ML20151T330
| ML20151T330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1984 |
| From: | Myers H NRC |
| To: | Kammerer C NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151T279 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-728, FOIA-87-853 NUDOCS 8804280650 | |
| Download: ML20151T330 (5) | |
Text
.
February 21, 1984
-s TO:
Carl Kammerer FRCM:
Henry Myers RE:
Response to Commission's Requ List of
_a.____________TMI In tegri ty Is sues. e st for Comments on the
_____..___... ______..(.II)
These comments are in reference to It Report:
em III - E, Keaten 1.
Is the December 15, acceptably complete and accurate reflectio1980 version of t information pertaining to the accident n of significant possessed by GPU management?
investigation and report Does the Keatenand its causes then GPU to assess the accidenconstitute an adequate effort by did the Keaten Task Force adequately t and its causes?
For example specified in B&W 339?
a'd 29, 1979 draft,Was the summary, dress questions,
the September as presented in the September 29 summary a moreinformation then po a en Task Force?
1980 draft.? representation than the one prese(nted in thor less} accu Is i
e December 15, 2
What the Keaten drafts discusees the Hartminfer that none of (Note that the Hartman allegations w an allegations?
c in May 1979, NRC raised questions aboutere available to GPU i
allegations were the subject of a televisioncalcu i
the i
March 24, 1980, i
submitted on September 17, gre & Benson report wasappearance on
}
}
and the Fae of the Keaten report.
1980, all prior to completion Items 2 and 3 in B&W 730 appear to refer to erroneous leak rate calculation pro
{
irregularities with regard to makeup wate 4
cedures and Mr.
Wallace directed Mr. R. Wilson to addr supplements.
I items.
inference should be drawn from the fWhere is th ress these f
al. did not seek to determine the impact upon th ort?)
What act that Keaten et of the leak rate falsification and the concomita t f to adhere to Technicial Specifications?
e accident n
ailure 3
determine whether HPI had been initiatedWhat ef fo en Task Force to a.m.?
Did the Keaten Task Force seek to deteat about 5:41 saturation conditions in the RCS at or about 5 40 rmine whether n
or cca William Dircks a.m.?
Harold Denton Dick DeYoung Ben Hayes 8804280650 880422 CO NORe -728 PDR
~4-
-There was no requirement to report to State or
. s, Federal officials that the reactor was in a condition not en' compassed by emergency procedures.
-The station manager believed, based upon what he himself had observed and reports by his subordinates, that the 1:50 p.m. pulse on the containment building, pressure reactors and associated phenomena and alarms (28 alarms in one second at the time of the pressure pulse, 100 alarms in the 30 second period following the detonation) were the manifestation of an electrical malfunction rather than an explosion.
-Statements by various persons present at TMI-2 on March 28 which are in conflict with the foregoing, are erroneous.
(Numerous such statements are cited in the House Interior Staff Report, "Reporting of Information Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island.*)
In light of the significance of the reporting. failures (see attached Interior Committee staff report and six memoranda related thereto), what inference should be drawn vis-a-vis integrity of current GPU management from the facts that GPU did not conduct an adequate inquiry into the reporting failures?
What inference regarding integrity should be drawn from the various statements made by GPU managers over the years vis-a-vis the reporting failures?
IV.
New Items:
GPU acceptance of responsibility for the accident.
A.
Does GPU accept that is negligence was a greater cause of the accident than the negligence of any other party?
Than other parties combined?
B.
The following refers to various statements in documents associated with the Keaten report and bears on the question of which party was most negligent.
The following are also in addition to items listed under !II-F which relate to presentations at the trial and perhaps elsewhere which conflict with statements in various GPU documents.
B-1.
What inference should be drawn f rom GPU's f ailure to explain why lessons of previous incidents (e.g.
April 23, 1978 and September 1977) were not incorporated into operating procedures?
(For example, B&W 339, page 15 states:
"The loss of coolant accident was not recognized by the operators in the watch section on duty, by some
' watch standers in another watch section and by some olant staff members.
This suggests that the Inability to recognize this event and prevent core damage extends to other watch sections and to the support staff for a complex event of this type.
+
n i
-s-
)
Technical data and engineering anal have at could routinely input into the plant training program."]
B-2 Does it remain the GPU position that precursor incidents and documents pertaining the TMI-2 thereto did not indicate a need to revise operatin procedures?
How does GPU reconcile its position g
that there was no reason on the day of th to anticipate increasing pressurizer lev l e accident
- with the facts that this phenomena ha e
ssure at TMI-1 prior to accident?
rred pages of Keaten's trial deposition (pages 88[ Note that ne relates to voiding in the primary and/or the-285) of same on pressurizer level.)
effect B-3.
States and B&W is based on assertions e United B&W negligence was the primary cause at NRC and accident.
Keaten Task Force implication (particulIs this po of the early drafts greater cause) of the accident?that GPU/ Met-Ed's neg arly the New Item:
V.
HPI Initiation at 5:41 a.m.
When did GPU first question the accuracy of Frederick, Zewe, and Faust of the recollections lawsuit against B&W?Did GPU question these recollections priore H l
recollections?
What caused GPU to doubtr to filing its 5:41 a.m. HPI initiation?Who at GPU first raised questions about th the operators '
operators ' recollections and the belief that HP e
initiated at about 5:41 a.m.?
e 5:41 HPI initiation in a chart prepared for(Note that Keaten listed the was not November 12,1979; see B&W 348.]
a speech given on on Auguct 25, 1983 Sholer et al. memor,andum stating thatGPU's attorney sent to the NR scientifically proves that there was not"Since the EDS analysis actuation of high pressure injection at or about 5 41 full flow manu the colorful charge that conclusively rebutted. "
a ' mystery man' turned it of f was a.m.,
Does GPU agree with the foregoing Kaye/Shole it the GPU position that HPI was not r statement?
Is or about 5:41 a.m.?
initiated at HPI initiation prepared following the trial at GPDoes GPU ag Does B&W agree with the conclusions stated i U's request?
memorandum?
Does Dr. Van Witbeck TDR-044) agree with the conclusions stated i(principal author of memorandum?
Does Mr. Keaten agree?
n the Kaye/Sholer GPU agrees with Kaye accordingly the Seque/Sholer, why has GPU not modifiedDr. Long? M If nce of Events entry indicating that HPI was initiated at 5:41 a.m.?
e 6-New Item: VI.
Tail Pipe Temperatures In light of GPU's argument that the tailpipe temperature in excess of 130 degress was not due to a leaking PORV, what calucations were done prior to the accident to determine tailpipe temperatures that should have been expected in the absance of a leaking PORV?
If no such calculations were performed, why were they not performed?
Is tailpipe temperature data available for each day beginning on September 1,
1977 and ending on March 28, 1979?
If not, for which days is such data not available?
What is the basis for the GPU position that tailpipe temperatures in excess of 130 degrees did not necessarily indicate a leaking PORV?
Doos the NRC agree with this analysis?
The Keaten Task Force states on page 14 of the December 15, 1980 report in explaining the failure to detect the stuck open PORV that "No attention was given to use of the temperature monitors as a means of detecting an open valve, since the monitors were not installed for this purpose."
This statement conflicts with statements in B&W 363, a January 29, 1980 memorandum by Mr. Keaten to file. The memo summarizes an interview with Brian Mehler.
Keaten notes that Mehler, in seeking to assess the situation at about 6:00 a.m.,
had "called up from the computer the temperature readings on the tailpipe downstream of the pressurizer relief and safety valves.
These readings showed that the temperature downstream from the PORV was significantly higher than, the temperature downstream ofeither safety valve. Brian correctly deduced that this indicated that the PORV was still open and took action to close the PORV block valve."
New Item:
VII.
"Punch List" In an interview with House Interior committee staff on May 12, 1983, Mr. Walter Marshall said that at startup of TMI-2 he thought there was punch list which "probably" contained "around 5,000" items indicating a need for corrective action.
Did such a list exist on the day of TMI-2 startup?
Did a "punch list" exist on the day of the accident?
Where is it now?
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