ML20151V035
| ML20151V035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1986 |
| From: | Garrison D, Georgiev G, Heishman R, Mclellan T, Nemoto J, Peranich M, Phillips H, Phillips H, Stein S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151V027 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-85-21, 50-499-85-19, NUDOCS 8602110181 | |
| Download: ML20151V035 (200) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1985021
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION OF INSPECTION PROGRAMS
REACTOR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS BRANCH
Report No.: 50-498/85-21,499/85-19
Docket No.: 50-498, 50-499
Licensee: Houston Lighting and Power Company
Facility Name: South Texas Project
Inspection At: Matagorda County, Texas
Inspection Conducted: October 21-November 1 and November 12-22, 1985
Inspectors: / M '#
M. W. Peranich, Chief Construction Programs /
/////74
Date 51gned
CAT Section, Team Leader
W hr /
'Inspedtor
h (Region IV)
Y'/fC
D&te' Signed
<D.L.Garytson,feside
N. 4. 5 /\lm LE& /f/0 86
)rgiev, Sr. Retctor Co truction Engineer Date S4gned
/G.B.Ge
I r Y Y?Yk
T. K. McLellan, Reactor Construction Engineer
///r/d4
D4te' Signed
L ll ///O/86
gmoto, Reac Construction Engineer Ddte S'igned
& M 2 . kto
M. W. P ipips, Reactor struction Engineer
egu
Date Signed
. ' {&J.'Jn -
'
~^
' S. R. Stein, Riactor Construction Engineer
/ ok6
Date Signed
Consultants: S. L. Baron, A. V. duBouchet, D. C. Ford,
J. B. McCormack, O. P. Mallon, E. Y. Martindale
W. J. Sperko, Jr. , D. G. Whatley,
/,
Approved By: / _
Robert F. Heishman, Chief 0(te' Signed
Reactor Construction Programs Branch
0602110101 06020S ,-
- R. !!. Compton was inadvertently omitted PDR ADOCK 0500 0
from the list of consultants. O
._. _ _ -_ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC SECTION
INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES............................... I
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION................... II
MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION....................................... III
WELDING AND NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION........................ IV
CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION............................. V
MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTR0L............................. VI
DESIGN CHANGE CONTR0L......................................... VII
CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS..................................... VIII
ATTACHMENT A - PERSONS CONTACTED AND DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
ATTACHMENT B - GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
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. _ _ _ . _ _ . _ ._ _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of
construction at the South Texas Project site. This objective was
accomplished through review of the construction program, evaluation nf ;
project construction controls, and review of selected portions of the i
Quality Assurance Program, with emphasis on the installed hardware in the i
field. The scope and significance of identified problems were also i
determined. '
F
Within the areas examined, the inspection consisted of a detailed
examination of selected hardware subsequent to quality control
inspections, a selective examination of procedures and representative
records, and limited observation of in process work.
For each of the areas inspected, the following was determined: )
Were project construction controls adequate to assure quality i
construction?
Was the hardware or product fabricated or installed as designed?
r
Were quality verifications performed during the work process with
applicable hold points?
Was there adequate documentation to determine the acceptability of
installed hardware or product? !
Are systems turned over to the startup organization in operable
condition and are they being properly maintained?
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II. ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION
i
A. Objective
The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and
instrumentation construction was to determine whether safety-related
components and systems were installed in accordance with regulatory
. requirements, Safety Analysis Report commitments, and approved vendor
and construction specifications and drawings. Additional objectives
were to determine whether procedures, instructions, and drawings used
to accomplish construction activities were adequate and whether
quality-related records accurately reflect the completed work.
B. Discussion
Within the broad categories of electrical and instrumentation
construction, attention was given to several specific areas. These
included electrical cable, raceways and raceway supports, electrical
equipment, and instrumentation tubing and components. Additionally, a
review as made of a selected number of documents associated with design
change control and nonconformance reporting.
A number of documents were generated by the applicant to record
individual observations of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT)
inspectors, and are referenced directly in the discussions that follow.
1. Electrical Raceway Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Seventy-two segments of installed Class 1E cable tray, representing
a total length of about 1,000 feet, were selected from various
plant areas for detailed examination by the NRC CAT. These
segments were inspected for compliance to requirements relative to
routing, location, separation, support spacing and configuration,
identification, protection, and physical loading. Additionally, 28
runs of installed conduit, with an aggregate length of about 1,600
feet, were inspected for compliance to specified requirements such
as routing, location, separation, bend radii, support spacing, and
associated fittings.
Twenty-eight raceway supports were examined in detail for such items
as location, material, anchor spacing, weld quality, bolt torque, and
installed configuration.
See Table 11-1 for a listing of cable tray, conduit, and raceway
support samples.
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the inspection:
Bechtel Specification 3E189ES1000, " Conduit and Tray Supports,"
Rev. 6
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___ __________-____-___ _ _ _ _ _ _
Ebasco Quality Control Procedure (QCP) 10.16, " Inspection of
Electrical Raceways," Rev. 4
Ebasco QCP-10.30, " Inspection of Installation and Fabrication of
Electrical Cable Tray Hangers, Conduit Supports and Auxiliary
Steel," Rev. 1
Ebasco Construction Site Procedure (CSP) 40, "EE580 Electrical
Installation," Rev. 4
b. Inspection Findings
In the area of electrical raceway the NRC CAT inspectors observed
that, in general, Class 1E raceway installations were in accordance
with applicable design criteria. Quality attributes such as
material type, location, identification, and installed
configuration were found to be as shown on approved construction
drawings. However, several deficiencies in design or construction
or both were identified and are discussed below.
(1) Raceway Separation
l (FSAR) section 8.3.1.4, entitled " Separation of Redundant
'
Systems," provides the basic criteria for acceptable Class 1E
circuit and electrical raceway installations. This FSAR
section describes commitments for physical arrangement of
raceways which pertain to the requirements of Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.75 for independence of redundant systems. In general,
these FSAR criteria specify the physical separation which must
be maintained between components of redundant electrical
divisions. Additionally, physical separation is required
between components performing Class 1E and non-Class 1E
functions.
During the examination of the selected raceway sample, NRC CAT
inspectors observed that a number of installations were not in
accordance with the FSAR requirements. Deficiencies were
identified in several areas of the plant but were most common
in the Mechanical / Electrical Auxiliary building. In this area
'
numerous Class 1E raceway components had been installed
without the required physical separation. See Table Il-2 for
a listing of the identified raceway segments that violated
separation criteria.
NRC CAT inspectors discussed this issue with licensee personnel
and reviewed relevant inspection procedures, design drawings
and plant historical records to determine why those deficien-
cies exist. The review indicates that the licensee had
identified problems in the area of electrical separation as
'
early as 1984. Corrective Action Report (CAR) G-434, dated
May 8, 1984, details specific violations of relevant FSAR
l criteria. Additionally, other site initiated documents such
l as the " Final Report for STP Pre-CAT Verification," dated July
j 18, 1985, highlight deficiencies in this area.
1
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_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
In reviewing these documents NRC CAT inspectors expressed
i
concerns with regard to actions taken to correct existing
deficiencies. As an example, in response to the deficiencies
identified in CAR G-434 the licensee elected to postpone the
inspaction of raceway division separation until the time of
area turnover. Relevant inspection and construction procedures
were then revised to reflect this decision by eliminating the
attribute of division separation from inspection of cable tray
and conduit. Discussions with licensee personnel indicate that
>
this decision was made based upon the fact that construction
activities are ongoing and thus it is not prudent to identify
separation violations prior to completion of any given area.
At the time of area turnover, a walkdown of each area is
planned by Ebasco engineering to identify violations in
separation and determine the course of action necessary to
alleviate those problems. Additionally, Ebasco Quality
Control (QC) personnel will perform an inspection after the
installation of required barriers in accordance with the
applicable Quality Control Procedure.
NRC CAT inspectors noted that many of the deficiencies identi-
fled during the examination of the raceway sample involved
i components which were part of a system turned over to Houston
!
Lighting and Power Company (HL&P) Startup. Consequently,
component modification or installation of barriers which may
result from future inspection activities may adversely affect
plant systems which have been turned over and accepted.
Several aspects of the licensee's proposed inspection and
engineering walkdown programs were evaluated, including a
review of Standard Site Procedure SSP-45. This procedure,
issued on October 25, 1985 during the NRC CAT inspection,
provides the basic acceptance criteria which will be used for
future inspection of separation between electrical components.
The procedure content appears thorough, but because inspection
activity has not commenced an evaluation of program effec-
tiveness could not be made.
In summary, while it is clear that the licensee is aware of
existing separation deficiencies, the implementation and
effectiveness of actions planned to correct these and other
currently unidentified deficiencies requires further evalua-
tion.
NRC CAT inspectors also observed several raceway installations
in which redundant divisional cable tray or conduit had been
attached to a common raceway support. NRC CAT inspectors
expressed concern that this configuration does not meet the
intent of RG 1.75 position C.3 which states that "In general,
locating redundant circuits and equipment in separate safety
class structures affords a greater degree of assurance that a
'
single event will not affect redundant systems. This method of
separation should be used whenever practicable and where its
use does not conflict with other safety objectives."
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This concern,.and its relationship to plant missile protec-
tion, was discussed with licensee personnel. With regard to
the common support of redundant raceways, it.is postulated that
a single event (i.e., missile impact) could adversely affect
the function of redundant divisional circuits.
NRC CAT inspectors reviewed section 3.5 of the STP FSAR. This
section and its Table 3.5-1 contain criteria for missile
protection for South Texas Project. Specific attention was
given to the FSAR discussion under the heading Internally
Generated Missiles Outside of Containment, ar.d the protective
measures required by the referenced table. NRC CAT inspectors
also reviewed Bechtel Project Engineering Directive PED-039
entitled " Engineering Evaluation Walkdowns" and the Systems
Interaction Design Guide PED-016 entitled " Internally Generated
Missiles."
One area of concern was identified during this review and was
discussed with licensee personnel. FSAR Table 3.5-1 describes
safety class systems and components and seismic category I
structures which require missile protection. The table appears
to provide exclusions for the categories of cable raceway
l systems and electrical supports based on component redundancy.
i However. as previously discussed the NRC CAT inspectors noted
I
that redundant raceway installations that are attached to a
common support would be equally affected by missile impact.
As a result of this observation the licensee has issued FSAR
l Change Notice 779 to more appropriately reflect the intent of
!
Table 3.5-1 to include raceways and raceway supports in missile
protection evaluations. This resolves the NRC CAT concern in
this area.
(2) Electrical Conduit
'
With exception of the specific deficiencies listed below, the
conduit sample inspected conformed to applicable design and
installation requirements relative to such attributes as size,
routing, identification and proper supports.
l Conduit C1XM3ER5204'was found to have a support distance
violation between two supports, and conduit AIXE2ARY102 was not
identified with its safety division marking at the required 15
i feet intervals. These two isolated deficiencies were sub- ,
sequently recorded on Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) CE-03207
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and CE-03213 by the licensee.
The strap bolts for eight QC accepted conduits did not exihibit
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torque seal as required by project instructions. QCP-10.30
requires QC to verify the torque on at least one bolt from each
connection and requires the verified bolt to be marked with
! torque seal. Discussion with the licensee indicates that the
l lack of or partial application of torque seal for QC accepted
l conduits is due to removal and reinstallation without reinspec-
l tion by QC. NRC CAT inspectors concluded that the licensee's
l ccentrol of QC accepted conduit installation is not completely
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effective. The inadequate torque sealing was subsequently
recorded on NCR CE-03213 by the licensee.
(3) Raceway Supports
The examination of raceway supports included conduit and cable
tray supports. Attributes such as location, material type and
size, anchor spacing and embedded length, welds (location, size
and general quality), and installed configuration were found to
be in accordance with design requirements. However, several
isolated hardware deficiencies and one documentation deficiency
were identified.'
It was noted by the NRC CAT inspectors that the traveler
package for cable tray hanger 2-002-H3 included the inspection
report for a different hanger. The licensee's subsequent
investigation revealed a number of documentation errors and
omissions attributable to hangers inspected by the same QC
inspector. The licensee has issued Standard Deficiency
Reports (SDRs) E-361 and E-362 to document and correct these
deficiencies.
The torque of approximately 150 bolts and 50 concrete anchors
of various sizes on raceway supports was verified by the NRC
CAT inspectors. Three cable tray supports, 2-103-H61,
1-010-H84 and 1-024-H52, each contained several 1/2-inch strut
bolts which did not meet minimum torque requirements. These
deficiencies were documented on NCRs CK-03111, and CE-03229.
Independent of the bolt torque sample, hanger 1-065-H11 was
also found to contain several loose 1/2-inch strut bolts even
though the bolts were marked with torque seal. In addition,
the embedded lengths of 17 concrete anchors were verified using
an ultrasonic inspection method with no items of concern noted.
It was noted by the NRC CAT inspectors that virtually all the
1/2-inch strut bolts had no markings on the bolt heads making
identification of the material indeterminate. Beginning with
Rev. 3 in 1983, Bechtel specification 3E189ES1000 requires
these strut bolts to be from material conforming to American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A-307, Grade B, but
specifically negates the ASTM requirement for manufacturers'
markings. The use of ASTM A307 bolting materials without
manufacturer's identification marks is also discussed in
Section VI, Material Traceability and Control, of this report.
Other than the indeterminate traceability of bolt material, the
documentation and hardware discrepancies identified by the NRC
CAT in this area are considered isolated cases,
c. Conclusions
- Except as noted, raceway systems have been installed in accordance
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with applicable design and installation requirements. However,
numerous installations have not naintained the physical separation
required by the licensee's commitment in the FSAR. In this area, it
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was determined that pertinent procedural.and administrative controls
have only recently been developed. As such, the adequacy of
electrical raceway separation after implementation of these controls
at South Texas Project will require further evaluation by the
licensee and NRC personnel.
The number of reworked conduit installations that were found lacking
QC reinspection of bolt torque indicate that rework of QC accepted
conduit installations requires increased control.
2. Electrical Cable Installation
a. Inspection Scope i
The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of installed Class 1E
cable runs that had been previously accepted by QC inspectors. The
sample included medium and low voltage power, control, and instru-
mentation cabling. For each of the cable runs, physical inspection
was made to ascertain compliance with applicable design criteria
relative to size, type, location, routing, bend radii, protection,
separation, identification, and support.
Additionally, the NRC CAT inspectors selected approximately 108 l
cable ends for examination of terminations. These were inspected to l
applicable design and installation documents for items such as lug
i size and type, proper terminal point configuration, correct identi-
l fication of cable and conductors, proper crimping of lugs or
- connectors, and absence of irmulation or jacket damage. See Table
l II-3 for a listing of cable terminations examined.
The following medium and low voltage power cable totaling about
1,700 feet were selected from different systems, electrical
trains, and locations:
Cable Type
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AIDJAKC1LA 1/C No. 4 AWG
B1CSABC1EA 1/C 250 MCM
I
B1CHABC2LB 3/C No. 6 AWG
BIRHADC1LE 3/C No. 10 AWG
C1PKACC1GA 3-1/C 750 MCM
D1VAABC1HB 3/C No. 4 AWG
D1DJABC1LE 1/C 750 MCM
The.following control cables totaling approximately 1,100 feet were
selected from different systems, electrical trains, and locations:
Cable Type
A1FWO7CISC 5/C No. 12 AWG
A1JWO2C1SA 7/C No. 12 AWG
C1PK01C3SK 3/C No. 16 AWG
01VA10C25A 7/C No. 12 AWG
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The following instrument cable totaling approximately 1,000 feet
were selected from different systems, electrical trains, and
locations:
Cable Type
AIDG04CIPA 2/C No. 16 Shielded
AIDG04C1PC 2/C No. 16 Shielded
A11114CAXF 2/C No. 16 Shielded
BIRH03C2WD 2/C No. 16 Shielded
D1VA10C2XA 2/C No. 16 Shielded
D1DJ10C4XC 2/C No. 16 Shielded
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the inspection:
- Bechtel Specification SE189ES1007, " Cable Installation In Trays,
Conduits and Ductbanks," Rev. 5
- Bechtel Specification SE189ES1004, " Cable Splicing, Termination,
and Supports," Rev. 5
- Bechtel Specification 5A230ES1008, " Installation of Electrical
Cable, Raceway, and Equipment Identification," Rev. 6
- Ebasco QCP-10.17, " Electrical Cable Installation Inspection,"
Rev. 2
- Ebasco CSP-19, " Safety and Non-Safety-Related Cable Pulling,"
Rev. 4
- Ebasco CSP-8, " Cable Termination and Splices," Rev. I
b. Inspection Findings
(1) Routing
In general, the routing of Class 1E cables through design
designated raceway systems was found to be in accordance with
specified criteria. Each of the Class 1E cables examined by
NRC CAT inspectors had been installed in accordance with the
routing detailed on the EE580 pull cards.
The examination of Class 1E cables did disclose an
apparent deficiency-in the routing of medium voltage cables
into cable spreading areas. NRC CAT inspectors observed
that these installations do not meet the requirements of IEEE
384-1974 section 5.1.3 which limits cable installation in a
cable spreading room to circuits which perform control and
instrumentation functions.
Subsequent discussions with licensee personnel disclosed that
the " cable spreading areas" were inaccurately defined on
drawing SE-03-0E-0100 sheet 6AA Rev. O. Consequently, the
medium voltage cables identified by NRC CAT inspectors were
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acceptably installed outside of actual cable spreading areas
and were in accordance with IEEE-384 and RG 1.75. As a result
of this observation the licensee has issued Design Change
Notice (DCN) I to revi'se and clarify the referenced drawing.
(2) Separation
In general, the separation of Class 1E cables was found to be
in accordance with requirements.
NRC CAT inspectors did identify a number of Class 1E cable
installations which exhibit inadequate separation at the
entrance to Class 1E equipment. However, these deficiencies
were the subject of Bechtel Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER)85-034 issued September 10, 1985, which was subsequently
determined to be potentially reportable pursuant to 10 CFR
50.55(e). Evaluation of actions taken to correct existing
deficiencies are in.accordance with this process and as such,
NRC CAT inspectors have no additional observations in this
area.
In~ general, the separation of Class 1E cables located inside
of electrical equipment was found to conform with requirements.
One area where a deficiency was identified is in cubicle 3 of
4160V switchgear 3E151ESCOE1C. The physical separation between
a non-Class 1E pull out~ fuse block and Class 1E wiring was less
than the required six inches. As a result of this observation
the licensee has issued NCR SE-03233 to identify and correct
this condition.
No other deficiencies were observed in this area.
(3) Power Cable Spacing and Derating
STP po.ter cable installations have been designed in accordance
with Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association (IPCEA)
publication P-46-426, 1963 " Power Cable Ampacities - Volume I
- Copper Conductors" and P-54-440, 1972 "Ampacities - Cables
in Open Top Trays." The STP FSAR further requires that SkV
and 15kV cables in tray be installed with spacing maintained
at 1/4 of the cable bundle diameterc In general, the installa-
tion of Class IE power cables was found to comply with these
requirements. However, spacing had not been maintained in tray
segments B1XE3FTEAE, B1XE3FTEAF and B1XE3FTEAJ. Deficiencies
in cable tie down requirements were also observed in these tray
segments. As a result of these observations the licensee has
issued NCR CE-3211.
No other deficiencies were identified in this area.
(4) Cable Damage
Although no damaged cable was found, two situations with'the
potential for cable damage were identified by the NRC CAT
inspectors. A number of cable tray segments above equipment
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were found to be missing required edge softeners where cable
breaks out of the tray over the. tray side rail into the equip-
ment. Numerous examples were noted in the switchgear rooms.
Based on this observation, the licensee documented an
individual occurrence on NCR CE-03210 and addressed the generic
issue with a procedure change. The change will add a visual
check for the presence of edge softeners to QCP-10.32,
"Walkdown/ Turnover of Safety-Related Systems, Sub-Systems,
Areas, or Components."
The second situation involves vertically run free air cable
between-spreading rooms on elevations 60 ft. and 74 ft. The
cables run through flame cut holes in metal decking with no
protection provided for the cut edges. This item was
subsequently documented on NCR CE-03256 for evaluation.
In addition, the quantity of Class 1E cable coiled throughout
the plant is of concern in that the potential for damage is
increased whenever cable coils are exposed to general construc-
tion activities. As a result of an NRC CAT observation, the
licensee issued NCR CE-03310 to document minimum bend radius
violations and other workmanship problems with cable
temporarily coiled in panel C1PNZLP803.
The area of cable protection merits continued licensee atten-
tion.
(5) Cable Identification.
In general, the identification of Class 1E cable installations
was found to be in accordance with applicable design criteria.
In connection with an issue which had been previously identi-
fied in both licensee and Region IV inspection reports, NRC CAT
inspectors noted that the color coding of numerous Class 1E
cables had faded due to weathering, aging or both. In some
installations fading had resulted in cable coloring which did
not accurately represent the functional division of the instal-
led cable. For example a purple cable (Division A) had faded
to blue (Division B).
Discussions with licensee personnel and the review of the
response to a previously issued nonconformance report indicates
that, although color fading of Class 1E cabling does cause some
confusion during performance of a visual inspection, a detailed
examination of any particular cable will confirm proper routing
and divisional separation based upon the divisional code
applied to each cable jacket. In addition, the cable identi-
fication at termination ends indicates the cable's safety
division.
NRC CAT inspectors conf % ed this during the field examination
of Class 1E cables but - ed that the divisional code had not
been applied to cable supplied by Rockbestos. However, no
examples of color fading in Rockbestos cable were identified
by the NRC CAT inspectors or site inspection personnel.
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No other concerns were identified in this area.
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(6) Terminations
In general, cable termination activities performed by
construction personnel conformed to requirements. However,
several isolated construction deficiencies and one procedure
conflict were identified by the NRC CAT inspectors.
- Cable B1DJACC1LL, the power feed from the safety Division
B battery, is trained such that it is in contact'with the
battery rack. This observation was subsequently recorded
on NCR SE-03241 by the licensee.
- Terminal block 200 in panel A1SIABC1HH has a broken separator
'
between the positive and negative terminal points for cable
A1SPAAC1SA. This was subsequently documented on NCR
CE-03222 by the licensee.
- Cables A1SPIABCICA and A1SIABC1HH-are terminated on their
respective breakers in reverse order to the specification
requirements. The specification requires black,. red, orange
terminated top to bottom and the cables.are terminated black,
red, orange bottom to top. This was subsequently recorded
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on NCR CE-03258.
- During the inspection of control cable terminations, several
adjacent cable conductors were found to violate the. require-
ment for minimum bend radius. The cables involved are.
A1SP25CBSC and A1SP25CBSE in panel A1PNETCA04, and cable
A1SP21 COSH in panel A1PNETCA02. Based on this observation
the cables were documented on NCR CE-03205 by the licensee.
QCP-10.13 Section 5.2.2.1 requires inspection for nicked or
missing conductor strands. This characteristic is required
for and is being recorded acceptable on inspection records
for post termination inspections where the conductor strands ,
are inaccessable for-inspection.
c. Conclusions
With the exception of concerns or deficiencies identified in the
areas of cable identification and cable damage, and the apparently
isolated deficiencies identified with terminations, the installation
of Class 1E circuits and wiring was found to be in accordance with
applicable design requirements' .
3. Electrical Equipment Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Over 40 pieces of installed or partially installed electrical
equipment and associated hardware items from the various safety
divisions were inspected.
11-10
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The following specific electrical components were inspected in
detail:
(1) Motors
The installation of ten motors and associated hardware was
inspected for such items as location, anchoring, grounding,
identification and protection. The motors inspected were:
Essential Cooling Water Pump Motor 3R281NPA101A
Essential Cooling Water Pump Motor 3R281NPA101B
Containment Spray Pump Motor 2N101NPA101A
Containment Spray Pump Motor 2N101NPA101B
Containment Spray Pump Motor 2N101NPA101C
Safety Injaction Pump Motor 2N121NPA101C
Essential Lnilled Water Pump Motor 3111VPA004
Reactor Makeup Water Pump Motor 3R271NPA101A
EAB Air Handling Unit Fan Motor 3V111VFN014
EAB Air Handling Unit Fan Motor 3V111VFN016
(2) Electrical Penetration Assemblies
.The following containment penetration assemblies were
inspected:
C1PHEP046 Instrumentation
C1PHEP054 480V Power
B1PHEP028 Instrumentation
A1PHEP018 Control
B1PHEP032 Control
B1PHEP036 480V Power
The location, type, mounting, identification, and maintenance
of these penetrations were compared with the installation
drawings and vendor manuals.
(3) Circuit Breakers
Circuit breakers for the following Class 1E motors were
examined to determine compsiance with design and installation
documents for size, type, system interface, and maintenance:
Safety Injection
(4) .Switchgear and Motor Control Centers
The following switchgear and motor control centers were
inspected:
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Motor Control Center B1PMMCEB1
Motor Control Center C1PMMCEC3
Motor Control Center A1PMMCEA2
Motor Control Center A1PMMCEA3
Motor Contro1~ Center A1PMMCEA4
4160V Switchgear B1PKSG0ElB
4160V Switchgear AIPKSG0E1A
(5) Station Batteries and Racks
The 125V battery rooms including the installed batteries,
battery racks and associated equipment were inspected. .The
location, mounting, maintenance and environmental control for
installation of the batteries were compared with the
applicable requirements and quality records.
125VDC Battery C1DJBT045D
125VDC Battery AIDJBT045A
(6) 125VDC System Equipment
The following equipment comprising portions of the 125Vdc
systems were inspected for compliance to design documents for
such items as location, mounting (welds, concrete anchors and
bolting) and proper configuration:
Battery Charger B1DJBC047E
Battery Charger AIDJBC047B
Battery Charger AIDJBC047A
Distribution Panel A1VADP1201
Distribution Panel B1DJPLO39B
Distribution Panel C1DJPLO39C
Static Inverter A1VAIV1201
Inverter / Rectifier A1VAIV001
(7) Control Panels
A number of safety-related electrical control panels were
inspected for compliance to requirements for items such as
location, mounting and type. The panels inspected were:
Diesel Generator Control Panel A1PNZLP101
Diesel Generator Control Panel B1PNZLP103
Remote Shutdown Panel A1PNZLP100 B1PNZLP100
C1PNZLP100 D1PNZLP100
Main Control Boards (2)
(8) Motor Operated Valves
The following 16 motor operated valves were examined in detail:
11-12
~ _ - - - _ .
i
l
CICVMOV01128 B1SIMOV0001B
B1CVM0V0113A CISIMOV00016
A1RCMOV0001A A1SIMOV0004A
B1RCMOV0001B B1SIMOV0004A
B1SIMOV0016B CISIMOV0016C
B1SIMOV0018B CISIMOV0018C
C1RHMOV0061B A1RHMOV0061C
C1CCMOV0209 CICCMOV0199
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria
for the inspections:
Bechtel Specification 3E319ES1040, " Class 1E' Induction
Motors (250HP and Below)," Rev. 0
Bechtel Specification 4A479ES1018, " Environmental
Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical and
Mechanical Equipment," Rev. 2
Bechtel Specification 3E159ES0012, "5KV Class IE Metal-Clad
Switchgear," Rev. 2
Bechtel Specification 3E269ES1091, "Special Electrical
Penetration Assemblies," Rev. 2
Bechtel Specification 5A230ES1008, " Installation of
Electrical Cable, Raceway and Equipment Identification,"
Rev. 6
Bechtel Specification SE329ES1002, " Valve Electric Motor
Actuators," Rev. 3
Bechtel Procurement Appendix G, "Large AC Induction Motors
for Class 1E Service (250 HP and Larger)," no revision
Ebasco QCP-10.15, " Electrical Equipment Installation
Inspection," Rev. 4
Ebasco QCP-10.20, " Electrical Penetration Installation
Inspection," Rev. 3
Ebasco SP-2, " Installation of Permanent Electrical and
Mechanical Plant Equipment," Rev. 4
Ebasco CSP-44, " Installation of Electrical Penetration
Assemblies," Rev. 3
Ebasco Construction Maintenance Instruction CMI-1, " Caring
and Maintenance of Permanent Plant Items," Rev. 7
Applicable design drawings and design change documents
II-13
__
b. Inspection Findings
. (1) Motors
In general, the Class 1E motors inspected were found to conform
with applicable design documents. The motors examir, d were of
the type, size, and configuration specified. A limited review
of maintenance records indicated that construction maintenance
had been performed in accordance with approved procedures.
However, several specification deficiencies were found with-
several 480V motors and mounting deficiencies were noted with
several 4160V motors.
Bechtel specification 3E319ES1040 requires motors under 250
horse power (HP) rating to have vendor installed terminal lugs
on the motor leads. The two air handling unit fan motors
inspected, 3V111FN014 and FN016, did not have the required
terminal lugs. The braided jackets on the fan motor leads were
also found to be frayed. A third fan motor, FN002, identified
by the NRC CAT mechanical inspectors was also found in this
condition. Although these are not considered significant
hardware deficiencies by the NRC CAT, the appropriate terminal
lugs need to be installed when the fan motors are terminated to
their permanent power source. Fans FN014 and FN016 were
subsequently documented on NCR BE-03335 and fan FN002 on NCR
BE-03334.
The Bechtel specification also requires motors under 250 HP
rating to have an insulation rating of Class F (135*C) or H
(150*C). The nameplate and vendor manual for the reactor make
-up water pump motor 3R271NPA101A indicate the motor insulation
is only Class B (110*C). This requires evaluation by the
licensee to assure the motor is adequate for its intended
service environment.
Approximately half of the motor hold down bolts for containment
~
spray pumps 2N101NPA101B and C and high head safety injection
pump 2N121NPA101C were unmarked ana of indeterminate material.
The remainder of the' bolts were marked as ASTM A-449 in lieu of
the required A-193, Grade B7. These and other pump motor hold
down bolt-discrepancies were subsequently dotumented on NCR-
CM-03078. These are discussed further in Se.ctions III,-
Mechanical Construction, and VI, Material Traceability and
Contt01, of this report.
In an isolated finding, containment spray pump motor
2N101NPA101A did not have a sight glass for the upper bearing
oil reservoir although the maintenance records indicated
adequate oil level. The missing sight glass was subsequently
documented by the licensee on Deficiency Report (DR) 1-505M.
(2) Electrical Penetrations
The penetrations examined were found to have been installed in
<
accordance with the applicable design documents. A review of
II-14
. -.
~
relevant maintenance records indicates that a number of
maintenance discrepancies such as 0 psi pressure and no
internal heaters were documented and adequately dispositioned
on Maintenance Discrepancy forms or determined to be unneces-
sary by the equipment vendor.
No deficiencies were observed in this area.
(3) CircuitBreakers
'
Thi. examination of the selected circuit breakers for the
containment spray and safety injection pump motors indicated
that they had been purchased, installed and maintained in
accordance with the applicable design documents. Important
installation attributes such as proper alignment, main contact
penetration, and safety interlocks were verified by physical
inspection and review of construction and test records.
Maintenance records were also reviewed and indicate that
appropriate activities had been performed.
Circuit breakers which serve various 480V motor control
centers were also examined and are discussed in Section
II.B.3.b.4, below.
No deficiencies were observed in this area.
(4) Switchgear and Motor Control Centers
The examination of Class 1E motor control centers disclosed
several deficiencies with regard to installation of circuit
protection devices. NRC CAT inspectors observed that load-side
terminal extensions on ITE type HE molded case circuit breakers
had been attached using connecting screws which lack sufficient
thread engagement to achieve and maintain a tight connection.
Additionally, insulating barriers installed between the
terminal extensions were found to be loose or missing. As a
~
result of this condition two concerns were noted and discussed
with licensee personnel.
(a) Potential for Inadvertent Circuit Interruption
Actual measurements indicate that terminal connecting
screws have an engagement of less than 1/4 inch into the
circuit breaker housing. This engagement was found not to
be adequate to assure that a tight connection will be
maintained between the terminal and circuit breaker in a
number of these installations. Many of the circuit
breakers examined, including QC accepted and turnover
items,. exhibited terminal extensions which were loose as
received from the vendor or due to normal construction
activity; i.e. , attachment of field cables or work in
adjacent cubicles and wireways. The potential for
inadvertent circuit interruption exists in that terminal
II-15
}
. - - . - - . .
connecting screws may work' loose during construction or
startup activities or due to the vibrations typically
experienced during plant operation.
(b) Phase to Phase Faultina
As detailed in (a), above, many of the Class IE circuit
breakers examined contained loose terminal extensions.
The' length and spacing of these extensions was such.that
phase to phase contact is possible. . Additionally, many of
the insulating barriers installed between terminals were
loose or missing due to inadequate vendor-installation or
construction or startup damage. As a result, the potential
for phase to phase faulting exists.
_
- , These concerns were. discussed with licensee personnel in an
attempt to determine the reason for use of load terminal
'
extensions on molded case circuit breakers at South Texas
Project, and why the previously mentioned deficiencies had not
been identified by site inspection or source surveillance
personnel.
These discussions and a review of the relevant Bechtel purchase
specification, 3E179ES1054, indicate that although the specifica-
tion does detail a requirement for breaker terminals which can
accomodate attachment. of a two hole termination lug, no
specific renuest for use of terminal extensions had been made
.
by the licensee to the motor control center vendor. It was
also observed that load terminal extensions were not-detailed
on any of the applicable. design and vendor documents available
for review.- Additionally, based upon review of relevant vendor ,
documentation and the equipment seismic qualification report it
could not be determined whether the Class 1E motor control
centers had been tested with circuit breakers in this ~
configuration. As a result of this observation and at the
request of NRC CAT inspectors, Bechtel engineering issued
~
letter ST-YB-00-74 to the motor control center vendor
(Telenecanique) requesting additional information on this
subject. No response had been received from the vendor during
the NRC CAT inspection.
During meetings with the licensee regarding the possible
reasons for use of the terminal extensions, the licensee's
criteria for cable sizing were discussed. At the request of
the-NRC CAT, the licensee evaluated the cable sizes and
limiting factors for the Unit 1 circuits connected to
breakers'with terminal extensions. Their evaluation showed
that although the cables for several circuits were one size
larger than required, all the circuits but one could be
terminated directly to their breakers. The one circuit with
terminal lugs too large for direct connection to its breaker
(MCC E1A4, cubicle F3L) was size limited for ampacity and not
voltage drop. Prior to the NRC CAT inspection, the licensee
had identified one circuit with a cable size limited due to
II-16
1
voltage drop (MCC E1C2, cubicle H2R) and has since re-routed
the circuit eliminating the voltage drop problem.
As a result of deficiencies identified in this area the
licensee has issued NCRs BE-03208 and SE-03201 to document and
identify the extent of this problem. Preliminary reviews
indicate that approximately 30 Unit 1 Class 1E circuit
breakers exhibit this configuration with an equal. number
existing in Unit 2. See Table 11-4 for a listing of motor
control centers, breakers, and safety-related loads affected by
this condition.
On November 18, 1985, the licensee notified NRC Region IV that
this issue is potentially reportable pursuant to 10 CFR
50.55(e).
In general, the installation of Class 1E 4160V switchgear was
found to be in accordance with requirements. Attributes.such
as location, mounting and installed configuration were as
specified by. approved design documents. However, several
specification deficiencies were identified.
Appendix C of Bechtel specification 3E159E50012 establishes
requirements for control wiring within SkV metal-clad
switchgear.
Subsection E states in part..."The preferred terminal
blocks are G.E. Catalog CR-151B2, connection U2 or
connection NU2. Each terminal block shall have no less
than 12 points." Contrary to this requirement NRC CAT
inspectors identified severai cubicles of the 4160V
'tchgear which contain terminal blocks with less than
t'w 12 points specified.
section Q states in part'.." Adequate space shall be
.
t c .ded on both sides of the terminal blocks for connect-
ing wires and wire markers. To allow for stripping and
bending on incoming cables, terminal strips shall be
located a minimum of 8-inches away from cable entrances
either at top or bottom." Contrary to this requirement
NRC CAT inspectors observed the location of terminal strips
to be less than 8 inches from cable entrances in several
switchgear cubicles.
These specification deviations were observed in several
cubicles of 4160V switchgear.
As a result of this observation the licensee has issued NCR
SE-03225 and initiated Specification Change Notice SCN-3 to
document and correct this condition.
No other deficiencies were identified with 4160V switchgear.
II-17
--- - - .- - - - --.
(5) Station Batteries and Racks
The condition of the battery rooms was found to be in good
order and clean and free of debris. . Ventilation systems were
installed and in operation. Access to these areas was
controlled by keyed entry, and the appropriate danger signs had
been posted to prohibit smoking or open flames.-
The 125V batteries were examined and found to be in good
condition. Maintenance _ activities were reviewed, and in
general, had been performed in accordance with requirements.
The inspection of the 125V battery-racks disclosed that
indeterminate bolting materials had been used in the assembly
process. This issue is discussed in detail in Section VI,
Material Traceability and Control, of this report.
(6) 125VDC System
In' general, the examination of components which comprise
portions of the 125Vdc system indicates that construction
activities had been accomplished in accordance with the
applicable procedures and design documents. However,
deficiencies in the area of equipment mounting and product
quality were identified on several pieces of Class IE
equipment.
The examination of distribution panels B10JPLO39B and
C1DJPLO39L disclosed a weld configuration which does not
match the mounting details specified by applicable design
documents. Field Change Request (FCR) CE-04475 specifies a
1/4 inch fillet weld of 4 inches length on 6 inches centers
to be installed on two sides of the equipment and a
continuous 1/4 inch fillet weld on the front. Actual
field conditions exhibited a 1/4 inch fillet weld on 8
inches centers on both front and sides of the panels.
Relevant inspection records which indicate acceptable
irstallations do not account for this discrepancy.
As a result of this observation the licensee has issued
NCR SE-03325 to document and correct this condition.-
Each of the three Class 1E battery chargers examined by
the NRC CAT exhibited loose soldered connections on the
equipment " firing boards." Inadequate solder joints were
observed at both pin-to-conductor and pin-to-circuit board
connections. Discussions with licensee personnel revealed
that this condition had been identified and evaluated on
Startup Work Request (SWR) 01757, and that, pending
delivery of qualified solder material, approved corrective
action would be implemented.
No other deficiencies were identified in this area.
II-18
i
l
,
(7) Control Panels
In general,-the installation of Class 1E control panels was
found to be in accordance with applicable requirements.
Mounting, location, and installed configuration were as
specified. Several discrepancies were identified with regard
to fastening materials used in the assembly of some panels.
This issue is discussed in detail in Section VI, Material.
Traceability and Control, of this report.
~
The NRC CAT inspectors also noted several non-Class 1E equip-
ments with identification tags color-coded as Class IE equip-
ment. Ten nonsafety relay panels had white identification tags
which indicate safety Division D 'and the nonsafety heater in an
emergency diesel generator high voltage panel had a blue tag
indicating safety Division B. The licensee .bsequently
documented the relay panels o'n DR E-0632 and all three diesel
generator high voltage panels on NCR BE-03300 for corrective
action.
(8) Motor Operated Valves
The NRC CAT -inspected 16 valve operators for installation to
the latest design requirements and identified deficiencies in
all 16 operatort examined. In addition, discrepancies were
found in the control and execution of design changes to certain
motor operated valves (MOVs) supplied by Westinghouse
Corporation (W).
Several deficiencies were noted in virtually all of the MOVs
inspected. These included loose vendor terminations,-jumper
wires containing bend radius violations, and the use of No. 16
AWG wire in lieu of No. 14. In addition, the licensee was
unable to provide the NRC CAT with evidence of qualification
for the No.16 wire. Other deficiencies were noted in one or
more operators and included more than two wires on one terminal
point, duct seal melted onto terminal points, unidentified
terminal points, Raychem wire installed in lieu of the required
Fire Wall III wire , a cracked terminal lug, and damaged
conductors. The damaged conductors and several of the minimum
bend radius violations appear to be generic to Limitorque model
SMB operators due to the minimal clearance between the cover
anr1 the rotor. Table II-5 lists the MOVs inspected and the
ficiencies found with each. The licensee subsequently issued
hCR BE-03209 to document the deficiencies observed by the NRC
CAT in valve motor operators.
During the first week of inspection the NRC CAT inspectors
observed in process field wiring changes in motor operated
valves and attempted to verify their field installation. A
number of problems ~ arose resulting in the investigation
continuing through the final weeks of the NRC CAT inspection.
The sequence of events is as follows:
II-19
- NRC CAT inspectors observed design changes being performed
during implementation of Configuration Control Package (CCP)
'1-N-WN-0021 by Westinghouse.
-
- NRC CAT's field. verification of.CCP 0021 resulted in the
identification of numerous hardware deficiencies as discussed
above.
~
- NRC CAT inspectors requested CCPs for ongoing design changes
with MOVs and were provided CCPs 1-E-EM-0243.and 1-E-ST-0339.
The subsequent NRC CAT evaluations of these packages resulted
"
in the identification of conflicts with CCP 0021.
- Based on NRC CAT observations and licensee reviews of the
identified problems for MOVs, the licensee issued a
voluntary stop work order.
- No further documentation was provided to the NRC CAT, pending
the completion of a review of the overall MOV problem by the
licensee.
- The licensee. informed NRC Region IV of a potentially
reportable deficiency relating to the wiring of MOVs.
CCPs-0021 and 0339 were initiated by W FCNs to modify valve
closure indications and bypass an unqualified terminal block
respectively. CCP 0243 was initiated by Bechtel to brirg the
valve operators up to Bechtel's current design. -W was per-
fonning the work and QC inspection under CCP 0021 while .
Ebasco was making the design changes under CCPs 0339 and 0243.
While performing the wiring changes under CCP 0021, W added
additional jumpers outside the stated scope of the CEP. The
NRC CAT review indicated that these jumpers were the same as
several jumpers being removed by Ebasco under CCP 0243. The
review also showed that one of the required jumpers of CCP
0021 was being deleted by CCP 0339. In addition, jumpers had
been added to several MOVs such that a continuous close indica--
-tion would be displayed regardless of the actual valve posi-
tion.- These jumpers were required by and installed in
accordance with the site's EE-580 field wiring program. These
NRC CAT observations indicate that there was a lack of coordi-
nation for the sequence of work for'the CCPs and between the '
CCPs.and the ongoing EE-580 program. This also indicated
inadequate control of wiring changes for the MOVs and the
potential for installed wiring not conforming to design.
When an earlier wiring discrepancy in a motor operator was identified
by Ebasco under CCP 0243, Bechtel issued Engineering Request
for Site Action (ERSA) 0121-E in September 1985 to determine,
the actual wiring configuration of 58 W MOVs.
Discussions with the licensee and Bechtel at the site and
Bechtel's Houston office regarding the design changes being !
made to the W MOVs indicated several items:
1
l
II-20 '
_
..
- The status of QC . inspection for the design changes is
indeterminate.
- The licensee was unable to specifically identify the
original wiring diagram which represented the configura-
tion of the MOVs as they were received and upon which
design changes were being based.
- Bechtel changes to MOV wiring were not appropriately reviewed
by W'or provided for incorporation into W design drawings.
A similar problem in another area was identified in a licensee
audit report S15-501 dated April 15, 1985. This is discussed
further in Section VII, Design Change Control, of this
report.
- Bechtel verification of the ERSA as-built wiring details
revealed discrepancies between the reported configuration and
the actual configuration of the MOVs. As a resu'.t of these
observations the licensee has initiated a walkdown to .
establish the current wiring configuration of Class 1E MOVs.
Further discussions with the. licensee revealed that an MOV
inspection program was being planned because of a history of
problems reported by vendors, other sites, and the NRC.
However, the documents provided to the NRC CAT, specifically
Bechtel Interoffice Memorandum 10M-3885S dated October 21,
1985,.with the subject " Problems Associated with Limitorque
Valve Operators," propo w d a sample surveillance of only
warehoused valves. Such a program would not have identified
all the problems found with the installed MOVs.
As a result of the continued problems witn the valve motor
operators, the constructor instituted a r luntary stop work
order on November 13, 1985, and the licensee informed NRC
Region IV on November 19, 1985 of a potentially reportable item
under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The interface for design between the A/E and NSSS is further
discussed in Section VII, Design Change Control, of this
report.
In summary, numerous hardware deficiencies were found with the
MOVs inspected. In addition, a lack of effective design
change control for the wiring of W supplied valve motor
operators has resulted in the licensee not being certain as to
their wiring baseline or current configuration. Corrective
action by the licensee is required to assure that all
safety-related MOVs meet their required design configuration.
An ancillary concern was rais*.( by the NRC CAT inspectors
during discussions with the licensee regarding the control of
design documents for MOV wiring. It was noted that Bechtel's
elementary wiring diagrams, wnich are the controlled design
documents, did not provide point-to point wiring information.
II-21
The NRC CAT inspectors were concerned that HL&P startup and
operations personnel would need point-to-point information for
perfoming tests, troubleshooting and modifications. The
discussions with Bechtel indicated that they would review this
issue,
c. Conclusions
In general, the installation of Class IE equipment conforms to
design requirements. However, of concern were the hardware
deficiencies identified in Class 1E motor control centers and
motor operated valves, and the specification c'eviations identified
in Class IE switchgear and motors.
The examination of ITE type HE molded case circuit breakers
disclosed deficiencies with regard to attachment of load-side
terminal extensions. Consequently, installations which exhibit
this configuration have the potential for inadvertent circuit
interruption or phase to phase faulting.
Numerous hardware deficiencies were identified in the wiring of
V0Vs. A lack of effective design control for the MOV wiring has'
resulted in the inability to correlate their actual configuration
to the required design.
Several cubicles of Sky switchgear were found to deviate from the
applicable specification requirements for the location of terminal
strips and the minimum number of teminal block points. Four
motors were also found to deviate from their applicable
specification. Three air handling unit fan motors did not have the
required vendor installed terminal lugs, and the insulation of a
reactor makeup water pump motor is Class B in lieu of the required
Class F or H.
4. Instrumentation Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of 10 installed and
inspected instruments for examination to requirements for location,
mounting details, and instrument type and range. The instrument
tubing for these instruments were also examined to specification,
procedure, and isometric drawing requirements. A total of 16
supports from these runs were also inspected. Table II-6 details
the inspection sample for the instrumentation installation.
In addition, the internal wiring configuration of an
instrumentation process panel was verified.
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria for the
inspection:
II-22
- Bechtel Specification 4Z519ZS1040, " Instrument Installation
Seismic Category 1," Rev. 3
Ebasco QCP-10.13, " Mechanical Instrument Installation
luspection," Rev. 4
- Fbasco CSP-47, " Instrument Installation," Rev. 4
b. Findings
The sample of instruments inspected by the NRC CAT represents half
of all the instruments the licensee had inspected, accepted and
turned over to the startup organization at the time of the NRC CAT
inspection. The limited sample examined revealed numerous
construction deficiencies and several program weaknesses.
Deficiencies were found in the installation of the instrument-or
tubing in eight of the ten instr 2ments inspected. .The deficien-
cies found with more than' one installation included out of tolerance
dimensions, and loose conduit fittings._ Other deficiencies which
appear isolated to individual installations included a hanger weld
not meeting the drawing configuration, the actual instrument identi-
fication not corresponding to the drawing, a missing tubing clamp,
and a loose pressure transmitter. Two weaknesses were also identi-
fied through the installation inspections. These were QC inspec-
tions performed with drawing revisions other than the latest
revision, and existing supports used without the required engi-
neering approval. The deficiencies were subsequently recorded
on nonconformance documents by the licensee. Table II-7 details the
findings for the eight instrtnent instellations with deficiencies.
Discussions with the licensee indicated that a sample surveillance
of. instrument installation was being performed under their QC
Effectiveness Inspection Program. Two of the five instruments.
A1EWFT6854 and C1EWFT6873, inspected by the Effectiveness Program
coincided with the NRC CAT sample. Although the Effectiveness
Program has identified installation deficiencies similar to those
found by the NRC CAT, they failed to identify the out of tolerance
dimensions found with the installation of C1EWFT6873.
The NRC CAT inspectors verified wiring changes conducted under
CCP 1-N-WN-0083 (W FCN TGXM-10585 Revs. A, B, C) to instrument
process panel 3Z121ZRR018. Attributes such as circuit board
changes, point-to-point wiring changes, wire type and size, and
contrasting wire color met'the CCP requirements. However, the
jumper locations on two circuit cards were not as required. The
jumpers on the circuit cards in locations C3-247 and 248 are in
the "high" position while the CCP requires them to be in the " low"
~
position. This discrepancy was subsequently documented on NCR
SE-03341. In additon, HL&P's Station Procedure OPCP03-ZM-0011
" Plant Instrumentation Scaling Program" has provisions for document-
ing the configuration of circuit cards with jumpers or plug-in
components for use in calibrating.and testing process instrumenta-
tion by plant staff.
II-23
c. Conclusions
The number of construction deficiencies found in the limited sample
~o f. instrumentation indicates that the licensee's inspection and
surveillance programs are not completely effective. In addition,
weaknesses were identified in the use of latest drawing revisions
.for i.nspections and obtaining required engineering approval for
additional attachments to existing supports. This area requires
additional management attention.
!
II-24
i
l
TABLE II-1
RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE
Cable Tray:
B1XC4ATHAP B1XC4ATHAG B1XC4ATHAF B1XC4ATHAE
B1XC4ATHAD B1XC4ATHAC B1XC4ATHAB B1XC4ATHAA
B1XC4BTHAA B1XC4BTHAB B1XC4BTHAC AIXE1HTTAM
AIXE1HTTAG AIXE1HTTAH AIXE1DTTBH AIXE1DTTBG
A1XE1DTTBF AIXE1DTTBE AIXE1DTTBD AIXE1DTTBC
AIXE1DTTBJ A1XE1DTTBK AIXV1ATSAA AIXVIATSAB
B1XE3FTHAN B1XE3FTHAP B1XE3FTHAR B1XE3FTHAS
B1XE3FTHAT B1XE3FTHAU B1XE3FTHAF B1XE3FTHAE
B1XE3FTHAD B1XE3FTHAC .B1XE3FTHAB B1XE3FTHAA
B1XE4GTHAA B1XE4GTHAB -AIXFIBTJAG AIXF1BTJAF
AIXF1BTJAE AIXF1BTJAB A1XF1BTJAA AIXF1BTJAH
A1XF1BTJAV AIXF5AKTVA AIXF5AKTAB A1XF5ATTAA
A1XF5ATJAA AIXM4KTJAC AIXM4KTJAB AIXM4KTJAA
A1XM4JTJAB AIXM4JTJAA AIXM4DTJAS A1XM4CTJAB
AIXM4CTJAA A1XM4BTJAC AIXM4BTJAB AIXM4BTJAA
C1XG1ATSAN C1XG1ATSAM C1XG1ATSAG C1XG1ATSAF
C1XG1ATSAE C1XG1ATSAD C1XG1ATSAC C1XGIATSAB
C1XG1ATSAA
Cable Tray Supports:
1-019-H109 1-106-H4 2-103-H23
1-100-H51 1-019-H704 2-002-H3
1-105-H30 2-103-H41 2-002-H47
1-105-H702 2-103-H92 2-002-H23
1-152-H109 2-103-H61
Conduits:
Number Length (Feet) Number Length (Feet)
~A1XC4DRJ004 100- B1XE2ARY005 79
AIXC4DRT005 100 B1XE2ARY006 79
A1XE1FRS006 32 B1XF1BRS008 89
A1XE1FRH001 35 B1XM2ER5073 48
A1XElGRLO33 49 B1XM3ERJ068 33
AIXElGRLO32 44 C1XF1ARH004 55
A1XE2ARY102 51 C1XF1ARS004 67
AIXE2BRX004 39 C1XFIARS010 63
'A1XF1BRF001 64 C1XF1FRS009 45
AIXF1BRF002 58 C1XM3ERS204 39
A1XF1BRF003 49 D1XElGR2037 15
A1YC4 DRY 003 95 D1XElGRX002 30
B1XE2ARY003 79 D1XE2BRX004 84
B1XE2ARY004 79 D1XE2CRS081 32
II-25
1
TABLE II-1 - (Continued)
RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE
. Conduit Supports:
~ 1120005 1532512 1625783
1120008 1541547 1651000B
'1134931 1613130 1651001
1134932 1613132 1654548
1153322 1625779
i
,
Y
l'
'II-26
L
TABLE II-2
SEPARATION FINDINGS
Raceway segments listed in the A columns do.not maintain required separation from
the corresponding raceway segments in the B columns. The (*) indicates physical
separation of less than one inch between the two raceway segments.
Column A Column B Column A Column B
AIXE1HTTAM NIXE1HTTAD AIXE1DTSBB N1XE1DTSAA
D1XE1HTXAJ N1XE1HTYAH AIXE1DTXBB N1XE1DTCAA
AIXE1DTHBH- N1XE1DTJAV A1XE1DTXBS N1XE1DTCAC
AIXE1DTXBB N1XE1DTYAA AIXE1DTXBC NIXE1DTXAE
A1XE1DTXJB N1XE1DTHBF A1XE1DTHBK N1YE1DTHAX
AIXM4KTYAC N1XM4KTYAC AIXF1BTFAF * N1XF1BRJ011
A1XM4JTYAA N1XM4JTTAA AIXM4JTJAA N1XM4JTYAA
A1XM4CTYAA N1XMiCTYAA A1XM4BTJAC NIXM4BTSAE
AIXM4BTJAC N1XM4BTJAE AIXM4BTYAF N1XM4BTYAC
AIXM4BTFAB NIXM4BTHAC AIXM4BTFAB NIXM4BTTAC
B1XC4ATHAJ NIXC4ATAAJ AIXM4BTFAB * N1XM48R031
B1XC4ATHAP N1XC4ATHAJ B1XC4BTJAE * N1XC1BRX278
B1XC4BTXAF N1XC4BTHBA B1XCABRT852 * N1XC1BRX278
B1XE4GTHAB N1XE4GTHBA AIXE2ARY102 * C1XE2ARY103
B1XM1ERYO48 AIXM1MTYAB
II-27
TABLE II-3
TCPMINATIONS
Location Termination Description
A1B52RR014 A1BSAAC23B Control Cabinet
A1BS2RR014 A1SP12C1XA2 Control Cabinet Plug
A1CCMOV0050 A1CC04C1WA2 MOV
A1MB2CP1822 A1AM10C1XA2 Control Panel
A1PMMCEA152 A1AF01C1WA1 MCC EIA1
A1PMMCEA1G1 A1RH03C1WD1 MCC E1A1
A1PMMCEA1V42 A151AAC1HJ2 MCC ElAl
A1PMMCEA2F3 A1SP23CASC2 MCC E1A2
A1PMMCEA2J3 A1SP23 CASA 2 MCC EIA2
A1PMMCEA2R2 A151ABCILA MCC E1A2
A1PMMCEA2R3 A1S1ABC1HH1 MCC ElA2
'A1PMMCEAA2E1 A1CC04C1WC1 MCC E1A2
A1PMMCEAE1 A1CC04CID1 MCC E1A2
A1PN2LP10052 A1AF01C1WE2 Control Panel
A1PN2LP100S2 A1AF0361WF2 Control Panel
AIPN2LP659 A1AF01C1SA2 Control Cabinet
A1PN2LP700 A1AP02C1WB1 Control Panel
A1PN2LP700 A1AP02C1WA2 Control Panel
A1PN2LP801 A1AF01C1WF2 Control Panel
A1PNERR118A A1AF05C1WA2 Control Panel
A1PNERR130A A1AF08C1WA1 Control Panel
A1PNERR130A A1CC2VC1WA1 Control Panel
A1PZRR002-2 A1SP17CCSA1 Control Cabinet
A1502R0011 A1SP12C1XC1 Control Cabinet Plug
A1502RR008I A1SP12C2XA1 Control Cabinet Plug
A1S12RR051 A15129C1XB2 Control Panel
A1SP2RR001I A1SP12C1XB1 Control Cabinent Plug
A1SP2RR002-1 A1SP27CCSC1 Control Cabinet
A1SP2RR002-2 'A1SP17CHSB2 Control Cabinet
A1SP2RR0081 A1SP12C2XB1 Control Cabinet Plug
A1SP2RR002-1 A1SP27CCSB1 Control Cabinet
A1SP7RR002-2 A1SP17CDSA1 Control Cabinet
B10SPLO37C7 B1PKACCILA1 DC Switchgear
B1852RR017 BIBSABC26A2 Control Cabinet
B1B52RR018 B1HC30C1XB-1 Control Cabinet
81DJBC047E B1DJACCILG1 Charger / Inverter
B1DJBC047F B1DJACC1LH1 Charger / Inverter
B1DJBT045LN B1DJACCILL2 Battery
-B10NERR137 B1HC18C1SD2 Control Cabinet
B1FMMCEB1J1 B1HC20C2SC1 MCC E181 I
B1MB2CP22T11 B1HC18C1SC2 Control Panel
BlMB2CP4T30 BlMB04C1501 Control Panel
B1MB2CP4T30 BlMB04C1SS1 Control Panel
B1M82CP4T30 B1MB04CIST1 Control Panel
B1PK2GD0E183 B1SP22CUSB2 MCC E182
B1PKSG0E187 B1EW01C2WH1 4160V Switchgear EIB
B1PMMCEB122 BlAF03C2WC1 MCC E181
B1PMMCEB1F1 B1CCADC1LC1 MCC ElB1
B1PMMCEB1F3 B1HC18CISE1 MCC E181
II-28
TABLE II-3 - (Continued)
TERMINATIONS
Location Termination Description
B1PMMCEB1LIL B1CCADL1LK1 MCC ElB1
B1PMMCEB1P3 B1CCADC1LM1 MCC E181
B1PMMCEBIR2 B1AF03C2WA1 MCC E181
B1PMMCEBIT1 B1CC1C1WA1 MCC ElB1
B1PMMCEB203 B1CC0525El MCC ElB2
B1PMMCEB253 B1CHABC2LB1 Distribution Panel
B1PMMCEB2F3 B1CC642WD1 MCC E182
B1PMMCEB2F3 B1CC04C2WC1 MCC ElB2
B1PMMCEB2G B1C006C2SB1 MCC E182
B1PMMCEB2G1 B1CC06C2SC1 MCC ElB2
B1PN2LP654 B1AF01C2WD1 Control Panel
B1PN2LP660 B1CC06C2SA2 Control Cabinet
B1PN2LP678 B15129C1XB1 Control Panel
B1PN2LP678 B1HC30C1XB2 Control Panel
B1PN2LP678 B1B509C1XA2 Control Panel
B1PN2LP802 B1CC01C2WB2 Control Panel
B1PNERR1208 B1C010CBSB Control Panel
B1PNERR121B B1CC01C2WA2 Control Panel
B1PNTB678 BlAMABC2SR1 Termination Box
B1512RR052 B1S129C1XC1 Control Panel
BISP2RR004-1 B1SP22CMSD Control Cabinet
B1SP2RR004-1 B1SP24CASD1 Control Cabinet
81SP2RR004-1 B1SP24CASB1 Control Cabinet
81SP2RR004-2 B1SP22CUSA1 Control Cabinet
B1SP2RR004-2 B1SP22CVSD1 Control Cabinet
B1VA1V1203 B1VAACCILA2 Charger / Inverter
C1BS2BR019 C1FW11C2PA1 Control Cabinet
C1BS2RR019 C1CV10C5PA2 Control Cabinet
C1BS2RR019 CIRC 10C7PB1 Control Cabinet
C1DN2LP679-1 C1FW23C9XC2 Control Panel
ClMB2CD4T50 C1MB04C1SF1 Control Panel
ClMB2CP1T35 C1B504C1XA2 Control Panel
C1MB2CP1T35 C1MB01C1SC1 Control Panel
ClMB2CP3T45 C1MB03C15El Control Panel
C1MB2CP3T45 C1MB031SE1 Control Panel
C1MB2CP4T50 ClMB04CISG1 Control Panel
ClMB2CP4T50 C1MB04CISH1 Control Panel
C1PN2LP10055 C1AMACG1SC2 Control Panel
C1PN2LP679 CIAMACCISG2 Control Panel
C1PN2LP679 C1RA13C1XB2 Control Panel
C1PN2LP679 C1RA13C1XH2 Control Panel
C1PNETCC01 ClMB04C1SH2 Control Cabinet
C1PNTB679 C1AMACC15G1 Termination Box
D1DJBC047D D1DJABCILG1 Charger / Inverter
01DJBC047G D1DJABC1LB1 DC Switchgear
D1DJPLO37813 D1AF09C1SL1 DC Switchgear
D1DJPLO37B3 D1DJABC1LG2 DC Switchgear
D1DJPLO37B4 D1VAABC1LA1 DC Switchgear
11-29
"
i
TABLE II-3 - (Continued)
'TERNINATIONS.
~ Location Termination Description !
D1DNERR141 D1PNAEC3SA2 Control Cabinet
D1M82CP1817 D1CC17CISA2 . Control Panel
01PNERR1240 01CC17C1SB1 Control Panel
DIPMERR124P DIPN10CNA2 Control Panel
DISP 2RR0011 DISP 12C1XC1 Control Cabinet Plug
DISP 2RR008I DISP 12C2XA1 Control Cabinet Plug i
DISP 2RR0081- DISPT2C2VB1 Control Cabinet Plug.
,
DISP 2RR008I DISP 12C2XC Control Cabinet Plug :
' DISP 2RR008I- Control Cabinet
'
DISPABCISB2
01VADP1202 D1BSA8CISA1 Distribution Panel
D1VATV11202 D1VAABC1LA2 Charger / Inverter
V
i
l
6
l
l
I
l-
l
>
.
'
l
!
1
II-30
-
>
L
l
- . . , . . . - - . . . . . . . - . . ..- , . . . - - - . - , - - . . . -,- , -. ,.. , , -.- -_-..-..- - , ~. -
m
TABLE'II-4
UNIT l' CLASS 1E E0UIPMENT AND LOADS AFFECTED BY
MOLDED CASE CIECUIT BREAKER DEFICIENCIES
.
Motor Control Center: 3E171MCE1A2
Cubicle / Breaker Type: A4L/HE3-8050
Class 1E Load: Distribution-Panel Transformer
Motor Control Center: 3E171EMCE1A4
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C1R/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Panel
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C1L/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: 120Vac Distribution Panel Inverter Channel II
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C3R/HE3-B030
Class 1E-Load: -Spare
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C3L/HE3-B015
Class 1E Load: Battery Room Reheat Coil
Cubicle / Breaker Type: EIR/HE3-8040
Class 1E Load: Accumulator 1A Discharge Isolation MOV
Cubicle / Breaker Type: E1L/HE3-B015
Class 1E Load: Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan
Cubicle / Breaker Type: F3R/HE3-8050
-
Class 1E Load: Voltage Regulating Transformer
Cubicle / Breaker Type: F3L/HE3-B100
Class 1E Load: Battery Room Charger
Cubicle / Breaker Type: H3R/HE3-B030
Class 1E Load: Spare
Cubicle / Breaker Type: H3L/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Battery Room Reheat Coil
Cubicle / Breaker Type: J2R/HE3-8050
Class 1E Load: Distribution Panel Transformer
Cubicle / Breaker Type: J2L/HE3-B015
Class 1E Load: Starter for Chiller Oil Lamp
II-31
--
TABLE II-4 (Continued)
UNIT'l CLASS 1E EOUIPMENT AND LOADS AFFECTED BY
HOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKER DEFICIENCIES
.
- Motor Control Center: 3E171EMCE184
Cubicle / Breaker Type: B2R/HE3-B015
Class 1E Load: Starter for Chiller Oil Pump
Cubicle / Breaker Type: B3R/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Spare
Cubicle / Breaker Type: B3L/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C2L/HE3-B015
Class 1E Load: Battery Room Reheat Coil
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C2R/HE3-8030
Class 1E Load: Spare
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C3R/HE3-8030
Class 1E Load: EAB Main Area Heating Coil
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C3L/HE3-8030
Class 1E Load: Spare
Cubicle / Breaker Type: E4R/HE3-8020
Class 1E Load: Spare
Motor Control Center: 3E171EMCEIC.!
Cubicle / Breaker Type: H2R/HE3-B050
Class 1E Load: Heat Tracing Transfomer
~~
l Motor Control Center: 3E171EMCE1C4
Cubicle /Breater Type: C3R/HE3-8040
Class 1E Load: Accumulator 1C Discharge Isolation MOV
Cubicle / Breaker Type: C3L/HE3-8015'
Class 1E Load: Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan
l Cubicle / Breaker Type: D1R/HE3-8015
l
Class 1E Load: 120Vac Distribution Panel Inverter
'
Cubicle / Breaker Type: D1L/HE3-8050
Class IE Load: Power Distribution Panel Transformer
l
l
-
( II-32
L
. _
TABLE II-4 (Continued)
. UNIT 1 CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT AND LOADS AFFECTED BY
MOLDED CASE CIECUIT BREAKER DEFICIENCIES
Cubicle / Breaker Type: D3R/HE3-B015
Class 1E Load: ' Spare
Cubicle / Breaker Type: D3L/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Panel
Cubicle / Breaker Type: LElR/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Starter for Chiller Oil Pump
Cubicle / Breaker Type: E1L/HE3-8015
Class 1E Load: Battery Room Reheat Coil
11-33
_ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ - - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
-
_.
TABLE II-5
VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR DEFICIENCIES
Motor Operated Valve CICVMOV0112B:*
a. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations. ,
i
b. Loose vendor terminations on the power terminal block, heater coils, and l
torque switch points 24, 25, 26, and 27. .'
c. No. 16 AWG wire is installed in lieu of No. 14 AWG wire on the limit
switch between points 22 and 37 and between points 11 and 36.
d. More than two-wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Operated Valve B1CVMOV113A:*
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
switches.
b. No. 16 AWG wire used in lieu of No. 14 AWG wire.
c. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
d. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Operated Valve A1RCMOV0001A:*
a. Loose vendor terminations'on the terminal blocks, craters, and limit
switches.
b. No. 16 AWG wire is installed in lieu of No. 14 AWG wire.
c. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
l d. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Opreated Valve BIRCMOV0001B:*
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
!
switches.
b. No. 16 AWG wire is installed in lieu of No. 14 AWG wire.
c. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
d. 'More than two wires tenninated under one terminal point.
II-34
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
TABLE II-5 - (Continued)
VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR DEFICIENCIES
Motor Operated Valve B1SIMOV00018:*
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
switches.
b. Lug at terminal point 26 was cracked and then broke off during
inspection.
c. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
d. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Operated Valve CISIMOV0001C:*
a. Jumper wires cont'ain bend radius violations.
b. Loose vendor terminations on the power terminal block, heater coil
and torque switch points 24, 25, 26, and 27.
c. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Operated Valve A1SIMOV0004A:*
a. . Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
switches.
b. An additional jumper was installed which was not on drawing 9-E-SI13,
sheet 1 DSP.
c. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
d. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Operated Valve B1SIM0V0004B:*
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
. switches.
b. Duct seal used to cover temporary power cabic opening has melted onto
the termination points.
c. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
d. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
II-35
.
'
,
TABLE II-5 - (Continued)'
' VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR DEFICIENCIES-
.
Motor Operated Valve B1SIMOV0016B:*
a .' Loose 1 vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters,:and limit ;
switches. '
.b. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
c. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
I
- MotorL0perated Valve CISIMOV0016C:*
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
switches.
C
b. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
c. -Terminal point 10 is not identified.
.
d. .More than two wires-terminated under one terminal point. .{
Motor Operated. Valve B1SIMOV00188:
i
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
switches.
b. Temporary power cable is shorting against the MOV housing and the
vendor wires.to'the heater have been deformed by the cover installation. j
c. Jung r wires contain bend radius violations.
' d. No. 16 AWG wire in lieu of No. 14 AWG wire is installed between-
points 22 and 37. ;
-
e. More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
Motor Operated Valve CISIMOV0018C:*
a. Loose vendor terminations on the terminal blocks, heaters, and limit
switches.
b. Numerous jumper wires contain bend radius violations. ;
c .- . Wire manufactured by Raychem was installed on site instead of '
Firewall III as required.
11-36
,
. .
s
'
. TABLE II-5 - (Continued)
VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR ~ DEFICIENCIES
fd. (Jumperwirescontainbendradiusviolations.
-
- e. .More than two wires. terminated under one terminal' point.
~
MotorOperatedValveN1RHMOV0061C:*-
a. Loose vendor terminations'on.the terminal blocks, heaters, and. limit
. switches.
- b. -No. 16 AWG wire'is installed in lieu of No. 14 AWG wire.
c. " A jumper between point 35 and 36 has been installed that is not
identified on the scheme drawing; 9-E-RH02, sheet 1.
' d. Jumper. wires contain bend radius violations.
e. ' More than two wires terminated under one terminal point.
-Motor Operated Valve C1CCMOV0209:
a '. Damaged conductors.from. removal /re-insta11ation of motor-operated valve
cover. -(This appears to be a generic problem due to lack of cover / rotor
clearance'on limitorque SMB models).
b. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
Motor Operated Valve CICCMOV0199:
~
a. Insufficient motor operated valve cover clearance with wires on top'of
rotors. (Similar to problem with CICCMOV0209).
b. Jumper wires contain bend radius violations.
N'TES:
O
- Def.iciencies for these valves were subsequently recorded on NCR BE-03209 by
.the licensee.
'
.
l II-37
E
TABLE II-6
INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
Hangers:
Field Sketch Hanger Field Sketch Harger
-IC-EW-02 A IC-EW-03 F
IC-EW-02 B IC-EW-03 G
IC-EW-02 'C IC-EW-03 H
IC-EW-03 A IC-EW-03. I
IC-EW-03 B IC-EW-03 J
IC-EW-03 C -IC-EW-05 A
IC-EW-03- D IC-EW-12 A
IC-EW-03 E IC-EW-12 C
Tubing:
Field Sketch Field Sketch
IC-CC-22 IC-EW-09
IC-EW-02' IC-EW-10
IC-EW-03 IC-EW-11
IC-EW-04 IC-EW-12
IC-EW-05 IC-EW-13
Instruments:
A1EWFT6854 CICCFT4522
A1EWFT6856 C1EWFT6873
A1EWFT6904 .C1EWFT6874
B1EWFT6864 C1EWFT6876
B1EWFT6866 CIEWFT6906
II-38
e
l TABLE II-7
L -
INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION DEFICIENCIES
,
-Field Sketch Instrument Findines
IC-EW-12, Rev. 2 A1EWFT6856 1. Har.ger C welded at one end only.
Drawing 4201-9-2-45080 Sheet 126,
, Detail A requires both ends welded.
2. Hanger A not installed in accordance
with the correct drawing detail.
IC-EW-10, Rev. 3 C1EWFT6906 1. Seven dimensions outside'of
tolerance.
'
2. Sketch identifies instruments as
FT-9606 and FI-9606.
3. Loose conduit fittings at FT-6906.
4. Inspected and accepted to ICEW-10,
Rev. O. Rev. 3 in effect at time
of inspection.
IC-EW-02, Rev. 3 A1EWFT6904 1. Two dimensions outside of tolerance.
2. Loose conduit fitting at FT-6904.
3. Inspected and accepted to IC-EW-02,
Rev. O. Rev. 2 in affect at time
of inspection.
! IC-EW-09, Rev. 3 C1EWFT6874 1. Missing clamp east of hanger E.
i
2. Hanger E 17 inches east of sketch
location.
l 3. Hangers A and B attached to existing
'
.
support without required engineering
concurrence.
4. Inspected and accepted to IC-EW-09,
, Rev. O. Rev. 3 was in effect at
time of inspection.
IC-EW-03, Rev. 3 A1EWFT6854 1. Conduit fittings loose at FT-6854.
2. Flow transmitter loose at base
plate.
3. One dimension outside of tolerance.
,
IC-EW-04, Rev. 2 C1EWFT6873 1. Five dimensions outside of tolerance.
IC-EW-05, Rev. 2 B1EWFT6864 1. Hanger B attached to existing support
i
without required engineering
concurrence.
2. Conduit fitting loose at FT-6864.
IC-CC-22, Rev. 5 CICGFT4522 1. Three dimensions outside of tolerance.
I
II-39
~III. MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Objective
The~ objective of the appraisal of mechanical construction was to
determine if the installed and Quality Control (QC) accepted mechanical
items conformed to engineering design, regulatory requirements and
licensee commitments.
B. Discussion
The specific areas of mechanical construction evaluated were piping,
pipe supports / restraints, concrete expansion anchors, mechanical
equipment, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC)
systems. To accomplish the above objective, a field inspection of a
sample of QC~ accepted hardware was performed in each arec. In
addition, certain programs, procedures'and documentation were reviewed
as required to support or clarify hardware inspection findings.
1. Piping
a. Inspection Scope
Piping depicted on the sixteen Bechtel isometric drawings listed in
Tabe III-1 was inspected by the NRC CAT. Approximately 140 feet of
2 inch diameter and smaller. piping, and approximately 1680 feet of
greater than 2 inch diameter piping, which had previously been
accepted by Ebasco QC, was inspected. The inspection sample
included piping located in the Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building
(RCB), the Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building (MEAB), the
Fuel Handling Building (FHB), and the Diesel Generator Building
(DGB); the~ Unit 2 MEAB; and the Essential Cooling Water structure.
Piping sizes ranged from 3/4 inch to 30 inches and pipe classifi-
cations were ASME 1, 2 and 3. Attributes inspected included
configuration (component orientation and dimensions), component
locations and types, valve operator orientations, clearances,
flanged joints (gasketing, bolting material, proper makeup), and
hydrostatic testing. In addition, site construction practices were
observ.ed.
As identified in Table III-1,'six of the piping isometrics included
in the NRC CAT inspection sample had been walked down for turnover
to the Houston Light and Power (HL&P) Startup organization, for
flushing and hydro-testing in accordance with Ebasco Quality
Control Procedures (QCP) 10.14. One piping isometric included
piping which had been hydrostatically tested. The h3 Jro-test
documentation package was also reviewed.
Verification of installations in accordance with current design
change documents were also selectively examined for the sixteen
piping isometric drawings, involving 28 design change documents
including Design Change Notices (DCN), Field Change Notices (FCN),
and Field Change Requests (FCR), as listed by Section VII, Table
VII-78.
III-1
The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed, and discussed with responsible
inspectors and engineers the execution of the following procedures
related to final walkdown inspections and engineering reconciliation
of as-built conditions, developed to meet the requirements of IE
Bulletin 79-14, " Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping
Systems."
Ebasco QCP-10.14, Rev. 3, " System / Subsystem Walkdown Inspection"
Standard Site Procedure (SSP) -34, Rev. 0, " Technical Requirements
and Walkdown Procedure for As-Building of Piping Systems"
-SSP-39, Rev. 0, " Engineering Procedure for As-Built Reconciliation
of Safety-Related Piping Systems and Associated Pipe Supports"
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria and
background .information for the NRC ' CAT inspection:
Bechtel Specification, 5A010PS002, Rev. 7, " Piping Erection and
Field Fabrication"
Bechtel Specification, SL019PS004, Rev. 8, " Criteria for Piping
Design"
Bechtel Specification, 4UO10PS007, Rev. 6, " Pre-service and
In-Service Inspection"
Ebasco Construction Site Procedure, CSP-16, Rev. 5, " Piping
Installation Procedure"
.
- Ebasco Construction Site Procedure, CSP-17,'Rev. 4, " Hydrostatic
and Pneumatic Testing"
Ebasco Construction Site Procedure, CSP-22, Rev.~3, " Valve / Pump
Work"
- Ebasco Quality Control Procedure, QCP-9.1, Rev. 6, " Weld
Inspection ASME"
Ebasco Quality Control Procedtre, QCP-10.11, Rev. 5, " Mechanical
Equipment Installation Inspection"
Ebasco Quality Control Procedure, QCP-10.14, Rev. 3,
" System / Subsystem Walkdown Inspection"
Ebasco Quality Control. Procedure, QCP-11.1, Rev. 4, " Hydrostatic
and Pneumatic Pressure Test Inspection"
In addition. the NRC CAT inspection included observation of the
modificatio, of Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Piping by Westinghouse
Construction in accordance with Westinghouse traveller T-TGX-059.
This modification involving Fast Response RTD's was accomplished
under a Westinghouse Field Change Notice (FCN).
III-2
e
b. Inspection Findings
NRC CAT inspections associated with specific piping isometric
drawings are listed in. Table III-1. In general, piping conformed to
design aid procedural requirements. However, several deficiencies
were identified.
On six lugged wafer valves. in the Unit 1 Essential Cooling Water
System (EW-0016, 0019, 0052, 0055, 0089, and 0092), the hex-head
cap screws in the flange-to-valve joints were determined through
ultrasonic testing (UT) to be shorter than required by the asso -
ciated isometric-drawing and bill of materials, reducing thread
engagement in several locations to less than one-half bolt diameter.
Licensee and NRC CAT inspectors subsequently performed a physical
verification for the six lugged wafer valves, resulting in a con-
firmation of the UT findings. In a number of other installations of
~
this type of valve in Unit 1, hex-head cap screws have been substi-
tuted for threaded studs and nuts, without appropriate changes to
the isometric drawing and/or bill of materials. In addition, the
applicable Ebasco inspection procedure, QCP-10.11, does not require
verification or documentation of the length of headed bolts used in
assembly of bolted flange connections. Thus, the bolt length in
lugged wafer valves installed with hex-head cap screws (in place of
studs) is currently indeterminate, and based on NRC CAT findings,
are likely to be incorrect. A Nonconformance Report (NCR CM-03068)
was initiated to disposition the first valve found with unauthorized
substitution of cap screws for studs. Standard. Deficiency Reports
(SDR E-353 and -354) were initiated to evaluate the extent of the
construction deficiency and the inspection procedure deficiency. A
Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER 85-057) was also initiated to '
evaluate the reportability of this-deficiency.
Undersize socket weld fillets were found on twelve of the thirty QC
accepted field welds on isometric 4C369PCV417, SH. A02 for 2 inch
Schedule 160 pipe fittings. During the NRC CAT inspection, a
Nonconformance Report (NCR CP-03139) was issued to disposition
the undersize welds. This deficiency is discussed in more detail
in Section IV of this report.
Two Annubar flow probe mounting flanges on isometric 3M369 PEW 229
Sh. 18, were mislocated with respect to the distance from the pipe.
outer wall, based on the installation dimensions supplied by the
vendor. However, these probes were located within the field piping
erection tolerances provided in Bechtel Specification 5A010PS002.
There are 33 such installations in the Essential Cooling Water,
Component Cooling Water, and Chilled Water Systems. After discus-
sions between Bechtel and the vendor to determine the extent to
which these tolerances could be relaxed, Nonconformance Reports (NCR
SJ-3008 and -3111) were initiated to rework the seven Annubar
mounting flanges which did not meet the relaxed installation
tolerance. A Deficiency Evaluation Form (DEF 85-80) was initiated
to determine if field installation tolerances may impact other
unspecified installation tolerances for vendor supplied pipe mounted
instrumentation.
III-3
At several locations on the support columns for Unit 1 steam genera-
tors, the NRC CAT inspection noted zero clearance to steel work
platform supports. A Nonconformance Report NCR BC-03193 was
initiated. In a number of locations, piping exhibited zero or very
small (less than 1/2 inch) clearance to adjacent components and
structures. A further discussion of this issue is contained in
paragraph III.B.2.b below.
The NRC CAT inspectors considered the procedures related to final
system walkdown inspections and engineering reconciliation of
as-built conditions to meet IE Bulletin 79-14 requirements, to be
thorough and well written. Responsible personnel were
knowledgeable of requirements and responsibilities.
No prcblems were noted in the inspected hydro-test packages or in
the implementation of design. change documents.
c. Conclusions
' Piping was found generally to conform to design documents. However,
the improper flange bolting on lugged wafer valves indicates impro-
per documentation / control of hardware changes and inadequate proce-
dures and inspection effort for bolted joint makeup. The Annubar
flow probe installation criteria deficiency indicates a design
error, which requires resolution by engineering.
2. Pipe Supports / Restraints
a. Inspection Scope
Thirty-two ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 supports / restraints which
represented a variety of types, sizes, systems and locations were
selected for detailed inspection. As a result of the licensee's
Pre-CAT inspection performed earlier this year, the basic support /
restraint inspection program was revised and previously accepted
hardware was subjected to a reinspection for many attributes. The ,
sample selected by the NRC CAT included ten that had been through l
the reinspection program and 22 that had been QC accepted under the
new inspection criteria. These supports / restraints were inspected
for proper configuration, clearances, member size, location, weld
size, fasteners, expansion anchor installation and damage. See
Table III-2 for a listing of the inspection sample.
- Documentation packages for five of the inspected supports /
l restraints were examined for completeness, accuracy, and conformance
to procedural requirements. The Field implementation of seven
Field Change Requests (FCRs), four Field Change Notices (FCNs) and
one Nonconformance Report (NCR) applicable to the inspected hard-
ware were also inspected. See Section VII, Table VII-78.
Acceptance criteria for the above described inspections were
contained in the following documents:
- Bechtel Construction Specification SL340JS1002, Rev. 7, SCN
24, " Pipe Support Field Fabrication and Installation"
III-4
t
Support Installation"
- Bechtel Work Plan Procedure / Quality Control Instruction (WPP/QCI)
23, Rev. 6, " Fabrication and Furnishing Pipe Support Items"
Ebasco Quality Control Procedure (QCP) 10.12, Rev. 4, " Component
Support Fabrication and Installation Inspection"
- Applicable design drawings and change documents
b. Inspection Findings
At the time of the CAT inspection, of the approximately 9,000 ASME
pipe supports / restraints to~be installed in Unit 1 and common
systems, approximately 1200 had been QC accepted. Approximately 500
had been accepted under the revised inspection program and 700 had
been previously accepted and reinspected to the new criteria by
retrained inspectors. A review'of the licensee's Pre-CAT
inspection report indicated a thorough study of pipe supports /
restraints. Improvements in specifications, procedures and person-
nel training were implemented and reinspections performed as
required.
Discrepancies were noted on seven of the 32 supports / restraints
inspected by the NRC CAT. Discrepancies included out of tolerance
angularity of a strut and a restraint brace member, undersized /
missing welds (two supports), undersized U-strap restraint, improper
expansion anchor embedment and an oversized spacer plate installed
that could have decreased support capacity. With the exception of
the undersized U-strap, the discrepancies were not a major concern
from a structural integrity standpoint although they were items.that
should have been identified by QC during the inspection / reinspection
process. In addition,- conditions were noted on several installa-
tions relating to unclear criteria and/or work control.
Restraint SI-9106-HL5009 consisted of a pipe clamp with welded lugs
restraining the pipe laterally in a box frame. However, the ears
of the pipe clamp were only about 3/8 inch from the horizontal
members of the box frame. The construction specification allowed a
1/2 inch tolerance on clearances in the unrestrained direction. As
no clearance in the unrestrained direction was specified on this
drawing, it was not clear what was acceptable in this situation.
The following actions were taken as a result of the NRC CAT inspec-
tion findings: A change to the specification was issued to provide
a tolerance on the installation of the pipe clamp for this type of
configuration; a drawing review by engineering identified 47
restraints of this design including 11 that could still have
potential interference due to thermal or seismic movement (including
.four that had previously been QC accepted); nonconformance reports
were issued to provide for reinspection of the four supports and
Design Change Notices (DCNs) were issued to specify the necessary
clearance on the remaining seven.
III-5
.
A temporary hanger for a 30 inch pipe had been welded to support
EW-9406-HL5001. Although the installation of this temporary support
was specified on a Request for Conditional Release form and a
Startup Work Request (SWR), the only reference to removal was a note
on the installation sketch. The NRC CAT inspectors consider that a
more formal method of control is warranted with at least an
inspection signature that the temporary support has been removed.
~The inspector notes that this is a programmatic issue and that in
this case the temporary support would most likely have been removed
and system walkdowns should identify ~this type of oversight if left
installed.
A large number of potential or actual interferences u e observed.
during inspection by the NRC CAT, between piping, supports /
restraints and other hardware, and installation and inspection
criteria for this attribute did not appear to be adequate. It was
determined that this issue had been identified months earlier by an
INPO evaluation and had been reported to Region IV pursuant to 10
CFR 50.55(e). Although a program to address this concern has been
developed, it has not yet been' implemented. More aggressive and
timely action to provide craft and QC with acceptance criteria
is warranted.
After identification of the undersize (under capacity) U-strap on
restraint SI-9118-HL5009 the NRC CAT inspector selected and
examined ten additional restraints that had heavy duty U-straps
specified on the drawing. All were found to have the correct
material installed.
The NRC CAT inspector noted two large (1500 pounds each) air
operated valves on a three inch diameter Safety Injection line
(SI-1117) in a high traffic area that were not supported, were
visibly leaning and could easily be moved by hand. This was
questioned by the inspector. Although not considered required by
Bechtel site engineering, temporary supports were installed on these
valve operators and installation of the permanent' designed supports
was initiated.
The change documents associated with the supports / restraints
inspected had all been properly implemented and closed out. No
problems were noted in the documentation packages reviewed.
See Table III-3 for a summary of inspection observations.
c. Conclusions
In general, pipe support / restraints were found to be installed in
accordance with drawing, design change and procedural requirements.
However, due to the one undersized U-strap and number of other
discrepancies noted, it appears that further improvement by craft
and QC in attention to detail is required. Also, improved controls
for the installation and removal of temporary supports is warranted.
III-6
. . . -.
3. Concrete Expansion Anchors
a. Inspection Scope
Fifty-six concrete expansion anchors (CEAs) on 12 pipe
supportshestraints and 97 CEAs on 17 HVAC supports were inspected
in detail. Inspection attributes included length, marking,
embedment, spacing, edge distance, damage, angularity and residual
torque. In addition, the CEAs on pipe' supports were verified to be
the proper length by ultrasonic testing (UT). Various systems,
sizes, and locations were included in the anchor sample. Table
III-4 provides a listing of the anchors inspected. Anchors were
torqued to the designer specified test torques which were 70% of
minimum installation torques.
Seven FCRs, four NCRs and one DCN related to expansion anchors
were inspected for conformance to as-built conditions. See Section
VII, Table VII-78.
Acceptance criteria for these field inspections were contained in
the following. documents:
Bechtel Construction Specification 5A010SS1000, Rev. 7,
" Installation of Expansion Anchors, Rock Bolts, Grouted Anchor
Bolts, and Core Drilling"
Bechtel Construction Specification SL340JS1002, " Pipe
Support Field Fabrication and Installation"
"
. * Ebasco CSP-41, Rev. 6, " Installation of Expansion Type Anchors" -
- Ebasco CQP 10.19, Rev. 7, " Inspection of Anchoring Devices
Installed Within Concrete Structures"
"
Applicable design drawings and change documents
b. Inspection Findings
Nut rotation at test torque or less was observed on approximately
20 of the 153 CEAs tested and most turned very close to the test
torque value. Only one anchor took as much a one turn to achieve
minimum installation torque. Only one anchor was determined to
have less than the specified embedment (on pipe-support
EW-1329-HL5001) although many were at the exact minimum and many
had been previously identified by QC as not meeting original
specifications and were dispositioned by FCR or NCR. During the
NRC CAT's inspection of pipe supports / restraints and mechanical
equipment several cases of CEAs with out of tolerance embedment and
anchor to concrete edge distances were identified. Other attri-
butes were within design tolerances or had been previously identi-
, fied and dispositioned by engineering. The FCRs, NCRs and DCNs were
verified as being acceptably implemented.
l
III-7
-_
See Section-V.B.4.b (Civil / Structural) for a discussion of qualifi-
cation testing and other design aspects of the concrete expansion
anchor program at STP.
c. Conclusions
Generally with the exception ~of minor deficiencies as noted above, the
-
concrete expansion anchors for pipe supports / restraints and HVAC
supports were installed and inspected in accordance with design and
procedural requirements.
4. Mechanical Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
Twelve pieces of mechanical equipment including six HVAC mechanical
components which are part of the STP's equipment specification, five
ASME pumps, and one ASME tank were inspected for conformance to
design and procedural requirements. In addition the insertion of a
Roto-lock reactor vessel stud insert (#35) in the Unit I vessel was
observed.
The installation documentation for the inspected equipment was
examined and the process control and QC verification documentation
for assembly of the Unit I reactor vessel upper internals by
Westinghouse Construction was also reviewed. Table III-5 provides
a listing of the mechanical equipment inspection sample.
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria and
background information for the NRC CAT inspection:
Bechtel Specification 4C1195S1008, Rev. 2, " Reactor Coolant System
Component Supports and Other NF Steel Items"
- Ebasco CSP-22, Rev. 3, ICP-1, " Valve / Pump Work"
- Ebasco CSP-2, Rev. 4, ICP-5, " Installation of Permanent Electrical
and Mechanical Plant Equipment"
Ebasco SSP-24, Rev. O, " Disassembly / Reassembly of Safety and
Non-Safety Related Valves"
Ebasco QCP-10.11, Rev. 4, PCR-5, " Mechanical Equipment Installation
Inspection"
Ebasco QCP-9.1, Rev. 6, " Weld Inspection ASME"
- Bechtel Drawing 3A01-0-C-0010, " Concrete Standard Details-Embedded
Plates-Misc. Supports"
- Bechtel Drawing 3A01-0-C-0012, " Concrete Standard Details-Embedded
Plates-Misc. Supports"
- Applicable design drawings, vendor technical manual and drawings.
l
[
III-8
1
b. Inspection Findings
Discrepancies were noted on most of the mechanical equipment
installations examined by.the NRC CAT inspectors. Programmatic /
procedural weaknesses as well as inadequate QC inspection are of
concern.
The discrepancies listed below were noted in the reassembly of
the following Unit 1 pumps; Containment Spray (CS) pump B, Low Head
Safety In.jection (LHSI) pump B, and High Head Safety Injection
(HHSI) pump 8:
- Fasteners installed for bolting the motor stand to the motor and
the motor stand to the foundation were of various material types
or were unmarked. Washers specified for the motor stand to motor
connections were missing. These installations had been accepted
by QC and the joints sealed with " torque seal". Refer to Section
VI, Material Traceabil'ty and Control, for further discussion of
this concern.
Although the process control sheet referred to the vendor manual,
which required installation of new 0-rings, the old 0-rings were
reinstalled.
Although the applicable construction procedure, CSP-22, requires
bagging of fasteners and small parts, disassembled fasteners -from
the pump-motor couplings were observed stacked on the pumps
and pump flange fasteners were observed scattered on the floor,
and the QC inspector involved with the pump work was unaware of
the bagging requirement.
Discrepancies noted on four of the six mechanical equipment HVAC
components inspected, included missing and undersize welds,
unshimmed foundations, backed off foundation mounting nuts, improper
concrete expansion anchor embedment and spacing to concrete cored
holes, attachment welding to edge of embedment in possible violation
of structural drawing requirements, damage, and support bracing that
did not conform dimensionally to design. The current site program
for inspecting non-ASME equipment does not provide for inspection of
equipment support configuration dimensions etc. Based on a review
of structural drawings 3A01-0-C-0010 and 3A01-0-C-0012 and discus-
sions with pipe support and mechanical equipment QC inspectors it
was apparent that the design requirements for welding near the edge
of embedded plates was not clearly delineated. Site engineering
. committed to evaluation of existing criteria and revising drawings
and retraining inspectors as required.
On the Reactor Water Make-up Tank the NRC CAT inspectors found that
a design specified ring of cushion material (Flexcell) had been
removed after QC acceptance of the tank installation. The tank
mounting flange was in contact with the concrete floor at some
locations and had more than a one inch gap at others. At the time
of the inspection the tank was partially filled with water for
flushing operations. The licensee was unable to provide evidence
that formal documentation and/or controls existed to identify,
III-9
track and restore the installation of the tank to design require-
ments. At the request of the NRC CAT inspectors the licensee agreed
to perform the following actions:
- Determine the nature and distribution of the remaining
cushion material and other sandy material under the tank.
Evaluate the activities related to removal (and eventual
replacement) of the cushion material.
- Evaluate the stresses imposed on the tank due to loading the
tank with the existing gaps around the foundation.
During the NRC CAT inspection of piping it_was noted that vendor
assembled piping spool flanges on Diesel Generator 1A had been
disconnected, apparently to facilitate the installation of an
adjacent field installed expansion joint. There was no documenta-
tion authorizing this disassembly as required per QCP 10.27. During
t
the course of this inspection these joints were remade, apparently
to eliminate leakage during testing, again without authorization or
control / documentation of proper joint makeup. A Procedure Violation
Notification (M-17) was initiated to address this problem.
During the observation of the installation of the Roto-lock insert,
it was observea that a case of Molycote 505 anti-seize lubricant,
which is no longer recommende~d by Westinghouse for nuclear-
applications (Westinghouse letter DL-82-01 and WCAP-9464, 1979),
had been requisitioned and delivered to the reactor vessel flanga
area. However, Ebasco personnel did use a recommended lubricant
and the 1%tAe :etete rmined unopened. The Molycote was
removed and NCR BN-03021 was initiated. The Inspectors note that
the installation traveler for the RHR pumps listed as an acceptable
lubricant FEL PRO N1000, whic- is . iso on the Westinghouse "not
recommended" list. Again a .aeck of installation records indicated
that an approved lubricant 'nd been used on the RHR pumps. However,
it appears that additional .ittention to ensure control and use of
approved lubricants is we ranted.
On RHR pumps A and C, the construction process sheet (CPS) specifies
as sequencing step 1 the installation of the pump supports per the
vendor manual and drawing 3C01-9-S-1600. This is checked in the CPS
column for " work sequence installation" as a prerequisite step to
pump and motor installation. A QC HOLD point was not specifici.
Subsequent steps of the CPS had been completed including machin.ng
and leveling of the pump feet and support pads to a precise.0.00z
inch tolerance. However, the ASME Equipment Support Checklist used
in conjunction with the CPS, indicated that the torquing of the pump
support foundation bolts had not yet been performed. The condition
was considered acceptable based on the engineering response that
the pump had not been accepted for levelness and location, nor had
the pump alignment been performed. However, as the RHR pump instal-
lation is still in progress, it appears that specific sequence
requirements of the CPS should have been more clearly controlled
with the review of exceptions taken to an intended prerequisite
appropriately documented prior to completing subsequent work steps to
III-10
<
ensure that leveling during subsequent torquing of foundation
bolting is not degraded.
It should be noted that the installation of the lugged wafer valves
with the fastener control problems previously discussed in the
piping section of this report was under the control of the
mechanical equipment installation program and the valves were
inspected by mechanical equipment inspectors.
No problems were identified during the review of reactor vessel
upper internal installation documentation.
Table III-5 provides a number of NRC CAT observations for the
mechanical equipment items inspected.
c. Conclusions
Significant deficiencies were noted in regard to mechanical
equipment installation. A lack of attention to detail by craft and
QC inspators was apparent. Programmatic / procedural weaknesses
regarding control and documentation of bolting activities, lubri-
cants, inspection of non-ASME equipment support framework, and
acceptance criteria for location of attachments to embedded plates
was also apparent.
Licensee action is necessary in areas of mechanical equipment
installation to provide assurance'that hardware is installed and
inspected in accordance with design and procedural requirements.
Subsequent rework activities must be controlled, documented and
provide for QC reverification of hardware acceptability.
5. Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
a. Inspection Scope
Fifteen HVAC seismic supports / restraints, forty-seven duct sections,
and five fire-dampers were selected from both Units 1 and 2 at
random and inspected in detail.
The supports / restraints were inspected for location, configuration,
member size, weld size and connection details. Duct sections and
fire dampers were examined for proper configuration, companion angle
size, joint make-up and free operation of fire dampers.
In addition, adjacent HVAC hardware, including approximately 20 other
HVAC supports / restraints, 25 duct sections, and 10 dampers was
observed at random for the following attributes: loose or missing
fasteners, joint makeup, improper clearances or angularity,
disassembled, and damaged items.
Ten Field Change Requests (FCR) associated with the NRC CAT HVAC
hardware samples were verified for conformance to as-built
conditions. Also, twenty-four construction traveler packages were
reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
III-11
Acceptance criteria for these field inspections were contained in
the following documents:
Bechtel Specification SV279VS1003, Rev. 5. " Installation
of Safety Class and Non-Safety Class HVAC Equipment and Duct
Work."
Bechtel Specification 3V279VS1000, Rev. 8, " Safety Class
HVAC Duct-Work Fabrication."~
Ebasco Procedure CSP-6, Rev. 4, " Installation of HVAC Duct
Hangers and Equipment klangers."
Ebasco Procedure CSP-9, Rev. 4, " Inspection of Duct and
Duct Accessories."
Ebasco Procedure CSP-95, Rev. 2, " General Welding Requirements
for HVAC."
Bechtel Procedure QCP-10.21, Rev. 5, "HVAC/ DUCT / HANGER
Installation Inspection."
pplicable Duct Support / Restraint and Layout Drawings.
-b. Inspection Findings
Approximately 39 percent of the seismic supports, 22 percent of
the duct sections, and 9 percent of the fire dampers had been QC
accepted by Ebasco at the time of the NRC CAT inspection. During
the inspection by the NRC CAT, workmanship appeared to~be good and
no installation deficiencies were found for HVAC hardware (supports,
. duct sections, and fire dampers). However, during the observation
of adjacent HVAC hardware, QC accepted tornado damper number
3V11V0A0302 was'found installed upside down. This apparent isolated
case of questionable. installation was subsequently dispositioned
"use-as-is" by Bechtel Engineering on NCR BH-03037.
Ten " Field Change Requests" (FCR) associated with the HVAC hardware
inspected were reviewed and found to conform to the as-built condi-
tion. See Section VII, Table VII-78.
The NRC CAT was informed of an reinspection program under
" Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER 85-031) conducted by Ebasco QC
for direct attachment welds and expansion anchor bolt / base plate
installation. During the inspection of HVAC supports the NRC CAT
did not observe weld attachment discrepancies as described in
DER-031.
Six of the twenty-four " construction traveler packages" reviewed by
,
the NRC CAT for completeness and accuracy, were noted to have
documentation omissions on the " Construction Cover Sheet" (Form
'
CS-AD-852). A Standard Deficiency Report (SDR) was subsequently
issued by the licensee to Construction (SDR E-350) and to Quality
Control (SDR E-351) to prevent the recurrence of these deficien-
cies.
.
! III-12
- _.
--
.
c. Conclusions
.HVAC safety related support / restraints, duct sections, and fire
.
, dampers conformed to design and procedural requirements. More
attention to the review of documentation is required to ensure
completeness and accuracy of the construction traveler packages.
,
9
4 ,
i
i '
.
!
i
I
,
III-13
TABLE III-1
PIPING IhSPECTION SAMPLE AND OBSERVATIONS
Isometric Diameter
(Note 1) (Inches) Class Notes Observations
2C369PAF402 6, 8 2 None
.Sh. 01, Rev. 3
~2C369PCV417 4 2 -
Clearance to hanger
Sh. 03, Rev. 2
2M369PRH259 8 2 2, 4 Deficient ISI prep (NCR
Sh. 02, Rev. 2- SP-03152)
3M369 PEW 229 . 6, 8 3 2, 4 Annubar flow probe mounting
Sh. 18, Rev. 0 10, 30 flange (NCR SJ-03008 & 03111)
3M369PRM263 4, 6 3 2, 4 Broken flex conduit
Sh. 03, Rev. 4 (SWR-01921)
3Y361 PEW 729 3, 24, 30 3 2 None
Sh. 03, Rev. 3
4C369PCV417' 2 2 4 Undersize socket welds (NCR
SH. A02, Rev. 4 CP-03139, SDR E-349 DER 85-049)
4C369PCC407 16 2 2, 4 Luggedwafervalvebbiting(NCR
SH. 34, Rev. 3 NCR CM-03068, SDR E-353
& -354, DER 85-057)
Uncapped MOV housing. (Main-
tenance Discrepancy MD 1-0868)
4C369PRC457 3/4, 2 1, 2 -
Only partially inspected
SH. A06, Rev. 4 during CAT. Reviewed hydro-
test records.
3/32" saw-cut in coupling
4C369PRH459 4, 12 1, 2 -
Masking tape on pipe.
Sh. 04, Rev. 6 Uncapped opening
SD369 PEW 329 4, 6, 10 3 2 Broken temperature probe.
Sh. 01, Rev. 1
SD369 PEW 329 4, 6, 10 3 4 Valve reversed and handle
Sh. 03, Rev. 1 blocked (NCR SP-03148)
III-14
_ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ . _____ __ __ - -
.
TABLE III-1 - (Continued)
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE AND OBSERVATIONS
-Isometric Diameter
(Note 1)- (Inches) Class Notes Observations
SD369 PEW 329 4, 10 3 -
Clearance to support
SH._04, Rev. 1
Wood blocking
50369 PEW 329 4, 6, 10 3 -
.None.
SH. 06, Rev. 1
SF369PFC530 4, 10, 20 3 -
None
SH. 04, Rev. 4
5M369PCC207 14, 20 3 3 No gaskets on temporary
Sh. 10, Rev. 4 flange assembly (poor
construction practice)
Notes
1. Letter in second position of isometric drawing number
identifies pipe location.
"
C = RCB
M = MEAB
Y.= Yard (Essential Cooling Water Intake Building)
2 0 = DGB '
F = FHB.
2. This isometric had been walked-down in accordance with Ebasco QCP-10.14,
and turned over to HL&P Startup for flushing and hydro-testing.
3. All isometrics are Unit 1 except SM369PCC207
4. HL&P and Ebasco discrepancy reports are a result of NRC CAT observations
and are shown in parentheses ( ).
III-15
_ _ _ - - . - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _
7_
TA8LE III-2-
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT' INSPECTION SAMPLE
Support / Restraint .
Number M (Inches)- Location (1) Class
.RH-9215-HL5004 (2)- Strut 8 C 2
-SI-9105-RR0031 (2) Strut 8 C 2
CC-9105-HL5007 (2)- Strut 16 C 3
SI-9106-HL5009 (2) Box 6 C 2
.
SI-9105-RR0038 (2) Box 8 C 2
RH-9206-HL5006 (2) ' Strut 8 C 2
RH-9102-SH0001(2) Spring 12 C 2
CC-9426-SH0001 Sprir.g 12 FHB 3
SI-9102-RH0007 Strut 8 FHB 2
CC-9427-HL5005 Strut 12 FHB 3
CC-9427-HL5004 Strut 12 FHB 3
EW-9406-HL5001 (3) Strap 3 EWPH 3
SI-9102-HL5001 Strut 8 FHB 2
EW-9113-HS5001.(3) Anchor 2 MAB 3
EW-9383-HL5001 (3) Box 10 MAB 3
EW-9283-HL5001 Box 10 MAB 3
SI-9117-RR0004 Strut 3 MAB 2
SI-9118-HL5009 (3) Strap 6 MAB 2
EW-9102-HL5001 Strut 30 MAB 3
EW-9205-HL5008 Strut 4 MAB 3
EW-9102-HL5003 (3) Strut 30 MAB 3
EW-9202-HL5001 Strut 30 MAB 3
RH-9205-HL5011 Box 8 MAB ' 2
RH-9205-HL5001 Box 8 MAB 2
SI-9118-RH0011 Strap 6 MAB 2
III-16
_ _ _ _ _
e
! -TABLE III-2 - (Continued)
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION SAMPLE
Support / Restraint ASME
Number Type (Inches) location (1) Class
RH-9205-HL5009 Box 8 'MAB 2
CH-9203-HL5004 (2) Box 6 EAB 3
SI-9337-HF5005 (2) U-Bolt 2 FHB '2
CV-9032-H15015 (2) Box 4 MAB 3
l CC-9413-GU1004 Unit 2 Strap 4 MAB 3
CC-9413-HL5002 Unit 2 Strap 4 MAB 3
SI-9201-HL5009 . Strut 12 FHB 2
NOTES:
, (1) C = Containment Bldg.
!
'FHB = Fuel Handling Bldg.
EWPH = Essential Service Water Pump House
MAB = Mechanical Auxiliary Bldg. ,
EAB = Electrical Auxiliary Bldg.
(2) Through licensee reinspection program
l (3)' Document package reviewed
l
I
l
i
!
III-17
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ . -
y
TABLE III-3
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS
Support / Restraint Observations (1)
SI-9105-RR031 Strut angularity exceeds tolerance by 4
degrees (NCR CS-3181)
SI-9106-HL5009 Minimal clearance between pipe attachment
and support structure in unrestrained
direction (NCR CS-03314)
~ SI-9105-RR0038 Undersize skewed fillet welds (NCR CS-00875)
RH-9102-SH001 1/2. inch clearance to adjacent support'
EW-9406-HL5001 Temporary support attached
SI-9118-HL5009 undersize U-strap installed (NCS CS-3189)
EW-9102-HL5003 Three expansion anchors with less than
specified embedment (NCR CS-3182)
EW-9202-HL5001 Oversized plate installed but not properly.
documented / evaluated. (NCR 55-3227)
CC-9413-HL5002 *
Missing flare bevel fillet cap weld
(Unit 2) -(NCR CS-03263)
SI-9201-HL5009 Brace angle exceeds design' tolerance
(NCR CS-03228)
NOTE:
(1) Ebasco NCR issued as a result of the NRC CAT
observation (s) shown in parentheses.
f
III-18
TABLE III-4
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR INSPECTION SAMPLE AND OBSERVATIONS
Number / Diameter
(Inches)
of Anchors
Support / Restraint Inspected Observations
Pipe S/R's:
CC-9318-HL5002 8 - 3/4
CC-1317-HL5006 4 - 1/2
CC-1317-RR13 4 - 3/4
CC-1114-GU19 4 - 3/4
CC-1317-HL5001 4 - 1 1/4
CC-1428-HL5016 4 - 3/4
CV-1006-HL5017 4-1
CC-9422-HL5005 4 - 3/4
CC-1414-HL5010 4 - 3/4 *(One CEA)
CC-1424-HL5004 4 - 3/4
CC-1301-HL5002 8-1
EW-1329-HL5001 4 - 1/2 Embedment violation on
one CEA: 3 3/16 actual
vs. 3 1/2 required (NCR
SS-03264)
HVAC S/R's:
1-6-0144-5012 4 - 3/4
1-6-0144-S016 12 - 1/2 *(Four CEA's)
1-6-0144-5046 -
3 - 5/8 *(One CEA)
1-6-0144-5017 12 - 1/2 *(FourCEA's)
1-6-0144-5019 16 - 1/2 *(Eight CEA's)
1-6-0144-S037 4 - 3/4
1-6-065-5045 4 - 1/2, 4 - 1 1/4
III-19
- - - - _ - - _ _
7_ _
.. ..
-
TABLE III-4 --(Continued)
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR INSPECTION SAMPLE AND OBSERVATIONS
Number / Diameter
(Inches)
of Anchors
Support / Restraint Inspected Observations
HVAC S/Rs: I
1-6-0065-5025 4 - 5/8
1-6-0065-5075 4 - 3/4, 3 - 1
1-6-065-S008' 2 - 3/4, 2 - 1 *(One CEA)
1-6-0144-5083 6 - 1 1/4
1-6-0128-5083 8 - 1/2, 4 - 1 1/4 *(Two CEA's)
1-6-0128-5002 2 - 3/4
1-6-0128-S058 4 - 3/4 *(Two CEA's)
in less than 1 full additional turn of the nut. ;
,
.
III-20
p--
'
TABLE III-5
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT SAMPLE AND OBSERVATIONS
Equipment (All Unit 1) Observations
Reactor Water Makeup Tank Alteration to tank foundation configura-
tion without proper documentation / control.
Containment Spray Pump B 1. Incorrect /indeterminant fastener material.
Low Head Safety'Injecton Pump B 2. 0-ring reused when technical manual
High Head Safety Injection Pump B specified replacement.
3. Fasteners not controlled.
RHR Pumps A and C Torquing of foundation bolts not completed
. prior to leveling and setup of critical
support framing.
Charging Pump Supply Cooler- One mounting pad not shimmed as required
3V101VAH010 and damage to flange of foundation beam.
(NCR CM-03087).
EAB Return Air Fan-3V111VFN002 1. Gusset plate welded to edge of embed
exceeding tolerance.
2. Undersize attachment weld.
3. Missing welds on 4 gusset plates.
4. Damage frame member on fan.
5. Notches in bracing not shown on drawing.
6. Bolt hole locations in brace gusset
plates'not per drawing. (NCR CM-3092)
Control Room Return Fan - None
3V111VFN026
MEAB HVAC Chiller - 3V111VCH001 None
Charging Pump Supply Cooler - 1. North end of attachment welds 1/16 to
3V101VAH004 1/8 inch undersize entire length.
2. Attachment welds to edge of embed
plate violates drawing requirement.
3. Two maxibolts to cored holes in concrete
violate minimum spacing requirements.
(12 1/2 inch required, 5 inch actual)
4. Nut is tight on foundation stud but
is 1/4 inch from mating with contact
surface. (NCR CM-03091)
i Fuel Handling Building Filter 1. Undersize unit to embed fillet welds.
l Train-3V121VXV003 2. Expansion anchors violate minimum
i spacing to cored holes.
3. Expansion anchors do not have required
embedment.
i
r
NOTE: Ebasco NCR's generated as a result of the NRC CAT observation (s) shown in
, parenthesis.
l
,
III-21
l
I
. - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _
,-
TABLE III-6
HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS
(Supports / Restraints)
Inspection
Support Duct. ~FCR Traveler
Number Size In. Unit' Building 1 Review Reviewed Observation
1-1-0083-S014 8 dia. 1 RCB None Yes None
1-1-0083-S039 16 dia. 1 RCB BH-00827 Yes None
1-1-0083-5040 16 dia. 1 RCB CH-01546 Yes None
1-1-0083-5046 8 dia. 1 RCB BH-00559 Yes None
1-1-0083-5048 16 dia. 1 RCB CH-00845 Yes None
1-1-0083-5049 16 dia. 1 RCB None Yes None
1-1-0087-5-004 14x10 1 RCB CH-01800 Yes- None
1-6-0143-5016 30x72 1 EAB DL-00152W - Yes None
1-6-0144-5017 12x12 1 EAB CH-02181W Yes None
1-6-0144-5019 12x12 1 EAB EAB-314 Yes None
2-6-0050-S033 14x16 2 EAB None Yes Document
discrepancies
on content
sheet of
construction
traveler.
2-6-0051-5007 24x20 2 EAB None Yes Document
discrepancies
on content sheet
of construction
traveler.
.
III-22
._ _ _ _ ______ _ _ _ - ____-_ - _ ___- _ __ - __ _ - -_ _ _~
TABLE III-6 (Continued)
HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS
(Supports / Restraints)
Inspection
Support Duct FCR Traveler
Number ' Size In. Unit Building 1 Review Reviewed Observation
2-6-0124-5003 20x18 2 EAB None Yes Document i
discrepancies
on content
sheet of
construction
traveler.
2-6-0124-S066 22x22 2 EAB None Yes Document
discrepancies
on content
sheet of
construction
traveler.
2-6-0125-S005 20x18 2 EAB BH-01844 Yes Document
discrepancies
on cover sheet
of construction
traveler.
'RCB = Reactor Containment Building
EAB = Electrical Auxiliary Building
III-23
--
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
TABLE III-6 (Continued)
HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS
(HVAC Sections)
Inspection
-Orawing Number FCR Traveler
& Duct Sections Unit Building 1 Reviewed Reviewed Observations
5-V-14-1-V- 1 RCB None None None
0083-A-10
Rev. 5
HVAC Section Nos.
P-005 thru P-019
5-V-14-1-V- 1 RCB None None None
0083-B-1D
Rev. 5
HVAC Section Nos.
P-101 thru P-114
5-V-11-1V- 1 EAB BH-01142 Yes None
0144-A-1D (P-011,
Rev. 0 012, 015,
HVAC Section Nos. 016, 021,
P-011 thru P-025, and P-025)
P-027, P-028
2RCB = Reactor Containment Building
EAB = Electrical Auxiliary Building
III-24
. -
TABLE III-6 (Continued)
HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS
(Fire Dampers)
Inspection
Drawing Fire Damper FCR Traveler
Number Number Unit Building 1 Reviewed Reviewed Observations
5-V-11-1-V- FF-01 1 EAB None No None
065-A-ID,
Rev. 4
FF-04 1 EAB None No None
5-V-11-1-V- FF-319 1 EAB None Yes None
0128-A-ID
Rev. 3
FF-320 1 EAB None Yes None
FF-321 1 EAB None Yes None
IRCB = Reactor Containment Building
EAB = Electrical Auxiliary Building
.
III-25
_ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _______ __ _. _ _ _ - _ _ . - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
IV. WELDING AND NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION
A. Objective
The objective of the appraisal of welding and nondestructive examination
(NDE) was to determine if Quality Control accepted work related to
welding and NDE activities was controlled and performed in accordance
with design requirements, Safety Analysis Report commitments, and
applicable codes and specifications.
An additional objective was to determine if personnel involved in
welding and NDE activities were trained and qualified in accordance
with established performance standards and applicable code
requirements.
B. Discussion
To accomplish the above objectives; welds and welding details for
piping; pipe supports /retraints; field and shop fabricated tanks;
structural steel installations; heating, ventilating and air condition-
ing (HVAC) installations; electrical supports; and instrumentation
control tubing and supports were inspected. The inspected welds were
selected to provide a representative sample of the applicant's
contractor welding activities in terms of welding processes used,
materials welded and existing weld-joint configurations. Considera-
tions such as physical location, difficulty of welding and limited
accessibility were also used in sample selection. Design changes
related to welding such as increase or decrease of weld sizes and a
change from one welding process or procedure to another welding process
or procedure were also reviewed for technical adequacy and
implementation.
NDE activities were appraised through the review of radiographs for
both field and vendor fabricated welds, the review of NDE procedures
and personnel qualifications, the inspection of the calibration status
of NDE equipment and the witnessing of in process NDE activities. The
NRC construction assessment team (CAT) inspectors reviewed a sample of
radiographic film in final storage in the vault of the licensee's
facility. In addition, a sample of NDE documentation was requested for
review which was stored by the Nuclear Steam System Supplier,
Westinghouse and was not yet transmitted to the licensee.
During the inspection of structural welds in the pipe supports' area,
the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) identified welds which did
not meet the weld size requirements specified by the Architect Engineer,
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). Undersized socket welds were also
identified in 2 inch schedule 160 piping spools. Some undersized weld
reinforcements were also found in nozzle to shell joints (ASME Code
Category D Joints) on tanks and heat exchangers. A detailed discussion
concerning these welds is included later in this section.
In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT inspectors reviewed. film for field and
shop fabricated pipe welds, film involving equipment and hardware
supplied under the Westinghouse (NSSS) scope of supply and film supplied
by various vendors and contractors for the balance of plant.
IV-1
.
!
l
l
A relatively small number of deficiencies were found in the reviewed
sample of radiographs. However, in the area of NDE documentation,
with the exception of the Westinghouse file, the team encountered
difficulties in establishing the number of NDE vendors and suppliers.
The inspectors also observed that in general the project has difficul-
ties in identifying existence and location of film and documentation
related to the balance of plant suppliers. For equipment and hardware
supplied under the NSSS scope of supply the licensee has instituted a
program in which, Westinghouse is required, to submit monthly reports
identifying the current status of film and NDE documentation. The
program was instituted in May 1985 after the project identified missing
radiographs of the reactor head supplied by Combustion Engineering. The
NRC CAT believes that some similar program is needed for the balance of
plant suppliers, to insure film and documentation could be readily
identified. A detailed discussion concerning NDE deficiencies,
retrievability and availability of film and documentation is provided
later in this section.
The welding and NDE activities were examined in order to ascertain
compliance with the governing construction codes and specifications.
This effort involved the review and inspection of the following
contractors:
Field Activities
1. Bechtel Power Corporation: architect engineer.
2. Ebasco Services Inc.: piping installation and piping supports /
restraints, fire protection system fabrication and installation,
electrical, instrumentation, HVAC installation and structural steel
erection.
3. Pittsburgh Des Moines Corp. (PDM): containment liner and contain-
ment penetration fabrication and installation, reactor and spent
fuel liner fabrication.
4. Westinghouse: reactor internals-modification and installation.
5. Babcock and Wilcox: Steam Generator Eddy current preservice
inspection and examination.
Shop Fabrication
1. Southwest Fabricating & Welding Company, Inc.: shop fabricated
piping spools.
2. Copes-Vulcan: valve manufacturer.
3. Westinghouse: nuclear steam supply system.
4. Anchor / Darling Valve Company: valve manufacturer.
5. Teledyne Brown: steam generator supports fabricator.
IV-2
6. Esco Corporation: material supplier.
7. Sandansky F&M Company: material supplier.
8. Brown Minneapolis Tank Manufacturers: tank fabricator.
9. RECO industries: tank fabricators.
10. Fisher Controls: valve manufacturer.
11. Joseph Oat Corporation: heat exchanger manufacturer.
12.~TRW Mission Manufacturing Co.: material supplier.
13. Richmond Engineering: tank fabricators.
14. Pacific Pumps: pump manufacturer.
15. Pacific Valve: valve manufacturer.
16. Master Craftsman Inc.: ' heat exchangers suppliers.
17. Pall Trinity Micro. Corporation: cartridge filters supplier.
18. Lamco Industries: tank fabricators.
19. Quaker Ally Casting Co.: castings supplier.
20. Wollaston Alloys: material supplier.
21. McJunkih Corporation: material suppliers.
22. Combustion Engineering: reactor vessel fabricator.
23. Sabine Steel: tank fabricators.
24. GW Energy Product Corp.: tank fabricators.
25. Atlas Industrial manufacturing: heat exchangers manufacturer.
26. Struthers Wells Inc.: heat exchanger manufacturer.
27. PDM - tank fabricators.
The results of the inspection activities involving each of these
areas and contractors are documented as follows:
IV-3
1. Pipe and Pipe Support Fabrication
a. Inspection Scope
(1) Welding Activities
The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed activities relating to fabrica-
tion contracts in the areas of piping system welds, support /.
restraint welds, welding procedures, welder qualifications, NDE
procedures, personnel qualifications, and the review of radio-
graphic film for shop and field fabricated welds. Field
welding involving pipe fabrication was performed by Ebasco. .
Southwest Fabricating and Welding supplied the shop fabricated
piping spools.
The NRC CAT inspected 41 pipe supports / restraints involving
approximately 450 welds to verify conformance of welding to
drawing requirements, and to confirm the visual acceptability
of welds. Thirty-four of the pipe supports had been inspected
by QC inspectors, 4 supports were "in process" and were not yet
inspected by QC, and 3 supports were identified as Class 7
supports which does not require QC inspection except on a
random basis. The "in process" and Class 7 pipe supports were
inspected in order to verify the initial quality of work
performed by craft personnel. See Table IV-1 for a listing of
supports subjected to detailed inspection. Additionally,
another 14 supports / restraints involving 150 welds were-
visually inspected to verify the quality of the completed
welds. See Table IV-2.for a listing of supports inspected. '
The NRC CAT inspectors also inspected the welds on the upper
and lower lateral supports.for two steam generators. The
steam generator supports were fabricated by Teledyne Brown.
Three sets of Bechtel calculations for the design of skewed
welded supports were also reviewed for adequacy.
The NRC CAT inspection of piping welds consisted of visual
inspection during walkdown of piping systems and inspection of
pipe welds located near the supports restraints being inspected.
Approximately 62 piping spools involving 1200 American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 1,.2 and 3 welds were
inspected. Four of those piping spools were subjected to
detailed inspection which included the review of pertinent QC
documentation while the remaining 58 spools were only visually
inspected. Both field and shop welds were inspected in order
to assure compliance with the requirements of the ASME Cooe.
See Tables IV-3 and IV-4 for listings of piping spools
inspected. In addition, 60 welding filler metal test reports,
27 welder qualification test _ records and 6 welding procedures
were reviewed for' compliance with applicable specifications,
procedures and the ASME Code requirements.
IV-4
. . . .. . . . - - _ . . . . . . .- ~, .- .
'
,
~
'
(2) Nondestructive Examination Activities.
J-
JThe NRC CAT inspection of NDE activities in the pipe fabri-
cation area included the review of 46 shop and 145 field
fabricated welds which involved 1,905' film. The-field welds
were fabricated by Brown and Root (SR) and-Ebasco and the shop
- fabricated pipe spools were supplied by Southwest Fabricating
i and Welding. _In addition, 6 NDE procedures and 4 NDE personnel
' qualification records were reviewed in order to verify compli-
~
ance with the governing codes and specifications. Three NDE ,
I technicians were observed while performing in process inspec- '
tions and were evaluated for their ability to follow the .
,
applicable inspection procedures. Twenty pieces _of NDE equip- "
, ' ment were inspected for calibration and one NDE procedure was.
reviewed for adequacy.
1
,
I
. b. Inspection Findings !
- (1) In general, the inspected pipe and pipe supports / restraints
welding activities were found to comply with' governing codes
and specifications. However, discrepancies were identified
l involving undersized welds'in pipe supports / restraints.
Specifically, eight QC accepted skewed welds were found to be.
undersized and two other-skewed welds were located on the acute
side of the joint instead of the obtuse side as required on the' '
drawing. Ten nonskewed welds were also found to be undersized
with~ respect to.the specified acceptance criteria. As a result
~
4
'of these findings-the licensee issued nonconformance reports
and the deficient' welds will be reviewed and evaluated by~
Bechtel.
,
In the area of "in process"-and class 7 pipe supports inspec-
- -tions, the NRC CAT inspectors also identified welds which did
- not conformed to the specified acceptance criteria. Twelve
"in process" welds were found'to be undersized and two gusset
- plates were missing in one of the inspected supports. 10 of
,
the inspected welds in class 7 supports were also found to be ;
undersized. As a result of this finding Ebasco and HL&P
indicated that they will conduct additional training for both ;
L craft and inspection personnel. ;
,
One of the three sets of calculations reviewed for the design l
of supports having skewed joints.did.not have any calculations
for the welds in the skewed connections. The calculations
also did not provide compensation for the loss of weld throat ,
thickness in. skewed welds. '
.
The lack of calculations for skewed joints had been previously-
identified on a number of supports.during a third party design
assessment performed in March and April 1985. The project'has
committed to review the design calculation and such review was
i underway during the time of the NRC CAT inspection.
1
.I
i
IV-5
- -
.._. ~ . , . . . _ . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . , _ , _ . - - . _ - . - . _ _ _ . . . . , , . , _ _ , _ . - , _ _ _ . , , _ . , , . -
Undersized reinforcing fillets on groove welds and undersize
fillet welds were found on the upper and lower steam generator
lateral supports. NRC CS-03201 was written against this
finding. Ebasco performed additional inspection consisting of
mapping out the undersized conditions, which were evaluated and
accepted by Bechtel without rework.
During the inspection of pipe welds the NRC cal inspectors
identified undersized socket welds in 2 inch schedule 160 pipe
spools. As a result of this finding the licensee issued NCR
CP-03139. A Standard Deficiency Report (SDR E-349) was issued
to determine the extent of the undersize condition in other
small-bore socket welds, and a Deficiency Evaluation Report
(DER 85-049) was issued to evaluate the reportability of the
condition. Results of the reinspection conducted by Ebasco
QC indicated that the undersized condition is limited to
2 inch Sch.160 socket welds fabricated in the field (not the
site fabrication shop). Of the approximately 200 QC accepted
field welds of this type, at least 15 percent were reported
to be undersize. No undersized socket welds were found in
other pipe schedules and sizes by the_NRC CAT inspectors or
the Ebasco reinspection effort.
The NRC CAT inspectors also visually inspected ~55 socket welds
for proper fitup and gap. In addition, 7 socket welds ~were
radiographed to determine that the required gap exist between
the pipe and the fitting. No discrepancies were identified
during the visual and RT inspections. Two of the-100 inspected
" weld-o-let" pipe branch connections were found to have inade-~
quate weld sizes. NCR HP-3238 and NCR HP-03164 were written to
document this condition.
During the review of Welding Procedure Specifications,_one of
the supporting qualification records for WP-89 was found to
violate ASME Code requirements regarding the size of tensile
specimens which were in effect at the time the qualification
tests were performed. Ebasco Welding Engineering performed a
review of the applicable qualification record against current
code requirements, which had deleted the tensile specimen
restriction, and it was found acceptable.
During review of the Material Test Reports for welding filler
metal, it was observed that the purchasing specifications and
test reports did not specifically address the requirements of
ASME Section III regarding the cooling rate of post weld heat
treatment to be followed during welding of the test coupons.
Bechtel agreed to add the cooling rate requirements to the
purchasing specification, as well as the specific tensile
strength requirements for material tested in the heat treated
condition. Based on review of 60 welding filler metal test
reports, this discrepancy has no consequence on hardware.
IV-6
(2) Nondestructive Examination Activities
In general, the inspected NDE activities were found to comply
with the applicable codes and specifications. No deficiencies
were identified with the inspected shop fabricated pipe welds.
However, during the review of the radiographic film for field
fabricated welds some deficiencies were identified which
involved the following four welds:
- Weld EW 1202 - FW 0027 was found to have low weld thickness.
- Weld EW 1205 - FW 14 had a linear. indication adjacent to a
repair area.
the area of interest; one repair-view indicated that the
complete area repaired had not been covered; and one view
exhibited porosity with a crack extending from_it. NCR
- BP-03221 was written to document this deficiency.
- During the review of circumferential weld C52007 - FWOO6
the adjacent area of the logitudinal weld seam showed a crack
.like indication in the seam. The licensee indicated that the
crack like indication may be caused by microbiological
induced corrosion (MIC) attack which has taken place during
the storage of the pipe. The licensee committed to investi-
gate further the cause and nature of this indication.
It should be noted that weld EW1202 - FW0027 and weld EW1205 -
FW14 identified above have been reviewed during HP&L audit
- M11-301 of the radiographic activities prior to the NRC CAT
inspection.
The HP&L audit did not ideritify any deficiencies with those
two welds which indicates that the audits were not effective.
See Section VIII'of this report for additional details
concerning project audits and corrective actio~ns.
c. Conclusion
(1) Welding Activities
In general, the inspected welding activities were found to
comply with the requirements of_the applicable codes and
specifications. However, the NRC CAT found structural welds on
pipe supports / restraints which did not meet the weld specifi-
cations. Skewed connections did not meet drawing requirements
.for size and location and some were not supported by calculations.
In addition, undersized socket welds were found in 2 inch
schedule 160 piping spools.
IV-7
.
_. ..
(2) Nondestructive Examination
In general, the inspected NDE~ activities were found to comply
with the requirements of the governing codes and specifica-
tions. However, the NRC CAT found some welds which had linear
indications and another weld which had low weld thickness. In
addition, the reviewed NDE audits were found to be ineffective.
2. Reactor Internals Modification and Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 30 tack welds on the bottom mounted Instrumentation
(BMI) locking caps were~ visually inspected. The documentation
packages for the welds on the Core Barrel Assembly and tie plates
for the lower internals were reviewed. The documentation package
for the welds on the Energy Absorber Installation was also reviewed.
In addition, one welding procedure and the qualification test
records for two welders were also reviewed for adequacy. The
modification work was performed by Westinghouse.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No problems were identified in the area of irispected welding
activities. Activities were found to meet the specified acceptance
criteria.
3. Preservice Inspection (PSI)
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 30 steam generator tubes requiring preservice and
inservice inspections were witnessed while performing Eddy current
inspections in order to verify compliance with the requirements of
Section XI of the ASME Code. In addition, the qualification test
records for four Eddy current technicians were reviewed and 2
technicians were observed while performing Eddy current inspections.
The NDE procedure and 10 data records, were reviewed for adequacy.
b. Inspection findings and Conclusions
No problems were identified in the inspected preservice inspection
activities. Activities were found to comply with the requirements
of the governing codes and specifications.
4. Electrical Installation and Electrical Supports
a. Inspectior Scope
The NRC CAT inspected approximately 110 welds in the area of
electrical installation. This involved the inspection of welds on 6
cable tray -supports, 2 junction ' box supports, 9 conduit supports
and the installation welds for 3 electrical panels. Two welding
procedures and the qualification test records for five welders were
reviewed. In addition, the personnel qualification test records for
IV-8
_ _ . _ -
___ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
four welding inspectors were also reviewed and two inspectors were
observed and evaluated for their ability to follow the visual I
inspection procedures. The welding activities in the electrical
'
area were performed by EBASCO.
b. Inspection Findings
During the inspection of Electrical supports 1-016-H99 and
1-016-H100 it was established that those supports were QC accepted
-for integrity and tightness of technical connections on September
15, 1984. Since that date, two bolted connections on support H-100
have been changed to welded connections without obtaining the
required Modification / Removal Form prior to installation of the
welded connections. As a result of this finding a Quality Control
. Notification of Procedural. Violation #C-8 was generated and the
connections will be inspected by QC to determine the acceptability
of the welded connections.
c. Conclusions
No major problems were identified in~the area of inspected welding
activities. With the exception of the uncontrolled modification
discrepancies, all inspected activities were found to comply with
the applicable construction codes and specifications.
5. Instrumentation Tubing Installation and Instrumentation Supports
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 80 welds involving 10 instrumentatic.. supports were
visually inspected to ascertain compliance with_the specified
acceptance criteria. Two welding procedures and qualification test
records for four welders were reviewed. The qualification records
for five NDE inspectors were also reviewed. Two visual welding
inspectors were observed and evaluated for their ability to follow
the applicable inspection procedures. The radiographs for one
instrumentation tubing weld was also reviewed for adequacy. The
welding in the instrumentation area was performed by Ebasco.
b. Inspection Findings
During the review of documentation of instrument stand EWR~#A03134
it was discovered that the stand has been fabricated and installed
without the welds being inspected as required by QC procedure QCP-95
paragraph 5.2.1. As a result of this finding the licensee issued
NCR C503004. The paint was removed from the welded areas and the
welds were inspected as required by the inspection procedures and no
other problems were noted.
During the inspection of supports.for instrument #N2ED-FT-7822A it
was noted that a double type globe strut (G5812A strut) was used
instead of.the required single type globe strut. As a result of
this finding Ebasco generated Deficiency Report (DR) I-0021 and all *
IV-9
double type globe strut (G-5812-A) will be removed. The construc- l
tion personnel was instructed in the correct use of the G-5812-A ;
strut.
l
C. Conclusions
No major problems were identified in the area of inspected welding
activities. With the exception of the globe strut installation
discrepancies, all inspected activities were found to comply with
the applicable construction codes and specifications.
6. Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
Installation and Supports
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 120. welds involving 16 supports were inspected for
compliance with the specified acceptance criteria. Two welding
procedures and the qualification test records for five welders were
~
reviewed. In addition, four personnel qualification test records
were also reviewed and two welding inspectors were observed and
evaluated for their ability to follow the visual inspection
procedures. The welds on four duct pieces, two air blowers and two
dampers were also included in this inspection. The welding in the
HVAC area was performed by Ebasco.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No problems were identified in the area o.f inspected welding activi-
ties. Activities were found to comply with the applicable construc-
tion codes and specifications.
7. Structural Steel Fabrication, Erection and Modification
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 120 welds comprising 70 field and 50 shop welds
involving 16 structural beams and columns.were visually inspected in
order to ascertain compliance with the specified acceptance
criteria.
Two welding procedures and the qualification test records for five -
welders were revie, sed. Visual inspection procedures and the quali-
fication records for four inspectors were also reviewed. Four
welding inspectors were observed and evaluated for their ability
to follow the visual inspection procedures. The structural steel
field welding was performed by Ebasco. American Bridge Steel-
Company supplied the structural steel to the project.
b. Inspection Findings
No problems were identified in the area of inspected field welding
activities.- However, several original welds involving clip to beam
web connection welds were found to be deficient. Specifically, the
design drawings required fillet welds all around, while the connec-
IV-10
. . . .
r
tion was seal welded on the top and bottom of the clip. As a result
of this finding the licensee issued NCR #HC-03182, HC03183 and
HC-03184. The welded connections were evaluated by Architect
Engineer, accepted "as is" and determined to be adequate for the
intended application.
c. Conclusions
In general, the . inspected welding activities were found to comply
with the governing Code and Specifications. With the exception
of the deficient undersized clip to web welds, which required.
engineering evaluation, the inspected welding activities were
found to comply with the specified requirements.
8. Refueling Cavity and Spent fuel pool Liner Fabrication
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT visually inspected approximately 80 feet of welded seam
on the spent fuel pool and the Reactor Pool Liner. The attachment
welds for four brackets and the welds' on two erriedment plates were
also inspected in order ~to ascertain compliance with the specified
acceptance criteria. One welding procedure was also reviewed for
adequacy. In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT reviewed the NDE docu-
mentation for the required vacuum box testing of the inspected
welds. The Refueling Cavity and spent fuel pool Liner fabrication
was performed by PDM.
b. Inspection and Findings and Conclusion
No problems were identified in the areas of inspected welding and
NDE activities. Activities were found.to comply with the applicable
construction codes and specifications.
9. Containment Liner and Containment Penetration Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT visually inspected approximately 60 feet of liner seam,
the welds on two incert plates, four welded plugs, the welds on one
construction opening, and the attachment welds for two mechanical
and two electrical penetrations. Two welding procedures and the
qualification test records for four welders were also reviewed. In
the area of NDE, the NRC CAT reviewed the radiographs for 41 welded
seams which involved 674 films. One radiographic examination
procedure was also reviewed as a part of this inspection. The
containment liner and penetrations were installed by PDM.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding and
NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with the require-
ments of the governing codes and specifications.
IV-11
-10. LVendors-and Shop Fabricators Other Than Those Previously Addressed
-a. Inspection Scope
.The NRC CAT visually inspected nine vendor supplied tanks and heat
exchangers. See Table IV-5 for inspected vendor supplied equipment.
-In addition to'the welds inspected and listed in Table IV-5, the NRC
CAT inspectors reviewed radiographs related.to work performed by 25
vendors which have supplied various equipment and hardware to the
South Texas Power-Station project. .A total of 2,271 feet'of welded-
sean involving 3,168 radiographs and 20 welds involving 145 film
were. reviewed. The radiographs for 74 valves, pumps and castings
involving 1,170 film, and the radiographs-for 105 spot welds
involving 105 film were also~ reviewed for compliance.with the
-
governingLcodes and specifications.
b. Inspection Findings
-
During the inspection of tanks and heat exchanges supplied by the
vendors-listed in.T%1e IV-5, the NRC CAT found that the size of
the nozzle and manway weld reinforcement did not meet the require--
.ments stated in the' vendor drawings. In addition, the welds on some
of the inspected supports-were also found to be undersized. A total
of seven tanks an~d heat exchangers'were found to deviate from the
required drawing sizes. See Table IV-5 for details. -The NRC has
issued.Information Notice 85-33 on the subject of undersized weld
reinforcement in ASME Code nozzle to shell joints. The project has
not performed any. inspection of tanksLand heat exchangers prior to
- -the NRC CAT inspection, indicating the licensee may not have
performed an adequate review of the content.of this notice for
applicability to the South Texas = site.
In the area of NDE the NRC CAT inspectors identified disorganized
reports, . linear indications and yellow film in radiographs and NDE
documentation supplied by vendors. See Table IV-6 for details.
Prior to the NRC CAT inspection the NRC requested that the project
provide a list of. vendors which have supplied radiographs in
conjunction with vendor supplied equipment and hardware. Such a
list was still unavailable at the end of the first two weeks of
the NRC CAT inspection.
At the beginning of the second.two week period, film from several
vendors picked at random was requested. This list included; Guyon
Alloys, Rockwell, Lonergan, Target Rick, Valtek, Yarway, Clow, and
Posi-Seal, among others. A computer search failed to locate any
record of. film for these vendors. Furthermore, there appears to be
no way to readily determine whether film is required or not required
for these purchase orders. If the film is required for any of these
orders, there seems to be no convenient method to determine where
the. film is located, or even if it exists.
A document search for four of the above vendors was conducted using
only one purchase order per vendor and the following results were
obtained: Target Rock-P.O. 4050 included some 8 inch ASME III
IV-12
.
valves which probably would require radiographs. Further search
is~necessary to determine this. Valteck-0.0. 4409 includes many
valves requiring weld end radiographs. A search for these radio-
-
graphs has been started by the applicant. Yarway-P.O. 6455 includes
ASME III Valves which, if cast would require weld end radiographs.
Clow-P.O.6452, as above, if the valves are castings, weld end
radiographs probably would be. required.
Early in the first week of the inspection the NRC CAT requested the
radiographs for three Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers
fabricated by Struthers Wells. In the third week another request
was made for film based on P.O. No. 4018, FID NO. P0610 and PID N05.
3R201NMX101A, 3S201NMZ101B and 3R201NMX101C. The computer found no
film. Also no information could be obtained as to whether the film
existed or where it could be found. A document search.found that
the film had been reviewed by the vendor, that verification of the
review had been made, but no indication of a request for the film to
be sent to the site was found.
During the last two weeks much effort was expended to come up with
a computer program which would expedite retrieval of information-
concerning the radiography program. A program was developed that
does improve accessibility of information concerning radiographs in
the film storage vault. However, the ability to determine if a
verdor should have performed radiography is still a tedious and time
cons 1 ming task. After a brief scan of the vendor list the
possibility that there could be in excess of 60 vendor purchase
ordera that may require radiography and for which there is no
program for expeditious retrieval of this information.
It should be noted that the Code of Federal Regulation 10 CFR 50
Appendix B, Criterion VII requires that documentary evidence that
the material and equipment conform to the procurement requirements
be available at the site prior to installation or use of the
material and equipment. The documentary evidence is to be retained
at the site and shal1 be sufficient to identify the specific
requirements, such as codes, standards or specifications met by the
purchased material and equipment. Since the NDE requirements are
<
specified by the ASME code, the NRC CAT team believes that the
project should have instituted a program to identify location and
'
existence of NDE film and documentation for the Balance of Plant
vendors and suppliers.
~
The NRC CAT also reviewed NDE documentation and film which was under
the Westinghouse scope of supply and in general the retrievability
and availability of NDE documentation was found to be satisfactory.
It should be noted that the project has instituted a program
requiring Westinghouse to suomit monthly reports concerning status-
and availability of NDE film and documentation. This program was
instituted after missing radiographs were identified for the reactor
vessel head. The NRC CAT inspectors believe that the project
should have instituted the program to cover both, the Westinghouse
i,
suppliers and the balance of plant suppliers so that the existence
and location NDE film and documentation could be promptly
identified.
IV-13
.- _ -- - ._
-
c. Conclusions
In general, the inspected welding and NDE activities'were found to
comply with the requirements for the governing codes and specifi-
cations. However, seven tanks and heat exchangers were found to
deviate from the requirements stated in the applicable drawings and
specifications. In the are of NDE, several radiographs and NDE
documentation supplied by vendors were found to be deficient with
respect to the_ required quality. In addition, difficulties were
encountered in retrievability, availability and location of NDE film
and documentation for the balance of plant suppliers which indicated
that the licensee had performed inadequate corrective action after
the discovery of missing radiographs for the reactor vessel head in
May 1985.
The difficulties encountered in retrievability, availability and
location of NDE film and documentation pertaining to the Balance
of Plant Scope of supplied equipment, indicates a need for a formal
program to identify requirements, location and existence of NDE
film and documentation.
IV-14
- --
_
.
TABLE IV-1
LIST OF SUPPORTS WHICH WERE INSPECTED AGAINST DRAWING REQUIREMENTS
SA-1756-HF5025 (1) CC-1318-HL5002 'CC-1403-HL5001
FW-10160-HL5001- .CC-1402-RR3002 FW-1018HL5001 (4)
CC-1401-HL-5003 CS1001-RR0029 (2) .CC-1106-HL5016
CV-1209-RR002 (5) FP-1560-GUO412 CV-1046-GU1001 (6)
CC-1106-HL5015 RH-1201-RR0004 CC-1504-RR0013
CC-1412-HL5001 FC1016-HL5001 EW-1285-HL5001
'BA-1003-HF5005 CH-1203-HL5017 CS-1001-RR0012 (2)
'EW-1383-HL5006 CS-1001-HL5007 CV-1088-RR0019
CC-1474-GU01. CV-1047-RR1004 (7) CC-1317-HL5006 (3)
EW-1383-HL5007. CC-1480-RR0011.(8) SI-1201-HL5015 (11)
.SI-1301-HL5010 (9) CC-1103-HL5003 SI-1201-HL5009 (10)
CC-1210-SS01 (12) 'CC-1101-HL5001 (13)'CC-1209-HL5004
- RH-1205-HL5002 (14)- CC-1210-HL5001 CC-13-3-HL5003 (15)
SIl05-RR0038 (16) CV-1046-RR1002
(1)7 of 14 fillet welds undersized. Class 7 item. Item still
'"in process".
-
- (2) Two undersized skewed fillet welds and two undersized
fillet welds. Item still "in process".
(3) Fillet' weld from spring can to base plate undersized. NCR-CS-3215.
(4) 'Two fillets un'dersized.
~
NCR-CS-03205. Item still "in process".
(5) Seven fillet welds undersized. NCR-CS-03198.
(6) One' undersized fillet. Class 7. Engineering accepted "as-is"
during' audit.
(7) Two fillet welds undersized. Class;7. NCR-CP-03147.
(8) Three of four skewed fillet welds undersized. NCR-CS-03200.
(9) One skewed fillet welds undersized. NCR-CS-03199.
(10) Two skewed welds specified as groove welds were actually seal
welds. NCR-CS-00840.
(11) Four skewed fillet welds undersized, two gusset plates missing.
Item still "in process".
(12)~W8X31 section bent through the web. NCR-CS-03197.
'(13) Two undersized fil.lets. Item still "in process".
(14) Two welds located on the accute side of a skewed joint instead
of'the obtuse side as specified on the drawing.- NCR-CS-03169.
(15) One skewed fillet weld undersized on throat. Two fillet welds
undersized. NCR-CS-03201.
.(16) One skewed fillet weld undersized. NCR-CS-00875.
IV-15
}
=
-TABLE IV-2
SUPPORTS WHICH WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED
DW-1501-HF5005 DW-1501-HF5006 DW-1501-HF5004
SI-2205-HL5020 CC-2317-RR0012 CC-2115-RR0006-
' CC-2115-RR0005 CV-2088-HL-5006 CV-2086-HL5010-
CC-2209-RH0009 CC-2209-RH008 CC-2109-RR0009
CC-2109-RR0008 CV-1214-HL5002
4
IV-16 ;
. _ . - . _ __ _ ,
. ._ . . .. . .._ _ . _ _ . . __
TABLE IV-3
LIST OF PIPING'WHICH WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED
'
ITEM DESCRIPTION. PIPE' SIZE (IN.) MATERIAL
,
'
CC-2116. ' Component Cooling '10 Carbon Steel
CC-2114 Component Cooling '10 Carbon Steel
CC-2117L Component Cooling 14 Carbon Steel
CC-2317 Component Cooling 10- Carbon Steel
CC-2115 Component Cooling 10 Carbon Steel
.BA-2001 Breathing Air. 2 Stainless Steel
CV-2086 ' Chemical / Volume Control 4- Stainless Steel
CV-2088 Chemical / Volume Control 4 Stainless Steel
CV-2006' Chemical / Volume Control 4 Stainless Steel ;
CV-2092 Chemical / Volume Control 4 Stainless Steel !
-CC-2109 Component. Cooling 12, 24 Carbon Steel
-CC-2209 -Component Cooling 30 Carbon Steel
CC-2410 _ Component Cooling 12 Carbon Steel
CC-2110 Component Cooling 24 Carbon Steel
CC-2109 Component Cooling 20 Carbon Steel
EW-2202. Essential Service Water 30 Aluminum Bronze
CV-1111 Chemical / Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel
.CV-1112 Chemical / Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel
CV-1209 Chemical / Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel
.CV-1106 Chemical / Volume Control 2 -Stainless Steel
CV-1205 Chemical / Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel-
.CC-1515 Component Cooling 2 Carbon Steel
CC-1479 Component Cooling 2 Carbon Steel
CC-1401: Component Cooling 3 Carbon Steel
CC-1402 Component Cooling 3 Carbon Steel:
CC-1403- -Component Cooling 3 Carbon Steel
SA-1756 Station Air l' Carbon Steel
FP-1506 Fire Protection 4 Carbon Steel.
'
CC-1106 Component Cooling 16- Carbon Steel
FC-1016 _ Fuel Pool Cooling 10 Stainless Steel
~CC-1504 Component Cooling 6 Carbon Steel
CS-1002 Containment Spray 8 Stainless Steel
.CC-1417 Component Cooling 14 Carbon Steel. '
FW-1016 Feedwater 18 Carbon Steel
FW-1018 Feedwater 18 Carbon Steel
RH-1201 Residual Heat Removal 12 Stainless Steel
CC-1474 Component Cooling 6 Carbon Steel
CC-1318 ' Component Cooling 14 Carbon Steel
'
CS-1001 Containment Spray 8 Stainless Steel
EW-1285 Essential Service Water 30 Aluminum Bronze
EW-1383 Essential Service Water 30, 10 Aluminum Bronze
CV-1088 Chemical / Volume Control 4 Stainless Steel
CV-1047 Chemical / Volume Control 4 Stainless Steel.
CC-1480 Component Cooling 8 Carbon Steel
CC-1103 Component Cooling 16 Carbon _ Steel
~CC-1201 Component Cooling 24 Carbon Steel
SI-1201 ' Safety Injection 12, 16 Stainless Steel
.SI-1301 Safety Injection 12 Stainless Steel
.CC-1412 Component Cooling 4 Carbon Steel
i
IV-17
-
__
l
. . ._ . _ _ . _ . _ ._ . _ . . --
TABLE IV-3 .(Continued)
LIST OF PIPING WHICH WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED
ITEM- DESCRIPTION PIPE SIZE (IN.-) MATERIAL
CC-1209' Component Cooling 20 Carbon Steel
' CC-1309 Component Cooling 20 Carbon Steel
4
CC-1203- Component. Cooling 20 Carbon Steel
CC-1209. Component Cooling 20 Carbon Steel
CC-1527 Component Cooling 12 Carbon Steel
CH-1029; Chilled Water 12 Carbon Steel
CH-1053- Chilled Water 12 Carbon Steel
CC-1425 Component Cooling 4 Carbon Steel'
- RH-1102 Residual Heat Removal 12 Stainless Steel
.
I
. -
?
1
IV-18
. -. . _ _ - _ . _ __ _ - _ . , , ,
TABLE IV-4
PORTIONS OF' PIPING SYSTEMS VISUALLY EXAMINED AND
FOR WHICH DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED
ITEM DESCRIPTION PIPE SIZE (IN.) MATERIAL
MS-1004 -Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel
FW-1014- Feedwater. 18 Carbon Steel
FW-1012 Feedwater. 18 Carbon Steel
SI-1201 Safety Injection 16 Stainless Steel
i.
1
IV-19
-
TABLE IV-5
TANKS PRESSURE VESSELS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS
WHICH WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED
ITEM MANUFACTURER NOTES
Accumulator. Tank SIATAT-02 Southwest Fabricating and Welding (1)
CCW Surge Tank 3R201NTS101A Brown-Minneapolis Tank (2)
CCW Heat Exchanger 3R201NHX101A Struthers-Wells, Inc (3)
RHR Exchanger 2R161NHX101B Jcseph Oat Corporation (4)
Dimineralizer' Tank 3R171NDM102A Westinghouse Pensacola
Spray Additive Tank.TGXSIATSA-03 RECO Industries, Inc. (5)
DFO. Storage Tank 3Q15MTF0337TK21 Brown-Minneapolis Tank (6)
Volume Control Tank'TGXCSATVC-01 RECO Industries, Inc. (7)
Fuel Pool Cooling HXTXSFAHSF-02 Atlas' Industrial Manufacturing
-(1) Bolting ring fillet welds intermittently undersized on one leg.
NCR HM-03081
(2) Reinforcing fillet weld at various nozzles, manway neck to flange fillet
weld and support fillet welds undersized.- NCR HM-03075.
(3) Fillet weld from nozzle reinforcing pad to shell undersized. One reinforcing
fillet weld at a 1" nozzle to shell weld undersized. NCR HNO3074.
(4) Reinforcing fillet at three nozzle to shell welds intermittently undersized.
NCR HN-03029.
(5) -Arc strike on vessel shell. NCR HM-03088.
(6) Shell access hole re'inforcing fillet at nozzle to shell and fillet at
flange face undersized. Manway to shell reinforcing fillet undersized.
Roof vent nozzle to roof reinforcing fillet weld undersized. One fillet
weld undersized. NCR~HM-03094.
(7) Manway nozzle fabricated as a nozzle with reinforcing pad instead of
integrally reinforced butt welding fitting as required by drawing.
Stiffening ring to vessel shell fillet welds undersized. .NCR HM-03095.
IV-20
TABLE IV-6
VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS-REVIEWED
Castings
Valve. Spot Feet of
Contractor Welds Pumps Welds Welds Film Notes
G&W Energy 4 8
-Products
TRW Mission 2 8 (1)
Manufacturing
Anchor Darling 56 775
Pacific Valve 1 4
Quaker Alloy. 6 42
Teledyne~ Brown 8 8
Pall: Trinity 8 72
Sandusky.Fo6ndry 39 169
Master Craftsman- 16 16
Lanco 46 46
Joseph Oat 114 114
Richmond Engineering 206 206 (2)
Brown Minneapolis 508 508 (3)
Westinghouse 1041 1436 (4)
PDM 100 '200
Southwest Fabricating 149. 260 (5)
Copes-Vulcan 4 98
Esco 1 88
Reco Industries 8 65
Pacific Pumps 8 67
-Wollaston Alloys- 1 22
McJunkin Corp. 18 18
IV-21
. TABLE IV-6 --(Continued)
VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED
Castings .
.
._ . Valve Spot Feet of
Contractor' _ Welds Pumps' _Welds. Welds Film Notes
Combustion Eng. 80' 182
Fisher Controls 3 133
Sabine Steel- 43 43 (6)
NOTES:
(1) Reader sheet was not found in the. package. The sheets were later found and
film was reviewed and no further problems were identified.
(2) Yellow film was found in the film packages for the Volume Control tank and
Lthe Pressure Relief Tank. The licensee issued SDR #-192 to cover this
deficiency.
~(3)' Microbiological Induced attack was found to have occurred during the storage
-
'
-
period of the tanks. However, '.he-licensee has rework all BMT supplied tank
-and the final condition of the tanks is considered acceptable.
_( 4) Linear-indications found in the backing ring welds in the demineralizer tank
serial #37740. Yellow film was found in a.16 inch surge line, however the
line was deleted by a design change. NCR #AN-03028 and AN-0329.
(5) Cylinder P4131, weld W-K-H-69 showed no evidence of retakes although the
reader sheet indicates some were shot. Cylinder _4133, weld W-K showed a
linear indication 3/4 of an inch long at interval no. 2. This appears on
the films for intervals 1-2 and 2-3.
.(6) Problem areas included questionable film,. disorganized reports, some pages
were unreadable due to light copy, it was therefore unable to coordinate
film-with data sheets. Also some repair _ film for rejects seemed to be
unavailable. After some time HL&P determined that the light data sheets were
apparently duplicates of other readable data' sheets. Also it was determined
that the apparently missing film areas-were covered by film shot by Ebasco
after.they had. repaired the questionable areas. The film was reviewed and
- no further problems were identified.
IV-22
-
V. -CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Objective
The objective of-the appraisal of civil and structural construction
was to determine by evaluation and review of Quality Control (QC)
accepted work and documentation whether civil and structural construc-
tion areas were completed in accordance with regulatory requirements,
Safety Analysis Report commitments, and project specifications,
drawings and procedures.
B. Discussion
The specific areas of civil and structural construction evaluated
included: reinforced concrete construction including mechanical
splices, and concrete pour packages; structural steel installation
including high strength bolting for structural steel friction and
sliding connections; backfill and earthwork construction; the concrete
expansion anchor bolts; and the containment post tensioned system.
This evaluation included hardware and selected documentation.
This portion of the NRC CAT inspection of concrete expansion anchors
was limited to the review of the qualification test report. The
inspection of installed concrete expansion anchors was performed by
NRC CAT electrical and mechanical groups (see Sections II and III).
Parts of the above hardware inspection included verification of
hardware to a sample of design change documents. The documents
reviewed are listed in Section VII, Table 7C.
1. Reinforced Concrete Construction
a. . Inspection Scope
Reinforced concrete construction ~ areas inspected by the NRC
Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) included reinforcing steel
configuration, activities for two concrete placements, in-process
mechanical splicing, Quality Control (QC) documentation for -
mechanical splices and concrete placement, and general concrete
surface quality.
The reinforcing steel for three concrete placements were inspected
for proper bar diameter, spacing and length. Embedded plates and
anchor bolts which were part of the concrete placements were
inspected for proper size and spacing.
Activities for two concrete placements were observed by the NRC
CAT. Activities observed were batch plant mixing operations,
concrete placement, tests for slump, air content and unit weight,
length of time required. for concrete placement from truck mixers,
and preparation of concrete cylinder test specimens. For one of
V-1
. _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .__
,
k
the two concrete placements, the general surface quality after
the forswork had been removed was_ inspected. In process mechanical
i splicing activities were observed by the NRC CAT. QC documentation
~
and appropriate field procedures were reviewed for. concrete
placements and mechanical.' splices completed by Ebasco Constructors.
A review of the licensee's Phase A statusing of_QC documentation
_
for concrete placements and mechanical splices was performed. The
purpose of the licensee's Phase A statusing was to determine the -l
status of construction and QC documentation of work performed by '
Brown and. Root at the time when engineering and construction
services were turned over to Bechtel Engineering and Ebasco ,
i Constructors. In addition, the qualification records for four
cadwelders were reviewed. ~
$' Concrete placement. records reviewed included concrete pour
pre placement checklist, in process concrete pour placement
'c checklist, concrete pour curing and post placement checklist,
and concrete compressive strength test. report. The reviews
checked the forms for' adequate completion by the QC inspectors,
existence of senior QC inspectors' signature for evaluation of
completed forms when necessary, and acceptable coverage of various
, inspection attributes.
- 'Cadweld QC documentation reviewed by the NRC CAT included the 5
j cadwelder test record report, the tension test report of cadweld
rebar splices, the cadwelder qualification report, and the cadweld
- (visual) inspection report. This review also verified whether or
i not the forms had been adequately completed by the QC inspectors,
.' had been signed off by a senior QC inspector, and had acceptable- *
] coverage of various inspection attributes.
, By a general walkdown, the surface' quality of completed concrete
work was observed by the NRC CAT. -
1
The requirements and acceptance criteria for reinforced concrete
construction were obtained from the drawings listed in Table
i V-1 and the following specifications and procedures:
i
- Bechtel Construction Specification 2A010CS1004, Rev. 2, "Spect-
. fication for Mechanical Splicing of Reinforcing Bars,"
January 18, 1985
- Bechtel Construction Specification 2A010CS1009, Rev. 4, "Speci ,
fication for Forming,.P13cing, Finishing, and Curing of Concrete,"
.
,
-
< March 28, 1985
4
- Ebasco CSP-4, Rev. 5, " Concrete Placement," June 28, 1985
- Ebasco QCP-10.1, Rev. 5, "Cadweld Inspection," September 20,
,
1985
i
i * Ebasco QCP-10.2, Rev. 5, "Preplacement Concrete Inspection,"
- August 14, 1985
i
[ V-2
!
- - - - - . - . - . - - - . - , - . . - - - . - . - - - -
.- . - - -.- - -.- . . - -
,
4
- Ebasco QCP-10.3, Rev. 5, " Concrete Placement Inspection,"
August 12,-1985
b. Inspection Findings
<
The inspection of installed reinforcing steel for the two
concrete placements found no hardware deficiencies.
Activities observed for the two concrete placements as well as
in process mechanical splicing of reinforcing steel were found
to be adequate.
The licensee's Phase A statusing for concrete pour packages and
grouting packages reviewed a list of documents for 100 percent .
of the activities. This list was. developed from the requirements.
in Brown and Root Procedure CCP-25. A concrete document checklist
~
, had been prepared by the licensee for Phase A statusing of concrete
pour packages to-identify existing and missing (if any) QC documen-
tation. The NRC CAT sampled one concrete pour package including
six sets of associated QC documentation to verify if the contents
in the concrete pour package matched those indicated on the
concrete document checklist. No concerns were identified.
The licensee's Phase A statusing for mechanical splice QC docu-
mentation reviewed the documentation of cadwelds made by Brown and
>
Root. Two forms, a cadwelder qualification and testing report
and a cadweld walkdcwn and documentation checklist, were prepared
<
by the. licensee for Phase A statusing to identify existing and
. any missing records related to mechanical splices. The NRC CAT
reviewed the Phase A statusing work by sampling one cadwelder and
one cadweld.' One concern was identified with the cadwelder
., qualification and testing report for cadwelder No. 43. The space
. box for the "two in ea. subsequent 100" column of the " horizontal-
requalification" row had been marked "S" for satisfactory.
However, it should have been marked "U" for unsatisfactory. The ,
NRC CAT was informed that cadwelder No. 43 was the only Brown and
. Root cadwelder requalified. Based on the information that no other
cadwelder was requalified and that the error was only with the
tensile testing frequency implemented after cadwelder No. 43 was
'
e requalified, the NRC CAT feels the error to be an isolated one.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. GC03199 was issued to address the
concern. Also, the dates listed in the " Dates Qualified To" spaces
for the " vertical qualification" and " horizontal qualification"
parts of the cadwelder qualification summary were found to be
E reversed. The licensee subsequently documented this concern.
The NRC CAT found no concern with the cadweld sample checked
against the contents of the cadweld walkdown and documentation
checklist.
During a general walkdown, the NRC CAT identified a crack in the ,.
Unit 2 azimuth 304* tendon access wall at elevation (-)13 ft. 3
inches. This area was subsequently chipped out. It was then
identified that the 3 inch seismic joint material had not been
installed as required by drawing 3M01-9-C-4230R0 between the l
Reactor Containment Building mat and the tendon access wall.
V-3
._ u - ,_ , - - - . - - . - . _ . - - - - - - - - . . - - . . . - - -
-
"Y
~Bechtel Engineering (BEC) issued NCR HCO3170.and state'd that-the
~
disposition-of. this' NCR would be to use as is. The stated basis of
- ;the disposition was that all settlements had taken place, the
bearing surface area was small, and the -vertical seismic movements
would be small at this location.
The NRC CAT's review of this issue found that BEC's disposition did
not adequately address the seismic movement of the mat and the
'previously predicted unfavorable relative heaves of the two
adjoining buildings once the dewatering system is discontinued.
Whether predicted unfavorable soil heave between the Reactor
Containment Building and the Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary
Building could. create added unacceptable forces on the tendon
access wall r.eeds to be addressed.
, c. Conclusion
-
In general, reinforced concrete construction appeared to be
adequate. The review work performed for Phase A statusing on the
Brown and Root concrete pour and mechanical splicing QC documenta-
tion appear ~ed to be thorough. The documentation concerns with the
mechanical splice QC records did not appear to affect the hardware.
Under certain conditions the omission of the seismic joint between
adjacent concrete structures could cause significant structural
damage.
2. Structural Steel Inspection
. a. Inspection Scope
Installed and QC accepted structural steel members and connections
were-inspected by the NRC CAT. Attributes ' inspected were member
size, configuration, and bolted connections. For bolted connec-
tions, both friction and sliding connections were tested by using a
,. calibrated torque wrench to detemine whether the bolts had proper
L pretension. In addition, the bolts were inspected for proper
. material and nut engagement on the bolt.
The 1, ample used in the structural steel verification for correct
? member size and configuration is described in Table V-2. A total
of 93 structural steel members and 39. connections were inspected.
The location, bolt size and material type, and number of ~ friction
and sliding type connections which were checked for proper pre-
tension are shown in Tables V-3 and.V-4 respectively. These
bolts were sampled from structural steel connections although both
samples are separate from those nentioned above as inspected for
configuration. Test torque v0 ns were obtained by using a
Skidmore Whilhelm tension testm to establish the proper torque-
tension relationship.
The requirements and acceptance criteria for structural steel
installation are included in the drawings listed in Table V-5
and in the following specifications and procedures:
.
V-4
_ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-_
. _ _
- Bechtsi Construction Specification 3A010SS0012, Rev. 3,
F " Category I Structural Steel," December 4, 1984
~
- Bechtel Construction Specification 3A010SS0030, Rev. 5,
" Erection of Structural Steel and Miscellaneous Steel,"
July 26, 1985
- Ebasco CSP-10, Rev. 6, " Erection and Boltup of Structural-
Steel," September 19,'1985
- Ebasco QCP-10.5, Rev. 5, " Inspection of Structural Steel
Erection and Bolting," July 19, 1985
b. Inspection Findings
Of the-93 structural steel members and 39 connections inspected
for correct member size and configuration, only one hardware
configuration deficiency was identified. This deficiency involved
~
.one column base connection being installed without nuts on one of
its anchor bolts. Deficiency Notice 2-510-C was issued to repair
the condition.
A total of 648 7/8 inch diameter A325 high strength bolts were
checked _ for proper installed torque for structural steel friction
type _ connections.-- The installed torque values of twenty-three
(approximately 4 percent) of the 648 7/8 inch diameter A325 bolts
were significantly below the inspection torque of 450 ft-lbs. . Four
of the 23 were found to be installed loose. NCRs CC03132 and
CC03134 were written to repair the improperly installed bolts. All
twenty-three bolts were to be properly tightened. The remaining
625 bolts were determined to be acceptable.
Thirty-two 7/8 inch diameter A490 high strength bolts were checked
for proper installed torque. The sampled bolts were installed
above the inspection torque value of 550 ft-lbs and determined to
be acceptable.
'
For the sliding type structural steel connections, a total of.
68>7/8 inch diameter A325 high strength bolts were inspected for
proper installation torque. Forty-three of the 68 A325 bolts were
installed at torque values greater than the inspection torque
value of 150 ft-lbs. Twenty-five of the 43 'over-tightened bolts
were installed at torque values greater than 500 ft-lbs. NCR-
CC03190 was written to document and disposition the deficiency.
All of the sampled ' sliding connections had inspection markirgs
indicating that they had been inspected. The inspection criteria
for sliding connections states that the bolts be installed snug
tight. : Snug tight is defined as the full force of a man on a
~
spud wrench. Based.on such a vague inspection criteria, neither
the NRC. CAT'nor the licensee was able to. determine how these _
connections could have been inspected. The NRC CAT finding
indicates that more specific inspection criteria is necessary to
V-5
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- A
..
inspect the sliding connections adequately. The licensee has
committed to write adequate inspection criteria in the current
specifications and to reinspect all sliding. connections.
It was found that project specifications allow welding across the
flanges on fully loaded structural steel members. The NRC CAT
asked if an engineering evaluation had been performed (similar to
that indicated in AWS D.1.1, Section 7.5.1) to determine, due to
extent of cross-section heating, whether or not a member is permit-
ted to carry a live-load stress while welding on it. No specific
analytical evaluation of whether the welding across the flange
could weaken the affected structural steel member was provided to
the NRC CAT. BEC ju'stified the specifications based on general
engineering judgement and historical knowledge. This engineering
response, without the supporting evaluation, is considered
inadequate.
c. Conclusion
In general,-utructural steel members and connections for size and
configuration verification were .found to be installed properly.
The high strength A325 and A490 bolts for friction type structural
steel connections were generally determined to be installed
adequately. The lack of adequate inspection cri_teria for sliding
connections resulted in the acceptance of a deficient installation.
All sliding connections should meet the new inspection criteria
when established by the licensee.
An evaluation should be conducted. showing that the practice of
cross flange welding has not and will not overstress loaded
members.
3. Backfill and Earthwork Construction
a. Inspection Scope
The daily reports and backfill compaction records'for the
Essential Cooling Water (ECW) pipe trench backfill were
reviewed. The backfill compaction work activities and in situ
sand cone tests in area II40, northeast of the Unit 1 Diesel
Generator Building, were witnessed by the NRC CAT.
The requirements and acceptance criteria are contained in the
following specifications:
- Bechtel Construction Specification SY069YS0043, Rev. 12,
" Structural Excavation and Backfill".
- Bechtel Construction Specification 2Y060YS0044, Rev. 5, " Field
and Laboratory Testing of Earthwork Construction".
V-6
. __ ._ . . -_. . _ . __ _ _ _ . .__ .._ __ - . _
d
t
Inspection Findings
{ b.
The daily. reports and backfill compaction records appeared _to
3 be complete'and in accordance with the project specifications.
J The backfill work activities observed by the NRC CAT northeast
'
of the Unit'l Diesel Generator Building at elevation +26.0 was
L properly placed and compacted.
2
F -The NRC CAT inspectors-identified a potential problem which may
, not.have been addressed by the licensee. The ECW pipe trench is
i
. supported on a highly plastic A 2 clay layer. This clay layer
will shrink when dried and expand as the clay particles absorb
'
_
-
water. Since 1975 the. site dewatering system has been in operation
and the ground water level has fallen below the A2 clay layer. -+
,
During this dewatering period the clay layer could have lost
'
i
significant moisture. The site dewatering system is scheduled to
be discontinued prior to plant operation. When this occurs, the. s
<
ground water level will be re-established to about-its pre-1975
level. If,the moisture. content of the clay layer during the
1 dewatering period has been reduced significantly and then the
, dewatering system is discontinued, the clay layer when exposed to
, the returned ground water is expected to expand. The issue _of
whether this clay layer will expand and whether.the expansion will
-
occur uniformily_ appears not to have been properly considered to
date. This along with other data on the thickness of the clay
,
, layer, the placticity index of the clay, the confining pressure and
, 'the quantity of water absorbed by'the clay particles, and the in
situ moisture content of several points at various levels in the
'
' clay layer during the dewatering period will also need to be
,
considered. The concern is whether the expansion of the underlying ,
- and adjacent clay could cause differential-displacements of the ECW ;
pipes. Also, whether.this potential.for ground movement could
'
cause the ECW pipes to become overstressed. The licensee was not
able to provide information on such.a review during the NRC
inspection.
c. Conclusions
1
The structural backfill compaction records and the structural
backfill reviewed by the NRC CAT inspectors were generally _found
'
-
l to be acceptable.
The licensee should investigate the potential of the expansive
. clays to swell upon return of ground water to normal levels and
the potential affect of this swelling on the ECW piping.
4
- 4. Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt Qualification Test Report
,
a. Inspection Scope "
i-
'
The qualification test report for the wedge type concrete expansion
anchors was reviewed for technical adequacy, conformance to
.
project specifications and demonstration of satisfactory anchor
- performance.
L
i
-
V-7
,
- &
'
,-w ey,=. < , ,,w,,,,- - .
,.,,e y,,,,_,w,y .-.r_.my, .-, ,--,.g ..
.,,my, ,
<
The following qualification test report was reviewed:
- Wiss, Janey, Elster and Associates, Rev. 2, " Tension, Shear and
Relaxation Testing of Expansion Anchors at the South Texas
Project, Bay: City Texas", May 29, 1981
The requirements and acceptance criteria are contained in the
following documents:
- Bechtel Construction Specification 5A010SS1000, Rev. 7,
" Installation of Expansion Anchors, Rock Bolts, Grouted
Anchor Bolts, and Core Drilling"
Ebasco CSP-41, Rev. 6, " Installation of Expansion Type Anchors"
- Ebasco QCP 10.19, Rev. 7, " Inspection of Anchoring Devices
Installed Within Concrete Structures"
b. Inspection Findings
The allowable loads used in the design of concrete expansion bolts
(CEAs) was based on the average results of the tests divided by
a factor of safety of 4. For the 1/4 inch diameter CEAs with
1-1/8 inch embedment the average maximum load for 4070 psi concrete
is 890 lbs. The allowable tensile load is 250 lbs. This allowable
load does not meet the factor of safety of 4 criteria specified in
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79-02.
For the 1-1/4 inch diameter CEAs, the anchor slip at the design
tension loads is greater than 1/16 inch for 8-1/2 inch embedment
and 3/16 inch for 10-1/2 inch embedment. The shear tests show
similar results. The licensee has stated that the 3/16 inch
movement at the design loads was unacceptable and that the
allowable loads will be reduced. The licensee stated that for
the 1/16 inch slip, the current design load is acceptable.
The-NRC CAT finds the licensee's response for the 1/16 inch slip
at the current design loads to be inadequate. The results in the
test program for anchor bolts are for one time loading. However,
reliance solely on the referenced test program without considering,
in actuality, that within the plant the maximum design load may
be applied more than one time, is considered inadequate. Since
most of the slip is likely to be permanent, these deflections will
tend to accumulate with each load application. Also, the 1/16 inch
deflection in shear and tension may be considered unacceptable in
many piping analysis.
c. Conclusion
The licensee should reevaluate the~ allowable design loads used for
concrete expansion anchors. This reevaluation should take into
account the magnitude of anchor slip at the design load and
consider the shear, tension, deflections, and the piping systems
that are supported.
V-8
1
_-
5. Containment Post-Tensioned System
a. Inspection Scope
The installation records of 8 Unit 1 prestressed tendons were
reviewed. The NRC CAT also observed.various stages of tendon
installation work activities which include the pulling, button-
heading, stressing, and greasing of the tendons.
The requirements and acceptance criteria were included in the
following specification and procedures.
- Bechtel Construction Specification 2C239CS0003, Rev. 4,
" Containment Post Tensioning System," July 15, 1985
- FIM-STP-01, Rev. O, " Procedure for Cleaning and Checking-
Post Tensioning Embedded Items," August 8,1984
- FIM-STP-H-1, Rev. 1A, " Installation, Buttonheading, Stressing
and Greasing of Horizontal Tendson," August 29, 1985
- FIM-STP-V-1, Rev. 3A, " Installation, Buttonheading, Stressing
and Greasing of Vertical Tendons," August 29, 1985
- FIM-VCP-01, Rev. 2, " Tendon Void Clearing Procedure," May 22,
1985
FQCP-STP-03, Rev. 3, " Quality. Control Procedures - Vertical
and Horizontal Tendons," July 9, 1985
- STP-FTP-1, Rev. 4, " Friction Test Procedures," August 13, 1985
b. Inspection Findings
. ,
The review of installation records and the observation of various
stages of tendon installation work activities indicated that the
post-tensioned system was being installed in accordance with
the specifications and procedures.
c. Conclusions
The installation of the containment post tensioned system was found
to be in accordance with applicable instructions and specifications.
V-9
_
.- . . - - ~. .. . _ - _ _ -
b
_
TABLE V-1
DRAWINGS USED FOR REINFOR'C D CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION
[DrawingNo. Rev. Title
t
193AB- -B (Shop Drawing)
t 193BC C. (Shop Drawing)
] 193C A (Shop Drawing)
-2C22-9-S-1012 1 Steel Reactor Containment Building Dome Liner - Plans -
-and Sections and Details
,
2C22-9-C-1033 5 -Concrete-Reactor Containment Building Dome Reinforce- '
,
'
ment.- Plan
2C22-9-C-1034 2 Concrete Reactor Containment Building Dome Shell"-
i Sections and Details
- 2C22-9-C-1036 0 Concrete Reactor Containment Building Dome Tendon - i
Anchorage Location
j J2C23-9-C-1021 1 Concrete Reactor Containment Building Post Tensioning
System
'
3A01-0-C-0001 20 -Concrete Structural St'andards General Notes
3A01-0-C-0011 14 Concrete Structural Standards General Notes-
3M01-2-C-4026 9. Concrete Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building
, Floor Plan 9 E1. 41'..-0"
i
3M01-9-C-4241 2 Concrete Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary-Building =
Std.: Wall Reinf._ Details E1. 29'-0" to Roof (U.N.0.)
p'
3M01-9-C-4242 1 Concrete Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building
Miscellaneous Details .i
j 3M01-9-C-4309 3 ' Concrete Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building i
d
Miscellaneous Sections-and Details
-
3M05-9-C-4009 5 Concrete Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building
j. Foundation Plan 9 El. 10'-0"
- i
J
Y'.
.
,
J
V-10
.-. - -. -
. . - . . . - _ _ - . . .. a .-. - . - - . . . . . . - . - ...-.;-. . . - - - -.
- - . - . . .. . - . . _ . - -. .. .
-
.
j
. TABLE V-2
INSTALLED STRUCTURAL-STEEL INSPECTION SAMPLE
i. i
Unit ~ Number Approximate Truss
. and Building- Elevation Comments
Beans Braces Columns Connection @ @ers
.
Unit 1- 68 ft 14 -
2 3 -
'
Reactor .
'
- Containment 52 ft 5 .1 - - -
,
37 ft 2 - --
.- -
-2 ft 2 -
1 3 -
Unit 11 118 ft 5 - -
8 11 Sample Taken
Fuel Handling-. From Roof
Trusses and
Framing -'
Unit-1 69 ft ~5- - -
5 3
, Mechanical'& and
Electrical 6 inches
t . Auxiliary
.
74 ft 3 -
3 3 -
_ _ _ _ _
Total 36 1 6 22 14
'
,
1
t
L
4
e
$-
- t
,
k
r
V-11
,
4
,. , ..
-
~,__,.._.,,-_,-w,,,,,,,_ , _ . . _ _ . . _ , . , - . , ,,_,,_.r, _._,,_m.,. _ . . ~ . , . . , . . , . , . . , . . _ , . _ , , ..,,.%
. - . - - - - . _ . . .. . . - - - . .-
1
-TABLE V-2 (Continued)
,
INSTALLED STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION SAMPLE
~
Unit Number- Approximate
and Building Elevation Beams Columns Connections Comments
Unit 2 .
10 ft - -
1 Deficiency Notice
. Mechanical & 2-510-C was issued
Electrical to repair the
Auxiliary anchor bolts of
column base
connections.
20 ft 5 2 6
35 ft 3 2 3
.
58 ft 8 3 5
Unit 2 52 ft 5 -
1
Reactor
Containment 68 ft 8 -
1
_ _ _
-
Total 29 7 17
.
.t
i
I
4
v
'
V-12
- - . .. . .. - . _ . . - - - - -
. . _ . - - - _ - _ . - . - - . - _ _ . - . .
. .
,
I
TABLE V-3
HIGH STRENGTH BOLTING FOR FRICTION CONNECTION INSPECTION SAMPLE
Number of Number of
Number of Bolts Checked Bolts Installed
Unit Number- Bolt Size Friction for Proper Below Inspection
!
-and Building and Type- Connections * Installation-Torque
-
Torque Comments
Unit 1 7/8 inch .15 144 5 See note 1
Reactor dia. A325
Containment
Unit 1 7/8 8- 77 8
Mechanical & dia. A325
Electrical
Auxiliary
Unit 2 7/8 inch 12 172 0
Reactor dia. A325
Containment
Unit 2 7/8 inch 20 255 13
Mechanical & dia. A325'
. Electrical
Auxil'iary
Unit 2 7/8 inch 1 32 0 See note 2
Reactor dia. A490
Containment
Note 1: The inspection torque value for 7/8 inch dia. A325 bolts was 450 ft. lbs.
Note 2: The inspection torque value for 7/8 inch dia. A490 bolts was 550 ft. lbs.
- The connections sampled are separate from the structural steel connections
inspected in Table V-2.
V-13
-
TABLE V-4
HIGH STRENGTH BOLTING FOR SLIDING CONNECTION
INSPECTION SAMPLE
Number of Bolts
Number of Bolts Installed Above
_ Number of Checked for Inspection Torque
Unit Number Sliding Proper Installation and the Installed
and Building Connections * Torque Torque Range Comments
Unit 1 1 10 67 10 installed between All bolts were
R; actor
160 and 200 ft-lbs 7/8 inch dia.
A325. Approxi-
5 installed between 'mately 63% were
200 and 250 ft-lbs found to be
installed
28 installed above overtorqued.
300 ft-lbs
"The connections sampled are separate from the connections inspected in Table
Table V-2 and V-3.
V-14
, :. :
TABLE V-5
DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSTALLATION INSPECTION
American Bridge Detail Drawings
Order No. Sheet No. Revision No.
K-7023 E12 8
610AD .A-
~6100 -
'K-7024 E2 C
E5 F
E18 G
E20 E
E22- G
E301- E
E302 G
123 B
176 C
506 A
526 -
,
K-7025 E4 D
E12 H
E702 A
718 -
K-7029 E17 C
E22 C
405 -
413 -
,
508 B
516 C
K-7030 'El -
E2 -
E6 B
E7 A
E9 0
102 A
106 A
V-15
TABLE V-5 (Continued)
DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSTALLATION INSPECTION
Bechtel Design Drawings
Drawing No. Rev. Title
1C01-9-S-1532 4 Reactor Containment Building Steam Generator,
R.C. Pump Vertical and Pressurizer Lateral Support
IC01-9-S-150 5 Reactor Containment Building Internal-Steel Framing
Plan @ E1. 68-0"
3A01-05-0001 12 Steel Structures Standards General Notes
3C01-9-S-1502 8 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Framing i
Plan 9 El. (-)2'-0"
3C01-9-5-1505 4. Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Framing
Plan @ El. 37'-3"
3C01-9-S-1508 5 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Framing
Plan 9 El. 52'-0'
3C01-9-S-1509 4 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Framing
Plan @ El. 68'-0"
3C01-9-S-1510 5 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Framing
Plan 9 El. 68'-0"
3C01-9-S-1511 1 Reactor Containment Building Coluc.n Schedule and Details
3C01-9-S-1528 8 Reactor Containment Building Internal Sections and Details
3C01-9-S-1539 2 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Miscellaneous
Plan Sections and Details
3C01-9-S-1619 6 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Alterations
@ El. (-)2'-0"
3C01-9-S-1621 5 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Alterations
0 E1. 37'-3"
3C01-9-S-1622 3 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Alterations
O El. 52'-0"
3C01-9-S-1623 3 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Alterations
9 E1. 68'-0"
3C01-9-S-1624 6 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Alterations
Details and Tables
3C01-9-S-1625 2 Reactor Containment Building Internal - Steel Alterations
Details and Tables
3C01-9-S-1629 6 Reactor Containment Interal - Steel Alterations
Details and Tables
3F01-9-S-3003 3 Fuel Handling Building Roof Framing Plan (Plan - Roof
Truss 9 Top Chord and Roof Truss MK-TI)
3M01-9-S-4043 3 Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building Framing
in HVAC Areas El. 69'-6" U.N.
3M01-9-S-4060 4 Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building Framing
Plan @ Els. 21'-0" and 23'-0"
V-16
,
TABLE V-5 (Continued)
DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSTALLATION INSPECTION
Bechtel Design Drawings
Drawing No. Rev. Title
'3M01-9-S-4065 4 Mechanical ~and Electrical Auxiliary Building Framing
Plan 9 El. 35'-0"
3M01-9-S-4071 1 Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building Framing
Plan 9 El. 60'-0"
3M01-9-S-4082 4 Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building Framing
Plan 9 El. 72'-0", 74'-0" and 76'-0"
3M01-9-S-4090 4 Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building Coluns
Schedule and Standard Details
-
4
i
W
V-17
,_. - .. ,_ -_ - . , _ _ _ . _ -. -_- - _ .
VI. MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL
A. Objective
This part of the inspection effort was to verify that the identifi-
cation and marking of materials and equipment used in the fabrication
and construction processes have been maintained, and that the docu-
mentation required to support traceability, to both the. design
drawings / specifications and to the material sources, was retrievable
and met regulatory requirements, PSAR commitments, and applicable
codes and standards.
B. Discussion
A total of 219 items were selected at random and identified as samples
for the inspection. The items inspected were located in the storage
yards, laydown areas, storage warehouses, outlying buildings, and
various elevations and rooms in the reactor containment, auxiliary
building, diesel building, and fuel handling building for both Unit
1 and Unit 2. Some items inspected were in storage and others
were being installed. Some had been installed and were in a storage
mode, and others had been installed and turned over to the operations
group.
Tables VI-1 through VI-8 indicate the areas where material / equipment
samples were selected, and adequacy of the identification, trace-
ability and documentation. The applicable reference documents
reviewed and used during the inspection included the following:
Site Final Safety Analysis Report.
- Specification 4A010GS1009, Safety Related Non-ASME Bolting
Materials, Rev. 1.
- Specification 5A010GS1007, Civil / Structural Construction
Materials, Rev. 3.
- Specification 3E189ES1000, Conduct and Tray Supports, Rev. 6.
- Procedure SSP-13, Material Control, Rev. O.
- Procedure ASP-5, Material Control, Rev. 8.
- Procedure WPP/QCI-12.4, Material Identi*ication and Marking
Requirements, Rev. 10.
- Procedure QCP-9.4, Verification of Weld Filler Material
Control, Rev. 3.
- Procedure WPP/QCI-18.0, EE580 Cable and Raceway Tracking
Procedure, Rev. 12..
- Procedure QCP-10.22, Receipt Inspection, Rev. 12.
- Engineer and Constructor ASME Procedure.
VI-1
' * American Society for Testing Materials standards.
Equipment and components were inspected in order to verify that
required identification codes were maintained on items such as civil
construction materials, electrical cable and equipment, welding
supplies, vendor supplied equipment assemblies, structural and
mechanical items.
1. Material Traceability
a. Inspection Scope
Two hundred nineteen samples were examined to determine if the
identification and markings were traceable to the applicable
specification, drawing, purchase. order, code data package, mill
test report or a combination thereof. The licensee's records
management group. retrieved the requested documentation which was
analyzed and compared to site requirements and field notes by the
NRC CAT inspector.
b. Inspection Findings
During the inspection it was determined that a program for
. identification of materials and retrievability and adequacy of
documentation was generally in place and functioning.
(1) The following were found to be satisfactory:
(a) The records management group uses a computer assisted
program for retrieval of most documents that are
considered complete. In process records are processed
manually or by using sub programs (i.e., electrical
EE580 program for. routing, terminations, cable type,
etc.)
(b) Eighteen samples of different types of welding
consumables as noted'in Table VI-1 were examined for
markings, retrievability of documentation and adequacy
of the documentation.
(c) Fourteen samples of different types and sizes of
electrical cables were inspected for identification,
documentation and qualification requirements. These
results were satisfactory as shown in Table VI-2.
(d) Civil / Construction materials were inspected for
compliance to the specification requirements. Thirty-
one items were sampled and were found to meet the
specification requirements as shown in Table VI-3.
(e) Anchor bolts and embedded items were not a part of the
traceability program due to the fact that a major
program in this area was previously undertaken by the
licensee and is awaiting review by the NRC. The NRC CAT
inspector reviewed the structural bolting for an
VI-2
=
{
Accumulator and Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger and
noted that both were included in the licensee's report.
(f) Table VI-4 summarizes materials and equipment that was
inspected and is used in the Heating, Ventilating and
Air Conditioning (HVAC) discipline including fans,
motors and dampers. Tracability was.found to be
satisfactory.
(2) Significant' weaknesses in the program were found in the
following areas:
(a) The action taken for the disposition of FCR BE-00088 on
the clarification of bolting material requirements for
cable tray.and conduit supports was not effective in
that it allowed the option of not .aposing the manufac-
tures marking requirements of the specified national
bolting standard without appropriate consideration of
the measures needed to maintain the traceability and
control of unmarked fasteners throughout the plant.
(b) Verification of markings / traceability of bolting
materials used in the fabrication of large vendor
supplied skid mounted equipment and used by the
construction crafts in the fabrication and installation
of electrical equipment.
(3) The following' observations were made by the NRC CAT inspector
and found to be unsatisfactory:
(a) Code data packages for the' Unit 1 Radwaste Holdup' Tank
7R32IXTS101A and Reactor Internals Disconnecting Device
Pressure Housing, Board #18288 could not be_ located. As
a result of the NRC CAT finding, the licensee issued
Nonconformance Report BN-03015 to document the
deficiency of Board #18288 and provide for appropriate
corrective action. No written corrective action was
noted during the NRC CAT inspection concerning the'
Radwaste Holdup Tank.
The code data package for an ASME 8-inch check valve was
incomplete and a corrected copy of the certificate of
welding was generated. As a result of the NRC' CAT
finding, the licensee issued a Document Deficiency
Notice QC-RN-150.1. The material type'as indicated on a
code data report for an ASME 8 inch Safety Injection
Check Valve Bonnet (valve #V1423) was different than
that indicated on the mill test report. As a result of
the NRC CAT finding, the licensee initiated NCR BN-03013
to document this discrepancy for corrective action.
These and other ASME code data packages inspected are
indicated in Table VI-5.
VI-3
(b) Some documents that were requested to confirm bolting
traceability of certain selected equipment samples
summarized in Table VI-6 were not located and furnished
for review by the NRC CAT inspector prior to the end of
the inspection. Licensee representatives stated that
actions would be. continued to locate applicable
documentation and review bolting traceability.
(c) It was found by the NRC CAT inspectors that the specific
requirement of the national standard ASTM A307 Grade B
for marking of fasteners has been deleted by engineering
from a specification for electrical raceway supports,
~
L
without requiring adequate on-site material control
during their installation (Reference FCR BE-00088 and
Specification 3E189ES1000 for conduit and tray supports).
The deletion of marking / identification requirements for
electrical equipment bolting has resulted in the
uncontrolled distribution of bulk quantities of these
items throughout the plant. This condition may have
resulted in the indiscriminate use of the unmarked
fasteners in other types of equipment installations
because the bolting is readily available and presumed to
be adequate.
Based on the above observations, the NRC inspector could
not ascertain the appropriate use and traceability of
the unmarked fasteners for the various electrical
installations of the NRC CAT sample, and thus the
quality of the fasteners is considered indeterminate.
(d) The bolting in 10 of 11 samples of electrical equipment
was not found to be traceable when inspected for
conformance to specifications or seismic reports.
~
Bolting used in fabrication and/or installation of the
ten samples were not marked or had mixed markings. The
results are tabulated in Table VI-7.
(e) Two sections of 2 inch schedule 160 stainless piping in
storage were found to be mismarked. As a result of the
NRC CAT finding,.QCI report G1649 was issued by the
licensee to scrap the pieces.
(f) Mechanical material and equipment was inspected to the
specification requirements. Regarding bolting, several
items were found to be of the correct type, identified
and traceable. However, traceability deficiencies were
found in 14 of 20 samples of bolting for large mechani-
cal installations listed in Table VI-8. The following
are five examples of such deficiencies:
VI-4
- Mounting bolts for the Essential-Coo. ling Water Wash
Screen (3R281NPA102A) Motor were unmarked. These are-
required to be ASTM A193-87. As a result of the NRC
CAT finding, the utility has issued NCR AM-03072
documenting the discrepancy for corrective action.
- Motor mounting bolts for the Auxiliary Feedwater Motor
- 13 were identified as~ ASTM A193-B7 and were required'
to be ASTM A307. The licensee, during the NRC CAT
inspection, did not issue documentation to record this
-discrepancy for corrective action.
- Bolti~ng for the Containment Spray, High Head Safety
Injection and Low Head Safety Injection Pumps, motors
and transition pieces Nos lA, 2A, 3A, IB, 2B, 3B and
IC, 2C, 3C were observed to be either unmarked, A307,
A325 or A449. The correct bolting for these units is
~ ASTM A193-B7. As a result'of the NRC CAT finding, the
licensee issued NCR'CM-03078 to document this
discrepancy for corrective action.
- Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine (3S141MTU01) driver
bolting to the base was not identified or marked.
This material is required to be SA193-B7. As a result
of the NRC CAT finding, NCR BM-03076 was issued to '
document this item for' corrective action.
- Bolting on the Essential Cooling Water Strainer Flange
.(3R281NSP101A) by drawing was required to be cadmium
plated. The specification allowed for cadmium or zinc
plating, and the sample appeared to be zinc plated.
As a result of the NRC CAT finding, the licensee
issued Field Change Request BP-00891 to change the
drawings to include zinc ~ plating.
c. Conclusions
In general, the material traceability and control program was
considered to be satisfactory. However, lack of traceability was
found for fastener materials for certain large sendor supplied
4
mechanical / electrical equipment assemblies mounted on skids and
for certain electrical equipment and cable tray / conduit supports.
Also, documentation to permit verification of traceability of
fasteners for certain equipment was not located by the licensee
,' during the inspection.
VI-5
i
L
TABLE VI-1-
WELDING CONSUMABLES
.. ITEM LOCATION COMPLIANCE
3/32 E7018 Test Shop Satisfactory
.093 E6010 Test Shop Satisfactory
'3/32 E7018 Test Shop Satisfactory
1/8 E6010 RCB II Satisfactory
1/8 308L-16 RCB II Satisfactory
3/32 308-16 RCB II Satisfactory
1/8 316-16 RCB I Satisfactory
.045 ERNICR-3 RCB I Satisfactory
1/8 E12018-M RCB I Satisfactory
5/32-308-16 RECO Satisfactory
5/32 308-16 RECO Satisfactory
3/16 309-16 RECO ' Satisfactory
3/32 E7018 DG Caddy Satisfactory
3/32 E7018 MEAB Caddy Satisfactory
5/32 E7018 MEAB I Caddy Satisfactory
5/32 E7018 MEAB I Room Satisfactory
.035 wire MEAB I Room Satisfactory
1/8 308-16 MEAB I Room Satisfactory
VI-6
._ - .. _ _ _ _ .
'
TABLE VI-2
ELECTRICAL CABLE
ITEM LOCATION COMPLIANCE
3/c #12
'
Reel yard Satisfactory
7/c #12 . Reel yard Satisfactory
3/c #12 ECW Structure Satisfactory
'2/c #16 Unit I laydown Satisfactory
-
1/c 500MCM Unit I laydown
~
Satisfactory
3/c #8 Unit I laydown Satisfactory
5/c #12 Unit I RCB El 68 Satisfactory
9/c #12 Unit I RCB El 50 Satisfactory
3/c #8 Unit I RCB El 24 Satisfactory
3/c #10 Unit I FHB El 73' Satisfactory
i 2/c #12 Unit I MEAB El 65 Satisfactory
3/c #12 Unit I MEAB Satisfactory
5/c #12 Unit I MEAB El 35 Satisfactory-
7/c #12 Unit I MEAB El 10 Satisfactory
i
1
1
,
VI-7
- _ _ _ , . . . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ - _ . . _ . - . _ _ . . _ , _ - _ . _ _ _.
TABLE VI-3
CIVIL / CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
Item Identifier Location Compliance
- 9 Rebar T5-6275 Laydown Satisfactory
- 10 Rebar S-16741 Laydown Satisfactory
- 11 Rebar S-25074 Laydown Satisfactory
Cadweld Powder N-7178 Storage warehouse Satisfactory
Cadweld Powder D-24409 Storage warehouse Satisfactory
Cadweld Sleeve S-2068 Storage warehouse Satisfactory
Cadweld Sleeve S-1901 Storage warehouse Satisfactory
W.R. Admixture B-12120-09W Batch plant Satisfactory
A.R. Admixture B-11293-09V Batch plant Satisfactory
Cement Grind #13 Batch plant Satisfactory
Paint 111488 Paint warehouse Satisfactory
Paint Cure 108220B Paint warehouse Satisfactory
Paint Mix 112389 Paint warehouse Satisfactory
Paint Powder 112260 Paint warehouse Satisfactory
Cadweld Sleeve S-1798 Unit II RCB springline Satisfactory
Cadweld Sleeve S-2082 Unit II RCB springline Satisfactory
Structural Seam J72499 Unit II El 72 RCB Satisfactory
Wall Embed 70479 Unit II El 45 RCB Satisfactory
Structural Nuts 2H Unit II stairwell RCB Satisfactory
Steel Column K7029 . Unit II RCB Satisfactory
Floor Embed 2907 Unit'II El 35 control Room Satisfactory
Threaded Rod NA Unit II MEAB El 10 Satisfactory
Nuts DH Unit II MEAB El 10 Satisfactory
Stainless Plate -13721 Condensate Tank Unit I Satisfactory
C.S. Plate 401C7601 Condensate Tank Unit I Satisfactory
3" Shim 680015 Unit I FHB roof Satisfactory
Wall Embed 52028 Unit I RCB El 60 Satisfactory
Liner Plate 2425 Unit 1 RCB El 57 Satisfactory
Anchor Bolts NA Unit I RCB El 2 Satisfactory
Anchor Bolts NA Unit I RCB El 32 Satisfactory
Floor Plate 3E1846 Unit 1 RCB Refuel Pool Satisfactory
i
a
VI-8
__ - -
F 1
TABLE VI-4
HEATING, VENTILATING AND AIR CONDITIONING
Item Identifier Location Compliance
Joy Fan 3V112VFN003 Warehouse C Satisfactory
Bolts TB- Unit II MEAB El 60 Satisfactory
Bolts STB. Unit II MEAB El 60 Satisfactory
Hanger. 2-6-0052-S056-RSI-28075 Unit II MEAB El 35 Satisfactory
Damper 8V141VDA-043 Unit I RCB El 5 Satisfactory
Ventilation Fan 8V141VFN-023 Unit I RCB El 6 . Satisfactory
Cooling Coil 8V141VHX-004 Unit I RCB El 6 Satisfactory
Fire Damper 1-3-0073-VD-101 Unit I.FHB El 47 Satisfactory
VI-9
._
-
_ l
3 ,
. ,
[ TABLE VI-5'
ASME CODE DATA PACKAGES REVIEWED
Item Location' Compliance
8". Check Valve: Warehouse D -Unsatisfactory-
16" Gate' Valve : Warehouse D Satirfactory
-
- Instrument- Valve - -Unit II RCB Satisfactory
Component Support - Unit II RCB Satisfactory-
12" Pipe and Flange Unit II FHB- Satisfactory
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Unit II FHB- Satisfactory
10" Gate Valve. Unit II FHB Satisfactory
Ball Valve Unit II MEAB El 10" Satisfactory
6" Bronze Pipe ECW Building Satisfactory
24" Bronze Pipe
-
ECW Building Satisfactory-
2" Pipe and Elbow -
Unit I FHB Satisfactory
- 8" Containment Spray Ring Pipe Unit I FHB Satisfactory
- 2" Globe Valve Unit I FHB Satisfactory
Reactor' Internal Disconnect Device Housing Unit I RCB Not Retrievable
'30" Main Steam Pipe Unit I RC8 El 65 Satisfactory
~30" Main. Steam Pipe Unit I RCB El 35 Satisfactory
Pipe'Pentration Unit I RCB Satisfactory
-
RHR Heat Exchanger Unit I RC8 Rm 306 . Satisfactory _
- Flexible Instrument Line- Unit I RC8 El'35' Satisfactory
-24". Gate. Valve ~ Unit I RCB El 24 Satisfactory
31" Crossunder Pipe- Unit I RCB El 2 Satisfactory
8" Safety Injection Check Valve Unit I RC8 El 6 Unsatisfactory
Pressure Sensor Unit I RCB E1 32 Satisfactory
2": Solenoid Valve . ' Unit I DG8 El 32' ~ Satisfactory
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Unit I FH6 El 4 Satisfactory
Spent Fuel Cooling' Pump Unit 1 FHB El 35 Satisfactory
14" Fabricated Pipe Unit I FH8 El 17 Satisfactory
3" Plug Valve . Unit I MEAB El 74 Satisfactory
Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Unit I MEA 8 El 65 Satisfactory
Recycle Evaporator Condensate Tank Unit I MEA 8 El 56 Satisfactory
Waste Evaporator Condensate Tank Unit I HEA8 El 56 Satisfactory
FTD Filter Unit I MEAB El 65 Satisfactory
2" Valvc Unit I MEAB El 65 Satisfactory-
Radwaste Holdup Tank Unit I MEAB El 57- Not Retrievable
Chemical & Volume Control Tank Unit.I MEA 8 El 46 Satisfactory
Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Unit I MEA 8 El 29 Satisfactory
Seal Water Heat Exchanger Unit I MCAB El 10 Satisfactory
VI-10
t -
TABLE VI-6
TRACEABILITY DOCUMENTATION FOR BOLTING NOT FURNISHED
Item Location Compliance
Chilled Water Pumps Unit II MEAB El 10 Not Retrieved
Centrifugal Charging Pump Unit II MEAB El 10 Not Retrieved
Fire Pumps Fire Pump house Not Retrieved
Reactor Internals Disconnect Device * Unit I RCB .Not Retrieved
Feedwater Booster Pump Motor Unit I TGB Not Retrieved
Feedwater Booster Pump Unit I TGB Not Retrieved
Steam Generator Feed Pump Unit I TGB Not Retrieved
Diesel Generator Unit I DGB Not Retrieved
Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Unit I FHB El 27 Not Retrieved
Load Center E1C-1 Unit I MEAB El 65 Not Retrieved
Chemical and Volume Control Monitor Unit I MEAB El 35 Not Retrieved
Relay Cabinets Unit I MEAB El 35 Not Retrieved
Pressurizer Heater Controller Unit I MEAB El 35 Not Retrieved
'2" Carbon Steel Pipe Spoo1* Unit I MEAB El 46 Not Retrieved
Radwaste Holdup Tank * Unit I MEAB El 57 Not Retrieved
Load Center Transformers Unit I MEAB El 10 Not Retrieved
Liquid Waste Pumps Unit I MEAB El 10 Not Retrieved
Essential Cooling Water Pump Unit I MEAB El 10 Not Retrieved
"Except for those items indicated by an asterisk, the NRC CAT inspector requested
documentation to determine bolting requirements. Since documentation was not
provided, traceability was not verified.
VI-11
TABLE VI-7
.
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT BOLTING
!
Item Location- Compliance
Relay' Rack Cabinets Unit I MEA 8 El 35 Unsatisfactory
Computer Unit I MEAB El 35 Satisfactory
'
Pressurizer Heater-Controller Unit I MEAB El 35 Unsatisfactory
Load Center Transformers Unit I MEAB El 10 Unsatisfactory
Battery Racks Unit I MEAB El 10 Unsatisf actory
Battery Racks Unit I MEAB El 35 Unsatisfactory
Battery Racks Unit I MEAB El 65 Unsatisfactory
C&VC Control Board Monitor Unit I MEAB El 35 Unsatisfactory
Bi-Stable Status Control Board Monitor Unit I MEAB El 35 Unsatisfactory
Load Center Transformers Unit I MEAB El 65 Unsatisfactory
Diesel Generator. Control Panels Unit I DGB El 35 Unsatisfactory
l
!
i
< VI-12
l
l
k.
=-
,
TABLE VI-8
MECHANICAL BOLTING
Item Location Compliance
Chilled Water Pump Unit II MEAB El 10 Unsatisfactory
Centrifugal Charging Pump Unit II MEAB El 10 Satisfactory
Charging Pump Gearbox Unit II MEAB El 10 Unsatisfactory
Positive Displacement Charging Pump Unit II MEAB El 10 Satisfactory
Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Unit II MEAB El 10 Satisfactory
ECW Wash Screen Pump ECW Building Satisfactory
ECW Wash Screen Motor ECW Building Unsatisfactory
FCW Motor ECW Building Satisfactory
Fire Pumps. Fire Pump House Unsatisfactory
RHR Pump Support Unit 1 RCB El 3 Satisfactory
Feedwater Booster Pump Unit 1 TBG Unsatisfactory
Steam Generator Feed Pump Unit 1 TGB Unsatisfactory
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Unit I Valve Cubicle 1 ' Satisfactory
Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Unit I Valve Cubicle 1 Unsatisfactory
Diesel Air Compressor Unit I DGB Unsatisfactory
Fire Protection Actuators Unit I Deluge House #12 Unsatisfactory
Spent Fuel Cooling Pump Unit I FHB El 35 Satisfactory
HHSI, LHSI & Containment Spray Pumps (9) Unit I FHB El 15 Unsatisfactory
HHSI, LHSI & Containment Spray Motors (9) Unit.I FHB El 15 Unsatisfactory
Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Unit I FHB El 27 Unsatisfactory
Liquid Waste Pump Unit I MEAB El 10 Unsatisfactory
ECW Turbine Driver Unit I Valve Cubicle 4 Unsatisfactory
VI-13
VII. DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL
'
A. Objective
The primary objective of the appraisal of design change control was to
determine whether design change activities were conducted in compliance
with regulatory requirements, Safety Analysis Report commitments and
approved licensee, engineer, constructor and vendor procedures. An
additional objective was to determine that the changes.to structures
and hardware prescribed in a sample of design change documents were
accurately completed.
B. Discussion
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III " Design Control" and Criterion VI
" Document Control" establish the overall regulatory requirements for
design change control. These requirements are elaborated in Regulatory
Guide (RG) 1.64 Rev. 2, June 1976, " Quality Assurance Requirements for
the Design of Nuclear Power Plants," which endorses American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N45.2.11-1974 " Quality Assurance
Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants." The licensee's
commitments to comply with RG 1.64 is stated in Chapter 17 of the South
Texas Project (STP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The areas of design change control evaluated by the NRC Construction
Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors were control of changes to design
documents and control of design changes. In each of these areas,
interviews were conducted with persor.nel responsible for the control of
activities, procedures were reviewed, and a sample of the controlled
documents was reviewed. In addition, a sample of the completed
structures and hardware which had been inspected and accepted by on-
site contractor quality control (QC) personnel was inspected by the NRC
CAT inspectors. These evaluations were performed on an interdiscipline
basis.
1. Control of Design Documents
The specific aspects of the control of design documents inspected
were the availability to the users of the latest approved design
documents and design change documents, and the methods of assuring
that approved changes not yet incorporated into design documents
are provided to the users prior to work being performed,
a. Inspection Scope
(1) The following general quality assurance (QA) program manuals
and procedures primarily related to distribution and control
of design documents and design change documents were reviewed
to establish the acceptance criteria for this portion of the
inspection:
'
Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P) Project Quality
Assurance Plan for South Texas Project, Rev. 7, dated
August 7, 1985.
VII-1
]
Bechtel South Texas Project Quality Program Manual, Rev. 3,
dated July 15, 1985.
Ebasco Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual ETR-1001
for South Texas Project, Rev. 12, dated July 26, 1985.
South Texas Project Procedure No. RMSP 1.02, " General
Operating Description-RMS," Rev. 3, dated August 1, 1985.
South Texas Project Procedure No. RMSP 2.03, " Design
Drawing and Drawing Change Notice Control," Rev. 3,
dated June 14, 1984.
South Texas Project Procedure No. RMSP 2.05, " Specifications,
Specification Change Notices and Procurement Document Control,"
Rev. 4, s ted March 14, 1984.
South Texas Project Procedure No. RMSP 3.16, " Quality
Records," Rev. 6, dated May 20, 1985. '
Bechtel Procedure No. WPP 3.0, " Field Control of Design
' Documents," Rev. 17, dated November 13, 1985.
Bechtel . Procedure No. WPP 3.2, " Field Supplier Document
Control," Rev. 3, dated March 29, 1983.
Bechtel Procedure No. WPP-QCI 6.0, " Control, Review and
Processing of Quality Records," Rev. 9, dated March 25, 1985.
! Bechtel Engineering Department Procedure (EDP) No. 4.46,
" Project Drawings," Rev. 8 STP, dated March 6, 1985.
Bechtel EDP 4.49, " Project Specifications," Rev. 6 STP,
dated January 23, 1985.
l Ebasco Quality Assurance Instruction (QAI) No. 019,
l " Review, Processing and Turnover of Quality Records,"
Rev. 2, dated March 25, 1985.
'
Ebasco Quality Control' Procedure (QCP) No. 6.2, " Document
Control," Rev.1, dated January 21, 1985.
t
Ebasco QCP No. 17.1, " Quality Assurance Records," Rev. 3,
dated March 8, 1985.
Ebasco Procedure No. ASP-6, " Document Control," Rev. 7,
dated May 17, 1985.
(2) Bechtel, Ebssco and HL&P QA audit and surveillance reports
concerning det.ign document control were reviewed for findings,
trends and corrective actions.
VII-2
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. . . -- -.- _- - . - . - - . -_ - -..- - . - . - -
1
4
' (3) Bechtel, Ebasco and HL&P document control, engineering,
1 construction and QA personnel were interviewed concerning
- design document and design change document distribution and
control.
i..
b. -Inspection Findings
i
(1) Design documents and design change documents are issued by :
Bechtel; issue at the site is through the Bechtel Field !
Document Control Center (FDCC) to various satellite document
stations in accordance with a distribution matrix. The
- satellite stations are also controlled by Bechtel. A.compu-
i
terized Field Revision List (FRL) is the data base which gives i
the current design document revision and lists the unincor- f
i
'
porated design changes; a " historical" version of the FRL' ,
showing each revision of design documents and the change
'
documents written against each revision is also available.
The unincorporated design changes are posted on the design
documents in the reference stations to relieve the users of
i the need to review the FRL.
- . i
(2) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed against the latest FRL a series
of procedures, specifications and drawings at the Bechtel FDCC,
at Bechtel Reference Station A02 (located in the Unit 1 con-
struction office, Building 10), and at Bechtel Reference
- Station B49 (located in the Unit 2 construction office,
Building 16). Tables VII-1A through IE summarize the NRC ,
CAT findings for this review, which was performed to check :
that documents were being distributed, posted and otherwise
~
controlled in accordance with Bechtel Procedure WPP 3.0,
" Field Control of Design Documents, and other applicable
requirements.
The team reviewed eleven Bechtel and Ebasco procedures and
five Bechtel specifications against the latest FRL at Reference
- Station A02. Four of the sixteen documents had deficiencies
(i.e. , did not accurately reflect all approved changes) as
recorded in Table VII-1A.
<
Fifteen Bechtel large and small bore piping' isometric drawings '
'
.
were reviewed at Reference Station A02. The active change
documents listed in the field revision log for these drawings
were posted on the drawings with minor exception, and only a
few superseded change documents were found posted on the
drawings (Table VII-1B).
.
4 A total of 49'Bechtel electrical drawings.were reviewed
. against the latest FRL at Reference Stations A02 and B49
i (Tables VII-1C-D). Four of the nineteen drawings reviewed at
Reference Station B49 exhibited an unacceptably high rate of '
discrepancies (Bechtel drawings 3E359E58020, -029, -191 and
,
-317, Table VII-10). The NRC CAT inspectors are particularly
concerned about the active change documents not posted on the
drawings, since this information is lost to the users. These
- drawings were all cable tray support detail " cookbook"
'
<
- VII-3
L
4
+ --m,,,m+-----e-. ,-e, , , - - , , m-,r- * -.-- - ~ + -.m., ,--y , + - - ew -
F
drawings. The cable tray support " cookbook" drawings posted
in the reference stations are maintained by reference station
personnel for reference use only. However, FDCC maintains the
master copies of these drawings, and issues bound sets of these
detail drawings at five-day intervals to check-out-stations
where their issuance for use by the construction craft is
also controlled.
In order to determine if incorrect information was being issued
to the construction crafts, the team reviewed 21 electrical
drawings at the Bechtel FDCC against the latest field revision
log, including 11'of the detail drawings reviewed at Reference
Station B49. The team found these drawings to be properly
controlled (Table VII-1E).
(3) The NRC CAT reviewed a sample of ten pipe support detail
drawings for large and small bore safety class pipe. The
latest issue of each pipe support drawing was checked to
confirm that any change documents issued against the previous
revision to the drawing had been properly incorporated. No
discrepancies were observed.
(4) A Bechtel in-house study entitled " Overview of the Design
Change Control Program" was prepared at the request of the
NRC CAT inspectors and issued on November 11, 1985. This study
describes the scope and trends of change documents issued for
the South Texas Project, as well as compliance with respect to
the number and time constraints detailed in existing site
procedures; i.e., documents must be revised every "x" months or
when "y" unincorporated design changes are outstanding.
Attachment C, sheet 2 of the study indicates, for example, that
a total of 25,320 Drawing Change Notices, 27,120 Field Change
Requests, and 4,113 Field Change Notices have been issued for
the South Texas Project through October, 1985. Attachments H,
sheets 1, 2 and 5, indicate that approximately 90 percent of
the change documents tracked since the beginning of 1985
have been processed in accordance with the governing number and
time constraints.
c. Conclusions
The controls for posting unincorporated design changes on design
documents were not adequately implemented at Station B49. However,.
for the sample inspected, the availability of design documents and
approved design change documents for users is generally adequate.
2. Preparation of Document Packages
The use of design documents and design change documents in the
preparation of work packages and inspection packages was inspected.
VII-4
a. Inspection Scope
(1) The following procedures primarily related to the preparation
and use of work packages and inspection packages and were
reviewed to establish the inspection criteria for this portion
of the inspection:
South Texas Project Standard Site Procedure (SSP) No. 36,
" Work Package Control," Rev. O, dated September 16, 1985.
Bechtel QCP-10.16, " Inspection of Electrical Raceways,"
Rev. 4, dated May 1, 1985.
Bechtel PED-027, " Civil / Structural Directive for the
Review of Pipe Support Drawings," Rev. 1, dated March 13,
1985.
Bechtel Specification 3A010SS0012 for Category I Structural
Steel, Rev. 2, dated January 21, 1984.
Bechtel Specification 3A010SS0026 for Category I
Miscellaneous. Steel, Rev. 6, dated August 27, 1985.
Ebasco QCP-9.5, " Weld Inspection (AWS)," Rev. 6, dated
October 10, 1985.
Ebasco QCP-10.5, " Inspection of Structural Steel Erection
and Bolting," Rev. 5, dated July 19, 1985.
Ebasco QCP-10.7, " Miscellaneous Metal Fabrication," Rev.
6, no rev. date.
Ebasco QCP-10.12 " Component Support Fabrication and
Installation Inspection," Rev. 4, dated June 17, 1985.
Ebasco QCP-10.19, " Inspection of Anchoring Devices
Installed Within Concrete Structures," Rev. 6, dated
February 28, 1985.
Ebasco QCP-10.31, " Inspection of Configuration Control
Packages," Rev.1, dated July 11, 1985.
Ebasco Procedure Construction Site Procedure (CSP) 43,
" Installation of Electrical and Associated Hangers,"
Rev. 5, dated September 30, 1985.
(2) Bechtel, Ebasco and HL&P document control, engineering,
construction and QC personnel were interviewed concerning
the use of design documents and design change documents.
VII-5
-
-
.
b. -Inspection Findings
(1) Ten samples of installed structural _ steel installation docu-
ments and QC inspection records provided by Ebasco civil /
structural site engineering were reviewed. Table VII-2
summarizes the NRC CAT findings for this review, which was
performed to confirm that Ebasco used the correct drawings,
change documents, procedures and specifications to install and
inspect the structural. steel. Four of the ten samples were
found_to have deficiencies. The most significant. finding from
this review was that work done under a Field Change Request
(FCR) dated September 14, 1984 had not been QC. inspected.
When a QC inspection was performed, a nonconformance was
identified (Item 1, Table VII-2).
Structural steel is installed and inspected based on design
drawings and approved design changes (i.e., there is no
procedural requirement at STP for a structural steel work
package) and the related QC inspection activities are performed
on an area basis, with no easily auditable tracking of. records
for specific joints, members, etc. In a number of instances,
the team encountered difficulty in identifying the specific-
installed steel that had been QC inspected. As a consequence,
some installed or modified structural steel may not be QC.
inspected or inspected in a timely manner.
On September 20, 1985, HL&P notified NRC Region IV of a
potentially reportable. item ccncerning inspection of installed
structural steel. The lack of an accurate detailed location
description for structural steel is one of the identified
deficiencies currently under review by NRC Region IV. The
licensee is conducting an investigation to determine the
extent of the documentation deficiencies in regard to
structural steel erection. A thorough review of inspection
documentation on structural steel erection is currently
being performed. The licensee's review should also address
the above identified NRC CAT finding.
(2) A sample of installation documents and QC inspection records
for the ten electrical cable tray supports listed in Table
VII-3A was reviewed to verify that Ebasco used the correct
drawings, change documents, procedures and specifications to
install and inspect the cable tray hangers. Table VII-38-
summarizes the NRC CAT findings for this review. Minor docu-
mentation deficiencies were identified in seven of the ten
samples.
There is no requirement at South Texas Project to provide an
- as-built record of an installed cable tray support. In addi-
tion, a given cable tray support detail drawing defines a
design envelope rather than a unique hanger configuration. As
a consequence, physical inspection is required to verify the
specific configuration of an installed cable tray support.
NRC CAT inspectors verified another sample of 14 cable tray
supports, and concluded that the installed hanger configurations
VII-6
conformed to the hanger detail drawings. NRC CAT review of
this sample is documented in Section II, Electrical and
Instrumentation Construction, of this report.
c. Conclusions
The use of design documents and design change documents in prepara-
tion of work packages and inspection packages appears generally
adequate. However, during this review a deficiency in inspection
of structural steel was identified. The licensee needs to determine
whether this deficiency will be addressed in his overall evaluation
of the inspection of structural steel pursuant to his notification
to NRC Region IV of similar problems with the inspection and iden-
tification of structural steel.
3. Control of Design Changes
The specific aspects of the control of changes to design inspected
by the NRC CAT were the change control systems for Field Change
Notices (FCNs), Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Drawing Change
Notices (DCNs) and implementation and verification of the changes.
a. Inspection Scope
(1) The following procedures relating primarily to the control of
design changes were reviewed to establish the acceptance
criteria for this portion of the inspection:
South Texas Project Site Instruction 2.17, " Requests for
Engineering Assistance," Rev. 2, dated July 31, 1985.
Bechtel Procedure No. WPP-QCI 20.0, " Field Change Request,"
Rev. 15, dated August 20, 1985.
Bechtel Procedure No. WPP 20.1, " Field Change Notice,"
Rev. 5, dated May 21, 1985.
Bechtel Procedure No. WPP 22.0, " Configuration Control
Package (CCP)/(Design Change Package - DCP)," Rev. 2,
dated November 4, 1985.
Bechtel Procedure No. WFP-QCI 34.0, " Organization and
Responsibilities," Rev. 8, dated June 10, 1985.
'*
Bechtel EDP-2.13, " South Texas Project Engineering Team
Organization and Responsibilities," Rev. 4 STP, dated
June 1, 1984.
Bechtel EDP-4.26, " Interdisciplinary Design Review,"
Rev. O, dated December 2, 1977.
Bechtel EDP-4.27, " Design Verification," Rev. 2 STP,
dated July 31, 1984.
VII-7
_ _ _ _ _ _
Bechtel EDP-4.33, "On-Project Design Review," Rev. 3 STP,
dated December 31, 1984.
Bechtel EDP-4.34, "Off-Project Design Review (Design
Control Check List and Design Review Notice)," Rev. 2 STP,
dated December 15, 1983.
Bechtel EDP-4.37, " Design Calculations," Rev. 4 STP,
dated August 7, 1984.
Bechtel EDP-4.47, " Drawing Change Notice," Rev. 4 STP,
dated February 6, 1985.
Bechtel EDP-4.62, " Field Change Request / Field Change
Notice," Rev. 5 STP, dated March 26, 1985.
Bechtel EDP-4.72, " Configuration Control Package,"
Rev. 3 STP, dated September 5, 1985.
Bechtel EDP-4.73, " Design Change Management Procedure
(Design Change Approval Request - DCAR - Process),"
Rev. 2 STP,. dated May 23, 1984.
Ebasco Procedure No. ASP-7, " Field Change Notice Procedure,"
Rev. 4, dated August 1, 1985.
-
Ebasco Procedure No. ASP-11 " Field Change Request," Rev. 4,
dated July 29, 1985.
Ebasco Procedure No. ASP-17, " Configuration Control Package
(CCP)/ Design Change Package (DCP)," Rev. 2, dated October
28, 1985.
(2)' Bechtel and Ebasco QA audit and surveillance reports
concerning design changes were reviewed for findings, trends
and~ corrective actions.
(3) Interviews were conducted with personnel from Bechtel, Ebasco
and HL&P concerning initiation (organization) review, approval
and implementation of design changes.
b. Inspection Findings
(1) The Bechtel Site Engineering Organization (SE0) currently
employs approximately 150 office personnel and 120 field
personnel on site. The functions of Bechtel SE0 are described
in Bechtel procedure.WPP-QCI 34.0, subsection 5.6. The
functions of Bechtel project engineering personnel assigned to
the site are described in Bechtel procedure EDP 2.13,
l subsection 5.6. Bechtel project engineering personnel
assigned to the job-site take the lead in responding to field
, change requests, provide engineering dispositions on noncon-
L
'
formance reports, and monitor Ebasco field change' notices for
compliance to Ebasco and Bechtel requirements.
l
VII-8
<
(2) The NRC CAT reviewed a sample of 55 Bechtel and Ebasco FCNs, l
FCRs and DCNs. These change documents ,
were selected from the civil / structural and pipe support
disciplines. Table VII-4 summarizes the NRC CAT findings
derived from this review, which was performed to confirm that
change documents had been correctly incorporated into the
referenced drawings. .NRC CAT review of an additional sample
of design change documents is discussed in Section
VII.B.3.b.(7), below.
Discrepancies were observed in the incorporation of 8 of
the 55 change documents into the design documents. In
seven cases, the team found that either the technical content
or the scope of some change documents had been modified upon'
incorporation into the referenced design drawings. Six of
these. cases involved modification of FCRs or FCNs. Neither
Bechtel procedure WPP-QCI 20.0, " Field Change Request,"
subsection 5.4.3, nor Ebasco procedure ASP-11, " Field Change
Request," subsection 8.0.6, permits the modification of Field
Change Requests. Bechtel procedure EDP 4.47, " Drawing Change
Notice," subsection 3.6 permits the modification of a Drawing
Change Notice upon incorporation into a design drawing, if
notification is included in the drawing revision block.
'
However, the change documents are not annotated to indicate the
modified version of the technical content or scope that has
been incorporated.
Change documents originally restricted to k 2ilation in
either Unit 1 or Unit 2 have been modified upon incorporation
into the. referenced drawing for installation in both Units.
Since many drawings are applicable to both Units 1 and 2 by
default, and since the change documents are not reviewed to
reflect the incorporated modification, it is not possible to
determine if any error of omission has occurred or a conscious
design decision has been made.
(3) The NRC CAT reviewed selected audits in the area of design
control (Table VII-5) that had been conducted either by
Bechtel or Ebasco, or by teams composed of Bechtel, Ebasco
and HL&P personnel. The modification of some field change
requests upon incorporation into the design drawings does
not appear to have been an identified concern, although
Bechtel explicitly audited this attribute in the latter part
of 1984 (audit No. ESI-14-84, page 45, audit item 47).
The team also reviewed audit findings with respect to the
Bechtel/ Westinghouse interface. Audit M24-501 was conducted on
March 11-25, 1984 to assess the programmatic adequacy and the
proper procedural implementation of the Westinghouse NSSS
program on site. The audit summary noted that the corporate
Westinghouse program was being adequately implemented, but
concluded that' site specific procedures and instructions had
not been developed to control. activities affecting quality
which were being performed by Westinghouse site personnel.
VII-9
_ -
-
The audit summary considered this a significant deficiency
which could have an impact on the overall South Texas Project
quality program. Audits S15-501, D08-501, G42-501 and S23-501
also address aspects of the Bechtel/ Westinghouse design
interface. The deficiencies identified in Section II,
Electrical and Instrumentation Construction, of this report
with respect to the installation of Westinghouse motor
operated valves indicate that the concerns identified in
previous audit reports at the Bechtel/ Westinghouse design
interface require vigorous corrective action to assure a
controlled A/E-NSSS design interface at South Texas Project.
(4) The NRC CAT documented conflicting definitions for confi-
guration control package revisions in the governing Bechtel
and Ebasco procedures: Bechtel EDP 4.72, subsections 7.3-4;
Bechtel WPP-22.0, subsection 4.9.1, and Ebasco ASP-17, subsec-
tion 8.0.4. One definition notes that each revision of a
configuration control package supersedes all previous revi-
sions, and includes all previously issued design information.
Another definition notes that each revision of a configuration
control package supplements the previous revisions, and that
all revisions are necessary to determine the intended final
installed configuration. Design documents contained in a
specific configuration control package may be revised upon
completion of the physical work associated with that package.
The team notes that the Bechtel field document control center
has recently upgraded -the field revision list to identify con-
figuration control packages as a function of a given drawing.
However, the NRC CAT is concerned that drawings incorporated
into multiple configuration control packages prior to this
upgrade may have been subject to conflicting modifications.
(5) The NRC CAT requested the Bechtel structural calculations
for ten civil / structural change _ documents which added (or
modified) equipment support steel to the Bechtel structural
drawings. Table VII-6 summarizes the NRC CAT findings for
this review, which was perfonned to confirm that appropriate
calculations had been performed to substantiate design changes
to project drawings. The team found seven of the ten Bechtel
calculations acceptable.
Three of the changes . reviewed were found to have inadequate
. calculational bases. A calculation for a nonsafety support in
the seismically designed Fuel Handling Building had been
performed, but not checked or signed off by a group leader
(Table VII-6, item 1). Four bays of floor steel had not been
verified by calculation, or by documented engineering judgment
(Table VII-6, item'2), and some existing steel that was
recently checked for the first time showed relatively high
stress ratios (Table VII-6, item 3).
The NRC CAT is concerned that structural calculations or other
adequate documentation of design bases may be lacking for some
structural steel in safety related and nonsafety seismic
structures. All structural steel should be explicitly or
VII-10
1
generically qualified, and this analytical qualification
should be documented. ANSI N45.2.11-1974 Section 4.2, Design
Analyses, notes in-part that " Analyses shall be sufficiently
detailed as to purpose, method, assumptions, design input,
references and units such that a person technically qualified
in the subject can review and understand the analyses and
verify the adequacy of the results without recourse to the
originator."
(6) The NRC CAT reviewed three pipe support calculations to verify
that supplementary steel had been properly ~ modeled, and that
calculated weld sizes had been noted on the pipe support
drawings. Although no concerns were identified, the team had
become concerned during the course of the inspection that pipe
support supplementary steel and supporting steel was not always
being evaluated for possible addition of beam stiffener plates.
However, the NRC CAT was informed that a pipe support review
team has already been established within the Bechtel pipe
support group to review all ASME and seismic II/I supports
for various pipe support design attributes. Both new as well
as existing pipe support designs will be reviewed under this
program, in accordance with Rev. 3 to Bechtel PED 023.
(7) Inspectors in each NRC CAT discipline checked the design con-
trol process at South Texas Project by evaluating compliance
of a sample of installed and inspected hardware with respect
to the applicable design drawings and their approved design
change documents (Table VII-7A-C). In most instances,.the
installed hardware conformed to the design documentation.
.0f the 87 hardware samples reviewed for compliance with the
governing design change documents, only 2 discrepancies were
noted. However, because the NRC CAT is concerned that the
design control process at South Texas Project may not be
adequately controlled in some areas, i.e. , motor-operated
valves (Section II.B.3.b(8)), the licensee needs to assess the
1
impact that these deficiencies may have on the associated
hardware.
c. Conclusions
Control of the design change process is generally adequate for
the sample inspected. However, additional management attention is
needed to: (1) preclude further modification of design changes
during incorporation into their referenced drawings, particularly
unit specific changes, (2) control the design interface between
Bechtel and Westinghouse, (3) ensure that documented calculations
exist to demonstrate both the bases and adequacy of design drawings
and design changes, and (4) to ensure that the conflicting defi-
nitions for configuration control packages have not resulted in
the improper use or as-building of these change documents.
VII-11
, - ._.
_-- - - -
I
TABLE VII-1A
REVIEW 0F POSTING OF DESIGN CHANGES
PROCEDURES / SPECIFICATIONS SAMPLE
Reference Station A02
Document. Observation
Ebasco Procedure a) Table of contents does not list ICP
ASP-11 (interim change to a procedure) No. 1;
b) Procedure pages not correctly numbered
Ebasco Procedure Table of contents does not list PCR
QCP-10.7 (procedure change report) No. 7
Bechtel Specification a) Table of contents and appendices
SA010PS002 misfiled;
b) Total number of pages per appendix
not tabulated.
Bechtel Specification Total number of pages per appendix not
3A010SS0030 tabulated
,
VII-12
--
TABLE VII-1B
REVIEW 0F POSTING OF DESIGN CHANGES
BECHTEL LARGE AND SMALL BORE PIPING ISOMETRIC SAMPLE
Reference Station A02
Total Active Superseded
Change Documents Active CDs Not CDs Posted
Drawing Sheet No. Rev. No. ,
(CDs) Posted on dwo On dwa
'8M369 PIA 239 A08 4 5 - -
8M369 PIA 239 A13 4 4 - -
-
8M369 PIA 239 A17 4 4 - -
8M369 PIA 239 A24 3 4 - -
8M369 PIA 239 A29 4 3 - -
3M369PCC207 2 4 17 - -
SM369PCC207' S 3 5 - -
SM369PCC207 7- 4 14 1 -
4M369PCC207 9 5 14 - -
5M369PCC207 10 4 18 - -
3M369 PEW 229 18 0 40 1 -
-50369 PEW 329 5 1 18 -
2
3C01951542 -
4 6 -
1
3C019S1600 -
5 2 - -
3C01951603 -
3 3 1 -
TOTAL F 3- 3
VII-13
_-
TABLE VII-1C
REVIEW OF POSTING OF DESIGN CHANGES
BECHTEL ELECTRICAL DRAWING SAMPLE
Reference Station A02
Total Active Superseded
Change Documents Active CDs Not- CDs Posted
Drawing Sheet No. Rev. No. (CDs) Posted on dwg On dwg
-3E560E55127* -1 1 21 '- -
-3E359E58001' 1 11 7 -
3
3E359E58001 4 6 4 -
1
3E359E58001 -5 7 4 --
1
3E359E58001 7 4 7 -
4
3E359E58001- 2 9 2 -
1
-3E359E58002 1 0 3 - -
SE209E01638 2 9 5 - -
SE209E1631- ~
5 8 3 - -
.9E0VNAV.- 1 3 6 - -
9EEWO101- 1 2 5 -
li
9E0HE21 1 2 2 - -
SE549EL5031 -
8 15 - --
~3E209E2825 -
8 16 - -
3E209E56009 -
9 7 > - -
9E0ANO3 2 2 1 - -
6E100E02130- -
.7 6 - -
SE030E0100 3 14 4 - -
9E00AAB 1 5 1 - -
.5E030E0100. 3A 3 4 - -
-9E0HC09 1 2 2 - -
SE500E00103 .3 22 9 2 -
9E0VCAB 1 3 5 - -
9E0VCAG 1 2 3 1 -
9EOFP08 1 3 -4 - --
-9EOPMAL 1 5 3 - -
OEOSW10 - 1 1 2 - -
3E209E56104 -
5 6 - -
9EOPFCF 1 3 2 - -
1EPFCC01' 1 3 1 - -
TOTAL T6T 3 T
(*) There were approximately 35 not to be incorporated (N/I) CDs posted on
this drawing that were subsequently tabulated on sheet 1A of the drawing
and should have been deleted from sheet 1.
(!) Incorrect CD No.-posted.
VII-14
TA8LE VII-1D-
REVIEW OF POSTING OF DESIGN CHANGES
BECHTEL ELECTRICAL DRAWING SAMPLE
Reference Station B49
Total Active Superseiled
Change Documents Active CDs Not CDs Posted
Drawing Sheet No. Rev. No. (CDs) Posted on dwg On dwg
3E359E58317 1 5 14 3 5
- -3E359E58191 1 3 4 1 6
3E359E58020 1 10 15 9 4
3E359E58029 1 6 7 2 5
3E359E58260 1 6 6 - -
6E210E02564 2 4 6 -
1
3E359E58042 1 11 9 1 2
3E359E58140 1 4 7 - -
9E560E50021 -
3 4 -
1
3E359E58901 1 1 5 -
it
3E359E58067 1 '5 7 2- -
3E560E55127 l' 1 21 - -
3E560E55127 1A 2 3. - -
3E359E58822 1 4 13 -
1
-3E359E58072 1 6 5 - -
3E359E58041 1 9 10 1 1
SL49T60002 '
-
16 44 16 1
3E560E55045 -
12 15 - -
.3E560E55046 -
-9 22 -
1
TOTAL 717~ 20 -'2T
(1) Incorrect CD posted
(9) 1 CD posted on drawing.twice
. VII-15
_ , . _ - _ _ ._ ,
.
TABLE VII-1E
REVIEW 0F POSTING OF DESIGN CHANGES
. BECHTEL ELECTRICAL DRAWING SAMPLE
Field Document Control Center (FDCC)
Total Active Superseded
Change Documents' Active CDs Not. CDs Posted
Drawing Sheet No. Rev. No. (CDs) Posted on dwa On dwg
.3E359E58317* 1 5 14 lt
-
3E359E58191* 1 3 4 - -
3E359E58020* 1- 10 15 1 -
3E359E58029* 1 6 7 - -
3E359E58041* 1 9 10 - -
3E359E58140* 1- 4 7 - -
3E359E58148 1 6 3 - -
3E359E58169- 1 5 3 - -
3E359E58238 1 3 3 - -
3E359E58093 1 4 4 1 -
3E359E58260* 1 6 6 - -
3E359E58268 1 2 3 - -- '
3E359E58048 1 8 3 - -
3E359E58057 1 4- 3 -
1
3E359E58901 1 1 5 - -
3E359E58831 1 1 2 - -
3E359E58042* 1 11 9 - -
.30359E58067* 1 5 7 - -
3E359E58073 1A 5 4 - -
3E359E58072* 1 6 5 - -
-3E359E58822* 1 4 13 -
1
TOTAL 130 3 2
.
(*) Drawings reviewed at Reference Station B49
( ) 1 CD number transposed
VII-16
. __ -. - ._.
. _ . . _ _ . ._ . . _ _ _
,
-
7
TABLE VII-2
REVIEW OF WORK PACKAGES AND INSPECTION REPORTS
STRUCTURAL STEEL SAMPLE
'
ITEM- OBSERVATION -
1
<
1 Field Change Request (FCR) No. CC-0414W was issued on September
14, 1984-against Bechtel drawings No. 3C01-9-S-1506, Rev.:5,
- 3C01-9-S-1508, Rev. 3, and 3C01-9-S-1510, Rev. 2. The.FCR
- .specified the coping of radial and circumferential steel at three
- different elevations in containment. Coping the beam.
,
'
flanges provides access to enable welding of the containment liner
plate at the construction hatch opening. -However, at the time of
the CAT inspection, the steel rework had not been QC inspected.
Subsequent Ebasco-QC inspection is documented on miscellaneous
, metal fabrication inspection report 3461F1 dated October 28,
1985. Nonconformance Report Number CC-03133 was also issued on
~
f'
October 28, 1985 to document coping of beam flanges in excess of
,7
the dimensions specified in the FCR.
i
2 Drawing Change Notice (DCN) No. 3 was issued on January _25,1985
, against Bechtel drawing No. 3F01-9-S-3001, Rev.1, in order to
,
. provide support details for Fuel liandling Building Sump Tank No.1
Sump Pumps 9Q061/2NPA113A. Field Change Notice (FCN) 1-C-0329
provides the fabrication details for the new steel. However,
there are discrepancies in the bolt hole diameters specified for-
,_ the beam clip angles. The DCN and the drawing sp?cify 15/16 in.
. diameter bolt holes for 3/4 in. diameter bolts,:while the FCN-
r- specifies 13/16 in. diameter bolt holes. The Bechtel civil /
- structural site engineering organization issued DCN No. 5 on
Octobe'r 30, 1985 to correct DCN.No. 3.
. 3 FCR BC-01544 was issued on December 24, 1984 against Bechtel
. drawing No. 3F01-9-S-3005, Rev.1.1 The FCR detailed modifica-
~
i
tions to'HVAC plenum No. 9V121VXV021 perimeter grating and
u support steel to provide an air-tight seal. However, Ebasco QC
AWS D1.1 structural welding inspection report No. 1-00865,-dated
{. Narch 7, 1985, incorrectly references Rev. 1 of the Bechtel
drawing. Rev. 2 of the drawing, dated December 18, 1984, was
the correct drawing of record. The inspection report was
,
corrected on October.30, 1985.
-
t
4 The not to be incorporated (N/I) amendment list for Bechtel
drawing .3M01-9-S-4043, Rev. 3, dated July 15, 1985, incorrectly
references FCN 1C-0265, dated February 21, 1985, as a FCR.
L Rev. 4 of the drawing, issued on November 5, 1985, correctly
!
references the FCN.
i.
l
VII-17
,
[
TABLE VII-3A
LISTING OF ELECTRICAL CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS
~ Support No. Location Drawing No.
H64- 3-E-20-9-E-56004, Rev. 3
H117 3-E-20-1-E-56004, Rev. 5
H2 3-E-35-9-E-56008, Rev. 8
H153 3-E-20-9-E-56004, Rev. 3
H139 3-E-35-9-E-56008, Rev. 5
H115 3-E-20-9-E-56004, Rev. 3
H84 3-E-20-1-E-56004, Rev. 5
H136 3-E-35-9-E-56008, Rev. 3
H102 3-E-35-9-E-56008, Rev. 5
H100 3-E-35-9-E-56008, Rev. 8
.
VII-18 j
l
TABLE VII-3B
REVIEW 0F WORK PACKAGES AND INSPECTION REPORTS
ELECTRICAL CABLE TRAY SUPPORT SAMPLE
-ITEM OBSERVATION
1 Page 2 of the electrical' raceway hanger inspection
record / traveler for hanger No.1-004-H64 does not reference
Bechtel drawing No. 3-E-35-9-E-58140, sheet 1, Rev. 2
AWS D1.1 structural welding inspection report No. 02630 for hanger
No. 1-004-H64 does not reference the cable tray hanger connection
detail drawings, and references incorrect detail numbers 22 and 23
for the installed cable tray. ~The correct details are 42 and 70.
The inspection report was corrected on November 11, 1985.
2 Bechtel drawing No. 3-E-20-1-E-56004, Rev. 5, is incorrectly
referenced on page 3 of the electrical raceway hanger inspection
record / traveler for hanger No. 1-004-H117. The inspection
report was corrected on November 11, 1985.
3 Page 2 of the electrical raceway hanger inspection record /
traveler for hanger No.1-004-H153 does not reference
Bechtel drawing No. 3-E-35-9-E-58148, sheet 2, Rev. 4.
AWS D1.1 structural welding inspection report No. 02407 for
hanger No.1-004-H153 references Rev. 2 of Bechtel drawing
3-E-20-9-E-56004. Rev.-3 of the drawing, dated September 16,
1983, was the drawing of record at the time of inspection on
October 20, 1983. The inspection report was corrected on
November 11, 1985.
AWS D1.1 structural welding inspection report No. 02407 does not
reference the cable tray hanger connection detail drawings.
4 Page 2 of the electrical raceway hanger inspection record / traveler
for hanger No. 1-008-H139 does not reference Bechtel drawing No.
3-E-35-9-E-58029, sheet 4, Rev. 4.
5 The line diagram for the cable tray support shown on page 2 of the
electrical raceway hanger inspection record / traveler for hanger
No. 1-004-H115 shows one more G58HD12A tray support than the
installed cable tray.
Page 1 of the traveler (item 5) does not reference Bechtel drawing
No. 3-E-35-9-E-58117, sheet 3, Rev. 5. The inspection report was
corrected on November 11, 1985.
Page 2 of the traveler (item 5) does not reference Bechtel drawing
No. 3-E-35-9-E-58117, sheet 3, Rev. 3.
VII-19
_ _ . . _ . . . _ _ - _ ._ . .- .- _-
,.; TABLE VII-3B - (Continued)
9 REVIEW OF WORK PACKAGES AND INSPECTION REPORTS
j ELECTRICAL-CABLE TRAY SUPPORT SAMPLE ,
1
ITEM OBSERVATION
j. AWS D1.1-structural welding inspection report No. 02630 for hanger
No. -1-004-H115 does not reference the cable tray hanger connection
. ~ detail drawings. The inspection report was corrected on November
'll', 1985. :
].
,
6 Page 2 of electrical raceway-hanger inspection record / traveler-
1-004-H84, prepared on December 19,-1983, was not updated to
reference Field' Change Request (FCR) CE-02312, dated April 24, .
, 1984. The construction supervisor signed off on page 2 on June
23, 1985.
'
7- Page 2 of the electrical raceway hanger inspection recor'd / traveler-
- for hanger No.1-008-H136 references Field Change Notice (FCN)
CE-00831. The change document is actually a FCR. Ebasco voided
-
this FCR on January 6, 1984. The construction supervisor signed
>
off page 2 on August 4, 1984.
FCR CE-00923 is referenced on the traveler (item 7). However,
this FCR was superseded by FCR CE-01089 on November 4,1983.
-
FCR CE-01089 is referenced on page 2 of the traveler, but does
not appear to be applicable to hanger 1-008-H136.
-
FCR~CE-00578 is referenced on the traveler (item 7), but this
FCR was superseded by FCR CE-00828 on September 27, 1983, which
is not referenced on the traveler.
FCR'CE-01133 is referenced on the traveler (item 7) but this FCR
-
was superseded by FCR CE-01287 on December 6, 1983, which is not
,
referenced on the traveler.
Page 5 of electrical raceway hanger inspection record / traveler No.
1-008-H136 does not reference Bechtel drawing 3-E-35-9-E-58042,
'
.
sheet 5; Rev. 0. The inspection report was corrected on November
11, 1985.
,
l
VII-20 l
1
i 1
- . _ . _ _ . ._._ -____ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _
TABLE VII-4 I
REVIEW OF DESIGN CHANGE DOCUMENTS FOR
INCORPORATION INTO DESIGN DOCUMENTS
j
ITEM OBSERVATION
1 Field Change Request (FCR) BC-01202 was issued on June 13, 1984
against Rev. 2 of Bechtel drawing 3M01-9-C-4312. The FCR was
issued to reduce an oversized HVAC opening. A modified version of
'the FCR (as noted.in the drawing revision block) was incorporated
into revision 3 of the Bechtel drawing, which was issued on
October 4, 1984. As shown on the drawing, the detail is now
applicable to both Units 1 and 2. It appears that the penetration
was reworked ~in accordance with the FCR, so that the as-built
configuration is not in agreement with the design drawing. The
Bechtel civil / structural site engineering organization indicates
that FCR BC-01202 was incorrectly incorporated into Rev. 3 of the
Bechtel drawing, and issued Drawing Change Notice (DCN) No. 3 on
November 16, 1985 to correct the drawing.
2 FCR CC-03426.was issued on June 23, 1984 against Rev. 7 of Bechtel
drawing 3M35-9S-37417. The FCR was issued to shift a piece of
supplementary steel in plan to provide support for a hanger for
Unit 1 only. The FCR was incorporated into Rev. 8 of the Bechtel
drawing, but this detail is now applicable to both Units 1 and 2.
The drawing revision block does not indicate that the FCR was
modified upon incorporation into the drawing. The Bechtel civil /
structural site engineering organization indicates that the
decision was made to shift the steel for Unit 2 as well, at the
time the FCR was incorporated into the drawing.
3 DCN No. 7 was issued on September 26, 1984 against Rev. 1 of
Bechtel drawing 3C01-9-S-1600. The DCN was issued to provide
support details for.RHR pumps A, B and C in Unit 1 containment.
The DCN was modified upon incorporation into Rev. 2 of the
Bechtel drawing, as noted on the drawing revision block, to be
applicable to both Units 1 and 2.
4 FCR CC-04949 was issued on December 22, 1984 against Rev. 3 of
Bechtel drawing 7G-22-9-S-2002. The FC9 revised support details
for relay racks ERR 126 (nonsafety) in Units 1 and 2. The FCR
was modified upon incorporation into Rev. 3 of the Bechtel
drawing, as noted in the drawing revision block, and as detailed
on the drawing. However, the location of the revised steel in
plan was not clouded, and the 13/16 in. bolt holes for the
support channel were not transferred onto the drawing. The
Bechtel civil / structural site engineering organization has
verified that the support was installed as detailed on the
drawing, and issued DCN No. 18 on November 18, 1985 to correct
the drafting error.
VII-21
-
TABLE VII-4 - (Continu;d)
. REVIEW OF DESIGN CHANGE DOCUMENTS FOR
INCORPORATION INTO DESIGN DOCUMENTS
ITEM OBSERVATION
5 FCR BC-01279 was issued on July 24, 1984 against Rev. 1 of
Bechtel_ drawing 7G22-9S-2010. The FCR adds a supplementary
steel beam to provide support for exhaust fans 8V321(2)VFN013
and _4 (nonsafety) in the turbine generator building. The
addition of the supplementary steel is required because of
interference _ with a concrete block wall. FCR BC-01279 was
superseded by FCR CC-04461, which restricted the identical
support detail for installation in Unit 1 only. FCR-04461 was
modified upon incorporation into Rev. 3 of the Bechtel drawing,
as noted in the drawing revision block, for installation in Units
1 and 2. The Bechtel civil / structural site engineering organi-
zation issued DCN No. 4 on November 18, 1985 to restrict the
application of FCR CC-04461 to Unit 1 only.
6 DCN No. 2.was issued on October 6, 1984 against Rev. 1 of
Bechtel drawing 3C01-9-S-1603. The DCN.provided construction
details for the carbon unit A and B fan supports in containment
for Units 1 and 2. The DCN was correctly incorporated into
Rev. 3 of the Bechtel drawing, except for.a minor drafting
error involving failure to dimension a steel connection plate.
The Bechtel civil / structural site engineering organization
issued DCN No. 3 on November 15, 1985 to correct the drawing.
7 FCN BS-1-0194 was issued on July 9, 1984 against Bechtel drawing
CV-9010-GU0006, Rev. 1. The FCN revised the bill of materials <
for a pipe support configuration to allow the installation of a
rigid sway strut from bulk stock for-Unit 1 only. The FCN also
specified the center-to-center dimensions for the Unit 1 struts.
However, the drawing did not properly specify the different ,
center-to-center (C-C) dimensions required ~for the struts. The
C-C dimensions for the Unit 2 struts were listed in the bill of
materials (apparently past practice) while the C-C dimensions
for the Unit 1 struts were dimensioned on the drawing. However,
the drawing did not restrict the use of these strut C-C dimensions
to the Unit 1 struts. The Bechtel pipe support group site i
engineering organization issued DCN No.1 on November 18, 1985
to correct the drawing.
8 FCN BS-1-0235 was issued on August 5, 1984 against Rev. 2 of
Bechtel drawing CC-9215-RR0005. The FCN was incorporated into 1
Rev. 3 of.the Bechtel drawing on March 12, 1985. The team !
reviewed the drawing, which details separate pipe supports for
Units 1 and 2. The supporting steel for these supports appeared
to require stiffeners, and the team then reviewed the pipe
support calculation. Rev. 1 of calculation JC-CC-92-15-RR0005,
dated September 30, 1985, does require beam stiffeners for both
the pipe support supplementary steel and the support.ng framing
VII-22
TABLE VII-4 - (Continued)
REVIEW OF DESIGN CHANGE DOCUMENTS FOR
INCORPORATION INTO DESIGN DOCUMENTS
ITEM OBSERVATION
. steel. Bechtel~ issued two separate configuration control packages
on October 30, 1985 to add beam stiffeners to the pipe support
steel, CCD-1-M-ST-0066-00 and 2-M-ST-0067-00; however, the beam ;
stiffeners to be added to the supplementary steel for the Unit 2
pipe support were not clouded on the pipe support drawing. The
Bechtel pipe support group site engineering organization issued
FCR XEJ-00371 on November 18, 1985 to correct the configuration
control package for Unit 2.
VII-23
-- -. .- , .-. . , . . . - , - . - - - - . .. -- .- .. . -
TABLE VII-5
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT AUDIT SAMPLE
Audit-No. Audit Date Audit Subject
EQA-123 12/07/84 Document Control / Instructions and
Procedures, FCNs
ESI-14-84 11/26/84 Evaluation of Design Control Operations
BEC-6-84 05/24/84 Document Control - Field Control of
Design Documents (Unscheduled Audit)
BEC-7-84 07/18/84 Evaluation of Quality Program for-
Procurement Document Control
BEC-8-84 08/14/84 Evaluation of Quality Program for
QA Records
BEC-10-84 09/28/84 Evaluation of Compliance to Quality
Program Requirements for Design Control
and Project Engineering-Design Interface
Activities
BEC-11-84 10/31/84 Evaluation of Quality Program for
Evaluation of' Compliance to Quality
Program Requirements for Preparation,
Review, Approval and Control of Procedures
C14-501 02/06/85 Ebasco Structural Steel Installation
Activities
G35-501 02/06/85 HL&P-RMS Site Records Retrieval
G39-501 03/13/85 HL&P/Bechtel/Ebasco-Quality Records
M24-501 04/18/85 Westinghouse - Site Activities
S15-501 04/15/85 Bechtel Control of Westinghouse Design
Disclosure Documents
D08-501 04/23/85 Bechtel Design Control (Houston & Site)
G42-501 06/06/85 Bechtel/Ebasco Document Control
M16-501 07/25/85 Ebasco Valve & Pipe Installation
008-502 10/22/85 Bechtel Design Control (Houston & Site)
S23-501 10/16/85 Bechtel Document Control of Ebasco and
Westinghouse Documents
VII-24
TABLE VII-6
REVIEW 0F CALCULATIONS
STRUCTURAL SAMPLE
ITEM .0BSERVATION
1- Drawing Change Notice (DCN) No. 5 issued on August 9, 1983
against Bechtel drawing No. 3F01-9-S-3005, 'added support details
for Fuel Handling Building heating coils 8V121VHX001 and -002 at
two plan elevations. Bechtel had performed a calculation for the
support steel for this non-safety equipment but the calculation
had not been checked or signed by the group leader at the time of
the inspection. Bechtel did not assign a number to this
calculation, and does not plan to formalize this calculation.
2 Bechtel' drawing No. 3M01-9-S-4043, issued on November 5,1984, 1
revised the structural steel floor plan in the Mechanical and
Electrical Auxiliary Building between column lines 30 and 32, and
column lines M8 and H, at plan elevation 69 ft.-6 in. Field
Change Notice (FCN) 1-C-0265, issued on March 6, 1985, provides
.the fabrication details for the structural steel adjacent to a
pair of HVAC openings located in the southeast corner of the floor
plan. The CAT team requested the calculations for the structural
steel detailed on the FCN. Bechtel indicates that engineering
judgment was used to size the installed steel. However, this
engineering judgment was not documented. The Bechtel civil /
structural site organization has verbally indicated that calcula-
tions could not be retrieved for any of the four above-referenced
bays of structural steel in the Mechanical and Electrical
Auxiliary Building.
3 DCN No. 5, issued on October 24, 1985 against Bechtel drawing
No. 3M01-9-S-4069 Rev. 4, added a transverse stiffener beam
between two existing parallel beams which support pipe hangers.
The beam was added to increase the torsional stiffness of the
existing beams. The added steel is located in the Mechanical
and Electrical Auxiliary Building. The team requested the
structural calculation for the added steel beam. Bechtel
provided a recently completed calculation which verified the
adequacy of the added beam (Rev. 1 to Bechtel calculation No.
CC-6043, dated November 13, 1985). Each of the existing steel
beams was also checked in this calculation. The stress in one
of the beams is 86 percent of. allowable load capacity. The
stress in the other beam is 109 percent of allowable load
capacity. These beams were subjected to generic dead and live
distributed loads, a concentrated live load, and peak vertical
and horizontal seismic spectra (i.e., the loads that would
normally have been used to size this steel initially). It
appears, however, that this is the first formal check of this
steel.
VII-25
TABLE Vl"-7A
ELECTRICAL-AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE SAMPLE
Change Document
FCR DE-00274
FCR CE-04476
FCR CE-04475*
FCR CE-05252
FCR CE-05302
FCR BE-00536
FCR CE-05294
FCR CE-04881
DCN No. 8 (Dwg. 3D019-S-5002)
FCR CC-D5635
FCR XDE-00055
FCR CE-04284
FCR BE-00674
FCR BM-00225
FCN TGXM-10585, A, B, C*
(*) Refer to Section II, Electrical and Instrumentation Construction, for a-
discussion of the deficiencies noted with the implementation of these
design change documents.
VII-26
TABLE VII-7B
MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION. HARDWARE SAMPLE
Change Document
A. Piping FCR DP-451
FCR DP-541
FCR DP-57-1
FCR DP-503
FCR DP-690
FCR DP-748'
FCR DP-662
FCR DP-669
FCR DP-269W
FCR DP-614
FCR DP-916-
FCR DP-14W
DCN Nos. 14 & 15 (Dwg. 5M369PCC207, Sh. 10, R.1)
FCR DP-939W
.FCR DP-918
.FCR DP-772
FCR DP-751
FCR DP-739
FCR DP-718
<
FCR DJ-00248
FCR XEJ-00185
FCN J-0919
FCR DJ-00368
FCR DJ-00306
FCR DJ-00374
FCR DJ-00648
FCR DJ-00440
FCN J-0967
FCN J-0968
NCR BS-00212
VII-27
TABLE VII-7B - (Continued)
MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE SAMPLE
Change Document
C.. Concrete Expansion _
FCR CM-02181W
-Anchors and Base Plates NCR CM-00587
NCR CS-00802
NCR CS-03103
NCR CS-01014
FCR DJ-00787
'
FCR DJ-00994
FCR DJ-00894
FCR EJ-00289 1
'
-FCR J-0983
- DCN No.1 (Dwg. CC9317-HL5006)
FCR DJ-00763
D. HVAC FCR BH-00827
FCR CH-01546
FCR BH-00559
FCR CH-00845
FCR CH-01800
FCR DL-00152W
3 FCR CH-02181W
FCR EAB-314
FCR BH-01844
FCR BH-01142
4
.
1
\
4
VII-28
, . ..
. . - . . - . . - . - . . , , - - - . ,. .. .
. .. . . - _
. . - . - _. .- . , - . _ . ., .
..
TABLE VII-7C
CIVIL / STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION HARDWARE SAMPLE
Change Document
FCR EC-00318
FCR EC-00321
FCR EC-00098
FCR EC-00318
FCR CM-00194
FCR CC-02180
Dwg. No. 3C01-9-S-1633, Rev. 10
,
'
,
t
i
i
f
f
g.
VII-29
i _ _ _ _ _ . _ . ._, _ . . . - . _
__ _ - - -
- - _ _ - . .
,
VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS
A. Objective
The objective of this portion of the NRC CAT inspection was to verify
through selected samples, whether measures were established and
implemented to assure that nonconformances and other conditions adverse
to quality were promptly identified and corrected.
r
B. Discussion
An examination was made of the licensee's program for identification
i
and control of nonconformances and corrective actions, including review
of documents and inspection of some material / equipment for verification
of actual corrective actions in the plant. Items such as the following
were reviewed:
- Quality assurance programs
Procedures and organizational interfaces
Trend analyses
- Audits and surveillance reports
'* Nonconformance reports
r Deviation reports
( * Inspection reports
( * Corrective action reports
- Control of actual material / equipment corrections in the plant
- Control of open nonconformances at turnover for testing or operation
Table VIII-1, " Corrective Action Samples," contains a list of samples
that were randomly selected.
The following manuals and procedures of on-site organizations were
found in place, and applicable portions pertaining to corrective action
provide the background infonnation and acceptance criteria for this
inspection.
Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P)
- Quality Assurance Program Description for the Design and Construction
Phases of the South Texas Project, Rev. 11
Project Quality Assurance Plan, Rev. 7
South Texas Project Quality- Assurance Procedures, Rev. 46
Standard Quality Assurance Procedures:
SQAP-01 General Control of Standard QA Procedures, Rev.1
SQAP-02 Deficiency Reporting, Rev.1
SQAP-03 Project Audits, Rev.1
SQAP-04 Project Surveillances, Rev. 1
PSQP-16.3 Trend Analysis, Rev. 3
SSP-8 Nonconformance Reporting, Res. 0
VIII-1
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
OPGP03-ZM-0002 Preventive Maintenance Program, Rev. O
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
Project Quality Program Manual, South Texas Project, Rev. 11
WPF/QCI.-4.0 Receiving Inspection, Rev. 11
- WPP/QCI-5.0 Nonconforming Materials,. Parts and Components, Rev. 14
WPP/QCI-28.0 Maintenance of Materials and Equipment, Rev.11
SQAP-04 Project Surveillances, Rev. 1
Ebasco Services Incorporated (Ebasco)
_ETR-1001 Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual, Rev. 11
QAI-11 Corrective Action and Stop Work Authority, Rev. 7
QCP-10.9 General Inspection (G series), Rev. 2
- QCP-10.30 Inspection of Installation and Fabrication of Electrical
Cable Tray Hangers, Conduit Supports and Auxiliary Steel, Rev.1
- QCP-10.11 Mechanical Equipment Installation Inspection, Rev. 5
Westinghouse Construction Services (Westinghouse)
Division I
QAPM Addenda for South Texas' Project (yellow pages)
- QAPM Addenda, Section 15.0 Nonconformances, Rev. 9
QAPM Addenda, Section 16.0 Corrective Action, Rev. 7
- STP Project Quality Plan, Rev. 4
Pittsburgh DesMoines St' eel Company (PDM)
Corporate Quality Assurance Manual (CQAM) ASME Section III, 1981
Edition, Rev. 8
CQAM Appendix 202 (for STP), Section 12, Nonconformances and
Corrective Action
Richmond Engineering Company (RECO)
Quality Assurance Manual, South Texas Project, Rev. 3
Intermach Company (Intermach)
Quality Assurance Manual (The Bahnson Co.), Rev. 9
VIII-2
.
-
-.
m .
J
- QFP-15.001 Nonconfonning Items, Rev. 4
- QFP-16.001 Corrective Action, Rev.1
- QFP-8.001 Identification and Control of Materials, Parts and
.
'
Components, Rev. 3
- QFP-9.001 Control of Welding Processes, Rev. 3
- * QCI-013 Control of Nonconforming Items, Rev. 2
Prescon Corp. (Prescon)
- Quality Assurance Program, Rev. 10
Champion, Inc. (Champion)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 26
Pittsburgh' Testing Laboratory-(PTL)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 8
1. Corrective Action Measures
a. Inspection Scope
A review was performed of applicable portions of the Quality
Assurance (QA) program and procedures. In addition to QA manuals
and procedures, a total of 439 samples of corrective action docu-
ments were reviewed. . Also,'16. samples-of closed nonconformances
involving material / equipment were inspected for verification of
corrective actions in the plant. In' addition, 58 samples of open
nonconfonnances were selected for verification of " HOLD" status.
b. Inspection Findings
In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in place
for corrective action systems to identify and control the
correction of conditions adverse to quality at the site. Except
for concerns discussed below, the corrective action systems and
implementing measures were found to be acceptable. The 16
material / equipment samples requiring rework in the plant were
inspected, and corrective action control was verified.
(1)' Fastener Materials
Numerous problems with fastener material discrepancies on large
vendor-supplied ASME pump / motor assemblies and other vendor
equipment were found by the NRC CAT inspectors for which
effective corrective actions were not previously evident.
See Section VI.B for details. These problems indicate a
lack of attention by vendors to ensure that fasteners of
required materials are specified and provided with delivered
items, a lack of effective quality control at vendors'
VIII-3
1
'
.
~
plants, and also a lack of vendor surveillance by the licensee
wi_th ' attention to' verification of proper fasteners prior to
shipment.
'
(2) Preventive Maitenance (PM)
Review of the PM program revealed that numerous problems have
been encountered, including overlubrication and contamination
due to commingling of lubricants.. Seven fan motors, after
- turnover to Startup, .were _later found to have been
overlubricated.
Review of PM history of four Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (three
motor: driven and one turbine driven) revealed repeated
corrosion problems. One unit seized and could not be
rotated. Rotating . elements of the four_ units had to be
returned to the ' vendor for repairs.
.The NRC Resident Inspection Office has issued inspection
reports (85-08 and 85 11) on PM deficiencies. Also, Ebasco
issued a Management Corrective Action Report .MCAR-13 dated
February 23, 1985 which contains a list of 106 deficiencies and
resulted in a major review and reorgnization of the PM program.
Of parti _cular concern is the current practice of the' licensee _
accepting turnover packages and preparing operational
maintenance programs assuming that the past PM history is
good without assessing potential for damage to the equipment
due to past PM deficiencies. The potential long term effects
of' the lack of proper maintenance-has not been addressed and
documented, and it does not appear that measures-(reference:
OPGP03-ZM-0002 Preventive Maintenance Program, Rev. O, dated
5-15-85) were in place to. provide for damage assessment and.
'
evaluation.
(3) Nondestructive Examination (NDE)/ Radiographic Testing (RT)
Audits; Records Retrieval
Review of'the total .of 21 prior audits of welding /NDE revealed
only two audits that addressed RT records packages and
retrievability (audits M11-301 and G35-502). These two audits
included three weld joints for one audit and six weld joints
for the other. The total of 9 weld joints (of approximately
25,000 field weld joints) is a very small sample to have been
audited. NRC CAT examination of the radiographs for'two of the
three welds for audit M11-301 found them to have deficiencies,
' indicating that the audits.were limited in scope and depth
(see Section IV.B 'for details).
None of the 21 prior audits covered vendor NDE/RT records.
Requests for information to identify vendors that were
required to supply radf ographs were not'readily answered.
Some radiographs from vendors involving plant equipment were
not made available to the NRC CAT inspectors, and in some
VIII-4
cases could not be located. A method for identifying vendors,
equipment and related radiographs was not available at the
start of the CAT inspection (see Section IV.B for details).
The required records retrieval for RT film was not evident
during this inspection, and raises questions regarding the
ability of the licensee to verify the required product quality,
if records are not readily available.
'(4),, Significant Deficient Corrective Actions for Certain Electrical
Items: Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) and Motor Control Centers MCC)
Corrective action deficiencies related to unauthorized
electrical wiring of MOVs furnished by Westinghouse were noted
by the NRC CAT inspectors (see Section II.8). Questionable
QA and corrective action activities involving design change
control, field modification and inspection were indicated. It
was noted that no audits or surveillances of Westinghouse
activities related to MOVs had been conducted. However, one
HL&P audit report, S26-501 dated September 24, 1985 addr(ssed
field wiring changes by Westinghouse on other electrical equip-
ment inspected and accepted at the site without prior written
authorization for the changes. The response by Westinghouse
noted a procedure change for accelerated Field Change Notice
(FCN) work to require written authorization prior to the work.
Also, a project team audit S15-501 dated April 15, 1985
referenced a prior HL&P audit M24-501 of Westinghouse which
addressed deficiencies in the electrical area. It appears that
the generic aspects of these audit results were not applied by
Westinghouse to the MOV~ work.
Also, corrective action deficiencies related to faulty bus
extensions of circuit breakers in MCCs procured by Bechtel
were noted by the NRC CAT inspectors (see Section II.B).
(5) Open Nonconformances " HOLD" Status Control
Open Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) and related equipment
requiring " HOLD" tags for 58 items were reviewed for
verification. " HOLD" tags for 13 items (22%) were missing or
improperly controlled.
Since " HOLD" tags are required to be used as a means of
controlling quality, attention and action are required to
assure proper application and maintenance of "H0LD" tags on
nonconforming material and equipment. As a result of this NRC
CAT finding, Bechtel issued General Surveillance Report SB 727
to document incorrect " HOLD" tag control,
c. Conclusions
The licensee's corrective action program was found to be generally
acceptable, except for the following concerns:
VIII-5
r-
(1) Failure to assure that fasteners of required materials were
furnished with vendor supplied equipment.
(2) Failure for Operations to assess and evaluate damage to
equipment due to past PM deficiencies and incorporate such
considerations into operational maintenance programs.
(3) Failure to conduct a reasonable quantity of audits of actual
radiographs of both field welds and vendor supplied welds.
Also, failure'to assure that vendors required to supply
radiographs were readily identified and that the location of
radiographs / records were known and readily retrievable as
required.
(4) Failure to identify the need for effective corrective action
activities for certain electrical items: MOVs and MCCs.
(5) Failure to properly apply and control " HOLD" tags on
nonconforming material and equipment.
(6) There appears to be a need for more ~ attention to generic and
lessons-learned aspects of the corrective action program to
help reduce deficiencies and avoid recurrence.
VIII-6
C
L
r _ , , - -
.~ l r
,
p .
L~
j;;
,
-TABLE VIII-1
p CORRECTIVE' ACTION SAMPLES
[
>
JItems/ Reports Quantity Examined
L HLP BEC EBA' WES PDM -REC INT PTL- TOTAL
L . Trend 3* *- * ~3 - - -
6
- . Audit' 41* * * 6 3 '-- -1 -
51
- Nonconformance 17 61 69 6 5 5 .12 5 180
l- ~
Deviation -- - -
10 8 -
.15 -
33.
Inspe'ct' ion
-
-
5 18 - - - 4 -
27
l- . Surveilla'nce -14 19 12 - - - - -
45
i
"
- Corrective Action 9 18 12 - - - - -
39
L
!
Deficiency Eval. 10 10 - - - - - -
.20
i :Mgt. Corrective - -
4 - - - - -
4
l
,
. Action-
Inspection 9 - - - - - - ~ -: 9
r. Efficiency-
l
L
/Stop Work ~ 3 -
1 - - - .
-
'4
Turnover. Packages 20 - - - - - --
. 20
p
-T
~
TOTA'l TE6 TIT IT6 Y5 T6 72 - !i. . TJB
'
L_ HLP = Houston' Lighting and Power Company
BEC = Bechtel Power-Corporation
=
',
. EBA = Ebasco Services Incorporated
L . WES =. Westinghouse. Construction Services
D PDM = Pittsburgh DesMoines Steel. Company
REC = Richmond Engineering Company
.
INT.= Intermach Company
PTL = Pittsburgh.. Testing Laboratories
-
v
- Joint (HLP,. BEC, and EBA) trend and audit program samples listed under' HLP, ,
' l
l
l
l
l
VIII-7-
1
L___'
_
ATTACHMENT A
A. PERSONS CONTACTED
The following list identifies 1 censee representatives and NRC personne1'
4
present at the exit meeting, and licensee discipline coordinators and key
individuals-contacted during the inspection for each area.
1. Exit Meeting
Houston Lighting and Power Company
F. L. Alkov G. Goldberg T. H. McGriff
J. Bevins S. Head R. C. Munter
P. F. Boyle R. Hernandez A. G. Peterson
D. P. Bradley S. R. Hubbard G. B. Rogers
R. J. Daly M. F. Hutcheson M. T. Sweigart
S. Dew T. J. Jordan W. Trujille
F. Dotson D. R. Keating J. Westermeier
J. E. Geiger W. H. Kinsey, Jr. W. R. Whitley
M. R. Wisenburg
Bechtel Energy Corporation
R. D. Bryan L. W. Hurst -R. L. Rogers
J. L. Hurley D. R. Quattrochiocchi R. Wilkerson
Ebasco Services, Incorporated
A. M. Cutrona W. Taylor R. W. Zaist
R. A. Harrington
Westinghouse Ele-tric Corporation
D. M. Bokesch C. W. Rowland F. J. Twogood
H. L. Hogarth S. R. Spiegelman R. J. Von Osinski
NRC and Consultants
S.' Baron D. Garrison T. McLellan W. Sperko
D. Carpenter G. Georgiev 0. Mallon S. Stein
L. Constable R. Heishman E. Martindale R. Taylor
R. Compton C. Johnson J. Nemoto R. Vollmer
A. DuBouchet R. Kadambi M. Peranich
D. Ford J. McCormack H. Phillips
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2. Licensee Coordinators and Contacts'
Area' Contact
= Team-Leader- R. Hernandez
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W. Trujillo
- Electrical and Instrumentation D. Bradley-
D.-Richter
J. Bagley
Mechanical M. Hutchesan.
S.' Hubbard
J. Bagley
C. Brewer
A. Benyo
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Welding and NDE S. Hubbard
R. Abel-
R.. Lewis
Civil and Structural 'T. McGriff
J.-Stevens
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Material. Traceability F. Alkov
J. Senecal
~~R. Fish
Corrective Action Systems E..Luder
-J. Hansen
Design Change. Controls - K. McNeal
.In addition to the above personnel, numerous other inspectors, engineers-
and supervisors were also contacted.
~ B. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED.
The types of documents listed below were-reviewed by the NRC CAT members-
to the extent necessary to satisfy ~the inspection objectives stated in.
'Section I of this report. There are' additional references within the
body of.the report to' specific procedures, instructions, specifications
and drawings.
1. F.inal Safety Analysis Report and. Safety Evaluation Report
.
2. lQualityassurancemanual
'3. ' Quality assurance procedures and instructions
4. ' Quality control procedures and instructions
5. Administrative procedures
6. General. electrical installation precedures and specifications
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7. General instrumentation . installation procedures and specifications.
- 8.r : General piping and pipe support installation procedures and
specifications
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9. General mechanical equipment . installation procedures and
specifications-
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!10. -General concrete specifications !
11. As-built. drawings
12.. Welding and NDE procedures
.13. Personne1~ qualification records
14. Material traceability procedures
15. ---Procedures for processing design changes
16. .-Procedures for document control
-17. . Procedures for controlling as-built drawings
18. . Procedures for processing nonconformances
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~ ATTACHMENT B
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS.
_ .
A/E - Architect-engineer
'AISC. - American Institute of Steel Construction
ANSI '- American National Standards Institute
'
ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers
' ASTM .American Society for Testing and Materials
AWG - American Wire Gage
AWS --American Welding Society
'ATWS' - Anticipated transient without scram
BBC- -TBlount Brothers Company
BEC_ ' -~Bechtel Engineering Corporation
-BR- - Brown & Root, Inc.
, . CAR- - Corrective Action Report
CAT - Construction _ Appraisal. Team (NRC)
'
CB&I. - Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
CCP - Configuration Control Package
C of C - Certificate of Conformance
CEA - Concrete expansion anchor
, CMTR- ~- Certified material test report
CPS -Construction Process Sheet
CSP - Construction Site Procedure
.DCN Drawing Change Notice
DEF - Deficiency Evaluation Form
DER - Deficiency Evaluation Report
-
DR ' - Deviation Report
ECN : Engineering Change Notice
- Essential Cooling Water
~
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ECW
, EDP- - Engineering Department Procedure
'
.ERSA - Engineering Request for Site Action
'FCN '- Field Change. Notice
FCR - Field Change Request
FDCC Field Document' Control Center
-FRLL - Field Revision List
. FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report
HEco - Hatfield Electric Company
I
HL&P - Houston Lighting and Power Company
'
Hunter- - Hunter Corporation
.HVAC - Heating, ventilating and air conditioning
- IE - Office of Inspection and Enforcement (MC)
'IEEE
-
- Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
L IPCEA - Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association
'
LP -- - Liquid penetrant inspection
LOCA - Loss-of-coolant accident
MCC. - Motor Control Center
MCM - Thousand circular mils
MIC - Midway Industrial Company.
MOV - Motor operated valve
!- NCR - Nonconformance Report
j3 NDE - Nondestructive examination
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NISCo - Nuclear Installation Service Company
' Nuclear Power Service, Inc.
~
NPS'
NRR - Office'of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
NRC .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-
'
.NSSS. - Nuclear. steam system supplier
PAP - Powers-Azco-Pope
. PDM - Pittsburgh Des Moines Corporation
PED Project Engineering Directive-
PSAR . Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report
PSI - Preservice inspection
PTL' - Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories'
QA - Quality assurance
QAI - Quality Assurance Instruction
QAM' - Quality Assurance Manual.
QC - Quality Control-
QCP - Quality-Control Procedure
~
QR - Quality Requirement
RG' - Regulatory Guide (NRC)
RHR - Residual Heat Removal System
RSM - Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc.
RTD -- - Resistance Temperature Detector
.SAR - Safety Analysis Report
SDR -. Standard Deficiency Report
SEO. - Site Engineering Organization
SIP - Site Implementation Procedure
SSP - Standard Site. Procedure
SWI - Site Work Instruction
SWR- - Startup Work Request
UT - Ultrasonic inspection
V - Volt
VT. - - Visual inspection
- Westinghouse Electric Corporation
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NRC Form 8-C
(4-79)
NRCM 0240
o
COVER SHEET FOR CORRESPONDENCE
Use this Cover Sheet to Protect Originals of Multi-Page Correspondence.
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