ML20235Y665

Rereview of Plant Instrumentation & Control for IE Bulletin 79-27

ML20235Y665
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	08/31/1987
From:	BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y592	List: ML20235Y588 ML20235Y665 ML20235Y889
References
51-1169097, 51-1169097-00, IEB-79-27, NUDOCS 8710200442
Download: ML20235Y665 (138)

Text

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i REPORT TO SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 1

RAKCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION i

l 1

RE-REVIEW-OF PLANT INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL FOR.IE BULLETIN 79-27 I

5 B&W TASK 847 AUGUST 1987 PREPARED BY THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY' NUCLEAR POWER DIVISION P.O.

BOX 10935 LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA 24506-0935 i

8710200442 B71012' j.

PDR ADOCK 05000312 G

PDR l

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I i-l TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE j

' EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

4

1. -

INTRODUCTION.

5 2.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6-j o ~

2. l' CONCLUSIONS 6

2. 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS 12 3.

STUDY ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 15 4.

DESCRIPTION OF STUDY METHODOLOGY

'18 E

5.

EVALUATION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES 22 6.

ELECTRICAL BUS FAILURE IDENTIFICATION 44 7.

EVALUATION OF BUS FAILURES 47-i

'8.

EVALUATION OF CASUALT

Y. PROCEDURE

S 129 i

(u@org 9.

REFERENCES 132 TABLES TABLE 1:

EQUIPMEPT REQUIRED FOR NORMAL PLANT COOLDOWN 25 TABLE 2:- SELECTED BUS FAILURES 45 TABLE 3:

POWER SUPPLY' FAILURE EVALUATION 49 TABLE 4:

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 123 i

TABLE 5:

CASUALTY PROCEDURE REVIEW 130 l

FIGURE FIGURE 1:

BUS FAILURE EVALUATION 21 51-1169097-00 Page 3 of 132 August 31, 1987

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f EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

IE Bulletin 79-27 (IEB 79-27) requires a review of plant bus failures which could affect the ability to achieve Cold shutdown.

This re-review of IEB 79-27 was

. cessitated by numerous plant changes which have impacted the electrical supply arrangement.

The scope of the re-review also included an evaluation of the adequacy of loss of bus indication to the operator and an assessment of the loss of bus casualty Procedures.

The study 1

methodology is based on the selection of - specific single bus failures for evaluation and a determination of the equipment which is made unavailable due to the loss of that bus and the consequential failures of connected busses.

After determination

?

of equipment losses, the ability of the plant to proceed to Cold Shutdown based on normal procedures is evaluated.

The normal procedures assumed for this study are E.01 and E.02 for immediate post-trip response and B.4 for plant cooldown.

A total of 47 individual bus failures were evaluated.

For most situations, the plant can proceed to Cold Shutdown with minimal problems by using backup equipment.

There are, however, three bus failure situations which cannot currently be accommodated by existing equipment and procedures.

These concerns include the loss of auxiliary boilers due to the single failure of seven different busses, the powering of loss of bus annunciation by the failed bus in six instances, and deficiencies in the current loss

[,8 of bus Casualty Procedures.

These problems can be acceptably resolved by procedure changes and/or hardware modifications.

In the short term, it is recommended that these concerns be resolved by procedural modifications which assure appropriate operator response.

In the longer term, it is recommended that the identified concerns be addressed with plant hardware modifications.

The primary limitation to the short term recommendation is an increase in operator burden until hardware modifications are implemented which resolve these concerns.

Since all of the loss of bus casualty Procedures are being revised prior to restart, no formal review recommendations were made in this study.

The results of this study should, however, be utilized in the preparation or revision of the casualty Procedures.

It is intended that any recommendations made in this report be processed by the normal District review process for determination of the appropriate priorities.

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.. INTRODUCTION-Thiscrepc*. documentsta: re-review of IE Bulletin. No. 79-27

-(IEB; 7 9-M ),

" Loss of. Non-Class.1E Instrumentation ~and.

Control Poyer System Bus During' Operation" '(Ref. 1). for the, Rancho.Sece. Nuclear-Generating Station.- The'firstcreview of.

/IEB'79-27 was submittediby.the; Sacramento Municipal Utility DistrictL(tha District) by Ref.;2 and 3.

This re-review has

~been necessitated _by numerous' plant changes impacting plant.

ele'ctrical -' supply ' arrangements,- particularly bus changes 1

.being made due to the installation of two additional diesel-generators.:

This report' was ~ prepared' ~ by the L Babcock &

Wilcox. Company - (B&W), z.the Rancho Seco nuclear steam system supplier, _ for the' District : under.' B&W Task Number ' 847.~-(Ref.

L4 ).

This work!was performed by B&W in accordance'with'B&W-

. procedures for: safety related work.

.1 The. purpose of.this re-review is to" determine whether.the Rancho S e c o.: p l a n t ~ h a s the ' capability to_ proceed 'to Cold Shutdown. _using normal plant procedures when a

single; electrical' bus failure has occurred..

The failure of each' single bus will include the loss of connected _ busses, when applicable, and the' loss of any equipment which is powered by any of the failed busses.

The.information used' in the. preparation _ of this report consisted l of. Rancho.Seco plant documentation current: as of Og June-1987', which was made available to.B&W by the District.

This information included plant electrical drawings, plant P& ids, and-plant procedures.

Specific. documentation directly utilized in this report has been referenced in.the text or' tables.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-37

2.1 CONCLUSION

S 1

The' purpose..of.this-evaluation was:.to' determine the. effects of, single bus failures on the ability toL bring the' Rancho Seco plant,.to a ' Cold. Shutdown condition.,

Several Ibus failures werei identified' which present circumstances: to 'the

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operator :which could be difficu.'.t to deal with: and which could ' affect the plant Cold. SL ?.down. ' capability.

-These failures are, identified in.this section.and the detailed bus

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failure:information is presented:in Table 3.

1

- The scope' of - this ' evaluation ' was 1 to : identify ' ' potential' problems and to consider: appropriate-recommendations to.

resolva these problems.

'.The discussion of-'the' bus failures which.cause potential problems-indicates possible. fixes and' the'possible use.of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)'to respond ' to : certain^ failure scenarios.

The review of. EOPs other than'the normal post trip response procedures E.01'and E.02.was outside the-scope of this evaluation.

Generally, the use of additional EOPs would be needed for certain.

circumstances'not specifically within the scope of IEB 79-27, e.g.

the' inability. to open a manual valve inside containment in addition-to the failures resulting from the bus failure.

A summary of the problems resulting from these' bus failures-follows.

Startup Transformer #2:

This specific bus is not being analyzed as part of this study since it' results in a situation similar to a loss of off-site power event which should be bounded by USAR Section

. 14.1.2.8.4.

Reference 12 states that Casualty Procedure c.04 has been prepared for operator response in this situation.

Bus S4A:

l This failure results in the possible loss of Decay Heat system cooling due to the resultant loss of Bus S3A.

' SEE BUS S3A FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT LOSSES.

Bus S4A2:.

This. failure results in the loss of both auxiliary boilers due to the. consequential loss of bus S1J after battery power is exhausted.

SEE BUS S1J FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT LOSSES.

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2sl CONCLUSIONS-(continusd)

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Bus S4B:

This failure results in potential loss of Decay Heat System.

. cooling due to the resultant loss of Bus S3B.

SEE' BUS S3B FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT LOSSES.

Bus S4C:

This failure results in the loss of both lube oil system vapor extractors due to the loss'of bus S3C1. This equipment has no effect on-the' plants' ability to reach' Cold Shutdown.

L SEE BUS S3C1,FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT. FAILURES.

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Bus S4D:

1 This failure results in. the loss' of busses S3D1 and S3D2 which power many motor operated valves.

- SEE BUSSES S3D1 AND S3D2 FOR SPECIFIC ~ EQUIPMENT FAILURES.

I Bus S4El:

The consequential' loss of bus S3E results in'a loss of the

]

Auxiliary Boilers due to the loss of both auxiliary boiler fuel oil pumps.

SEE BUS S3E FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT FAILURES.

j Bus S3A:

This failure results in a possible loss of Decay Heat System cooling due to the loss of power to DHS dropline valve.HV-

)

20001.

Unless HV-20001 can be opened, the plant cannot i

proceed to Cold Shutdown within the framework of procedures E.01, E. 02. and B4.

Manual operation of this valve is the preferred solution to this problem,

however, due to its reactor building location manual operation cannot be assured.

The plant can remain stable with existing equipment if this valve cannot be manually operated.

If bus power cannot be restored, ample time is available to connect a temporary power supply to HV-20001.

Bus S3A2:

This failure results in the loss of control of both auxiliary boilers due to the resultant loss of bus SlJ.

SEE BUS SlJ FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT FAILURES.

l Bus S3B:

This failure results in a potential loss of Decay Heat System cooling due to the loss of remote control of DHS dropline valve HV-20002.

Unless HV-20002 can be opened, the plant cannot proceed to Cold shutdown within the framework of procedures E.01, E.02 and B4.

Manual operation of this valve is the preferred solution to this problem, however, due.to its reactor building location manual operation cannot 51-1169097-00 Page 7 of 132 August 31, 1987 h

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2.1 CONCLUSION

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be assured.-

.~The. planti:.can remain stable with ' L existing 1

.equipmentTif this; valve cannot be manually operated.-

If. bus power cannot be restored, ample time is availableito connect a temporary power supply.to HV-20002.

Bus S3C1:

g This : failure. results in the loss of both lube oil system vapor extractors.

This equipment loss.has no effect:on the plants' ability to achieve Cold shutdown, however, the loss of"both vapor extractors may result in undesirable equipment problems.

Bus S3D1:.

This failure results ; in. the; inability to isolate the core flood c tanks from the control room due to-the loss of.. power to core flood ' tank ' isolation valves MV-26513 and HV-26514.

i Unless these valves can be closed, the plant cannot'. proceed

' to Cold Shutdown ' within. the guidelines of ~ procedures E.01, E.02' and B.4.

LManual operation of these valves l is. the preferred solution to ' this problem, however.due to their-reactor building

location, manual operati'on cannot be assured.

The plant can remain stable - with existing equipment --if these valves cannot be manually operated.

If bus power cannot.~.be restored, ample time is available. to connect a temporary power supply to HV-26513 and HV-2651'4.

fD' The-loss of this bus: also results in the inability to W

isolate pressurizer spray since the normal spray valve-(PV-

~21520) and the spray isolation' valve (HV-21510)- are both I

powered from bus S3D1.

Procedure C.11 contains instructions-j to turn off reactor coolant pumps to remove the driving

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force for pressurizer spray under these conditions, however, j

the exact problem may not be immediately apparent due to other equipment failures.

Bus S3D2:

The loss of this bus results in the loss of remote. operation

-1 of the - three way diversion valve HV-23004.

This will not.

present a problem since the valve can be manually operated.

Bus.S3E:

This fallure results in-a loss of both Auxiliary Boilers due j

to the loss of both auxiliary boiler fuel oil pumps.

Auxiliary steam from the boilers is subsequently lost.

During periods of low decay heat generation, the possibility of excessive heat transfer from the primary to secondary i

plant exists if-the steam demand exceeds the steam generation rate required to remove decay heat.

The loss of auxiliary boiler procedure and procedure B.4 should address the shedding of unnecessary steam loads if an excessive heat transfer condition exists.

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Bus SlA:

This failure results in the pressurizer level control valve failing open (if LT-21503B is selected for control).

Pressurizer level control is also available from LT-21503C which is powered from bus SlB.

This failure also results in the pressurizer heaters remaining energized (if PT-21038 is selected for control).

Loss of bus SlA procedure should be reviewed to assure that adequate direction is given to restore pressurizer level control and to secure pressurizer heaters if the plant is going to Cold Shutdown, or to select alternate heater control if *he plant is not going to Cold Shutdown.

Bus SlA2-1:

This bus powers its own failure indication.

Bus SlB:

This failure results in the pressurizer heaters remaining energized (if PT-21040 is selected for control).

The loss of bus SlB procedure should be reviewed to assure that adequate direction is given to secure pressurizer heaters if the plant is going to Cold Shutdown, or to select alternate heater control if the plant is not going to Cold Shutdown.

Bus SlB2-1:

This bus powers its own failure indication.

Bus SlE, SlF:

A fault in the SlEF voltage regulator will draw fault current from MCC 2D1 feed to SlE and SlF through breakers CB1, CB2, CBB, and CBI.

Because all four of these breakers are rated to trip at the same current level (100 amps), they could trip simultaneously resulting in a loss of SlE and S1F.

Both SFS instrument channels to the NRW and NSW systems are lost with the loss of both of these busses.

System operability is not affected since other indicators of system performance are available during plant

cooldown, however, a single failure should not remove instrumentation from both trains of emergency cooling systems.

j Bus SlG-2:

This failure results in a loss of OTSG shell temperature indication.

Due to cooldown limitations on the steam generators and due to the fact that they are part of the RCS primary system pressure

boundary, cooldown should not proceed until temporary shell temperature indication is available or power is restored to this equipment.

The plant can remain stable while this equipment is restored to i

service.

51-1169097-00 Page 9 of 132 August 31, 1987 i

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. CONCLUSIONS: (continusd)

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Bus S1GA-1:

This' failure results in the loss of auxiliary boilor control-due to the resultant loss of. bus SlJ.

This bus also powers itslown failure. indication.

SEE-BUS S1J FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT FAILURES.

. Bus S1GB-1:,

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This-bus powers its own failure indication.

Bus S1J:

Since bus. SlJ powers controls for both.the auxiliary

. boilers,. auxiliary. steam.. from the: boilers is subsequently.

lost.,

During periods of low decay heat generation, the

~

possibility.of ' excessive heat transfer from the' primary to-the secondary plant exists if the steam-demand exceeds the steam.. generation rate required to remove. decay heat.

The l

loss of auxiliary - boiler. procedure and procedure B.4 should address the_ shedding of. unnecessary steam 11oads if an' excessive heat' transfer condition exists.

' Bus-SIN 1-1:^

This bus powers its own failure indication.

. Bus. SOB:

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The loss of this bus,results in the loss of letdown flow due to the loss:of-SFV-22009.

Letdown can be restored either by 1,

local control or by restoring power to the bus.

Bus'SOE:

The failure of this bus results in numerous-control problems.

The plant cannot cooldown below 350F without violating the Rancho Seco Technical Specifications for LTO system operation until EMOV control is reestablished.

The loss of letdown capability due to the loss of various cooling water. pumps does not affect the ability to achieve-jl Cold Shutdown, since boron can be injected into the reactor coolant system either directly into the makeup pump suction

line, or added to the makeup tank.

The loss of the i

auxiliary boiler draft fans and. auxiliary boiler feed pump I

controls.can possibly lead to excessive heat transfer from I

the primary to the. secondary plant during periods of low decay heat generation.

Reactor coolant pumps cannot be l

started or stopped without the risk of' equipment damage due

)

to the loss of control power to both the AC and DC powered lift oil pumps.

If the. bus failure occurs prior to a plant L

trip, automatic transfer of plant loads to the startup j

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transformers will not occur.

This bus also powers its own failure indication.

51-1169097-00 Page 10 of 132 August 31, 1987

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Bus SOF:

This failure results in the loss of normal boron addition due to the loss of - TV-2 3 004B. -

Capability to inject boron

- directly into the makeup pump cuction lines still exists however..

Loss of bus SOF procedure should be reviewed to assure that this problem is addressed.

Summary of Bus Failure'Results I

Several. single. bus failures result in. the loss of the-

. Auxiliary Boilers.

If the plant is at a very low decay heat generation rate, a significant possibility of excessive heat-transfer from the primary to the secondary plant. exists since the steam drain will exceed the decay heat generation 3

rate.

Bus failure indications for the busses listed 'below are powered from themselves:

S1A2-1, S1B2-1, SlGA-1, S1GB-1, SIN 1-1, SOE.

IEB 79-27 requires that plant operators have sufficient bus failure indication available to them to alert them to the loss of power to.each bus.

A review' is required to determine whether alternate failure indication is available for loss of these bussas.-

The District is currently revising all Casualty Procedures for-single bus failures and intends to upgrade them to assure appropriate operator response.

A review of these Casualty Procedures was therefore not possible.

These procedure-revisions should include resolutions to the procedural problems identified in this report.

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.2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS The-specific. recommendations from the B&W review 'are L

iterized~below.

L 1.

Seven independent bus failures result in the loss of both the' auxiliary -boilers.

These busses are ' S4A2, S4El,.S3A2, S3E, S1GA-1, S1J, and SOE.

During periods of low decay heat generation, -the possibility of

-excessive heat transfer from the. primary to secondary -

plant' exists if the steam demand exceeds the steam

' generation rate required - to remove decay heat.. The specific busses causing _ -loss of boiler equipment or controls are S1J,. S3E, and SOE.-

The. loss of auxiliary-boiler. procedure, and. procedure B.4, should address the shedding of unnecessary steam loads if an-excessive heat' transfer condition exists.

A procedural solution-to this problem should. terminate the excessiva heat j

transfer condition,.however, it is recommended that the District. evaluate making hardware ~ modifications which I

will prevent a single bus failure from resulting_in a I

loss of both auxiliary boilers.

)

2.

One of the items-addressed in IEB 79-27 is the need for

.i adequate bus failure indication.

A review of. these indications revealed that the failure indications for-several busses are powered by those busses whoseL failure they are indicating.

The specific busses are S1A2-1, 51B2-1, S1GA-1, S1GB-1, 81N1-1, SOE.

It is i

recommended that failure indications be provided' for i

these busses which are powered from sources other than the busses whose failure they are indicating.

3.

The normal pressurizer spray control valve PV-21520 and the spray isolation valve HV-21510 are both powered from bus S3D1.

If pressurizer spray through' PV-21520 is occurring prior to a

failure of bus. S3D1, i

pressurizer spray cannot be isolated.

Casualty l

Procedure C.11 contains instructions to turn off l

reactor coolant pumps to remove the driving force for pressurizer spray, however, the exact problem may not be immediately apparent due to other equipment j

failures.

It is recommended that HV-21510 be powered i

from a source different from PV-21520 and PV-21509.

l 4.

Busses S1E and S1F can both fail due to the failure of one power supply (see section 2.1).

The failure of both busses results in the loss of several indications on both trains of the NP.W and NSW systems.

The loss of

)

this instrumentation does not affect the ability to j

l 51-1169097-02 Page 12 of 132 October 2, 1987 I

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2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS (continued).

f..,

achieve Cold Shutdown'since other indications of system performance are available, - and local verification ~ of

. I several-system parameters-is possible.

A single

failure, however, should not remove indication from both redundant trains of emergency cooling systems.

It y

- is' recommended that these busses be provided with an alternate power

supply, or. that one train of

" instrumentation be supplied, from-a different power

. source.

5.

The loss of bus SOE results in the loss of both "A" and "B"

annunciators.

It is recommended that "A"

and "B" annunciators be powered from different power supplies.

This does not-affect the ability to achieve-Cold Shutdown.

6.

The' loss of bus SOE results in-the loss of both AC and DC reactor coolant pump lift oil' pumps.

Although not required to-20hieve Cold Shutdown, because of the potential for reactor. coolant pump

damage, it.is recommended th it. separate. sources of control power be provided for the AC and DC lift oil pumps.

7.

The plant cannot cooldown below 350F without violating the Rancho Sec) Technical Specifications unless the low

/]

temperature os t.rpressure protection (LTOP) system has been placed la service.

A loss. of cus SOE, which supplies power to the EMOV (PSV-21511), will prevent the LTOP system from functioning.

Sincer LTOP is only required during the latter part of plant cooldown, time is available to attempt to restore power to the bus or to provide alternate means of powering the EMOV.

It is recommended that the loss of bus procedure for bus SOE include a caution to prevent plant cooldown below 350F until control power to the EMOV has been restored.

8.

Depending on whether PT-21038 or PT-21040 has been i

selected for pressurizer heater control, the failure of i

bus S1A or S1B may result in the pressurizer heaters remaining. energized after the bus failure.

If the plant is going to cold Shutdown the heaters can be secured.

If the plant is not progressing to cold Shutdown the alternate transmitter can be selected, but this-requires the use of patch plugs in the RPS cabinet.

It is recommended that the loss of bus procedures S1A and S1B be reviewed and revised if necessary to include instructions to either secure the pressurizer heaters or to select the alternate control.

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51-1169097-00 Page 13 of 132 August 31, 1987

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9.

Depending; on whether' LT-21503B or ~ LT-21503C 'has' been

. selected fori pressurizer' control, the, failurx of bus S1A-oriS1B will:resultiin the pressurizer l level control.

valve failing open.

. Switchover to' the other-transmitter isJavailable but is not. automatic.

It~is f.

- recommended that loss of bus procedures S1A.and S1B be-

~ reviewed -and. revised if-necessary.

to include instructions to assure pressurizer level control from; I

4

- the operating transmitter.

' 10.. The failure of ' either busses. S3A or S3B results in a i

possible loss of Decay Heat. System; cooling. due.to the D

. loss of; power.to DHS dropline' valves HV-20001 or HV-

- )

20002.

Unless. both. valves can.be - opened, the plant 1

cannot proceed to' Cold Shutdown within-the framework of procedures E.01,- I.02; and B4.

Manual operationi of;

- these. valves is the preferred solution to this problem,.

- however, due to their-reactor building location, manual'

- operation cannot be. assured. -

It is recommended that Rancho-Sedo Procedures be' reviewed to assure that they include: adequate direction to supply temporary power to-HV-20001 or HV-20002 if required.

11.

The addit l,on of boron to the' reactor coolant system is required,for the: plant to achieve-a Cold Shutdown conditiord

'The loss of bus'SOF results in the loss of L.

power. to FV-23004B, which may require an alternate i

boron injection path.

It is recommended that the loss-of bus-SOF procedure be reviewed and revised if necessary to address either manual operation' of FV-23004B, ' or the addition of, boron to the RCS through-manual valves'in the makeup pump suction line.

12.

The loss ofLbus 53D1 prevents ' isolation 'of the core f1>od tanks due to the loss of power to valves HV-26513-and HV-26514.

Manual operation is the preferred alternate method of closing the valves, however, due to their _ reactor building location, _ manual operation cannot be assured.

It is recommended that. Rancho Seco procedures be reviewed to assure that they give adequate direction to supply temporary power to these valves if needed.

13.

The loss of bus S3C1 results in the loss of both lube oil system vapor extractors.

Although not affecting Cold Shutdown capability, it is recommended that the loss of both vapor extractors be evaluated by the District to determine whether a separate power source for each one is advisable.

51-1169097-00 Page 14 of 132 August 31, 1987

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STUDE ASSUMPTIONS-AND LIMITATIONS q

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' Thel review. scope ' required.by IEB 79-27 is covered in three'

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specific? items-

]

Review.the Class 1-E and Non-Class 1-E busses supplying a.

I power to safety and non-safety. instrumentation and control systems, which could affect the ability to-achieve Cold-Shutdown,

.b.-

'. Review emergency. procedures required to achieve Cold l

Shutdown'upon loss of' power, and, i

c.-

.Re-review IE Circular No.'.79-02,

" Failure of 120' Volt-JVital AC Power Supplies"..

The primary focus. ' of this. study.was Item a.

above.

BM reviewed ' the effects (of variousLbus failures on equipment

~ availability 'and. then reviewed the adequacy of Rancho Seco normal' operating procedures for achieving Cold Shutdown for l

each loss of bus scenario.

The review also included an evaluation of theJindication provided to'the operator in the control Room for the loss of power to the bus.

' Item b.

above was~ covered in this study by' reviewing the Rancho Seco i

Casualty Procedures for the. loss of individual electrical busses.

Item c. above was not included in this. study (Ref.

5). -

This-report. includes conclusions for each single bus

@c.

failure and, when necessary, a discussion of any design

, Vt0F modifications or additional procedure use which is deemed ~to be necessary to. assure the ability of Rancho Seco to proceed to Cold Shutdown.

The significant

' assumptions, clarifications, and conservatism which were placed on this-study are described below.

Two major conservatism were applied'to the scope of this study to assure.that the appropriate plant conditions, from an equipment standpoint, had been bounded.

The first

. assumption was to restrict the study to major bus failures and - to combine the net effects for each failure.-

For example, all equipment losses for a particular bus plus the equipment lost because of the failure of connected busses were taken into account in the shutdown evaluation.

The only inter-connected busses which were assumed to still be available after a higher bus failure are-those which have an i

automatic transfer to another power supply.

This conservatism provides significant expansion of equipment losses in many cases making it unnecessary to evaluate lower level failures, such as inverters.

The failure of power supplies for the Integrated Control System and the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System are not within the scope of I

this study.

An evaluation of the loss of these power supplies has been prepared by the District (Ref. 6).

ECN R-51-1169097-00 Page 15 of 132 August 31, 1987 4'

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STUDY. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued).

0927 contains'theLpower; supply modifications resulting from the-ICS and NNI studies (Ref. 7).

The-.second-major. conservative. assumption.is that' all equipmentilosses due to arbus failure are considered in the l

Cold; Shutdown capability' evaluation.

Equipment losses have not-been restricted to instrumentation and controls ~as specifically called, for, in IEB 79-27.

This conservatism leads.to thefconsideration, for example, of pump-and valve failures and. complete system > unavailability.

It was assumed-within the scope-of this. study-that loss of a-piece of equipment, its control signal, or its indication wouldLmake it unavailable for ' operator-use in proceeding to cold Shutdown unless an alternate or backup is shown to be i

- available.

R During power operation the Reactor Protection Systen (RPS)~

protects the ' plant from any conditions which could affect:

~ the safety of the plant.

If a bus loss occurs which causes the plant to go outside its safe operating limits, the RPS will trip the - plant.

For this reason the starting point assumed for this' study is the post-trip condition following manual or automatic reactor trip (Ref. 5 and 8).

The. study assumes.that at this point a single bus failure occurs, or has already occurred.and has resulted in a plant trip, which must then' be ' dealt with by the operator as he proceeds to s

Cold Shutdown.

Each bus failure evaluation begins immediately post-trip with a single. bus failure prior to the operator beginning his - post trip plant status evaluation through Emergency. Operating Procedures'E.01 and E.02.

Once the operator completes ' E. 01 and E. 02, he Will proceed to procedure B.4.of the Plant Operations Manual to take the plant to Cold Shutdown.

All of procedure. B.4 was included in this

study, including Limitations and Precautions.

(Section 3.0) and Plant Shutdown - (Section 4.0), to. assure i

that any possible equipment reliance during the shutdown process has been included within the_ scope'of this analysis.

B.4 provides for plant cocidown by either forced circulation or natural circulation.

A successful plant response to a single bus failuro has been defined in this study to be the ability' to cooldown within the framework of B.4 after a bus loss.

Since the purpose of this evaluation is to determine i

the ability of the plant to proceed to cold shutdown within the framework of normal cooldown procedures, the use of additional EOPs (other than E.01 and E.02 for post trip status), was not considered an appropriate response to a single bus failure.

This review assumption eliminates the HPI Cooling EOP as part of the analysis.

This method of core cooling provides a means to cool the core assuming i

multiple plant equipment failures.

It was deemed 51-1169097-00 Page 16 of 132 August 31, 1987

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STUDY ASSUMPTIONS ANDfLIMITATIONS'(continued)

u,

,4

'inapp:"opriate to resort,to HPI cooling as the result of loss of.a singl's1 bus.

Plant modifications.should be considered forL any-single' bus-failures ' which ~ require HPI cooling' or require any other EOPs'.

A general assumption madei:as part of the failure evaluations

l is that no additional' failures' occur other than those~which are. -directly related. to - the 1singlel bus, failure ' and. itc?

consequences.

No' additional' ' electrical _

or^ equipment.

failures' are assumed: ~ to occurL andiJno -additional plant I

transient or accident conditions:are' imposed.as part of this-l

-study.

i The. general method s usedi for: proceeding [to cold'. shutdown' is to identify redundant-equipment or; instrumentation for

-operator use in continuing the plant. cooldown: 'with the Since there is no time limit.. imposed.on-normal. procedures.

c the ability ~ to achieve. Cold LShutdowns it: hr.mL been assumed that bus restoration.; is a!-' suitable. option.^during;Lthe.-

cooldown if the.plantc can~ be!-maintained. ini as stable condition. (Ref. 5,.9/ and~10). NIf the plantfcannot: proceed

-with the ' normal _ cooldown procedure.due -to equipment unavailability, but. it can be maintained in a.

stable condition, it has been: assumed; that-the operator will hold.

the plant at its current' condition until power to'the-failed' z, ;

. bus is restored' (Refe 5,

9," and 10). ~

Once power and W

equipment: are restoredc the < operator. will continue the cooldown in'accordance with' normal procedures..

l 51-1169097-00 Page 17 of 132 August 31, 1987 s

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DESCRIPTION OF STUDY METHODOLOGY The maj or portion of this report focuses on the plant shutdown, in accordance with normal procedures, with various equipment unavailable due to specific single bus failures.

In addition, reviews have been performed to assure that the operator has appropriate failure indication available to assess bus status and that the bus restoration Casualty ll Procedures adequately address the restoration of power for l

each failed bus.

The basic technique used. for the l

evaluation of the Rancho Seco response to a postulated l

single bus failure is to perform a desk top " walk-through" l

of the plant procedures used post trip to take the plant to l

a Cold Shutdown condition.

The essential information l

required for the procedure walk-through is identification of equipment no longer available to the operator due to the specific bus failure.

A flowchart showing the methodology 4

steps described in this section is shown in Figure 1.

It is assumed for this study that the plant was in normal operation and then underwent a trip, therefore the analysis effectively starts at a post trip condition (Ref.

5, 8,

and 10).

Normal post trip operator response in accordance with

(

plant procedures is then assumed except that the plant has undergone a single bus failure which makes specific plant equipment unavailable.

The study assesses post trip 'lant 8 ate status by reviewing Emergency Procedures E.01, Immi.

j/%.

Actions", and E.02, " Vital System Status Verification", with d

equipment losses in accordance with the failed bus (Draft E.01 and E.02 procedures were provided for B&W use, Ref.

11).

Proceeding through E.01 and E.02 leads to Plant Operations Procedure B.4,

" Plant Shutdown and Cooldown".

Review or usage of any Emergency Procedures other than E.01 and E 02 's not within the scope of this study (Ref. 10).

Procedure B.4 provides two methods of plant cooldown, normal cooling with reactor coolant pumps available (Section 5.0) and natural circulation cooling (Section 6.0) should reactor coolant pumps be unavailable.

A third mode of cooling is available should the first two modes be unavailable, i.e.

"HPI cooling".

This third cooling mode is governed by the Emergency Procedures.

(As mentioned previously, it was assumed for this analysis that loss of a single bus should not result in a requirement for HPI cooling).

Section 4.0 of B.4,

" Plant Shutdown", was also evaluated to assure that any procedural steps taken in this section of the procedure are reflected in the B&W analysis.

Section 4.0 of B.4 contains the steps necessary for normal shutdown from about 15% power to Hot Shutdown.

f 51-1169097-00 Page 18 of 132 August 31, 1987 1

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-4.rll DESCRIPTION OF STUDY METHODOLOGY-(continued) r,

~ TheYRancho'Seco electrical: bus arrangement was reviewed.to-l

determine.the bus fallures. which-w e r e..

required to'..be E

i evaluated as :part of ' this study.

The evaluationfof'.the various single bus failures leads to plant' equipment which b

is' lost'as a result of the bus failure and, in some. cases, f

also leads ~to failure of additional, connected ' electrical u

E busses.

The-study-evaluation. method considers' the:

cumulative loss-of equipment from each single bus failure.as it affects'the operator's ability to follow normal / shutdown' procedures...

The

' equipment-' losses!.are; not : limited 'to-1 L

instrumentation and controls, but also consider the. impact of. other plant equipment losses since thia: could have a.

significant impact 'on the ' ability 1 to. reach a cold' Shutdown L

- condition.

After all single electrical bus failures were selected for.

the study, the associated cumulative equipment losses. for

- each bus fallure were prepared.

Then. the plant. shutdown

- capability. was evaluated for-.each ' failure.'

As noted earlier, this was performed by a procedure walk-through'in-

. accordance with. E. 01 and. E.02. followed by the' appropriate

-1 sections. of B.4 7 depending on equipment availability.

'Each postulated single. bus failure was evaluated by the procedure walk-through technique..This process provides an-assessment of the operator's ability to follow through with his' normal i

. procedures for each bus failure.

The evaluation of'the single bus failures is. presented in a series of tables in Section 7.

These tables, summarize'the scope.of the electrical' failures, the associated equipment.

failures,- an ~ evaluation of the shutdown procedure.. for the

- failure situation, an evaluation of the failure indication available to. the operator, and a summary of the'results of each failure., The categories included in each bus failure ovaluation sheet are:

a.

Power Supplies,

b. Equipment Losses,.

c. Cold Shutdown Procedure,

d. Summary of Bus Failure Results,

e. Bus Failure Indication, and

f. Effect of Bus Failure.

51-1169097-00 Page 19 of 132 August 31, 1987 i

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DESCRIPTION.0F STUDY METHODOLOGY (continued)

(-

~

The Effect' of' Bus Failure summary categorizes each bus failure in one of the following manners:

a..No impact on plant shutdown. procedure.

b. Requires the use of EOPs which is'not' rec'ommended and plant modifications are needed,

c. The ability to achieve cold shutdown.is affected.

The plant can.' remain stable'with available equipment.while power is restored to the bus or alternate power is made.

available without using any other EOPs.

d. No ' impact on plant modifications, ' however, review and possible changes to the procedures.are needed.-

.M Mr 51-1169097-00 Page 20 of 132 August 31, 1987

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EVALUATION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES The Rancho Seco plant procedures provide for three alternate means of plant cooldown:

a.

Forced circulation ccoling with reactor coolant l

(RC) pumps operating, 1

]

b.

Natural circulation cooling without reactor coolant pumps, and l

l c.

High pressure injection cooling.

j l

Forced circulation cooling and natural circulation cooling j

are performed in accordance with procedure B.4.

During a l

normal cooldown, Section 5 of B.4 would be followed with RC pumps available.

In accordance with Section 3 of B.4,

" Limitations and Precautions",

should RC pumps be unavailable, the plant would be cooled down by natural circulation in accordance with Section 6 of B.4.

The HPI l

cooling mode is governed 'by the plant Emergency Procedures and should not be required as a result of a single bus i

failure.

In addition to the three procedural shutdown paths, two alternatives are available to the operator, in the event of a single bus failure, which are appropriate for this study.

These two additional alternatives are to:

a.

Restore power to the bus and b.

Follow the normal shutdown path with redundant or alternate devices.

The bus failure evaluation was performed by assuming that Emergency Operating Procedures E.01 and E.02 were followed by the operator after plant trip in accordance with normal operating practice.

Equipment failures due to a single bus failure were taken into account during the evaluation of the operator's response to E.01 and E.02.

Typically, the l

operator is able to satisfactorily respond to E.01 and E.02 and then proceed to B.4 for a

normal plant

cooldown, entering B.4 after the

" Plant Shutdown" portion of the procedure (Section 4).

)

i 1

l 51-1169097-00 Page 22 of 132 August 31, 1987 I

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I 5.

EVALUATION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN FROCEDURES (contlaued) 7 The plant would normally proceed to Cold Shutdown in accordance with B.4 by the forced circulation cooling mode.

In the event of an equipment loss which prevents the operator from continuing with forced circulation cooling, i

the operator will proceed to natural circulation cooldown in accordance with Section 6 of B.4.

This study is based on an assumption that an acceptable response to a bus failure is the ability to cool down the plant via either forced circulation cooling or natural circulation cooling even with the associated equipment failures.

An acceptable cooldown I

can be achieved by proceeding with the plant cooldown

)

without the lost equipment, if possible, or by maintaining a stable plant condition until bus power (and associated equipment) is restored and then continuing the cooldown.

c Since no specific limit is placed on the time required to reach cold shutdown, it is basically assumed that sufficient time would be available for bus restoration, when necessary.

No credit is taken for battery backed busses which do not have an alternate power supply.

For this study, it is assumed that the plant can remain stable regardless of the length of time required for cus restoration.

This methodology conservatively ignores the possibility of HPI cooling which is a third mode of cooling available through

{

the plant procedures.

Since HPI cooling is governed by n

Emergency Procedures, however, it was assumed that a single (1) bus failure should not be allowed to place the plant into this cooling mode.

I Secondary plant cooling can be achieved with either main or i

auxiliary feedwater (AFW).

Numerous bus failures result in f

the potential for total loss of main feedwater.

For these cases the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System J

(EFIC) and AFW are used to cool the plant.

This is still l

considered a normal plant cooldown since this is a backup to the use of main feedwater and since EFIC and AFW contain I

redundant equipment.

E.02 Sections 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 address the use of EFIC and AFW for plant cooling with a loss of main feedwater.

One of the initial phases of this study was an evaluation of the equipment required for post-trip plant cccidown.

This evaluation wac based on a review of the plant procedures applicable to the post-trip plant status assessment (E.01 and E 02) and then plant cooldown to Cold Shutdown (B.4).

This portion of the study wan done without considering any electrical failures.

An equipment listing was prepared based on the equipment specifically required by the plant procedures.

In addition, an assessment of other plant systems and equipment was performed to assure that 51-1169097-01 Page 23 of 132 September 17, 1987 e.s.a=,..,-..-.m..==h=e.=*W.JaA.***-M--

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EVALUATION OF PLANT. SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES (centinued) p, supporting equipment-was.also available when requirod for the operation of the equipment called for in'the procedures.

The. result of.this procedure ovaluation' is a

set of equipment requirements. necessary for Cold Shutdown of. the plant-.f ollowing-normal. procedures.

. Thit.,

listing 'of equipment is provided in Table 1 and is'shown based on the-

~

procedure step (E.01, E.02, or

'a. 4 ) where'the equipment is-utilized.

This' equipment listing is.used in the single bus.

fsilure evaluation. tot identify procedure steps where

~etuipment unavailability requires that alternate action must

-be.taken'by the operator.

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)t S 6o LELECTRICALf BUS FAILURE : IDENTIFICATION Iw

.The1scopefof thiststudy-was to review! single electrical bus-

,p s

.g fallures and'their; impact on theLability oflthe' operator to-achieve Cold Shutdown.

The Rancho ~ Seco. electrical bus arrangement 1 was reviewed as the. initial step l in selecting the--failures which needed to be evaluated.

From the~ review-of ~ thisL arrangement,, iti was1 determined that. the ; fo11owing.

. electrical' busses should be. considered _in.this-. study:-

a.

Startup Transformers, b.-

6900LVolt AC (S6 busses),

g; c.-

4160 Volt AC (S4 busses),

t; c

L d..

480 Volt AC (S3 busses),

e.

120 Volt AC (S1 busses)',.and' f.

125 Volt'DC (SO busses).

Each specific. bus' was: identified-as a; potential single failure _ and the l equipment ~ 1osses due tot that bus failure.

,were determined.and evaluated.,

In ' addition, dueito bus-connections and. tie-ins, the failure of.certain busses.could cause'the loss of1 additional busses. :

In these ' cases, all.

!, f @* L possiblel equipment failures were.' considered on a cumulative '

' basis' to provide the. total effect of each singlec_ bus J

i-failure.-

Battery backed busses were - assumedE to still be lavailable only if an:. independent, ' alternate ~ power feed.to

'that bus was available.- However, the battery. backed busses were ' individually - evaluated.as potential single fallures.

Motor-control centers connected to the 480 Volt busses were considered to be part of' the single failure set for those busses.-

The operator is provided with. bus. failure indication in the Control' Room-. by ' annunciation and/or' computer. point indication.

The indication which is provided for each' bus

. is included in the _ power supply failure evaluation sheets which are presented in Section 7.

Casualty. Procedures.'are available for-response to bus failures..

These procedures were reviewed to determine whether they adeguately addressed the-problems identified"in l

this report resulting from the bus failure and whether they provided guidance to the operator-concerning inoperable equipment and recommended alternate equipment.

j i 1169097-00 Page 44 of 132 August 31, 1987

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TABLE 2 SELECTED BUS FAILURES 7

VOLTAGE BUS NO.

DRAWING Startup Transformer No. 1 N/A E-101/20 Startup Transformer No. 2 N/A E-101/20 6900 Volt AC S6A E-103/12 6900 Volt AC S6B E-103/12 4160 Volt AC S4A E-104, Sh. 2/10 4160 Volt AC S4A2 E-104, Sh. 6/3 4160 Volt AC S4B E-104, Sh. 3/11 1

4160 Volt AC S4B2 E-104, Sh. 7/4 1

4160 Volt AC S4C E-104, Sh. 1/10 4160 Volt AC C4D E-104, Sh. 4/6 4160 Volt AC S4E1 E-104, Sh. 5/8 I

4160 Volt AC S4E2 E-104, Sh. 5/8 480 Volt AC S3A E-105, Sh. 1/7 l

480 Volt AC S3A2 E-105, Sh. 36/5 1

480 Volt AC S3B E-105, Sh. 2/7 480 Volt AC S3B2 E-105, Sh. 37/4 480 Volt AC S3Cl E-105, Sh. 3/6 480 Volt AC S3C2 E-105, Sh. 4/9 l

480 Volt AC S3D1 E-105, Sh. 5/13 l

480 Volt AC S3D2 E-105, Sh. 6/19 (cyg Q) 480 Volt AC S3E E-105, Sh. 7/12 120 Volt AC SlA E-108,.S h. 1/22 120 Volt AC S1A2-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 120 Volt AC SlB E-108, Sh. 1/22 120 Vo]t AC S1B2-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 120 Volt AC Sic E-108, Sh. 1/22 120 Volt AC SlC2-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 120 Volt AC SlD E-108, Sh. 1/22 120 Volt AC SID2-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 120 Volt AC SIE E-108, Sh. 2/23 120 Volt AC SlF E-108, Sh. 2/23 120 Volt AC S1G-2 E-108, Sh. 1/22 120 Volt AC S1GA-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 120 Volt AC SlGB-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 120 Volt AC SlJ E-108, Sh. 2/23 120 Volt AC SIN 1-1 E-108, Sh. 12/12 51-1169097-00 Page 45 of 132 August 31, 1987

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SELECTED BUS FAILURES j

4

[_

(continued)

)

I VOLTAGE SUS NO.

DRAWING i

125 Volt DC SOA E-107/22 l

125 Volt DC SOA2-1 E-107, Sh. 2/5 125 Volt DC SOB E-107/22 125 Volt DC SOB 2-1 E-107, Sh. 2/5 125 Volt DC SOC E-107/22 i

125 Volt DC SOC 2-1 E-107, Sh. 2/5 125 Volt DC SOD E-107/22 125 Volt DC SOD 2-1 E-107, Sh. 2/5 125 Volt DC SOE E-107/22 125 Volt DC SOF E-107/22 125 Volt DC SON 1 E-107, Sh. 2/5 The drawings listed below include the identified DCN's.

pWQ DCN's E-101 17,18A E-103 6

E-104 Sh. 2 6,

7, 8

E-104 Sh. 3 8,

9, 10, 11 E-104 Sh. 6 4B, SA, 7,

9, 10B g,q E-104 Sh. 7 3B, 7,

9, 10, 11A E-105 Sh. 1 SA E-105 Sh. 4 SA E-105 Sh. 5 6A E-105 Sh. 10 15A, 17B E-105 Sh. 36 10B E-105 Sh. 37 11B E-107 --

16A, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 E-107 Sh. 2 15D, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23A, 25 E-108 Sh. 1 5,

16A, 20, 21, 23, 24 E-108 Sh. 2 19, 21, 22, 23 51-1169097-00 Page 46 of 132 August 31, 1987 s

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71 EVALUATION OF BUSLFAILURES 2fi

_i The review of the11mpacts of single busJfailures required by IEBL,79-27.DwasL, performed by- ; utilizing.

equipment 9

unavailability' listings.for each ' selected electrical bus

failure'.

The-normal ~ plant-cooldownL procedures were s

Eevaluated for each iselectedL electricali bus. failure by' -

. comparing' equipment' required-for cooldown to: equipment l

. unavailable due' to the electrical ' bus failure.!

These reviews were parformed for each of the bus failures shown in Table?2.

Rancho :Seco electrical'. drawings were. reviewed' to prepare lists of' the' equipment connected to - each bus considered in the study so the. unavailable equipment could be' determined.

'As discussed in.Section'4., the review of the plant" shutdown;

- procedures yielded. a listing of. the equipmentc (and systems) L Part of the procedure. review ~

necessary for; plant cooldown.

was the determination of alternative,or. redundant' equipment which.could be utilized by the operator for.cooldown.

This would aid. the operator in following normal procedures and would provide'an adequate response to specific bus failures.

,i The evaluation of each single' bus failure and the associated plant, equipment. failures was performed by. comparing. the equipment. losses to the equipment required for cold shutdown gfp#f based on the review ~of plant procedures.

The result of this 1

i&

comparison is a listing, for each bus evaluated 'in, the study, of the equipment which it powers. that is needed for cold Shutdown.

A review of equipment control and' indication schemes: was also; performed. so these impacts could be considered.

The' basic assumption used was that loss of power to a piece of equipment, loss of control, or loss of indication would render that piece of equipment unavailable j

to the operator unless adequate backup verification of

{

equipment operability is available.

This assumption l

maximizes the ' equipment failure situation and assures that

]

no credit has been taken for equipment which cannot be i

relied upon by the operator.

The results of tne equipment review for.each singla bus failure are shown in Table 3.

Tablet 3 is a compilation of the analysis sheets used for the evaluation of each of the bus failures listed in Table 2.

In

general, the listed equipment. failures are those

)

connected to the primary bus.

Other equipment failures due to failure of inter-connected buses. can be determined. by referring to the= power supply failure evaluation sheet for that specific bus.

Motor control center equipment failures are included' on the sheet for the 480 Volt bus failures.

J Control rod ' drive

control, absolute group position

)

indication, and in/out group limit indication is not listed with any bus failures since power is supplied from multiple

)

3 51-1169097-00 Page 47 of 132 August 31, 1987 l h, he &fe

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EVALUATION OF BUS FAILURES (continued)

L

. busses.

.A. single bus failure would not cause loss of this equipment.

The only relevant failure situation would be an internal fault which is not within the scope of this study.

Mcst of the single bus failures analyzed in this report did not prevent plant cooldown in accordance with normal plant 4

procedures, i.e.

their equipment failures would not prevent achieving Cold Shutdown in accordance with B.4.

Some bus

' failures result in equipment unavailability which causes minor deviations from B.4, such as manual valve operation outside containment.

These are not considered to be significant problems.

However, some cf the bus failures did produce a set of equipment failures which cc tid affect the operators ability to reasonably achieve Cold dhutdown within the framework of B.4 or which cause other problems of note.

These bus failures are summarized in Section 2.

Table 4 is provided as a cumulative listing of the primary equipment and backup equipment noted in the Table 3 bus failure summary sheets.

This table provides a convenient reference for equipment number, equipment description, and a source reference.

i 66 i

1 l

51-1169097-00 Page 48 of 132 August 31, 1987

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p, TABLE 3-STARTUP TRANSFORMER ~#1 j

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. POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

. POWER' SUPPLIES FAILED POWER; SUPPLY:

STARTUP TRANSFORMER # 1

' CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUSSES 6A AND 6B CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH DO NOT FAIL:

BUS JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT FAILING S4A, S4A2.

ALTERNATE FEED FROM DIESEL GENERATORS OR STARTUP TRANSFORMER.# 2 1

2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-210A,B,C,D RCS NONE E-203 Sh. 1/16, 1A/10, 1B/6, IC/2 3 '. -

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS. SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

B.4 STEP 6.O; NATURAL

-CIRCULATION-DEVIATION FROM NORMAL ' SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

PROCEDURE B4 SECTION 6.0,

" NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING" MUST BE FOLLOWED SINCE ALL RCP's ARE LOST.

' EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

P-210A,B,C,D ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

PROCEDURE B.4 SECTION 6.0 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF ALL REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS RESULTS IN THE NEED TO PURSUE NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING PER SECTION 6.0 OF PROCEDURE'B.4 51-1169097-00 Page 49 of 132 August 31, 1987 i

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STARTUP TRANSFORMER'#1 a.

5.-

BUS FAILURE INDICATION' H2ES-002 S-U TFMR'#1 TRIP CONT PWR FAILURE H2ES-019

.S-U TFMR #1-PROT TRIP H2ES-053 S-U.TFMR.#1 976 TRCUBLE H2ES-085 S-U TFMR #1 220KV FDR DIFF TRIP H2ES-036 S-U TFMR #1 976' TEMP HI 6.

EFFECT OF EUS FAILURE

. NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE p

~ h?Q -

/

51-1169097-00 Page 50 of 132 August 31, 1987

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i TABLE 3-STARTUP TRANSFORMER #2 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES q

l FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

STARTUP TRANSFORMER #2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUSSES S4El, S4E2, S4C, S4D, S1E, SlF, S3C1, S3C2, S3D1, S3D2, S3E CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH DO NOT FAIL:

BUS JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT FAILING S4B, S4B2 ALTERNATE FEED FROM DIESELS OR STARTUP TRANSFORMER # 1 2.

EOUIPMFNT LOSSES l

EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE IDENTIFIED ON INDIVIDUAL BUS SHEETS 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED: NONE DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE: MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT FAILURES RESULT IN CONDITIONS SIMILAR TO A LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER EVENT.

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

'mLTIPLE EQUIPMENT LOSSES.

SEE INDIVIDUAL BUS SHEETS ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF STARTUP TRANSFORMER #2 RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ALL NON-ESSENTIAL BUSSES WHICH IS SIMILAR TO A LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER EVENT WITH THE DIESELS POWERING ALL ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT.

THIS EVENT IS NOT BEING ANALYZED AS PART OF THIS STUDY SINCE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER WHICH IS ANALYZED IN CHAPT."R 14 OF THE RANCHO SECO USAR.

i 51-1169097-00 Page 51 of 132 August 31, 1987 N..

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l STARTUP TRANSFORMER #2

.c 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-003 S-U TFMR #2 TRIP CONT PWR FAILURE H2ES-020 S-U TFMR #2 PROT TRIP H2ES-054. S-U TFMR #2 94' TROUBLE H2ES-102 S-U'TFMR #2 220KV'FDR DIFF TRIP H2ES-037 S-U TFMR #2 94 TEMP HI l'-

6..

EfFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

l 51-1169097-00 Page 52 of 132 August 31, 1987

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~ TABLE 3-BUS 56A POWER SUPPLY' FAILURE EVALUATION 1.-

POWER SUPPLIES-l FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S6A-j CONNECTED: POWER' SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE-2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES:

' EQUIPMENT' SYSTEM

' BACKUP REFERENCE P-210A-

~ RCS P-210B

.E-203 SH 1/16-P-210C

-RCS

.P-210D E-203 SH 1B/6 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED: ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN' PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE

- ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN. PATH:

NONE REQUIRED

- 4...

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS i

BUS FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT IN DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE B.4,

. E. 01 ' OR E. 02.

AFTER A PLANT TRIP TWO RCP'S ARE SUFFICIENT TO ADEQUATELY CIRCULATE REACTOR COOLANT.

l 5.

. AUS' FAILURE' INDICATION H2ES-035 6900V SWGR BUS 6A TROUBLE H2ES-052:

6900V SWGR BUS 6A SUPPLY TRIP 1

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 51-1169097-00 Page 53 of 132 August 31, 1987

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TABLE 3-BUS S6B POWER-SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.-

POWER SUPPLIES.

FAILED POWER' SUPPLY: -BUS S6B' LCONNECTED^ POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL: NONE 2.

EOUIPMENT' LOSSES EQUIPMENT-

-SYSTEM BACKUP

-REFERENCE.

P-210B RCS-P-210A-

~E-203 SH 1A/10 P-210D RCS P-210C E-203 SH 1C/2 i

3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS.SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION.FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDUR2:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION;FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE' REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE B.4, E.01 OR E.02' REQUIRED.

TWO RCPs ARE SUFFICIENT TO CIRCULATE REACTOR COOLANT 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-069 6900V SWGR BUS 6B TROUBLE H2ES-086 6900V SWGR BUS 6B SUPPLY TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDCWN PROCEDURE

51-1169097-00 Page 54 of 132 August 31, 1987

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TABLE 3-BUS S4A POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY: BUS S4A CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

S3A, S2Al 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-236(ALT)

SIM P-236 E-203 SF ;!/14 P-238A SIM P-238B E-203 3h 4/16 P-261A DHS P-261B E-203 SH 3/10 P-472A NRW P-472B E-203 SH 42/13 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 4.12; B.4 5.35 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

VALVES LISTED ABOVE WHICH DO NOT HAVE A BACKUP REQUIRE LOCAL OPERATION.

DECAY HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL HV-20001 IS OPEN.

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE: HV-20001, AND HV-20560 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE AVAILABLE.

POWER MUST BE RESTORED TO HV-20001.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS S4A IS REDUNDANT.

THE FAILURE OF BUS S3A RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:

THE DECAY HEAT SYSTEM CANNOT BE INITIATED UNTIL DROP-LINE VALVE HV-20001 IS OPENED.

IF FOR SOME REASON THE REACTOR BUILDING CANNOT BE ENTERED AND POWER CANNOT BE RE-ESTABLISHED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLIED TO THE

VALVE, THEN NORMAL DECAY HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT POSSIBLE.

HV-20560 CAN BE LOCALLY OPENED TO ESTABLISH REDUNDANT STEAM SUPPLY TO THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINES AND TO THE AUX STEAM SYSTEM.

51-1169097-00 Page 55 of 132 August 31, 1987

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BUS S4A HV-26046 CAN BE LOCALLY OPENED IF DHS CROSS-TIE FLOW IS REQUIRED FOR ANY REASON.

1 CCW ISOLATION VALVES SFV-46203 AND SFV-46907 WILL NOT FAIL CLOSED ON LOSS OF THIS BUS.

A FAILURE OF TWO SEPARATE SFS CHANNELS IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE THESE VALVES.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-007 4160V SWGR BUS 4A TROUBLE H2ES-008 4160V SWGR BUS 4A TROUBLE H2ES-009 4160V SWGR BUS 4A FEEDER TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT WHILE POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABIZ WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOP's.

51-1169097-00 Page 56 of 132 August 31, 1987 v

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TABLE 3-BUS S4A2 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S4A2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUS S3A2, S2A2.

S2A3, S2A4 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-319 FWS P-318 E-104 Sh. 6/2

)

3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 4.5, 4.24; E.02 STEP 16.0 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

AUXILIARY STEAM IS NOT AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

E-360, 365 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS A REDUNDANT FYSTEM IS AVAILABLE FOR THE LOSS OF AFW PUMP P-319.

I THE FAILURE OF THIS BUS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BATTERY CHARGER H4GBA.

ONCE BATTERY POWER IS EXHAUSTED, BUSSES

{

SlGA-1 AND SlJ WILL ALSO FAIL.

THIS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS UNLESS POWER CAN BE RESTORED TO BUS I

S3A2 OR ALTERNATE POWER CAN BE FED TO BUS S1J.

THE LOSS OF THE AUXILIARY BOILERS CAN POSSIBLY RESULT IN EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM THE PRIMARY TO THE SECONDARY PLANT AT VERY LOW DECAY HEAT GENERATION RATES.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION i

IDADS Z-1302 S4A2 4160V SWGR BKR E-1343 4160V SWGR UNDERVOLTAGJ 51-116987-00 Page 57 of 132 August 31, 1987

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BUS S4A2 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW JWD POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

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l 51-1169097-00 Page 58 of 132 August 31, 1907 l

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1 TABLE 3-BUS S4B POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 2OEER SUPPLIES 1.

Q FAILED POWER SUPPLY: BUS S4B CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL: S3B, S2B1 2.-

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-472B NRW P-472A E-203 SH 42/13 P-238B-SIM P-238A E-203 SH 4A/O P-236 SIM P-236(ALT)

E-203 SH 2A/2 P-261B DHS P-261A E-203 SH 3/10 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED: B4-4.12, 5.27, 5.35.

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES WHICH ARE REQUIRED FOR AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY AND DECAY HEAT SYSTEN OPERATION WILL NOT OPERATE REMOTELY AFTER A LOSS OF THIS BUS EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

HV-23802; HV-20002 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE AVAILABLE.

POWER MUST BE I

RESTORED HV-20002.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE:

q ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS S4B IS REDUNDANT.

THE ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF BUS S3B RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:

I IF THE REACTOR BUILDING CANNOT BE ENTERED FOR ANY REASON THEN HV-23801 CANNOT BE OPENED AND AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER i

SPRAY FROM THE MAKEUP SYSTEM CANNOT BE INITIATED UNTIL POWER i

IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE.

)

THE PLANT CAN STILL ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN BUT AT A SLOWER RATE.

THE DECAY HEAT SYSTEM CANNOT BE INITIATED UNTIL DROP-LINE l

VALVE HV-20002 IS OPENED.

IF FOR SOhf REASON THE REACTOR

]

l 51-1169097-00 Page 59 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

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BUS S4B BUILDING CANNOT BE ENTERED 'AND POWER CANNOT-BE RE-ESTABLISHED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLIED TO THE

VALVE, THEN NORMAL DECAY HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT f

POSSIBLE.

HV-20565 CAN BE LOCALLY OPENED IF REQUIRED TO SUPPLY MAIN STEAM TO THE FEED PUMP TURBINES AND THE AUX STEAM SYSTEM.

l HV-32243 SUPPLIES PEGGING STEAM TO SECOND AND FOURTH POINT HEATERS.

IT CAN BE LOCALLY CLOSED IF REQUIRED.

HV-23802 IS REQUIRED FOR AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY FROM THE MAKEUP SYSTEM.

ALTHOUGH PERFORMED AT A SLOWER RATE, COOLDOWN CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THIS SPRAY FLOW.

HV-26047 CAN BE LOCALLY OPERATED IF DHS CROSS-TIE FLOW IS REQUIRED.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-041 4160V SWGR BUS 4C TROUBLE H2ES-025 4160V SWGR BUS 4B SUPPLY TRIP H2ES-026 4160V SWGR BUS 4B FEEDER TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE h

THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT WHILE POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOP's.

j I

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51-1169097-00 Page 60 of 132 August 31, 1987

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TABLE 3-BUS S4B2 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES l

FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S4B2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

S3B2, S2B2, S2B3, S2B4 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-318 FWS P-319 E-104 Sh.

7/4 DCN llA 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

E.02 STEP 5.O DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE POSITION INDICATION REQUIRES VISUAL VALVE POSITION VERIFICATION.

,,',ity, EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

MAIN AND t"

AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE POSITION INDICATION (Z-1801 THROUGH Z-1829)

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED.

ONCE THE OPERATOR IS ASSURED THAT NO VALVES ARE LEAKING, COOLDOWN IS PER PROCEDURE B.4.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF BUS S3B2 RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BATTERY CHARGERS H4BB2 AND H4BD2.

ONCE BATTERY POWER IS ' EXHAUSTED, BUSSES S1GB-1, HON 1, AND SIN 1-1 WILL ALSO BE LOST.

ALL EQUIPMENT ON BUSSES S3B2, SIN 1-1, AND SON 1 IS REDUNDANT.

THE FAILURE OF BUS SlGB-1 RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.

VISUAL POSITION VERIFICATION MUST BE MADE AND NO DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURES B4, E.Ol, AND E.02 IS REQUIRED.

5.

]@S_,JAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1314 S4B2 4160V SWGR BKR E-1380 S4B2 4160V SWGR UNDERVOLTAGE 51-1169097-00 Page 61 of 132 August 31, 1987 y

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NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE j

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i 51-1169097-00 Page 62 of 132 August 31, 1987 I

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TABLE 3-BUS S4C POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SU M M FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S4C CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUSSES

S3C1, S3C2, S2C1, S2C2, S2C3, S2C4, S2C5, 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-462A CCW P-462B E-203 SH 41/7 P-351B MCM P-351A,C E-205 SH 2A/2 P-425B PCW P-425A,C E-206 SH 1/5 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCET'URE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS S4C IS REDUNDANT.

BUS S3C1 POWERS BOTH FEED PUMP TURBINE LUBE OIL VAPOR EXTRACTORS.

AFW IS AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO MAIN FEEDWATER AND IS COVERED BY E.02 STEP 3.0.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-041 4160V SWGR BUS 4C TROUBLE H2ES-042 4160V SWGR BUS 4C SUPPLY TRIP H2ES-043 4160V SWGR BUS 4C FEEDER TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE.

4 51-1169097-01 Page 63 of 132 September 17, 1987 e

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- TABLE'3-BUS S4D' POWER SUPPLY.-FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER' SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S4D CONNECTED ' POWER-SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUSSES S3Dl, S3D2, S2D1 S2D2, S2D3, S2D4

2..

EOUIPMENT LOSSES' EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE l P-425A PCW P-425B,C E-206 SH 1/5,

l P-351A

.MCM P-351B,C

'E-205 SH 2/13.

P-462B-CCW P-4 62A E-203 SH 41/7 j

3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 3.14, 4.9, 4.25, 4.28.6

' DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF REMOTE OPERATION OF ' CORE FLOOD TANK.. ISOLATION VALVES.

POSSIBLE

. ~~ PRESSURIZATION DUE TO LOSS OF PRESSURIZER SPRAY CONTROL.

EQUIPMENT. LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:. HV-21510, HV-21520, HV-26513, HV-26514.

1 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS S4D IS REDUNDANT.

THE ADDITIONAL ' LOSS OF BUS S3D1 AND S2D2 RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:

THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE CORE FLOOD TANKS MAY RESULT IN THE INJECTION OF NITROGEN INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

THIS. IS NOT LIKELY - SINCE TIME IS AVAILABLE TO POWER'THESE VALVES FROM ANOTHER POWER SOURCE AND THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WHILE THIS PROBLEM IS BEING ADDRESSED.

IF THE REACTOR BUILDING CAN BE ENTERED, THE VALVES CAN BE CLOSED j

LOCALLY.

i

[

51-1169097-00 Page 64 of 132 August 31, 1987

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BUS S4D THE LOSS OF PRESSURIZER SPRAY ISOLATION PRESENTS A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF DEPRESSURIZING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

IF THE PRESSURIZER IS BEING SPRAYED USING PV-21520 AT THE TIME OF BUS FAILURE A

DISTINCT POSSIBILITY OF DEPRESSURIZATION EXISTS SINCE THE SPRAY' ISOLATION VALVE (HV-21510) IS ALSO POWERED FROM THIS BUS.

CASUALTY PROCEDURE C.11 CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN OFF REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS TO REMOVE THE DRIVING FORCE FOR PRESSURIZER SPRAY.

THE RESULTING LOSS OF REMOTE OPERATION OF THE TWO RCS VENT VALVES HV-21515 AND HV-21517 SHOULD NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM.

VENTING OF THE PRESSURIZER IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATIOH H2ES-058 4160V GWGR BUS 4D TROUBLE H2ES-042. 4160V SWGR BUS 4C SUPPLY TRIP

{

H2ES-043 4160V SWGR BUS 4C FEEDER TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT WHILE POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS. OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE I

WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOPs.

l l

l 51-1169097-00 Page 65 of 132 August 31, 1907

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l TABLE 3-BUS S4E1 FOWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIM FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS 54El CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUSSES S3E, 52El, S2E2, S2E4 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-351C MCM P-351A,B E-205 SH 2B/3 P-402A MCW P-402C E-206 SH 3/8 P-402B MCW P-402D E-206 SH 3/8 3.

COLD _ SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 4.5, 4.24; E.02 STEP 16.0 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

P-898, P-899, K-307A ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED BY BUS S4El IS REDUNDANT.

THE ADDITIONAL LOSS OF BUS S3E CAUSES THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:

THE LOSS OF AUXILIARY BOILERS DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE FUEL SUPPLY PUMPS RESULTS IN THE USE OF THE AFW SYSTEM FOR HEAT REMOVAL.

IF LITTLE DECAY HEAT POWER IS AVAILABLE, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM THE PRIMARY TO THE SECONDARY PLANT EXISTS DUE TO A RAPID DRAIN OF AVAILABLE STEAM SUPPLY FROM THE STEAM GENERATORS WHICH IS NOT BEING j

MATCHED BY DECAY HEAT GENERATION.

{

SINCE THE TURNING GEAR MOTOR IS UNAVAILABLE THE TURBINE MUST BE PERIODICALLY TURNED DURING PLANT COOLDOWN TO PREVENT

" SETTLING" OF THE TURBINE SHAFT.

51-1169097-00 Page 66 of 132 August 31, 1987

)

1 s

j..-.. -.

__l L

l

-.._ _ _._ m m m _

BUS S4El j

{

THE LOSS 'OF REMOTE OPERATION OF' THE -. FOLSOM CANAL SUPPLY-VALVE (HV-43010) SHOULD NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM.

WATER SUPPLY-IS STILL AVAILABLE FROM THE SITE -RESERVOIR THROUGH NORMALLY OPEN HV-430ll.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION i

' H2ES-075 4160V SWGR BUS 4El, 4E2 TROUBLE I

H2ES-076 4160V.SWGR BUS 4El, 4E2 SUPPLY TRIP H2ES-077 4160V SWGR BUS 4El, 4E2. FEEDER TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS-FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW AND POSSIBLE CHANGES'TO THE PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

l l

l l

.\\

I i

I l

51-1169097-00 Page 67 of 132 August 31, 1987 i.,

l l

I

• Wy ( M [H N,---jM-*

=96+#^("-Map #8 g,

t' N,'*-

y b-i_r - ' - - - %

n- =

• 2=

~

1 p

??

TABLE 3-BUS S4E2 o

k

~5

'ie, f~'

/

POWER-SUPPLY FAILURE: EVALUATION:

- I

1..-

POWER SUPPLIES l

FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S4E2 l

CONNECTED POWER EUPPLIES.WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE

' 2.

'EOUIPMENT LOSSES 1

1 EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE i

A-361-AS C :.

A-366 E-206 SH 12/5-P-402C MCW P-402A

.E-206 SH.3/8 P-402D MCW P-402B E-206 SH 3/8 j

i

.P-425C PCW-P-425A,B.

E-206 SH 1/5

' 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL' SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS-CAUSING DEVIATION'FROM'-PROCEDURE: - NONE

-ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN' PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4 ~.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE' B4 E. 01 AND E. 02' IS REQUIRED.

ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT:WHICH IS POWERED FROM THIS BUS IS REDUNDANT.

5.

. DJIS FAILURE INDICATION l

H2ES-075 4160V.SWGR BUS 4El, 4E2 TROUBLE H2ES-076 4160V SWGR BUS 4El, 4E2 SUPPLY TRIP H2ES-077 4160V SWGR BUS 4El, 4E2 FEEDER TRIP

t.

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE:

NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 51-1169097-00 Page 68 of 132 August 31, 1987 y

\\.

.~~.-w+.<

9..n.m.r.~,.,

.~..~.~

....-_...-.,..,~n J.'__

,_w'?*.*1*55.5.'L' :L._--...

% N rNlww -

S. w~ e.

l'.

+ -.1, m

.~c.~**A

-.~.~ s v

w--.

n m

-.~..?

w

..e..

--.....n e

TABLE 3-BUS S3A POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES _

FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S3A CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC 2Al 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-482A NSW P-482B E-203 SH 43/12 HV-20529 FWS HV-20515 E-105 SH 27/7 SFV-22005 PLS S FV-2'2 025 E-203 SH 56/13 SFV-22023 PLS SFV-22009 E-203 SH 48/15 HV-20005 DHS HV-20006 E-203 SH 118/0 SFV-24004 PLS SFV-24013 E-203 SH 69/7 SFV-25003 DHS SFV-25004 E-203 SH 68/9 SFV-26005 DHS SFV-22025 E-203 SH 50A/3 HV-26007 DHS HV-26008 E-203 SH 53B/2 SFV-46203 CCW NONE E-203 SH 85/6 SFV-46907 CCW NONE E-203 SH 85A/3 HV-20560 MSS NONE E-203 SH 20A/0 "g

FV-20569 MSS HV-20596 E-203 SH 20C/0 4

P-2',8A (L.O.)

SIM P-238B (L.O.)

E-203 SH 37/6 SFV-26039 DHS SFV-26040 E-203 SH 81/6 HV-26037 DHS HV-26038 E-203 SH 80/7 P-705A BWS P-705B E-203 SH 15/6 SFV-23645 SIM SFV-2-3646 E-203 SH 52B/1 SFV-22006 PLS SFV-22025 E-203 SH 56A/2 HV-26046 DHS NONE E-203 SH 53A/3 j

HV-20001 DHS NONE E-203 SH 60D/3 SFV-23508 SIM ALT FEED E-203 SH 97/7 MCC S2B1 HV-22005,6 CCW NONE E-203 SH 56/13 SH 56A/2 HV-26105 DHS HV-26106 E-203 SH 53/9 HV-26007 LHS HV-26008 E-203 SH 53B/2 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROCEDURE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 4.12; B4 5.35; DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

VALVES LISTED ABOVE WHICH DO NOT HAVE A BACKUP REQUIRE LOCAL OPERATION.

DECAY HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL HV-20001 IS OPEN.

51-1169097-00 Page 69 of 132 August 31, 1987

(

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q,,_

gg.

g,_y,

, [p9

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,,gy

l 1

BUS.S3A' l-EQUIPMENT' LOSS. CAUSING' DEVIATION FROM' PROCEDURE: HV-20001,

--AND HV-20560 ALTERNATIVE. SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE AVAILABLE.

POWER MUST BE-RESTORED TO'HV-20001.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS' FAILURE RESULTS THE DECAY:. HEAT. SYSTEM CANNOT BE' INITIATED UNTIL DROP-LINE VALVE HV-2 0001 ~ IS, OPENED.

IF : FOR SOME REASON THE ~ REACTOR BUILDING CANNOT BE ENTERED.AND POWER-CANNOT~ BE RE-ESTABLISHED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER. SUPPLIED TO.THE

VALVE, THEN. NORMAL DECAY. HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT POSSIBLE.

HV-20560 CAN BE LOCALLY. OPENED TO ESTABLISH REDUNDANT STEAM o

SUPPLY TO THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINES AND TO THE AUX STEAM SYSTEM.

HV-2604 6 CAN BE LOCALLY OPENED IF DHS ' CROSS-TIE FLOW IS REQUIRED FOR ANY REASON.

- i CCW ISOLATION VALVES SFV-46203 AND.SFV-46907 WILL NOT FAIL-CLOSED ON LOSS OF THIS BUS.

A FAILURE OF TWO. SEPARATE"SFS g

CHANNELS IS' REQUIRED TO CLOSE THESE VALVES.

i 5.

BUS' FAILURE INDICATION' H2ES-011' '.480V SWGR BUS 3A UNDERVOLTAGE\\0VERVOLTAGE H2ES-012.480V SWGR BUS 3A SUPPLY TRI~P H2ES-013 480V SWGR BUS 3A FEEDER TRIP 6.

.EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE THE ABILITY TO' ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT

.CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT WHILE POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOPs l

I 51-1169097-00 Page 70 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

- k.

I A

-= =. - c_

---.~.-

c

_n n

m ;=.

a-

-m-

.anw=a.a -

m

}

_ {.

~*

~

^'

' ~ ' * '

TABLE 3-BUS S3A2

~

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S3A2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC's 2A2, 2A3, 2A4, BUS S1GA-1, S1J 2.

EQU.IPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE V215-L RCS V-215M E-203 SH 45/10 HV-20529 FWS HV-20515 E-105 SH 27/7 l

HV-20530 FWS HV-20516 E-105 SH 27/7 HV-31827 FWS UV-31826 E-105 SH 27/7 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 4.5, 4.24; E.02 STEP 16.0 i

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

AUXILIARY BOILERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE: E-360 AND i

E-365 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM THIS BUS IS REDUNDANT.

THE FAILURE OF THIS BUS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BATTERY CHARGER H4GBA.

ONCE BATTERY POWER IS EXHAUSTED, BUSSES SlGA-1 AND S1J WILL ALSO FAIL.

THIS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS UNLESS POWER CAN BE RESTORED To BUS S3A2 OR ALTERNATE POWER CAN BE FED TO BUS S1J.

l THE LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS CAN POTENTIALLY RESULT IN EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM THE PRIMARY TO THE SECONDARY PLANT IF THE CORE IS AT A VERY LOW DECAY HEAT RATE.

1 l

I 51-1169097-00 Page 71 of 132 August 31, 1987

\\. _..

1

~~

~

• ~~~

ib

BUS S3A2

g >,,

5.-

BUS FAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1303 S3A2 480V SWGR BKR

' E-1344

- S3A2 480V LOAD CENTER. VOLTAGE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE l

NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW AND

)

- POSSIBLE-CHANGES TO THE PROCEDURES ARE.NEEDED.

1 4

)

l

. 3 i

i 1

51-1169097-00 Page 72 of 132 August 31,'1987

. Y.

p-

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W gaisme e.g.'s.q p.a

.,m,,4

.g 4

p.

,,g,__,,,,,p 4

N M % Mi

...m....

t

TABLE 3-BUS S3B POWER SUPPLY' FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED MWER SUPPLY:

BUS S3B CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC 2B1 2.

OUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-482B NSW P-482A-E-203.SH 43/12 HV-20565 MSS NONE E-205 SH 20A/O HV-20596 MSS HV-20569 E-205 SH 20C/0 P-238B (L.O.)

SIM P-238A (L.O.)

E-203 SH 37A/3 SFV-22025 PLS SFV-22005,6 E-203 SH 48/15 SFV-23646 SIM SFV-23645 E-203 SH 52B/1 HV-26038 DHS HV-26037 E-203 SH 80/7 SFV-23616 SIM NONE E-203 SH 54/16 HV-20006 DHS HV-20005 E-203 SH 119/3 SFV-25004 DHS SFV-25003 E-203 SH 68A/3 SFV-26006 DHS SFV-26005 E-203 SH 50A/3 HV-26008 DHS HV-26007 E-203 SH 53B/2 f..

EV-32243 MSS NONE E-205 SH 30/3 f6 HV-20002 DHS NONE E-203 SH 60E/4 P-705B BWS P-705A E-203 SH 15/6 SFV-26040 DHS SFV-26039 E-203 SH 81A/1 HV-26047 DHS NONE E-203 SH 53A/3 HV-23802 SIM NONE E-203 SH 60B/3 HV-23801 SIM NONE

.E-203 SH 60C/7 SFV-23508 PLS ALT FEED E-203 SH 98/6 MCC S2A1 HV-21505 RCS PSV-21511 E-203 SH 58D/5 HV-26106 DHS HV-26105 E-203 SH 53/9 R-500 RMS R-7000,1 E-318 SH 1/19 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE IDENTIFIED PROBLEM STEPS: B.4 STEPS 4.12, 5.27, 5.35; DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES WHICH ARE REQUIRED FOR AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY AND DECAY HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION WILL NOT OPERATE REMOTELY AFTER A LOSS OF THIS BUS.

1 51-1169097-00 Page 73 of 132 August 31, 1987

(

= =,

l BUS S3B EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

HV-23802; HV-20002

]

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE AVAILABLE.

POWER MUST BE RESTORED TO HV-20002 4.

S,UMMARY OF BUS FAILURE:

IF THE REACTOR BUILDING CANNOT BE ENTERED FOR ANY REASON THEN HV-23801 CANNOT BE OPENED, HV-23802 CANNOT BE CLOSED, AND AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY FROM THE MAKEUP SYSTEM CANNOT BE INITIATED UNTIL POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR i

ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE.

THE PLANT CAN STILL-ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN BUT AT A SLOWER RATE.

THE DECAY HEAT SYSTEM CANNOT BE INITIATED UNTIL DROP-LINE 1

VALVE HV-20002 IS OPENED.

IF FOR SOME REASON THE REACTOR BUILDING CANNOT BE ENTERED AND POWER CANNOT BE RE-ESTABLISHED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLIED TO THE

VALVE, THEN NORMAL DECAY HEAT SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT POSSIBLE.

HV-20565 CAN BE LOCALLY OPENED IF REQUIRED TO SUPPLY MAIN STEAM TO THE FEED PUMP TURBINES AND.THE AUX. STEAM SYSTEM.

HV-32243 SUPPLIES PEGGING STEAM TO SECOND AND FOURTH POINT l

HEATERS.

IT CAN BE LOCALLY CLOSED IF REQUIRED.

HV-26047 CAN BE LOCALLY OPERATED IF DHS CROSS-TIE FLOW IS

)

REQUIRED.

NOT REQUIRED FOR PLANT COOLDOWN.

i l

S.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION j

H2ES-028 480V SWGR BUS 3B UV/OV H2ES-029 480V SWGR BUS 3B SPLY TRIP H2ES-030 480V SWGR BUS 3B FDR TRIP j

t I

i l

I i

51-1169097-00 Page 74 of 132 August 31, 1987

=64tme er +4ei e vem e"- - - -

a c.

Et, J MeaW Mme.

%s a degh h re-es,@.Tum"W-Dies lgD 4d@ 99 W+

4 Sse euhmmium.me+em

'-Mb*=i.e-a g-wge gu'W e

mue==

BUS S3B

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT WHILE POWER IS RES7.'ORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOPs 51-1169097-00 Page 75 of 132 August 31, 1987 i

MNO U "Nb'e' M

• M4**-1 Pm ems em

,.ye a

a.

,..-4

I' TABLE.3-BUS S3B2 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION r

-- l. -

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED: POWER SUPPLY: BUS S3B2 CONNECTED -POWER SUPPLIES ~ WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC's 2B2, 2B3, 2B4,.' BUSSES SlGB-1, SON 1, SIN 1,

.2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES

' EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP-

REFERENCE:

V-215M RCS'

~V-215L'

'E-203.SH 46/19 HV-31826 FWS HV-31827 E-105 SH 28/5

.HV-20515 FWS HV-20529 E-105 SH'28/5 4

HV-20516 FWS HV-20530 E-105 SH 28/5 3.

. COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM' STEPS IDENTIFIED:

E.02 STEP 5.0

' DEVIATION FROM. NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY: STEAM RELIEF VALVE POSITION INDICATION REQUIRES VISUAL VALVE POSITION VERIFICATION.

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

MAIN AND L

AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE POSITION INDICATION- (Z-1801 THROUGH'Z-1829)'

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED.

ONCE..THE OPERATOR'IS-ASSURED THAT No VALVES ARE LEAKING,.COOLDOWN IS PER PROCEDURE B4.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF BUS S3B2 RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BATTERY CHARGERS H4BB2 AND H4BD2.

ONCE BATTERY POWER IS EXHAUSTED, BUSSES SlGB-1, SON 1, AND SIN 1-1 WILL ALSO BE LOST.

ALL EQUIPMENT ON BUSSES S3B2, SIN 1-1, AND. SON 1.IS' REDUNDANT.

ls THE FAILURE OF BUS SlGB-1 RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF - MAIN AND, AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE POSITION INDICATION.s VISUAL POSITION INDICATION IS POSSIBLE AND No DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURES B4, E.01, AND E.02 IS REQUIRED.

5 s

-i

l 51-1169097-00 Page 76 of 132 August 31, 1987 3

K.

r

... +..

..--.---,s..

.. -.. ~. - -. - -

Er1 irrTrrnz T T1 =

~

~ 5

~ 1 U-i 2--z55 5 5 z S

p-BUS-S3B2

,7 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION 4

IDADS

. Z-1315 S3B2 480V SWGR BKR-i..

E-1381 S3B2 480V LOAD. CENTER VOLTAGE o

l 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO' IMPACT ON' PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 51-1169097-00 Page 77 of 132 August 31, 1987 h..

i4. -,,% + --..

~,... -.

'h.

nnw, -.p=

..----..4.

o..,_

4-i

-_.__:____-__x.,,1.-w1.nw J

j.

L L

TABLE'3-BUS S3C1 L..y POWER SUPPLY-FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

' POWER SUPPLIES-l

.i; FAILED POWER' SUPPLY: ' BUS S3C1 l

CONNECTED. POWER. SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:- MCC'sL2C1,- 2C3, 2C5, 2C6,'2C7, BUS 1C1

.2.-

EQUIPMENT LOSSES

' EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP-REFERENCE L

~C-900B SAS' C-900A,C-E-206 SH'4/6 A-874A LOS-NONE E-201 SH 35/9 A-874B-LOS NONE' E-201'SH 35/9:

PV-215 0 9 --

RCS PV-21520 E-203 SH 59/12 P-868A-LOS P-868B E-201 SH 28/11 P-868C LOS P-868D E-201 SH 28B/2 E-870B LOS P-870A' E-201 SH 35/9 P-976C SWS' P-976A,B E-206 SH-7/8 FV-36543 ASC FV-36060 E-206 SH 38/6 LV-36505 ASC LV-36005 E-206 SH 10A/4 FV-40207 MCW

.FV-40205 E-206 SH 3A/3-FV-40208 MCW FV-40206 E-206 SH 3A/3-3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM. NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FRO

M. PROCEDURE

NONE

. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED

-4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF THIS BUS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BOTH FEED PUMP TURBINE-LUBE OIL VAPOR EXTRACTORS.

AFW IS AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO MAIN FEEDWATER AND IS COVERED BY E.02 STEP 3.0.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-045 480V SWGR' BUS 3C1, 3C2 UV H2ES-046 480V SWGR BUS 3C1, 3C2 SPLY TRIP H2ES-047 480V SWGR BUS 3C1, 3C2 FDR TRIP

'51-1169097-00 Page 78 of 132 August 31, 1987 k*

.... - -. ~. -

G

~~

g 7 ___

-c

7. i n

BUS"S3C1 a

I.

6.-

' EFFECT'OF~ BUS FAILURE o

NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE.-

I',,

J i

i 1

. 51-1169097-00 Page 79 of 132 August 31, 1987

.e-

,,.._ -.. _ -... ~. _.

.__r...

-e g

de* tup-4 mm ab.e w ogimpiname.-emm emerh

..ma.m e-m u am - s

e. o men-u sn+

e a

rN+4.=6w-

- --^

-*d

__m__.____.

A i

i TABLE 3-BUS S3C2

.5 POWER SUPPLY. FAILURE EVALUATION

1. -

EOWER SUPPLIES j

FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

S3C2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC's 2C2, 2C4, 2C8, 2C9 j

2..

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP.

REFERENCE C-900A SAS C-900B,C E-206 SH 4/6 P-807 LOS P-809-E-201 SH 3/6 P-371A ASC P-371B E-206 SH 2/9 P-469A CCW P-469B E-203 SH 16/6 V-215M RCS V-215U,L E-203 SH 45/10 V-215L RCS V-215U,M E-203 SH 45/10 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL STEPS COMPLETED

. h DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE: NONE i

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH: NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES B.4, E.01 AND E.02 FOLLOWED.

ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM THIS BUS IS REDUNDANT.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-045 480V SWGR BUS 3C1, 3C2 UV H2ES-046 480V SWGR BUS 3C1, 3C2 SPLY TRIP H2ES-047 480V SWGR' BUS 3C1, 3C2 FDR TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

s..

51-1169097-01 Page 80 of 132 SeptembeV 17, 1987

• W O$,g' O

"*9 O$

'T TT'.9.,y* #

f t

1#i w

b

(

-.m.

w=_====_.___==._--.

_ _= =-

- - = - - - - - - -

TABLE 3-BUS S3D1 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES _

FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S3D1 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC's 2D1, 2D2, 2D3, 2D5, 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE HV-21510 RCS NONE E-203 SH 58/16 HV-21515 RCS NONE E-203 SH 58H/2 HV-21517 RCS NONE E-203 SH 58H/2 HV-22005 CCW NONE E-203 SH 57/4 i

HV-22006 CCW NONE E-203 SH 57/4 HV-22007 PLS HV-22008 E-203 SH 58/16 HV-22008 PLS HV-22007 E-203 SH 58/15 PV-21520 RCS PV-21509 E-203 SH 59A/5 HV-26513 CFS NONE E-203 SH 58F/0 HV-26514 CFS NONE E-203 SH 58G/0 V-215M RCS V-215L E-203 SH 45/10 V-215U RCS V-215L E-203 SH 46/9 9

H2RWF PLS NONE E-105 SH 18/15 R-500 RMS R-7000,1 E-318 SH 1/19 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 3.14, 5.24, 5.12 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

B.4 STEP 5.24 l

REQUIRES THE CORE FLOOD TANK ISOLATION VALVES BE CLOSED.

UNLESS THE CONTAINMENT CAN BE ENTERED AND THE VALVES CAN BE I

CLOSED MANUALLY, THIS CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

l B.4 STEP 4.2 INVOLVES MONITORING AND CONTROLLING RCS PRESSURE.

IF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE IS BEING CONTROLLED VIA SPRAY THROUGH HV-21520 AND THIS BUS FAILS, PZR SPRAY THEN CANNOT BE ISOLATED SINCE HV-21510 IS ALSO POWERED FROM THIS

BUS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPRESSURIZING THE REACTOR l

COOLANT SYSTEM EXISTS.

CASUALTY PROCEDURE C.11 SECTION 4

2.3.6.1 ADDRESSES THIS PROBLEM WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REDUCE PRESSURIZER SPRAY BY SECURING TWO OR THREE RCPs.

(

51-1169097-00 Page 81 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

1 t--

h.. ;

~

.._;.~..,....

a._.

a_.-

BUS S3D1 4

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

HV-21510, HV-21520, HV-22005, HV-22006, HV-26513, HV-26514 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE CORE FLOOD TANKS MAY RESULT IN THE INJECTION OF NITROGEN INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

THIS IS NOT LIKELY SINCE TIME IS AVAILABLE TO POWER THESE VALVES FROM ANOTHER T'v;74R SOURCE AND THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WHILE THIS

/ROBLEM IS BEING ADDRESSED.

IF THE REACTOR BUILDING CAN BE ENTERED, THE VALVES CAN BE CLOSED LOCALLY.

THE LOSS OF PRESSURIZER SPRAY ISOLATION PRESENTS A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF DEPRESSURIZING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

IF THE PRESSURIZER IS BEING SPRAYED USING PV-21520 AT THE TIME OF BUS FAILTTRE A

DISTINCT POSSIBILITY OF DEPRESSURIZATION EXISTS SINCE THE SPRAY ISOLATION VALVE (HV-21510) IS ALSO POWERED FROM THIS BUS.

CASUALTY PROCEDURE C.11 ADDRESSES THIS PROBLEM WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REDUCE PRESSURIZER SPRAY BY SECURING TWO OR THREE HCPs THE RESULTING LOSS OF REMOTE OPERATION OF THE TWO RCS VENT p

VALVES HV-21515 AND HV-21517 SHOULD NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM.

VENTING OF THE PRESSURIZER IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-062 480V SWGR BUS 3Dl, 3D2 UV H2ES-063 480V SWGR BUS 3D1, 3D2 SPLY TRIP H2ES-064 480V SWGR BUS 3D1, 3D2 FDR TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT WHILE POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT USIh. ANY OTHER EOPs 51-1169097-00 Page 82 of 132 August 31, 1987 x.

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TABLE 3-BUS S3D2 p.

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION C

1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

S3D2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES -WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC's 2D4, 2D6, 2D7, 2D8 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM ~

BACKUP REFERENCE C900-C SAS C-900-A,B E-206 SH 4/6 P371-B ASC P-371-A E-206 SH 2/9 P469-B CCW P-469-A E-203~SH 16/6 V215-U RCS V-215-M,L E-203 SH 47A/O HV-23004 PLS NONE E-203 SH 61/4 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

NONE DEVIATION FROM NORMAL-SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF POWER TO THE THREE WAY DIVERSION VALVE HV-23004 DOES NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM.

MANUAL OPERATION IS STILL POSSIBLE.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-062 480V SWGR BUS 3D1, 3D2 UV H2ES-063 480V SWGR BUS 3Dl, 3D2 SPLY TRIP H2ES-064 480V SWGR BUS 3Dl, 3D2 FDR TRIP 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE l

[

51-1169097-00 Page 83 of 132 August 31, 1987 w.

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-TABLE 3-BUS-S3E' j

l POWER SUPPLY FAILURE' EVALUATION l

1. :

POWER SUPPLIES l

FAILED' POWER SUPPLY:

'S3E CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

MCC's 2El, ~ 2E2, 2E3, 2E4, 2.

EQUIPMENT-LOSSES

~

EQUIPMENT:

SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE

'A-366 ASC A-361 E-206 SH 5/5 K-307-A HPT NONE E-201 SH 30/9 FV-36060 ASC FV-36543 E-200 SH 38/6 LV-36005 ASC LV-36505 E-206 SH 10/6 P-868B LOS P-868A E-201 SH28A/2 P-868D LOS P-868C E-201'SH 28C/1 P-898 ASC NONE E-206 SH 14/3 P-899 ASC NONE E-206 SH'14/3 P-976A SWS-P-976C E-206 SH 7/8 P-976B SWS P-976C E-206 SH 7/8

'HV-43010 lSRS NONE.

E-304 SH 34/1 FV-40205 MCW FV-40207 E-206 SH 3A/3 FV-40206 McW FV-40208 E-206 SH 3A/3 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 4.24; E.02 STEP 16.0 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

THE LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILER FUEL OIL PUMPS SHUTS DOWN BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS.

THE LOSS OF THE MAIN TURBINE TURNING _ GEAR REQUIRES MANUAL LOCAL TURNING OF THE TURBINE PERIODICALLY EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

P-898, P-899, K-307-A.,

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED o

/

51-116)097-00 Page 84 of 132 August 31, 1987

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BUS.53E 4.

SUMMARY

~OF BUS FAILURE-RESULTS l-THE LOSS OF.THE FUEL OIL SUPPLY PUMPS RESULTS IN THE LOSS'OF THE AUXILIARY BOILERS.

IF THE DECAY HEAT. GENERATION IS LOW, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM THE PRIMARY-TO THE SECONDARY'. PLANT EXISTS. DUE TO A ' RAPID DRAIN 0F.

AVAILABLE STEAM SUPPLY FROM THE STEAM GENERATORS,.WHICH IS NOT BEINGLMATCHED BY' DECAY HEAT GENERATION.-

1 SINCE THE TURNING GEAR MOTOR IS. UNAVAILABLE THE' TURBINE MUST BE PERIODICALLY TURNED DURING. PLANT COOLDOWN ' TO. PREVENT -

j

" SETTLING"'OF THE-TURBINE SHAFT.

THE LOSS OF REMOTE OPERATION OF THE FOLSOM: CANAL SUPPLY ~

VALVE (HV-43010) DPES ' NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM.

WATER SUPPLY l

IS STILL AVAILABLE FROM THE SITE RESERVOIR ".RROUGH NORMALLY OPEN HV-43011.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-79 480V SWGR BUS 3E UV:

H2ES-80 480V SWGR BUS 3E SPLY TRIP 6.

EFFEbT OF BUS FAILURE

. NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

J 51-1169097-00 Page 85 of 132 August 31, 1987 y

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TABI2 3-BUS S1A j

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES i

FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S1A CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUS SIA2-1.WILL ALSO'BE LOST IF FAILURE MECHANISM IS THE-BYPASS SWITCH H8TA4-OR CABIES CONNECTING THIS SWITCH TO. BREAKER H8TA5 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE PR-21092 RCS P-9035 N15.07-64/10 P-014 RCS PR-21037 N15.03-9/4 FI-23606 SIM NONE N15.07-74/2 FI-26003 "9S NONE N15.07-80/5 LT-20501 FAS L-139 N15.07-69/8 LI-20503B FWS LI-20503A N15.07-69/8 LI-20504B FWS LI-20504A N15.07-69/8 PI-48009 NRW NONE 51-1168867-0 P.3 LI-47001 NRW NONE El-1168867-0 P.17

((p.

LI-48403 NSW NONE 51-1168867-0 P.19 XI-00003 NIS XI-00006 F2,5. 03 -6/11 XI-00001 NIS.

XI-00002 N15.03-6/11 INCORE TC'S RCS S1B INCORES I-51 SH 14/0 PT-21038 RCS PT-21040 N15.03-9/4 FI-23805 SIM H2SFA-11 N15.07-76/4 H2SFA-6 SIM FI-23805 N15.07-76/4 P-9051 SFS P-9052 I-53 SH 1/3 LT-21503B RCS LT-21503C N15.07-61/9 LIK-21503 RCS L-110 N15.07-61/9 P-261A DHS P-261B E-203 SH 3/10 1

l 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEP 3.14 I

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED l

(;

51-1169097-01 Page 86 of 132 September 17, 1987 l.

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j L.-.-.

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BUS S1A lAE '

l 4.

SUMMARY

OF~ BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO REDUNDANT ' INDICATION IS 'AVAILABLE FOR SEVERAL. DHS, NRW I

AND NSW) INDICATIONS

' LISTED..ABOVE (PI-48009, LI-47001, LI-48403)..

HOWEVER,' REDUNDANT TRAINS FOR.THESE SYSTEMS ARE' AVAILABLE, WITH THE LOSS OF THIS BUS. AND NO DEVIATION IS-

. REQUIRED FROM B4, E.01 AND E.02.

LOSS 'OF'THIS BUS WILL RESULT IN' LOSS'OF TOTAL SEAL INJECTION' FLOW ON FI-23606.

INDIVIDUAL SEAL INJECTION ' FLOW FOR EACH LOOP'IS STILL AVAILABLE WHICH IS POWERED FROM NNI-X.

LOSS > OF ' THIS BUS MAY RESULT IN. LOSS OF PRESSURIZER LEVELL CONTROL' IF LT-21503B

.IS BEING UTILIZED TO CONTROL-PRESSURIZER LEVEL.:

SWITCHOVER TO LT-21503C FOR PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL IS'AVAILABLE BUT IS NOT AUTOMATIC.

VALVE WILL GO OPEN ON LOSS OF LEVEL INDICATION PT-21038 :. PROVIDES RCS PRESSURE INPUT'TO PRESSURIZER HEATER CONTROL.

LOSS OF THIS PRESSURE SIGNAL IF SELECTED WILL CAUSE THE HEATERS TO REMAIN ENERGIZED.

THE REDUNDANT 1 PRESSURE SIGNAL' (PT-21040)' WHICH IS POWERED FROM BUS S1B' MUST MANUALLY BE-SELECTED WITH PATCH PLUGS IN. THE RPS CABINET.. DURING PLANT'COOLDOWN, THE PRESSURIZER HEATERS ARE SECURED.

PROCEDURES.SHOULD BE REVISED TO INCLUDE. SECURING.

O@

THE HEATERS IF THIS BUS IS LOST (EMERGENCY HEATERS ARE POWERED FROM SEPARATE POWER SUPPLIES-AND WILL STILL BE

, AVAILABLE) 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION-H2ES-015 VITAL PWR BUS 1A TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE

- NO IMPACT, ON. PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW 'AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO TH3 PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

4 51-1169097-00 Page 87 of 132 August 31, 1987 i,

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1 TABLE'3-BUS S1A2-1 4

3 POWER SUPPLY'-FAILURE EVALUATION

&l

/1.

EQWER SUPPLIES FAILED = POWER SUPPLY:. BUS S1A2-1'

-CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSOcFAIL:

SEE BUS S1A 2.-

EQUIPMENT LOSSES 4

EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP

-REFERENCE P-811; FWS PI-20519B-I-51 SH 4/4~.

-P-810, FWS PI-20520B I 51 SH 4/4-L-139 FWS LI-20501 I-51 SH 5/4.

PV-20571A,B,C MSS.

PV-20562A,B,C E-205 SH 45/3 INCORE TC'S.

RCS.

ALT FEED INCORES -(S1B2-1)

EFIC-A.

FWS.

EFIC-B,C,D.

E-108 SH 12/12 EFIC TIE A

'FWS EFIC TIE B E-108 SH 12/12 FV-20525 FWS-FV-20515 M-532~SH 1 FV-20526 FWS HV-20516.

M-532 SH 1 FV-20575' FWS.

HV-20515 M-532 SH 1 FV-20576 FWS HV-20516 M-532.SH 1

'y FV-20527, FWS FV-20531 EFIC A v

FV-20528 FWS FV-20532 EFIC A P-810 FWSJ PI-20520B I-51 SH-4/4

^

L-140

.FWS LI-20502 I.51 SH 5/4-l FI-26049A DHS NONE I-51-SH 15/1 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS' CAUSING.' DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED-4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS ~ FAILURE RESULT @,

NO DEVIATION:FROM PROCEDURES B.4, E.01 AND E.02 REQUIRED o

I' 51-1169097-00 Page 88 of 132 August 31, 1987 L %.

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>t 4

1

' I BUS S1A2-1 I

jt Ei NOTE

,4 FIE26049A IS DECAY" HEAT.' TRAIN CROSS-TIE FLOW "B TO A" INDICATION.

.THIS, CROSS-TIE LINE IS.ONLY REQUIRED DURING ACCIDENT. SCENARIOS.

SINCE THE "B"

TRAIN' FEEDS THE:"A" TRAIN, POWER FOR THIS FLOW INDICATION'SHOULD BE FROM THE BUS FEEDING THE "B"

TRAIN INSTRUMENTATION.

.THIS IS NOT PRESENTLY' THE ' CASE.

THE SAME~IS TRUE FOR CROSSATIE-FLOW "A TO'B" INDICATION'ON BUS'S1B2-1.

-l 5.

BUS' FAILURE INDICATION f

IDADS

- Z-1306.,- S1A2-1 AC PANEL.BKR' E-1357 S1A2-1 PANEL. VOLTAGE' N.9TZ

.THIS BUS POWERS MUX.7 THROUGH WHICH THESE POINTS ARE~

PROCESSED 6.

EFFECT OF. BUS FAILURE 4

NO IMPACT ON PLANT PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

O 4

d I

I 51-1169097-00 Page 89 of 132 August 31, 1987 h-

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TABLE 3-BUS SlB

- POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S1B CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUS SlB2-1 WILL

.ALSO BE LOST IF FAILURE OCCURS IN BYPASS SWITCH H8TB4 OR 4

CABLES CONNECTING THIS SWITCH TO BREAKER H8TB5 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE FI-26004 DHS NONE N15.07-80/5 LI-20502 FWS L-140 N15.07-69/8 LI-20503A FWS LI-20503B N15.07-69/8 LI-20504A FWS LI-20504B N15.07-69/8 PI-48010 NRW NONE 51-1168867-0 P.

2 LI-47002 NRW NONE 51-1168867-0 P.

18 LI-48404 NSW NONE 51-1168867-0 P.

20 h

XI-00006 NIS XI-00003 N15.03-16/9 XI-00002 NIS XI-00001 N15.03-16/9 HV-30801 FWS DUAL DRIVE E-107-2/7 I

P-319 l

INCORES NIS ALT FEED I-51 SH 14/0 I

SlA P-9052 SFS P-9051 I-53 SH 1/3 PT-21099 RCS NONE N23.01-100/6 H2SFA-ll SIM FI-23805 N15.07-76/4 f

FI-23808 SIM H2SFB-6 N15.07-76/4 PT-21040 RCS PT-21038 N15.03-19/4 P-261B DHS P-261A E-203 SH 3/10 LT-21503B RCS LT-21503C N15.07-61/9 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN' PROCEDURE i

PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEP 3.14 i

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED l

51-1169097-01 Page 90 of 132 September 17, 1987

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x -_ - _:a -

a

~

- I BUS SlB' l

e

. y 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS' FAILURE RESULTS-VARIOUS INSTRUMENTATION ON THE DHS,..

NRW,

'NSW' SYSTEMS (PI-48010,. LI-48414, LI-47002), IS UNAVAILABLE.- AFTER A - LOSS

. OF THIS BUS.

THE PLANT CAN STILL'BE. COOLED'DOWN WITH NORMAL

~

-COOLDOWN. PROCEDURE B.4 SINCE REDUNDANT ' DHS, - N R W '. A N D N S W TRAINS. EXIST WHICH'ARE NOT.AFFECTED-BY THE LOSS OF BUSeSlB.

' PT-21099; FEEDS DECAY' HEAT VALVE.~HV-20002l INTERLOCK.

IF THIS:

l BUS FAILS IT: WILL CLOSE VALVE HV-20002 RESULTING IN' A LOSS'-

OF'DHR' COOLING.

A VOLTAGE MONITOR HAS-BEEN-INSTALLED.WHICH-ALLOWS.THIS= SIGNAL ~TO BE BYPASSEDiAFTER;A BRIEF TIME-DELAY.

VALVE HV-20002 CAN-THEN'BE OPENED REMOTELY.

PT-21040. PROVIDES RCS PRESSURE INPUT TO PRESSURIZER H' EATER CONTROL.

LOSS OF THIS-PRESSURE SIGNAL IF SELECTED WILL' CAUSE THE HEATERS TO REMAIN ENERGIZED.

THL REDUNDANT PRESSURE SIGNAL (PT-21038) : WHICH IS POWERED FROM. BUS SlA

- MUST. MANUALLY BE SELECTED WITH PATCH PLUGS IN -THE RPS CABINET.

LOSS OF' THIS BUS MAY RESULT. IN. LOSS ' OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL '

CONTROL IF LT-21503C IS. BEING UTILIZED TO CONTROL PRESSURIZER LEVEL..

SWITCHOVER TO LT-21503B FOR PRESSURIZER

,e LEVEL CONTROL IS AVAILABLE BUT IS NOT AUTOMATIC.

VALVE WILL'

(

GO OPEN ON LOSS OF. LEVEL INDICATION 5.

- BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-032 VITAL PWR BUS 1B TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE No IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE' PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

51-1169097-00 Page 91 of 132 August 31, 1987 0

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___1__.__

TABLE 3-BUS S1B2-1 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES

-FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

S1B2-1

' CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

SEE BUS SlB

2 '.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE FI-26048A DHS NONE I-51 SH'15/1.

PV-20562A,B,C MSS PV-20571A,B,C-E-205 SH 45/3 EFIC-B FWS EFIC-A,C,D E-108 SH 12/12 INCORE TC'S RCS ALT FEED INCORES. (SlA2-1)

FV-20531 FWS HV-20527 E-107 SH 2/7 FV-20532 FWS HV-20528 E-107 SH 2/7 HV-20515 FWS HV-20529 E-105 SH 28/5 HV-20516 FWS HV-20530 E-105 SH 28/5 EFIC B TIE FWS EFIC A TIE E-108 SH 12/12 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE i

_ STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENTLOSS.CAUSINGDEVIATIONFROMPROCEDURN:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF' BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE B.4, E.01 OR E.02 REQUIRED I

NOTE FI 26048A IS DECAY HEAT TRAIN CROSS-TIE FLOW "A TO B" INDICATION.

THIS CROSS-TIE LINE IS ONLY-REQUIRED DURING ACCIDENT SCENARIOS.

POWER FOR THIS FLOW i~

INDICATION SHOULD BE FROM THE BUS FEEDING THE "A" TRAIN I

INSTRUMENTATION.

THIS IS NOT PRESENTLY THE CASE.

THE SAME IS TRUE FOR CROSS-TIE FLOW "A TO B" INDICATION ON BUS S1A2-1.

(

51-1169097-00 Page 92 of 132 August 31, 1987

(

[

s 1

1

'?'

., 1 BUS S1B2-1

. w l

3 5.

' BUS FAILURE INDICATION 1-IDADS

'Z-1318

-S1B2-1 AC PANEL BKR-E-1391 S1B2-1-PANEL VOLTAGE i

NOTE THIS ' BUS SUPPLIES POWER TO MUX.9 THROUGH WHICH THESE.

POINTS ARE' PROCESSED 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON: PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE l'

O 4

l i

i 1

51-1169097-00 Page 93 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

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l"IT.J* J. 6% *

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TABLE 3-BUS Sic POWER SUPPLY' FAILURE EVALUATION 4

n

. l..

POWER SUPPLIR$,;

FAILED. POWER SUPPLY: ~ Sic CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUS SlC2-1 WILL ALSO BE LOST IF: FAILURE OCCURS IN THE BYPASS SWITCH H8TC4 OR CABLES' CONNECTING THIS' SWITCH TO BREAKER H8TC5

.A 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-9035 RCS PR-21092-N23.01 43/2' i

PR-21037 RCS P014 N15.07-64/10 L-141 PLS LR-23502 I-51 SH3/5 P-811 FWS PI-20519B.

I-51 SH 4/4 P-810 FWS PI-20S20B I-51 SH 4/4-L-139 FWS LI-20501 I-51 SH 5/4 L-140 FWS LI-20502 I-51 SH 5/4 XI-00201 NIS XI-00202 N15.03-26/6 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE l STEPS'SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS BUS FAILURE RESULTS IN NO DEVIATION FROM B.4, E.01 OR E.02 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-049 VITAL PWR BUS 1C TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE

.NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

\\

I l'

(

51-1169097-00 Page 94 of 132 August 31, 1987 w.

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ess

.Ig.r in

~ - - - '

v.

s t

n.

' y TABLE,3-BUS.S1C2-1

..w

~,

.i 9;

A

~ POWER SUPPLY FAI, LURE' EVALUATION.

b

1.

POWER SUPPLIES 0 -a :

. FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BbS S1C2-1 n

1 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH'ALSO' FAIL:

-SEE' BUS S1C'

2 '.

- EQUIPMENT LOSSES f

EQUIPMENT-SYSTEM-BACKUP REFERENCE

.o EFIC-C FWS-EFIC-A,B,D.

E-108 SH.12/12

HV-20581

.FWS HV-20577 E-107:SHi2/5

, HV-20578 FWS HV-20582 E-107-SH 2/5 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE.

STEPS'SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSINGJDEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE' SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

~OF BUS' FAILURE RESULTS' l

NO DEVIATION FROM'B.4,-E.01 OR E.02 REQUIRED

.5.

-BUS' FAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1308

'S1C2-1 AC PANEL BKR.

E-1364 S1C2-1 PANEL VOLTAGE 4

6..

EFFECT'OF BUS' FAILURE

.)

-i NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE, 1

i g[

51-1169097-00 Page 95 of 132 August 31, 1987 v.. :.

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~ - -

.m v-

,aw,:.w,,.--,*-,.neo,,-

~~.,3 - ~ em n~r..

- ~ - - ~ + - ~ - - ~ - - - -

- ~ ' " '

• ' ^ * ' ' " ' *

' ' " ~ ^ * ^ ^ " " ~~

g _ _..,,.

.gg

.n aw s

~..~.n.+

__ - __r__ - _ _ - -_ _

~

- " - - - ' ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ ~ ' - ~.

- - Q :: ~ -^T_' ".T& '

M'm-

x

.c TABLE 3-BUS S1D POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION o

1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

SlD CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

BUS S1D2-1 WILL.

ALSO BE LOST IF THE FAILURE OCCURS IN BYPASS SWITCH H8TD4 OR CABLES CONNECTING THIS SWITCH TO BREAKER H8TD5 2.-

EQUIPMENT LOSSES e

EQUIPMENT SYSTEM-BACKUP REFERENCE XI-00202 NIS XI-00201 N15.03-26/6 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROQEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED: ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS l

NO DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE B.4, E.01 AND E.02 REQUIRED.

l l

5.

BUS FAILURE' INDICATION H2ES-066 VITAL PWR BUS 1D TROUBLE

'6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE J

NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

J 51-1169097-00 Page 96 of 132 August 31, 1987

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-*.w...-

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TABLE 3-BUS S1D2 ~

^;

5 POWER-SUPPLY. FAILURE ~ EVALUATION p.

1.

POWER SUPPLIE'S' FAILED POWER SUPPLY:, BUS'S1D2 CONNECTED: POWER' SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

SEE BUS S1D

2.:

EOUIPMENT LOSSES IEQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP.

REFERENCE'.

EFIC-D FWS EFICA,B,C

.E-108'SH 12/12 HV-20577 FWS HV-20581 E-107 SH 2/5.

-MV-20582 FWS HV-20578 E-107 SH 2/5 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:. ALL

)

DEVIATION'FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE-ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:: NONE REQUIRED

- 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO DEVIATION FROM B.4,.E.01 AND E.02 REQUIRED-

)

- 5 BUS FAILURE INDICATION l

IDADS Z-1300 S1D2-1 AC PANEL BKR l

E-1398 S1D2-1 PANEL -VOLTAGE l

1 6.-

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE j

(

l l

1 y

51-1169097-00 Page 97 of 132 August 31, 1987 j

1 I

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e r w-y n.-._ vax_ :A: r z.;

-s

~-

._______..N 2IC

'l

~ 2.Nl_____.

~ _ _

'^

TABLEL3-BUS S1E POWER SUPPLY FAILURE' EVALUATION

'1.

POWER SUPPLIES

-FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS S1E CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:. BUS.S1F CAN ALSO FAIL '~ IF A FAULT IN THE ~ S1EF : VOLTAGE'. REGULATOR. WILL DRAW-FAULT, CURRENT FROM MCC 2D1 FEED TO S1E AND C1F THROUGH BREAKERS CB1, CB2, CBB, AND CBI.

BECAUSE ALL FOUR OF THESE BREAKERS ARE, RATED TO TRIP AT THE SAME CURRENT LEVEL - (100

. AMPS)', THEY COULD TRIP. SIMULTANEOUSLY RESULTING IN A LOSS OF-S1E AND S1F.

22.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT

. SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE i

GV-1,2,3,4 MSS NONE E-201 SH_14/4

.TV-1,2,3,4 MSS NONE E-201 SH 14/4 TJR-06-14 PRT TI-21801 51-1168867 P.

9

~ TJR-06-12 NRW T753 51-1168867-0 P.

10 TJR-06-13 NRW T752 51-1168867-0 P.

11 PI-48009 NRW NONE' 51-1168867-0 s

P.'3 LI-47001 NRW

.H2SFA-07 51-1168867 P.

17

-LI-48403 USW H2SFA-12 51-1168867 P.

19 LI-48404 NSW H2SFB-12 51-1168867-0 P.

20 PI-36015 ASC PI-36013 I-53 SH 8/1 3.

qqLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE l

PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

E.02 STEPS 2.0 AND 5.0

-l I

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL-SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:-

TURBINE THROTTLE AND-GOVERNOR VALVES MUST-BE LOCALLY VERIFIED CLOSED.

AUXILIARY 1 STEAM HEADER' PRESSURE MUST BE LOCALLY CONTROLLED.

LOCAL VERIFICATION.OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY' STEAM RELIEF VALVES

.I 1:

IS. REQUIRED.

)

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

GV-1,2,3,4; TV-1,2,3,4; PI-36015; PI-36015, Z-1801 THROUGH Z-1829, PI-36015 51-1169097-00 Page 98 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

j b

s n_.._.---.

'- + - ' '

i

[,

BUS.SlE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS BUS FAILURE ' RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ALL TURBINE STOP AND GOVERNOR VALVES POSITION INDICATION.

VERIFICATION. IS REQUIRED BY E.02 STEP 2.0.

l AUXILIARY STEAM HEADER PRESSURE IS ALSO~ LOST WHICH REQUIRES LOCAL MANUAL' CONTROL.

'1 PI-48009 AND ' PI-48 010 INDICATE NUCLEAR SERVICE.. SPRAY POND PRESSURE IS. ALSO NOT AVAILABLE.

VISUAL VERIFICATION OF '

SPRAY POND ' SPRAY IS REQUIRED.

OTHER INDICATORE OF NRW SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ARE AVAILABLE HOWEVER THIS SYSTEM IS A'

SAFETY SYSTEM AND A SINGLE FAILURE SHOULD NOT REMOVE AN INDICATED. VARIABLE FROM BOTH TFAINS.

THE LOSS OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE INDICATION REQUIRES LOCAL VERIFICATION THAT ALL VALVES HAVE RESEATED OR ARE NOT LEAKING.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-083.

NON VITAL PWR BUS 1E/lF/lJ TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT Olt PLANT. SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE i

i l

I l

1 l

51-1169097-00 Page 99 of 132 August 31, 1987

.q

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--4

TABLE 3-BUS S1F POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SlF CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

SlE CAN ALSO FAIL IF A FAULT IN THE SlEF VOLTAGE REGULATOR DRAWS FAULT CURRENT FROM MCC 2D1 FEED TO S1E AND SlF THROUGH BREAKERS CB1, CB2, CBB, AND CBI.

BECAUSE ALL FOUR OF THESE BREAKERS ARE RATED TO TRIP AT THE SAME CURRENT LEVEL (100 AMPS), THEY COULD TRIP SIMULTANEOUSLY RESULTING IN A LOSS OF S1E AND'SlF.

2.

EQUIPMENT LOVEEE 1

EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE V-215L,M,U RCS ALT. CONTROL E-203 SH 45/10 S2A2 AND S2B2 i

PI-21801 PRT PI-21920 N15.07-82/10 TI-21801 PRT TJR-06-14 N15.07-82/10 PI-48010 NSW NONE 51-1168867-00 LI-47002 NRW H2SFB-07 51-1168867-00 PI-36015 ASC PI-36013 I-53 SH 8/l

...g Z-1801THRU29 MSS NONE 51-1169081-00 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

E.02 STEPS 2.0 AND 5.0 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

TURBINE THROTTLE AND GOVERNOR VALVES MUST BE LOCALLY VERIFIED CLOSED.

AUXILIARY STEAM HEADER PRESSURE MUST BE LOCALLY CONTROLLED LOCAL VERIFICATION OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVES.

i EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

GV-1,2,3,4; TV-1,2,3,4; PI-36015; PI-36015, Z-1801 THROUGH i

Z-1829, PI-36015 ALTERNATIVE SHUTLOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS BUS FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ALL TURBINE STOP AND GOVERNOR VALVES POSITION INDICATION.

VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED BY E.02 STEP 2.0.

51-1169097-01 Page 100 of 132 September 17, 1987 xa

- - = -

,e.;._...

.. ~.,. - - - - - - -.

,- - -- - ~ ~ -

"^

~~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

ww:..:2.,.t a. m.x m::n.w.. L:a=:smuss

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^ ~ ' " " ^ * "

~~~~ '~

~ ' ' '

• BUS S1F 1

- AUXILIARY STEAM' HEADER ~ PRESSURE IS ALSO LOST WHICH REQUIRES LOCAL MANUAL CONTROL.

PI-48009 AND PI-48010 INDICATE. NUCLEAR SERVICE ' SPRAY POND

- PRESSURE IS ALSO NOT AVAILABLE.

VISUAL VERIFICATION 'OF SPRAY POND. SPRAY IS REQUIRED.

OTHER - INDICATORS OF NRW SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ARE AVAILABLE HOWEVER THIS SYSTEM-IS A

- SAFETY SYSTEM AND ' A SINGLE FAILURE SHOULD NOT REMOVE AN' INDICATED VARIABLE FROM BOTH TRAINS..-

l THE LOSS OF MAIN AND AUXILIARY STEAM RELIEF VALVE INDICATION REQUIRES LOCAL VERIFICATION THAT ALL VALVES HAVE RESEATED OR

- ARE NOT LEAKING.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-083 NON VITAL PWR BUS 1E/1F/1J TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

i 51-1169097-00 Page 101 of 132 August 31, 1987

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L

.TABLEL3-BUS S1G-2 l

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION

1~. '

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED-POWER, SUPPLY:

BUS S1G-2 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO~ FAIL:

NONE 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT ~

SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE L110' RCS

.LIK-21503 I-51 SH 3/5

. L139 FWS LI-20501 I-51 SH 5/4 L140-FWS LI-20502 I-51 SH 5/4 T800 MSS TI-20541.

N15.07-69/8 T753-NRW TJR-06-12 51-1168867-0' P.

14

'l

. T752 NRW TJR-06-013 51-1168867-0 P.

13' I

P751 NSW H2SFA-22 E-107/22-P752 NSW H2SFB-22 E-107/22

- T067 FWS TI-20537 N15.07 SH 71/5-T095 DHS TI-26043 51-1168867-0 P.

5 Ils T096 DHS TI-26044-51-1168867-0 f

P. 6 i

L141 PLS LR-23502 I-51 SH 3/5 j

T051THRU65 FWS NONE E-108 SH 1/19' I

P-811 FWS PI-20519B I-51 SH 4/4 P-810 FWS PI-20520B I-51 SH 4/4

- R7000,1 RMS R-500 I-53 SH 22/0 q

3.

' COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEP 3.17 DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF OTSG j

SHELL TEMPERATURE.

1 k

EQUIPMENT. LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

OTSG SHELL

]

TEMPERATURE INDICATORS T051 THROUGH T065 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

PLANT STABILIZED UNTIL POWER-IS l

RESTORED TO THE' BUS OR SHELL TEMPERATURE IS AVAILABLE.

I

)

t 51-1169097-00 Page 102 of 132

' August 31, 1987 1

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_d,w m c-%,,,

a,,#,,,

3

.,%u.,u.,,

,a

,,,m,,

r BUS S1G. T I'

.,).

4.-

SUMMARY

"OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS' DUE TO TEMPERATURE RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRIMARY ~AND' SECONDARY SIDE-OF THE. OTSG'S, ' OTSG SHELL TEMPERATURE. MUST BE' l

AVAILABLE.

THIS REQUIRES EITHER-' RESTORING POWER TO'THE BUS 1

OR INSTALLING TEMPORARY TEMPERATURE INDICATION.

o 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION

.H2WC-13 INVERTER FAILURE 6.

EFFECT'OF BUS FAILURE.

~

THE ABILITY.To' ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS-AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE.WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT' WHILE POWER IS RESTORED' TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE ' POWER IS MADE. AVAILABLE WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOPs O

I 51-1169097-00 Page 103 of 132 August 31, 1987 1

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1y

.,...,,_.m.,.

,_y,

_.,q y

T8

• =+--==w-

.-,4

.-m

3

.,g JN

' h.

'\\

i i

\\

TABLE 3-BUS SlGA-1 j

" POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES s

i FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SlGA-i 1

CbMNECTED POWER SUPPLIES,WHICH ALSO FAIL \\BCS SlJ

<J J

2.

EOUIPMENT Jf,jg.Eg j

i EQUIPMENT I

SYSTEM rACKUP REFERENCE L 1$0 RCS LIK-21503 I-51 SH 3/5 f

\\

L-141-PLS

!Jt-73502 I-51 SH 3/5 s

3.

g@D SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B 24 STEF[4.5; E.02 STEP 16.0

\\

i c

1 DEVIATION FROM NORMAIJ SHUTDC/4N PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS h,'

f i

t

}

{

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION 7GOM PROCEDURE: ' LV-36007, LV-36507, E-360, E-365

i s

i ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE RCQUIRED l'

4.

jip]gIARY OF BUS FAILUREJtESULTS 5'

' g(.

t-4 ALL. IDENTIFIED EQ1TIPMENT POWERED F.! TOM BUS SlGA-1 IS REDUNDANT, l

THE RESULTING LOSS OF BUS SlJ CAUSES A LOSG OF THE AUXILIARY BOILERS.,

THIS CAN RESULT IN EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM l

THE PRIMARY TO THE SECONDARY PLANT. DURING PERIODS OF LOW j

DECAY HEAT. GENERATION.

5.

BUS FAILUj L TypJCATION 4'

x \\

j IDADS Z-1312 SlGA-1 AC PANEL BKR e'

l E-1368 SlGA-1 PANEL VOLTAGE 3

NOTE S1GA-1 POWERS H4CDAR8 (MUX.8)

THROUGH WHICH ABOVE POINTS ARE PROCESSED

]

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE i

NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS, HOM:VER, REVIEh' AuP<

j POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

3 i

?

51-1169097-00 Page 104 of 132 August 31, 1987 1

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a

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=.= y

{t 1

i g3 T'

,9 G.,

,. TABLE 13-BUS S1GB-1 M'

49, g.'

.,{

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE ~ EVALUATION q%

- w a;

4'

4. :

POWER SUPPLIES

% 7

]

FAILED POWER' SUPPLY:

, Q- 0

=

> BUS S1GB-1 s-o 1 CONNECTED-POWER l SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE a

EOUIPMENT LOSSES

~

K 2.o '

3.yf7g-

?{. -

..,a

-' SYSTEM-

-BACKUP-

. REFERENCE EQUIPMENT-

.,,[

yys NONE.

.51-1169081-00 Z-1801 THR9'29 MSS..

.1 o

y 3.E i COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE l

h PROBLE PROCEDURE-STEPS IDENTIFIED:

E.02' STEP 5.O

lg

+

3

,. f. '

DEVIATIONFFROM' NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS.0F MAIN-AND..

.j m/-

' AUXILIARY ' STEAM RELIEF VALVE ' POSITION INDICATION REQUIRES

'1

,, w

. MANUAL' VERIFICATION' THAT.NO VALVES ARE LEAKING.

OTHER 1

!P INFORMATI.ON. SUCH. AS STEAM' GENERATOR PRESSURE CAN BE USED BY l

THE OPERATOR ' TO DETERMINE WHETHER ' A ' VALVE 'HAS FAILED TO f rp3; RESEAT,ECR ISiLIAKING.

kN iEQUIPMENT. LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION - FROM. PROCEDURE:

MAIN AND

' AUXILIARY L STEAM. RELIEF VALVE POSITION-INDICATION (Z-1801

%eom

.THROUGH Z 1829) by*f, i"'

ALTERNATIVE SHU'"DOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED.

ONCE. THE 5,I' OPERATOR 5

IS ASSURED ~ THAT NO LEAKING SAFETY VALVES EXIST y

COOLDOWN.WILL BE PER PROCEDURE B.4.

4.

fdDDEGY OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS LODS OF. POSITION INDICATION FOR MAIN AND AUXILIARY-STEAM l RE11IEF VALVES'. REQUIRES LOCAL VERIFICATION OF VALVE

'i POSITION.

4 5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION IDADS.

Z-1313 S1GB-1 AC PANEL BKR E-1369 StGB-1 PANEL VOLTAGE H,QTI:.

S1GB-1~ POWERS MUX.10 THROUGH WHICH THESE POINTS ARE ANNUNCIATED.

h 6..

EFFECT OF BtJS FAILURE y

NO IMPACT ON' PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE

- (.

.t

,l[51-1169097-00 Page 105 of 132 August 31, 1987 A.

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e n.+;mw.-

,-~ ~ -

n.

.mU in

'ww

_________.____er__

.~.a..

TABLE.3-BUS SlJ J

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATTON 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY: ' BUS S1J CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE LV-36007 ASC NONE M33.01-121/3 LV-36507 ASC NONE M33.01-121/3 E-360 ASC NONE E-108 SH 2/23 E-365 ASC NONE E-108 SH 2/23 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE I

PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEP 4.5; E.02 STEP 16.O DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEOURE:

ALL EQUIPMENT LISTED ABOVE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF THE ABOVE IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT RESULTS IN A LOSS OF CONTPOL OF THE AUXILIARY BOILERS.

DURING LOW DECAY HEAT GENERATION, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM

{

THE PRIMARY TO THE SECONDARY PIANT EXISTS

{

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-083 NON VITAL PWR BUS lE/1F/lJ TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAIIA7.EE I

NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED 1

l 1

r 51-1169097-00 Page 106 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

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.____.....-..2

..2._.._

.mw.

..,i.,--...

m.%

~ ~ ~ ~ ~... _... _ _ _ _

~" E ~

_ \\

~ = ~ ~ ' ~ ' "

~

i TABLE 3-BUS SIN 1-1 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SIN 1-1 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-9035 RCS PR-21092 N23.01 SH 43/2 T-9017 RCS TI-21023A N15.07-63SH 1/7 T-9016 RCS TI-21024A N15.07-63SH 1/7 LI-20503B FWS LI-20503A N15.07-69/8 LI-20504B FWS LI-20504A N15.07-69/8 PV-20561, 63 MSS ALT. CONTROL E-108/12 PV-20564, 66 MSS FROM NNI E-108/12 T-9011 RCS TI-21031A N15.07-62/7 T-9010 RCS TI-21032A N15.07-62/7 R-7000 RMS R-500 I-53 SH 22/0 R-7001 RMS R-500 I-53 SH 22/0 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS TURBINE BYPASS VALVES ARE REGULARLY CONTROLLED FROM THE ICS.

NNI-X, NNI-Y, NNI-Z, AND ICS POWER ARE ALL REQUIRED FOR THIS CONTROL.

NNI AND ICS NORMAL AND STANDBY POWER SOURCES ARE DERIVED FROM SlGB-1 AND SlJ RESPECTIVELY.

BUS SIN 1-1 IS AN ALTERNATE POWER FOR THE TBVs AND SUFPLIES POWER TO THE TURBINE BYPASS VALVES ONLY WHEN ICS POWER IS NOT AVAILABLE.

THE LOSS OF THIS BUS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF BOTH STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORS.

THE OPERATOR USES THESE INDICATORS TO AID IN DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAS A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE IN SECTION 5.0 OF E.02.

IF THESE INDICATIONS ARE NOT AVAILABLE THERE WILL BE NUMEROUS OTHER INDICATIONS THAT EXCESSIVE PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKAGE EXISTS 51-1169097-00 Page 107 of 132 August 31, 1987 WD.4 e e mummew + 3m.we<m**

• i',

f l,

BUS SIN 1-1 l

l:

.i 5.-

RUS FAILURE INDICATION-IDADS-Z-1300' S1N1-1 AC PANEL BKR I

E-1332 SIN 1-1 PANEL VOLTAGE-l l.

NOTE j

BUS SIN 1-1 ~ POWERS MUX.4-' THROUGH WHICH THESE POINTS ' ARE

/

PROCESSED.

1 l'

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PIANT SHUTDOWK PROCEDURE l

i V

i i

O i

51-1169097-00 Page 108 of 132 August 31, 1987 e

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M

=,49-$

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-m-4 he nehee.*_.gp.

q-

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m

,.4 i

.-c.-

.. ~....... -... -. _ - - - -

-.., ~._ - -....-

mr_rr_ u'_: :r___.

e~~~~-

~ ~ - - --:~~

'-~

~ - -

---

- - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ '

TABLE 3-BUS SOA

.c POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOA I

CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.-

' EQUIPMENT LOSSES

' EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE SFV-46014 CCW NONE E-203 SH 87/9 SH 87A/2 SFV-46204 CCW NONE E-203 SH 86C/1 P-238A SIM P-238B E-203.SH 4/16 P-236(ALT)

SIM P-236 E-203 SH 2A/2 ALT FEED P-261A DHS P-261B E-203 SH 3/10 P-482A NSW P-482B E-203 SH 43/12 SFV-46906 CCW(CRD)

CHANNEL"B" E-203 SH 87B/3 SFV-46908 CCW(CRD)

CHANNEL"B" E-203 SH 86B/2 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE

.tt STEPS SUCCESSFULLY CO'MPLETED

ALL r

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE':

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL CCW ISOLATION VALVES REQUIRE THE LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE POWER SUPPLY TO GO CLOSED AND ISOLATE CCW.

ALL OTHER EQUIPMENT IS ON A SYSTEM WITH REDUNDANT TRAINS.

THE LOSS OF THIS BUS WILL NOT RESULT IN DEVIATION FROM B.4 E.01 OR E.02 PROCEDURES.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-017 125V DC BUS FAILURE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE

]

l 51-1169097-00 Page 109 of 132 August 31, 1987 A

p@h64 mA ndObt--

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---e..y-,e-A g,..gm.g y,,,

m_._..

- ~~=

im m wr-=.

-~

~ ~ -,---

TABLE 3-BUS SOA2-1 POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOA2-1 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE NO EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS SOA2-1 IS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1307 SOA2 DC PANEL BKR E-1358 SOA2 PANEL VOLTAGE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE i

i 51-1169097-00 Page 110 of 132 August 31, 1987

\\,

I

+yu

~

y m

l" TABLE ' 3 -BUS SOB '

.r -

m POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION l '.

POWER SUPPLIEl FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOB CONNECTED POWER' SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE, 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P-238B SIM P-238A

'E-203 SH 4A/O P-236 SIM ALT FEED

'E-203'SH'2/14 BUS SOA P-261B DHS P-261A-E-203.SH 3/10 P-482B NSW P-482A E-203 SH 43/12.

SFV-24013 CCW NONE E-203'SH-63/10 SFV-46908 CCW(CRD)

CHANNEL"A" E-203 SH 86B/2 SFV-24013-PLS NONE E-203 SH'63/10 u

SFV-22009 PLS NONE E-203.SH 62/8 SFV-46204 CCW NONE E-203 SH 86/8' SFV-46014.

CCW NONE E-203 SH 87A/2

~

<SH 87/9-SFV-46906 CCW(CRD)-

NONE E-203 SH 87C/5 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM' STEPS IDENTIFIED:

E.02 STEP 6.0 l

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SSIUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

LOSS OF LETDOWN FLOW.

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

SFV-22009 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS 3

)

CCW ISOLATION VALVES REQUIRE ' MORE THAN ONE POWER SOURCE FAILURE TO RESULT IN AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF THE. VALVE THEREFORE THE FAILURE ' OF THIS BUS WILL NOT RESULT IN THE

' ISOLATION'OF CCW TO THE RCP'S.

LETDOWN ISOLATION '(SFV-22009) ~, IF IT OCCURS AFTER A LOSS OF THIS BUS, IS COVERED IN E.02 STEP 6.0.

THE OPERATOR IS INSTRUCTED IN THIS STEP TO CLOSE SFV-22009 IF LETDOWN CANNOT BE CONTROLLED AT 40 GPM.

LETDOWN CAN BE RESTORED EITHER BY LOCAL CONTROL OR BY RESTORING POWER TO THE BUS.

51-1169097-00 Page 111 of 132 Aucfast 31, 1987 s

s

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l

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7 g.

g._-..

-L-..--__-----....---

~

~

~ ~ '

^~ ~

~~'

i. ;

BUS' SOB-5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-033 125V DC BUS B' TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IS AFFECTED.

THE PLANT CAN REMAIN STABLE WITH, AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT. WHILE POWER IS RESTORED TO THE BUS OR ALTERNATE POWER IS MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT USING ANY OTHER EOPs.

i i

I I

i i

l 51-1169097-00 Page 112 of 132 August 31, 1987

(.

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77*

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w.

9

'E~ T.

____.___J_E__

__T'-~^

" - ~

- ~ ~

L, 3

TABLE 3-BUS SOB 2-l'

' POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION

-.1.

' POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOB 2-1

" CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH-ALSO FAIL:

NONE l;

I' 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES l

EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE-l L

FV-20531 FWS FV-20527 E-107 SH.2/7 FV-20532 FWS-FV-20528 E-107 SH 2/7

- 3.

COLD-SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE-STEPS:SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL l

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE-EQUIPMENT' LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE-SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4..

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT. POWERED FROM BUS ' SOB 2-1 IS REDUNDANT.

S '.

BUS._.FAILURF INDICATION IDADS Z-1319' SOB 2 DC PANEL BKR

' E-1392-SOBE PANEL VOLTAGE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILUBE NO IMPACT.ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 51-1169097-00 Page 113 of 132 August 31, 1987 t'n

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1___ __

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TABLE 3-BUS SOC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOC CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE SFV-23809 SIM SFV-23810 E-203 SH 50E/2 SFV-23811 SIM SFV-23812 E-203 SH 50H/2 SFV-23604 SIM LV-21503 E-203 SH 49/11 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE fr ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF HPI INJECTION VALVES WILL NOT PREVE;'T THE 9LANT FROM ACHIEVING COLD SHUTDOWN.

EVEN IF HPI IS REQUIRED DURING THE COOLDOWN, TWO REDUNDANT INJECTION FLOW PATHS STILL EXIST INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

THESE VALVES COULD ALSO BE MANUALLY OPENED IF NECESSARY.

SFV-23604 IS NORMALLY OPEN AND WOULD REMAIN OPEN AFTER A LOSS OF THIS BUS.

SEAL INJECTION WOULD NOT BE TERMt"NATED.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-050 125V DC BUS C TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 51-1169097-00 Page 114 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

i

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TABLE 3-BUS SOC 2-1 3

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE-EVALUATION 1.

= POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOC 2-1 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.-

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE HV-20581-FWS HV-20577 E-107 SH 2/5-HV-20582-FWS HV-20578 E-107 SH 2/5 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL I

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED l

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS NO DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURES B.4, E. 01 AND E,02 REQUIRED.

ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS SOC 2-1 IS REDUNDANT.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1309 SOC 2 DC PANEL BKR E-1365 SOC 2 PANEL VOLTAGE I

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE i

l I

{

i l

51-1169097-00 Page 115 of 122 August 31, 1987 l

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==s 1

TABLE 3-BUS SOD POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOD CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE j

l 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES i

EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE SFV-23810 SIM SFV-23809 E-203 SH 50F/3 SFV-23812 SIM SFV-23811 E-203 SH 50H/2 l

3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE: NONE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS FAILURE OF THIS BUS RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF TWO OF THE FOUR HPI VALVES.

HPI, IF REQUIRED, CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE OTHER TWO VALVES.

FOR THIS BUS ANALYSIS NO ACCIDENTS t

ARE ASSUMED TO OCCUR AND THEREFORE HPI IS NOT ASSUMED IN ADDITION, THE VALVES CAN BE MANUALLY OPENED IF REQUIRED.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-067 125V DC BUS D TROUBLE l

i 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE l

I s

l l

l l

51-1169097-00 Page 116 of 132 August 31, 1987 l

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TABLE 3-BUS SOD 2-1 4

PCMii SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.1 POWER SUPPLIES FAILED POWER' SUPPLY:

. BUS SOD 2-1 CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE

-2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES-EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE HV-205'77 FWS HV-20581 E-107 SH'2/5 HV-20578 FWS HV-20582-E-107 SH 2/5.

3.

COLD SHUTDOt3F PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE l

EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN. PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BQS FAILURE RESULTS NO DEVIATION FROM B.4, E.01 AND E.02 REQUIRED.

ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUS SOD 2-1 IS' REDUNDANT.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1321 SOD 2 DC PANEL BKR E-1399 SOD 2 PANEL VOLTAGE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAITflRE NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE i

l l

51-1169097-00 Page 117 of 132 August 31, 1987

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TABLE 3-BUS GOE POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED' POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOE l

CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.

EQUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE H2PSA-62 PRT LI-21905A 51-1168866-0 SH 13 H2PSA-62 PRT LI-21905A 51-1168866-0 SH 13 H2SFA-07 NRW LI-47001 51-1168866-0 SH 17 H2SFB-07 NRW LI-47002 51-1168866-0 SH 18 H2SFA-12 NSW LI-48403 51-1168866-0 SH 17 I

H2SFB-12 NSW LI-48404 51-1168866-0 SH 18 H2SFA-22 NSW P751 51-1168866-0 SH 17

/F'Js N2SFB-22 NSW P752 51-1168866-0 kik$

SH 18 TV-46012A,B PCW NONE E-203 SH 34/9 P-210A,B,C,D RCS NONE E-203 SH 1/16, (AC AND DC LIFT OIL PUMPS) 1A'/10, 1B/6, 1C/2 l

P-425A,B,C PCW NONE E-206 SH 1/5 P-462A,3 CCW NONE E-203 SH 41/7 2-402A,B,C,D MCW NONE E-206 SH 3/8 l

P-351A,B,C MCM NONE E-205 SH 2/13, 2A/2, 2B/3 I

P-807 LOS P-809 E-201 SH 3/6 C-900A,B,C SAS EMERGENCY E-206 SH 4/6 DIESEL i

COMPRESSOR PSV-21511 RCS NONE E-203 SH 65/12 i

P-317A,B FWS NONE H2SFA-11 SIM FI-23805 N15.07-76/4 H2SFA-6 SIM FI-23808 N15.07-76/4 K-307A,B FWS NONE E-201 SH 31/19, 31A/3 P-371A ASC NONE E-206 SH 2/9 P-371B ASC NONE E-206 SH 2/9 A-366 ASC NONE E-206 SH 5/5 i

A-361 ASC NONE E-206 SH 12/5 l

i 51-1169097-00 Page 118 of 132 August 31, 1987 i

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=

. = = = = = = =. =:.,.-.=

=

-e

. BUS SOE b>

. 3 '..

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS' IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 4.24,.5.10,'5.28; E.02

. STEPS;10.0,.16.0

(

' DEVIATION-FROM NORMAL ~ SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

PRESUMED LOSS OF

' R C S,,. ' C C W, ! PCW,. MCM, AND MCW PUMPS RESULTS INL NATURAL:

CIRCULATION:COOLDOWN AND LOSS.OF LETDOWN..

o THE LOSS. OF ' THIS BUS RESULTS IN. A LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FEED <

' PUMPS'WHICH WILL INITIATE EFIC AND AFW

- AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF> PLANT LOADS. TO THE^ STARTUP.

- TRANSFORMERSLWILL NOT OCCUR IF LOSS OF THIS BUS OCCURS PRIOR TO A PLANT TRIP.

THE LOSS. OF THE. EMOV - ( PSV-21511). WILL s PREVENT - THE ' LTOP 1

' SYSTEM FROM! FUNCTIONING.

THE LOSS' OF ' ALL AIR COMPRESSORS REQUIRES THAT THE EMERGENCY

' DIESEL' AIR COMPRESSOR' START.

.j

'THE LOSS OF THE AUX BOILER ' DRAFT FANS. AND BOILER FEED PUMP I

CONTROLS RESULTS IN THE LOSS:OF BOTH AUXILIARY BOILERS' EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING' DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

RCP'S P-210A,B,C,D;'

P-425A,B,C;-

P-462A,B; TV-46012A,B; P-317A,B;.PSV-21511;'P-402A,B,C,D; P-351A,B,C;

. J P-402A,B,C,D; K-307A,6; P-371A,'B;- A-361,366' l

d ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN.

1 4

THIS IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL COOLDOWN AND IS COVERED IN B.4

-STEP 6.0 l

4.-

SUMMARY

OF BUS' FAILURE RESQLTS, 1

l

.THE LOSS OF BUS SOE RESULTS IN A PLANT TRIP DUE TO THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER.

PLANT INSTRUMENTATION IS ALSO LOST FOR THELREACTOR COOLANT PUMPS, THE CCW,: PCW, MCW, AND MCM PUMPS WHICH REQUIRES THAT RCS COOLDOWN BE VIA NATURAL CIRCULATION.

THE LOSS'OF CCW WILL RESULT IN.A LOSS'OF LETDOWN.

)

1 "A FAILURE OF THIS BUS ALSO PREVENTS AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF w

PLANT: LOADS' TO THE STARTUP TRANSFORMERS IF THE BUS LOSS I

OCCURS PRIOR TO A PLANT TRIP.

POWER TO BOTH AC AND DC LIFT OIL PUMP CONTROLS IS LOST.

1 l

y 51-1169097-00 Page 119 of 132 August 31, 1987 r

1 1

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.._,--m.m.

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_._.#.-.~._

r/;

. BUS SOE

-r:

UNLESS THE EMERGENCY ' DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR STARTS ~THE LOSS

/

C OF i THIS. BUS WILL RESULT - IN A TOTAL LOSS. OF SERVICE AND

= INSTRUMENT ' AIR.

VERBAL INFORMATION :FROM' THE DISTRICT INDICATES THAT THE, DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR'WILL AUTO-START ON DECREASING SAS ' HEADER' PRESSURE AND HAS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY

.TO SUPPLY PLANT LOADS REQUIRED FOR.THE PLANT TO: ACHIEVE COLD n

. SHUTDOWN.

THE ' INABILITY OFJ THE ' LTOP SYSTEM TO FUNCTION REQUIRES THAT '

POWER BE-RESTORED:TO'THIS BUS'PRIORfTO' PLANT COOLDOWN BELOW

'350F BOTH CHANNEL'A AND B ANNUNCIATORS ARE LOST

.THE LOSS L OF BOTH AUXILIARY. BOILERS CAN. POSSIBLY RESULT IN.

EXCESSIVE HEAT TRANSFER FROM THE PRIMARY ' TO THE SECONDARY

! PLANT'DURING PERIODS OF LOW DECAY HEAT' GENERATION.

5..

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-084 '125V DC BUS E TROUBLE.

E.QTE BUS -SOE: POWERS: ANNUNCIATORS WHICH ANNUNCIATE THE LOSS

.OF' BUS SOE.

6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE h.

No ~ IMPACT ON' PLANT MODIFICATIONS,. HOWEVER,,

REVIEW AND POSSIBLE CHANGEG TO THE PROCEDURES ARE.NEEDED.

I

(

51-1169097-00 Page 120 of 132 August 31, 1987

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m2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

= - m __.

TABLE 3-BUS SOF POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER' SUPPLIES I

i FAILED POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SOF CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

NONE 2.

EOUIPMENT LOSSES EQUIPMENT SYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE FV-23004B PLS-BWS-040 E-203 SH 51/12 l

3.

HQLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PROBLEM STEPS IDENTIFIED:

B.4 STEPS 4.25, 4.28.6 L

DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

BORON INJECTION DIRECTLY INTO MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION LINE EQUIPMENT LOSS CAUSING DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

FV-23004B l

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH:

BORON INJECTION DIRECTLY INTO THE MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION LINE VIA MANUAL VALVES.

4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS IF THE LOSS OF THIS BUS RESULTS IN THE INABILITY TO INJECT BORON FROM THE CONCENTRATED BORIC ACID TANK INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM USING THE NORMAL BATCH CONTROL METHOD, THE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO INJECT BORON DIRECTLY INTO THE RCS VIA MAKEUP PUMP SUCTION LINE.

THIS METHOD REQUIRES THE USE OF LOCAL MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION H2ES-101 125V DC BUS F TROUBLE 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILUBE NO IMPACT ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS,

HOWEVER, REVIEW AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED.

51-1169097-00 Page 121 of 132 August 31, 1987 L

..=..:

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1__

=-

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i J.

TABLE 3-BUS SON 1 l.,

POWER SUPPLY FAILURE EVALUATION 1.

POWER SUPPLIES FAILED' POWER SUPPLY:

BUS SON 1

-CONNECTED POWER SUPPLIES WHICH ALSO FAIL:

SIN 1-1 2.-

EQUIPMENT LOSSES

' EQUIPMENT LSYSTEM BACKUP REFERENCE P869-A LOS P868-A,B E201 SH.29/12 P869-B LOS' P868-C,D E201 SH 29A/2 P809 LOS P807 E201 SH 2/8 3.

COLD SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE STEPS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED:

ALL DEVIATION FROM NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE:

NONE EQUIPMENT ~ LOSS CAUSING. DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE:

NONE~

l ALTERNATIVE' SHUTDOWN PATH:

NONE REQUIRED 4.

SUMMARY

OF BUS FAILURE RESULTS l

No DEVIATION FROM B.4, E.01 AND E.02 REQUIRED.

ALL IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT POWERED FROM BUSSES SON 1 AND SIN 1-1 IS REDUNDANT.

5.

BUS FAILURE INDICATION IDADS Z-1301' SON 1 DC PANEL BKR E-1333 SON 1 PANEL VOLTAGE j

j 6.

EFFECT OF BUS FAILURE.

NO IMPACT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1

1 I

l I

51-1169097-00 Page 122 of 132 August 31, 1987 s.

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TABLE 4 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION REFERENCE I

A-361 AUX. BOILER DRAFT FAN E-206 SH.12/5 l

l A-366 AUX. BOILER DRAFT FAN E-206 SH.5/5 A-874A F. P. T. LO RES. VAPOR EXTR+

E-201 SH.35/9 A-874B F. P. T. LO RES. VAPOR EXTR.

E-201 SH.35/9 C-900A SERVICE AIR COMPRESSOR E-206 SH.4/6 C-900B SERVICE AIR COMPRESSOR E-206 SH.4/6 C-900C SERVICE AIR COMPRESSOR E-206 SH.4/6 E-360 AUXILI ARIES AUX. BOILER E-206 SH.34B/2 E-365 AUXILI ARIES AUX.EOILER E-206 SH.34/12 E-870A F. P. TURB. LUB E O. RES. HTS E-201 SH.35/9 E-870B F.P.TURB. LUBE O.RES. HTS E-201 SH.35/9 EFIC B E-108 SH.12/12 DCN40 EPIC C E-108 SH.12/12 DCN40 EPIC D E-108 SH.12/12 DCN40 EPIC TIE A E-108 SH.12/12 DCN40 EFIC TIE B E-108 SH.12/12 DCN4 0 i

EPIC-A E-108 SH.12/12 DCN40 FI-23606 RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW N15.07-74.2 FI-23805 H.P.I. FLOW LOOP"A" N15.07-76/4

. UW FI-23808 H.P.I. FLOW LOOP"B" N15.07-76/4 FI-26003 DEC AY HT CLR " A"OU T. FLOW N15.07-80/15 FI-26004 DECAY H. COOLER"B"OUT.FL.

N15.07-80/5 FI-26048A DECAY H. CROSSTIE" A"TO"B" I-51 SH.15 FI-26049A DECAY H. CROSSTIE"B"TO"A" i-51 sh.15 FV-20526 M.STM FAIL.F.W.ISOL.

EFIC"A" FV-20527 AUX. F.W. TO S/G-A EFIC"A" PV-20528 AUX. F.W. TO S/G-B EFIC"A" FV-20531 AU X. F.W. TO S/G-A EFIC"B" FV-20532 AU X. F. W. TO S/G-B EPIC"B" FV-20575 M.STM FAIL.F.W.ISOL.

EFIC"A" FV-20575 M.STM FAIL.F.W.ISOL.

EFIC"A" FV-20576 M.STM FAIL.F.W.ISOL.

EFIC"A" FV-23004 MAKE-UP TK BORATING VLV E-203 SH.51/12 FV-36060 AU X. BOILER VENT.

E-206 SH.38/6 FV-36543 AUX. BOILER VENT.

E-206 SH.38/6 Fv-40205 C.W. P. "A"DISCH ARG E E-206 SH.3A/3 FV-40206 C.W. P. "B"DISCH ARGE E-206 SH.3A/3 FV-40207 C.W. P. "C "DISCH ARG E E-206 SH.3A/3 FV-40208 C.W. P. "D"DISCH ARGE E-206 SH.3A/3 H2RWF LETDOWN FILTER V. CONT.PNL E-105 SH.18/15 H2SFA-07 NSRW SPRAY POND"A"L/L A.

E-107/22 H2 SPA-ll F. P. I. FLOW LOOP"B " AL ARM N15.07-76/4 H2SFA-12 NS CW " A" SURG E TK L/H L. A.

E-107/22 H2SFA-22 NSCW" A" SURGE TK H/L P. A.

E-107/22 H2SFA-6 H. P. I. FLOW LOO P " A" AL ARM N15.07-76/4 H2SFB-07 NSRW SPRAY PO ND " B " L/ L A.

E-107/22 51-1169097-00 Page 123 of 132 August 31, 1987

~... - -

y.:

• * * " * * * ^ -

TABLE 4 (Continued)

H2SFB-12 NSCW"B'" SURGE TK L/H L.A.

E-107/22 H2SFB-22 NSCW"B" SURGE TK H/L P.A.

E-107/22 l

HV-20001 R.C.TO DECAY HEAT SYSTEM E-203 SH.60D/3 L

HV-20002 R.C.TO DECAY HE AT SYSTEM E-203 SH.60E/4 HV-20005 D.H. PUMP "A" SUCTION E-203 5H.118/0 HV-20006 D. H. PU M P "B" SUCTION E-203-119/3 I

l HV-20515 M. F.W. TO S/G-A ISOL.

E-105 SH.28/5,DCN17A HV-20516 M.F.W.TO S/G-B ISOL.

E-105 SH.28/5 DCN17A HV-20529 M. F.W. BLOCK V ALVE A E-105 SH.27/7,DCN15A 4

HV-20530 MAIN F.W. BLOCK V. "B" E-105 SH.27/7 DCN15A l

HV-20560 M. STM TO F. P. TURB. HE AD ER E-205 SH.20A/0 HV-20565 M. STM. TO F. P. TURB. HEADER E-205 SH.28/0 HV-20569 STM TO AUX. F. P. TURBINE E-205 SH.20C/0 HV-20577 AUX.F.W.TO S/G-A ISOL.

E-107 SH.2/5 DCN21 HV-20578 AU X. F. W. TO S/G-B ISOL.

E-107 SH.2/5 DCN21 HV-2 05 81 AUX. F.W. TO S/G-A ISOL.

E-107 SH.2/5 DCN17 HV-20582 AUX.F.W.TO S/G-B ISOL.

E-107 SH.2/5 DCN17 HV-20596 STM TO AU X. F. P. TU RBINE E-205 SH.20C/0 HV-21505 PRZR RELIEF ISOL.V.

E-203 SH.58D/5 HV-21510 PRZR SPRAY E-203 SH. 5 8/16 HV-21515 PRZR VENT.VLV"A" E-203 SH.58H/2 HV-21517 PRZR VENT.VLV"B" E-203 SH.58H/2 HV-22005 CLG WTR FROM L.D. COOLER E-203 SH.57/4 HV-22006 CLG WTR FROM L.D. COOLER E-203 SH.57/4 HV-22007 LET DOWN COOLER"A" OUTLET E-203 SH.58/16 HV-22008 LET DOWN COOLER"B&C"OUTL. E-203 SH.58/16 HV-23004 LETDOWN TO MU.OR FLUSH TK E-203 SH.61/4

?M HV-23801 H.P.I. LOOP"B"STOP CHECK E-2 03 SH. 6 0C/7 HV-23802 M.U. SUPPLY 10 PRZR SPRAY E-203 SH.60B/3 HV-26007 HDR WTR TO H. P. I. PU MP" A" E-203 SH.53B/2 HV-26008 HDR WTR TO H.P.I. PUMP"B" E-203 SH.53B/2 HV-26037 DECAY HT COOLDOWN BY-PASS E-203 SH.80/7 HV-26038 DECAY HT COOLDOWN BY-PASS E-203 SH.80/7 HV-26046 D.H. CROSS TIE 8-203 SH.53A/3 HV-26105 R.B.EM. SUMP TO D.H.P.

E-203 SH.53/9 HV-26106 R.B.EM. SUMP TO D.H.P.

E-203 SH.53/9 HV-26511 CORE FLOOD.TK"A" VENT.

E-203 SH.58E/0 HV-26512 CORE FLOOD.TE"B" VENT.

E-203 SH.58E/0 HV-26513 CORE FLOOD TK"A"TO REACT. E-203 SH.58F/0 HV-26514 CORE FLOOD.TK"B"TO REACT. E-203 SH.58G/0 HV-31826 AUX.F.W. CROSS TIE ISOL.

E-105 SH28/5 DCN19 HV-31827 AU X. F.W. CROSS TIE ISOL.

E-105 SH.27/7 DCN16 HV-32243 PEG.STM TO HEATERS E-205 SH.30/3 HV-43010 FOLSOM CANAL SUPPLY E-304 SH.34/1 HX-30801 AUX.F.W. TURBINE ISOL.

E-107 SH.2/7 DCN20 K-307A M. F. P. TURB. TURNING GEAR E-2 01 SH. 3 0/ 9 K-307A M.F.P. TURBINE CONTROL E-201 SH.31/19 K-307B M. F. P. TURB 4 TURNING GEAR E-201 SH.30A/l K-307B M.F.P. TURBINE CONTROL E-201 SH.31A/3 L-110 FRZR LEVEL I-51 SH.3 L-139 OTSG" A" FULL RANGE L EVEL I-51 SH.5/1 L-140 OTSG "B" FULL RANG E LEVEL I-51 SH.5/1 L-141 MAKE-UP TK LEVEL I-51 SU.3 LI-20501 OTSG " A" FULL R ANG E LEV EL N15.07 69/8

(

51-1169097-00 Page 124 of 132 August 31, 1987 I

-4_ ;

L___.___________

i LI-20502 OTSG"B" FULL RANG E LEVEL N15.07-69/8 l

LI-20503A OTSG " A" START-UP R. LEV EL N15.07-69/8 LI-20503B OTSG " A" START-UP R. L EVEL N15.07-69/8 l

LI-20504A OTSG "B "S T ART-U P R. L EV EL N15.07-69/8 1

LI-20504B OTSG "B "S TART-U P R. L EV EL N15.07-69/8 l

LI-21905A PRZR RELIEF TK LEVEL B6W51-1168867 SH.16 l

LI-47001 NSRW SPRAY POND L EV EL B&W51-1168867 SH.17

)

LI-47002 NSRW SPR AY POND"B" LEVEL B&W51-1168867 SH.18 l

LI-48403 NSCW" A" SURG E TANK LEVEL B&W51-ll68867 SH.19 j

LI-48403 NSCW"A" SURG E TK L EVEL B&W51-ll68867 SH.19 1

LI-48404 NSCW"B" SURG E TK LEVEL B&W51-ll68867 SH.20 LIK-21503 PRZR LEVEL N15.07-61/9 LR-23502 MAKE-UP TK LEVEL N13.07-76/4 LT-21503B PRZR LEVEL N15.07-61/9 LT-21503C PRZR LEVEL N15.07-61/9 LV-21503 NORM. PRZR LEVEL CONT.

N15.07-74 LV-36005 AUX. BOIL.TO AUX.STM HDR E-206 SH.10/6 LV-36007 AUX. BOILER LEVEL CONTROL M33.01-121 LV-36505 AUX. BOIL.TO STM HDR E-206 SH.10A/4 LV-36507 AUX. BOILER LEVEL CONTROL M33.01-121 P-014 RCS N.R. PRESSURE LOOP"B" N15.03-9/4 P-210A REACTOR COOL ANT PUMP E-203 SH.1/16 P-210B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP E-203 SH.lA/10 P-210C REACTOR COOL ANT PUMP E-203 SH.lB/6 P-210D REACTOR COOLANT PUMP E-203 SH.lC/2 P-236 MAKE-UP FEED PUMP E-203 SH.2/14 P-236(ALT) MAKE-UP FEED PUMP E-203 SH.2A/2 P-238A HIGH PRESS. INJECT. PUMP E-203 SH.4/16 P-238A L.O H.P.I. LUBE OIL PUMP E-203 SH.37/6 P-238B HIGH PRESS. INJECT. PUMP E-203 SH.4A/0 P-238B L.O H.P.I. LUBE. OIL PUMP E-203 SH.37A/3 P-261A DECAY HEAT REMOVAL E-203 SH.3/10 P-261B DECAY HEAT REMOVAL E-203 SH.3/10 P-268D F E ED P. TU RB. A. C. LUB E O. P. E-201 SH.28C/l P-317A MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE" A" E-319 SH.2/6 P-317B MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE"B" E-319 SH.4/7 P-318 AUX. FEED WATER PUMP E-104 SH.7/3 DCN llA P-319 AUX. FEED WATER PUMP E-104 SH.6/2 DCN 10B P-351A CONDENSATE PUMP E-205 SH.2A/13 P-351B CONDENSATE PUMP E-205 SH.2A/2 P-351C CONDENSATE PUMP E-205 SH.2B/3 P"371A AUX. BOILER FEED PUMP E-206 SH.2/9 P-371B AUX. BOILER PEED PUMP E-206 SH.2/9 P-402A CIRCULATING WTR PUMP E-206 SH.3/8 P-402B CIRCULATING WTR PUMP E-206 SH.3/8 P-402D CIRCULATING WTR PUMP E-206 SH.3/8 P-422C CIRCULATING WTR PUMP E-206 SH.3/8 P-425A PL ANT COOLING WTR PUMP E-206 SH.1/5 P-425B PLANT COOLING WTR PUMP E-206 SH.1/5 P-462A COMPONENT C.W. PUMP E-203 SH.41/7 P-462B COMPONENT C.W. PUMP E-203 SH.41/7 P-469A CONT. ROD D.CLG WTR PUMP E-203 SH.16/6 l

P-469B CONT. ROD D.CLG KTR PUMP E-203 SH.16/6 P-472A RAW WATER PUMP E-203 SH.42/13 s

51-1169097-00 Page 125 of 132 August 31, 1987

^-"9**e-+-hee-4me-~

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TABLE 4 (Continued)

P-472B RAW WATER PUMP E-203 SH.42/13 P-482A N.S. COOLING WTR PUMP E-2 03 SH. 4 3/12 P-482B N.S. COOLING WTR PUMP E-203 SH.43/12 P-705A BORIC ACID PUMP E-203 SH.15/6 P-705B BORIC ACID PUMP E-2 03 SH.15/ 6 P-751 NSCW" A" SURG E TK L/H P.

E-108 SH.1/22 P-752 NSCW"B" SURGE TK L/H P.

E-108 SH.1/22 P-807 TURNING GEAR LUBE O. PUMP E-2 01 SH. 3/6 P-809 MAIN TU RB. EMERG. LUB E O. P. E-201 SH.2/8 P-810 OTSG "B" OUTLET PRESS.

I-51 SH.4 P-811 OTSG " A"OUTL ET PRESS.

I-51 SH.4 P-868A FEED P. TURB. A. C.LUB E O. P. E-201 SH.28/11 P-868B FEED P.TURB.A.C. LUBE O.P.

E-201 SH.28A/2 P-868C F E ED P. TU RB. A. C. LUB E O. P. E-2'01 SH.28B/2 P-869A FEED P. TURB. D. C. LUBE O. P.

E-201 SH.29/12 P-869B FEED P. TURB.D.C. LUB E O. P.

E-201 SH.29A/2 P-898 AUX. BOILER D. FU EL O. PUMP E2206 SH.14/3 P-899 AU X. BOILER D. FUEL O. PUMP E-206 SH.14/3 P-9035 RCS W.R. PRESSURE LOOP"A" n23.01-43/2 P-9051 R. BLDG PRESS.

I-53 SH.1 P-9052 R. BLDG PRESS.

I-53 SH.1 P-976A SERVICE WATER PUMP E-206 SH.7/8 P-976B SERVICE WATER PUMP E-206 SH.7/8 P-976C SERVICE WATER PUMP E-206 SH.7/8 PI-20519B OTSG " A"OU TL ET PRES S.

N15.07-69/8 PI-20520B OTSG "B" OUTLET PRESS.

N15.07-69/8

/Ps PI-21801 PRT RECIRC.P.DISCH. PRESS. N15.07-82/0 k

PI-21920 PRZR RELIEF TK PRESS.

B&W51-1168867 SH.21 PI-36015 AUX.STM HEADER PRESS.

I-53 SH.8 PI-48009 NSRW SPR AY POND " A"PR ESS.

B&W51-ll68867 SH.3 PI-48010 NSRW SPRAY POND"B" PRESS.

B&W51-ll68867 SH.2 PR-21037 RCS N.R. PRESSURE LOOP" A" N15.07-64/0 PR-21092 RCS W.R.PRESSUU.E LOOP"B" N15.07-64/10 PSV-21511 PRZR RELIEF VALVE E-203 SH.65/12 PSV-21511 PRZR RELIEF VLV E-203 SH.65/12 PT-21038 RCS N.R. PRESS. LOOP"B" N15.03-9/4 PT-21040 R. COOL ANT PRES S. TRANS.

N15.01-30 PT-21099 RCS W.R. PRESSURE N2 3. 01-100/ 6 PV-20561 TURBINE BY-PASS VLV E-108/12 DCN57 PV-20562A ATMOSPH.STM DUMP E-205 SH.45/3 PV-20562B ATMOSPH.STM DUMP E-205 SH.45/3 PV-20562C ATMOS PH. STM DU MP E-205 SH.45/3 PV-20563 TURBINE BY-PASS VLV E-108/12 DCN57 PV-20564 TURBINE BY-PASS VLV E-108/12 DCN57 PV-20566 TURBINE BY-PASS VLV E-108/12 DCN57 PV-20571A ATMOSPH.STM DUMP E-205 SH.45/3 PV-20571B ATMOSPH.STM DUMP E-205 SH.45/3 i

PV-20571C ATMOSPH.STM DUMP E-205 SH.45/3 PV-21509 PRZR SPRAY E-203 SH.59/12 PV-21520 PRZR SPRAY E-203 SH.59A/5 R-500 COND. AIR EJ ECT. RAD. MON.

E-318 SH.1/19 R-7000 MAIN STM LINE RAD. MON.

E-318 SH.ll/l l

R-7001 MAIN STM LINE RAD. MON.

E-318 SH.12/1 x

S2 PS A-6 2 PRZR RELIEF TK H/L LEVEL E-107/22 51k169097-00 Page 126 of 132 August 31, 1987

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s

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TABLE 4 (Continued)

.)

i i

i SFC-23645 MAKE-UP PUMP RECIRC.

E-203 SH.52B/l SFV-22005 LET DOWN COOLER INLET E-203 SH.56/13 SFV-22006 LET DOWN TO COOLER E-203 SH.56A/2 SFV-22009 R.C. LETDOWN E-203 SH.62/8.

SFV-22009 R. C. L ETDOWN E-203 SH.62/8 i

SFV-22023 R. C. L ETDOWN E203 SH.48/15

. SFV-23508 MAKE-UP TK ISOLATION E-203 SH.97/7 SFV-23508 A MAKE-UP TK ISOL ATION E-2 03 SH.9 8/3 SFV-23604 R.C.SYST.M.U. ISOLATION E-203 SH.49/ll S FV-2 3 616 S EAL TO R. C. P.

E-2 03 SH.54/16 SFV-23646 M AKE-UP PUMP RECIRC.

E-203 SH.52B/l I

LPV-23809 H.P.I. LOOP "A" E-203 SH.50E/2 SFV-23810 H.P.I. LOOP "B" E-203 SH.50F/3 SFV-23811 H.P.I. LOOP "A" E-203 SH.50G/2 l

SFV-23812 H.P.I. LOOP "B" E-203 SH.50H/2 SPV-24004 SEAL RETURN FROM R.C. P.

E-203 SH 69/7 GFV-24013 SEAL RETURN FROM R.C. P.

E-203 SH.63/10 SFV-25003 SUCTION FROM B.W.S.T.

E-203 SH.68/9

- SFV-26005 L.P. INJECTION LOOP "A" E-203 SH.50A/3 SFV-26006 L. P. INJ ECTION LOOP "B" E-203 SH.50A/3 SFV-26039 D.H.S."A" FLOW CONTROL E-203 SH.81/6 SFV-26040 D.H.S."B" FLOW CONTROL E-203 SH.81A/l SFV-46014A COMP.C.W. RETURN ISOL.

E-203 SH.87/9 SFV-46 014B COMP.C.W. RETURN ISOL.

E-203 SH.87A/2 i

SFV-46203 COMPONENT C.W. ISOL. RETURN E-203 SH. 85/6

- SFV-462 04 A COMP.C.W. RETURN ISOL.

E-203 SH.86C/l SFV-462 04B COMP.C.W. RETURN ISOL.

E-203 SH.86/8 kh)

SFV-46906 CRD C.W. SUPPLY ISOL.

E-203 SH.87B/3 SFV-45907 CRD C.W. ISOLATION SUPPLY E-203 SH.85A/3 SFV-46908 CRD C.W. RETURN ISOL.

E-203 SH.86A/3 SFV22035 LET DOWN COOLERS ISOL. INS E-203 SH.48/15 SFV25004 SUCTION FROM B.W.S.T.

E-203 SH.68A/3 T-051-65 OTSG*A"AND"B" TEMP.

E-108 SH.1/19 T-067 MFW TEMP.TO OTSG'S N15.07-71/5 T-095 PRZR SPRAY TEMP.

B&W51-1168867 SH.5 T-096 PRZR SPRAY TEMP.

B&W51-1168867 SH.6 T-21031A RCS T HOT LOOP"A" N15.07-62/7 T-752 NSRW PUMP"B" OUTLET TEMP.

B&W51-ll68867 SH.13 T-753NSRW PUMP" A" OUTLET TEMP.

B&W51-ll68867 SH.14 T-800 OTSG"B"STM TEMP.

N15.07-69/8 T-9010 RCS T HOT LOOP"B" N15.07-62/7 T-9011 RCS T HOT LOOP"A" N15.07-62/7 T-9016 RCS W.R.T COLD LOOP"B" N15'.07-63 SH.1/7 T-9017 RCS W.R.T COLD LOOP"A" N15.07-63 SH.1/7 TI-20537 MFW TEMP.TO OTSG'S N15.07/5 TI-20541 OTSG "A"STM TEMP.

N15.07-69/8 TI-21023A RCS W.R.T COLD LOOP"A" N15.07-63 SH.1/7

-TI-21024A RCS W.R.T COLD LOOP"B" N15.07-63 SH.1/7 TI-21032A RCS T HOT LOOP"B" N15.07-62/7 TI-21801 PRT RECIRC.LINE TEMP.

N15.07-82/10 TI-26043 DECAY H. CLR" A"OUT. TEMP.

N15.07-80/5 TI-26044 DECAY H. COOLER"B"OUT.T.

N15.07-80/5 TJR-06-12 NSRW SPRAY POND"A" TEMP.

B&W51-ll68867 SH.10 TJ R-0 6-13 NSRW SPRAY POND"B" TEMP.

B&W51-116886 7 SH. ll 51-1169097-01 Page 127 of 132 September 17, 1987

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i TABLE '4 (Continued)~

TJ R-06-14 PRZR RELIEF TK ~ TEMP.

B&W51-1168867 SH.9 TV-46012A 'CCW HEAT EXCH."A"OUT.

E-203 SH.34/9 TV-46012B' CCW HEAT EXCH. "E"OUT.

E-203 SH.34/9 V-215L' PRZR HEATERS LOWER E-203 SH.45/10 V-215M PRZR HEATERS MIDDLE E-203 SH.45/10 V-215U PRZR HEATERS' UPPER E-203 SH.46/9

- XI-00001 SOURCE R. POWER COUNT RATE N15.03-6/ll XI-00002 SOURCE R. POWER COUNT RATE N15.03-16/9 XI-00003 SOURCE R.' POWER S.U. RATE N15.07-6/11 XI-00006 SOURCE R. POWER S.U. RATE N15.07-16/9 XI-00201 INTERMEDI ATE R. POWER N15.03-26/6 XI-00202 INTERMEDI ATE R. POWER N15.03-Z-1801-29 TBV AND ADV POSITION B&W51-ll69081-00 4

l

+r 51-1169097-00 Page 128 of 132-August 31, 1987

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EGLUATION~OF, CASUALTY-PROCEDURES

-Loss?of BusxCasualty? Procedures wer_e frequently utilizedas-partyof this-task.

.In' addition,:a? specific. result of this task is an" assessment. of the 1 adequacy of. these procedures from the - standpoint - of alerting. the operator to. equipment required' for Cold-Shutdown which-- has.been-rendered inoperable' by. the. bus fallure and recommending suitable

alternate. equipment.

Table 5 provides' ' a ' listing of the Casualty' Procedures'which were reviewed;within the scope of this task.

It should be noted-that this was not an in-depth review.

-The review, however, Dwas' sufficient' to - indicate ' that a significant number. of these procedures. do not; address the potential problems which would result based on the< review.

performed in this study.

In addition, 'several of the bus failures' considered ~ in this study. do not currently have corresponding Casualty Procedures.

It is B&W's understanding that'the' entire set of-Rancho Seco bus. failure Casualty Procedures are being revised prior to plant restart.

Therefore,. it appears that the majority of

.the casualty Procedures reviewed by B&W are outdated and.are:

in'the' process of being replaced.. Based on discussions' held at-Rancho-Seco-(Reference-16)~,

the ' revised. Casualty Procedures will take,into account the equipment failures and will provide; adequate guidance. to the: operator for l'

responding to single bus failures.

This report should.. be

' utilized: in the preparation' of these revised' procedures.

Based on the current status of. the new Casualty Procedures,

)

this study has obviously not included a review of-the

)

- procedures which will be in effect at the time of plant restart.

l l

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1

.l 51-1169097-00 Page 129 of 132 August 31, 1987

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TABLE 5 CASUALTY' PROCEDURE REVIEW l

C.101, Rev. 4

S4A, 4

- C.102, Rev. O S4A2 C.103, Rev. 5 S4B C.104, Rev. O S4B2 C.105, Rev. 5 S4C C.106, Rev. 5 S4D C.107, Rev.

5.

S4E1

- C.108, Rev. 5 S4E2 C.109, Rev. 8 S3A C.110, Rev. 1 S3A2 C.111, Rev. 9 S3B i

C.112, Rev. 1 S3B2

- C.113, Rev. 6 S3C1 C.114,-Rev. 4 S3C2 C.115, Rev. 6 S3D1 j

C.116, Rev. 6 S3D2 l

C.117, Rev. 5 S3E C.118, Rev. 8 S2A1 C.119, Rev. 1 S2A2 C.120, Rev. 2 S2A3 i

C.121, Rev. 0 S2A4 Ob C.122, Rev. 6 S2B1

$f C.123, Rev. 1 S2B2 C.124, Rev. 2 S2B3 C.125, Rev. O S2B4 C.126, Rev. 8 S2C1 C.127,'Rev. 6 S2C2 C.128, Rev. 6 S2C3 C.129, Rev. 5 S2C4 i

C.130, Rev. 10 S2C5 C.131, Rev. 6 S2C6 C.132, Rev. 6 S2C7-C.133, Rev. O S2C8 C.134, Rev. 1 S2C9 C.135, Rev. 6 S2D1 C.136, Rev. 6 S2D2 C.137, Rev. 7 S2D3; i

C.138, Rev. 4 S2D4 C.139, Rev. 4 S2D5 l

C.140, Rev. 6 S2D6 C.141, Rev. O S2D7 C.142, Rev. 1 S2D8 C.143, Rev. 6 S2E1 C.144, Rev. 6 S2E2 i

C.145, Rev. 5 S2E3 51-1169097-00 Page 130 of 132 August 31, 1987

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. 3 TABLE 5 CA'SUALTY PROCEDURE REVIEW g

.(continued)

~,

'C.146, Rev.

0-SOA t

C.147, Rev.

0-SOA2 C.148, Rev. O SOB-

' l C.149, tev. O SOB 2 C.150, Rev.

0-SOC C.151, Rev. O SOC 2 c.152,.Rev. 0 SOD C.153, Rev. O SOD 2 T

C.158, DRAFT

. S1A-c.157, DRAFT S1A2-1 C.159, DRAFT S1B C.160, DRAFT S1B2-1 C.161, DRAFT SIC:

C.162, DRAFT SIC 2-1 i

C.163, DRAFT S1D

-j C.164, DRAFT SID2-1 i

4 C.167, DRAFT S1GA-1 l

C.168, DRAFT S1GB - 1 1

i p

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l 1

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. E 51-1169097-00 Page 131 of 132 August 31, 1987

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REFERENCES:

-l-2 a

('

3 i

'/ g' 1.

. United States Nuclear Reguladory Commission, IE' p'

' Bulletin No.

79-27,

" Loss of Non-Class 1-E 4.

-Instrumentation and Control, Power System : Bus During Operation, November 30, 1979.-

{..

y 2.

SMUD-Letter.'to NRC, W.S. Bossenmaier to.R.h

Engelken, "IE Bulletin 79-27", February 22, 1980.8 i

. j p

3..

SMUD Letter to L NRC, W.C.

Walbridge t R.H.

Engel' ken, "IE:Bdlletin 79-27", March 32, 1980.

3 6

i s

.I

- B&W : Letter F.R.

Burke to G.. C2 kuston, " Task 847-Re' view 4.-

of. Plant Instrument-- and Controls for IE Bulletin 79-27", SMUD-87-186,. dated April:3, 2987.

,')

4 5..

SMUD Telecon with NRC, May 21, 1987'.

}~

i 6.

SMUD Letter to NRC, S.

Ward to F.J; Mdaglia,' ' Jr., -

" District Response to NRC Request for Information", JEW 86-652, October 30, 1986.

.c 7.

B&W Telecon with SMUD, June 24, 'lN7..

l

,,3 8.

B&W Telecon with SMUD, May 20, 1967.

d 1

g-9'.

D&W Telecon with SMUD, June 12, l$/87. -

10.

B&W Letter to SMUD, F.R. Burke to G. Chan.ston, SMUD.

280, May 28,-1987.

s

- L 1:

11. -

InformW draft EOPs provided by SMUD dated 5/11/87.

{

y 12.

SMUD Letter.to NRC, G.C.

Andognini to J.B.

Eartin,

" Operating 3 Plant Status Report", GCA.87-206, 6/15/87.

B&W Letteh 'to SMUD, 13.

F.R. Burke to L.Rs Keilman, " Task 469-Preliminary Modification Description for Operational Assessment 81-003A, Partial Loss of DC Power", SMUD-84-252, December 14, 1984.

i :<

14.

B&W Document No.

51-1168867-00 "79-27 Review 1

f Instrument Loop Sketches" i

15.

B&W Document No.

51-1168866-00 "79-27 Review Annunciators" m.

16.

Meeting Minuten, P.

Patel to Attendees, 8/20/87..,i 1

17.

B&W Document 51-1169081-00, "79-27 Review-IDADS f

Annunciators" I

i

' 51-1169097-01 Page 132 of 132 September 17, 1987

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ATTACHMENT 2

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Report Recommendation: District Position

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i Recommendations:. District Position J

Summary:

The.DistrictLhas reviewed the recommendations from the 79-27 Report'and has

.i

. determined that compliance with its requirements can be met via the use of procedures',' 'Therefore, the discussion which follows briefly describes the expected procedure modifications which will be made to assure compliance'with the IE Bulletin prior to restart'. Any hardware modifications which have.been

- recommended will be evaluated and if found to be beneficial. will be.

implemented after restart..

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