ML20058B652

Rev 0 to ERPT-M0216, Property Loss Study for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station in Long Term Defueled Mode

ML20058B652
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	05/04/1990
From:	Zott J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20058B634	List: ML20058B630 ML20058B652
References
ERPT-M0216, ERPT-M216, NUDOCS 9010300367
Download: ML20058B652 (22)

Text

. - -___- -.

,5 j

7h;J '

EW tNEERING REPORTS'AND STUDIES Y $6400(ea7000l14, P

COVER SHEET T

4l-

^

y

,7,

Subject:

f M W '1 de n TWO Md-M ## b OMA s e

[

Gwas.Asuvc, Smrw t9 rMa. LoM4 TM Muop Hope ja V-Control Number: ERPT-M OA/6 lil L.{G l

.j-l Initiated required follow-up documents [ ] YES ( ) NO C50 NOT REQUIRED nr

) '

Follow-up documents attached

( ) YES ( ) NO Disc. Hgr.

. ~:

f

)E Rev. No. DAtt Initial Issue and Revision Histerv Oriainator

.Aenroval

.s O

k9*

04'6'M A L f

.]

't y yh 4..

Yi ih

?,ik 8%'

dd

[{

. ig w.

h 4,

2]1 4

l, 4

4 w

m

N a

M.

i; 3 %

);

s

?

y4.

p'hh

-k<

gq lb.

J

' r.

l%

id$gh ENG-066 Rev. 3 i

=

K4 k_,.

i s s s,it a b a m m

-m m&.s,a

,,mapajggagd; l

~

9010300367 901022 PDR ADOCK 05000312 J

PDC l

1

.A

D'D N N k[

hhhf!hkIN,f!%%

kf

=j ENGINEERIi4G REPOMS AND STUDIES g

,4 COVER SHEET e

S'g i

}

Subject:

PROPERTY LOSS STUDY FOR RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATINGS51ATION d

l IN THE LONG TERM DEFUELED MODE

^4 Control Number.: ERPT-M0216,,

j J ;$

Initiated required follow-up documents [ ] YES ( ) NO (X) NOT REQUIRED l

y b

10 CFR 50.59 Determination [ ] Requi. red (and attached)

I, $f (X) Not Required (see DCP/PDQ No.

)

J9

" i Disc. Hgr.

g:

Rev. No. QAlg Initial Issue and Revision Historv Oriainator Acoroval O '!)

0 3/9/90 ORIGINAL J. ZOTT J.

IE i

9

)

a t-f)f6

~4 t

v Y

i f

5-e

+.

9 iy,

,h.'

1

)n

~5 s

.s X l.

.,Q -

1,p.g Q,

f.{$@i

{$

Qf R

j

%6

,i ENG-066 Rev. 2

_'j '[

l i i 3D J

gem,... =

+

w'

. 60 a

%b

,7 4.w_

1

+

.4

?f'

((-t

.. d M

- )' :

Qlt PROPERTY LOSS STUDY

~_

p L

hi

4. I~

hi FOR y

t qt

i k

RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION s

bi t; 'e b{

IN THE 4

it

,W $

g;jg LONG TERM DEFUELED MODE a.

k i

ERPT M0216 l ?'

k INITIAL ISSUE c

.i.M t;

pi

,t t.

i k,

i.

E n

'h c

1 l

.I d

I 0

.;$$fhX;;

ih. is, '_

l 1

Uk, h00Y%;n.6,1. :,,;%M

(

l i

i

-u-A

,;.j!pk

[5M3EN hhEhDND;%% f hhhh 4

p jqgd-y

, ts -

Y, (p

ERPT M0216 y;na

- l o-D TABLE OF CONTENTS

.A. !

l[I

'h

p;

'1 '

A; f;d "ij PAGE y.,

.a

%N 5

n-

-4

I o

INTRODUCTION 1

?(

. s9h ASSUMPTIONS 1

5 t/.9 L4 x

cf METHODOLOGY 2

,j D

Scenarios 3-4 M3 d.Id gs f !f',{e -

fg ;

Anahsis 59 li d CONCLUSIONS 10 4

l

,Q' gs 'W REFERENCES 11

.i ATTACHMENTS gu 9,

b'f 1

Sketch of Transformer Area

' l i e3 2

Sketch of Tank Farm

> E

] $

3 Technical Paper (Reference 2)

,\\ 0?

7.3

[y

!w j

]Iyi-y

+.

Pf' l

a,,

e.3 l

i.

i 10

.i.

1 ;g nt N

[

h.;

- f'

/4 kb

'4[

.5

,N h

i

{

l l

kh,0lhYkb $

h e ?D, ^^ - -

pv vg i

~

y' L

7.O :

w"j y

ERPT-M0216

• 9

~

INTRODUCTION g-

.x r 4, l

l' Due to the shutdown and defueling of the Rancho Seco Nuclear P

s, Generating Station, risks are substantially reduced over those h

associated with plant operation.

Insurance coverage should be ik reduced accordingly.

This report develops two Maximum 3

p h

Foreseeable Property Loss (MFL) ccanarios appropriate to the l

}

E, long term defueled mode.

One addresses property loss while the

'(

'f e.n other addresses on site radioactive contamination.

p-ll tF vo I

AB8UMPTIOMB k~,

/S.

,th}

['{

In developing scenarios and the subsequent analyses, the

}

7 following assumptions were used:

Il n

5-p

• Replacement of equipment and restoration of systems is limited to that required to support operation in the long term

~

defueled mode.

y j

• Penetration of spilled water into the soil of the Tank Farm 1

(semi-porous in nature) would be 2 feet.

1 )

5 Y

h!

I

,u; Uj

.3 1

0 a

3 8 l t,

c

=

v 2-UkASAdie!N W$2iLO

.:fk a..

t b hb&

khk$hj

---

i--

m

= -

h i

ERPT-M0216 iM i

ep:

MRTEODOLOGY

.vf W

y

"?'

J o

k BCENARIOS i) 3 i

Several scenarios for each type of property loss were reviewed g' -

)

in general.

The scenarios resulting in the greatest property g}

h damaged were identified and fully analyzed.

?,i y f 18

.O Turbine Generator Lube Oil Fire 1.(R A

s l

For an operating plant, a turbine generator lube oil fire 3:

'f v

would be devastating with damage to the Turbine Building

'}.

i h i structure, turbine, generator, heater drain pumps, main

("N feedwater pumps, main air compressors and much control by cabling.

Since this equipment is not needed in the long

,W-h term defueled mode, this scenario was discarded.

g

.if '

f i

Transformer Yard Fire

$q['

Due to the large amounts of oil contained in the Main v

-- q.j Transformers, a fire involving one or more transformers in N( :

the Transformer Yard would spread to the Turbine Building.

I The main generator would become involved by fire spreading I

l!,i through the bus duct.

This scenario was discarded because t.,

g little of the affected equipment is needed in the long term E

defueled mode.

' y Main contro' Room Fire jil All plant monitoring functions would be lost in a Main Control Room Fire. Although the cost of replacing control l

f y; room panels and re-pulling damaged cables would be very l

4

f. d high, little of the lost monitoring capability is required

{

d[

in the long term defueled mode.

To recover, one or more l

h

-b, 1 tl 0;

l

! T 5

T l

1

,c k$bs5$$

9Adi% ~ +

' S4$'0$

bYbtNo$ iga L$501 s

m--m um ummmm u

f b?ih f) & & j Y

f; Q:

ERPT-M0216 M

ht satellite monitoring stations or mini-control rooms would g

i f

be created to monitor essentipi parameters.

The cost of ty these modificatione would not result in " worst case" scenario.

.1 ig

.hh i.

&{

Transformer Fire Involvina PCBs

Ty

(. j There are several PCB filled transformers in the yard formed l}

el by the intersection of the Auxiliary Building, Nuclear

[

Service Electrical Building and the T&R Building. Although N

['h the replacement cost for the transformers is relatively low, h

Y the cost for the clean-up of PCB contamination makes this

' 'y.52 m

3c{

the

" worst case" scenario not involving radioactive r

W{%

-u k4 g

contamination.

"g ',;

li{

4.

t:

i

%e Dronced Puel Assembly A dropped fuel assembly accident scenario is presented in

fh, j

J Chapter 14 of the USAR.

Although this is a significant

" "S j

accident, the radioactivity which would escape the Spent j

s. s(

U Fuel Pool would be in a gaseous form. This radioactive gas j

k would be vented by the normal ventilation system and, because it is a gas, would not result in ground h,

Aw contamination on or off site.

Ve fg-Ruoture of the Borated Water Storace Tank y*

A rupture of the Borated Water Storage Tank would dump

,y several hundred thousand gallons of radioactively contaminated water into the Reactor Yard area.

Gravel, y

jA soil and storm drains would become contaminated.

Due to p,

g, the extent of the required clean-up, this was developed as i

if the

" wor,t case" scenario for on site radioactive Yl contaminatlon.

@%i a

s f

e l

-a

a 1

kMJ V +MER.Mc,WMMUn k,V

-m M.WYildi#

)

I i

. v :,.. y ;

y..

ERPT-M0216 4

fk :t; y; 2k

};g a

f Failura of the Deca,y,Ep.at_Idtte_e.iLAha.EP.9AtLI49).Epol

},

A rupture of the Decay Heat Line as it penetrates the Spent fS g,'

Fuel Pool would release much radioactively contaminated il, 9,,D,[

-l water into the Tank Farm.

Less than one-half of the water inventory resulting from the rupture of the Borated Water

< IJ i

Storage Tank would be lost.

On this basis, this scenario

! h,d was discarded, eqg i

1*e

!itc en

[ b.

g,f ze+

a i

~i W?

4y

_!kjf MSn y

c4

' Qi ['yp 4p

~l

-po a

l 2p -

ws

= iA J.my c

).

• f. '

n@.

Lg

'p 3P-

.n$f \\

M

, i-ys

. qu k.H.

O i.

n' '

sjfg-4:p{

N

;Y:

C.G L ih lh:

gls

'e y,W ;."., ' I.e4 l j$f*

73

.'lfM"'%kh

'V k j,a

c. 3r f

_ )f w

- y

.a, 5'

• ^'

.c j$d.[{i;Q pg g

hjQ c., %,yg< l+ u. y W

g,4 4.

a r

y y kC(

QW.

s

~t

'u

,+

d, A' b"p%j%

4,;h.Ykn chkQbd' N,m f;).

W y,,j,s

• s,

.., n g

gp

~

a jd[ Yfp,}ygg p g g p ~ f !! Q f g f,y j A 8

nm em----isii-mens

-i-ismsnm.-umi---m m

,.. }V

Y g

ju" ff

&j(

l1 p;

!!" C ERPT-H0216 o

c

['

4 l

Analyses

[

.u.s..

L l

Fire in PCB Filled Transformers yl

(

The following PCB filled transformers are located in the N

alley south of the Auxiliary Building and north of the h

combined T&R/NSE Building (see Attachment 1).

The dg transformers are in a curbed area with tbc drains normally

!, H plugged. Table 1 shows the PCB content of each transformer.

g,sf k,$ ?

• sl[

Table 1

[

m f,

h Transformers PCB content Volume of p'

((j ids (PPM).

Araelor Fluid (cah

'Q t i X43D2 790,000 1254 340 Up f

(;

H4RXA 410,000 1260 178 9

H4RXB 740,000 1254

177, g:

H4RRA 530,000 3260 166

'Qh H4RRB 450,000 1260 166 fl.e fire is assumed to occur in X43 Dis and involve the othe

((

transformers..saoke is carried upward, over the 'wa1Y '"

i $

where.it is picked' up by ventilation equipment? fo$)l j

q I

Y three buildings.

Because of the mechanical ventilation 9

e a m, w

smokewithPCBcontaminantsiscirculatedthrougho g

Nuclear Service Electrical /T6R Buildings and most of the. y.

'Ng Auxiliary Building.

. We c,_,

w :

' u

, o }'

ki

.,k l

~~,a; hy s

a

$ 2s h

k

. [

]

,A+-

sM

'esw L,.R

$$g pgpgV

E R h'f U UNSyh@ftJ h hkN"/ g '

a

7

~

?$

I;

({.

ERPT-M0216 i:f Contaminated smoke is also deposited on roofs and aujoining "s;

j*

walls.

Limited fire fighting will result in the curbed area being filled with water, pushing some PCB liquid ogto the asphalt area and into the drains, oily water separator e'I and retention basins.

Firo damage would occur to the adjacent walls and NSED p{

bridge requiring replacement of the bridge.

Some fire l[

damage would also occur inside the building where the p

I) bridge pulls away.

7

(

l

?

M, Areas not affected by the contamination are the ruel

[

1 Storage, Reactor and Turbine Buildings, Diesel Generator j;

r[

building, and the -47 foot level of the Auxiliary Building. (j Areas outside the power block buildings are not consideredd '

! b involved except for the drain pipe, oilywaterseparator$

and retention basins.

$i t[.g

[g, D3 contamination of the alley would require some scarifying;"

(h and wall replacement, and replacement of the asphalt. The,'

t drains, oily water separator and retention basins would d.

'{[

Decontaminatio i

require replacement or decontamination.

would also be required for the interior of the three f

?:

buildings: Auxiliary, T&R, and NSEB.

2

-(

3 j[ h

??

. l 1

_ fg

' y t' g r f

A

.y m

^2 l. It.

h.

Ob'

'i '

'j..

,( ma w.

~6-mw,+..

n, s#

hIII5Nh fDIsMMlf,@0,NDFhb NUD' OIM@ ' ' Nkgp

'g i

1 E,:.

ERPT-M0216 6)

TABLR.1 M

Loss gasAFDOWN h

,%f Tank Juantity Coat Less-$

NSEB cleanup 14,000 ft' 400/ft'Id 5,600,000 T&R Bldg cleanup 43,000 ft' 200/ft'"I 8,600,000 Aux. Bldg. cleanup 60,000 ft' 400/ft'Id 32,000,000

'Y, Scarify concrete 17,000 ft' 4/ft' 68,000 g, k p

Remove / replace asphalt 1,000 ft' 9/ft' 9,000 Pesove/ replace oily 100,000 ea.

100,.000 W 5

([

1T, water separator f; ;

J Replace drain 2,000 ft 80/ft 160,000 3

k' Piping Y$

1 Disposal of Material 3,000 f t' 8/ft' 24,000 6.t nrz

l q Re-Power Affect Plant 31 I

Equipments j

4 t

e.

tJ' Design 250 MH 50/Mll 12,500 i) :

[Q'

j Cable /

']

Installation 10,000 ft

$2/ft 20,000 Fire Damage 1,500,000 t

,;)tp

.. e Recovery Management 10,000 MH

$0 MH B00.000 4

TOTAL IDS 8

$44,593,500 ih 3

4-Y gi

%)

(a)

According to Reference 1, the cleanup is $200/sq ft for

$11 k [k

[.ll office occupanciae.

j p

' [k According to Reference 2, the cichn-up is more costly in a ';l,

[;.c.

nuclear power plant than for office occupancy.

Assumed {y 200% or $400/sq ft.

n h

w 2

Y.

k' l

k)1

.y.

to

'v

.t+

,f

?qf + % ppb + i +-

d 24 s'

ig$kh$"hjp A_ j /

--am

f

? khfhY5 Y b

f?

b) ffff

-( ; p y

.g ERPT-M0216

@p i

[

r.

3 yt Runture of the Berated water storace Tank The Tank Farm, t. ort!. cf the Reactor Building, contains the

[

'T 450,000 gallon Borated Water storage Tank.

This tank i

contains water with borj,o acid and radioactive

.]

A contamination.

The tank level varies with operational 3

(

activities.

For the proposed loss scenario, the tank is

)

YA

$a assumed full.

s}

h i

l A catastrophic failure is assumed, that is, the release of y

j

! NI

./ k the water is rapid causing flooding of the Tank Farm and 9.d k y

\\

4

{f

{g$

some adjacent areas.

If the failure is almost k

1 instantaneous, the Tank Farm area would be filled to a d

h maximum depth of about 22 inches.

However, penetrations

(

[k through the Tank Farm walls, gaps below the gates, and the i 4 Tank Farm area stora drains would prevent the level from b

reaching this height.

The Tank Farm area drains flow to l 'q.

on-site retention basins.

It is assumed that the entire 1

j /ll Tank Farm area would be contaminated.

The Tank Farm area d y has gravel 18 inches deep, with soil below.

It is assumed

.[

i that all gravel and two feet of soil is removed for I

disposal.

Borated water which escapes the Tank Farm would end up in the stora sewer and flow directly off site.

ft Roadways and plant yard areas would be contaminated.

,[

Scarifying or asphalt replacement would eliminate the

, /,

radioactive contamination.

This analysis assumes removal Pif and replacement.

t p'L (Il l)f.

t w.

I i

ja i

$$ du.

db mu l

h.

&q

.2

,jg%f ^ i?Q([ hb?itjg@gggggg+6)W $= gI{pq g,

,g{;

iM 4

q..

~.

.vgg. g..j;.y.

's?

ERPT-M0216.;

4;,p,

u 4

q TABLR 3 j'-

4'.Y 192.3rA4)dpyn d

M-vjQ p

v4 -

my.

Unit

• f!.

Tank ouantity cost Loss e

}4

~

Remove / Replace 4e

' {'

Tank Fara gravel 49,500 ft

$6/ft'

$297,000 a

h Tank Fara earth 66,000 ft' 6/ft 396,000

}.

j s

jim other asphalt 7,400 ft' 12/ft' 88,800

{

[(I other, gravel 20,000 ft' 6/ft' 120,000 j%'

l j[40,..

Retention Basin 75,000 ft 4/ft' N 300,000 g

a i

% :,i.

Scarifying e

f[(!f Disposal 150,000 ft 150/ft8N 22,500,000 h

f s

1. h Equipment 2,000,000 d

Repair / Replace Tank 1,000,000 1,000,000

]0 (Mi Recovery Management 10,000 MH 50/MH 500,000 7

'g Rad Protection 2,000 MH 30/MH 60,000 7

o support W

[p' Y[

Replace storm 10,000 ft 80/ft 800.000

[f sewer lines fhb TOTAL ICSS: $28,061,800 3i AM' 8

4-Q l

p i

k t

M y

Disposal Cost $150/cu ft starting 1991 (Reference 4) h

\\ n a

'O {

1, iOO

'{

i4

..v j p a

d

+2 f

l

. *p t-v.

s i

1 n

n n

^Y f

i N

kIhhMEkd d$NiN#k,

.JbkOfkgiihd.hh

. Ave t

,......v

-..Es-

h...

9as

hI

-f.'h M

i fffl g,.

"5NfkERP.n.6ffng, b,g~; -'

MC21

, v

= m' - e, s,.j 44 t '..

-[;C poBcLDs10Mg j

.jp.-

.n.; ;c p

xw m

"b For a PCB fire at the plant, a loss estinate for NFL,of ?$49 aty-r n scenar'..7,~ d A ;

e QF.

aillion is obtained.

This is based on the ioi.an V

,?/

discussion previously presented. This loss figure is validated *,' N.

{

k II by the most comparable scenario in Reference 2, which estimated,N-.

,i [

$79 million for a 2 unit, 2,000 megawatt plant.

b-4

.,q 3N,,

j+,,

j}(p.

For a radioactive water release, a loss estimate of $28 million y 3 i

' /h'f, g(f '

is obtained.

j i

d$

w,$,p.

, :GL.

j s

?

I 4 %,,.

'i w

[ $

3*.

'i&!

ll 5

i Try

?yl A I

py G

I V

JN

.4, p

) iD5

'g

%i c $'

4 g{ly;,',

\\

3

),

&g

'j N

M

{. 4

.f s

e ' li.

di di h[p o

-d I

jr m

_gf ',

4 1 Y.

w Rh&

x$D lf b

i 3,

$,lc y!

9.

.w 3

t.- %

%I4 c%

r r;

fa

'y' ',g..

-}

a t b t,$

YN. ANMM T'*kNb

[

c t

i 1

1 c

1

(

5; h'hr.l. :l f,,[f.

[

1 4l 7

off' ?. 4 ' '

ngc-

'*s

' WIP M10216 4

,m b'

,l$.g5yyo,-%

;f

,a e n

4 ' ' *;'

j

^

g i

h REPRRMICRB

,/

(1)

Meno Jim Field from Dan DeLac, February 16, 1990; Maximun 3'f' Foreseeable Loss Studies for Nuclear Property Dapage b

3 i

e and Decontamination Insurance j

9,.

y,s J]f -

f

=

i

- {,

(2)

Paper PCB Transformer Fires The Risk In Nuclear Power

'hy.,, ;

, g, Plants, by Kirk Blackman (attached).

(e

/

ig:

Drawings M 308, Sh 2-7 Fire Protection Fire Areas Wp h.~

(3)

C 748, Sh 4 T & R Building C 181, Sh 33 Tank Fara Fence j';,"

C 132, Sh 1 Finish Grading & Paving

j. ; t 4'

q[)>

e,; n

'#%l.}

(4)

Telecon Dennis Gardiner, SMUD Radiation Protection Dept and T4 Joe Ectt, SMUD Technical Services.

4 '-

?

JJ g [>N.

D (5)

Paper Rancho Seco Escalated Replacement Costs - Selected Systems

3

? %.

(6)

Report Guidelines for Producing Commercial Nuclear Power al]?

i

'p t.h "

i Plant Decommissioning Cost Estimates; AIF/NESP-036 7i 3

[h

?l

'.i e;

• b].d m

b ?j(k.

h[h

_11 Nhi h.b$$$wesh.o.

wewudahd 1

1

.)

5

xy;fQ~.;yggME$MNEbMk fgb l

.y

.v,yn. 3g4,,y wa..p.nugg,ygg p,,,$gg~m,,yy

~

-l y.

,. g;.; gj gg t

.pg-w..

[

{

. g.

r-Z 9

k ;'

e&.-

tj Cd n.

m p-Z

,p; pet pry -

=

{v i.p-

,p'

_U_-

hy.

s v

4 m

R,- s sTG-0 x43C2 T*;

s Z

D x43c1 td m

i O

(/)

p I'[f'

~,i In pri 0 X43D1 C

d

• d X43D2

.g CX Z

H4RXB Ud pr]

1 H4RXA

/@t i

t

~

D

'j.!

I H4RRA f-I) f!I.

O H4RRB i

t-j

__T e @:; ;

o [-)I

7; i

1.'

s

[3l

.7 AJ if =

,x x

T

.Q!'

i

-F t

t ' ;F-1 f-f

)

(

w i

"B" R

AD 2

f-

+Y s:

.I

}

R AJM. N.

b.4;i h*ih%kkw n m nr h'

auawaaak i

i i-

-..~g

.*-e-ev-. - -

pium

"'N-

' " ' " - * ~ ' * "

h I

,a *t &o w n w n ? v r G' " ~ ~~ * Sswewww+

~ e r $e w

. -. M s.~+g e & w -Aw

.^ -

f.e--

z 4 *WM.

q,q

-7

qm ; %-

~

4 T, ;-G.Mh mSTORM DRAINS j

e. : --- >

ga sz g $.

Jg x

PAP e.:gg e

TANK Qi BLDG.

b A.

.. RM (

g ra

1. go a

WALL

, /,,

'A' ROAD VEST x

.3 d (/

3 C

^

^

^

9 V

g

(

~

. c

^

,s.r.

oV

'l f+

• et 4

v v

w.

.P X

X BORATED s.

n.

WATER S'

y

- EI

• TANK STORAGE ed

' TANK lE nF x FARM V

'a j

n r

v.g 4

n t-

Q; 4

g ao nw.._,

e DF REACTOR ua BLDG 1

TURBINE

'M W+

r 4<

w.aN BLDG.

e d[XFMR Sis j

.[

YARD AUX.

A 7E BLDG.

o z c5 r

72 w

yp

-x y

v{ ~

p; *a a

w J

$2 1

20 z

- a x

1;s

.. g.

'.a,gc m.s q

w

yp.%

}

o YM. u.a. x=

r s NSEB

m,

• p a w- *-

e= q w ; m y,::..g _ g. w_ &g g,e ; g a s-,a @Ji -- _Tk.mun.

4-

= =. mm g _w_ ; 3,w, 3 g q. g

+7,-

_z q

_QPN@A)SW WMwatw myggpagpgggg g pg-ERPT-M0216 3

Q' '

g i

0 s

l Lw k

?*

PCB TRAN1r0RMER r!KES:

THE R11t IN Xt' CLEAR POVER P1,Alfr5 W'

Kirk Blackson h'

fi President - Blackmor hooting $teematic Technologies. Inc.

d i

One Suisitt Avenue l;M Suite 202 fort Worth. Temos 76102 7

p t

One of the more valuable asette any utility company possesses to its nuclear power h

p.

h plant. For that reason if one of these plante to out of commise1on fot any 4;tj C

period of time due to a PCB fire it can be very costly. The average down time cost 4

(

for a nuclear power plant to between 2 to a sillion do11ere a week. per unit and D

many plante have multiple units. It to eetiested that ena-half of the present f

4 C

nuclear power plante operate with PCB filled transformer equipment.

A study performed in 1984 for Nucleat Mutual Lietted and Nuclear glectric Insurance (J.

Lietted addressed the risk potential for PCB fires at nuclear generating f acilities.

G The study was performed by the National Economic Research Aeoeciation. Inc.. in i

conjunction with M6M Protection Consultante and Clayton Environmental Coueultante.

The report identified conditions where PCB filled transforsers were located in close ft E

prontaity to major oil hasarde beneath turbine generatoes. escause of the large 1;

quantities et lubricating oil required in these facilittee. a fire in a power plant (2

u.

- Mk to not untoemon. A classic esemple of *his wee a fire that occurred under the

=

yl turbine et the 30 megawatt fickway Generating Float in Coluebuse Ohio en June 23, 1'

Sf 1931. Fite damage was extensive and included tollat"*e of the tient roof. Of g

~

M("

gh course, there was an fire protection systes et the plant.

Nh Another incident occurred'apprenteately 13 years age when a fire et the Browns Terry Wuclear Power Plant taught the attention of the utility industry. Apparently

'M for leake in seale between the containment building and the Of 1

an employee checkinb 7

~

){}f~

,lv gf g auxiliary building accidentally set fire to ooes ineviating material.; The fire i

', " ' y spread under the control to,e and severely damaged table tune to the point where proepted the WRC to require certain fire protection in all nucitar power plante.

iy.

the plant vee shut down for en entended period of time. This incident is what b)

Probebility estimatse relating to the frequency of this type incident can never

'h i

be accuratet however, it to possible to estabtish feitty sceurate estiestes of jfp

-d@;d M

potential clean-up costs and down tisee.

3 In en ettempt to obtain better estimates of clean-up costs in a nuclear power plant

• ht

' g%

under reasonable lose stenarios, a study wee censissioned. This study was a joint c

venture between giocknen-Mooring Steamatic Technolostes. Inc.. (SMS TECH) and H&M h

0 i %:W Protection Consultante4).hThis joint study was conducted at a typical pressurised '

gg W

water, reactor plant sonaisting of two 1000 megawatt unite. Three specific scenarios W

1)'att electrical f ailure of a;transforest in an tectated evitch geer rooel 2) a y}

wers;8 elected and analysed for,thie' typical power plant. These scenartoe weret' k

2:

4 treneformer esposed to a $$ gallon transtettt combustion oil fire in the availlary 3

n bu11dingitend=3)h:a PCs transfereer involved in a major turbine tube

.h n

?

• • 'bL,**)*!**h*I 0WW$&&

f In the first etenariN.it'was assumed that the evitah gear rope could be completely j

Q' s assisted and that sotitseinante free the fire would be contained within that roce.

O A

y'g; Q%#mhff g4y I

gr%Me8%W6 WW# FMITN #

......_...-----------3'--'

y.,y g*mR Q' {,

W

'O j

h ERPT-M0216 gy

$y

'N Damage was estimated to be at approstostely $$00.000.

Although this toeleted evitch gear rose wee tieed only in case of escrgenty. the NRC cles41

[' _

that they would not allow the plont to operate unless the equipoent was in working 7 ettpulated condition.

Because of this, it was anticipated that the plant would be shut down because this vae a two unit nuclear plant it wee soeused thatduring the entire 10

{

However.

only one of the un're would be affected.

in the second scenario a 33 gelion drum of oil was being transported through an 7

area of the aus11tery building when it accidentally spilled and the ett ignited 4 nemt to a transfoteer containing PCg's.

Seenues of the open constructica of the availlary building (between floors and within each floot). soot fellmut could be espected to spread throughout this structure.

decontaminetton effort was estimated at approstaately 79 ell!'.en dollars.The cost for the clean-up an of approntmetely a senths. estimated the entire plant voeld be shut down including both reactore for a It was In the final ocenario a PCs transfotiner was engulfed in flames caused by an j

accidentel turbine lubs oil relaaeo.

This time the transformer was located is a open area of the turbine butiding beneath the turbine operating floor.

Again ek i

becovee of the vest openiness et the turbine building, and the positive air flov from this area into the ausiliary building it wee deemed highly probable that the Q@

O turbine building se well at the avu11tary buildleg would be contaminated.

h

[*

a1111on dollare.and decontamination costs for the third etenario were estimated at appromisstelv la 3

Clean-up oonths the clean-up operation would require. goth resetore wees supetted to be obvt duvn for

'Wbj j

in all of the scenarios no additional damage was assumed to have occurred to O8 3d M,

equipeent exposed to the fire et U

damage to the transformes won included.the combustion by-products. Also no estimate of d

The only regulatory delays anticipated Y

in the clean-up eetteetes were approximately 2 weeks te negotiate with the health e

A officiale concerning the acceptable level of decontaaltattoi. necesesey. gagnificant

!@D.

V regulatory delays caused by the NRC. epa. CSHA. etc., chid antand the outage eignifitantly beyond the estimates included in this repert.

j Another factor that sust be included as a cost but was not in thie study wMd be the purchese of t

i replacement electricity during the tima the plant vse ar.st down.

?

N the average down time cost for a unit is eatinated to be between 2 and 6 sillionAs stated earlier.

{J do11ere a week.

k g

In general, a clean-up at a nuclear power plant would be

k

}

e' clean-up in an ordinary of fice building contaminated as esiore difficult than a k

(;

Soed of the reasone are se follovet result of a FCs tire.

]j h

I.

Seth cleaning and handling of the residue froa PCg'.. related tonie compounde.

g and waste water would be complicated by the presence of radioactive asterial.

/

p Cleaning would requita additional worker protection.htch would estend the y

af clean-up stee.

i b

J Weste handling and disposal could be more coop 11cate:

{.9 ;

2.

and coetty Decause both j

toxic cheatcale and radioactive natarials could tie nvolved, o

h-n 3.

$(

Megative air pressure, typically found in the containment butiding. designed s -

to keep radioactive material free spreading to the uu111ary and turbine i;

'V; bu11dinge would provide a vehicle to spread any transformer fire conteetnants jM from the turbine bu11 ding to the avalliary building.

..y 4.

An additional ~r. a aegulatory authority. the NRC. would have to be added to the

-J M group of dettaion ashors when is came to forsulating clean-up criteria and

- @m n

operating procedurse. N.

h Health and 'sofeM pfograms would not only have to take into consideration the M g

occupational physician's and industrial hydelnist's normal concerns, but also J

ohe-would involve input from health physicists to deal with possible problema nf am-

. W-

'M-b'u e--

m n M..N;.

.k.

47[ e7 S

lp

4

nhw%pp

~

W ag i

lt ERPT-M0216 M

t yf 3

raetoectivity.

6.

Plant security which is typically enceptionally stringent in a nuclear generating facilitt, co.ild slow the clean-up effort.

l in performing decontamination et a nuclest power plant eeny of t b rencedures v111 be very staller to those used in other PCs fires. while ethere will be gutte eifferet.t Some of the elftetences are se follove l.

Air filtration grotees used to evacuate air f rom contaminated areas eget not only be able to remove the cheattel contaminente but will eleo have to remove tedioettive contesinents. It to probable that the ett filtration system will i

adversely af fect the plant's operating radioactive air contamination controle.

2.

All vaste water generated from the cleariaup activity would first have to pase through a tedioactive vaste water treatment let111ty and than throwth a FCs waste water systes. However, the capacity of most plante existing rad-waste titeteent systems appeste sufficient to handle the volume of liquid weste that vov1d be generated by such a clean-up operation.

There were also several other factore that appear to affect cost and down times

-Q 1.

14 le taperative that corrosion control procedures be implemented immediately after entinguishing the fire.

The corrosive fallout generated from o PCs fire y

toeld cause extensive damage te unpainted metal surfaces. If these surfaces M

~

were left untreated the cost end down time wovid dramatically increase because equipment could be damaged beyond repair and therefore need to be replaced.

2.

It was dierovered during the course of this study that if certain etees of the 4

plant were isolated f rom each other damage could be sinistaed. Some items to

+

be considered are as followes i

a c.

A.

The design of HVAC systems through negative pressure, smoke triggered

,j eshaust systems, etc.

0 p

g.

The sealing of all openings between areas.

-Q C.

The encasement of PCB transformere in vaults with seperate vent 11ation y

p eystems.

/,

t 7

3.

The degree of cleaninese that a plant noimally maintains with respect to W

jt radiation contemination can also ef f ect clean-up costs and down time. !! en ds stoa is contaminated with PCs and PCs by products as well se radioactive b

contesinetton, the clean up to further complicated. The worker normally le a IA

< ;1 y

able to work for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in a PCg/PCDD/PCDP environment wearing proper

.k protective gaat but if the area is additionally contaminated with radioactive 1 %

@j:"

material it le possible that the work day could be reduced to two heute er i

7 lose.

g%

M 4.

This type of lose generates coopten vestes. making disposal more difficult.

k' {

~Y S.

Contingency piene covering these types of evente should be implemented prior U

.k to the occurrence of an accident. How well an organitation is propeted for such a catastrophic event can dramatically af fect cost and down time.

iM The issue of frequency et transformer failutee lii a nucleet power plant was also 4

v.

'Q addressed in this study. It can be expected that the rate of those incidente may h;

be lower than in a cosmercial building due to better maintenance. surveillance.

d inner locks and operator action. etc. For these reasons it le estimated that the

pg annual rete of 6 a 10-$ per treneformer per year should be assumed. (2) Thema y4

-M features should reduce the likelihood of electrical or mechanical fs1Turas.

-n "i

However 's major portion of the PCB risk to derived free transformers being esposed i"

15 to esternal fires. Because of the fact that these transformers are normally loested in open areas of the plante and/or esposed to potentially severe fires such

.g Lk'.

as turbine lubricating fires it is expected that conteeination would be wide spread

a g.

f q q g M M Q,,g i

(g f

MMsc'y wou*gigWtutppg ?p tyyt.ptg+'4m d'#*"%?tFM$F"WM"@y{

'll '

ERPT-M0216

'U b

e va in the plant.

naaed en the ruulte of the aMS TBCN/M&M Protectica Consultante study. the insurante carriere for thie industry have implemented an adjustment in their rate structures for nuclear plante that have PCB equipment. It should also be meted that oost muelear power plants are self insured for the first 6 months of down time. Civen the resserth that has been toepleted. and conainerl.6 current fg techniques in decontesinatten and po11titel as well se environmental complications that exist in the United States. the risk of a PCB fire in a nuclear power plant

{

is not only signif1 tant but has catastrophic ramifications. This conclusion to based teore on the severity of such a event rather than its frequency.

4 i

.I h

o,,

n.,..

a

, r

.; g

\\r 191 13 4

s.t, m

?*

ig

t

,i h

I hC i

i

?

ll i[t i,e y

p h

' u, o

d

1. s gs

.y s

1, f

i l

f i

a b

%fy

}4

',,?

(9 1.

M&N Protettien Consultante are affiliated with tiarah and McLennan. Coopantes K

i -

_l 2.

PCB Transformers - The Riek In llueleet Power Plante, prepared by Jesse s4 q

M. Connally, P.E., = M6M Protection Consultante November 24, 1986 g

O j '

h I(

yi,

)

+' m '

n.:.

s.4 na

'; t.

gj 0%

y

[4 -

{

w' g!ng.j,

2;u

. gt 7

t eme I ED S T A IES

[

9

NtJCLE.ut HEGtJLA forsY COMMISSION us s..azmu o c :asss

)

• s.,,/

c

' /

g il0TE FOR: Document Control Desk FRCH:

Licznse Fee and Debt Collection Branch, OC/DAF The enclosed materials licensing documents are being form roea for placement on the Document Control System in accordance with the llay 21, 1984 procedures.

D

,A. /

. c3 f

License Fee and Debt' Collection Branen Division of Accounting and finance.

~

Office of the Controller.

e v-9 e

o

%