ML20149D398
| ML20149D398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1988 |
| From: | SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149D390 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8802090479 | |
| Download: ML20149D398 (41) | |
Text
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-i-4 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO.SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 IE BULLETIN NO. 85-03
)
I-MOTOR-OPERATE 0 VALVE COMMON MODE FAILURES DURING PLANT TRANSIENTS DUE TO IMPROPER SWITCH SETTINGS l
FINAL REPORT m29MR BRMEha G
a INTRODUCTION IE Bulletin No. 85-03 (IEB 85-03), i-
.ed November 15, 1985, requested licensees to develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings on certain safety-related motor-operated valves are selected, set and maintained correctly to accommodate the maximum differential pressures expected on these l
valves during both normal and abnornal events within the design basis.
A description of the methods by which the District complies with IEB 35-03 requirements was transmitted to the NRC by SMUD letter GCA 87-504 dated l
September 8, 1987.
This report responds to the specific action items of IEB 85-03.
RESPONSE TO IEB 85-03 ACTION ITEMS IEB 85-03 Item a l
For motor-operated valves in the high pressure coolant injection / core spray and emergency feedwater systems (RCIC for odRs) that are required to be tested for operational readiness in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g), develop and implement a program to ensure that valve operator switches are selected, set and maintained properly.
This should include the following components:
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a.
Review and document the design basis for the operation of each valve.
This documentation should include the maximum differential pressure i
expected during both opening and closing the valve for both normal and abnormal events to the extent that these valve operations and events are included in the existing, approved design basis, (i.e., the design basis documented in pertinent licensee submittals such as FSAR analyses and fully-approved operating and emergency procedures, etc). When determining
)
the maximum differential pressure, those single equipment failures and I
inadvertent equipment operations (such as inadvertent valve closures or openings) that are within the plant design basis should be assumed.
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l Response to item a An analysis has been conducted to document the Design Basis operating conditions for motor-operated valves (MOVs) in the High Pressure Injection portion of the Purification and Letdown / Seal Injection and Makeup Systems (PLS/SIM) and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) portion of the Feedwater System (FWS) which are required to function in order to mitigate any Design Basis Accident.
This analysis evaluated the normal plant transients (startup, power operation, shutdown) and each of the SMUD Rancho Seco USAR Chapter 14 accidents to identify the motor operated valves which are required to function in order to mitigate each event.
The HPI and AFW valves required are listed in Table 1.
Also listed in Table 1 is the maximum credible differential pressure imposed upon each valve by each event.
As discussed below, the maximum differential pressure for each valve was determined by evaluating the system (RCS, PLS/SIM, AFW, DHS) parameters.
Evaluation of each event beyond the limits of USAR chapter 14 was necessary because the USAR evaluation and description terminates using an acceptance criteria for which the event no longer represents a threat to public health and safety but not necessarily with the plant at a stable shutdown condition.
Most of the design basis events (Chapter 14) are evaluated to end in hot shutdown; however, selected events (i.e., LOCA & Control Rod Ejection Accident) are evaluated to cold shutdown to ensure all component operating conditions are identified.
In addition to evaluating the Chapter 14 events, the normal plant operating procedures and the Rancho Seco emergency operating procedures were reviewed to assure the most severe differential pressure operating condition was identified.
The isolation valves for the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) and Reactor Building Sump were included in the evaluation because their operation is essential to the operation of the HPI system af ter certain events.
Similarly the AFW Pump Turbine Isolation Valve (HV-30801) and Main Steam To AFW Turbine Isolation Valves (HV-20596, HV-20569) are included in the evaluation and table because they are required to function in order to drive the AFW Pump Turbine and to isolate a break in the AFW Pump Turbine steam line.
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1 The Make-Up Tank three-way valve HV-23004 and the letdown cooler isolation valves SFV-22005, SFV-22006, HV-22007, and HV-22008 were included because these valves may be required to function to re-establish letdown foll0 wing an accident.
Originally, thirty valves were selected as being affected by IEB 85-03.
Because the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) system has been installed during the current outage MOVs HV-20581 and HV-20582 have been added to this report.
HV-20581 and HV-20582 are AFW valves, parallel to HV-20577 and HV-20578, oroviding a redundant path for emergency feedwater.
Since HV-20581 and HV-20582 are new valves, they are not included in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (as-found conditions).
The method of evaluation of each event was to establish the initial conditions of each component prior to the event.
The system parameter changes due to the event were then evaluated for (position and parameter) changes to the components of interest. Numerous motor operated valves in the HPI (PLS/SIM) and feedwater system are commanded to a specific position by automatic protection systems.
These automatic position changes plus other manual operator commanded (even spurious) position changes were evaluated to determine which condition produced the maximum differential pressure upon each valve for each valve function (open or close).
During the initial evaluation, in order to establish the highest credible differential pressure, several guidelines were used.
These guidelines are as follows:
- 1) The pressure drop due to line losses has been neglected.
- 2) Normal operating pressure has been assumed for the Make-Up Tank in lieu of the relief valve settings.
This yields a 20 psig pressure across the make i
up tank isolation valve.
Therefore 20 psig will be used as the HPI/HU pump suction pressure for all events.
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3)
Pump start time and valve sequence have been neglected.
This requires the valve be able to open against the maximum credible pump discharge pressure for the down stream valve condition.
4)
For large 1.0CAs it is assumed that the RCS pressure drops to building pressure instantly.
- 5) The governor overrun will be neglected in establishing a maximum f
differential pressure.
The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-319 j
may possibly be started prior to opening of the t.FW bypass valves HV-20577 and HV-20578.
If the pump is started using the steam turbine, the turbine governor will try to limit the speed once it has passed its set point of 3600 revolutions per minute.
If the AFW bypass valves are opened during l
the governor overrun period the valves will see a higher differential j
pressure than normal.
If the valves see a higher initial differential i
pressure than design due to the turbine governor overrun, the motor on the motor operated valve will have sufficient torque to open the valve.
These i
motors are sized for the voltage available at the end of battery life.
- 6) When the plant is repressurized the RCS pressure may go to any pressure below the 2500 psig safety valve setting.
For this evaluation repressurization will be considered to be 2150 psig.
- 7) The conversion f actor used for one foot of water elevation was 2.31 l
ft/ psi.
This is the appropriate and conservative value if the water l
I temperature is between 39.2*F (most dense) and 80*F.
If the water were f
hotter than 80'F the force of each foot of water is less due to the density change. However, the change is small within the limits of water temperature of this analysis compared to the other pressure values (pump TOH) and was neglected. Similarly the static pressure (delta elevation between sensed point and valve) of steam was neglected due to relatively small magnitude.
(300 ft/ psi).
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- 8) A main steam pressure of 1100 psig is used as input pressure to all main steam line valves. This analysis requires an evaluation of the main steam pressure following certain evertti.
The required full capacity of main steam safety valves is determined arbitrarily by a percentage of full reactor power, and not upon any credible event.
Experience and analysis support the assumption that main steam pressure only approaches 1100 psia upon turbine trip from 100% power even without operation of the turbine bypass system valves. This event produces the highest nain steam line pressure of all design basis and normal events.
A thorough review of the initial evaluation required certain guidelines to be added or modified, as follows:
1)
For SFV-23508, the initial evaluation assumed a normal operating pressure of 20 psig; however, the worst case scenario is the overfilling of the make-up tank, such as occurred during the December 26, 1985 transient.
Although administrative steps have been taken to prevent a recurrence, this is still the worst case scenario, resulting in a maximum differential pressure of 85 psid at 103 psig line pressure when reopening the valve, based on:
a) 1he Make-Up Tank is at its relief valve (PSV-23501) pressure setpoint of 100 15 psig for valve opening.
b)
The Borated Water Storage Tank is at its technical specification minimum level of 43'-10".
c)
The temperature of BWST water is maintained at 75-85'F.
Assume T = 85'F, and T of BWST = T of Make-Up Tank.
d)
BWST isolation valve is open for opening SFV-23508, e)
The Make-Up Tank is at the high level alarm:
86" = 7'-2".
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- 2) No credit is taken for sequence of operation of parallel valves or valves in alternate flowpaths which may reduce the maximum pressure imposed upon the motor-operated valve (s) being evaluated. -
s
- 3) The RCS pressure during full power operation is normally 2155 i 10 psig as controlled by heaters.
However, the pressurizer spray is not initiated until 2205 10 psig.
Therefore, the normal RCS pressure range is 2215 to 2145 psig. However, for _ this evaluation the range of 2155 1 100 psig, as specified in Operatirig Procedure 8.3, will be used for conservatism.
- 4) Minimum Make-Up Tank (V-235) pressure is assumed to be 0 psig unless otherwise noted.
- 5) The evaluation for valves in the same configuration (e.g. SFV-22023 and SFV-22025) was performed using the elevation of the valve which would provide the more conservative results.
6)
Pump curve T-32265-2 was used for determining TOH of the Make-Up or HPI pumps since the shut-off head for this particular pump was the most conservative of three curves.
- 7) The effect of water hammer was not considered in developing the maximum differential pressure.
The method of selectiun of the valves affected by IEB 85-03, as well as the analysis to determine differential pressure, is documented in calculation number Z-ZZZ-M2135, "SMUD Dif ferential Pressure Operating Conditions for IEB 85-03, B&W Engineering Information Record 51-1164043-02." Table 1 summarizes the results of this calculation by indicating the normal function of the valve, the pressure dif ferential for each event which was analyzed, and the open and/or close function for each differential pressure. A brief description of the nornal function and IEB 85-03 function of each valve follows.
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Feedwater System (FWS)
Main Steam System (MSSl Auxiliary Feedwater ( AFW) Function 1
HV-20577. HV-20578, HV-20581, HV-20582 AFW flow injection valves.
Required to open to provide an AFW flow path to the steam generators.
Required to close to prevent overcooling or overfilling the steam generators.
FWS, safety-related, active.
HV-31826, HV-31827 AFW crossover isolation valves.
Required to open or close to provide injection flow paths to both steam generators from either AFW pump.
FWS, safety-related, active.
HV-30801 AFW pump turbine steam flow control valve.
Required to open or close to provide flow control of steam to emergency feedwater pump turbine.
MSS, safety-related, passive.
i HV-20596, HV-20569 AFW pump turbine steam supply isolation and flow control valves.
Required to open or close to provide isolation of and steam flow control for the emergency feedwater pump turbine.
MSS, safety-related, active.
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a Decay Heat System (DHS)
Purification and Letdown System (PLS)
Seal Injection and Makeup System (SIM)
Hiah Pressure Injection (HPI) Function SFV-23809, SFV-23810, SFV-23811, SFV-23812 High pressure injection valves.
These valves must open on receipt of an SFS signal to supply an injection flowpath to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) f rom the High Pressure Injection pumps.
Must close to prevent overcooling or overfilling the RCS.
SIM, safety-related, active.
SFV-22005, SFV-22006, SFV-22023, SFV-22025 Letdown line isolation valves.
Must close to provide letdown line and letdown coolers isolation.
PLS, safety-related, active.
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HV-22007, HV-22008 Letdown cooler isolation valves.
Letdown cooler downstream isolation -- may be required to re-establish letdown following an accident.
PLS, non-safety.
SFV-24004 Reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve.
Must close to provide isolation for RCP seal return lines.
i PLS, safety-related, active.
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l SFV-23645, SFV-23646 Makeup pump recirculation isolation valves.
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Must close to provide isolation of HPI and makeup pump recirculation.
Must open to prevent HPI pump damage at low flow.
SIM, safety-related, active.
l SFV-23604 Makeup injection isolation valve.
Must close to provide normal makeup injection isolation.
SIM, safety-related, active.
SFV-23508 Makeup tank isolation valve.
Must close to provide isolation of the makeup tank from the makeup pump.
PLS, safety-related, active.
l SFV-25003, SFV-25004 Borated Water Storage Tank (EWST) isolation valves.
Must open to provide a flowpath from the BWST to the Decay Heat Removal (OHR) pumps and the HPI pumps for injection into the RCS.
Must close when BWST is empty to prevent pump cavitation.
DHS, safety-related, active.
SFV-23616 i
Reactor coolant pump seal injection isolation valve.
Must close to provide seal injection isolation (manual initiation only).
SIM, safety-related, active.
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HV-26105, HV-26106
+
Reactor building sump isolation valves.
Must open to switch DHR pump and HPI pump suction from the BWST to the reactor building emergency sump.
4 DHS, safety-related, active, s
HV-26007. HV-26008 DHR pump to HP1 pump isolation valves.
Must open to provide adequate head to the HPI pumps'from the DHR pump i
discharge when recirculating fleid from the reactor building sump
("piggy-back" operation).
OHS, safety-related, active.
HV-23004 Three-way valve of the letdown system.
t The "normal" position of this valve provides a letdown path to the makeup tank.
The "bleed" position of this valve provides a letdown path to the Radwaste and Coolant Radwaste System (RWS).
This valve may be required to function to re-establish letdown following an accident.
PLS, non-safety.
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IE8 85-03 Item b b.
Using the results from item a above, establish the correct switch settings.
This shall include a program to review and revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting and setting all switches (i.e.,
torque, torque bypass, position limit, overload) for each valve operation (opening and closing).
If the licensee determines that a valve is inoperable, the licensee shall also make an appropriate justification for continued operation in accordance with the applicable technical specification.
ResDonse to Item b The program to review and revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting and setting all switches has been described in the following correspondence from SMUD to the NRC:
SMUD letter JEW 86-023 of May 16,1986 SMUD letter JEW 86-667 of November 5,1986 SMUD letter GCA 87-373 of July 21, 1987 SMUD letter GCA 87-504 of September 8,1987 These letters (and their attachments) provide a description of the comprehensive MOV refurbishment program undertaken at Rancho Seco.
The refurbishment, including selection and implementation of proper switch settings, was accomplished during an extended outage which began in December 1985.
Thus, determination of operability of MOVs was necessary only for continued shutdown operation.
For the decay heat outage, as well as for shutdown operation, all MOVs required for the operating configuration were evaluated and (1) declared operable by virtue of being released for interim use, (2) determined to be acceptable, or (3) placed in a fail-safe condition.
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The MOV refurbishment program for IEB 85-03 valves commenced with a complete, detailed inspection of each MOV to establish the "as-found" condition and to obtain the information necessary for the engineering -
evaluation -- information such as gear ratio, spring pack part number, lubricant condition, torque switch setting, limit switch setting, and valve stem thread pitch and lead, among many other items. 1he object of thi, "walkdown" information was to obtain reliable first-hand data, rather than relying upon recorded data.
Limitorque Corporation and the various valve manufacturers were contacted to acquire information on the "as-supplied" configuration of the MOV assembly.
Comparison of "as-found" with "as-supplied" information served to identify modifications or to verify the walkdown data. The maximum allowable thrust was also obtained from the valve manufacturers.
The engineering evaluation utilized the "Selection Procedure," written by Limitorque Corporation and dated June 6, 1979.
The various selection guides (SEL-1 through SEL-12) were used to determine maximum operator torque, required operator torque to stroke the valve against maximum dif ferential pressure, and the adequacy of the valve and operator assembly to produce the required thrust without exceeding the valve or operator capabilities.
Nuclear Engineering specifies the thrust "window" to be used when setting the torque switch.
The thrust window (or target thrust), walkdown data, supplier data, and other information, are recorded on an E-1012 drawing, "Motor Operated Valve Data," a controlled document.
l All IEB 85-03 MOVs were refurbished (disassembled, inspected, parts replaced as necessary, and reassembled).
Following refurbishment, testing was performed to confirm that the required thrust was achieved without l
exceeding the valve, operator, or motor allowables.
During the test process, which uses MOVATS equipment, the torque switch is set to achieve the required thrust and the limit switches are set to ensure proper indication and proper torque switch bypass limit switch operation.
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IEB 85-03 Item c c.
Individual valve settings shall be changed, as appropriate, to those established in item b, above. Whether the valve setting is changed or not, the valve will be demonstrated to be operable by testing the valve at the maximum differential pressure determined in item a above with the exception that testing motor-operated valves under conditions simulating a break in the line containing the valve is not required.
Otherwise, justification should be provided for any cases where testing with the maximum dif ferential pressure cannot practicably be performed.
This justification should include the alternative to maximum differential pressure testing which will be used to verify the correct settings.
Note: This bulletin is not intended to establish a requirement for valve testing for the condition simulating a break in the line containing the valve.
However, to the extent that such valve operation is relied upon in the design basis, a break in the line containing the valve should be considered in the analyses prescribed in items a and b above.
The resulting switch settings for pipe break conditions should be verified, to the extent practical, by the same methods that would be used to verify other settings (if any) that are not tested at the maximum dif ferential pressure.
Each valve shall be stroke tested, to the extent practical, to verify that the settings defined in item b above have been properly implemented even I
if testing with differential pressure can not be performed.
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Response to Item c Table 2 lists the system line pressure, maximum differential pressure, and test pressure. Special Test Procedures (STPs) have been developed and approved which govern the differential pressure testing of all IEB 85-03 MOVs. Wherever possible, M3Vs were tested under maximum dif ferential pressure and full flow conditions.
Exceptions to this general rule are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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a HV-30801, HV-20596, and HV-20569 are located in the main steam supply to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine.
Transient conditions could cause a maximum differential pressure of 1100 psi; however, the maximum normal steam pressure available for testing is 970 psig. This testing will not be conducted until ~ af ter plant startup, when steam pressure is available.
SFV-22005 and SFV-22006, letdown isolation valves, must be hydrostatically tested (no full flow test). Thus, the maximum differential pressure is applied to test the ability of the valve to open. However, differential pressure cannot be applied to test the valve in the closing position.
HV-22007 and HV-22008 are isolation valves for the letdown heat exchanger. These two valves are identical with SFV-22005. A satisfactory test on SFV-22005 is considered proof of operability of HV-22007 and HV-22008 by similarity. These four valves did not receive a full-flow l
test because it is desired to minimize the thenaal cycles on the letdown heat exchangers.
SFV-23645 and SFV-23646 are block valves in the Makeup Pump recirculation lines. The differential pressure achieved for SFV-23645 and SFV-23646 was 2800 psi which is less than the maximum differential pressure of 2944 psid.
In order to achieve 2944 psid, the pump would have to be at shutof f head and it is not advisable to run the pump without flow due to the i
possibility of pump damage.
Additionally, the 2800 psid test is representative of plant conditions upon initiation of a Safety Feature Actuation Signal (SFAS). Upon SFAS, valves SFV-23809, SFV-23810, SFV-23811, and SFV-23812 all open to allow approximately 125 gpm flow each, while at the same time valves SFV-23645 and SFV-23646 close to isolate recirculation (miniflow).
This condition was simulated during testing by having flow through SFV-23812 of approximately 125 gpm with one HPI pump operating.
The analysis for HV-23004 (three-way valve) assumes that the maximum letdown pressure of 148 psig is acting at the valve.
During test conditions, a system differential pressure of 120 psi is the highest available without lifting the letdown line relief valve.
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Q The maximum dif ferential pressure for SFV-25003 and SFV-25004 is calculated at 30 psid. The Limitorque selection notes (SEL-5) require 33 psi as a minimum pressure for any operator selection for gate and globe valves; thus, the delta P used for calculating required thrust / torque is 33 psid. During delta P testing, however, the highest available differential pressure is 27 psid because of system configuration.
Each valve has been stroke tested to ensure that the operator develops the proper torque / thrust as calculated by the Limitorque equations (see the response to Item b). The thrust ' window' is 105% to 115% of the design thrust at delta P.
The 105% mir.imum allows for 5% tolerance in the Limitorque operator and the additional 10% permits an adjustment band when setting the torque switch. M0 VATS (R) equipment is used to control, i
monitor, and record the test data, as well as to set the thrust within the "window." The stroke testing is done, generally, with the system depressurized, and is done prior to dif ferential pressure testing.
During the performance of differential pressure tests, it was found that a thrust ' window" of 105% to 115% of the Limitorque equations was not adequately conservative for certain valves in the closing direction.
This phenomenon was particularly evident for gate valves four inches and larger in size, subject to a dif feren*;ial pressure of 1000 psi or higher, and located immediately downstrrim of a source of turbulence (for example.
control valves, orifices, tre.ees, and other valves). Valves HV-20578 and HV-20581 are located diie y downstream from control valves ar.d required higher thrust to close. Valves HV-31826 and HV-31827 are adjacent to a tee and required higher thrust to close.
i A similar problem was encountered with two smaller valves subject to high delta P and located downstream of a source of turbulence.
SFV-23604 is downstream of a pipe bend and required higher thrust to close. Valve SFV-23645 is located immediately downstream of SFV-23646 and required l
higher thrust to close.
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1 To rectify this situation, two actions were taken:
(1) The required thrust for high pressure valves (greater than 300 psi differential) was recalculated using one version of an equation developed by MOVATS, Incorporated:
Closing Thrust SC (SL + PE) o scaling constant SC 1.3
=
=
seat face load SL
=
(valve f actor)(delta P)(orifice area)
=
piston effect PE (delta P)(stem area)
=
=
(2) The thrust "window" was calculated at 110% to 121% of the value calculated in (1) above. The M0 VATS tolerances range from about 6%
at high thrust to about 16% at low thrust; thus, the thrust "window" of 110% to 121% accounts for the M0 VATS tolerance plus the Limitorque tolerance (5%).
t' This method was used for valves HV-20577, HV-20578 HV-31826, HV-31827, HV-20596, HV-20569, SFV-23604 and SFV-23645, as well as several other valves which are not affected by IE8 85-03. A summary of the changes e
i follows:
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Original Original Adjusted Adjusted Window Switch Window Switch Valve (ft-lb)
Settina (ft-lb)
Setting HV-20577 244-268 1.25/1.25 280-300 1.25/1.25 (0 pen /Close)
HV-20578 244-268 1.0/1.0 314-345 1.5/1.5 (0 pen /Close)
HV-20581*
147-161 2.12/2.12 147-161 7.0/2.25 (0 pen /Close)
HV-20582*
147-161 1.25/1.25 147-161 2.25/2.25 (0 pen /Close)
HV-31826 240-264 1.87/1.87 340-374 2.5/2.5 (0 pen /Close) 1 4436D/16
t Original Original Adjusted Adjusted Window Switch Window Switch Valve (ft-lb) lettina (ft-lb)'
Settina HV-31827 240-264 1.75/1.75 357-379 1.5/2.5
'(0 pen /Close)
HV-20596 167-184 2.25 167-219 2.5 (0 pen) i HV-20596 167-184
.2.25 199-219 2.5-(Close)
HV-20569 167-184 2.0 167-219 1.62 (0 pen)
HV-20569 167-184 1.5 199-219
.1.62 (Close)
SFV-23604 86-91 1.75/1.75 100-108 2.0/2.0 (0 pen /Close)
SFV-23645 37-40 2.0/1.75 58-64 3.0/3.0 (0 pen /Close)
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- For HV-20581 and HV-20582, the upper limit of the thrust / torque window is the maximum thrust / torque allowed for an SM8-00 operator, as calculated by i
the Limitorque equations; thus, the window could not be increased'even though such was indicated by the M0 VATS equations. These are new valves which were added by the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC)
System during this outage. All programs specified by this report were conducted on HV-20581 and HV-20582 except the actual delta P testing with MOVATS signature tracing. However, the valves were cycled under full flow delta P, and operated satisf actorily.
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IEB 85-03 Item d d.
Prepare or revise procedures to ensure that correct switch settings are determined and maintained throughout the life of the plant.
Ensure that applicable industry recommendation; are considered in the preparation of 4
these procedures.
This item is intended to be completely consistent with action item 3.2, "Post-Maintenance Testing (All Other Safety +Related Components)," of Generic Letter 83-28, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." These procedures should include provisions to monitor valve performance to ensure the switch settings are correct.
This is particularly important if the torque or torque bypass switch setting has been significantly raised above that required.
Response to Item d 1
Nuclear Engineering Administrative Procedure 4801 (NEAP-4801), "Evaluation of Motor-Operated Valves," governs the engineering evaluation of MOVs to accomplish the following:
o Acquire technical information o
Establish maximum operator torque / thrust i
o Calculate required torque / thrust o
Calculate required switch settings o
Evaluate existing MOV assembly o
Direct refurbishment, correction, or replacement o
Confirm proper switch settings i
o Record data on controlled documents Engineering analysis is aided by computer code VADIP, "Valve Actuator Data j
Input Program," which is documented in Engineering Report ERPT-M-50 and validated in calculation number Z-ZZZ-M2111.
Inputs include valve l
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characteristics, operator characteristics, motor characteristics, system characteristics (including maximum differential pressure), and torque / thrust limits.
Using Limitorque equations and valve supplier data,
-the code calculates thrust and torque for several parts of the mechanism and compares them with allowable values. A printed output is retained as part of the permanent record.
The engineering process uses the methods and recommendations of Limitorque Corporation for evaluation and selection of components of the motor and operator.
Likewise, the allowable valve thrust and operator compatibility are provided by the valve manufacturer.
For larger gate valves which are subject. to higher pressures, the revised methods previously discussed have been applied. NEAP-4801 was revised to address these additions to the calculation method.
The Maintenance Department uses 'everal procedures, the functions of which are explained by the titles:
Limitorque Valve Actuator SMB-00, SMB-000, and HBC Gear Box M.ll5 Refurbishment and Corrective Maintenance Procedure (Mechanical).
M.ll6 - Limitorque Valve Actuator SMB-0. SMB-1, 2, 3, 4 and HBC Gear Box Refurbishment and Corrective Maintenance Procedure (Mechanical).
EM.ll7 - Limitorque Maintenance-Valves-Limitorque Motor Operated Controllers, Maintenance and Testing (Electrical).
EM.ll7A - Testing of Limitorque Motor Operated Valves Using MOVATS (Electrical).
I EM.1170 - Limitorque Valve Actuator SMB and SB Models Electrical Refurbishment and Corrective Maintenance Procedure (Electrical).
1 Procedure EM.117A requires the valve thrust to be set within the thrust l
"window" specified by Nuclear Engineering on the E-1012 drawing, "Motor Operated Valve Data." a controlled document.
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The Maintenance Procedures cover, among other activities, the following:
o Setting of limit switches o
Setting of torque switches I
o Confirming proper switch settings using M0 VATS signature trace methods o
Utilizing M0 VATS equipment for switch monitoring, current monitoring, torque switch balancing, spring pack calibration, target thrust' verification, motor load threshold signature, thrust monitoring device (TMD) and control switch signature, motor current signature, and motor load signature.
Information acquired during the MOVATS testing is transferred from bubble memory to disk memory for permanent storage and for future use in trend analysis.
Additionally, the original data sheet is stored in a permanent file.
Pertinent information is recorded on the E-1012 drawing, "Motor Operated Valve Data," a controlled document.
A separate E-1012 drawing sheet is used for each MOV assembly.
Approximately 90 entries record data on valve, operator, and motor.
To ensure continued proper performance of MOVs, a preventive maintenance program is in place which includes the following:
o Categorize all MOVs in accordance with Maintenance Administrative Procedure MAP-0009, o
Category 1 MOVs are those valves requiring surveillance by Section XI of the ASME Code (110 MOVs).
i o
Category 2 MOVs are all other motor-operated valves (61 MOVs).
o Every refueling cycle, the main gear case of all MOVs will be opened, c
l inspected, and lubricated.
j o
If a problem has been noted, or if corrective maintenance has been done, M0 VATS testing will be performed as Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT).
o Every refueling cycle, all Category 1 MOVs will be tested and analyzed for trends, using Maintenance Procedure EM ll7A.
44360/20 i
_=
^.'
IEB 85-03 Item e e.
Within 180 days of the date of this bulletin, submit a written report to the NRC that:
(1) reports the results of item a and (2) contains the program to accomplish items b through d above including a schedule for completion of these items.
1.
For plants with an OL, the schedule shall ensure that these items are completed as soon as practical and within two years from the date of this bulletin.
2.
For plants with a CP, this schedule shall ensure that these items are completed before the scheduled date for OL issuance or within two years from the date of this bulletin, whichever is later.
Response to item e I
l The written report required by IEB 85-03 Item d was submitted via SMUD f
i letter to the NRC identified as JEW 86-023 of May 16,1986. SMUD letter to the NRC JEW 86-667 of November 5, 1986, expanded the scope of the MOV refurbishment program and superseded the May 16 letter.
This correspondence made the commitment by the District to complete the work on thirty (now 32) IEB 85-03 MOVs and all other safety-related MOVs prior to restart.
I 4
l 0
i 1
I 3
44360/21
IEB 85-03 Item f f.
Provide a written report on completion of the above program. This report should provide (1) a verification of completion of the requested program, (2) a summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any adjustments as a result of this bulletin, and (3) a summary of data in accordance with Table 2, Suggested Data Summary Format. The NRC staff l
intends to use this data to assist in the resolution of Generic Issue II.E.6.1.
This report shall be submitted to the NRC within 60 days of
]
completion of the program. Table 2 should be expanded, if appropriate, to include a surnary of all data required to evaluate the response to this a
bulletin.
Response to item f This report is verification of completion of the program requested by IEB 85-03.
Table 3 provides the final valve configuration after completion of the refurbishment and evaluation process.
Significant valve changes are described in the following two paragraphs.
During refurbishment, the seat of SFV-22006 was damaged beyond repair.
Lead time (at the time the damage occurred) for a replacement gate valve would have made the delivei/ date beyond the restart date; thus, the gate j
valve was replaced by a suitable globe valve. An evaluation has been completed which concludes that sufficient flow rate through the letdown heat exchanger is available with a globe valve in the system.
i Inspection of SFV-22005 and SFV-22006 prior to refurbishment revealed bent
' ears" on the valve disk. The "ears" are the upper part of the wedge i
which forms the key slot to accept the bottom of the stem. The bending was probably due to overthrust in the open direction while unseating the i
44360/22 i
valve.
The conditions leading to the overthrust are not known, but the overthrust could have been caused by thermal binding.
The safety function of SFV-22005 and SFV-22006 is performed in the closing direction; therefore, the bent ears would not affect the safety function of these two f
- valves, Minor valve changes are discussed in the following two paragraphs.
The valve disks (wedges) of SFV-22005, HV-22007, and HV-22008 were replaced due to low allowable thrust on the wedge. A revised configuration of the wedge ears was designed, fabricated, and shipped by Velan on an expedited basis to meet the-requirements of system availability.
The wedge of SFV-23616 was replaced because of damage to the seating surfaces.
Table 3 also lists the operator torque corresponding to the allowable thrust on the valve as provided by the valve manufacturer.
Table 4 provides the final configuration of each operator and motor af ter refurbishment and evaluation. Significant changes were required as i
described in the following paragraphs.
2 HV-20577 and HV-20578 operators were changed from SMB-00 to 58-0.
The larger operator was necessary because the lower limit of the thrust window was about 105% of the maximum thrust specified for the SMB-00 by Limitorque.
The increased operator size ensures that the thrust window is l
within the operator limits.
The SMB was changed to SB to decrease the coastdown thrust experienced by the valve; instead, some of the coastdown
)
{
thrust is absorbed by compressing the spring of the SB operator. The motor was changed f rom a 7.5 f t-lb alternating-current motor to a j
25 ft-lb direct-current motor. The change to direct current was required by the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System.
The increased maximum torque rating ensures valve operation in an undervoltage 44360/23
condition.
These changes resulted from a change in operational requirements, but the changes also upgraded a marginal operator to a satisfactory operator.
HV-20569 and HV-20596 motor size was increased f rom 15 f t-lb to 25 f t-lb to provide additional thrust margin for the undervoltage condition.
HV-20569 and HV-20596 thrust window was approximately 10$% to 111% of design thrust at delta P, limited to 111% (115% is desired) by the maximum thrust available f rom a 15 f t-lb motor at 80% voltage.
The 25 ft-lb motor provides greater available thrust and provides the desired thrust window.
The limiter plate was removed f rom HV-20596 to achieve a higher torque switch setting.
HV-31826 and HV-31827 operator size was increased f rom SMB-00 to SMB-0, and the gear ratio changed f rom 102.6:1 to 72.5:1, because the lower limit of the thrust window exceeded the maximum operator thrust specified by Limitorque by about 5% with the SMB-00 installed.
The changes ensure that the thrust window is within the limits of the operator as specified by the operator manufacturer.
The motor was increased f rom 10 f t-lb to 15 f t-lb to compensate for low torque at 80% voltage.
SFV-23616 operator was changed f rom SMS-00 to SB-0 because the lower limit of the thrust window was about 7% above the maximum thrust specified for the SMB-00 by Limitorque.
The larger operator ensures that the thrust window is within the limits of the operator.
The change from SM8 to 50 decreases the coastdown thrust experienced by the valve.
The spring pack was replaced in the SB-0 operator to match the desired thrust range.
SFV-22023 operator was changed f rom SMB-00 to 58-00. As with several valves discussed above, the SB absorbs thrust and thus the coastdown thrust on the valve is decreased.
The spring pack of SFV-22023 was changed to a higher range.
44360/24
I On SFV-25003 and SFV-25004, an 58 conversion kit was installed to mitigate the coast down thrust.
Due to gear damage on the operator of SFV-25003, the operator of SFV-25004 was installed on SFV-25003.
Later, after gear replacement, the operator f rom SFV-25003 was installed on SFV-25004. The interchange was necessary because of system availability. On both operators, the brake was removed because it was not rated below 90%
1 voltage and because it was not needed for proper operation.
j As stated above, the gate valve SFV-22006 was replaced by a globe valve.
A new motor and operator were also installed. The spring pack was changed to a lower range.
On SFV-30801, gears were changed due to a chipped motor pinion gear. The gear rat.io was changed f rom 40:1 to 43.75:1.
In HV-26106, the spring pack was replaced due to no preload in the 4
t existing spring pack.
In HV-23604, the spring pack was replaced with one of lower range. The gear ratio was changed to attain suf ficient thrust to close the valve a
against delta P at the worst conditions.
i s
In SFV-23508, the spring pack was replaced.
1 The original spring packs of HV-10581 and HV-20582 were replaced with spring packs with a higher range to accomodate the thrust requirements due to delta P.
Table 5 lists the required and as-found torque switch settings. The required settings are taken f rom the electrical maintenance records.
The as-found settings were recorded during the plaaned inspection prior to refurbishment.
In general, the as-found settings do not deviate significantly from the required settings, l
l 1
44360/25
4' Table 6 provides the as-found limit switch settings.
Significantly, 18 of the open torque switch bypass limit switches were set at less than 10%
of full travel.
Eleven of those 18 were set at less than 5% of full travel.
Note that the valve travel is measured by handwheel turns from the start of disk movement; tl:as, the operator coastdown and backlash is taken up prior to counting handwheel turns. These recorded limit switch settings are inconclusive when trying to determine whether the valve was unseated prior to actuation of the bypass limit switch.
The current practice at Rancho Seco is to set the bypass limit switch at 10% to 15% of opening travel, and then confirm by signature enalysis that the valve is off the seat and has only the running load when the bypass limit switch actuates. Alternatively, the open torque switch is set high enough to overcome maximum unseating thrust.
Tables 7, 8, and 9 provide as-found conditions of the valve, operator,and motor. These conditions were noted during the planned inspection prior to refurbishment, and/or previously reported in Licensee Event Report 87-06.
A judgment is included as to whether the single condition noted leaves the valve operable.
It is evident that some MOVs have several degradations; however, because these valves have operated properly under actual plant conditions, they are conside*ed to have been operable. The one exception is HV-20569, which is explain'. below.
The planned inspection prior to refurbishment indicates that the torque switch of HV-20569 opened during valve travel in the open direction (see Table 8).
Since this occurred without differential pressure, HV-20569 would have been inoperable when subjected to actual operation. Valve HV-20596 is the redundant valve which performs the same function as HV-20569, which is to supply main steam to tne turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Since HV-20596 was operable, steam would have been available to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine.
If a steam line break is postulated which requires isolation by HV-20596, coupled with a failure j
of HV-20569, steam would not be available to the turbine.
However, the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps would be available for the same function.
Thus, any safety consequences of a failure of HV-20569 are j
adequately compensated by redundant auxiliary feedwater flow paths.
44360/26
+
i Operability can best be determined by actual conditions, but most practicably by differential pressure test'with full' flow.
Plant conditions and availability of systems would have required significant-resources to conduct-dif ferential pressure tests prior to any adjustments as a result of IEB 85-03. Since delta P tests would have expended outage time and utilized personnel, coupled with the intent to refurbish all-safety-related MOVs, such differential pressure testing was deferred until refurbishment was completed.
I 44360/27
TABLE 1
~
DIFFERENTIAL FRESSURE EVALUATION NORMAL OPERATIONS ACCIDENT EVENTS PER USAR CHAPTER 14 PLANT NORMAL PLANT
.USAR USAR USAR USAR USAR USAR STARTUP POWER SHUTDOWN 14.1.2.1 14 ).2.2 18.1.2.3 14.1.2.4 14.1.2.6 14.1.2.8 OPERATION UNCOMPENSATED
.STARTUP ROD WITHDRAW MODERATOR LOSS OF-LOSS OF-l OPERATING ACCIDENT ACCIDENT DILUIION COOLANT ELECTRIC REACTIVITY AT RATED ACCIDENT FLOW-POWER CHK-GES POWER AFW SYSTEM l
AFW ISOLATION N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1340-0 (0) 1340-0 (0) l y HV - 20577, 20578, y
20581, 20582 ro 1
m AFW CROSS CONNECT
'N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
-N/A-W - 31826 & 31827 AFW PUMP TURBINE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
.N/A.
875 (0) -
-I HV - 30001 MAIN STEAM TO AFW 940-0.(0)
N/A 940-0 (C)
N/A N/A-N/A N/A N/A 1100 (0)
HV - 205% & 2G569 e
0 44460
TABLE 1 (Continued)
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE EVALUATION ACCIDENT EVENTS PER USAR CHAPTER 14 USAR USAR USAR USAR USAR USAR 14.1.2.5 MAXIMUM 14.2.2.1 14.2.2.2 14.2.2.4 14.2.2.5 14.2.2.6 OTHER USAR 14.1.2.7 DIFFERENTIAL STEAM STEAM CONTROL LOSS OF LETOOWN EVENTS USAR 14.2.2.3 PRESS'JR2 LINE GENERATOR ROD COOLANT LINE USAR 14.2.2.7 (psid)
FAILURE TUBE EJECTION ACCIDFNT RUPTURE USAR 14.1.3.12 FAILURE ACCT 0ENT AFW SYSTEM AFW ISOLATION 1340-0 (0) 1340-0 (0) 1340-0 (0) 1340-0 (0) 1340-0 (0) 1340 (0)
N/A 1340 (0) o HV - 20577, 1295-950 (C) 1340 (C) 1340 (C)
- 20578,
- 20s81, 20582 AFW CROSS 1340-0 (C)
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1340-0 (0)
N/A 1340 (0)
CONNECT HV - 31826 &
1340-0 (C) 1340 (C) 3182?
AFW PUMP 875 (0) 875 (0) 1100 (0) 1100 (0) 1100 (0) 1:00 (0)
N/A 1100 (0)
TURBINE HV - 30801 MAIN STEAM 1100 (0)
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1100 (C)
N/A 1100 (C)
1100 (C) 1100 (0) 20569 4446D
TABLE 1 (Continued)
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE EVALUATION
~-..
NORMAL OPERATIONS ACCIDENT EVENTS PER USAR CHAPTER 14'
(
PLANT NORMAL PLANT USAR USAR USAR USAR-
.USAR
^USAR STARTUP.
POWER SHUTDOWN 14.1.2.1 14.1.2.2 14.1.2.3 14.1.2.4 14.1.2.6 14.1.2.8 OPERATION UNCOMPENSATED STARTUP R00 WITHORAW MODERATOR LOSS OF-LOSS OF OPERATING ACCIDENT ACCIDENT DILUTION COOLANT ELECTRIC-
. REACTIVITY AT RATED ACCIDENT FLOW ~
POER CHANGES POER PLS/SIM SYSTEM HPI ISOLATION VALVES N/A N/A N/A 2185-1900 (0) 2185-1900 (0) 2185-1900 (0) 2185-1900 (0) 2'35-1900 (0) 2185-1900 (0)
SFV - 23809.10,11,12 2400-2150 (C) 2400-2150 (C) 2400-2150 (C) 2400-2150 - (C) 2400-2150 (C) 2400-2150 (C) l LETDOWN ISOL. VALVES 310-5 (0) 2150-45 (C) 150-5 (C)
N/A N/A M/A N/A N/A N/A f'
SFV '22005,06,23,25 310-5 (0) l HV - 22007, 22008 400-4 (0) l o
RCP SEAL RETURN 310-5 (0)
N/A 150-5 (C)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1900-0 (C) i.$'
SFV - 24004 1900-0 (0) l $
MU PUMP _RECIRC 0- (0)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
'N/A' n
l SFV - 23645, 23646 MMEUP ISOLATION 2960-0 (0)
N/A
,/A N/A N/A N/A' N/A' N/A 2185-1900 (0)
SFV - 23604 MU TANK ISOLATION 20-0 (0)
N/A N/A
'N/A N/A N/A N/A-N/A N/A SFV - 23508 I
BWST ISOLATION N/A N/A N/A 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0)
N/A~
SFV - 25003, 25004 30-0 (C)
RCP SEAL INJECTION 2984-14 (0)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A SFV - 23616 R.B. SUMP ISOLATION N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A HW - 26105, 26106 LPI-HPI X-CONNECT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
.N/A
.N/A N/A N/A-HV - 26007, 26008 TWEE-WAY VALVE 148-10 (0) 148-5 (0) 148 -5 (0)
N/A N/A N/A; N/A'
'N/A'
.N/A HV - 23004'
+
44460
TABLE 1 (Continued)
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE EVALUATION
, e ACCIDENT EVENTS PER USAR CHAPTER 14
~..
USAR USAR USAR USAR USAR USAR 14.1.2.5 MAXIMUM 14.2.2.1 14.2.2.2 14.2.2.4 14.2.2.5 14.2.2.6
'OTHER USAR 14.1.2.7 DIFFERENTIAL STEAM STEAM CONTROL LOSS OF LETDOWN EVENTS USAR 14.2.2.3 PRESSURE LINE GENERATOR R00 COOLANT LINE USAR 14.2.2.7 (psid).
FAILURE TUBE EJECTION ACCIDENT RUPTURE USAR 14.1.3.12 FAILURE ACCIDENT PLS/SIM SYSTEM HPI ISOLATION VALVES 2055-1600 (0) 2055-1600 (0) 2055-1600 (0) 2965-200 (0) 2055-1600 (0) 2960-0 ~ (0)
N/A 2960 (0)
SFV - 23809,10,11,12 2400-2150 (C) 1750-1050 (C) 2965-200 (C) 2400-2150 (C) 2400-2150 (C) 2765 (C)
LE1DOWN ISOL. VALVES 2286-17 (0) 2286-17 (C) 2286-17 (C) 2286-17 (0) 2286-17 (C)
~N/A N/A 2269 (OC)
^
SFV - 22005,06,23,25 2282-13 (0) 2282-13 (C) 2282-13 (C) 2282-13 (0) 2282-13 (C)
N/A 3%' (0)
HV - 22007, 22008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2255-45 (C) 2210 (C)
RCP SEAL RETURN 2280-12 (C) 2280-12 (C) 2280-12 (C) 2280-12 (0) 2280-12 (C)
N/A N/A 2268 (C)
SFV - 24004 2280-12 (0) 1050-0 (0) 2280-12 (C) 2280-12 (0) 2268 (0) u MU PUMP RECIRC 2974-30 (C) 2974-30 (C) 2974-30 (C) 2974-30 (0) 2974-30 (C)
.2914-30 (C)
N/A 2944 (0)
SFV - 23645, 23646 2974-30 (0) 2974-30 (0) 2974-30 (0) 2944 (C) 1 MAKEUP ISOLATION 2055-1600 (C) 2055-1600 (C) 2055-1600 (C) 2965-1600 (C) 2055-1600 (C) 2960-0 (C)
N/A 2960 (0)
SFV - 23604 2400-2150 (0) 1750-1050 (0) 2400-2150 (0) 2960.(C)
MU TANK ISOLATION 42-0 (C) 42-0 (C) 42-0 (C) 42-0 (C) 42-0 (C)
N/A N/A 85 (0)
SFV - 23508
.103-18 (0) 103-18 (0) 103-18 (0) 42 (C)
BWST ISOLATION 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0) 30-0 (0) 30-0 '(0)-
30-0 (0)
.N/A 30 (0)
SFV - 25003, 25004 30-0 (C) 30 (C) 30 (C) 30 (C)
RCP SEAL INJECTION N/A N/A N/A 2941-14'(C)
N/A N/A N/A 2970 (0)
SFV - 23616 2927 (C)
R.B. SUMP ISOLATION N/A N/A 20 (0) 20 (0)
N/A N/A N/A 20 (0).
HV - 26105, 26106 LPI-HPI X-CONNECT N/A N/A 190 (0) 189-5 (0)
N/A.
N/A N/A 190 (0)
HV - 26007, 26008 THREE-4 DAY VALVE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
-N/A N/A 143 (0)
HV - 23004 44460
l
.' ??
TABLE 2 VALVE PRESSURES MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIAL TEST PRESSURE LINE PRESSURE PRESSURE (NOTE 1)
VALVE-VALVE OPEN CLOSE OPEN CLOSE OPEN CLOSE DESIGNATION
_ FUNCTION (PSIG)
(PSIG)
(PSID)
(PSID)
(PSID)
(PSID)
HV-20577 AFW Isolation 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 HV-20578 HV-20581 HV-20582 HV-31826 AFW Cross-Connect 1340-1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 HV-31827 HV-30801 AFW Pwp Turbine 1100 1100 970 970 HV-205%
Main Steam to AFW 1100 1100 1100 1100 970 970 HV-20569 SFV-23809 HPI Isolation 2960 2965 2%0 2165 2960 2960 SFV-23810 SFV-23811 SFV-23812 SFV-22005 L'etdown Isolation 2286 2286 2269 2269 2269 (NOTE 2)
SFV-22006 SFV-22023 Letdown Isolation 2282 2282 2269 2269 2269 (NOTE 2)
SFV-22025 HV-?2007 Letdown Isolation 400 2255 3%
2210 (NOTE 3)
HV-22000 SFV-24004 RCP Seal Return 2280 2280 2268 2268 2268 2268 SFV-23645 Makeup Punp Recirculation 2974 2974 2944 2944 2800 2800 SFV-23646 SFV-23604 Makeup Isolation 2960 2960 2960 2960 2960 2960 SFV-23508 Makeup Tank Isolation 103 42 35 42 85 85 SFV-25003 BWST Isolation 40 40 30 30 27 27 SFV-25004 SFV-23616 RCPSealInjection 2984 2941 2970 2927 2970 2927 HV-26105 RB Smp Isolation 25 20 20 HV-26106 HV-26007 LPI-HPt Cross-Connect 190 190 190 HV-26008 HV-?3004 Three-Way Valve (Note 4) 148 143 120 (Letdown to RWS)
Abbreviations:
AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater RB - Reactor Building HPI-HighPressureInjection LPI - Low Pressure Injection RCP - Reactor Coolant Punp RWS - Ra &aste and Coolant Radwaste System BWST - Borated Water Stora9e Tank Notes:
1.
Mininun pressure for acceptance is listed. Higher pressures nay be used per procedure.
2.
Open test is conducted with hydrostatic pressure.
Close test cannot be perfonned with nuximum differential pressure.
3.
HV-22007 and HV-22000 identical to SFV-22005. The differential pressure test on i
SFV-22005 will demonstrate operability by simliarity.
4.
HV-23004 "Open" refers to the "Bleed" position (To Radwaste System) and "Close" refers to the "Nonul" position (To Makeup Tank).
44520 Page 32
,P TABLE 3 VALVE INFORMATION ALLOWA8LE STEM NOMINAL ANSI VALVE VALVE TORQUE SIZE RATING DESIGNATION FUNCTION (FT-LB)
MANUFACTUREft TYPE (INCES)
(LB)
HV-20577 AFW Isolation 563 Anchcr/ Darling Gate 6.0 1500 HV-20578
%3 Anchor / Darling Gate 6.0 1500 HV-20581 354 Pacific Gate 6.0 900 HV-20582 354 Pacific Gate 6.0 900 HV-31826 AFW Cross-Connect 716 Anchor / Darling Gate 6.0 900 HV-31827 716 Anchor / Darling Gate 6.0 900 HV-30801 AFW Punp Turbine 166 Ginpel Globe 4.0 900 HV-205%
Main Steam to AFW 300 Velan Cate 6.0 600 HV-20569 300 Velan Gate 6.0 600 SFV-23809 HPI Isolation 291 Velan Globe 2.5 1500 SFV-23810 291 Velan Globe 2.5 1500 SFV-23811 291 Velan Globe 2.5 1500 SFV-23812 291 Velan Globe 2.5 1500 SFV-22005 Letdown Isolation 73 Velan Gate 2.5 1500 SFV-22006 102 Rockwell Y-Globe 2.5 1500 SFV-22023 Letdown Isolation 224 Anchor / Darling Gate 2.5 1500 SFV-22025 610 Anchor / Darling Gate 2.5 1500 HV-22007 Letdown Isolation 73 Velan Gate 2.5 1500 HV-22008 73 Velan Gate 2.5 1500 SFV-24004 RCP Seal Return 204 Velan Gate 4.0 1500 SFV-23645 Makeup Pisip Recirculation 45 Velan Gate 2.0 1500 SFV-23646 45 Velan Gate 2.0 1500 SFV-23604 Makeup Isolation 236 Anchor / Darling Gate 2.5 1500 SFV-23508 Makeup Tank Isolation 152 Anchor / Darling Gate 4.0 1500 1
SFV-25003 BWST Isolation 350 Crane /Aloyco Gate 16.0 150 SFV-25004 350 Crane /Aloyco Gate 16.0 150 SFV-23616 RCPSealInjection 204 Velan Gate 4.0 1500 HV-26105 RB Starp Isolation 1742 Anchor / Darling Gate 18.0 300 HV-261%
1742 Anchor / Darling Gate 18.0 300 HV-26007 LPI-HPI Cross-Corinect 151 Velan Gate 4.0 300 HV-26008 151 Velan Gate 4.0 300 HV-23004 Three-Way Valve 29 Fisher Globe 2.5 600 (Letdown to RWS) 4452D Page 33
i l
TABLE 4 e
OPERATOR AND MOTOR INFORMATION DESIGN l
TORQUE MAX.
OPERATOR I
MOTOR MOTOR SWITCH OPERATOR TORQUE VALVE VALVE OPERATOR UNIT SIZE SPEED MOTOR SETTING TORQUE AT DELTA P
_ DESIGNATION FUNCTION TYPE RATIO (FT-LB)
(RPM)
VOLTAGE OPEN/CLOSE (FT-LB)
(FT-LB)
HV-20577 AFW Isolation 58-0 48.95 25 1900 125 DC 1.25/1.25' 500 232' HV-20578 58-0 48.95 25 1900 125 DC 1.50/1.50 500-232 HV-20581 SMB-00 23.10 25 1900 125 DC 2.00/?.25 250 140 HV-20582 SMB-00 23.10 25 1900 125 DC 2.25
'S 250 140 HV-31826 AFW Cross-Connect SMB-0 72.50 15 1700 460 AC.
2.50 u A 500 229 i
HV-31827 SMB-0 72.50 15 1700 460 AC 1.50/2.50 500 229 HV-3N 01 AFW Punp Turbine SMB-000 43.75 5
1900 125 DC 2.25/2.50 90 30 l
HV-205%
Main Steam to AFW SMB-0 46.25 25 3400 460 AC-2.50/2.50 500 159 HV-20569 SMB-0 46.25 25 3400 460 AC 1.62/1.62 500 159 SFV-23809 HPI Isolation SMB-00 41.00 15 1900 125 DC 2.00/2.00 250 110 SFV-23810 SMB-00 41.00 15 1900 125 DC 1.75/1.75 250 110 8
SFV-23811 SMB-00 41.00 15 1900 p.
125 DC 2.25/2.00 250 110 SFV-23812 SMB-00 41.00 15 1900 125 DC 1.50/1.50 250 110 w'
SFV-22005
_ Letdown Isolation SMB-00 41.00 10 1700 460 AC 1.50/1.50 250 79-SFV-22006 SMB-00 101.30 10 1700 460 AC 1.00/1.25 250 79-SFV-22023 Letdown Isolation 58-00 101.30 15 3495 460 AC 2.50/2.50 250 91 SFV-22025 SMB-00 46.80 7.5 1700 460 AC 1.50/1.50 250 67 HV-22007 Letdown Isolation SMB-00 41.00 10 1700 460 AC 1.00/1.00 250 78 HV-22008 SMB-00 41.00 10 1700 460 AC 1.00/1.00 250 78 SFV-24004 RCP Seal Return SMB-00 101.30 15 1700 460 AC 2.00/2.00 250 129 SFV-23645 Makeup Punp Recirculation SMB-000 75.00 5
1725 460 AC 3.00/3.00-90 35 SFV-23646 SMB-000 75.00 5
1725 460 AC 1.75/2.00 90 35 SFV-23604-Makeup Isolation SMB-00 34.74 10 1900 125 DC 2.00/2.00 -
250 95 SFV-23508 Makeup Tank-Isolation SMB-00 138.30 7.5 3400 460 AC 2.00/2.00.
250 29 SFV-25003 BWST Isolation-58-2 31.15 40 3450 460 AC 1.00/1.00 1800 86 SFV-25004 58-2 31.15 40 3450 460 AC 1.00/1.00 1800 86 SFV-23616 RCP Seal Injection 58-0 48.95 25 3400 460 AC 1.00/1.00 500 164 HV-26105 RB Sunp Isolation SMB-0 46.20 40 1700 460 AC 1.25/1.37 500 79 HV-26106 SMB-0 46.20 40 1700 460 AC 1.50/1.50 500 83 HV-26007 LPI-HPI Cross-Connect SMB-000 68.00 5
1700 460.AC 1.00/1.00 90
-21 HV-26008 SMB-000 68.00 5
1700 460 AC 1.25/1.00 90 21 HV-23004 Three-Way Valve SMB-000 47.85 5
1700 460 AC 1.00/1.00 90 :
17 (Letdown to RWS) 44560
e, TABLE 5
' AS-FOUND TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS TOROUE SWITCH SETTINGS VALVE VALVE' REQUIREDID.
ASFOUND121 DESIGNATION FUNCTION OPEN CLOSE OPEN CLOSE HV-20577 AFW Isolation 2.75 2.75 2
2.5 HV-20578 2.75 2.75 2
2 HV-31826 AFW Cross-Connect 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 HV-31827 1
1 1
1 HV-30801 AFW Pwp Turbine 1.5 2.5 2
2 HV-205%
Main Steam to AFW 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 HV-20569 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 SFV-23809 HPI Isolation 1.75 1.15 1.75 1.75 SFV-23810 1.75 1.75 1.5 1.75 SFV-23811 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.5 SFV-23812 1.75 1.75 1.5 1.75 SFV-22005 Letdown Isolation 1.25 1.25 1
1 SFV-22006 1.25 1.25 2
2 SFV-22023 Letdown Isolation 2
2 2
1.75 SFV-22025 2
2 2
2 HV-22007 Letdown Isolation 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 HV-22008 1.5 1.5 2
1 SFV-24004 RCP Seal Return 1.5 1.5 2.25 1
SFV-23645 Makeup Pmp Recirculation 2
2.5 2
2.5 SFV-23646 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.5 SFV-23604 Makeup Isolation 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 SFV-23500 Makeup Tank Isolation 1
1 1
1 SFV-25003 BWST Isolation 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 SFV-25004 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 SFV-23616 RCPSealInjecilon 1.5 1.5 2
1.75 HV-26105 RB Swp Isolation 3
3.1 3
3.1 HV-26106 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.75 HV-26007 LPI-44PI Cross-Connect 1.75 1.75 Not Recorded HV-26008 1.75 1.75 1.5 2
HV-23004 Three-Way Valve 1.5 1.5 1.25 1.25 (Letdown to RWS)
(1) As specified in naintenance records (2) As recorded in naintenance inspection data reports
-i l
4452D Page 35
. a TABLE 6 AS-FOUND LIMIT SWITCH SETTINGS LIMIT SWITCH SETTINGS (1)
VALVE VALVE (HANDlMEEL TURNS)
DESIGNATION FUNCTION L21 Q},
141 HV-20577 AFW Isolation Not Recorded HV-20578 1.7 48 49.5 HV-31826 AFW Cross-Connect 1.8 53.9 55.2 HV-31827 1
50.9 56.7 HV-30001 AFW Punp Turbine 3.3 10.5 11 HV-205%
Main Steam to AFW 14 263 267 HV-20569 26 249 259 SFV-23809 HPI Isolation 1.3 28.4 31.7 SFV-23810 27.7(5) 27.5 30.5 SFV-23811 0.2 27.2
'30, 7 SFV-23812 1.7 26.2 31.7 SFV-22005 Letdown Isolation 1.5 19 21.5 SFV-22006 3.3 23.7 26.7 SFV-22023 Letdown Isolation 1.5 23.7 25.2 SFV-22025 0.4 8.3 9
HV-22007 Letdown Isolation 3.2 24.3 27 HV-22008 1.2 26 26.5 SFV-24004 RCP Seal Return 1.7 72 73.5 SFV-25645 Makeup Ptsrp Recirculation 1.2 5.1 5.7 SFV-23646 1
4.3 5
SFV-23604 Makeup Isolation 4.5 38 42 SFV-23500 Makeup Tank Isolation 3
33.3 38 SFV-25003 BWST Isolation 5.7 519 528 SFV-25004 52 438 400 SFV-23616 RCPSealInjection 10.5 72.5 77 HV-26105 RB Strip Isolation 92 1130 1235 HV-26106 22 990 1043 HV-26001 LPI-HPI Cross-Connect 0.1 6.7 7.6 HV-26000 0.5 6.7 7.6 HV-23004 Three-Way Valve 0.7 6
7.3 (Letdown to RWS)
(1) As recorded in nanntenance inspection data reports (2) Frcrn disk motion to bypass limit switch (3) From disk motion to motor open limit switch (4) Frcrn disk motion to full disk travel ("backseat")
(5) Measurement error 4452D Page 36
.s
}
TABLE 7 AS-FOUND VALVE CONDITIONS BINDING BENT IN WEDGE DISK SEAT YOKE VALVE' SEAT "EARS" OVERT RJST DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAG_E BACKSEATING HV-20577 HV-20578 HV-31826 HV-31827 HV-30801 HV-205%
HV-20569 SFV-23809 0
SFV-23810 0
0 SFV-23811 0
SFV-23812 SFV-22005 0
0 SFV-22006 0
0 SFV-22023 SFV-22025 0
HV-22007 0
HV-22000 0
0 SFV-24004 SFV-23645 SFV-23646 SFV-23604 SFV-23508 SFV-25003 0
SFV-25004 0
SFV-23616 0
HV-26105 HV-26106 i
HV-26007 HV-26008 HV-23004 0
l 0-Condition not severe - operable 4452D Page37
, =
, is,'
TABLE 8 AS-FOUNO OPERATOR (X)NDITIONS CRACKED GREASE STEM NU1 DEGRADED LIMIT-PLUG LOCK NUT GREASE ELECTRICAL SWITCH BROKEN VALVE OVERT E T UNDERT N T BRAKING NOT STAKED SEPARATED CONNECTIONS ROTOR OR OUT HV-20577 0
0 0
HV-20578 0
0 0
0 HV-31826 0
0 0
0 HV-31827 0
0 0
HV-30001 0
0 0
0 HV-205%
0 0
0 0
HV-20569 0
0 0
SFV-23809 0
SFV-23810 0
0 SFV-23811 0
0 SFV-23812 0
0 0
SFV-22005 0
0 0
SFV-22006 0
0 0
SFV-22023 0
0 SFV-22025 0
0 HV-22007 0
0 0
HV-22008 0
0 0
SFV-24004 0
0 0
SFV-23645 0
0 SFV-23646 0
0 0
SFV-23604 0
0 0
0 SFV-23508 0
0 i
SFV-25003 0
0 SFV-25004 0
0 SFV-23616 0
0 0
HV-26105 0
HV-26106 0
HV-26007 0
0 HV-26008 0
0 HV-23004 0
0 0-Condition not severe - operable i
44520 i
Page 38
r-~
d 96
,' h.'
TABLE 8 (continued)
AS-FOUND OPERATOR CONDITIONS TORQUED OUT CAN'T DECLUTCH GOING EXCESS GREASE GREASE CLOSE GEAR VALVE MECHANISM-OPEN GREASE LEAKAGE
_HARD MANUALLY NOISE HV-20577 0
0 HV-20578 0
HV-31826 0
HV-31827 0
HV-30801 0
HV-205%
HV-20569 0
I SFV-23809 SFV-23810 0
SFV-23811 0
SFV-23812 0
SFV-22005 0
0 SFV-22006 0
0 SFV-22023 0
0 SFV-22025 0
HV-22007 0
0 HV-22008 0
0 SFV-24004 0
SFV-23645 0
SFV-23646 SFV-23604 0
0 SFV-23508 SFV-25003 0
SFV-25004 SFV-23616 0
0 HV-26105 HV-26106 HV-26007 0
HV-26000 HV-23004 0-Condition not severe - operable I-Condition severe - inoperable 44520 Page 39
r.
e..
.6 TABLE 9 AS-FOUND MOTOR CONDITIONS CONTACTOR UNDERSIZED VOLTAGE M0 TOR VALVE CABLE PROBLEM OVERTm UST HV-20577 HV-20578' HV-31826 HV-31827
-HV-30801 0
W-205%
0 HV-20569 0
SFV-23809 SFV-23810 SFV-23811 SFV-23812 SFV-22005 SFV-22006 SFV-22023 SFV-22025 HV-22007 HV-22008 SFV-24004 SFV-23645 SFV-23646 SFV-23604 0
SFV-23500 SFV-25003 SFV-25004 SFV-23616 HV-26105 HV-26106 HV-26007 HV-26008 HV-23004 0-Condition not severe - operable 4
44520 Page 40 d
/.
/
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