ML20213A127

Notice of Violation from Insp on 860813-0902.Violations Noted:Failure to Place Reactor Into Startup,Hot Shutdown or Cold Shutdown While Vacuum Breaker Assemblies & Acoustic Monitors Inoperable

ML20213A127
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	01/27/1987
From:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20213A118	List: ML20213A116 ML20213A127
References
50-354-86-41, 50-354-86-47, 50-354-86-50, EA-86-192, NUDOCS 8702030112
Download: ML20213A127 (2)

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION Public Service Electric and Gas Company Docket No. 50-354 Hope Creek Generating Station License No. NPF-57 EA 86-192 During a special NRC safety inspection conducted between August 13 and_

September 2, 1986, NRC inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with a violation of the plant's Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation involving the inoperability of the reactor building / suppression chamber vacuum relief system. During a subsequent routine NRC resident inspection conducted between September 9 and October 13, 1986, another viola-tion of the Technical Specifications was identified. In accordance with the

" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the particular violations are set forth below:

A. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.4.2 requires that whenever the reactor is in the power operatiori, startup, or hot shutdown condition, both reactor building / suppression chamber vacuum breaker assemblies consisting of a vacuum breaker valve and a butterfly isolation valve shall be operable and closed. Technical Specification LC0 3.0.3 requires that when a LCO is not met, except as provided in the associated action requirements, action shall be initiated within one hour to place the reactor into a condition in which the specification does not apply by placing the reactor into the startup condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, the hot shutdown condition within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and the cold shutdown condition within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, between June 28, 1986 and 11:45 a.m. on August 8, 1986, while the reactor was at various times in the power operation, startup or hot shutdown condition, both reactor building / suppression chamber vacuum breaker assemblies were inoperable, and during that time, the reactor was not placed into the startup, hot shutdown, or cold shutdown conditions within the time required by LCO 3.0.3. The vacuum breaker assemblies were inoperable in that differential pressure trans-mitters (DPT) sensing lines, which sense suppression chamber and reactor building relative pressure, were reversed when connected to the DPT. In this configuration, the butterfly valve, when required to open due to a vacuum in the suppression chamber, would actually have remained closed and, when required to remain closed on increasing suppression chamber pressure, would have opened.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

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Notice of Violation 2 B. Technical Specification LC0 3.3.7.5, and associated Table 3.3.7.5-1 for accident monitoring instrumentation, require that whenever the reactor is in the power operation, startup, or hot shutdown conditions, the required number of operable channels for safety / relief valve position indication shall be two for each valve, specifically, the acoustic monitor and tailpipe temperature.

The associated Technical Specification LCO Action Statement requires that with the number of operable accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the required number of channels (2) for any valve, the inoper-able channel shall be restored to an operable status within 7 days, or the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, between June 28 and September 11, 1986, while the reactor was at various times in either the power operations, hot standby or hot shutdown conditions, all acoustic monitors on all safety relief valves were inoperable and du~ ring that time, the reactor was not placed in the hot shutdown or cold shutdown condition in the time required by the LC0 Action Statement. The acoustic monitors were inoperable in that their power supply was not uninterruptable; the monitors would not have functioned in the event of a loss of offsite power.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 C.F.R. S 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to this Office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice.

This reply, should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, if admitted, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

Oriciral signed by Ecras E. Murley Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this day of January 1987.

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