ML20239A046
| ML20239A046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1987 |
| From: | Croley B, Humenansky D, Marshall T SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238F564 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8709170047 | |
| Download: ML20239A046 (19) | |
Text
'
EXPANDED AUGHENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM (EXPANDED ASRTP)
EVALUATION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM SUBMITTED BY: r #d7M D M #fA4/ DATE: #-6 ,P 7
/ THOMAS N. MARSHAT.L ,
TEAM LEADER {
CONCURRENCE: YNid % DATE: 8 3 7
/ DAVID HUMENAhSr(
/ EXPANDED ASRTP PROGRAM RANAGER (f
CONCURRENCE:
/
4- DATE: ~'
M![7
/
l I
BOB CROLEY DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR CHNICAL SERVICES I
1 i
G
r TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace Number 3
1.0 INTRODUCTION
4 2.0 PURPOSE 3.0 SCOPE 5 4.0 OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 6 5.0 SPECIFIC CONCERNS 9 5.1 Acknowledged (Valid) Concerns l 5.2 Open (Potential) Concerns 6.0 ATTACHMENTS 10 6.1 List of Documents Reviewed 11 6.2 Status of RIs ! 14 ;
6.3 Detailed Observations - Requests for Information i5 J
l i
I i i i
\ I l l t I
! l i
i I f
i i
I
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ __ .I ___A
l EXPANDED AUGHENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM f 1.0 INTR 000CTT.03 The Rancho Seco Expanded Augmented System Review and Test Program (ASRTP) evaluation effort involves an assessment of the .
effectiveness of the System Review and Test Program (SRTP] and an !
analysis of the adequacy of ongoing programs to ensure that systems 1 will continue to function properly after restart. The Expanded ASRTP is a detailed system by system review of the SRTP as implemented on 33 selected systems and an in-depth review of the engineering, modification, maintenance, operations, surveillance, i
inservice testing, and quality programs. It also conducts a review, on a sampling basis, of many of the numerous ongoing verification and review programs at Rancho Seco, {
Six multi-disciplined teams composed of knowledgeable and experienced personnel are tasked with performing the Expanded (
ASRTP. Each multi-disciplined team cent,sts of dedicated personnel !
j with appropriate backgrounds to evaluate the operations, i maintenance, engineering, and design functional areas, Independence, perspective, and industry standards provided by team members with consultants, architect engineer and vendor backgrounds are joined with the specific plant knowledge of SMUD team members.
Each team performs an evaluation on a selected system using the same )
fundamental evaluation techniques employed by the NRC in the ASRTP l inspection. System Status Reports are used as the primary source of leads for the teams. They are augmented with references to available source and design bases documents as needed. Team synergism and communication is emphasized during the process in order to enhance the evaluation. Each team prepares a report for each comoleted selected system evaluated. This report is for the Emergency Diesel Generator system.
4
2.0 PURPOSE The objectives of the Expanded ASRTP evaluation are to (1) assess the adequacy of act'ivities and systems in support of restart and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of established programs for ensuring safety during plant operation after restart.
l l
l l
l i
3.0 SCOPE To accomplish the first objective, the Power Systems team evaluated the Emergency Diesel Generator system to determine whether:
- 1. The system was capable of performing the safety functions required by its design bases.
- 2. Testing was adequate to demonstrate that the system j would perform all of the safety functions required. ;
- 3. System maintenance (with emphasis on pumps and valves) '
was adequate to ensure system operability under postulated accident conditions.
- 4. Operator and maintenance technician training was adequate to ensure proper operations and maintenance of the system.
- 5. Human factors relative to the system and the system's l supporting procedures were adequate to ensure proper i system operations under normal and accident conditions.
To accomplish the second objective, the Power Systems team reviewed l the programs as implemented for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EGS) system in the following functional areas:
- 1. Systems Design and Change Control
- 2. Maintenance
- 3. Operations and Training 4 Surveillance and Inservice Testing
- 5. Quality Assurance
- 6. Engineering Programs The Power Systems team reviewed a number of documents in preparation for and during the Expanded ASRTP evaluation of the EGS system.
This list of documents is found in Attachment 6.1.
The primary source of leads for the team were the problems identified in the Emergency Diesel Generators System Status Report.
Various source documents such as the USAR and Technical Specifications and available design bases documents were reviewed as needed to augment the information needed by the team.
The evaluation of the EGS system included a review of pertinent portions of support systems that must be functional in order for the EGS system to meet its design objectives.
4.0 CVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS The more significant issues identified pertaining to the Idequacy of the SRTP and the effectiveness of programs to ensure continued safe operations after restart are summarized below. The summary focuses on the weaknesses identified during the evaluation. Attachment 6.3 provides detailed findings by providing the Request for Information (RI) forms that are used by the Expanded ASRTP teams to identify potential concerns during the evaluation. Section 5.0 lists the .
specific concerns identified by the team. The numbers in brackets after each individual summary or concern refer to the corresponding l RIs in Attachment 6.3.
4.1 Lack of a Fuse Control Program The inspection team has a concern that the Emergency Diesel Generators may fail to perform their required function because of inadequate fuse control.
4.1.1 A Fuse Control Program should ensure that an adequate design review is performed, which addresses all fuse parameters and requirements for individual applications. A review of ECN's R1150, R1060 and R1128E, all of which installed fuses, revealed a lack of adequate design review addressing the added fuses. On ECNs R1150 and R1060, no documentation could be found which addressed fuse coordination with other protective devices, interrupting rating, voltage rating, qualification for DC applications or required amperage to support function. A calculation, Z-EDS-E0671, was found for ECN Ril28. It addressed the required parameters in most cases. It did not address the suitability of OT type fuses l
for DC application. The vendor information specified AC ratings only but the fuse was to be used in the 125 VOC control circuit for the Diesel Generator output breaker.
(RI No. 035) 4.1.2 A Fuse Control Program should ensure that adequate information is included on the drawings to support l operations and maintenance. Deficiencies were noted on the I design drawings for the above referenced ENCs. These included: failure to indicate fuse amperage on schematic drawings; failure to change reference numbers, which specify type and amperage, on connection drawings; and failure to revise Bill of Material drawing which should specify new fuse type and amperage. (RI No. 035) i 4.1.3 A Fuse Control Program should ensure that the design specified fuses are installed and properly maintained. As a sample, diesel generator A output breaker was checked to determine if proper fuses are installed. Design drawings show that the 2 fuses for protective relaying should be 2AK20. Actually installed was found an OT15 and a renewable fuse, we were unable to determine the amperage. Design
OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued) ,
1 drawings show that the 2 fuses for metering should be 2AK20. Actually installed was found 2 renewable fuses, i amperage undetermined. Design drawings show that the single I fuse for the control circuit for the diesel generator breaker should be a 2AK20. Design Calculation, Z-EDS-E0671, says the renewable "REN-20" will be replaced with an OT10 because the "REN-20" does not coordinate properly with the circuit breaker. Hhat was actually installed was an FRN type fuse, could not see amperage rating. All five fuses in diesel generator A output breaker circuitry appear to be in variance with design bases. The diesel generator B output breaker was checked but all fuses were removed for work in progress.
No further survey of installed fuses was performed. At other sites renewable fuses are not allowed on site for the following reasons: (1) different amperage links are interchangeable and positive identification is impossible without disassembly, (2) due to mechanical connections, hot spots and unreliable operation are possible (3) possibility of these fuses being used in safety related circuits. l (RI No.035) l l
4.1.4 A Fuse Control Program should provide training on fuse application, fuse installation, and fuse maintenance.
Several design personnel and several electrical maintenance personnel were interviewed. All of the personnel interviewed said they had received no training on fuses or fuse control. They knew of no fuse training available. To their knowledge there are no procedures or guidelines cealing with fuses. Training was contacted, they said that, recently a 7 hour8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> course dealing with basic protective devices had been developed and some people had been trained. The adequacy of the training was not reviewed.
(RI No. 035) 4.2 Human factors Concerns The inspection team has two concerns for the Emergency Diesel Generators System because of lack of Human Factors Engineering being applied to the EGS system.
(1) Possible damage may occur on the diesel generators before the operator can respond due to lack of human factors on the diesel gaugeboards and annunciator procedures.
(2) During required surveillance or maintenance operation, if a Design Basis Accident were to occur, it may take the operator an inordinate amount of time to accomplish a restart on the diesel generator due to the lack of human factors considerations.
OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued)
The Emergency Diesel Generators System Status Report listed seven individual problems of a Human Factors nature. SSR Problem Nos. 1,2, 4, 22, 28, 29 and 30. The problems appeared to be addressed on an individual basis rather than addressing them as symptoms of a generic problem. With over 231. of the known problems being related, the inspection team looked at this area further and identified additional Concerns.
4.2.1 Annunciator lights on the diesel and generator panels should be grouped, outlined, or colored to distinguish between lights which indicate normal condition, lights which indicate the diesel is "not ready for auto start," and .
lights which indicate that a parameter is exceeded. For ;
example, conditions which actuate the emergency shutdown circuit are not all outlined in blue lamenoid. " Crankcase pressure high" and " jacket water temp alarm" are outlined in blue lamenoid, but other annunciator lights which cause this condition, doverspeed alarm" and "lo lube oil alarm" i are not. (RI No. 079) l l
4.2.2 Annunciator windows 92 (Diesel Generator A Auto Start i Inoperable or Loss of Remote Control) and 93, (Diesel Generator B Auto Start Inopera'ble or Loss of Remote Control), each receive input signals from twenty actuating devices listed on six pages for each window in Annunciator Procedure H2ES, Rev. 14, which have to be checked before the ,
operator can take action to correct the problem and make the diesel generator " ready for auto start" or " returned to {
Control Room" control. Considerable time is required to determine the problem before corrective action can be initiated. (RI No. 079) 4.2.3 Indicating Meters and gauges on diesel generator local panels and in Control Room do not indicate " normal ranges" or " limits " such as Tech. Spec. limits or dangerous operating limits. (RI No. 079) 4.2.4 Three alarm lights on the diesel local annunciator panel are not addressed in the alarm response procedure. (RI No. 079) 4.2.5 Alarm lights on the local panel are numbered but do not correlate with the alarm response procedure. It takes ,
considerable time to locate the appropriate response. l (RI No. 079) I I
l.
l
_- I
l I
5.0 SPECIFIC CONCERNS l A list of the specific concerns the Expanded ASRTP team believes are l new concerns not previously identified for resolution follow:
5.1 Acknowledged (Valid) Concerns
- 1. There is a potential for Emergency Diesel Generators failing to 1 perform their required function because of inadequate fuse l control. l l
1.1 Nuclear Engineering does not adequately address fuse i design critiera. (RI-35) 1.2 Nuclear Engineering provides inadequate fusing information on the drawings. (RI-35) 1.3 Maintenance installs incorrect fuses. CRI-35) 1.4 All appropriate personnel are not trained on proper fuse application. (RI-35) 1.5 Renewable element fuses are used in Class IE circuits.
(RI-35)
- 2. Due to the inadequacy of human factors considerations in procedures, alarms, gauge faces and labels, there is a possibility that the diesel generator could be damaged during normal operation before the operations personnel could take corrective action.
5.2 Open (Potential) Concerns None i l
I l
_9_
6.0 ATTACHMENTS 6.1 List of Documents Reviewed 6.2 Status of RIs 6.3 Detailed Observations - Requests for Information i
i 1
i l
l l
\
l l l
l l
l l
l l
\
l 6.1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED USAR Section 8 System Status Report for EGS, Rev. 1 Rancho Seco Technical Specification Draft Copy of System Design Basis, NEPH 5422 Quality Control Instruction QCI-12, Rev. 3 ,
Master ECN List I Installed Parts Equivalency Evaluation Report, AP.91 Field Problem Report, RSAP-0305, Rev. O Maintenance Test Procedure, RSAP-0807, Rev. O Rancho Seco Annunciator Procedures H2ES, H2DGA, H2DG8 Design Guide 5204.59 l Construction Specification 5304. llc j Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979, Fuel Oil System for Standby Diesel Generator AP.44, Rev. 11, Plant Modifications Design Bases Reports for ECN R-1060, R-1150, and R-1128E !
ECN Package for ECNs R-1060, R-ll50, and R-il28E i RSAP-0803, Rev. 1 & 2 - Work Request l Reviewed the Work Request Summary for Trending, both Nucleis ]
and MIMS l IE Notice 85-91 l Licensee Event Report 87-08 !
Occurrence Description Report 46 !
SP.206.01A Biannual "A" Emergency Diesel Eng. Insp. j Emergency Operating Procedures AP.23.10, Equipment Maintenance and Operating Standards AP.91, Installed Parts Equivalency Evaluation Report STP.1012 Emergency Diesel Generator (G-886B) Post 4 Modification Test l Rancho Seco Daily Plant Outage Schedule )
Field Problem Report #14, ECN R-1898 4 Field Problem Report #15, ECN R-il50 A.31B (Proposed), TDI Diesel Generator System OP C.13A (Proposed), Remote Shutdown AP.159, Rev. 7, Diesel Generator and Diesel Fuel Oil Systems Technical Specifications Manual, Amendment 147 SP.206.05, Rev. 3, Standby Diesel Generator and Diesel Driven Fire Pump Fuel Oil Quarterly Testing AP.306, Rev. 2, Chemistry Manual ECN R-1108, R-0770A/B, R-0890, R-0415A/B, R-1000 STP-970, STP-895, STP-1062 EM.1268 P&ID H-583, Sh 1, Rev. 12 RSAP-0807, Rev. O, Maintenance Test Program Emergency Diesel Generator System Test Matrix ATTACHMENT 6.1 (Continued)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED Surveillance Procedures SP.206.018, Rev. 3, Biannual Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection SP.206.03A, Rev.16, DG G-886A, Synchronization Surveillance Test SP.206.03B, Rev. 14, DG G-8868, Synchronization Surveillance Test SP.206.01A, Rev. 3, Biannual "A" Emergency Diesel Engine Inspection SP.206.02A, Rev. 4, Refueling Interval Diesel Generator "A" l SFAS Start Test SP.319A, Draft Copy, Refueling Interval OG (G-886A) SFAS and LOOP Loading Scheme Surveillance Test Electrical Maintenance Procedures EH.177A, Rev. 8, Function Test of Nuclear Service Bus "A" and A2 Unloading Scheme EM.126A. Rev. 1, Refueling Testing and Maintenance of Diesel Generator A EM.164, Rev. 5, Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers ,
EM.144, Rev. 9, Testing of Protective and Control Relays i EM.168, Rev. 5, Electrical Maintenance Inspection of i Emergency Diesel Generators i MAP-0004, Rev. 0, Control of Onsite Contractor and Vendor Personnel MAP-0006, Rev. O, Work Request Planning l
Ooeration Procedures A.32A, Original Issue (Draft), Diesel Fuel Oil System l A.31, Rev. 28, Diesel Generator System !
Casualty Procedures C.13A, Rev. 6, Hot Shutdown from Safe Shutdown Panel With a I Fire in Control Room C.180 (Proposed), Diesel Generator A(B) Fall to Start C.181 (Proposea), Diesel Generator A2(B2) Fail to Start C.182 (Proposed), Diesel Generator A(B) Fail to Load C.183 (Proposed), Diesel Generator A2(B2) Fail to Load C.184 (Proposed), Diesel Generator A(B) Fail to Stop C.185 (Proposed), Diesel Generator A2(B2) Fail to Stop Calculations 1
Z-EGS-E0658, Rev. 1, Size Verification of Diesel Generators GEA, GEB, GEA2, GEB2 Z-EOS-120, Rev. 2, Short Circuit Study of Aux Power System Z-E05-E0671, Rev. 1. Control Circuit Fuse and Breaker Coordination for Switchgears S4A2, S4A and Load Center I
ATTACHMENT 6.1 (Continued) j
l LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED Drawinas i
E-104, Sh 2 Rev.11 - One Line Diagram, 4160V System '
l P&ID H-582 Diesel Oil Systems E-104, Sh 3, Rev.12 - One Line Diagram, 4160V System P&ID H-583 Emergency Diesel Generator E-204, Sh 1, Rev. 23 - Elementary Diagram, Diesel Generator System E-204, Sh 2, Rev.18 - Elementary Diagram, Diesel Generator l System E-204, Series Drawings for Diesel Engine "A" and "8" Control E-208 Series Drawings for Nuclear Service Bus Loading Hork Reauest l Hork Request Nos. P65830, 125891, 116927, 133702, 134215, 125787, 128900, 117439, 120433, 120434 l
l ATTACHMENT 6.1 (Continued) 6.2 STATUS OF RIs Attachment 6.2 provides RI status as of this report date. An RI is considered closed if the Team Leader was convinced a potential concern was not valid or not significant enough to be an RI. An RI would also be closed if requested information was provided. All other RIs are open. Acknowledged RIs are open RIs that have been accepted as valid by the responsible organization and have been stated as concerns in Section 5.0.
RI NUMBER STATUS I 035 Acknowledged 079 Acknowledged l
l ATTACHMENT 6.2 i
_ _ _ _ _ _ . 1
DETAILED OBSERVATIONS - REOUEST FOR INFORMATION During an evaluation, all potential concerns are documented on ,
Request for Information sheets (RIs) that are sent to the l responsible organization to receive their input concerning the potential concern. RIs are also used to request information that the EASRTP team is having difficulty ' obtaining.
These PIs are considered drafts throughout the entire evaluation until they become part of the report. Responsible organizations can accept the potential concern as valid or they may disagree with the potential concern. If they disagree, they can submit information that convinces the EASRTP team members that the potential concern is not valid, or they may redirect the EASRTP members to better focus the concern. RIs developed during the system evaluation comprise this section of the report.
I
\
i l
i I
l l
l l
l l
i l
l ATTACHMENT 6.3 15 -
o __
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI)
RI NO: 035 SYSTEM CODE: EGS ISSUE DATE: 07-28-87
SUBJECT:
FUSE CONTROL DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: RON LAWRENCE TEAM LEADER: THOMAS MARSHALL
\
POTENTI_AL CONCERN /00ESTION:
Potential for Emergency Diesel Generators failing to perform their ;
required function because of inadequate fuse control.
l . ECN's R1150, R1128E and R1060 were reviewed and the following problems were found:
- 1. None of the Design Bases Reports addressed fusing. The l following questions were asked of Engineering:
- a. Was available Short Circuit Current and Interrupting Capacity evaluated? This was addressed on one of the ECNs, not for the other two.
- b. Was time coordination with other protective devices evaluated? This was also' addressed on one ECN but not the other two,
It was addressed partially on one ECN but not on tne other two.
- 2. Some of the Schematic drawings do not show the amperage rating for the fuse.
1 E-204 Sh. I Fuse to Metering and Synchroni:ing E-204 Sh. 2 Fuse to Metering and Syncnrcnizing E-204 Sh. 65 FU3 and FU4 DC Air Start System E-204 Sh. 65 FUS and FU6 AC Air Start System E-204 Sh. 65 FU1 and FU2 Fault Shutdown Circuit E-204 Sh. 66 Fuses to Alarm Lights and Annunciator E-204 Sh. 68 Ful3, i4, 15 and 16 Generator Protective Relays, Auto and Manual Voltage Control, Electric Governor Control.
1 RI 035 (Continued)
- 3. The Bill of Material does specify the type and ampcrage of fuse but does not adequately indicate where it is to be installed.
. Interviews with Maintenance Personnel were conducted and the following concerns were expressed by Electrical Maintenance Personnel:
- 1. No training on Fuse Application or Fuse Installation.
- 2. Inadequate labeling of fuses. r j
- 3. Inability to determine fuse type and amperage from drawing.
- 4. The lack of guidelines or procedures addressing fuses. l S. If a fuse was damaged or had been previously removed, it might be impossible for maintenance to determine the type or ]I even amperage of the required fuse because of inadequate information on the drawings.
. Observation by Evaluation Team
- 1. Inadequate la.beling of fuses in EGS circuits. ;
- 2. Inadequate controls on storage of fuses. Replaceable '
l element fuses were stored along with other fuses.
3, Replaceable element fuses were observed in the control circuit for Diesel Generator A output breaker. Electrical i Maintenance Engineer stated that, Renewable Fuses are not !
used in Safety Related Ecuiement.
- 4. Of 5 fuses in the Diesel Generator A output breaker compartment, all 5 appear to be not in accordance with the drawings. !
. NCR No. 5535 contains details of a fuse failure on Emergency Diesel ;
Generator "B" because of inadequate fuse control.
1 1
]
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) l d
RI NO: 079 SYSTEM CODE: EGS ISSUE DATE: 07-29-87 '
SUBJECT:
HUMAN FACTORS DEPARTMENT: OPERATIONS RICH MACIAS TEAM LEADER: TOMMY MARSHALL COORDINATOR:
POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION:
Possible damage may occur on the diesel generators before the operator i
may be able to respond due to the lack of human factors on the diesel gaugeboards and annunciator procedures. During a diesel generator surveillance with a designed basis accident it may take the' operator a '
great deal of time for a restart of the concerned diesel generator due to '
the lack of human factors considerations.
. Lighting on the north side of G-8868 diesel generator room is i
inadequate.
. There is no reflash capability for Control Room annunciators for the diesel generators;.H2ES windows 1, 18, 92, and 93.
. Annunciator Procedure H2ES, Rev. 14, index has incorrect window names for windows 92 and 93, although they are correct in the procedure.
. Control Room annunciator procedures for the diesel generators do net 1 reference local panel annunciator procedures. l 1
. Annunciator windows 92 (Diesel Generator A Auto Start Inoperable or !
Loss of Remote Control) and 93, (Diesel Generator B Auto Start Inoperable or Loss of. Remote Control), each receive irput signals from twenty actuating devices listed on six pages for each window in Annunciator Procedure H2ES, Rev. 14, which have to be checked before the. operator can take action to correct the prenlem and make the diesel generator " ready for auto start" or
- returned to Control Room" control. Considerable time is required to determine the problem before corrective action can be initiated. (RI No. 079)
. Meters on d usel generator panels H7J272 and H73273 and generator panels H2DGA and H2DGB are not color coded for procedure " Limits and Precautions" and " Process Standards" setpoints.
. Pumps are not labeled with noun equipment names even though A.31, Diesel Generators System, Rev. 28, refers to noun names.
l 1
e
i s ,
I g s j l RI 079 (Continued)
. Annunciator lights on the diesel and generator panels should be grouped, outlined, or colored to distinguish between lights which i
' indicate normal condition, lights which indicate the diesel is "not ready for auto start," arjd lights which indicate that a parameter is exceeded. For example /tonditions which actuate the emergency shutdown circuit are not all outlined in blue lamenoid. " Crankcase pressure high" and " jacket water temp. alarm" are outlined in blue lamenoid, but other annunciator. lights which cause this condition, "overspeed alarm" and "io lube oil alarm" are not. (RI No. 079)
. EngravedNameplatesor/panelsH7J272andH7327Ildonotmatchthe names of alarms in' Annunciator Procedures H2DGA, Rev. O and H2DGB, !
Rev. O. l
. There is a lack of standardization in diesel fuel oil day tank level !
indication. ,N-l
.v 1
- 1) T-893A and T-8938 sightglasses have no markings. / '
f.
- 2) LI-88693 and LI-88694 are marked in fractioral Iinc ements of thirty-seconds, sixteenths, eighths, and halves. 1 1
- 3) Process Standards, AP.159, Rev. 7 and Annunciator Procedures !
H2DGA, 3ev. O and H2DGB, Rev. O, use inches. l l
- 4) Diesel Generator System, A.31, Rev. 28, uses inch *;s and percentage.
- 5) Technical Specification Amenoment 147, Section 3.7.IF, will a require percentage or gallons. -
. Not all alarm lights on local annunciator canels are Mc!uded in -l alarm response procedures H2DGA, Rev. O and H20GB, Rev. O. During j STP-1012 on G-886B alarm light " Comb. Air Press Lo" annunciated and the operator had no idea what to 00 because the alarm was not listed in Annunciator Procedure H2DGB, Rev. O. -
. Local Panel Annunciator Procedure H2DGA, Rev. O and H20GB, Rev. O are not easily referenced. During STP-1012 on G-8868.the alarm light for " motor driven fuel pump failure" annunciated and it was several minutes before the operator could locate the alarm in the annunciator procedure to determine a response, even though lights on diesel panel H7J273 are newly numbered.
4 I
l 1
.-._- _ _ -_-_________a