ML20239A066
| ML20239A066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1987 |
| From: | Croley B, Humenansky D, Stock F SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238F564 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8709170058 | |
| Download: ML20239A066 (27) | |
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EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM 1
(EXPANDED ASRTP)
EVALUATION OF THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM t.
SUBMITTED BY: /M ' Eff4 DATE: E-17-M FRANK STOCK TEAM LEADER
! CONCURRENCE: Nid % DATE: f-i?-F7
! DAVID HUMENANSKY EXPAND D RTP PROGRAM "< GER
/ m DATE: '[< / 7 l CONCURRENCE:/ BOB CROLEY /
DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR TICHNICAL SERVICES
/' /
i 8709170058 870909 l DR ADOCK 0500 2 WP34258/0-01838 i
EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Rancho Seco Expanded Augmented System Review and Test Program
[ASRTP] evaluation effort involves an assessment of the effectiveness of the System Review and Test Program [SRTP) and an !
analysis of the adequacy of ongoing programs to ensure that systems will continue to function properly after restart. The Expanded ASRTP is a detailed system by system review of the SRTP:as implemented on 33 selected systems and an in-depth review of the ]
engineering, modification, maintenance, operations, surveillance, inservice testing, and quality programs. It also conducts a review, on a sampling basis, of many of the numerous ongoing verification and review programs at Rancho Seco, j Six multi-disciplined teams composed of knowledgeable and experienced personnel are tasked with performing the Expanded ASRTP. Each multi-disciplined team consists of dedicated personnel !
with appropriate backgrounds to evaluate the operations, {
maintenance, engineering, and design functional areas.
In6ependence, perspective, and industry standards provided by team members with consultants, architect engineer and vendor backgrounds are joined with the specific plant knowledge of SMUD team members.
Each team performs an evaluation on a selected system using the same fundamental evaluation techniques employed by the NRC in the ASRTP inspection. System Status Reports are used as the primary source of leads for the teams. They are augmented with references to available source and design bases documents as needed. Team synergism anc communication is emphasized during the process in order to enhance the evaluation. Each team prepares a report for each comoleted selected system evaluated. This report is for the j main steam system.
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L i I 3.0 SCOPE j i
To accomplish the first objective, the steam plant team evaluated l the main steam system to determine whether:
- 1. The system was capable of performing the safety functions required by its design bases.
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- 2. Testing was adequate to demonstrate that the system )
l would perform all of the safety functions required. )
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- 3. System maintenance (with emphasis on pumps and valves) f was adequate to ensure system operability under i postulated accident conditions.
- 4. Operator and maintenance technician training was adequate to ensure proper operations and maintenance of l the system.
- 5. Human factors relative to the system and the system's q supporting procedures were adequate to ensure proper j system operations under normal and accidert conditions. 1 To accomplish the second objective, the steam plant team reviewed the programs as implemented for the main steam system in the i following functional areas:
- 1. Systems Design and Change Control 1
- 2. Maintenance
- 3. Operations and Training 4 Surveillance and Inservice Testing
- 5. Quality Assurance
- 6. Engineering Programs l
The steam plant team reviewed a nun 1ber of documents in preparation for and during the Expanded ASRTP evaluation of the main steam system. This list of documents is found in Attachment 6.1.
The primary source of leads for the team were the problems identified in the Main Steam System Status Report. Various source documents such as the USAR and Technical Specifications and available design bases documents were reviewed as needed to augment the information needed by the team.
The eva N,C,'- of the main steam system included a review of pertinent .o;tions of support systems tlat must be functional in order for the main steam system to meet its design objectives.
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CVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued) 4.1;3 The System Status Report identifies four (4) problems )
related to the perfo. nance and reliability of the MSSV acoustic monitors. An inspection of the systam design, l installation, and test requirements indicates W t the poor j reliability and performance may be the result of; i
. excessive lengths of cable which are unsupported or not j run in conduit for all 18 valves '
= bare signal cable strapped to the relief pipe for 3 valves
= calibration procedures which do not provide for 1 performance evaluation
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The performance and reliability of the MSSV acoustic monitors is necessary as a means for the monitoring of l radioactive releases in accordance with 10CFR50, App 9ndix A, Criterion 64. IRI 10]
4.1.4 In response to.SSR Problent #10, the installation of the j backup instrument air supply was evaluated. The latest calculations for the backup instrument air supply contained inaccurate assumptions regarding air consumption and bottle depletion rates. In addition, the corresponding special test procedure which is to be utilized for verifying the calculation data and alarm setpoints references an earlier revision of those calculations.
This same surveillance test procedure is also intended to verify the identified bottle depletion rates and actual air consumption rates, however, the test is performed in a cold condition without steam flow. The amount of air consumeo by the valve positioner will actually be greater when hot and l with steam flow present since the valve will require more I force to stroke. Therefore the special test orocedure is not adecuate for verifying bottle depletion rates and air consumption, without some additional testing beinq !
performed. [RI 373 [RI 47]
4.1.5 Surveillance procedure 210.03C, " Turbine Throttle Valve Fail ,
Test" does not adequately address the requirements of ASHE j Section XI with respect to documenting and trending of valve ,
closure times. l l
In addition, the verifiable results of the' test to date do :
not substantiate what may be a nonconservative assumption i contained in the USAR regarding a main steam line break I analysis. ]
5.0 SPECIFIC CONCEMS !
A list of the specific concerns the Expanded ASRTP team believes are I I
new concerns not previously identified for resolution follow; 5.1 Acknowledged (Valid) Concerns 5.1.1 Acoustic monitor signal cable installation can contribute to l poor performance and reliability of the acoustic monitors. i In addition, completed resolution to SSR Problems No. 7, 8 l and 41 does not address calibration frequencies or I performance evaluation. [RIl0] ]
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5.1.2 The surveillance procedure utilized for testing of the l' turbine throttle /stop valves does not address ASME Section XI requirements for trending of such valves. In addition, the verifiable test results to date do not adequately l substantiate the assumptions utilized in the USAR for a main l steam line break analysis. [RIl5] ]
5.1.3 During operation, the atmospheric dump valve and turbine bypass valve movements could damage the valve (s), valve j positioner, flexible hosing, or instrument air tubing which )
could render the valve inoperable. [RIl9) [RI97] {
5.1.4 The low pretsare auxiliary steam header could be exposed to l main steam pressure of 900 psig, which is beyond the component ratings of 500 psig. CRI46]
5.1.5 The backup instrument air bottle may be undersized since the design calculations developed for sizing of bottles utilize assumptions that do not represent actual conoitions during plant operations. Additionally, the special test procedure developed to verify the adequacy of t5e backup air system capacity is performed under no steam flow and cold conditions. [RI37] [RI47]
5.1.6 The MSR main steam coil could be suojected to uneven nea:up and possible tube oundle failure due to inconsistencies between operating procedures. [RI14]
5.2 Open (Potential) Concerns l J
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I LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED USAR System Status Report Technical Specifications l Master Ec;uipment List (MEL) l 1
MIMS Nucleis Process Standards AP.150, Rev. 14; Process Standards AP.156, Rev 9; Process Standards System Design Bases Overall Plant Operating Procedures B.2, Rev. 39; Plant Heatup and Startup B.3, Rev. 29; Normal Operations B.4, Rev. 41; Plant Shutdown and Cooldown i System Operating Procedures A.6, Rev. 26, Steam Generator Secondary Side Steam A.46, Rev. 20, Main Turbine System A.53, Rev. 20; Extraction Steam Reheater and N edwater Drain System A.61, Rev. 7; 125 VDC System A.62, Rev. 8; 120 VDC Vital System Emergency Operating Procedures E.03, Rev. 3; Loss of Subcooling l E.04, Rev. 7; Loss of Heat Transfer E.05, Rev. 9; Excessive Heat Transfer E.06, Rev. 7; Steam Generator Tube Rupture Annunciator Procedures Casualty Procedures C.13A, Rev.7; Remote Shutdown C.33, Rev. 2; Freeze Protection C.34, Rev. 3; Temporary ADV Nitrogen System C.36, Rev. 2; Emergency Repair of ADV Air Hoses Af ter a Fire C.37, Rev. 1; ADV Manual Leading Station ATTACHMENT 6.1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED (Continued) i l
Vendor Manuals:
H2.02-45, M19.02-313 H21.08A, N6.03 IMO, 30120-OH-01 & -02 (Tec Accelerometers).
B&W Site Bulletin 81-076 i Dresser Report SV214, Rev. 0 E&QC Hemo 81-38 ASME III, Article 9, 1968 Nameplate Data Spare Parts Listings Equipment History l IE Notice 86-05 i
DG Hemo 86-272 !
Design Specifications Design Calculations: i Z-IAS-H2084, Rev. 2, Z-IAS-H2085, Rev. 2, Z-MSS-M0430, Rev. 3, l Z-MSS-M0431, Rev. 4, l Z-MSS-M2055, Rev. O, Z-MSS-M0829, Rev. O Davis Besse TAP Report on March 2.1984 Trio Regulatory Guide 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, S & R NRC ASRTP Report Memo GVC-87-681 I&C Calibration & Maintenance Records Precursor Review Task Final Report Deterministic Failure Consequences Recommendation 0588 l
1 ATTACHMENT 6.1 l 4
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I DETAILED OBSERVATIONS - REOUESTS FOR INFORMATION During an evaluation, all notential concerns are documented on Request f for Information sheets (RIs) that are sent to the responsible l organization to receive their input concerning the potential concern.
RIs are also used to request information that the EASRTP team is having difficulty obtaining.
These RIs are considered drafts throughout the entire evaluation until i they become part of the report. Responsible organizations can accept the ,
l potential concern as valid or they may disagree with the potential concern. If they otsagree, they can submit information that convi-es-the EASRTP team members that the potential concern is not valid, or they l may redirect the EASRTP members to better focus the concern. RIs i developed during the system evaluation comprise this section of the report, i
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l ATTACHMENT 6.3
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) l RI NO: 014 ' SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-21-87
SUBJECT:
_ CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN O.P. A.6. A.46 AND i A.53 PROCEDURES DEPARTMENT: OPERATIONS COORDINATOR: R. MACIAS l
TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK l
l PROCEDURES REFERENCE 0:
0.P. A.6, Steam Generator Secondary Side System, Revision 26 0.P. A.46 Main Turbine System, Revision 20 0.P. A.53 Extraction Steam, Reheater and Feedwater Drain System, Revision 20 Concern The MSR main steam coil could be subjected to uneven heatup and possible tube bundle failure. The procedures and valve line ups used in the present configuration are not in conformance with Westinghouse recommendations for MSR mala steam coil isolation, evacuation and startup.
The Westinghouse recommendations in I.L. 1370-1482, Rev. 1, state:
- 1) " Positive isolation of the high pressure tube bundles from heating steam must be assured until the turbine' generator reaches the specified load for reheater activation. A leak off.
valve must be located downstream from the main steam shut-off valve to prevent leakage through the control valve during the startup operation."
- 2) "It is necessary to evaluate the non-condensibles from the tube bundles prior to the admission Of steam in order to warm the tubes evenly."
- 3) " Controlled admission of heating steam to the high pressure tube bundle is required in order to avoio excessive thermal shock."
- 4) " Venting of 2% of the heating steam entering each tube bundle must be vented through the vent condenser over all operating conditions."
" Failure to provide this positive isolation system can result in premature and uneven heating of the tubes with subsequent tube bowing and tube failures."
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REQUEST FCR INFORMATION RI)
RI NO: 015 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 08 13-87
SUBJECT:
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE SP.210.03C " TURBINE THROTTLE STOP VALy E FAIL TEST" DEPARTMENT: __ SYSTEM ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: J. ITTNER TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK POTENTIAL CONCERN /OUESTION:
Surveillance Procedure SP.210.3C, " Turbine Throttle Stop Valves Fail Test" does not satisfy the criteria in ASME Section XI for determining an increase in valve stroke time for power operated operability of the Turbine Throttle Stop Valves.
In addition, the verifiable results of the tests to date do not substantiate what may be a non-conservative assumption contained in the USAR regarding main stean line break analysis.
REVIEW /RESULTS:
ASME Section XI, Summer 1975, Section IWV 3110 (c) states, "the stroke time of all power operated valves shall be measured to the nearest second or 10% of the maximum allowable stroke time, whichever is less, whenever l
such a valve is full stroke tested. If an increase in stroke time SC% or more for valves with stroke times less than or equal to ten seconds is observed, test frequency shall be increased to once each nonth until I
corrective action is taKen, at wnicn time ne original test inc vency will be resumed." The Surveillance Procedure does not specify or provide l
for recording of the actual valve stroke time in the date sheet l (Enclosure 6.1). A cneck of SP.210.03C surveillance test results between l
1983 and 1986 show that on only one occasion was the valve stroke time noted (at 2.41 seconds on 8/17/84). The valve strcke time could degrade from a aesign value of .20 to .30 seconds to 3 seconds without Deing documented.
In addition, System Engineering has indicated that after the 1985 Refueling Outage, Westinghouse did not perform any documented valve tests.
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RI NO: 012 (Continued)
. All of the valves have newly installed flexible stainless steel tubing. Some of the flexible tubing are installed such that the valve movements can stretch and damage the tubing.
PV-20561. The new flexible instrument air tubing is mounted inside I
of a support and exists at right angles around a corner of the l support. The braided tubing and the corner are about 1/2" apart.
With approximately one inch movement in the south direction, the !
braided tubing will contact the support corner and the braided tubing could become damaged. The two instrument air tubings to the valve near the positioner cross over. The two tubes are close enough that they could make contact during pipe vibration and result .I in tube damage.
- PV-20564. The two new instrument air flexible tubings to the TBV are installed with no tubing slack to account for the 1.452" movement in the south direction. The resulting movement could damage the flexible tubira. l l
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REQUEST FOR INFCRFATION (RI) ,
RI NO: 046 S'YSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-27-87
SUBJECT:
POTENTIAL FOR HIGH MSS PRESSURI TO ENTER LOW PRESSURE AUXILIARY STEAM HEADER ,
1 RON LAWRENCE DEPARTHENT: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: l TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK REFERENCES
- 1) P&ID M-530, sheet 3, Rev. 17 i
- 2) SMUD Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Systems Training Manual-Main Turbine-Chapter 16 and 16 c. I
- 3) Main steam system design bases, Revision 1 (advance copy) l
- 4) MEL for GSC and ASC
- 5) Line designation sheet no. 158, 162, 298 I
- 6) Piping Design Specification Rev. 9 I
- 7) P&ID M-537, sheet 3, Rev. 13 l POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION:
The low pressure ASC header could De exposed to main steam pressures of 900 psig, which is beyond the ASC component ratings. This can result in !
a pipe rupture or component failure causing a loss of plant auxiliaries l due to loss of the ASC header. Additional piping and component damage J could also result from the energy release from the rupturc or failure..
The main steam at 900 psig (from Ref. 5) is normally supplied to the ASC through a pressure reducing Valve PV-36014A and/or PV-36014B (see Ref. 7) at a maximum of 25G psig. An alternate steam source, as identified in Ref. 2 and snown in Ref. 1, is througn valve MSS-035 and line l
30125-4"-EAI to the gland seal steam. MSS-035 is shown as normally i l open. This is an error since the olant configuration is normally closed. However, with MSS-035 cpen, :he 900 psig main steam can potentially enter the ASC heacer since there is no pressure reducing valve downstream of valve MSS-035.
The Ref. 4 MEL sheets for the ASC header were reviewed for maximum pressure that would occur in the ASC valves. These valves are:
yp1VJ MAX, PRESSURE (PSIG) l ASC-470 500 ASC-587 500 ASC-603 500 ASC-601 500 l
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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) .
RI NO: 047 SYSTEM CODE: MSS /IAS ISSUE DATE: 07-30-87
SUBJECT:
DESIGN BASIS TESTING OF BOTTLED AIR BACXUP.FOR ADVs _
DEPARTMENT: SYSTEMS ENGlNLERING COORDINATOR: JOHN ITTNER q
TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION CONCERN: STP-774, Rev. O will verify that the backup bottle system has the capacity to meet the design basis requirements for the valves in the cold condition with no steam flow, however it will not verify adequate capacity for'the valves in actual operating condition. Since the valve j requires more force to stroke'when it is hot with steam flow present, tne '
total amount of air consumed by the positioner will be greater.
Therefore, STP-774 alone is inadequate to verify backup bottle system capacity. J The Design Basis for the bottled air backup system for Atmospheric Dump l Valves (ADVs) and Turbine Bypars Valves (TBVs) includes a requirement I that the bottled air backup systems provide the capability to "cperate and control" the valves for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, for the EFIC or QA Class 1 backup l system, and 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> for the Appendix R or QA class 2 system. STP-774, j Rev 0 is intended to verify that the backup bottle system has sufficient capacity to meet the design basis. However, STP-774, Rev. O is performed with ADVs and TBVs cold with no steam flow.
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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI)
I RI NO: 097 SYSTEM CODE: __ MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-31-87 l
SUBJECT:
BACKUP INSTRUMENT AIR FOR THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES SYSTEM ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: J, ITTNER DEPARTHENT:
i TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK j POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION 1
Backup instrument air tubing for the ADVs could fracture as a result of valve movement, leaving backup instrument air inoperable for the valves.
Inconsistencies exist in the installation of the backup instrument air )
tubing, j DETAILS:
During a system walkdown and review the following discrepancies were noted for the ADV backup instrument air tubing:
o Various horizontal and vertical tubing runs between the ADVs and the control panel were found to have axial mov6 ment througn their clamps, while other tubing runs were clamped tight, allowing no movement.
o Tube clamps along various runs were found to be the incorrect l size allowing movement of the tube in the clamp (3 axis).
o Tubing clamps were found with no jam nut installed, jam nutt installed loose, or jam nutt installed with the clamo loose. ,
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