ML20236B010

Expanded Augmented Sys Review & Test Program (Expanded Asrtp) Evaluation of Nuclear Svcs Electrical Bldg Essential & Normal HVAC Sys

ML20236B010
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	10/12/1987
From:	Croley B, Esperanza E, Humenansky D SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20236A981	List: ML20236A978 ML20236A989 ML20236A992 ML20236A998 ML20236B002 ML20236B005 ML20236B010
References
NUDOCS 8710230295
Download: ML20236B010 (25)

Text

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EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEH AND TEST PROGRAM (EXPANDED ASRTP)

EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICES ELECTRICAL BUILDING ESSENTIAL and NORMAL HVAC SYSTEM Er7&M EsPaER.ANr4/4dM-1 DATE: 10 /M /87 SUBMITTED BY:

EFREN R. ESPERANZA

/

J TEAM LEADER CONCURRENCE:

$Moid swa DATE: lo-09-07 D

D HUMENANSKY

/

XPANDED ASRTP PROGRAM MNAGER

/0//2 77 CONCURRENCE:

DATE:

/

B0B CROLEY

/

DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR TECHNICAL SERVICES I

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PlA 288&i 8?s88sia G

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l TABLE'0F CONTENTS L>.

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Paae Number 1.0- INTRODUCTION 3

2.0, PURPOSE 4

3.0 SCOPE 5

4.0 OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS-6 5.0 SPECIFIC CONCERNS 8

5.1 Acknowledged (Valid) Concerns 8

5.2 Open (Potential) Concerns 8

6.0 ATTACHMENTS-9 6.1 List of Documents Reviewed 10 6.2 Status of RIs 13 6.3 Detailed Observations - Requests for Information 14 l

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' EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEH AND TEST PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICES ELECTRICAL BUILDING ESSENTIAL and NORMAL HVAC SYSTEM

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Rancho Seco Expanded Augmented System Review and Test Program

[ASRTP] evaluation effort involves an assessment of the effectiveness of the System Review and Test Program [SRTP] and an l

analysis of the adequacy of ongoing programs to ensure that systems l

will continue to function properly after restart. The Expanded ASRTP is a detailed system by system review of the SRTP as implemented on 33 selected systems and an in-depth review of the engineering, modification, maintenance, operations, surveillance, inservice testing, and quality programs.

It also conducts a review, I

on a sampling basis, of many of the numerous ongoing verification and review programs at Rancho Seco.

Six multi-disciplined teams composed of knowledgeable and

. j experienced personnel are tasked with performing the Expanded ASRTP.

Each multi-disciplined. team consists of dedicated personnel-l with appropriate backgrounds to evaluate the operations, i

maintenance, engineering, and design functional areas.

l Independence, perspective, and industry standards provided by team I

members with consultants, architect engineer and vendor backgrounds j

are joined with the specific plant knowledge of SMUD team members.

j Each team performs an evaluation on a selected system using the same fundamental evaluation techniques employed by the NRC in the ASRTP inspection.

System Status Reports are used as the' primary source of

)

leads for the teams.

They are augmented with references to 1

available source and design bases documents as needed.

Team j

synergism and communication is emphasized during the process in order to enhance the evaluation.

Each team prepares a report for each completed selected system evaluated.

This report is for the Nuclear Services Electrical Building (NSEB) Essential and Normal HVAC system.

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2.0 PURPOSE i

The objectives of the Expanded ASRTP evaluation are to (1) assess

. the adequacy.of activities and systems in support of restart and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of established. programs for ensuring safety.during plant operation after resta-t.

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.3.0 SCOPE 4

To" accomplish)the(first objective,.the.HVAC' team evaluated.the NSEB Essential and Normal: HVAC: system to determine whether:

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The: system was capable of performing the safety.

functions required by its design bases.

2.

Testing was adequate to demonstrate that the system would perform all:of-the safety' functions required.

3.

System maintenance-(with emphasis on pump's.and valves) was adequate to ensure system operability under

. postulated accident conditions.

4.

Operator and maintenance technician training was adequate to ensure proper operations and maintenance of the system.

5.

l. Human factors relative to the. system and the system's supporting procedures were adequate to' ensure-proper system operations under normal and accident conditions.

To accomplish the second objective, the, team reviewed.the programs as implemented for the. system in'the following functional areas:

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Systems Design and Change Control l

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'2.

Maintenance-3.

Operations and Training 4.

Surveillance and Inservice Testing 5.

Quality Assurance 6.

Engineering Programs i

The team reviewed a number of documents in preparation for and during.the Expanded ASRTP evaluation. This list of documents'is.

found in Attachment 6.1.

The primary source of leads for the team were the problems identified in the NSEB Essential and Normal HVAC System Status Report. Various source documents such as the USAR and Technical Specifications and available design bases documents were reviewed as needed to augment the information needed by the team.

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The evaluation of the NSEB Essential and Normal HVAC system included 1

a review of pertinent portions of support systems that must be 1

functional in order for the NSEB Essential and Normal HVAC system to meet its design objectives. f.

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z 4.0.0VERALL RESULTS AND-CONCLt1SIONS

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.The 'more significant' issues identified pertaining to the: adequacy of -

the SRTP and the effectiveness'of programs to ensure continued safe operations after restart are summarized below. The summary focuses'

.on' the: weaknesses identified during the' evaluation. Attachment 6.3 provides. detailed findings;by providing the Request for.:Information.

']

-(RI) forms that are used by the Expanded ASRTP teams to identify.

j potential concerns during the evaluation.: Section 5.0 lists. the

.j specific concerns identified by the teams. The numbers in' brackets 1

!after.each individual summary or' concern refer to the corresponding 1

RIs in Attachment 6.3.

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- 4.1 NSEB' ESSENTIAL HVAC SYSTEM 4.1.1 A review'of the system indicates that several'NSEB operating

. procedures and'NSEB Essential HVAC controls and status indicators in the Control Room are inadequate.

The following specific deficiencies'were noted and'are i

'important because the Essential HVAC units are considered

" required auxiliaries" for the electrical safety buses per Technical. Specification 3.7.2.

Inoperability in this case would result in a limiting condition of operation.

(RI 247)

(RI 263) 1 There is no. local or Control Room-annunciation'to.

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inform the operator to manually reset the condensing unit relay switch during power interruption. As a j

result, the condensing unit will not autostart upon receipt of Hi Temperature. signal. Although Limits.and Precautions section of Operating Procedure A.140 specifies to locally reset the compressor any time there is'an interruption of. control: power.to the unit, it does not provide defense in depth against ' operator oversight / error. The same problem was also identified s

in the CR/TSC HVAC system.

There is no annunciation for compressor crankcase j

heater failure (such as blown fuse).

The compressor.

unit will automatically start upon receipt of Hi Temperature signal. Operating the compressor without reaching the required crankcase temperature could cause a low oil pressure and excessive bearing wear due to lubrication with oil which contains refrigerant.

The same problem was also identified in the CR/TSC HVAC system.

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-OVERALL RESULTSLAND CONCLUSIONS- (Continued)-

-4.1.1 (Continued)-

No control room annunciation exists for,NSEB essential; compressor differential pressure' switches-

~PDSL-50137/50138

'When activated. they stop the compressors.

The compressors cannot be stPrted after..

such an occurrence until the pr. essure. differential.

switch.is reset and the~ local reset. button'at the compressor depressed.- (Ref:. Drainage E-206'Sh

156/157, Sh 2 of 2 for DCN R-1023D) l Operating Procedure A.14D - This procedure omits-l y

several valves in the line up that are critical to system operation and breakers in the line up that may; result'in the essential units not-being ready'for auto start.

l Operating Procedure C.52 (draft) - This procedure, when performed, may exceed limits and precautions resulting 1

in equipment degradation.

l Casualty Procedure C.158 and C.160 (draft)'- These procedures contain inadequate actions to recover from 1

loss of control power to the NSEB Essential HVAC Unit.

.t 4.1.2

.A functional test was not performed on newly' installed j

temperature switches and setpoints are not correctly established for the installed temperature switches.

The-setpoints (according to Procedure AP.154) for starting the Essential HVAC System is 85 degrees F (z 1.6%) for TSH-50135 and TSH-50136.

Several documents state that the temperature for battery rooms, computer rooms and switchgear rooms will be at degrees F maximum.

(i.e., Design Basis Report, Rev. I for ECNs A-4102 and A-3607, USAR Section 9.7, and Technical Specification 4.31).

(RI 238)

Temperature switches TSH-50137 and TSH-50138 were installed per ECN R-1107.

The ECN post modification

-l test did not require the temperature switches to be tested.

The capability of the existing switches that 1

were not replaced (TSH-50135 and TSH-50136) was tested 1

in special procedures STP.1066 and 1067.

(RI 283)

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5.0- SPECIFIC CONCERNS A list of the specific concerns the Expanded ASRTP team believes are new concerns not previously identified for resolution follows:

5.1 Acknowledged (Valid) Concerns 5.1.1 The NSEB temperatures may not be maintained within Design Bases Limits required for equipment qualification based on current setpoints.

(RI 238) 5.1.2 Numerous discrepancies were identified on some NSEB HVAC system operating procedures that could affect proper system operation.

(RI 247) 5.1.3 There are some manual isolation valves that do not comply with the requirements of Administrative Procedure AP.23.15 for proper equipment labeling.

(RI 252) 5.1.4~ ' The Maintenance Procedure (H.160) (draft) for the removal and replacement of heavy HVAC components on the NSEB is inadequate.

(RI 256) 1 5.1.5 There is no local or Control Room annunciation to provide the operator with the necessary information to indicate a lack of operability of NSEB HVAC equipment. (RI 263) 1 5.1.6 A functional test of some NSEB Essential HVAC System l

temperature switches was not performed. (RI 283)

I 5.2 Open (Potential) Concerns I

5.2.1 None I

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.a, 6.0 L TTACHMENTS

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6.1 List of Documents' Reviewed

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Status-of RIs

'6.3 Detailed ~0 observations

. Requests for'Information-

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED 1.

A.14D, NSEB HVAC System, Original-

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AP.154, Rev.13, Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems 3.

1 Amendment No. 68 to License 4.

Annunciator Response for NSEB - IDADS=

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Calculation. Z-HVS-2283, Rev. O, CR/TSC Essential HVAC Condensing Units Suction Pressure and Pressure Regulator Setpoints 5.

Calculation Z-HVS-M0269, Rev. O HVAC for NSEB 6.

Calculation Z-HVS-M0279, Rev.1, for HVAC - NSEB interim Period Temperature Analysis 7.

Calculation Z-HVS-M1972, Essential Refrigeration Condensing Unit's Condenser Fan Cycling Control Setpoints 8.

Calculation Z-HVS-M1998, Rev. O, for NSEB Rooms 146, 147, 232, 233, 234, and 235 Transient Temp Analysis After Loss of A/C in Emergency Condition

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Calculation Z-HVS-M2281, Rev. O, NSEB - Essential HVAC Condensing Units Suction Pressure Control Setpoints 10.

Casualty Procedure C.52

11. Casualty Procedure C.158/C.160-12.

Drawing E-206 Sh.'154/155; DCN Sh. 3 of 3 for ECN R-0904D 13.

E105 Sht. 27 (ALL DCN), Sht. 29 (ALL DCN) 14.

E206 Sht. 156/157 (Sht. 2 of 2 for ECN) R-1023D 15.

ECN A-3660Z DBR I

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ECN No. R-1023, Refrigeration System Control - NSEB j

17.

ECN No. R-1026, Essential Refrigeration Condensing Unit Condenser Fan Cycling 18.

ECN No. R-0141, DBR Rev. 1 19.

ECN No. R-1107, DBR Rev. 2, Add Thermostats to Rooms 232 and 233, NSEB ATTACHMENT 6.1,

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED -(Continued) 20.

ECN No. RRR-2090 21.-

IOM for Air Handling Units, M13.11-39 22.

IOM for Packaged Air Conditioning Units, NSEB, M13.13A-19' 23.. Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual (IOM) for Air Cooled Condensing Unit, Aux. Building and NSEB for SMUD, Rancho Seco Unit 1, M13.15-103

24. -Interdiscipline Document Review Notice 25.

Lesson Plan OD240, 3300B Rev. 0 1

26. Maintenance Procedure, M.160

27. NCR S-4790, STP.163, ECN R-1119, HR 100946, M13.11-21, NCR S-5654 28.

NCRs S-5746, S-5800, S-5901, S-5802

29. NSEB System Training Manual Chapter 11, Plant HVAC

30. OTS #26.0416

31. Operating Procedure A.140, C.52

32. P&I Diagram, NSEB HVAC Systems M-553, HVAC NSEB Sh 1, Rev. 13; M-553 HVAC NSEB Sh 2, Rev. 12 1

33.

PAG Meeting Minutes86-060 34.

Process Standards 35.

Proposed Technical Specification Amendment 147 36.

Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Unit #1, Design Basis Report, Rev. 1, HVAC System for the Nuclear Service Electrical Building, ECN No. A-4102 37.

SDC Log, ECN A-3725A, AP.44

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SP.85A/B, Monthly Surveillance Test of NSEB Emer. HVAC System A/B 29.

STP.1066 and STP.1067, Operational Verification of Refrigeration j

System for the NSEB - Essential HVAC System A/B d

40.

Seismic Qualification of ASCO Solenoid Valves w/ Eccentric Conduit i

Load (NOTE:

This is a non-generic cal Z-EFI-C0890, Rev. 0) j 41.

Seq Review Sheet, File No. Seg-093 ATTACHMENT 6.1. _ _-__-_-_

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.. o LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED ~ (Continued) i h-.

42. : Surveillance Procedure SP.211.10A, NSEB '- Emergency HVAC. System' A Monthly Test

'43.

Technical Specification Section 4.31, 3.7. Amendment 68 (Proposed Amendment 14,.Technicial Specification 3.7)

44. -US NRC Letter,-Miner'to RJR 06-04-85'

45. USAR Vol IV Section 9.7, Station Ventilation System and Appendix 2B

46. -HR134009, 134010, 136925, 136951, 136953-62 j

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Work Requests -- HR109473, HR116218, HRil7184, HR117185, QAPl7' Rev. 3, PMHR 9 075442, RSAP-0803 i

1 ATTACHMENT 6.1 1

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STATUS OF RIs

. Attachment 6.2 provides RI-status as of this report date. An RI is considered closed if the Team Leader.was convinced a potential concern was not valid or not significant.enough to be an RI. An RI would also be l

closed if requested information was provided. - All other RIs are open.

Acknowledged RIs are open RIs that have been accepted as valid by the responsible organization and have been stated as concerns in Section 5.0.

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I NUMBER STATUS R

1 238 ACKN0HLEDGED 239 CLOSED 247 ACKN0HLEDGED 252 ACKN0HLEDGED i

256 ACKNOWLEDGED 263 ACKN0HLEDGED 283 ACKN0HLEDGED I

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ATTACHMENT 6.2 1

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.c DETAI' LED'0 OBSERVATIONS - RE00EST FOR INFORMATION' 3

During an evaluation, all potential concerns are documented on Request :<

for Information sheets (RIs) that are sent to;the responsible organization to receive their input concerning the potential concern.

l RIs are-also used to request information that the EASRTP. team is having difficulty obtaining.

I These RIs-are considered drafts throughout the entire evaluation until-they become part.of the report.. Responsible organizations can accept the-i potential concern as valid or-they may disagree with the potential concern.

If they disagree, they can submit information that convinces the EASRTP team members.that the potential concern is not valid or they may redirect the EASRTP~ members to better focus the concern.. RIs

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developed during the system evaluation comprise this section of the; report.

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ATTACHMENT 6.3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

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. REQUEST FOR-INFORMATION (RI)

RI NO: __ 238 SYSTEM CODE:

NSEB ISSUE DATE:

09-21-87

SUBJECT:

TEMPERATURE LIMITS FOR NSEB VS. SYSTEM SETPOINTS DEPARTMENT:

NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR:

T.'TELFORD/3849 TEAM LEADER:'

E. ESPERANZA/3951 i

POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

l The NSEB temperatures-may not be maintained within~ Design Basis limits required for equipment qualification based on current HVAC system

.setpoints.

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Numerous references' state that the temperature for battery. rooms, computer rooms and switchgear rooms will be RQ dearees F maximum.

(DBR, Rev. 1, for-ECN A-4102 MAJOR A, B, C: NSEB System Status Report, Rev. 1, Section'4.2; USAR Section 9.7; Technical. Specification 4.31 (Basis); DBR for ECN A-36607 Section.III F).

The setpoint (AP.154) for starting the essential HVAC systems is 85-degrees F (*'1.6%) for TSHH-50135 and TSHH-50136.

(Note:

1.6% of input range of 0-200 degrees-F represents : 3.2 degrees F).. (New additional temperature switches being installed under ECN R-1107 will have the same setpoint value,according to the DBR for that ECN.) This represents an allowable setpoint of as high'as 88.2' degrees F (not including any instrument loop error). Starting the essential system at' this temperature appears to allow operation above the design value for some period of time before the essential unit would start..

.IT IS SUGGESTED THAT PAG CONSIDER THIS CONCERN A " VALID COVERED" CONCERN-AND INCORPORATE IT HITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERIC ISSUE IDENTIFIED IN RI #171.

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5 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION '(RI).

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RI N0:

'239

. SYSTEM CODE:

NHVS ISSUE DATE:

09-29-87 i

SUBJECT:

TESTING OF NSEB ESSENTIAL HVAC SMOKE EXHAUST 1 ISOLATION

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FUNCTION COORDINATOR:

J. ITTNER/4701 l

DEPARTMENT:

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING '

TEAM LEADER:

E. ESPERANZA/3951 POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

l The smoke / carbon dioxide /halon exhaust and fire / smoke isolation function l

of the NSEB Essential HVAC System may not be adequately tested.

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The System Design Bases (draft): HVAC Systems for the Nuclear Service f

Electrical Buildina,. identifies 'three principal functions for the Nuclear.

1 Services Electrical Building (NSEB) HVAC system.. The same three f

principal functions are identified in the Design Bases Report for ECN

'A-4102.

However, only two of the three functions are-listed in the l

Nuclear Services Electrical Buildina (NSEB) Essential and Normal HVAC 1

System -- System Status ReDort and the NSEB Essential and Normal HVAC System -- Test Matrix, the function which is omitted is:

-Provide smoke and carbon dioxide exhaust or isolation for elevations l'6".and 21'-6"; smoke and halon exhaust or isolation for the computer areas.at elevation 40'-0".

l Due to this omission, the exhaust or isolation function described above may not be adequately tested, j

This RI is closed.

The test can'be performed per Test Procedure STP.199 i

under Fire Protection System.

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1 ATTACHMENT 6.3 1 l 4

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI)-

RI N0:'

247 SYSTEM CODE:

NSEB ISSUE DATE:.

09-22-87

SUBJECT:

ADEOUACY'0F OPERATING PROCEDURES A.14D. C.52. C.158 and C.160

" DEPARTMENT:

OPERATIONS ~

. COORDINATOR:

R. MACIAS/4589 TEAM LEADER:

E. ESPERANZA/3951 POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION:

The existing NSEB Operating Procedures could result in exceeding a limit and precaution.-(resulting in equipment degradation), omitting breakers in-the lineup (resulting in the essential units not being ready for autostart), incorrect sequencing (resulting in equipment damage),

omission of valves in the lineup critical to proper system operation, and incomplete actions'in the Casualty procedure, i

.A.

Operating Procedure A.14D, NSEB HVAC contains the following deficiencies:

1.

. Limit and precaution 3.1 specifies that U-501 A/B.and U-503 A/B crankcase heaters must be on for a minimum of four hours prior to crankcase startup if the crankcase heaters-were de-energized for one hour or longer.

No procedure step indicates which breaker powers up the-crankcase heaters.

No hold point of four hours is specified in the f

procedure if crankcase heater was not powered up as required.

2.

If the procedure is followed as written, the essential unit will not.be ready for autostart because the procedure never specifies to close the compressor breaker.

The procedure only specifies breaker 3A217 and 38217 be " racked in."

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3..3 does not include breaker 1A317 for temperature loop for TE-50135.

(Note:

This temp loop provides the start signal for the "A" essential HVAC unit.)

4.

The sequence for starting the battery room exhaust fans results in the fans running (Enclosure 8.3/8.4) prior to suction isolation dampers being checked for proper (open) position (Enclosure 8.5/8.6). This can result in the fans running with suction dampers closed.

ATTACHMENT 6.3 - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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RI NO:.

'247 (Continued)-

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5.

Miscellaneous discrepancies:

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l HVS-030 and HVS-024 valves are included in'the "A" I

train lineup (8.1).. In fact,;these valves are located

'on the "B" train-(Similar problems exist on "B" train i

lineup.)

The following valves-were omitted from the "A" train lineup-(8.1):

HVS-031, HVS-035, HVS-025, HVS-029, and HVS-033. Disposition in any one of these would affect the functionality of the system.

(Comparable valves in "B" train are also omitted.).1 specifies valve number PSH-50133A.

This should be PSL-50133-A.

Breaker 1A303 was listed as being located at SIA2.

Location should-be S1A3.

.B.

Review of Operating Procedure C.52.(Draft) dated 07-31-87 resulted in the following discrepancies.

1.

Steps 2.1.3 and 2.2.3 imply that if the normal NSEB HVAC is running and the essential.HVAC is inoperable, no LC0 exists..This appear inconsistent with Tech Spec 3.7.2 where i

the essential units are the " required auxiliaries" of the respective electrical buses.

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Step 2.2.2 specifies if "U-501 A" starts. Should be U-501H since this section discusses the "B" train components.

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Steps following 2.2 are incorrectly numbered 2.1.1, etc.)

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Casualty Procedure contains no provisions to prevent Hydrogen building in battery rooms on HVAC failure.

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247 (Continued)

C.

' Review of Casualty Procedure, C.158/C.160 (Drafts, dated'05-18-87),

-loss of.120 volt AC vital bus SIA2-1/ SIB 2-1 indicates recovery from loss-'of the respective buses is incomplete'with respect to the NSEB-

. Essential.HVAC (and control room /TSC essential HVAC)..

Following the guidance, as written, would result in the' essential HVAC being not ready for autostart on high temperature (or high radiation / chlorine in the case of-the-control. room /TSC essential HVAC).

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For recovery'ofl control power to the NSEB essential HVAC units, the casualty procedure would have the operator "close remaining load.,

breakers as desired.".11 control power for the NSEB HVAC is closed,

.then the local reset at the compressor compartment must.be depressed to energize the 3CR relay and_make the unit ready for autostart (Ref:- E-206, Sh 156/157 Sh 2 of 2 for ECN R-10230). No guidance for the reset button is provided.

(Note-the same problem exists for the Control Room /TSC Essential HVAC System.

Ref: Drawing E-206 Sh 154/155. DCN Sh 3 of 3 for ECN-R-0904D) i i

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI)

'RI NO:-

252 SYSTEM CODE:

NSEB 3 ISSUE DATE:-

09-23-87 f:

SUBJECT:

'NSEB ESSENTIAL HVAC EQUIPMENT LABELS DEPARTMENT:

OPERATIONS COORDINATOR:

'R.-MACIAS/4589 TEAM LEADER:

E. ESPERANZA/3951 POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION:

Inadequate equipment labels on NSEB essential HVAC equipment could result in equipment. misalignment with resultant reduction in system functionality.-

The following manual isolation valves lack identification tags as I

required by Administrative Procedure, AP.23.15:

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'A' Train Essential NSEB HVAC HVS-031 HVS-025 HVS-033 HVS-035 HVS-029 i

'B' Train Essential NSEB HVAC HVS-024

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HVS-034

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HVS-028 IT IS SUGGESTED THAT PAG CONSIDER THIS CONCERN A " VALID COVERED" CONCERN AND INCORPORATE IT HITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERIC ISSUE IDENTIFIED IN RI #055.

ATTACHMENT 6.3,

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION'(RI) l RI NO:._,j5D SYSTEM CODE (_NSEH____

ISSUE DATE:

09-2I-HZ__

SUBJECT:

.,_ESEB ESSENTIAk. HVAC EOUIPMENT REMOVAL DEPARTMENT:

MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR:

JIM DARKE/4817' l'

' TEAM LEADER:

E. ESPERANZA/3951 Ef)TENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION:

The draft procedure for the removal ar.d replacement of heavy HVAC e

components on the Nuclear Service Electrica1' Building roof is inadequate.

Section 3.7.2 of the Rancho Seco Technical Specifications' requires the plant to go to Hot Standby-mode with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, if the NSEB essential HVAC units are inoperable since the essential HVAC units are " required auxiliaries" per Section 1.3 of Technical Specifications.

i At present, there are no permanent cranes, hoists or monorails on the Nuclear Service Electrical Building roof.to facilitate the removal of essential HVAC compressors, motors, fans or coils.

This problem was identified in the NSEB Essential liVAC Systems Status Report (Problem 22) g which states " Procedures and training which would facilitate maintenance.

or an expedited basis for the NSEB essential Air Refrigerant system do not exist." The absence of rigging equipment for the estential HVAC components will increase the duration of major repairs and.could cause a reduction of plant generating time.

A draft maintenance procedure (H.160) has been written for removal and reinstallation of the reciprocating compressors and their motors.

However, this draft procedure does not address the following needs:

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a.

There are no monorails, jib cranes, or platforms to move heavy l

components from their housings to the edge of the roof.

q b.

The. procedure doesn't provide instruction for removing essential fans; fan motors:, and coils, c.

The procedure statec that the compressors and compressor motors can be replaced Uith the on-site Bantam crane.

Hith boom fully extended 1

it will not be able to lift the condenser coils.

The maximum reach I

of the Bantam crane boom is 75 feet at a 16 degree angle.

The block and hook makes it approximately 73 feet.

The roof is 60 feet high with a four foot parapet which makes the height of the wall approximately 64 feet.

This leaves only 9 feet for rigging (slings, checker, etc.) and load.

1 l

l ATTAC4 MENT N.3

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RI NO:

256~

(Continued)-

J At ~ that height,'.the load limit is reduced to 5,300 pounds :off the.

front of the' Bantam crane and 3100 pounds off the back of the Bantam

~

7

crane.

The'only accessible place to'make a " pick" is'the east side of the stairwell between.the Auxiliary Building and the T&R Building.

This

.would necessitate making the " pick" from the.. front of the Bantam crane.

Swinging the load to the right over the' Auxiliary Building j

and: setting it behind the Bantam crane'makes the. maximum load only.

I 3,100 pounds (1-1/2 tons).- Renting and setting up a larger crane' would' increase the repair time by days.

v.

,4 IT IS SUGGESTED THAT PAG CONSIDER THIS CONCERN A " VALID COVERED" CONCERN

-)

AND INCORPORATE IT HITH THE RESOLUTION OF RI #040.

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ATTACHMENT 6.3 i,

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yy.

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8 C

REQUEST FOR,INFORMATION (RI)

Trp y.

,q, 3

m RI NO: _._ fit 2.

SYSTEM CODE:

NSEB ISSUE DATE:

09-25-87 7

INADEOUATE CONTROL ROOM / ANNUNCIATION FOR'THE NSEB HVAC SYSTEMS

'Q

SUBJECT:

7#

W[DEPARTMENir} NUCLEAR ENGINEERING

% COORDINATOR:

T.'

TELFORD/3849 y

l

)

TEAHSEADBU -

E. ESPERANZA/3951'

'l nG,

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p n

cp ERW/0UESTIQ hp

' ;EQTENTIA _

t

~

'iControl Roca ' annunciation'does'not provide the operator with necessary infor'matlor!do indicate a lack of operability of NSEB HVAC equipment.

o/ N

' Th*p is'pntieviaDyimportant,tdr the essential HVAC units which are tonsidered j",redjired apiliaries" of the electrical safety buses per 5 a. limiting conditioniof ope / Inoperabilitywin this: case would result Techni cal '5peci fication. 3.7.2l o

ratis/. 'The following specific 7

deficiencies were noted:

{ j.

Interruption of NSEB en'ential HVAC system control power (breaker-c trip,. blown fuse, etc.) will de-energize the 3CR relay in.the-f,

,y. ' /a control circuit rendering the essential HVAC units incapable of starting'on high temperature (or manual start) until the local ~ reset-r i button is depressed at the compressor unit. A de-energized 3CR

,J relay ("not ready for. auto start") is not annunciated in the Centrol

' Ppom. Although 'imits and precautions section-of Operating i', Procedure' A.14D specifies to locally reset the. compressor any time

! s there is an interruption'of control pwer to the unit, it does not-t provide defense in depth against operator. oversight / error.

No annue:lation exists tchnotiky operators of a failure of the crankrq3ehater (CCH) for aitheb the normal or essential HVAC compre3so&.\\i

. f'

., L i

,0perating Mocedurt A.1W, NSEE jWAC, specifies in' Limit and-Precaution 3.1 that U-S'l0 A/E,vio'U-503 A/B crankcase heaters must b_e on fpr a minimum of four h)urs prior to compressor startup if the crankca$dheaterswerede-endgize.1.foronehourorlonger.

Since

'thqnunits are required to be ready to start on high temperature, the j

heters must be energized any' time the compressor is in standby j

statut, If a fuse is blown or the CCH has failed the unit would stil;startonreceiptofa,hightemperaturesignal,butdueto i

ref rigerNt in the oil cc4# result in high bearing wear.

The NSEB System status report, pro 6 tem #12, linked failure of U-501 A in the

' *f year of 19p to failure 'of, the crankcase heater.

This is of 1

f particular concern for the' essential HVAC compressors which must be operable as ',regiired auxiliaries" for electrical safety buses per l

y,/

' Ted,.nical SpeciFf ration 3.7.2.

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ATTACHMENT 6.3 r>;

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263.

(Continued)-

~

RI NO:

No:controliroom annunciation exists for-NSEB essential, compressor'.

differential pressure switches POSL-50137/50138. When activated they stop the compressors.

The compressors:cannot be started after such-an occurrence until.the pressure differential switch-is -reset-and the local reset button at;the compressor depressed. -(ref:

Drawing E-206.SH156/157 SH 2 of 2 for'DCN R-10230).'

Such an occurrence is documented in work request #102789 following failure.of a surveillance procedure.. The. work request states the pressure switch and. local. reset switch were reset and ituta " Reran.

SP211.108 with;no problems." (tJ503-B).This indicates the unit was not." Ready for ' auto start" and no annunciation was available in the Control Room.; (Note: This parameter 11 annunciated in the Control Room /TSC Essential HVAC).

These problems are similar to the same concerns identified in the CR/TSC HVAC EASRTP report.

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I ATTACHMENT 6.3

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so,3 l,*g v L '. '

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) r RI NO:

283 SYSTEM CODE:

NSEB'

-ISSUE DATE:

09-30-87

SUBJECT:

NSEB ESSENTIAL HVAC SYSTEM HI-TEMPERATURE ACTUATION SHITCHES' DEPARTMENT:

SYSTEM ENGINEERING

-COORDINATOR:

J. ITTNER/4701 TEAM LEADER:

E. ESPERANZA/3951 POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION'

'The, functionality of the NSEB Essential HVAC System may be.affected.

because temperature switches recently installed in NSEB Rooms 232 and 233 l

were not tested.

l Temperature switches TSHH-50137 and TSHH-50138 have recently been L

installed in NSEB Rooms 233 and 238 in accordance with ECN R-1107.

Similar' existing switches TSHH-50135 and TSHH-50136, are ' located;in NSEB Rooms 147 and 148.

Each of the aforementioned switches is intended to r

start one; train of the NSEB Essential HVAC System in the event hi-temperature ~(85*F) is detected.

The capability of the existing switches (TSHH-50135 and TSHH-50136)Ito start the essential HVAC system is tested in Special Test procedures STP 1066 (1067), Operational Verification of the Refrigeration System for the Nuclear Services Electrical Buildina (NSEB) Essential HVAC System Train 61H1 However, the Test Outline for ECN R-1107 specifies that special testing of the recently installed switches is not required. No other test to verify the capability of switches TSHH-50137.and TSH-50138'to start the NSEB Essential HVAC could be identified.

ATTACHMENT 6.3 1 l

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