ML20133A449

Notice of Violation from Insp on 960815-0903.Violation Noted:On 960814,vital Area Access Not Physically Controlled in That Positive Access Control Over Photobadge Keycards Compromised,Creating Opportunity for Unauthorized Access

ML20133A449
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	12/11/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133A446	List: IR 05000272/1996014 ML20133A449
References
50-272-96-14, 50-311-96-14, 50-354-96-08, 50-354-96-8, EA-96-344, NUDOCS 9612310097
Download: ML20133A449 (5)

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ENCLOSURE d

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Public Service Electric and Gas Company Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311, 50-354 Salem Nuclear Generation Station License Nos. DPR-70, DPR-75, NPF 57 Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station EA 96-344 1

During an NRC inspection conducted between August 15-September 3,1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure.for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:

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VIOLATIONS ASSESSED A civil PENALTY A.

License Condition 2.E of License Number NPF-57 for the Hope Creek facility, q

and License Conditions 2.E of License Numbers DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem, require thet PSE&G fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans approved by the Commission and all amendments and revisions to such plans made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) Salem - Hope Creek Security Plan, Revision 7, dated June 21,1996, states,in Section 5.6, " Access Control to Vital Areas" that " Vital area access is physically controlled by the 1

photobadge-keycard sy' tem which permits access into specific areas to persons s

i designated on the current access list contained in the system computers.

Positive access control is accomplished by [ Security Force Personnel) (SFP) prior to issuance of the photobadge keycard. Persons are positively identified by requiring them to request the badge by number, and visually, by comparing i

the picture to the person before issuing the keycard."

Contrary to the above, on August 14, 1996, vital area access was not physically controlled in that positive access control over photobadge keycards was compromised, thereby creating the opportunity for unauthorized access to the vital areas. Specifically, on that date, an NRC inspector identified that the lock mechanism on a door to one of the badge issue stations had been taped over, rendering the lock incapable of performing its locking function, and at the time, the badges were left unattended in the issue station, and no compensatory measures were in place for the inoperative lock to preclude an unauthorized individual from gaining access to the badges and the protected and vital areas. (01013)

This is a Severity Level 111 Violation (Supplement Ill).

Civil Penalty - $50,000.

9612310097 961211 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G

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B.

License Condition 2.E of License Number NPF-57 for the Hope Creek facility, and License Conditions 2.E of License Numbers DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem, require that PSE&G fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans approved by the Commission and all amendments and revisions to such plans made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

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The PSE&G Salem - Hope Creek Security Plan, Revision 7, dated June 21,1996, states, in Section 4.2.1.4, " Personnel Search and Access Control," that " Searches at the guardhouses are performed by locally alarming portal or hand-held metaland explosives detectors. When there is reasonable cause to suspect that a person is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other unauthorized material into the protected area, the person is given a physical pat-down search.

When the metal and/or explosives detectors are not in service and 4

operating in accordance with equipment test standards, physical pat-down searches are performed."

Contrary to the above, on August 26,1996, a contractor employee 1

entering the protected area caused two portal metal detectors to alarm on three different attempts to pass through them, and although these 4

alarms provided reasonable cause to suspect that the contractor was attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other unauthorized material into the protected area, no physical pat-down search was performed, and the contractor wc: given his photobadge-keycard and entered the protected area. (02013) 2.

The PSE&G Salem - Hope Creek Security Contingency Plan, Revision 4, dated February 12,1996, states, in part, in Section 8.1.3.2, that it will be assumed that a security threat exists until it is known otherwise.

Section 8.1.4 of the Contingency Plan defines an intruder as a person present in a protecteo or vital area without authorization. Section 8.3.2.6 of the Contingency Plan states that in the event of discovery of intruders or attack, notify the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) of implementation of Contingency Event 6 (Discovery of intruders), provide a concise situation report, and request SNSS to classify the event per l

the Event Classification Guide in Section 16.

Contrary to the above, on August 26,1996, a contractor who had alarmed the two portal metal detectors on three occasions, entered the protected area without receiving a pat-down search, was not authorized to enter the protected area without having received a search, and, i

therefore, should have been assumed to be an intruder and security threat until it was known otherwise; however, the SNSS was not notified of the threat, and the event was not classified per Event Classification Guide 16.(02023)

This is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement 111).

Civil Penalty - $50,000.

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Enclosure 3

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VIOLATIONS NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY i

A.

License Condition 2.E of License Number NPF-57 for the Hope Creek facility, i

and License Conditions 2.E of License Numbers DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem, i

j require that PSE&G fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the

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physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans approved by the Commission and all amendments and revisions to such plans made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

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The PSE&G Salem - Hope Creek Security Plan, Revision 7, dated l

June 19,1996, states, in part, in the introduction Section that the 1

implementing documents of this plan are the Security Plan Procedures j

l and Post Orders.

Security Plan Procedure 4, Revision 3, dated November 1,1994, states, in Section 4.13, that when a person granted j

i unescorted access terminates ernployment or no longer requires access l

to the site Protected Area, the cognizant department shall notify the l

t Screening Supervisor within two working days, and the Screening j

l Supervisor ensures that the administrative actions required to inactivate i

the security photobadge and personnel access clearance are accomplished.

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Contrary to the above, the Screening Supervisor was not notified within two working days that 12 employees had been terminated in June and i

j July 1996. Specifically, notification of five employees that were I

j terminated in June 1996 was not made until the 31-day revalidation list I

was issued in July 1996, and notification of seven employees that were i

terminated in July 1996 was not made until the 31-day revalidation list i

was issued in August 1996.(03014)'

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This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement Ill).

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The PSE&G Salem - Hope Creek Security Training and Qualification Plan, Revision 3, dated February 12,1996, Section 3.3, states, in part that, j

the qualification matrix identifies the courses of instruction by job l

classification, which each person shall pass in order to qualify for performance of related security duties. Section 3.8, titled, Supervisory Training, states that supervisors are required to qualify in all security force tasks.

i Critical Security Task No. 5, titled, " Conduct Patrols," states, in Element 05-A, that the examinee will demonstrate knowledge of the site by responding correctly to the location of several protected and vital area

alarms, 1

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Enclosure 4

j Contrary to the above, on August 20,1996, the inspectors determined by a review of training records and shift activity logs, that two supervisory personnel were performing Field Operations Supervisor duties prior to qualifying on all of the required critical security tasks for the performance of their related security duties. Specifically, the supervisors were signed off as qualified supervisors by the security i

training department and given a 90-day period to complete Element 05-A. However, during the 90-day period, the supervisors were assigned independent Field Operations Supervisor duties, to include contingency response coordination, requiring extensive knowledge of the protected and vital area alarm locations. (04014)

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement Ill).

3.

The PSE&G Salem - Hope Creek Security Plan, Revision 7, dated June 1996, states, in part, in the introduction Section, that the implementing documents of this plan are the Security Plan Procedures and Post Orders. Security Plan Procedure 8, Vehicle Access Control, Revision 8, dated February 28,1996, requires, in part, in Section 10, Use of Crane Gate, that the Security Shift Supervisor / designee direct that the zone be crawl tested after the vehicle passes and prior to securing the patrol.

This procedure further states, that the security force member (SFM) No.

1 shall remain posted at the gate until the zone passes the crawl test.

Contrary to the above, on June 5,1996, a vehicle passed through the Crane Gate, and a crawl test was not conducted prior to SFM 1 being released from the post. (05014)

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement Ill).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

If an adequate reply.s not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Informatiun may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.

Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

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Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the 4

Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the cumulative amount of the civil penalties, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer

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addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly l

marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation (s) listed in

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this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed, in addition i

to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, sucn answer may request remission or

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mitigation of the penalties.

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In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR.

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j 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to

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i 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee j

is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a i

civil penalties.

l Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due that subsequently have been determined in l

accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c.

.The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 i

Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 1, and a copy tn the NRC Senior Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.

Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent 1

possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so I

that it can be placed in the PDR. If redactions are required, a proprietary version containing brackets placed around the proprietary, privacy, and/or safeguards information should be submitted. In addition, a non-proprietary version with the information in the brackets redacted should be submitted to be placed in the PDR.

Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 11th day of December 1996 l

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