ML20236A998

Expanded Augmented Sys Review & Test Program (Expanded Asrtp) Evaluation of 480-Volt AC Distribution Sys

ML20236A998
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	10/07/1987
From:	Croley B, Humenansky D, Marshall T SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20236A981	List: ML20236A978 ML20236A989 ML20236A992 ML20236A998 ML20236B002 ML20236B005 ML20236B010
References
NUDOCS 8710230287
Download: ML20236A998 (26)

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W. EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM.

(EXPANDED ASRTP)

C EVALUATION 0F THE 480 VOLT AC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

't . SUBMITTED BY:

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DATE: /4-d'((

~ THOMAS N.'MARnlALL TEAM LEADER W ~5k CONCURRENCE: I ,d DATE: )b -l,- 8 7 AVID HUMENANSKY

[EXPANDEDEASRTPPROGRAMMA(NAGER

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CONCURRENCE:

/ B0B CROLEY DATE: /#/7/[7

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DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR CHNICAL SERVICES t

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a.  ; --/1 0 INTRODUCTION

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L , [f 4.0 4VERAll RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 6

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[m#,. . 1) . , , G6.0 ATTACHMENTS;fj

'o List of Documents Reviewed 6.1

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6.2 Status of RIs 6.3 DetatiedObservations-RequestsforInformation s

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I EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEH AND TEST PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE 480 VOLT AC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Rancho Seco Expanded Augmented System Review and Test Program

[EASRTP] evaluation effort involves an assessment of the effectiveness of the System Review and Test Program [SRTP] and an analysis of the adequacy of ongoing programs to ensure that systems will continue to function properly after restart. The Expanded EASRTP is a detailed system by system review of the SRTP as implemented on 33 selected systems and an in-depth review of the engineering, modification, maintenance, operations, surveillance, inservice testing, and quality programs. It also conducts a review; on a samplir-) basis, of many of the numerous ongoing verification and review programs at Rancho Seco.

Six multi-disciplined teams composed of knowledgeable and experienced personnel are tasked with performing the Expanded EASRTP. Each multi-disciplined team consists of dedicated personnel ,

with appropriate backgrounds to evaluate the operations, maintenance, engineering, and design functional areas.

Independence, perspective, and industry standards provided by team members with consultants, architect engineer and vendor backgrounds are joined with the specific plant knowledge of SMUD team members.

Each team performs an evaluation on a selected system using the same fundamental evaluation techniques employed by the NRC in the EASRTP inspection. System Status Reports are used as the primary source of leads for the teams. They are augmented with references to available source and design bases documents as needed. Team i synergism and communication is emphasized during the process in J order to enhance the evaluation. Each team prepares a report for j each completed selected system evaluated. This report is for the j 480 Volt AC Distribution System. l i

. 2.0 PURPOSE The objectives of the Expanded EASRTP evaluation are to (1)' assess the adequacy of activities and systems:in' support of restart.and (2).

evaluate the effectiveness of established' programs.for' ensuring safety during plant operation'after restart..

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.3.0 SCOPE To accomplish the first objective, the Power-Systems team evaluated i l the 480 Volt AC Distribution system to determine whether. ,

l 1.. The system was capable of performing the safety functions required by its design bases.

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2. Testing was' adequate to demonstrate that the system would perform all of the safety functions required.

3. System maintenance.(with emphasis on pumps and valves) was adequate to ensure system operability under postulated accident conditions.  ;

4. Operator and maintenance technician training was, adequate to ensure proper operations and maintenance of -

the system. l

5. Human factors relative to the system and the system's supporting procedures were adequate to ensure proper system operations under. normal and accident conditions.-

To accomplish the second objective, the team reviewed the programs as implemented for the system in the following functional areas:

1. Systems Design and Change Control '

2. Maintenance

3. Operations and Training

4. Surveillance and Inservice Testing

5. Quality Assurance

6. Engineering Programs The team reviewed a number of documents in preparation for and during the Expanded EASRTP evaluation. This list of documents is found in Attachment 6.1.

The primary source of leads for the team were the problems identified in the 480 Volt AC Distribution System Status Report.

Various source documents such as the USAR and Technical Specifications and available design bases documents were reviewed as needed to augment the information needed by the team. l The evaluation of the 480 Volt AC Distribution system included a  !

review of pertinent portions of support systems that must be functional in order for the 480 Volt AC Distribution system to meet its design objectives.

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4.0x OVERALL RESULTS AND 'ONCLUSIONS C

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. l L ~ The more significant.. issues identified pertainingLto the adequacy of L

'the SRTP-and the' effectiveness of programs to ensure continued safe-operations after restart are summarized below. The summary focuses'

- on the weaknesses identified during the evaluation. . Attachment 6.3 provides detailed findings:by providing-the Request for Information (RI) forms 'that are used by the Expanded EASRTP teams'to identify

.po6ential concerns during the evaluation. Section 5.0. lists the specific concerns. identified by the teams. The-numbers'in. brackets

.after each individual summary or, concern refer to the corresponding- .

RIs.in: Attachment 6.3. '

4.1 ' Operations

-The Team found instances where the system was operated improperly because Operators were not aware of procedure changes. The-potential exists for overloading' tie lines between 480 Volt Nuclear Service buses because of procedure inadequacies. [RI 262] [RI- 265]

'4.2 ' Maintenance The Team feels-that there is a lack of adequate attention to .

transformer protection. Some protective relays are.not addressed in any procedure and may not be adequately, tested. Alarm setpoints are not adequately addressed and some apptfar to'be set for inappropriate values. Some transformers have no monitoring devices or alarms. No

. program currently identifies all components which must be maintained  !

or periodically changed to maintain the qualified life of I equipment. [RI 2331 [RI 279] [RI 280]

The Team also identified that several circuit breakers have been )

removed from compartments with no documentation of where it was  !

moved and no justification for the deviation from design )

. configuration. [RI 282) j 4.3 Quality Assurance The Team identified several QA concerns with respect to the 480 Volt Distribution System. Concerns identified included: minimal QA involvement, inadequate receipt inspections, inadequate documentation and lack of resolutions to discrepancies. Records of inspectors' training and certifications were also inadequate.

-[RI 267] [RI 261]

. S '. 0 ~ SPECIFIC CONCERNS A list of the specific concerns the Expanded EASRTP team believes are new concerns not previously identified for resolution follows: l 5.1' Acknowledged (Valid) Concerns i 5.1.1 Some changes to control room operating procedures are made without operator awareness. [RI 262]

5.1.2 Inadequacies in procedures could lead to overloading'of tie l lines between nuclear services buses. [RI 265]

5.1.3 Some 480V circuit breakers are removed without adequate documentation leading to a configuration control problem. 1

[RI 282]

4 5.1.4 There is no program which currently addresses replacement of components required to maintain qualification of Westinghouse Motor Control Centers. [RI 279]

5.1.5 Due to lack of correct setpoints and identification numbers-for the instrumentation on station service transformers, there is a potential for. transformer damage along with personnel safety and environmental concerns. [RI 280]

5.1.6 Some flex conduits are not grounded in accordance with procedures. [RI 261]

5.1.7 Sudden pressure relays on Oil Filled Transformers are not adequately addressed. [RI 233]

1 5.1.8 Some switchgear did not receive proper inspection by qualified personnel prior to use in the plant. [RI 267] ,

5.1.9 The Team' feels the corrective actions associated with.

transformer trouble alarms should be completed in a more j timely manner than currently prioritized. [RI 270]

5.2 Open (Potential) Concerns None

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6.0 ATTACHMENTS-6.1 List of Documents Reviewed' 6.2 Status of RIs-6.3 Detailed Observations Requests for Information-i

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED

.480 Volt AC Distribution System Status Report System Design BasesLDB-EDS 5421 (Draft)  :

Rancho Seco Technical. Specifications Rancho'Seco Updated Safety Analysis Report Quality Control Instruction QCI-12, Rev. 3 Master ECN List.

Quality Assurance NCR Log ECN R-1157;'Rev. 1 Control Room Shift Relief Checklists Electrical Alarm.and Annunciation System Review, 480V AC MCCs, Impell

' Report 01-0790-1620, Rev. O Receiving' Inspection Data Reports Nos. 1690'and 942 SMUD Specification E7.02.1, Technical Specification for' Motor Control' Centers (Nuclear) Documentation (Vendor). file at Records Management' l Inspectors Certification and Qualification File Inspector Training and Qualification Requirements, QAIP.18, Rev.- 1 i Operations' Special-Order Book 1987. '

Plant Systems Preparation Guide 00-21-I-6300. '

Vital Electrical Distribution System (4160V and below) Licensed Operator .

Training Program 00-21-I-6300 l Systems Training Manual, Chapter 43, Vital Electrical Distribution (4160V '

and below)

Operator Reading Assignment OA-87-A-0200-06/30/87

. Design Criteria 5104.2, Rev. 2, Selection and Sizing for Power Cables Design Guide 5204.9, initial issue, Electrical System Design Master Equipment List  ;

General Electric Manual for Overcurrent Relays i Rancho Seco Process Standards I Quality Assurance Audit Report 778 dated 03-21-86 i Auxiliary Electrical and Emergency Power Audit 01-02-86 through 01-24-86 Quality Assurance Audit Report 87-03 dated 06-19-87 Reactor Startup and Shutdown Audit 04-10-87 through 05-28-87 Abnormal Tag Reports 3422 and 3423 Design Criteria 5104.7, Rev. 1, Control and Protective Relaying Trip Report #69 Maintenance Record on 2E108 Licensee Event Reports for 1985, 1986 and 1987 Occurrence Description Reports Nos. 79, 113, 350 and 440 General 11ectric Motor Control Center E7.02-278 ITE Motor Control Center E7.01-82 l

, Westinghouse Five Star Motor Control Center E7.02.1-57 i 480V, CLIE Motor Control Centers for NSEB, DG Bldg and Aux Bldg NRC Generic Letter 83-28 ,

ITE 4160/480 Volt Transformers E7.01-83 .

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ATTACHMENT 6.1 l

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t . LIST OF. DOCUMENTS REVIEHED' (Continued) 1 Procedures .

A.59, Rev. 21,. 480. Volt Electrical System ,

RSAP-0507, Rev; 0, Change Notices to Procedures

~ Annunciator Procedure for Panel H2ES. Draft, Rev. 15~.

.IDADS Annunciator Procedure, Draft, Rev. 3

-QAP 6, Rev. 4 QC Inspection 1

.QAP-17, Rev. 5, Nonconforming Material Control .

AP.23, Rev. O, Equipment. Labeling  !

l A.59,1Rev. 22 Draft, 480. Volt Electrical System AP.23.03, Rev.t0, Logs and Rounds EM.152A, Oil' Filled Power Transformers. Maintenance and Testing  ;

l C.109, Loss of 480 Volt Nuclear Service Bus 3A C.115, Loss of 480 Volt Bus 3D1 C.116, Loss 'of 480 Volt Bus 302 C.117,' Loss of 480 Volt Bus 3E AP.26, Abnormal Tag Procedure RSAP-0803, Rev. 1, Hork Request C.32,-Rev. 4, Onsite Oil Spill. .

' NEP 5304.8C, Electrical Cable Installation and Termination RSAP-505, SDC Distribution Control RSAP-503 -Design Change Document Control RSAP-502, Rancho Seco Procedure Control RSAP-507. Change' Notices to Procedures .

STP.981, 4160V AC Bus 4A Load Shedding Isolation Control Switch Test ,

STP.979, 480V AC Bus 3A Isolation Control Switch Test  !

EH.1528, Dry-Type Power Transformer Maintenance and Testing Drawinas E-208 Sheet 10, Rev.16 Elementary Diagram E-208 Sheet 42, Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram E-304 Sheet 54, DCN IN-ECN 3478 E-304 Sheet 54, DCN 3A-ECN 1392 DCNs for ECN A-5293 E-101, Rev. 21, Main One Line Diagram E-208 Sheets 10 & 12, 13A, 13H, 13I, 13J E-105 Sheets 8 through 37 H-287 Sheet 2, Plant Effluent Drainage _ System E-201-08.

E-100 Sheet 2 Calculatismi ,

Z-EDS-E0696 Rev. O, Z-FPP-E0736 Draft, Z-EDS-E0117, Rev. 0 '

ATTACHMENT 6.1 l

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEHED (Continued)

Nonconformance Reports NCR 3696, NCR 5462 Rev. O, NCR 5463 Rev. O. S-4322, S-4401, S-4450, S-4850, S-4362, S-4962,-S-5012, S-5081, S-5083, S-5014, S-5194, S-5291, S-5292,-S-5319, S-5462, S-5463, S-5582, S-5584, S-5591, S-5601, S-5602, i S-5620, S-5640, S-5641, S-5642, and others i ECHI .

R-1157, A-5293 Rev. 1, A-36600, A-3660E, R-1128. R-1300A Rev. O Work Reauests 4 HR 84249, HR 127993, HR 114847, HR 133144, HR 112247 ,

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ATTACHMENT 6.1 l l

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STATUS OF RIs Attachment 6.2 provides RI status as of this report date. An RI is considered closed if the Team Leader was convinced a potential concern was not valid or not significant enough to be an RI. An RI would also be closed if requested information was provided. All other RIs are open.

Acknowledged RIs are open RIs that have been accepted as valid by the responsible organization and have been stated as concerns in Section 5.0.

RI NUMBER STATUS i

233 Acknowledged 234 Closed 261 Acknowledged 262 Acknowledged 265 Acknowledged 267 Acknowledged 270 Acknowledged 279 Acknowledged 280 Acknowledged 282 Acknowledged l

ATTACHMENT 6.2 .

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DETAILED OBSERVATIONS'-~REOUEST FOR INFORMATION  :

During an evaluation, all potential concerns.are documented on Request.

lfor Information sheets (RIs) that are sent.to the responsible 4- organization to receive their input concerning.the potential concern. -!

RIs are also used to request information-that the EASRTP team is having difficulty obtaining.

These~ RIs are considered . drafts throughout the entire evaluation until

.they become part of.the report. Responsible organizations can accept-the potential concern as valid or they may disagree with the potential concern. DIf they disagree, they can submit information that convinces the EASRTP team members that the potentialiconcern is not valid, or they

'may redirect the EASRTP. members.to better focus the concern. RIs

. developed during the system evaluation' comprise this section'of the report.

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i ATTACHMENT 6.3

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI)

RI NO: 233 SYSTEM CODE: 480VAC ISSUE DATE: 09-30-87 l l

SUBJECT:

SUDDEN PRESSURE RELAYS l J

I DEPARTMENT: MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR: J. DARKE/4817--

l TEAM LEADER: 'T. MARSHALL /3965 i

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POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

1 Sudden Pressure Relays on station service transformers X43A1, X43D1, X43D2 and X43E1 have not been addressed adequately. This creates the potential for subjecting the plant to transients and loss of generation. j

. Maintenance Procedures do not address testing the sudden pressure! f relays. '

. Maintenance Procedures do not address testing required before re-energizing the transformers after a sudden pressure trip. i

. Casualty Procedures C.109, C.115, C.116 and C.117_ do not address the sudden pressure relays and the need for transformer testing prior to re-energization.

. Annunciator procedure for H2ES, windows 09, 43, 60 and 77 do not reflect that the 486 lock-out relay may be activated by the sudden pressure relay. ,

. There is no identification on sudden pressure relay or the reset switch located on the transformer.

. No Calibration Data sheets exist for these relays.

. Per interview, the relays are checked to function but no calibration or set point check is performed. Even the function check is not documented.

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n C REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) g RI:NO: 234 SYSTEM CODE: 480VAC ISSUE DATE: 09-21-87

SUBJECT:

GROUND FAULT PROTECTION ON 2E108 AND 2C104 DEPARTMENT:- DESIGN ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: T.-TELFORD/3849 TEAM LEADER: T. MARSHALL /3965 POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

The Gland Steam Exhauster A-344A,. breaker.2E108 may cause the loss of

-MCC S2E1 on a ground fault because 2E108 does not have a ground fault relay.

• System Design Bases 2.3.2C states: ."The. purpose of ground-fault protection is to provide coordination such that the protective device closest to the load will operate first in the event of a -i fault." -

. Trip Report #69 states: "The 2E1 bus lost power when a gland steam )

exhauster fan ground faulted-and tripped the 480V breaker supplying-the bus " .The loss of the 2E1 bus resulted in the explosion of the generator'and weeks of lost generating revenue.

. Maintenance record on 2E108 lists-five work requests on problems found on the Gland _ System Exhauster A since 1982. These problems include twice replacing the motor and three breaker trips.

. Interviews have revealed that A-344A motars are in a harsh environment. This type of motor is not o? signed to operated in such a harsh environment.

. Gland Steam Exhauster A-3448 motor has been replaced three times, replaced bearings, breaker tripped on thermal overloads and "C" phase burnt in half.

. THIS RI IS TO BE CONSIDERED CLOSED. THE CONCERN IDENTIFIED IS ADEOUATELY INDENTIFIED IN GLAND STEAM AND CONDENSER SYSTEM INVESTIGATION REPORT. PROBLEMS NUMBER 1. 4 AND 6. TRACKING OF RESOLUTIONS HILL BE DONE UNDER THAT SYSTEM.

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REQUEST.FOR INFORMATION (RI)

RI'NO: 261 ' SYSTEM CODE: 480VAC ISSUE DATE: 09-24-87

SUBJECT:

' FLEX CONDUIT IN THE NSEB DEPARTMENT: DESIGN ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: T. TELFORD/3849 TEAM LEADER: T.' MARSHALL /3965-POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

1 1/2"f and larger liquid tight. flexible ~ power conduit is not grounded per Construction Methods and Procedures Section 4.7 Rev 1 or NEP-5304.11C

. Construction Specification for Grounding. Installation Section 5.4.

Field inspection of.the grade elevation of the NSEB (4A2, 3A2, 2A3, 3B2, 2B3 and 482) has uncovered a number of 1 1/2" and larger conduit that do not have external ground jumpers.

M81165 M81174 .M81197 L81053 L81064 M81166 M81175 M81198 L81055 L81065 M81167 M81176 L81059 L81105 M81170- M81177 L81060 L81106 M81171 M81187 L81061 L81107 M81173 M81192 L81062 L81108 The Construction Methods and Procedures was the document used for the installation of grounding in the NSEB at the time of its construction.

The Construction Methods and procedures states:.

4.7 Hhen flexible conduit is used with rigid steel power conduits grounding ferrules shall be used with type UA liquid tight flexible conduit'up 1-1/4" in diameter and length 6' or less. 1-1/2" and larger' liquid tight flexible power conduit shall be jumpered with a-bare copper conducted, sized equal to or greater than the largest conductor in the conduit, but not exceeding 2/0 AWG.

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION-(RI)

,RI NO: 262' SYSTEM CODE: GENERIC ISSUE DATE: 09-24-87

SUBJECT:

OPERATORS'ARE NOT AWARE OF CHANGES TO CONTROL ROOM OPERATING PROCEDURES DEPARTHENT:~ OPERATIONS COORDINATOR: R. MACIAS/4589 i.

TEAM LEADER: TOMMY MARSHALL /3965 POTENTIAL' CONCERN /0UESTION: -

Control Room operators are not always aware of changes made to Plant Operating Manuals, Casualty Procedures, and Administrative Procedures, particularly when the changes are made by Site Document Control Clerks.

-This may. lead to the plant not being operated in accordance with procedures which.could affect plant, personnel,.and equipment safety.

. On.9/15/87 a system walkdown on 480 volt MCC's revealed a Procedure

-Interim Change Notice, PICN-01.had been issued on 7/22/87 for alarm cutout switch operation of MCC's 2A2 -2A3, 2A4, 2B2, 283 and 2B4.

The alarm. cutout switches for MCC's 2B3 and 208 were not in the'-

proper position per PICN-01. The Control Room was informed, an ODR was written for procedure violation of A.59, and the alarm cutout switches were placed in the proper position.

c On 9/22/87 a follow up system walkdown was made and revealed that a Procedure Interim Change Notice PICN-03 had been made to A.59, 480 volt Electrical System, to include additional MCC's 2C8, 2C9, 2D8 and 9/2/87. -Yet alarm cutout switches on MCC 2C9 were not in the proper position per PICN-03. The Control Room was informed, an ODR was written and the alarm cutout switches were returned to the required position.

. On both occasions, the shift supervisors that the 00R's were turned in to didn't know that the new alarm cutout switches were covered by A.59 until they looked at the Procedure Interim Change Notices.

. Fo0Tr separate shift supervisors stated that when SDC clerks place I procedures or changes in Control Room manuals they are not aware of what changes are made.

. Control Room personnel on two different crews when asked said that they didn't know what changes were put in Control Room manuals when SDC clerks made changes.

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) l RI NO: 162 (Continued) 8 out of 9 Procedure Interim Change Notices and Procedure Temporary I Change Notices placed in Control Room manuals on 9/22/87 were not included in the Procedure Change Section of the Shift Relief Checklists for the shift supervisor, assistant shift supervisor, or  ;

the Control Room operator on the days of 9/22/87, 9/23/87 or 9/24/87. '

. In an interview with an SDC clerk, she confirmed that SDC clerks  !

make manual changes in the Control Room and Control Room personnel I are not informed. When procedures were left to be placed in manuals l before, they would get lost. '

One shift supervisor. referred to a shift when the Reactor Building Purge was to be placed in service. A large amount of time was lost i when the crew discovered that the procedure A.14 has been changed I and had to be reviewed at length prior to starting the purge. If the crew had known-about the change earlier they would have been familiar with the procedure and a short review would have been possible. .This could be serious depending on the system and .

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RIT RI NO:- 265 SYSTEM CODE: 480VAC ISSUE DATE: '09-25-87

SUBJECT:

-480 VOLTS SWITCHGEAR TIE LINES CAPACITY

- DEPARTMENT:- OPERATION' COORDINATOR: R. MACIAS/4589 TEAM LEADER: TOMMY MARSHALL /3965 POTENTIAL ~ CONCERN /00ESTION:

Inadequacies in. Operation Procedure A.59,-480 Volt Electrical' System, .

would lead.to exceeding electrical loading of the tie. lines between 480-volt nuclear service buses.

Tie' lines have been provided between the Auxiliary Building and Nuclear

. Service Electrical building 480 volt nuclear service buses. Draft .

Operation Procedure A.59 does not preclude use of the tie lines but-limits its operation to cold shutdown of the plant. The procedure allows a maximum of,2000 amperes to. flow through the tie lines. This is in excess of. tie lines capacity of.533 amperes as determined-in Calculation Z-EDS-E0117. Rev. 0.

The procedure does not identify how the current flowing through tie lines will be kept below the maximum allowable current since the Control Room does not have capability to monitor. the electrical' load in amperes for 480 volt nuclear service buses.

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION.(RI)

'RI NO:. 267 SYSTEM CODE:- 480VAC . ISSUE DATE: 09-30-87

SUBJECT:

. CERTIFICATION /00ALIFICATION OF OC INSPECTORS AND ADEOUACY OF RECEIPT-INSPECTION FOR VENDOR DOCUMENTATION e

, DEPARTMENT: OUALITY ASSURANCE COORDINATOR: N. SAMPSON/4673 TEAM LEADER: TOMMY-MARSHALL /3965 POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTIONi There are indications that Q-Class IE MCCs S2A2, S2B2, S2A3, S283,'S2A4' and'S2B4.did- not receive proper inspection by' qualified, personnel prior 4 to use in the plant. This is. based on a review of inspection results,.- 1 vendor documents, and Quality Assurance records on file.

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'1. . The QC' inspector who performed inspections on rework per the disposition to NCR 3696, and signed off Work Request #84249 indicating inspections were satisfactory was. 'not certified as

' required by.QAP 6."QC Inspection". The inspections were performed on 9/10/84, his certifications were valid for the period 6/1/82 through 6/1/84. . There were no subsequent records to indicate-he was certified at the time inspections were made.

2. The QC inspector who performed inspections per the requirements of RIDR No. 942 was not certified to perform the inspection (per review of his certification / qualification file). His certification /

qualification file indicates that his certifications were effective during the period 12/23/86 through 12/19/89. The inspections were performed 10/11/82.

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3. Inspection item 6e, on RIDR No. 1690, required the inspector to I verify that the wiring installation conforms to paragraph 9.5.11 of )

SMUD Specification E.7.02.1 (for lE MCC's S2A4 and S2B4). The '

inspector failed to stamp or initial this inspection item to indicate that is was acceptable. Therefore, it is not apparent that this inspection item is satisfactory. Additionally item No. 7 on this RIDR required review and approval of the documentation by Quality Assurance and Generation Engineering prior to acceptance / release of material. The RIDR does not reflect, in the appropriate block, that this approval was obtained.

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l REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) l RI NO: 251 (Continued)

4. Appendix 9A of Specification E.7,02.1 required that the Vendor

' (Westinghouse) furnish an Environmental Qualification Report for the Q-Class 1E MCC's. Inspection item No. 6a of RIDR No.1690 is stamped / initialed by the QC inspector indicating that this report was received. A review of the documentation package revealed that the report was not on file.

5. Inspection item No. 9 on RIDR No. 942 required the QC inspector to l " verify each breaker cubicle against single-line diagram as to proper size of starters, breaker ratings and accessories. Item No. 11 required that he visually inspect that size 3 and larger starters have 480V operating coils". These inspections were not performed. The inspector indicated in the remarks section of the l

RIDR " Unable to Verify". This RIDR was for Q-Class 1E HCC's, S2A2, S2A3, S282 AND S283.

6. The documentation package for MCC's $2A2, S2A3, S282 AND S2B3 does not contain an Environmental Qualification Report as required by Appendix 9A of Specification E7.01.1. The document package does not contain a Certificate of Conformance Report, stamped by a Professional Engineer, indicating that the.MCC's conform to the Quality requirements of the Spec., and were fabricated and i manufactured in accordance with the requirements of the l Codes / Standards (itemized in E.7.02.9).

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7. Item No. 7 in the Westinghouse Environmental Qualification Program for Class 1E MCC's document No. 55893-EQP Rev. 3 (on file at Records Management) indicates:

"A test report as specified in IEEE 649.-1980 will be provided and will include:

• Contract No.

• Listing of all Class IE safety related equipment supplied by Westinghouse Control Center Division to the Customer, the qualified life of each and the methods of qualification.

= Test or operational facility identification.

• Test Plant, equipment specification and objective.

. Pass / fail criteria.

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• Identification of critical components or material subject to aging and/or wear and replacement schedule.

>,' s e REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) j RI NO: 251 (Continued)

. Descriptionlof-analytical methods used.

. ' Recommended Preventative Maintenance Program.

. Equipment performance ' specifications.

. Signatures of an official of Westinghouse Control Center and registered professional Engineer."

This report,'in .the~ above format, was not contained in the documentation package for the 1E HCC's.

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-REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI)

RI NO: 270 SYSTEM' CODE: 480 ISSUE DATE: 09/29/87 4 4

SUBJECT:

TRANSFORMER TROUBLE ALARM _

DEPARTMENT: NED COORDINATOR: T. TELFORD/3849 l TEAM LEADER: T.N. MARSHALL /3965-POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

1 NCR# S4322, System Status Report problem #31 covering Nuclear Service  !

transformers X43A2'and X43B2A trouble alarm in the Control Room, was i given a priority 3. status. This appears to be inappropriate in light of i the following:  !

Presently, plant design provides necessary trouble alarms in the Control -

l Room for nuclear service and non-nuclear service transformers located in the auxiliary building and transformer alley. However, no trouble alarms '

exist for the' nuclear service transformers installed in the NSEB. These- .

transformers energize the 480V class 1 buses that provide power to vital. l equipment including; auxiliary feedwater-valves, TDI diesel generator auxiliaries, and essential HVAC units. Previously, tie lines were used to power the 480 volt Nuclear Service Buses in the NSEB from Aux Bldg Nuclear Services buses. However, the proposed' design and technical specification amendment eliminates this tie line during plant operation.

Failure.of these transformers will result in a loss of Nuclear Service c Buses and will place the plant in an LCO condition.  !

Since these transformers are in operation, it is possible that the plant could be placed in an LCO condition if the transformer trouble is not 3 known in time to take necessary action before any 480 volts nuclear i service bus is inoperable because the temperature alarms are not installed. The-temperature alarms will alert the Control Room when the temperature increase caused by winding overheating which is the primary cause of transformer failure.

l During the investigation, it was found that all the wiring and alarm points for the computer are in place. However, the instruments are purchased but not installed because of their present low priority.

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,  ! REQUEST FOR!INFORMATION (RI).

RI NO: '279 SYSTEM CODE: 480V ISSUE DATE: 09/29/87

SUBJECT:

. '0 QUALIFICATION OF WESTINGHOUSE CLASS IE MOTOR CONTROL CENTER  ;

DEPARTMENT: ' MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR: J. DARKE/4817 TEAM LEADER: . T. MARSHALL /3965 POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

There is a' potential for loss of Westinghouse Class'1E Nuclear Safety Related 480V AC Five~ Star Motor Control Centers-.(MCC's) due to a failure of a device;;omponent operating beyond its Qualified Life. Also the potential exists for. degradation'of the system due to the failure to

replace.. device / components:as specified by the manufacturer in order to maintain the qualifications of the MCC's.

The Westinghouse Class 1E huclear Safety Related 480 Volt AC Five Star MCC's are used in the NSEB,-Diesel Generator Bldg and the Auxiliary B1dg.

The Vendor Manual .E.7,02.1-57, includes a' list of'evices/ d components.

.with their qualified life and replacement schedule. The certificate of compliance and. statement of qualified life from Westinghouse for these MCC's also references this qualified life and replacement schedule-included in the vendor manual to maintain the qualified life of the MCC's. l Presently neither the existing Preventive Maintenance Program nor any proposed programs include the qualified life and replacement schedule necessary to maintain the qualifications of the Westinghouse five star MCC's.

The MCC's in question where installed in 1982 and 1983 and the qualified life and replacement schedule requires replacement of some parts after 5.5 years which will expire at the end of 1987 and into 1988.

IT IS SUGGESTED THAT PAG CONSIDER THIS CONCERN A " VALID COVERED" CONCERN AND INCORPORATE IT HITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERIC ISSUE IDENTIFIED IN 1 RI #173. j l

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-l rJfo REQUEST-FOR INFORMATION (RI)

'RI NO: 280 SYSTEM CODE: -480V ISSUE DATE: 09/29/87

SUBJECT:

~ INSTRUMENTATION ON TRANSFORMER X43A1. D1. D2 & El DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: T. TELFORD/3849 i TEAM LEADER: T.N.' MARSHALL /3965 POTENTIAL' CONCERN /00ESTION:

Due .to lack of correct identification numbers and setpoints for the instrumentation on station service transformer X43 A1, Dl, D2 and El there is a potential for transformer damage along with personnel safety and environmental concerns.

The TemperatureLIndicators (TI's),' Temperature Indicating Switch High

-(TISH's), Pressure Indicators.(PI's) and Pressure Switch High/ Lows. j (PSHL's)- are not all identified or tagged with their unique .

1 identification numbers. Most of.them are only identified with'the transformer trouble. alarms in the Control Room.

The .TISH setpoints.on the Calibration sticker for the TI's and TISH's don't match those setpoints in Process Standards (AP.167) nor in the

-Annunciator Procedure.

The PSHL's have no identification numbers and therefore are not in the

-Instrument Calibration records, the MEL or in Process Standards.

The setpoints on the PI Calibration sticker for pressure and vacuum (PSHL's) are not in Process Standards. These setpoints also exceeded the values in the limits section of Process Standards AP.167. Since these setpoints are also above the setpoint for the pressure relief valve, the relief valves could lift and release oil containing PCB's without an annunciator alarm in the Control Room.

IT IS SUGGESTED THAT PAG CONSIDER THIS CONCERN A " VALID COVERED" CONCERN AND INCORPORATE IT HITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERIC ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN RI #0,55 AND THE SETPOINT VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) l RI NO: 282 SYSTEM CODE:; 480V ISSUE.DATE: 09/29/87-

SUBJECT:

BREAKER DOCUMENTATION DEPARTMENT: _0PERATIONS COORDINATOR: R. MACIAS/4589 TEAM LEADER: T. MARSHALL /3965 -

j POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION:

i There is a configuration control problem due to lack of appropriate documentation on breakers. '

Breaker 3D10 Reactor Building Air Heater EDH A535, has been removed and'- j a fiber' board cover installed over the opening. There is no Abnormal Tag j nor deficiency tag on the breaker cubicle. There is.also no open work l request against the breaker. The present location of the breaker is {

unknown. Drawing E-105 SHS shows a breaker installed in 480 Volt switch gear compartment, 3010.

Breaker 3023, Spare, has been removed and a metallic cover installed over ,

the opening. There is no open work request against.the breaker nor any abnormal or deficiency tags at the breaker cubicle. the breaker's present location is also unidentified.

Breaker 3019, Spare, has been removed and a metallic cover installed over the opening. There is no Abnormal Tag nor deficiency tags on the breaker cubicle. However, this breaker is installed in breaker location 3C23 by Abnormal Tag #5052.

Breaker 3E19, Power Panel S3P50, has been removed and tape is stretched ,

across the opening. There is no Abnormal Tag nor deficiency tag on the l breaker cubicle. However, this breaker is installed in breaker location j 3035 by Abnormal Tag #7833. Drawing E105 SH7 show a breaker installed in i 480 Volt switch gear compartment, 3E19. 1 Breaker 3B205, Spare, has been removed and a fiber board installed over the opening. There is no Abnormal Tag nor deficiency tag on the breaker cubicle. However, there is an open Work Request 133144 to repair the breaker.

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