ML20151T347

Forwards Info for Record of 810625 Meeting of TMI-1 Subcommittee on Abbott Memo Concerning Facility Accident.I&E Conclusion Is Open to Interpretation That Info Intentionally Withheld

ML20151T347
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	07/06/1981
From:	Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS
To:	Moeller D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Shared Package
ML20151T279	List: IA-87-728, Comments on Statements Made at 811221 Commission Meeting Re Info Flow During Facility Accident.Inconsistencies Highlighted IA-87-853, Discusses Subj of Info Intentionally or Willfully Withheld During Facility Accident.Record Shows NRC Statements Logically Inconsistent W/One Another ML20151T277 ML20151T286 ML20151T330 ML20151T347 ML20151T352 ML20151T363
References
FOIA-87-728, FOIA-87-853 NUDOCS 8804280657
Download: ML20151T347 (7)

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l Dr . D . W Moeller Chairman, subcommittee on Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 l

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am enclosing information for the record of the June 25

) meeting of the TMI-l Subcom=ittee concerning Mr. Abbott's l

memorandum on matters relating to the accident at Three Mile Island. My comments are addressed primarily to the statement submitted at your meeting by the General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU). This statement contains an incomplete selection of citations concerning the findings of the various l

TMI inquiries with regard to reporting failures that occurred during the accident. The GPU statement also fails to express any explicit difference between the GPU position and the con-clusions of the Interior Committee Staff report. Because . .

the GPU statement does not take specific exception to any -

of the Interior Committee Staff report findings with regard to reporting of information in the possession of TMI managers --

information that the staff believes these managers understood to be relevant to the severity of the accident -- a reader could infer that GPU is in general agreement with the Interior.

Committee's staf f's findings and conclusions.

While it does not specifically' disagree with our staff conclusiens, the GPU statement does nevertheless imply that the Interior Committee report was based on an incomplete analysis of the record, and that the Interior staff findings l

were in substantial disagreement with the findings of the other inquiries. Your Committee may wish to take note of the fact that the TMI inquiries were less conclusive on <

l this matter than is implied by the GPU statement. For example, the President's Commission touched only superfically on the reporting issue; it apparently d,id not consider certain items of infor=ation that were in the available record and 1

other information became available only following ce=pletion i 8804280657 880422 i PDR FOIA CONNOR87-728 PDR

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'of She Commission's report. In addition, Governor Babbitt, a Commission member, was not satisfied with this aspect of the inquiry; he included an addendum in which he stated:

... the Commission with its limited time and resources did not pursue in detail the issue of whether facts, known by Met-Ed on the first day of the accident, were not communicated to NRC and state officials.

"It now appears that there is evidence to indicate that Met-Ed technicians understood, within a few hours of the accident, that the nuclear core had been uncovered and that this specific information was transmitted to supervisory personnel at the plant early Wednesday. There seems to be little question that the technicians who took the temperature readings that morning understood what they found. The real question is what happened to this .information and whether it was transmitted to the appropriate management personnel. It certainly did not get transmitted to responsible public officials, including Lieutenant Governor Scranton during a meeting with Met-Ed that af ternoon.

"This incident again demonstrates the total inadequacy of the utility's internal co=munication sys tem and raises serious ,

questions about crisis management. As a Governor, it seems to me beyond question that a responsible public official must have innediate access to all available information about the status of a nuclear accident.

l "There is no question that this information '

l might have influenced state and federal concerns over the need for evacuation then and subsequently.

Whether or not an evacuation should have been ordered on the bcsis of the evidence known at the time is not particularly relevant now, but the fact of the matter is that key decision-makers --

those responsible for the public health and safety of the citizens -- did not have access to the l information that was known to the utility. .

"This issue should be intensely scrutini:ed by other investigatory bodies continuing the inquiry into nuclear power and this accident."

(Report of the president's Commission, p. 33-84.)

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While the NRC Special Inquiry Group (SIG) did make the statements quoted in the GPU memorandum, these statements j are ambiguous. Please note that the cites from pages 156 and 159 of the SIG report are inconsistent with one another; the first states that,

. . . we found no evidence that officials frcm either the utility or the regulatory agency willfully provided "f alse information to the press or public." The second )

states:

. . . we concluded tha t the evidence f ailed to establish j that Met-Ed management or other personnel willfully. withheld l inf o rma tion from NRC . " The first statsnent says there i is no evidence and the second that there is evidence but that 1 is insufficient to establish willfullness. The first statement avoids the question of whether there might be a dif ference between "willfully providing false information" and withholding information that the managers understood to be relevant to the severity of- the accide.nt. The second statement in claiming that the " . . . evidence failed to establish" that Met-Ed personnel "willfully withheld information from the NRC" does not address the question of whether information might have been willfully withheld from the State of Pennsylvania.

Nor does the SIG make clear where it stands between the extremes of concluding information was or was not willfully withheld.

In briefing the Commission on the report, moreover, Mr. Fra=pton was less definitive; he said, "There is definitely conflicting testimony.

There are things that don' t make coherent sense to us. We made a judgment about the weight of the evidence. We found that, while there is some evidence to suggest that there is an intentional withholding of information, tha t the weight of the evidence doesn't support that, others could come to a different conclusion based on the evidence that we developed." '

(NRC Commission Transcript, 6/24/80, p. 60, lines 4-11.)

I would like to note also that contrary to the impression conveyed by the GPU statement, the conclusory statements of Messrs. Rogovin and Frampton in their March 4 memorandum are ambiguous, stating merely that in their minds the evidence was more supportive of their previous conclusion, as sta ted in the SIG report, than of willful withholding.

on page 66 of his March 4, 1980 memorandum, in answering the question as to whether Metropolitan Edison of ficials had an obligation to report certain significant information such as the pressure pulse recording and other manifestations

of'a hydrogen detonation at 1:50 a.m. on March 28, 1979, Mr. Frampton stated that:

"Station Manager Gary Miller has said he was not aware of the spike at the time, but others have testified that he was, and it appears more likely than not that he was made awars of it."

This conflict in testimony is important since the pressure pulse was one of the principal events leading the NRC to recognize the seriousness of the accident when the Commission learned of it nearly two days af ter it occurred.

With regard to the Senate inquiry, Senators Hart and Simpson apparently were not satisfied that the reporting matter has been resolved since following the conclusion of their inquiry they sent the attached letter to the Commission failures.

asking for further consideration of the reporting In referring to the latest inquiry conducted by the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E), the GPU memorandum does not note that one of the conclusions of NURIG 0760 was that: .

"Met-Ed was not fully forthcoming on March 28, 1979 in that they did not appraise the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of either the uncertainty concerning the adequacy of core cooling or the potential for degradation of plant conditions." (NUREG 0760, p. 11, 64.)

This I&E conclusion is open to an interpretation that information was intentionally withheld. Furthermore, during your June 25 meeting, the Director of the Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement ,

stated explicit agreement with the first sentence in the conclusion of the Interior committee report. Mr. Stello was not asked whether he agreed with the second and third sentences of the report's conclusion.

I am bringing this matter to your attention because I believe it important that the managers of all nuclear generating stations be aware of the reasons for reporting failures at Three Mile Island; I would hope tha t the ACRS could help to make this clear by stating its own conclusion as to the cause of inaccurate reporting on March 28, 1979, incerely, h

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Henerable Jchn F. Ahearne Acting Chai man .

Nuclear Regula:ery Co==ission Washington , D.C., 205 53

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Now that the Subce=i::ee en Nuclear Regulation has completed the repor: of its specia.1' investigation of the Three Mile Island accident, we would like to bring to your attentien certain matters that our inquiry was unable to pursue to the fulles: extent possible, either beca.use of a.

new documen s l.ack escame Ina: .of re sava:.,

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sere s .andtoo 3a:e-time to or se becau. s e of.

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These matter.s per ain : the utility's' response during

.ne :: s: day o:. tne ac:iden , particularly to the ouesti:n of whe:her vital inf e ma.:icn en pis.n: condi:icns was' known to key utility personnel and was cc:-hunicated orc =n:1v to NRC and ic S::: officials. Inasmuch as the O'ffic'e o'd Inspectica and Enfercement is now cenduc-ing an i:,ves-iga-icn a: the direction cf the Co=ission inte related matters raised by Congressman Udall, we would apprecia e 'i: if,:his .. ..

investigation also would pursue the following =a- ers tha-are an outgrow-n o: the Sent e Specia.1 Investiga. tion.

1. According to the so-called "Key people . Meeting" Tame -

of April 14, 1979, the head of the u-ili y's Emergency C'o==and Tes.: was told that the incere ther= occupies might have mel ed and was given this informa:icn as the basis for censidering

• them u . relia'cle . h*han the hea.d of the utility's Emergency -

Cc=s.nd Team discussed the readings from the incere ther=o-ceuples as unreliable, did.he consider the cessiblity tha:

temocratures sufficien to knoch ou the -h'ermocoucles were als'c sufficient to indica e un:'es ering of -he reac':e; cere ? ,

Did he dis. cuss this possibili y wi-h me=bers of .he Eme:ge .cs-Cc===nd Te.m? Was there any discussien cf -he need c ce==uf.-

ica e -he possibility of such high tempera ure tu -he NM and the State? If not, wht: is .he explant.icn?

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.. of the other investigatiensncy Cc==and

2. Our evidence and thatthe headabcut of the utility's Emerge 6:30 A.M. that the

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indicste was inf or=ed by telep(hone atPOEV) was It is not closed. tha: ti=e, Tez:

essurize relief valve the PORV hadmed at i

known, some however, time during whether the first he dcy, had tha:was beencicsed.inic If he or at d

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.why e awa'r e of this inf to the NRC or te the1:State?

er=a-ioncon=unicate did he no: .

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d been uncevered fe:

- 2 told the Senate Special investethers During this period hadthe been concern period of hou:s afteestablished 6: 45 A.M.with contac: bcth the by conveyed State the and utility.the utili:v this inf er=ation was no:

conveyed?

NRC, but Why was the infer =ation not :ne

3. :.c: be-ween wha:

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.e .ater :c.cce==.unica at.TMI-1 n

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s: czy,)anc was:as te whe-her he believed a: 10:15 A.M. o: (I53 Tape 226 Can this apparen-153 inves-iga:c;s the core was ccvered. l d?

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a. he afternoon of the first. day - -

he Sena:e 5:ecial Invest the "hvdregeh spike" during -However, cur evidence shews that utili y dge

1 roca had kncvle of the' acciden .erscnnel How in the is this neighboring apparen- i l of Uni:-1 difference the utility con:: be-ween of the hydrogen spike.was knowni byd?the top emergency offic a .

what and bv o-her utility personnel expla ne .

- . head c:. tne -

6. Can you provice in:er:stion on wha- the her key u-ility ~

utility's Emergency Command Team and he Lieutenant Also et what Governcr's d'id the officials discussed on the way to t ike?

discuss with of fice shor:1y af ter the hydrogen sphead .

-he plan:

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'ofegarding the acciden knowledge by utility persennel of the yseveriis the 5:ste? that was ne:

communicated to the NRC or c taoe that Was there any additional cenversation on the subsec.uen:was not recorded in the ::anscrip , or vere there Me: Id or GPU headquarters? recorded conversations be:veen and the plar.

8. Similarly, a. eper:

vender's site operations manager to the company was not available that indicates te us during our investigation.

immediately af ethe inmegrity of the containmentThis was report checke'd the hydrogen spike. What is the signifi-cance of this information regarding and other key personnel at the plant abcutwas known by him what and occurred?the significance of the hydrogen spike atthe existence the time i

9. Assuming tha: .

acknowledgement by the the utili Miller-Treffer y that opera'ing tape indicates t

were si uation,'inadequa:e why did fornotcoping with an ur.preceden procedures and th'e'S a:e the inadequacy of these procedures?the u oy means We vould of the appreciate Iu,:- anvestiga

. your pursuing these' sa :ers re:::1v en

'stzifs inic;med 'on the pregre:s s an. r: ease keep us anc.. our interviews of the involved pitn and d the results of you: -

util,ity personnel.

Finally, we unde

or uthe I51 investiga:i.en is s e e r.:. ng to determine n.rstand e neec.tha:

.s en licensees for reperting on plan:pgrac.ng N..C reeuiremen s.

conditions and on :he need for consideration of protective action during an acciden:

ei eur investigation -- thatIn this regard, please advise us on wh .

condition that uncertainty itself is a plan- -

should be considered in determining the need for trecautionary durihg an acciden:evacuation or other protective action review of NRC reporting requirements.-- is being considered of this as par our s affsreport promp-ly advised on whether a utility Please will bekeet us and r'equired to any uncertainty as to whether a core is coverso such a recuirement. and on how uncertainty wo,uld be defined for use in Thanh .ou sc

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a 5 EE 20701ITAN-EDI5CN (TMI II)  :

s 6 --,----------------X 7 Confere:ce loca D-u

.Hovard J hnson 30to: Inn 8 473 Eisenhove: Roulevarf Har:isbu:;, Pen =sfivania S

Frid17, Septesbe: 5, 1960 to Interview of

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12 called for by the Nuclea: 3equistoc7 C:m=issien, pu:suza: to 13 nott'ce, at 3:15 a.s. .

14 on 5=htif of ' M e v ue17 9 - **e"lite-" C --irrie.s 15 IERST HARPSTIE, Of fica of Inspection and 16 Info:cament T7 J O H N 'J . 03AI", offica of Iss;ecti:: and Infe:cecent VB 3325AN C. 205ELIY, Office of Inspection t:f Enforcasent i 19 DAVID H. G A 31E, Of fica of Inspector and Acdito:

20 RICHAED X. HOIFLI3G, Cffice Of Executive legal It Dirsets: .

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24 Ihav, Pittman, P:tts C T:o'thrifva 1500 3 Street , N. 'i .

!5 Washi:cten, D. C. 20036

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. 4 1

A So=e pressure to =ge t that tine, yes. I think I 2 knew that the p:esident of the company semehev was 3 involved.

I think I knew a lot of that stuff. Yes, tha t 4

put scae pressu e on my mind, seconds:7 to what was going :

5 the e, but pressure, yes.

6

!! 3R. GA531Z:

7 Q 5:. Eliier, about how much time was there between 8 when you heard about the seating, and when you left fo: the 9 aceting, do you have any recoilection?

10 A I think I hea:d about it s'omewhe:e in the 11 noon-time, and atybe it was after.

I think it was at least 12 an hour, but it is ha:d to comember.

Not ten minutes as -

13 opposed to in hour, that is what I as trying to say.

14

!Y EE. MOSILIT:

15 Q Go'ing ts:k to our list of things that mi;ht have 16 been discussed during the trip to Earrisbu:7. Was the 17 p:isary systen invente:7, o r invento:7 deficienc7 dise:ssed ?

! 18 A I think so, as is:

. _ _ . as the condition of the pushs 19 not starting, and. th e re asoning for tha t some of that. I 20 l

. believe some of that..vis discussed.

21 Q And celated to .this as an indication of -.

22 insuffi:1ent ;;ist:7 systed invento:7?

23 A Tes.

24 Q vis the extent of cera damage di curred ?

25 A Trom the standpoint Of :2diation :endine, and ALtt?SCN *E?tRT'NG ::Mpany, :NC.

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1 stuf f -- I : anno t specifi: ally remember.

2 Q Was the inability to establish f :ced flev (

3 cooling, o= natural tir clation, c: eff active as tural 4 ci =giation discussed?

5 A I as pretty sure that was disenssed and the 6 actions that we hat'taken.

7 The potential for the situation deteriorating?

8 A I can't resember in what to::s that would ha re S been discussed. The situation deteriorating, or the 10 situation we had versus where ve vere goin; vas disetssed.

1T I as not su:e ve tried to think cf ways it could 12 deteriorate, and we discussed tho se . I think we ' vere 13 dis :ssing mora where ve vere at, and where we voce g:ing, 14 and implied in that is that concern to no. That is th e be s 15 answer I can give you on that.

16 Q Was the pressu:e spike discussed?

17 1 No.

18 C Were you givert any guidance, specific or gene:21, 19 as to what was or was not to be discussed during the 20 briefing?

l 21 A

The only guidance *.

that I was given vould be that I

)

22 would be available to ansver on details. There was nething i

t I

23 that was discusset relative to not talking, act disenssing.

24 There was no infortation that was s;ecifically labeled, set 25 for discussion.

r l

AL:tPs:N at*0R*NG :: Mea NY, we,

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1 As is: as th e le a d e r fo r th e se e tic s , 1.t would 1 have been Jach, with me available to as;11f7 and help hi:,

3 without any restriction over what I would be allowed to say, 4 or could say.

5 Q On the other side, you vece not given any guida:ce 6 as to what was *o be discussed, other than :espondisq to 7 questions.

8 A Other than I assused from the discussions ve had, 9

it would have been Jack's position to b lef and ansve:

10 questions.

11 0 To your kno wled;e, was anyone else given guidance 12 ss to what was to be discussed c: not to b,e discussed duri:q 13 the briefing?

1A A No t to sy knowledge.

15 . Q Were'you given an7 quidance by anyone with regard 16 to, let us say, putting the bes: light on the situatio , or TT not volunteering unnecessar7 1: formation, or something of i

18 that nature? -

19 A I can't remember any direction of that natu:e.

20 Q Io your knowledge, was anyone else give cuidance 21 in this :egs:d? '

21 A Not to my knoviadge.

23 0 The thought comec to mind that perhaps %:. Xunde 24 nay have been given s:ch guidance. Are you avare whether he 25 was or was not given such guidance? .

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0 1 A I don't rese:bar his.bein; civen any guidanca like 2 that.

3 Q T: the bast =f your knowledge, which of the 4 gollowin g -- again I have a list of items -- ve:e discussed 5 with th e pao;1e as=embled at the ileutenant Governo:'s 6 beiafin;. And, I will also add here that I as ava:e tha:

7 you vere not there duri:q the entire period, so of course 8 only spaak to thosa thin;s which cccu::ed while you vere 9 th e r e .

10 Was the core uncovery or its possibility discussed?

11 ,A I think issurance of co:e coverage was dise:ssed El and the actions that we vere taking to assure wate: ft:ving K3 to the co:e. I don 't have any other memory of any 14 dis =:ssima tion; those lines,, other than I am sure ve 15 discussed the actions we were taking to naintais vate:.

16 Q Eut there was knovied;e or suspi:icn that the ee:e T7 any not be uncovered at that ti=e, and that was not 18 dis :ssed.

19 A I don't understand what you :ean by that

~

20 question.

21 Q There was kncvlad7e that the core had not been

.s ZZ uncovered, and migh t be uncove:1d at the time you brief ed l 23 tha Liectenant Governor, is this right?

l l 24 A 2 hat do you :ean by that? Oc you mean some of the l

15 dis:cssion we have ht?. here : d2y?

l l

l ALCERSCN 8tPC A*t40 CCMP ANY, ;NC.

s<

N; P. . . . 155 1 Q Yes.

1 A I as trying to say that the inic::a-lon assembled 3 was asseebled to show the plant status, no differently than 4 what we discussed enriie=, what was recogni:ed and what 5 wasn 't . Thace vss no attes; not to ;:cvida inf ormatio n

.6 along any lines.

7 Q Sut at the time you vere b:iefing the Lieutenant 8 Governor, 5:. Kunder has testified that he was aware that 9 the cc:e had been uncovered earlier, and he had sc=a 10 suspicion that thace was a ;cszibility of continued 11 uncovery. You have testified today of you: knowled;e or 12 thoughts along this line.

13 'My question is, was this discussed at the

- - - ~ ~ _ . . . . . ~ . . . .

14 leutenant Governce's briefing?

15 A I don't camenber it being discussed, and in the 16 car either on the way over.

17 Yo.u have said that George has testified th a 18 had this knaviedge. You did not tell se Gec ce testified 19 that this was the knowledge that ha brief ed us on on the way 20 in the est.

m Q That is cc::ect, I did not say that.

22 A I~ don't remember an7 of tha t disenssion in the es:

23 c: in the Governor's office.

Again, I to askin; whether c: not these thin;s 24 Q 25 veri included in the Lisutsnant Geve rn::'s b ria:!ing. 'is s AL::1.8 5CN 8 E80PTNG 0*'.tP ANY, 'N O. .

?

m l i

16r 1 supac-heat discussad in the Lieu t en a n t Governo:'s briefing?

2 A I can't resember.

3 Q Was plant stability discussed in the Lieutenant 4 Governor's briefin;?

5 A I. can 't specifically remember hov -- I am sure 6 that gart of oc: pu: pose was to discuss the condition. I an 7 not sure how that was discussed. I say not have been in 8 there if that was discussed.

9 Q Was the prina:7 system invento:7, or the 10 deficiency in the invento:7 discussed in the Lieu enant 11 Cova:nor's b:infin;?

12 1 It vas'part of the infor:atinn assenbled. I don't 13 einember Li it sas or 1: vasn't. I don ' t :nmember b eing in 14 there when that was discussed.

15 Q Was thera discussion of the extent of core 16 da age? .

r7 A I personsiiy canno t re= ember yes or no on that .,

~ '

18 today. ..

19 Q Ihe inabiilty to astablish f orced flow cooling or 20 effective naturai ci:cuiation, was that discussed?

21 A I can ' d remember.., I believe that I was pcebably 22 in haif of that_ sesting , you know.

23 Q I unde: stand.

24 A I could have been in less than half, I don't 3 remember. I knov ! vas out of it a lot.

n:t=s:N atacar.No ::ww. .s .

16 1 Q I unde: stand that. ,

2 Q Uas the potential for detarie:ation or fu:the:

3 detericcation f the situation discussed in the briefinq  !

l 4 while you vere present?

5 A I personally cannot remembe:.

6 Q Was the pressure spike discussed at the Lieutenant 7 Governer's briefing while you were present? i 8 A Not while I was present.

9- Q Could you ex;1ain to us what your perception of 10 the tone of the briafing f or the Lieutenant Governo: vas?

11 A  ?.T perception was that it was to provide an 12 accurate, objective status of the piant and our actions.

13 The tcne of the setting was ve:7 fo:nal in that aspect.

14 Also, to ansver any questions. I have no othe: recollection 15 of the tone o5 the meeting.

16 Q You conclude that tone das;ite the se:1es of 17 questions that we have jEist gone th:ough on what you believa 18 was included in the briefing?

19 A You asked me for zy is; escion of the seating.

2D Tou have asked se t io.jef specifies about what was resente:

21 discussed in the saeting , and the fact that I don 't 22 is just*that I don't :ase:be:.

There was enough information f - - .

23 assesbh.edtohaveadiscussioninthat se e :ing f:ss vhare ve 24 th ou gh t w e .v.e c,u go t a g a t that time.

25 I conclude that on :ne var ve a;; :a:hed the AL 1ASCN AUC A1".?JG COMP ANY. INC.

4 ::::: 534. :45

- _ _ .- __. . __ _ ,- -- __ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ . _... ...es__.

< w wa s mC :., e e, ::c:_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .

J 182 1

1 manting more than the "I don 't remembers" that you have had 1 ne put out here about whether I camembe: this in the 3 raeting, which was a long time ago .

4 I as sayiSg that 27 "I don't remembecs," and my 5

is; ession of the m e e ting I don't think should be cou;1ed it.

6 sy sind.

7 Q I guess I would have expected the basis for that 8

conclusion of the tone to have had a a::e lasting 9 impression, but if that is your recollection, that is your 10 recollection. .

11 . A I think when you go th:ough a period of a son-h 12.,

where.you voch every hour of the day, exce; . f or very f ew, 13 it is very hard to re= amber a year and a half later. I 14- think it is unreassnatia for a hu=an haing. I don't think 15 you can verify medically that th a t is possihla. I really 16 believe that.

17 It has been a year and a half.

It made a heck of .

18 an in;tession, but I had four veeks of impressions, four 19 weeks of thea, and I don't think that it is a reasonshie 20 conclusion on your part.

21 ER. BLAXI: He was also not in a good pa:t of the 22 matting, whi:h may be vny ha does not essestar.

23 SY 53. 503ILIT.

24 0 its the Liautenant Governer teid tht: the 25 situatics vio under cente:17 . .- .

At:esen aucamo ::a.tuny. :Nc.

a 30 *t

, 16 1 A- I believe, and I ca$not ress:bar s;3 ift:1117, bc:

2 I believe that he was told the situation as it was. I don' ,

3 know whether the voeds "under control" were specifically 4 used. I don't think ve told his that it was uncontrolled.

5 That is the best I can :eaember. _

6 Q . If we used the vord "stable," would tha t fit 7 better?

8 A Stable at that time, but not stable final, m~--.-

9 certainly not stable permanently.

10 Q Does it mean to you that th e lieutenant Governo 11 was told this diffstentiation, that it was t en;o:a:117

. 12 stable,.but not finally stable?

13 A I don't mean tenpora:ily stable. I think, 14 providing his the infotnation at that tine of where ve ve:e 15 going at that ti=e. So I an saying, the opacati:ns of the ,.

16 systes, and that type of thing. I don' t think that the 17 in;:ession was that it was unstable, and th a t is th e b e s t !

18 can reck11.

19 I don't helteve that it would have been like, we 20 have got it into fin 11 coo 11n7 =cd e .

I don't think we had 21 any probles recogni:ing t,$,a t ,' a n d t ha t is ths c:ntext of 22 that.

i 73 3! .13. 03AIC.

t 24 0 Did you feel that the het co:e that ve ta* k ad 25 about ea:119: vas stable t- this poi.~t?

l AL USCN agpen .No a .ap any, isc,

184 1 A Ns. '

Z Q bidyou tell the governo: that you did no: think 3

that the cooling mechaniss for the coca was stable or 4 unstable?

5 A I did no: personally tell the Lieutenan: Governo:

6 about tha =coliii3echanisa of the c::n. ,I t was reported t 7 se by people that one of the only methods of heat :e=cval

& vas sininum staunch staaming. It is hard to cc:m unicate on 9

a es= plex thing like this with so= tone who has no knovladie 10 of anythin; about it.

11 Isu tra asking the uastion like You and I ara 12 talkin;.

I think we tried to cossunicate to his the plant 13 status in his terms, without :estrictin; anything he could 14 ask. In fact, he came to the plant the next day, if I 15 =asamber right.

l 16 3! 32. SIILLO.

17 Q Did he ask you if it was safe?

18 A I caa't camenbar, Vic.

I can't remember whetha 19 he asked -- I k n o w in the ini isi Pr.:t of the mee ting, 20 people had thsi: own monitors out. *here vere othe: Sta:a 21 people in thera.

Z'L Q '4 a s n ' t the whole pu ;ose of th e sa n ting f:: the

! 23 Oovarno to : 7 to decida whether it was c: it was  ::

24 saft? It has ;ct to be the bott es line.

3 'J h a t impression did 7:u vant to leave with his ,

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e s .

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1 that it var saf e, o r that you.didn't know?

- 2 A In =7 21sd, I vantad to leave eve:ybody with the 3 i=;tession that it was serious 7"[nd tatt actions vare heisc 4 takan to evslutta sad ;11:e it in to stablitt7, int: final 5 stahiiity.

6 Th c.t same 1:;:ession should have been in his mind 7 the next day,'when Jis S111374: took his th:cuch tha ;11s?.,

& or on Friday -- I could be off on that. I 1- sure he toured 9 the plant either Thursday o: Triday, and I believe that it 10 was Thursday.

11 0 There is ac cos;arison between the state of sind 11 of Thursday, and the stata of mind on 'Jednesday?

13 A Thera was a state of mind on 7:iday that was in :7 ,

as 14 mind, whe:e ! sat in the cent:oi scom, of the sa:e state The state of the plan on Thursday ce:tal:17 vas 15 Wednesday.

16 not what it was on '4ed:e sday , but it es: ai ly was still 17 serious. .

18 Q I quass we a:e 111oved to diffa:. 7.y view of 19 Thursday was in orders of sagnituda sore favo:shle taas 20 7ednesday.

l 21 A I as thinking in the ocat:ci :com because as late 22 as Triday, I don't think tha t it vis o:d ers of =act.d.tud e ,

na ;eo;ia up the:e, yeu ;ao;1a, 27 23 and I as taiXin; 111 24 people.

25 Q I vas tha:e on Frid Y, so don't say 111 ':a:suce 1

n:useu .um:uo ew..w. :ue.

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