Chemistry Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia, December 1984.
- 2. " Inspection ' of BWR Stainless Steel Piping." NRC Generic Letter 84-11, April 19,1984.
- 3. " Report of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee."
NUREG-1061, Volume 1, August 1984. l
-4. BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Guidelines: 1987 Revision. NP-4947-5R-LD. Palo Alto, Calif.:
l Electric . Power Research Institute, s to be published. 6-S L- - - - - - . - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l lt
*? .
implementation or Justification Guidelines for Permanent BWR L .
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance '
L
-7.0 SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING 7.1 Do not comply:
7.1 SYSTEM INTEGRITY TESTING . In addition to the testing reqdred by the See Section 10.3 of the HWC licensing applicable. design - codes, completed package' for justification for noncon-process systems which will contain hydro- formance. gen shall be leak tested with helium or a soap solution as appropriate prior to initial operation'of the system. All components and joints shall be so tested in the fabri-
- cation shop or af ter installation, as appro-priate.- Appropriate helium leak tests shall be performed on portions of the sys-tem following any modifications or main-tenance activity which could affect the pressure boundary of the system.
7.2 Comply
7.2 PREOPERATIONAL AND PERIODIC
. TESTING Completed systems should be tested to the extent practicable to verify the oper-
. ability and functional performance of the
[ system. Proper functioning of the fol-lowing items should be verified:
- -Trip and alarm functions per Table 2-2.
- Gas purity, if generated on site.
- Safety features.
- Excess flow check valves.
- System controls and monitors per Table 2-2.
A pro 6 ram should be developed for peri-odic retesting to verify the operability and the functional performance of the system. 7-1
X 50
'j. y 4 : ._ , ' , . '
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification f _.
. Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance dr~ .
8.0 RADIATION MONITORING .
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1 Comply with intent: . This section reviews: the radiological s Design guidance provided in this section
- consequence of hydrogen water chemistry does not include any requirements.
(HWC) and presents the basis for increas-ing the rnain steamline radiation monitor setpoint to accommodate HWC. It is con-lcluded that implementation of HWC does
- not reduce the margin of safety as defined
.in the basis of the technical specification setpoint.
' During normal operation of a BWR, nitro-
' gen-16 is formed from an oxygen-16 (N-P) reaction. N-16 decays with a half-life of -
7.1 sec. and emits a high-energy gamma photon (6.1 MeV). Normally, most of the N-16 combines rapidly with oxygen to ~ form' water-soluble, nonvolatile nitrates
- and nitrites. - However, ' because of the lower. oxidizing potential present in a hydrogen water chemistry environment, a O higher percentage of _the N-16 is con-kJ verted to more volatile species. As a consequence, the ' steam activity during hydrogen addition can increase up to a factor of approximately five. The dose rates in the turbine building, plant -
environs,. and off site also increase; however, the magnitude of the increase at any given location depends upon the con-tribution of the steam activity to the total dose rate at that location. The specific concerns include:
- The dose to members of the general public (40 CFR 190),
. The dose to personnel in unrestricted areas (10 CFR 20), and
- The maintenance of personnel expo-l l sute "as low as reasonably achiev-able" (ALARA).
p VO S-I
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Guidelines for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
) 8.2 MONITORING MAIN STEAMLINE RADIATION 8.2 Do not comply:
See Section 8.2 and 10.4 of the HWC As noted in the previous section, main licensing package for justification for steamline radiation levels can increase up nonconformance. to approximately fiv2f,ld with hydrogen water chemistry. The majority of BWRs have a technical specifiution requirement for the main steamline adiation monitor (MSLRM) setpoint that . , less than or equal to three (3) times die norma! rated full-power background. For these plants an adjustment in the MSLRM setpoint may be required to allow operation with hydro-gen injection. For earlier BWRs with MSLRM setpoints of seven (7) to ten (10) times normal full-power background, a setpoint change may not be required. 3.2.1 Dual MSLRM Setpoint Recom- 8.2.1 Do not comply: mendation l See Section 8.2. For plants at which credit is taken for an MSLRM-initiated isolation in the control
,o rod drop accident (CRDA), a dual setpoint approach may be utilized. At most plants, !]' the MSLRM setpoint is specified in the plant Technical Specifications (Tech Specs) as some factor times rated full-power radiation background. With hydro-gen addition, the full-power background could increase up to 3 times that without hydrogen addition. Below 20% rated power or the power level required by FSAR or Tech Specs (see Table 2-1), the existing setpoint is maintained at the Tech Spec factor above normal full-power background, and hydrogen should not be injected. About 20% rated power, the MSLRM setpoint should be readjusted to the same Tech Spec factor above the i rated full-power background with hydro-gen addition. This adjustment would be made by the plant personnel during star-tups and shutdowns. Plant power would remain constant during this adjustment process. Thus, the Tech Spec factor which the MSLRM setpoint is adjusted remains the same with and without hydrogen addi-tion, but the background radiation level increases with hydrogen addition. If an /].
v S-2
+
L._ e
. Guidelines for Permanent BWR- Implementation or Justif.caticen <
for Nonconformance W Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation
- U l unanticipated ' power reduction event:
occurs such that - the reactor power is below this~ power level without . the required setpoint ' change, . control' rod motion' should be " suspended : until the [: necessary setpoint adjustment is made. At newer plants, credit is not taken for an MSLRM-initiated isolation af ter a CRDA,
-and a dual setp.o int is not needed at these
. plants.
Plants 'that need a dual setpoint should consider changing their Technical Specifi-cations to increase the factor used to
- determine the. MSLRM setpoint, if their CRDA analysis will permit this increase.
A suggested approach would be to use the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit
- 1, Amendment No. 58 Technical Specifica-
. tion' change as a model. Under ' this approach, the MSLRM setpoint was raised based on a' satisfactory evaluation of the of fsite consequences.-
8.2.2 MSLRM Safety Design Basis 8.2.2 Do not comply: The 'only design basis event for which See Section 8.2. somer plants may take credit for main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure on main steamline high radiation is the design
~ basis control rod drop accident (CRDA).
As documented in Reference (1), the CRDA is only of concern below 10% of rated power. :. Above this power level the rod worths and resultant CRDA peak fuel
< enthalples are not limiting due to core voids and. faster Doppler feedback. Since the current MSLRM setpoint ,will not be changed below 20 % rated power, the
' MSLRM sensitivity to fuel failure is not
. impacted and the FSAR analysis for the CRDA remains valid.
L The licensing basis for the CRDA states that the maximum control rod worth is j established by assuming the worst single 1: inadvertent operator error (2). From Rehrences - (2) and (3), .the~ maximum
~
l cd roi rod worth above 20% rated power, assuming a single operator error, is t0.8% g aK/K, Parametric studies utilizing the Q i S-3 l l
, t
'" ,'f. ~ Guidelines for Permanent BWR - Implem ntation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance
< N.A conservative GE' excursion model (1) indi-
;cate that the maximum peak fuel enthalpy
!for a dropped control rod worth of 0.8%-
AK/Kiis less than 120 calories per gram
~
4
- s. Qk Consequently,' . the conservatively
- calculated peak fuel enthalpy for a CRDA
.above 20% rated power will have signifi-cant margin.to the fuel cladding failure
. . threshold of 170 calories per gram.
' An increase in ' the' MSLRM setpoint will not impact any other FSAR design basis accident or transient . analysis since no credit is taken for this isolation signal.
Consequently, a technical . specification change ' which . adopts the recommended dual setpoint approach will not reduce overall plant safety margins. 8.2.3' MSLRM Sensitivity 8.2.3 Do not comply: Conceptually, the sensitivity of lthe- See Section 8.2. MSLRM to fission products is effectively reduced by the increase in the setpoint A However, it is still ()~ above 20% power. functional- and capable of initiating a reactor scram. The main function of the instrument 'is. to help maintain offsite releases to within the applicable regula-tory _ limits. The MSLRM is supplemented
. by the off-gas radiation monitoring system which monitors the gaseous effluent prior to its discharge to the environs. The off-gas radiation monitor setpoint is estab-lished to help ensure that the equivalent stack release limit is not exceeded.
8.2.4 Conclusions 8.2.4 Do not comply: From the above discussion, it can be See Section 8.2. concluded that an increase in the MSLRM setpoint above 20% rated power will not reduce the safety margins as defined by , l Technical Specifications or increase the offsite radiological effects as a conse- t quence of design base accidents. Further-more, since this change to the MSLRM can be justified independent of HWC, this change does not constitute an unreviewed
.g safety concern.
U S.4 L__-________-___---_-__._.__-..-___________ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ -
,f e
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.' Guidelints for PtrminInt BWR -
~
Implementation or Justification
;T ' Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation- . for Nonconformance p (y)iy8.3 EQUIPMEN r QUALIFICATION -
1
3.3 Comply
Outside primary containment the increase in dose rates with HWC is small relative to the integrated dose tssumed for equip-ment. qualification (EQ) tests. Further-m' ore, dose rates"inside the drywell near the . recirculation piping ~ will decrease because of the. increased carryover of N-16 in - the steam. Each utility. should , review the ' resultant dose increases to'
~
ensure that the doses assumed in the EQ
'. tests required for electrical equipment per ,
10 CFR Part 50.49 remain bounding. b
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S 8.4 Comply: Implementation of ' an HWC system is. unlikely to significantly increase the , amounts or significantly. change the types
'of effluents that may ' be released off
. site. Although an increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation expo-sure may occur, the guidelines provided in
<: .Section 6.1.3 of this document will ensure
-l ~ hat t radiological exposures to' both plant
personnel and the general public are con-
! . sistent with ALARA requirements. Since
. the design objectives and limiting condi-
.tions for operation as defined 10 CFR Part
-50,' Appendix 1, are not impacted, no Appendix ! revision is required.
Each plant should . examine the environ-mental effects of an HWC system. How-ever, it is . unlikely that environmental
. impact statements or environmental assessments will , be required for HWC
~
systems. o O 8-5 a __-_-_____ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
vg , .:. .
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1; ,
! $ , 2 Guidelines for. Permantnt BWR Implementation or Justification -
XHydrogen Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance g n ,, 8.5 Not applicable: Q, , L 8.5 - REFERENCES t 1;. R.~ C. Stirn, et : al., " Rod Drop' .'
' Analysis for Large Boiling Water Reactors." NEDO-10527. General -
Electric Company, March 1972. L .
- 2,. - R. C. Stirn, - et al., , " Rod Drop -
Accident Analysis for Large Boiling
; Water -Reactors Addendum No. 2 Exposed Cores."- NEDO-10527, Supplement 2. . General Electric Company, January 1973.
t . 3. R. - C. : Stirn, et al., ~ " Rod Drop
. Accident ' Analysis for Large Boiling Water: Reactors Addendum No. 1
, Multiple Enrichment - Cores ~ with .
Axial Gadolinium." NEDO-10527, Supplement 1. . General Electric
' Company,- July' 1972.
P
- j. -
t 3 l l l l s4 l 4
= , , '
r ...- ( l ( y ( w'" ~ 'JGuidelines.for Permanent BWR Implementation or Justification Hydrogen Water Chem'istry Installation for Nonconformance l^', h j3 s 9.0 ' QUALITY ASSURANCE 9.0 Comply with intent:
! [A.lthough the'HWC. system is non-nuclear- Design guidance provided in this section -
safety-related,5 the design, procurement, . ~ does not include any requirements. fabrication .and construction activities shall conform ~ to the. quality assurance
^
provisions of the codes ~. and standards y 'specified herein.:In addition, or'where not covered by. the referenced codes and stan-
- dards, the < following quality assurance features shall be established.
~ 9.1- SISTEM . DESIGNER AND ' PRO- 9.1 Comply: CURER;
- Design and Procurement Doc 6 ment Control. - Design- and procurement documents shall,: be . independently verified for ' conformance to the requirements" of ' this document . by individual (s) - within . the ' design organization who are not the origi-nators of the = design and procure-
- ment; documents. Changes to design -
O and procurement documents shall be
\ verified- or controlled 'to maintain conformance to this document.
- Control . of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services. Measures shall be established to ensure that suppliers of material, equipment and construction services are capable of supplying these: items to the quality specified in. the procurement docu-ments. : This may be done by an evaluation or a survey of the sup- -
pliers' products and facilities.
- Handling, Storage, and . Shipping.
Instructions shall be provided in pro-curement documents to control the handling, storage,. shipping and pre-servation of material and equipment to prevent . damage, deterioration, and reduction of cleanliness. O 9-1
Revision 1 March 1989 Guidslines for Permanent BWR implementation or Justification Hydrogcn Water Chemistry Installation for Nonconformance ( 9,2. CONTROL OF HYDROGEN STOR- Comply : GE AND/OR ' GENERATION EQUIP-MENT SUPPLIERS Liquid Air Corporation is using contractors with Commonwealth Edison Company approved QA
-In addition to.the requirements in Section program to install the system. All Code 9.1, the system designer should audit the and EPRI recommended tests on the tank will d2 sign and- manufacturing documents of be performed by Liquid Air Corporation or
. the equipment supplier to assure confor- its subcontractors.
mance . to the procurement documents. The system designer shall specify specific ftctory tests to be performed which will assure operability of the supplier's equip-ment. The system designer or his repre-sentative should be present for the factory I"sts. X 9J SYSTEM CONSTRUCTOR 9.3 Comply:
- Inspection. In addition to code l requirements, a program for inspec- i tion 'of activities affecting quality. l shall be established and executed by, or for, the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accom-p plishing the activity. This shall V include the visual inspection of components prior to installation for l conformance with procurement documents and visual inspection of items and systems following installa-tion, cleaning, and passivation (where applied).
- Inspection, Test and Operating ,
Status. Measures shall be estab-lished to provide for the identi-fication of items which have satisfactorily passed required ingections and tests.
- Identification and Corrective Action for items for Nonconformance.
Measures shall be established to identify items of nonconformance with regard to the requirements of ! the procurement documents or appli-cable codes and standards and to identify the remedial action taken to l 1 correct such items. 9-2 i
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9 7b UNITED STATES m ' ' p,o g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' ~f WASHING TON, D. C. 30555 gv ,oE 9
1 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. ll2 TO TACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29 AND AMENDMENT N0.108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-30 COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-254/265 h i
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated September 16 and November 18, 1988, the licensee requested to amend Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30 to change the setpoint of the main steam line radiation monitors (MSLRMs), to correct typographical errors and to make changes in the Technical Specifications. The requested change involves increasing the setpoint of MSLRMs from seven e times Normal Full Power Background (NFPB) to fifteen times NFPB+to allow for *dho"# implementation of Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) which is expected to mitigate [db5[ the effects of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC). The MSLRM setpoint change is necessary since the injection of hydrogen into the feedwater lowers the oxidizing potential in the reactor coolant which in turn converts more N-16 to a volatile species and results in an increase in steam line 3'. radiation level. As a consequence, the steam activity during hydrogen addition can increase up to a factor of approximately five. By letter dated September 28, 1988 the licensee provided additional information to support the implementation of HWC. The additional information included: (1) Report titled, "HWC Installation Report for Amendment to the Facility Operating License" dated May 16, 1988. (2) Report titled "HWC Installation Compliance with Electric Power Research Institute (ERPI) Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations - 1987 Revision." (3) Draft Copy of Proposed Changes to Updated FSAR as a Result of HWC Addition at Quad Cities Station. The changes will be included in the June 30, 1989 update to the FSAR. , 4
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2.0 EVALUATION The MSLRMs provide reactor scram and main steam line isolation signals when high-activity levels are detected in the main stream lines. ' these monitors serve to limit radioactivity releases in the event of fuelAdditionally, failures. Technical Specification (TS) changes are needed to accommodate the expected main steam line radiation levels (from increased N-16 activity levels - in the steam phase) as a result of hydrogen injection into the reactor coolant system. ! j The licensee has requested TS changes involving raising the MSLRM set points wi* heaf 1 from the current seven times NFPB to fifteen times NFPBf a single set point for the MSLRMs which is an exception to the E # for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation - 1987 Revision" * (hereafter MSLRM referred to as the Guidelines). The Guidelines recomend a dual set point: (1) For reactor power less than 20% of rated, when hydrogen should not be injected, the setpoint is maintained at the current TS factor above NFPB, and (2) For reactor power greater than 20% of rated, the setpoint I; is readjusted to the same TS factor above NFPB with hydrogen addition. !; The only design basis event in which the Quad Cities Station takes credit for the MSLRM is the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA). In the event of a CRDA, the MSLRMs detect high radiation levels in the main steam lines and provide signals for the reactor scram release of fissionand Main Steam products Line Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure to reduce to the environment. For the proposed MSLRM set w//hea.* point of fifteen times NFPBf the calculated dose rate at the MSLRM is 1.5 ^Yd9'" R/hr. For a CRDA the dose rate at the MSLRM is 8 R/hr. Since the MSLRM dose adda ho n rate from the CRDA is over five times the proposed increased MSLRM set point, the high radiation signal caused by the CRDA will still scram the reactor and isolate the MSIVs. Raising the MSLRM trip set point from the current 0.7 P'br to 1.5 R/hr will not result in a significant increase in the radiological cu .equences of a CRDA. The time to reach the proposed MSLRM trip set point following a CRDA will be by increased #he less than 1/4 second. The Quad Cities TS permits five seconds for MSlv closure. The increase in time-to-closure due to the proposed MSLRM set point is only 5% of the current time-to-closure. Since the calculated dose from the CRDA is only 12 mrem, the minor increase in MSIV isolation will have an the insignificant general public. effect on the total activity release and the resulting dose to In the event of an incident causing minor fuel damage such that radiation */fhDd levels will not exceed the proposed MSLRM set point of fifteen times NFPB he downstream steam jet air ejectors radiation detectors would be alarmed. These N# ad [M - detectors have a greater sensitivity than the MSLRMs for noble gases because of the holdup period (delay between MSLRM and steam jet air ejector radiation detectors) which allows for significant decay of N-16 (7.1 second half-life). Since steam jet air ejector radiation detectors are in the Quad Cities Unit 1 , i and 2 TS, the proposed MSLRM set point change will not result in offsite doses in excess of established release limits. Therefore, the proposed TS changes are acceptable.
2.2 RADIATION PROTECTION I
. l The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal regarding the radiological implications due to the increased dose rate associated with increased N-16 activity levels during hydrogen injections into the reactor system. The licensee is comitted to designing, installing, operating, and maintaining the HWC System in accordance with Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.1.0 to assure that occupational radiation exposures and doses to the general public will be As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). A preliminary radiological sukey- has been completed at the Quad Cities Station to identify areas of the station which may experience increased dose rates due to HWC. When HWC is implemented, the results of the preliminary stnfey will be confirmed and additional measurements -Ady will be made, if required. Based on the preliminary sfrvey and experience i from the Dresden Unit 2 (implemented HWC in March 1983), additional shielding appears to be unnecessary. Again, when HWC is implemented, these results will be confirmed and additional shielding will be provided, if required.
1,: Plant procedures will address access control of radiation areas that are !l affected by HWC. Guidelines will be established for any additional controls needed for area posting and monitoring due to HWC. The existing radiological ,i surveillance program (Section 8.4 of Offsite Dose Calculational Manual) assures compliance with regulatory requirements for offsite doses to the public. Radiation protection practices implemented for HWC will insure ALARA in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.8 and is, therefore, acceptable. 2.3 HYDR 0 GEN AND OXYGEN STORAGE FACILITIES
- The licensee will utilize-an-4nter4m-storage-facility for-gaseous hydrogen m e,9
. uns.. ..v.5m... .iquid hydrogen storage f acility is--completed. After-the unached
- liquid hydfegen fccility is installed, the gaseous hydrngan facility will be
. used as a baskup supply. The gasecus hydrogen supply will enneiet nf two tractor trailers coch ccfet+4Mng-a-bank-of-compr4sseMydroger gas tubes (total
. espacity 50,000 - 70,000 scf, cach tube-capeefty 8300 sch-eax4 mum pressure- J
- 2400 psig). The pressure control staticn has two parallel full flow pressure reducing regulators. An excess flow check valve is installed downstream of the interim tube trailer and long-term liquid hydrogen storage facility. An additional excess flow check valve is installed in the hydrogen gas supply line near the west wall of the Unit 1 turbine building. Each excess flow check valve has a stop-flow-setpoint of 200 scfm (plant's hydrogen flow requirements are 140 scfm).
+an k is
- The hag-tetw-liquid hydrogen storage faci'ity will consist of a 20,000 ga!!er-tattk constructed in accordance with Section VIII, Division 1 of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. The hydrogen storage facility (compressed gas and liquid) is located 1500 feet from the nearest safety-related structure.
This distance meets the Guidelines which requires 140 and 962 feet separation distance in the event of an explosion of a gaseous hydrogen storage tube and liquid hydrogen tank respectively. i
INSERT FOR PARAGRAPH 2.3 The hydrogen storage facility contains a liquid hydrogen tank, gaseous storage tubes, and two gaseous tube trailer discharge stations. The licensee will utilize a 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen tank as a long term hydrogen source. Gaseous hydrogen storage tubes (total capacity 50,000-75,000 scf, each tube capacity 8,300 scf, maximum pressure 2,400 psig) are provided to serve as a gaseous surge volume for the liquid hydrogen tank. If the liquid hydrogen system is not completed, the licensee will utilize two gaseous hydrogen tube trailers for initial startup and operation. Gaseous tube trailers will also be brought on site to provide backup hydrogen supply when liquid hydrogen is not available. i
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, I The hydrogen supply facility provides the gaseous hydrogen requirements for I turbine generator cooling / purging as well as HWC for Units 1 and 2. l The liquid oxygen storage tank, with a maximum capacity of 11,000 gallons, is located 1000 feet away from the nearest safety-related air intake which meets the Guidelines.
The hydrogen and oxygen storage facilities meet the Guidelines.
.t. 4 Jr3' HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN INJECTION SYSTEM
- The hydrogen piping is run underground from the storage facility to the outer wall of the Unit I turbine building. The piping is covered with* protective a.
coating to protect against corrosion and is electrically grounded. The hydrogen injection lines for each Unit are equipped with check valves and solenoid isolation valves, which are interlocked with the condensate pump. The individual solenoid isolation valves provide hydrogen flow isolation if the , I associated condensate pump is shut down and for all hydrogen injection trips. The hydrogen is injected into the condensate pump discharge to provide adequate dissolving and mixing and to avoid gas pockets at high points. The HWC system is tripped by the following signals: Reactor scram,
- Low residual off-gas oxygen concentration, High hydrogen flow, Low hydrogen flow Area hydrogen conc,entration high, Operator manual, Hydrogen Low reactor storage pcW;r facilf.Q icn. . Wtrouble, m flowl and
- Gash unif has dght hydyt9tn avta. monifers log.aiep Thc arca hydrog:n monitors etc in cight ;ccaticas in the vicinity of hydrogen injection system components that may leak.
e The sensors feed to a monitor panel which trips thejsystem at 20% of the lower explosive limit. (respecis ve ynit ks H& 0xygen in the off-gasis injected streaminto is the of t-gas system to insure that all excess hydrogen recombined. The hydrogen and oxygen injection system meet the Guidelines.
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.3 # CONCLUSION On the basis of the above evaluation, we find that the proposed Technical Specification changes required for implementation of HWC at Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 are acceptable. The proposed increased single set point, versus a dual power dependent set point, for the MSLRMs is an exception to the BWR Owners Group Revision". " Guidelines for Pernanent Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation - 1987 This exception is justified on the basis that the CRDA dose rate is already limiting at five times the new set point. Thus, it will rot affect the safety of the plant or the general public.
i 1 l
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area'as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has..been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eli for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR - 51.22(c)(9) gibility criteriaand10CFR51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no envir ,; mental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in' connection with the issuance of these amendments. 4.0 C0NCLUSION The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: i: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, suchand (2) public activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public. Principal Contributor: Frank Witt Dated: January 18, 1989 l
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l _ _ - _ _ __=_=
l ATIACIMl2iT._.D l DESCRIPTION OF COMMENTS Paragraphs 1.0 .intteduction and 2.0 Evaluation The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor setpoint is fifteen times the normal full power background level without hydrogen addition. The enhancement of "without hydrogen addition" provides a necessary distinction for calibration of the monitor. This comment is provided for clarification. Paragraph 2.2 - Radiation Protectian Replace the word " survey" with " study". Actual radiological surveys were not_ performed but rather a study was performed to anticipate increased dose rates and the need for additional shielding. This comment is provided for clarification. Paragraph 2.3 - 11ydrsgen_andJxygen StgI. age Facilitiga l The proposed change to the paragraph provides clarification to the ! gaseous and liquid hydrogen storage configuration. Paragraph 2.3 - liydrogen and Oxygen Iniacilan_EyEina (a) The HWC System trips on low reactor steam flow in lieu of low reactor
. power level.
(b) There are eight hydrogen area monitors per unit. The Safety Evaluation infers that there are eight hydrogen monitors for both units. This comment is provided for clarification. 0014k}}