IR 05000272/1985009

Safety Insp Repts 50-272/85-09 & 50-311/85-11 on 850406- 0506.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observations,Surveillance Observations & Review of Special Repts

ML20128F033
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/16/1985
From:	Limroth D, Limrroth D, Norholm L, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128F009	List: IR 05000272/1985009 ML20128F006
References
50-272-85-09, 50-272-85-9, 50-311-85-11, NUDOCS 8505290542
Download: ML20128F033 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

050311-850329 Report No /85-09 050311-850413 50-311/85-11 050311-850417 050311-850423

' Docket No ' License No OPR-70 DPR-75 Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: April 6, 1985 - May 6, 1985 Inspectors: T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector R. J. Summers, Resident Inspector Reviewed by: A.u d J. M . 63 0. F Litiihth, Project Engineer date R c,or Prd.jects Sec ton No. 1, DRP Approved By: A 6 L.J.Norrholm, Chief,ReactorProjects date'

S'ection No. 28, DRP Inspection Summary:

Inspections on April 6, 1985 - May 6, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-09 and 50-311/85-11 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including:

operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, review of special reports, NRC senior inspector, licensee event report followup and survey of licensees response to selected ;

safety issues. The inspection involved 82 inspector hours by the '

resident NRC inspector Results: There were no violations in this report. A concern with regard to operations and lack of supervisory oversight has been addressed by the inspector and the licensee and is described in section 2.c.2.c of this repor PDR ADOCK 05000272 G PDR l

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within.this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit . ' Operational Safety Verification Selected Operators' Logs

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Senior Watch Supervisors (SWS) Log

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Jumper Log

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Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)

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Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP's)

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Selected Chemistry Logs

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Selected Tagouts

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Health Physics Watch Log The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible.) During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, foremen, supervisors, and plant management. The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1) On a daily basis, particular attention was directed in the following areas:

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Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;

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Adherence to LC0's directly observable from the control room;

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Proper control room, shift manning and access control;

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Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm;

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Proper use of procedures;

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Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and,

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Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio .

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(2) On a. weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:

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Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions;

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Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions;

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Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications;

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Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operable conditions; and,

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Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit Systems Inspected:

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Safety Injection (Unit 1)

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Diesel Generators (Unit 1)

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Hydrogen Recombiners (Unit 2)

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Containment Spray (Unit 2)

(3) On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:

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Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system;

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Observed a shift turnover; ,

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Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents;

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Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;

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Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented;

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Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and,

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Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu p:

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4 Inspector Comments / Findings:

.The. inspectors selected phases of the units' operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulations. -The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not consti-tute a health and safety hazard _to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth: Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period, with the exception of minor power reductions to perform sur-veillance testin . Unit 2 began this report period in Mode 3 with Tavg at 458 degrees F and a heatup in progress. When the unit reached operating temperature, the licensee began experiencing difft-culties with the steam generator code safeties. The safeties were lifting'too early on #22 Steam Generator. Subsequently, the licensee determined that they were probably set too early in the heatup and not given a chance to equalize in temperature, The licensee closed the reactor trip breaker April 10 and the physics testing program was started on April 11. The unit was brought critical and physics testing continued until April 1 Shortly after synchronizing to the bus on April 13, the unit tripped due to low steam generator level with steam flow / feed flow mismatch. The trip was caused by mainte-nance work being performed on the steam flow instrument After completing the necessary maintenance, the unit was returned to servic The unit reached 25% power when a power reduction was initiated because of increasing temperatures on the thrust bearing of #22 Steam Generator feedwater pump. The turbine was manually tripped with the unit below P-10, and the unit remained critical. Due to the rapid load change and the steam dumps cycling, steam generator water levels began to cycl The operator placed the steam dump in the pressure control mode and began to increase reactor power to stabilize the steam generator water level transient At this time, steam generator atmospheric relief valves began to open but steam generator pressure continued to rise, and the steam generator code safeties lifted. The operator began to ramp down the setpoint of the steam dumps while another operator was manipulating control rods to control Tavg. The results, due to the delay in interaction between steam generator pressures and the primary tempera-ture effect caused by the movement of control rods, caused

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the pressure transients that lifted the relief valve During the event the automatic pressurizer spray valve failed to operate causing the Primary Pressure Operated Relief Valve to lift. The primary pressure transient, was terminated by the operator taking manual control of the pressurizer spray valve. The noteworthy contributions to this event that caused transients of both primary and secondary system are:

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Lack of coordination between the operator who was operating the steam plant and the operator adjusting control rods in the reactor. (No positive supervisory oversight)

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Failure of automatic spray syste The licensee has taken corrective action as follows:

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The senior licensed operators on duty have been counseled as to their role during operations with more than one board operato The licensed operators who were manipulating controls have been counseled as to better communications between themselves while performing siaultaneous operation The entire scenario has been entered into the training system (simulator) for all shifts to experienc The automatic spray controller was repaired and returned to servic d. The unit was returned to service on April 17. At 17% power the unit automatically tripped due to low-low water level in #24 Steam Generator. Feedwater controls were in auto-matic and #21 Steam Generator feedwater pump began to lose speed due to water entering the steam generator feedwater pump turbine as a result of a plugged steam trap on the steam supply line. The main generator breaker failed to open within the 30 seconds as designed and the operators opened them manually. The cause of the main generator breaker failure was attributed to a failed relay in the exciter field circuitry. After repairs, the unit was returned to service on April 1 e. On April 23 the unit tripped due to " Turbine trip and P-7".

The cause of the turbine trip was low auto stop oil pressure which occurred while shifting main lube oil coolers. At first the licensee could not determine the

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cause of the low auto stop oil pressure because the transfer of lube oil coolers is continuous and no inter-ruption of pressure should occu It was-subsequently discovered, with the introduction of a small amount of air into the cooler to be placed in service, that the momentary low auto stop oil pressure can be duplicated. This has been demonstrated by the licensee. On April 24 the unit was returned to servic The licensee had been experiencing alignment problems on

1. 22 Steam Generator feedwater pump until May 2 when align-ment problems had been corrected and the unit began escala--

tion of power to continue post refueling physics testin On May 2 the unit tripped automatically as a result of a turbine trip on " generator loss of voltage / loss of field."

This turbine trip is initiated by the activation of two relays in series. The first, a " loss of field relay," was determined by the licensee to have been wired improperly during the recent generator replacement. The second relay,

" loss of voltage," was energized as a result of a loose wire causing the relay to see an artificial low voltag The licensee is continuing to investigate the reasons for the relay problem The report period ends with the unit at 100% power and the physics testing complete No violations were identifie . Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to servic . Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in progress surveil-lance as well as completed surveillance packages. The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee-approved procedures and NRC regulations. The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance _

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The inspector paid particular attention to the review of the surveillances which were performed to return Unit.2 to service:following the refueling outage. The inspector concluded that all surveillances were performed in accordance with approved procedure ,

No violations were identifie . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspectors reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting.information consistent with design-predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informa-tion. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

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Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - March 1985

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Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - March 1985 NRC Senior Resident Inspector On April 21, 1985 the new Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Thomas J. Kenny assumed the duties, pursuant to the title. Mr. Kenny was the Senior Resident at Indian Point Units 2 and . ' Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LER to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate ' corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-dance with Technical Specification Unit 2 85-003 Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Channel II Indications This report detailed the actuation of the Pressurizer Overpressure Pro-tection System Channel II, when a reactor coolant pump was started, while in Mode 5, with the reactor coolant pressure at 325 psig. The event occurred twice and both times the pressure of the reactor coolant system did not exceed 380 psig, but the relief valve lifted at 360 psi Technical Specifications requires the relief setting of the channel to be equal to or less than 375 psig and the minimum pressure for starting reactor coolant pumps is 325 psig. This pressure channel is controlled by the 0-3000 psig transmitter of the reactor coolant system and the tole-rance of 2% i (15 psig) is within the tolerance of the equipmen Therefore the lift setpoint of 360 psig was within the tolerance of 375 psig setting. The operating procedures provide the operator with suffi-cient guidance for action during the filling and venting evolutio ___

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However, the licensee has modified another procedure " Reactor Coolant Pump Operations" to caution operators to the increased likelihood of a Pres-surizer.0verprotection Protection System actuation during the, starting.of l reactor coolant pump No' violations were identifie . Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues

~ ~The resident inspector conducted an inspection to accumulate the necessary information to complete Attachments I and=II to this report. The subjects of .the inspection were " Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps" and

"Mispositioned Control Rod." The_ inspector concluded that the licensee has taken the appropriate actions to these two events and no items of concern were identifie .3 Exit Interview-At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and

' findings. An' exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period. The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia * . .,

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SURVEY OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSE

. TO SELECTED SAFETY ISSUES ATTACHMENT 1, 2515/67-03.02a Plant'Name and Unit OAisiA l)otTs Ib i Item 03.02a. Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Is the discharge or the suction piping of the auxiliary feedwater pumps hot? ,

O , Is the' licensee monitoring and recording the temperature of the auxiliary feedwater system piping once per shift to detect back leakage? If not, how frequently?

O 3 Is temperature readout local or in control room?

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- 3 What is the method of monitoring AFW piping temperature? (For example: touching pipe, temperature sensing tape, or pyrometer)

Toocainc Is the licensee monitoring the temperature of the auxiliary feed-water system piping after each operation of a pump to detect back leakage?

kn S Did the licensee determine that procedural changes were needed to assure check valve seating when securing the auxiliary feedwater system?

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S Have the changes been made?

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s YOS 6 Have procedural guidance and training in identifying back leakage and returning the system to operability been provided?

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SURVEY OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSE ATTACHMENT 1, 2515/67-03.02.6b TO SELECTED SAFETY ISSUES 6 Provide a brief summary description of procedural corrective

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actions (For example, vent and flush).

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7 Is the licensee performing periodic leakage tests of the check

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valves (or isolation valves if normally closed) in the auxiliary feedwater discharge line? How frequently?

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7 Is the licensee performing periodic inspections of the check valves (or isolation valves if normally closed) in the auxiliary feedwater discharge line? How frequently?

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alternate reason or justification?

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SURVEY OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSE ATTACHMENT 2, 2515/67-03.0 TO SELECTED SAFETY ISSUES ;

Unit b4LFAA (h.)lTS I h, "2

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Item 03.02b Mispositioned Control Rod

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' (PWR) Do procedures define the steps necessary for recovery from a mispositioned rod?

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' (PWR) Are procedures implemented for verifying rod position when one form of normal indications is lost?

Vas (BWR) Are procedural requirements implemented for written instruc-tions, management concurrence, and briefing of operations personnel if a nuclear engineer is not required to be present during scheduled control rod movements?

l} (BWR), Are procedures which identify the conditions under which the rod worth minimizer (RWM) may be bypassed implemented? (BWR) Do procedures prohibit the use of scram timing equipment except in testing and emergen,cies?

A (BWR) Do procedures contain guidelines on the appropriate use of the " emergency-in" mode of rod insertion and the notch override switch in continuous' withdrawal?

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A (ALL) Has training been provided for operators in the proper move-ment of control rods, the consequences of improper movement, and the consequences of operating with a mispositioned rod? [BWRs only] Has training been provided the operators on the function of the RWM, rod sequence control system, and the scram test switches?

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Issue Date: -04/08/85 A2-1 i

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. SURVEY OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSE

.TO SELECTED SAFETY ISSUES ATTACHMENT 2, 2515/67-03.02c8 8.- For.any items which are not implemented, does the licensee have an alternate reason or justification?

OA If so, provide a brief descriptio L. ,

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A2-2 Issue Date: 04/08/85 +